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INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
The problems: Just after tlie medieval era in tlie 16"' centiuy Machiavclli, the father of modern 
political thought, gave the concept of nationalism. Side by side renaissance brought the 
freedom of individuality i.e. the confidence of autonomous individuality. Following this path 
in the post-French revolution period the nationalist stale thought was nourished. In the 
interest of nationalist states at this time liberalism and democratic thought also came together 
grasping each other's hands. Democracy provides the right to the people to elect their head of 
the state. In this electioneering process the political party system is must. In both of the 
democratic and authoritarian system of the modem state concept there is difference in the role 
of the political parties but in both of the governing system political parties occupy very 
important positions. 
Many countries of the world got independence from colonialist rulers through 
discussion and mutual understanding. But unlike those the situation of Bangladesh was 
different. Bangladesh had to achieve the freedom through a bloody liberation struggle. In the 
post liberation struggle of Bangladesh the communication system was destroyed, the trade and 
industry was shattered. The law and order situation also collapsed. The national and 
international anti-liberation forces were vindictive. There was scarcity of food. To overcome 
this national crisis there was the need of strong unity/ solidarity in the then single dominant 
governing party Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) leadership. But the practical problems 
arising out of factionalism and splits in Awami League, in this period of national crisis, 
created a crisis in providing an effective government. As a result in the one hand this 
disorderly and unstable situation played an important role in the changing over of political 
power in 1975 through a bloody military coup. On the other hand the other political parties, 
already became weak due to factionalism and split and could not play any decisive role to 
avoid this adverse consequence. As a result in the next 25 years the countiy had to suffer the 
autocratic rule of the military regimes; the people were deprived of the democratic rights. Till 
the last of 1990 the country could not escape itself from the tyranny of the military regime, as 
the political parties could not give proper leadership to the people for a successful democratic 
movement. One of the main reasons of the failure of the major opposition parties to give 
leadership to a successful anti-military regime movement to establish democracy was that 
they were drenched in internal infightings and splits. Even in the post 1990 period the 
governments led by AL and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) also experienced the lack of 
effective governance due to the factionalism in their party folds. 
The history of political parties in the country has been that of their formation, split and 
reformation. There is uncountable numbers of political parties in Bangladesh. BAL, BNP, 
Jatia Party (JP), Jammat e Islami (JI) are the prominent among them. The methods of the 
formation of the political parties in this country are different from the thinking of modem 
democratic states. Here in the formation of the political parties there is little presence of 
theoretical framework. Many parties don not have constitution and manifesto. In developed 
countries as parties are well organized and consensus on value system always prevails, 
factional disputes are usually settled within the party. The party system of UK and USA are 
the best examples. Even in the socialist countries, where the production relations are 
socialistic and there is the principle of'democratic centralism' within the party stmcture, 
factionalism does occur but the party has its own mechanism to minimize its impact. But 
unlike the developed countries Bangladesh 'faction management' is rather unusual. Here 
factional disputes often led to party splits and the formation of separate parties. The result is 
that most of the groups calling themselves political parties are not well-knitted and organized 
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up to the grassroots level. The main problems in the political development of the country are 
the internal parly factionalism, lack of tolerance ol'thc parties towards each other, the unjust 
military interference in politics, the emergence of uncountable number of small political 
parties and lack of political consciousness among the masses. All the parties are more or less 
devoured with factional conflicts. Due to the intra-party conflicts day-by-day mass-based and 
influential political parties lost their dynamism or became inactive. Many former mass-based 
and power^l political parties like NAP and CPB became obsolete. In the place of few strong 
mass-based political parties the mushroom growth of many personality-based political parties 
took place - which don't have any support base in tlie masses. These parties only divided the 
public opinion into several fractions. It manifested the unprecedented degree of factionalism 
in Bangladesh. Today there is hardly any political party in Bangladesh, which has not been 
affected by feud and factionalism. This phenomenon has led to a continuing instability in the 
politics of Bangladesh. As a result, even after thirty years of independence, Bangladesh is 
facing hurdles in giving institutional shape to democracy; the country is lagging far behind to 
provide a stable party system - which is the cherished dream of the people. Political 
development and establishment of democracy depends on the establishment of strong party 
system and few well-organized political parties in a coimtry. The socio-economic 
development of a country mostly depends on political development and proper growth of 
democracy in a country. As due to the intra-party and inter-party conflict, proper political 
development could not take place in Bangladesh because of this the socio-economic 
development of the country is also hindered - still maximum people of the country are living 
below poverty level. Thus understanding the pattern of factionalism is vital for critical 
appraisal for the political process and political development in the country. Unlike the parties 
of the modem states as Bangladesh is not the unique example of faction-ridden politics, the 
nature and sources of factionalism needed to be understood in her own context. 
These problems deserve careful study by the political theorists. The cause of conflicts, 
historical perspectives of factionalism, documental evidence of the political parties successes 
and failures through time and finally its potentials of their stability in future with and without 
factionalism have to be studied and findings drawn. The results of the study shall give a scope 
for the policy makers in the political parties to formulate future mitigation plans if they have 
to live with factionalism. Since it is not possible now- a-days to avoid factionalism completely 
due to the differences of opinion regarding policy, principle, international relations, 
regionalism etc, cause of factionalism on the surface need to be discovered. But the deep roots 
of factionalism, if any have to be identified. 
The reasons of selecting AL for the study: The most significant development in the East 
Pakistan was the emergence of the AL party and it's espousing of Bengali nationalism, which 
led the way to the independence of Bangladesh. In the Bangladesh political arena, the party 
also played a dominant role to establish the people's right. In different times engaged in anti-
autocratic movement to establish democratic right. With the popular mandate it governed the 
countiy for two terms. After the formation of AL, like all other mass-based political parties, it 
was organized v^th branches and ancillary bodies. Even now it maintains its strong 
organizing base throughout the country. Unity in diversity is the beauty of mass-based 
political parties. The AL developed as a broad- based political party with diverse elements 
joining hands together ostensibly for serving the national cause. Due to the heterogeneous 
characteristics of its leadership and workers group and other different reasons the party in it's 
over 50 year bumpy journey along the rough terrain of Bangladesh politics has suffered 
factional conflict and splits repeatedly. No other party in Bangladesh suffered as much splits 
as AL. Even then its inner conflict among the leaders and workers did not frustrate the higher 
political objective of offering the best leadership in the country. Still AL remained the most 
dynamic party having most experienced and talented leaders in its party fold. Its sheer 
capacity to survive historical difficulties and jump back to the centre stage is what makes the 
party significant. Now in Bangladesh it is the oldest and largest dominant political party. 
There is no such party in Bangladesh, which does have glorious history in realizing people's 
right. The case study of AL can provide excellent example/ empathy of the party factionalism 
of Bangladesh. 
This study carries an importance in finding the strength and weakness of AL under 
factional scenario with various options of risky variables. The cause of conflicts, historical 
perspectives of factionalism, documental evidence of AL's successes and failures through 
time and the possibility of its stability in politics having with factionalism in its irmer-body is 
discussed carefiilly in this study. The results of the study shall give a scope for the policy 
makers in AL to formulate future mitigation plans if they have to live with factionalism. This 
study will also explore an opportunities for other political parties of Bangladesh for reviewing 
their perspectives in the light of the recommendation of this study. This will have a great 
bearing on the sustainability of party politics under the peaceful domain of the young coimtry 
like Bangladesh. 
To know the changing characteristics of party factionalism in Bangladesh since its 
emergence there is a need of thorough study of factional politics. By a partial study it is not 
totally possible to know the reasons of intra-party factionalism of Bangladesh. The reasons 
working behind the selection of the period 1P71 to 1997 are: (i) During 1971-83 ideology was 
playing a very important role in the infighting within the AL; but after the fall of socialism, 
ideology does not play any decisive role in the factional politics of Bangladesh, (ii) The 
characteristic socio-economic background etc of the party leadership of the post-independent 
AL and the present politicians are not the same and these things inflict in factional politics, 
(iii) During 1971-75 Mujib was the towering figure of AL; he was the charismatic and 
unchallengeable leader. After the death of Mujib the party failed to select a unanimous leader 
fi-om the prominent elites. To fill the leadership vacuum though S. Hasina was made the party 
chief but she could not earn respects like her father. Still she is surviving on Mujib's 
charisma. Naturally the characteristics of the factional conflict inside AL in these three times 
are different, (iv) In the independent Bangladesh for about 21 years AL was in opposition. 
The party was also in power for two terms during 1972-75 and 1996-2001. The factional 
behaviors of different groups, working in AL, when it was in power and when it was out of 
power were not the same, (v) During 1971 liberation war in the absence of Mujib, there was 
leadership conflict in AL. At that time India was playing the mediator role to reduce the 
differences. During 1972-75 there was conflict among the party leaders to ensure their second 
position after Mujib; all were busy to have the blessing of Mujib. After the death of Mujib 
there was uncompromising attitude among the factional leaders to resolve the differences, 
which introduced the hereditary leadership in AL. After taking over the party president-ship 
Hasina had to fight with some of the top party leaders to secure her position. To know the 
changing trends of factionalism, changing behavior of faction leaders of AL, a study of AL 
politics during 1971 to 1997 is essential. In its over 50 year bumpy journey it has suffered 
factional conflict and splits of different nature/ character repeatedly. The study of AL can give 
a precise conception on factionalism of the political parties of Bangladesh, (vi) The focus on 
the factionalism in AL ending with the latest information, which the researcher hopes, will 
serve as a ready reference on this topic. 
Review of relevant literature: Political literature on the internal factionalism of the political 
parties in Bangladesh has been limited and specific research dissertations on the subject are 
almost few and far between. Political scientists and practitioners have contributed from time 
to time to this factional aspect of political parties in Bangladesh. For example 'The Era of 
Sheikh Mujib' and 'Democracy and The Challenge of Development' written by Moudud 
Ahmed, 'Political Elites in Bangladesh' of Rangalal Sen, 'Some Memorable incidents relating 
to Bangabandhu sheikh Mujib and Bangladesh' and 'Politics and Government of Bangladesh' 
written by M.A. Wajed Miah, 'General Ziaur Rahman and The BNP' written by Golam 
Hossain, 'Politics and Political Parties of Bangladesh' written by Amzad Hossain, 
'Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues' of Rounaq Jahan and 'The Memories of 
Liberation war' written by Amir-Ul-Huq etc are worth mentioning. But the deliberations 
made in these literatures are not entirely on the factionalism of political parties. These have 
reflected on factional aspects of political parties as when the authors felt necessity in order to 
justify their statements. 
Political literatures regarding factionalism are also available in political journals 
published from time to time. These publications are also not sufficiently resourcefiil to 
analyze the causes and consequences of factionalism in political parties. So the main frame of 
political literature comprising factional politics within the party system of the country has 
been more or less absent. 
However Profssor Abdul Wadud Bhuyan's article "Bangladesh Politics: Internal Party 
Split and Factionalism" published in Indian Political Science Review has some bearing on 
political factionalism in Bangladesh. In this small but well disseminated literature Prof. 
Bhuyan has tried to analyze factionalism in the context of its origin and nature with respect of 
AL. He has discussed the party splits and factionalism within AL up to 1975. In doing so he 
has identified some personalities in AL who have not been looked upon as the determining 
factors causing factionalism in AL. The author might of course have his resources to make 
them responsible for factionalism but the analysis is given in the article is not elaborate 
enough to establish them as the agents of factionalism. These deserve further insights and 
political analysis. The other limitations of the literature have been observed as follows: (a) A 
critical context of factionalism in AL emerged during the war of independence in 1971; (b) 
The reasons for factions within student front and other front organizations of AL have been 
kept out of the analytical framework; (c) Limited discussions about the role of non AL agents 
entering into AL in bringing about factionalism; (d) Absence of analysis of characters of 
political personalities in AL while describing factionalism cause by those persons; (e) the 
analysis has been kept limited only up to 1975. A lot of reasons are there for factional politics 
within AL arising after 1975. The later developments of factionalism are more critical and 
interesting than the previous factional context; (f) Professor Bhuyan's literature concludes 
with political optimism about factions but during discussions about activities of contemporary 
political parties (for example - CPB, NAP, BNP, BAKSAL and other factions of AL), the 
author has necessarily reduced this scope to the general context, composition and impacts of 
factionalism. 
Methodology of the study: The methodology followed for the study is primarily a 
combination of historical and empirical methods. The researcher has consulted source 
material available in Bengali as well as in English. The researcher collected materials from 
the records in the party office and government publication. The researcher has also collected 
from primary source in the form of interviews of the former leaders (old and retired from 
active politics) and also of those who are leading the party at present. Including these the 
research scholar has also undertaken interviews of prominent intellectuals and journalists of 
Bangladesh. Data from the secondary source also comprise of press clippings, daily and 
weekly newspapers, various research papers on the subject published in academic journals, 
books and from the biography of political leaders of the country. 
Objective of the study: 
1. To take cognizance of the political context of the political parties of Bangladesh. 
2. To define and analyze factionalism in political parities, particularly in the AL. 
3. To draw factional relationship between political stability and factionalism in the 
context of AL in particular and other parties in general. For the greater interest of 
development of politics, stabilizing democratic institutions and protecting political 
parties from deterioration and decay. 
4. To identify the present splits in the political parties and investigate into their causes. 
5. To suggest measures to mitigate or reduce factionalism to the minimum for a healthy 
political atmosphere in the country. 
Factionalism: An Analytical Frame Work 
• The Structure of Faction and Factionalism. 
Factionalism in politics is a universal phenomenon. In fact they are the two sides of 
the same coin and one without the other cannot exist. Mao Tse-tung admitted in his speeches 
to the Eleventh Plenum of the central committee on august 13, 1966:' 
"Do we have a party outside our party? I think we do and that we have factions inside 
the party. We used to criticize the Kuomintang, who said, no party outside the party is 
autocracy; no factions inside the party is nonsense. This applied to us. You may say 
that there are no factions in our party, but there are." 
Though it is very difficult to give specific definition on faction or factional politics, 
the problem of factionalism has been the subject of good deal of recent theoretical treatment. 
Several detail research work of different political and social scientists have been recently 
published in shaping the meaning of factional politics. The term faction has generally been 
used to refer to 'social groups' of varying complexities characterized by opposition to other 
groups in a society. It has been used in a variety of contradictory ways by social scientists. We 
shall consider different definitions of factions and factionalism given by different social 
scientists to understand the meaning of factionalism in the perspectives of 'Political Parties'. 
The term factional politics has generally been used by the political scientists to an internal 
conflict of different groups within a political organization. Here faction is used as the sub-unit 
of one big political organization. 
Politics in Indian sub-continent generally and in Bangladesh in particular are drawn in 
intense intra-party factionalism. Observing this Sission commented that,^ "political parties are 
the system of conflict and that the party is a conflict oriented institution." 
According to Harold D. Lasswell 'faction means any constitutional group of a large 
unit which works for the advancement of particular persons or politics'^. 
Ralph W. Nicholas, an US scholar, regards factionalism as primarily a political 
activity or phenomenon. By 'political activity' he means organized conflict over public 
1. Y.C. Chang, Factional and Coalition Politics in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Aftermath, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), P. 12. 
2. Richard Sisson, The Congress Party in Rajastan, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.7-11. 
3. Harold D. Lasswell, "Faction" in Encyclopedia of Social Science; eds Edwin R. A. Selingmam amd Alvin 
Johnson, (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1931), p.49. 
power. Power has control over resources, whether human or material. According to him 
participants in political activity attempt to expand their control over resources, or if they do 
not, they are not engaged in political action. He again says, "factions accordingly take on 
characteristics of political parties: 'progressive' and 'conservative' factions purport to 
represent distinct interests within the public rather than the interest of their leadership. To the 
extent the factions become means of'interest articulation', they become functionally different 
from one another. The taking of socially approved names by factions is often 'window 
dressing', designed to create a favorable impression in politics where parties have an 
established position. So long as an arena is organized by groups whose predominant 
characteristics is factional, I shall refer to it as having a segmentary factional political 
system"'*. 
Jones defines factionalism as a collection of individuals within an organization or 
institution who operate together in politics long enough, or with sufficient regularly to 
become recognized as a discrete group . 
Myron Weiner designates factions as a group with an articulated set of goals, 
operating within a large organization but not created by or with the approval of the party . 
While describing factions in the Congress Party of Rajasthan Richard Sisson 
maintained that a "faction is defined as any intra-party grouping or clique which is relatively 
permanent, whose members conceive themselves as being a part of a particular intra-party 
group which acts collectively in the selection of formal political leadership; both 
organizational and legislative parties^. 
B.K. Nagla's observation that, "factions arise through struggle for competition for 
power resulting in control over official and unofficial positions". He also maintains, "factions 
have at least three aspects: recruitment, activity and duration".^ 
Paul R. Brass has observed that the main sources of factionalism in a political party 
are power and prestige. He also maintained that, "The strength and cohesiveness of faction 
depends very heavily upon the ability of the leader to distribute material benefits to his 
followers. Very often faction leaders — bring private resources into local politics to build 
and maintain political support.^ 
Thus by contradicting the widespread feeling that politicians are involve in factional 
conflict motivated only by personal gain and that ideology is ignored where such selfish 
interests are concerned, Carass claimed that, "ideological preferences do play a role in 
political behavior in so far as they are interlinked with considerations of interests"'®. She 
further asserted that, "factionalism is not determined by 'irrational' (i.e. emotional) and often 
4. According toNicholas, segments are also exclusive: one may not be affiliated with two factions in the same 
political arena at the same time. See Ralph W. Nicholas,'Segmentary Factional Political System' in the Political 
Anthropology; edited by Marc J. Swartz, Victor W. Turner and Arthur Tuden, (Chicago: ALDINE Publishing 
Company, 1966), pp.52-53. 
5. Rodney W. Jones, Urban Politics in India: Area, Power and Policy in a Pane treated System, (Berkely: 
University of California Press, 1974), p.71, 
6. Myron Weiner, Party Politics in India: Development of Multiparty System, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1958), p.237 
7.Richard Sission, The Congress Party in Rajastan, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.207-08. 
8. B.K. Nagla, Factionalism Politics and Social Structure, (Jaipur: Radical Publications, 1984), p.5. 
9. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State: The Congress Party in Uttar Pradesh, (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1965), pp. 138 and 135. 
10. Marry C. Carras, The Dynamics of Indian Political Factionalism: A Study of District Councils in the State of 
Maharashtra, (Bombay: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 185. 
unpredictable personal loyalties based on tlie charisma of a leader or on feelings of loyalty 
evoked by cast and community ties or by family links"." 
Nicholas, in another book, regards a faction as a kind of political process. In his 
comparative analysis of five case studies of factions he observed five characteristics of 
factions:'^ 
• Factions are conflicting groups. 
• Factions are political groups. 
• Factions are not corporate groups. 
• Faction members are recruited by a larger. And 
• Faction members are recruited on diverse principles. 
By analyzing the interpretation of different scholars we may claim that, "Factionalism 
is a intra-group phenomenon. In the context of political parties factionalism refers to the 
conflict and competition between or among several groups to capture the party organization or 
to control the personnel and politics of the party". The objectives of such conflicts are always 
power and prestige. Factional politics itself opened a style of politics that is conflicting, 
complex, and unprincipled and consists of highly unpredictable political behavior. 
We may distinguish factions from the parties. Factions are not parties rather factions 
are the sub-units or smaller groups of a large political organization/ party created neither with 
the approval nor with the concern of the party. Two political parties are not factions whereas 
two groups in a political party are factions. A faction germinates at the advancement of a 
political leader who, in search of avenues to capture political power or to control politics of 
the party mobilizes the support of various likeminded persons within a party or within the 
same organization. Structurally factions are operated in a relatively narrow political arena 
within which there is fragmentation of power among the contending leaders. Usually a faction 
is less structured than an organization, but more uniformed and cohesive than the original 
group and thus has more unity of interest and action till the target is articulated. Factions 
appear to be stable and string as long as it maintains both power and popularity among the 
masses and continue to satisfy its followers by various means. Factions may be informal and 
impermanent and their members are recruited on diverse principles. Unlike political parties 
factions are not co^orate groups, as they do not continue for long and do not have fixed 
structural proprieties. The continuity of factions depends upon the nature and continuance of 
conflict; the resolution of disputes results in the disappearance of factions. Unlike structural 
units of a society factions do not have a permanent membership. Their membership depends 
upon the activity of their leaders as well as on the ability of the leaders to provide benefits to 
his supporters in exchange for political support they give him in critical periods. Hence 
factions are unstable. They are not legitimate in the sense that they do not have formal rules. 
They organize themselves and compete for power according to informal rules. This means 
that organizationally factions are based on 'articulated goals' resulting in shifting coalitions of 
component segments and irrational shifts in the balance of power within the party. 
In another place Lasswell defines a faction as "Any constituent group of a large unit 
which works for the advancement of particular persons or politics".According to Lasswell, 
factions are mutually opposed not only in their struggle for political power but also in several 
other non-political spheres as well. These groups may stand in a relationship of total 
11. Ibid. p. 184. 
12. Ralph W, Nicholas, 'Factions: A Comparative Analysis' in the Political System and Distribution of Power; 
edited by Ralph. W. Nicholas, (London: Tavistock Publications, 1963), p.42-46. 
opposition to each other.Contrary to Lasswell in some cases it was seen that in the multi-
factional conflict of a party, small factions are forming coalition against the dominating one or 
small factions are forming coalitions with the major two rival factions to survive in politics-
when they were being assured that their interests would be fulfilled. So we may argue that 
though major factions are usually oppose each other in their struggle but small factions, for 
their convenience, for a certain issue may form temporary coalition with any of the big one 
for the time being. Even in some cases it was seen that the small factions were merged 
permanently with the bigger one. However, Lasswell defines three aspects of factionalism: 
recruitment, activity and duration. 
Factions may be distinguished from influential groups by having their members in 
parliament and in local governing bodies. They may be distinguished from pressure group 
because they are concerned with a range of political interests. 
Factionalism runs vertically in either way i.e. up and down the ladder. It may nm from 
top to bottom or from bottom to top. If there is conflict in a political party, it would penetrate 
to its lower units like district units, sub-district units etc. The factional leaders at central level 
would tend to mobilize resources and support not only at the central level but also at the lower 
levels. Factionalism may also run in the reverse gear. If a village unit of the Awami League 
(AL), for example, suffers from factionalism the leaders of rival groups would tend to win the 
support of the leaders placed at the higher level of the party. Rarely, the party at a higher-level 
rung of the ladder split due to the split at a lower point of the ladder. But if already, there were 
divisions in the party at the higher-level, the lower level split of the party would mesh in with 
the higher-level split. 
Factionalism also flows over horizontally. Every political party in Bangladesh has got 
different ancillary organizations meant to perform different flmctions and they have some 
linkage-direct or indirect- with the power structure of the party. Thus when a factional conflict 
starts in the AL party it would not only remain long confined to main body of the party. It is 
bound to spread sooner or later, to the other organizations of the party. For example its effect 
would spread to the workers union, students organization, peasant organizations, lawyers' 
association or women organizations, which are affiliated to the party. 
•Characteristics of Factional Conflict. 
The characteristic of factional conflict covers the causes of factionalism, the social 
compositions of factions and the ties that bind leaders and followers. 
The Causes of Factionalism: Factional politics may develop in a party due to different 
social and political causes. Paul R. Brass has observed that the main sources of factionalism in 
a political party are power and prestige'''. Power, no doubt is the most powerful motivating 
factor of generation of grouping in a political party. Important political leaders, in their 
pursuit of power for garnering perceived benefits, seek to dominate the party by organizing 
groups consisting of their own supporters and tend to use these groups to calm down the rival 
groups within their party and to bring the party under their complete control. In addition to 
power, prestige also plays an important role in the formation of factions. An old political 
leader or an ex-ruler now may not have any obsession for power but he still is cautious to 
maintain the flow of his social prestige undisturbed more than capturing power. By the feeling 
of insecurity of his prestige from the rival group same politician may engage in forming his 
13. Harold D. Lasswell, 'Factions" in Encyclopedia of Social Science, Vol. 5, (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1937), p.49. 
14. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian State, op.cit. p.237. 
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own group or may join a dominating faction in the party. Some times when an important 
leader of a party feels offended that he is not accorded due weight in the party or the party 
takes some steps which are against his own interest or wishes, his vanity would be wounded; 
and he would be impelled to throw challenge to the ruling elite of the party. This challenge 
may result in the birth of factionalism. It should be mentioned here that though there is a 
difference between prestige and power but these are not separable. In maximum cases prestige 
and power are convertible. 
Difference of overall ideology and programs among the party leaders, in a nationalist 
party, are also the reasons behind the factional groupings. Moreover, factional conflict may 
occur on the difference of specific issues among the leaders; may be the issue is related to 
making new laws in the parliament or related to decision making process of the party or of the 
government. Here the unity of the faction is shaped and maintained by its programs and 
policies towards a particular issue or by its overall attitude towards society and social 
programs. Such factions, with the few exceptions, are more or less consistently coherent and 
stable, and their behavior also be predicted to a great extent from issue to issue at a particular 
political juncture and in the middle of various political forces that operate in a political 
system. Maximum political parties of Bangladesh were split due to ideological conflict. Mary 
Carras, in her study of factional politics, also emphasized the role of economic interest with 
the ideology in the origin and intensification of factionalism. Carras asserted that, "ideology 
preference do play a role in political behavior in so far as they are interlinked with 
considerations of personal interest"'^. 
Intra-party factionalism also may take place in those political parties, which are 
ideology-oriented and cadre-based due to the difference in explanation of certain ideology. 
Moreover, when the party leaders agree on overall ideology, faction may emerge on the basis 
of disagreements on strategy and tactics to be used to achieve party objectives, such as 
moderates and extremists. In this respect one may refer to the factional conflict within the 
East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) in the 1960s, which finally led to the division of the 
party in 1966 and the emergence of a new party out of it, namely, the EPCP (ML).'® Those 
who were relatively moderate remained with the original party and those who were favoring 
militancy and were soft towards China in its dispute with the Soviet Union came out of the 
party and formed a new party and called the EPCP (ML). But for long, the latter could not 
remain united. A small, but determined minority who believed that violence was only right 
path, left the party and formed a third stream called Sarbohara (Proletariats) Party. Thus the 
multi-split of the original EPCP in 1960s was a function of intense factionalism mainly based 
upon ideological rift and internal power struggle. Even today these parties are not completely 
free from factional struggles though they have very limited support base and after the fall of 
Communist Block in Eastern Europe the socialist ideological appeal lost its previous 
attraction. 
Factionalism may emerge in a party on the basis of personality cult or clash of 
personalities. There are always a few important personalities in any movement or in a political 
party. Even there were none in the beginning of the peoples' movement; then the peoples' 
movement themselves produce them in the course of their struggle in realizing the demands. 
Factionalism germinates within a political party or movement, when two (or more) leaders of 
15. Marry C. Carras, The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: A Study of District Council in the State of 
Maharastra, (Cambridge University Press: Bombay, 1972), p. 185. 
16. National Awami Party of East Pakistan was also divided for the same reason in 1967. See, Talukder 
Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and The Emergence of Bangladesh, (Dhaka:BangIadesh Books International 
Lunited. 1975), pp. 12-13. 
equal (and also unequal) status do not agree with each other on particular issues, The 
disagreement on certain issues of some leaders are natural, but when the real cause behind 
such conllict of principles luo highly insincere and motivated by power and inlluence etc., 
when both (or more) personalities compete for more and more influence among the rank and 
file within the organization and among the masses; such conflict turns into a tactical character. 
In such process factions are formed around their names. Factions, in this type of conflict, may 
be of a predominantly personal nature. Even though the language of conflict may be phrased 
in terms of important principle and policy issues but factional conflict primarily revolve 
around personalities. 
It is plausible to argue that if an important leader of a dominating group is 
disappointed in respect of receiving required benefits either for himself or for the community 
he represents, he would be inclined to challenge the incumbent factional leadership and would 
organize his own faction to overpower the ruling faction in the party. 
Since 1966 peoples from different socio-economic groups with different- often 
conflicting- interests joined the AL party with the hope of gratifying their private interests 
after getting liberation by the leadership of AL. The party also admitted all types of people, 
irrespective of their faith, ideology and objectives, into its fold with a view to achieve its 
target by strengthening the Bengali nationalist movement. Heterogeneity and incongruity 
became its dominant features. Thus the AL was gradually converted into an organization 
comprising different groups with often mutually hostile and incompatible interests. Now the 
party is reduced to a 'conflicting system' in which different diverging forces compete among 
themselves to dominate the party. 
Factional conflict may develop in a party due to the 'personal ambition' of certain 
leaders. Some leaders of a party sometimes feel themselves the most eligible candidate to lead 
the party. Their lure for power also works behind it. So to fulfill their ambition they engage in 
factional grouping not only in the upper strata of the party, they also try to mobilize the lower 
committee members in their own side. Ray points out that 'personal ambition' is the motive of 
forming intra-party alliances.''^ Factional conflict may develop in a party due to the presence 
of various class interests in the same party fold; such as the capitalists, middle class and have-
nots may have representation in the same party platform but with divert interests. So in this 
case factionalism may take place when different class will try to dominate the party leadership 
to materialize their ovm class interest, which is conflicting to each other. Conflict of class 
interest is one of the main reasons behind the internal factionalism of the political parties of 
Bangladesh since long. Before the independence of Pakistan this class-conflict took place in 
the Muslim Leagues internal politics and divided the Bengal Pradesh Muslim League 
leadership into three factions: (I) The land-lords and business class were representing the 
Nazimuddin group, (II) Fazlul Huq was leading the rural affluent peasant class and small 
business peoples and (III) the Suhrawardy faction was comprised by the educated Bengali 
middle class and were getting the support of the rising Bengali business community. Due to 
this class conflict the middle class ML workers of East Pakistan formed AL when, they were 
defeated by the Nazimuddin group (backed by the central committee) in the conflict to 
capture provincial party leadership. Even today this class conflict is continuing in inside AL. 
Though until 1979 the AL was totally dominated by the middle class but in the course of time 
they were also challenged by the rich Bengali society as this new rich section, with their 
moneyed power and social influence, wanted to be the main protagonists of the party. Now 
17. Ramashray Ray, "Interparty Conflict in the Bihar Congress", Asian Survey, Vol.7 No. 12, December 1966, 
p.707. 
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the party leadership is reorganized by this affluent section of the Bangladesh society, though 
the middle class are still the vital force of the party and all the party ranks are controlled by 
them. This new development has become a source of intense conflict between the upper class 
and the middle-class in the party fold. 
A weak leadership of a political party is responsible of germinating the factional 
conflict in its party fold. When the leader shows his inefficiency to manage/ solve the party 
problems or unable to minimize the differences in the party rank, or even having the lacking 
of impartiality in his dealing with his subordinates and others; in that case, we find reactions 
from the leadership rank. Conflict take place in the party fold and a portion of the leaders and 
workers by breaking the previous unity form separate faction under the leadership of another 
new leader. In some cases due to this intense rivalry new party emerge by splitting the 
previous one. It is a general phenomenon in all of the major political parties of Bangladesh. 
Factional conflict may develop on the basis of horizontal and vertical stratification 
within the party. Horizontally factional conflict may occur between the organizational wing 
and parliamentary wing. In this respect we may refer the factional conflict within the East 
Pakistan Awami League (EPAL) during the 1956-58, which occurred between the 
parliamentary groups of AL led by the provincial chief minister and party organization led by 
the general sectary of EPAL. While, in the conflict, the CM was supported by other ministers 
and EPAL parliamentary party, and the later was supported by the leadership and workers of 
the party. In this case internal party debates within the party revolved around the issue of 
party versus government. The EPAL Secretary demanded that parliamentary party and 
administration should be brought under the subordination of AL leadership, while the 
'ministers group' insisted upon the independence of the state government fi:om the party 
decision.'^ Some times factional conflict may occure vertically within the party as had 
happened during 1976-81 among the same rank leadership of AL. 
External competition with other parties also may occur internal differences in the party 
leadership. Some times it had been seen that to survive in the competitive political arena or in 
the government, different leaders wanted to follow some tactical strategy, which was differing 
the original ideology or programs of the party. Finally it created factional conflict and split in 
the party. 
Previous relationship of some leaders with other political parties or political ideology 
may create factions in a political party. In the third world countries like Bangladesh, the Army 
Generals after occupying the governing power use to form political parties, by distributing 
government patronage, to remain in power permanently. They gather political leaders, from 
different ideology and party in their party fold. But these defected leaders, though they are 
opportunists, cannot totally forget their previous ideology and try to maintain their own 
original ideological identity in the new party. Moreover, they joined the new party to fulfill 
hunger for power. As for example, the 'Bangladesh Nationalist party' was formed by General 
Ziaur Rahman to fiilfill his political ambition by strengthening his power. Some pro-Islamic 
factions, who were previously attached with ML as well as some pro-leftists (NAP) leaders 
and some more leaders of different political background joined the party also to fulfill their 
power aspiration by defecting their previous party. Still now, after several years, these people 
are maintaining their separate identity, through forming their ovra faction, in the party. As a 
result the party is not safe from factional conflict. 
18. For detail of this conflict See, Abul Mansur Ahmed, Fifty Years of Politics as 1 Saw It (an autobiography in 
bangla), (Dhaka: KhushRuj Kitab Mahal, 1995), pp.424-31. 
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Different professional groups such as ex-bureaucrats, ex-military officers, business 
people, lawyers, etc. nowadays they are enrolling in the big political parties of Bangladesh. In 
the party they always try to maintain their factional identity and always try to pursue the 
interest of their own through using the party platform. Factional antagonism also takes place 
among them due to the presence of these groups of opposite interests especially, in the major 
two political parties. Whenever, the parties are in power, these interest groups engage in cold-
war to capture important minister-ship and in the conflict they use to get help from their own 
lobby involving in different profession. 
Factionalism tends to flourish in a one party-dominant system. If one party is pre-
dominantly strong and other parties are too weak and divided from each other to pose any 
challenge; thus the absence of external stress tends to induce internal strain in a part}'. J.K. 
Mahapatra argues, " these are largely responsible for more factional conflict in those state 
organization of Congress Party where the party is pre-dominant since long".'' 
In addition to these factional conflicts may develop in a party on the basis of various 
reasons, such as: the indirect influence of foreign powers, lack of tolerance in the rank of 
party leadership, the army intervention in politics and their intrigue to weaken the party 
system for their siirvival in power, the mass poverty and lack of public consciousness for 
democracy, conflict between the progressives and conservatives in a party platform, 
regionalism, cast, creed, religion etc. also do work in the germination of various factions in a 
party platform. 
Further, more factional politics flourish in a political party under certain conditions. 
Paul R. Brass, in his study, has pointed out some conditions, which, he feels, were responsible 
for the emergence of factionalism within the Congress party in Uttar Pradesh during 1960s. 
These are: "the absence of an external threat, the presence of an internal consensus upon 
ideological issues and the absence of an authoritative leadership.^® However factional conflict 
can exist in the absence of either of these conditions as had happened in AL. Since 1976 to till 
now none of these conditions prevail in the case of AL in Bangladesh. 
The editor of 'Financial Express' Riaz Uddin Ahmed tells in his own way about the 
reasons of factional conflict, "Political parties are the largest institutions to institutionalize 
democracy in a country. Establishing one strong democratic foundation of a country largely 
depends on the democratization of its own internal party organization. Since the political 
parties of Bangladesh do not practice democracy in their party fold and all the big parties 
remain personality-oriented that is why leadership conflict and factionalism take place in 
political parties. Since the party leaders and workers cannot freely express their own opinion, 
they engage in various kinds of grouping inside the political parties. Usually, this internal 
factionalism in a party takes place due to their feeling of deprivation from political power. 
Since one man controls the party's activities in an authoritarian manner, so others are 
deprived from political power but are not able to stage an open protest. So from this depriving 
feeling secretly they form groups, engage in grouping and ultimately engage in open conflict. 
As a res\ilt off and on big/ renowned political leaders by leaving their previous parties either 
join other parties or float different new parties^'. 
Faction in a party may be a coalition of some leaders. They may be tied together with 
the faction leader by personal bonds of friendship, party by cast or religious or class loyalties 
or by economic interest and most of all by political interests. They may be primarily revolved 
around the faction leader. Membership of these factions changes constantly so that it often 
19. J.K. Mahapatram Factional Politics in India, (Allahabad: Chugh Publications, 1985). Pp.8-9. 
20. Paul R. Brass, 
21. Interview of Riaz Uddin Ahmed,editor Financial Express (Dhaka). 
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appears that there is no persistent conflict and no permanent alliances, that all is perpetually in 
flush. In fact personal enmities between the prominent leaders constitute the boundary lines 
for factional conflict and for shifting alliance. Another very important thing is that intra-party 
factionalism which germinates basically from different prominent leaders personality clash 
are the primary casual variables in producing party schism. 
The Composition of Factions: The central element of a faction is the leader. Any faction 
leader cannot stand-alone. He must have followers around him in forming a group. A faction 
is formed mainly in order to promote the interest of its leader or leaders. Faction membership 
consists of a "core" and "support". The leader or leaders comprise its "core" or inner circle 
and the followers compose its "support" or outer circle (periphery). The core of a faction 
remains with the faction leader through thick and thin, and its members are strongly 
connected to the leader through his activity. The support structure (outer circle) of a faction is 
large in number. The leader/ leaders recruit followers in order to strengthen his/their-fighting 
capability. The leader always try to increase this number of his support by recruiting members 
who are not yet members of any faction or by enticing/ alluring some members of rival 
factions to defect and join the group. The interests of the supporters at the periphery are 
always secondary. By supporting their leader the followers cannot expect the share of political 
power (which is the primary interest of the factional leaders) they only expect some patronage 
and reward and will remain with the leader as long as he rewards them for their support by 
providing them with material benefits. Otherwise they may desert him and join the rival 
faction if they get tempting offered by the later. So the outer circle consists of followers 
representing the floating votes of internal party politics. Thus the relationship between the 
faction leader and his supporters is reciprocal; both need each other and neither can thrive at 
the expense of the other. 
There may exist both the "direct" and "indirect" structure in a faction. It acquires a 
direct structure when the members of the core constitute the lieutenants of the prominent 
leader to whom the followers owe direct allegiance. It assumes in indirect structure when the 
secondary leader (the lieutenants or any other members of the core) have independent 
followings and posses the ability to secede. It happens in a internal group of a party when a 
faction is a result of a coalition of minor factions and the smaller faction leaders still have 
good number of followers or when the main leader is having some youth lieutenants with 
unique organizing capability and popularity. Here for the indirect leadership reward is totally 
"political interest". The only conditions the indirect leaders insist upon is that when the leader 
advances himself, he must take his inner circle with him. In practice a faction combines direct 
and indirect leaders in its structure but the balance in maximum case remains in the hand of 
the main leader though some times it may fluctuate for the time being. 
Both his control over authoritative power and the materialistic resources distinguish 
the faction leader from other members of a faction. Faction leader differs widely from others 
in personal temperament. An ideal faction leader posses seniority, education, integrity, strong 
organizing capability, capacity to detect the burning political issue of that time or has the 
capability to convert a non-issue into a burning issue to make political movement for 
capturing (party and government) power, capacity to understand peoples problems and 
struggles and has the ability to appease the peoples temperament. A successful leader has 
power over the fortune of others and has power to organize party affairs. He is the man who 
can get things done in his own way despite the contrary wishes of the less powerful rival 
leaders. Such a leader is called "Bhai" or "leader" by his lieutenants. Further more, faction 
leaders are competitors for political power. To them, factional interest (i.e. interest of the 
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core) may carry more preference over the interest of the political party. In the course of fight, 
personal interest of factional leaders gains momentum and develops autonomous status for the 
faction inside the party. The warring sides fail to maintain minimum norms and behave as if 
they belong to two hostile political parties: both side do not hesitate to attack each other with 
all venom and fliry. Either side puts much stake in the outcome of the duel that whoever, 
losses tends to prefer to leave the party. They have great control over resources than any of 
their supporters; they are involved in a transaction in which they provide patronage and 
reward in return of political support. A successful faction leader is one who knows the art of 
political manipulation and has access to abundant funds. 
Both the members of core and periphery of a faction come from diverse social and 
economic origins. Factional grouping is based on diverse relationship between the leaders and 
followers. Leaders and followers may be connected on diverse ways: patron-client, friendship, 
kinship, Guru-Sisya relationship etc. No single type of support would provide enough strength 
to make effective factional group. Some times factional leaders bring private resources or 
some time they are funded by some donor groups; such as some well wishers, interest group, 
or even in some cases some foreign countries use to provide funds to preserve their interests 
or to establish their own minded government in a country. 
•Typology of Factional Conflict. 
The pattern of factional competition may appear in different types depending upon the 
relative strength and number of factions involved in the conflict. Brass divided factional 
system into three types'^. The most usual one is by-factional system where two informal 
groups, with more or less equal power, are evenly engaged in conflict and each of them tends 
to countervail the other. In other words there is balance of power between the two and neither 
is in a position to dominate the party. This implies that the dominance has to be shared by 
them or rotate between them. These informal groups maybe usually referred as "Ministerials" 
versus "Dissidents" conflict. By-factional conflict produces bitterness at the political system. 
Uni-factional system refers to such a factional conflict where a single faction totally 
dominates the political climate and minor factions continue to operate within the party. The 
latter exist as factions for namesake without having any marked impact upon the power 
structure of the party. In this conflict there factions maybe named after leaders name. The 
third stream is known as multi-functional system. Such a system indicates that there are more 
than two factions in a party and none of them is overwhelmingly superior to others. Such kind 
of factional system is most fluid, tends to be most unstable and each one's strength is likely to 
change either for better or for worse. At no stage it is possible to say with certainty and 
confidence that particular faction is dominant one. This system provides comparatively less 
bitter atmosphere than the other types in an internal political arena of a party. 
All type of factional system are more or less unstable as their units are informal and 
subject to change and their rules of conflict are fluid and ambiguous due to the lack of a 
normative basis within a corporate group. They are not organized over stable conflict 
structures and any factional system can be converted into other one through the phases of 
conflict. For instance, an informal conflict may appear in a multi-factional structure, which 
becomes by-factional in the course of time through the fusion of minor factions and finally be 
transformed in a uni-factional structure; or the conflict may begin in a uni-factional system 
with the emergence of a new dynamic faction and it may convert into by-factional system. 
With the course of time it may appear into multi-factional system. 
15. Paul R. Brass, Factional Politics in an Indian Stat, op.cit. p.235. 
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A party may have a number of factions. A faction may oppose several other factions 
within the party, and maybe friendly towards some factions of other political parties. Such a 
situation of antagonism within the party and harmony between different party factions is 
found due to the ideological unison. The socialist faction of AL, as for example, has been 
sympathetic with the faction of CPB. This trend of intra-party factionalism and inter-party 
factional union of the dominant facflions of two or many party may provide opportunity to the 
respective parties to form coalition in governing the country or in strengthening the opposition 
movement against the governing party. 
Factional conflict is a political process, which occurs with the corporate groups 
(party), and is not governed by normal rules. The sanctions against it are heaviest in the face 
of external threat or pressure. However, it is the concern of the authoritative leadership of a 
corporate group (party) to keep the activities of factions within strict control, while at the 
same time ensuring that the activities of the factional conflict do not threat the unity and 
effectiveness of the group within the broader arena. 
•Leadership Roles. 
Several leadership roles come into play in the regulation of factional conflict. These 
may broadly be divided into four categories: command, arbitration, mediation and 
management. An authoritative leadership exercise command when he decrees any decisions 
without consulting the factions concerned, that a certain rule must be observed; he exercises 
arbitration when he issues such a degree after hearing the factional leader; and he mediates 
when he persuades the faction leaders to find common ground and to reach a mutually 
satisfactory decision after negotiation. Mediation is expensive in terms of resources, a leader 
in authority is obliged to command in resolving factional disputes. In addition if he arbitrates 
or mediates between factions, it amounts to the granting of recognition to the leader. The 
leader of a corporate group (party) must ensure that the power at his disposal enables him to 
resolve internal conflict by command. Otherwise, he will run the risk of sacrificing his 
authority and the coherence of the group. In his managerial role the leader of corporate group 
(party) has two functions: first, to ensure that there is sufficient power to enforce a decision; 
second, to provide and enforce normative and pragmatic roles for the internal policies of the 
group so that factional competition is either prevented or strictly regulated. 
Some or all of these leadership roles maybe allocated to separate persons depending 
on the seriousness of disputes within the faction. However when leaders are unable to perform 
these roles during factional conflict then inter-factional differences tend to become 
permanent. These groups then cease to be factions and emerge as formal political groups and 
acquire an independent existence. 
• The Functions of Factions: 
Factions and factional conflict may perform both integrative and disintegrative 
functions for a political party. The disintegrative impact of factionalism is more evident 
impact. The integrative functions, which factions perform, are less obvious, but may be more 
important in the long run. 
Disintegrative Functions: In a political party to resolve the differences between the 
factions they use to follow two paths: (I) the principle of majority rule, which has general 
legitimacy in modem western democracy, and (11) the use of internal mechanism. These may 
broadly divide into four categories: command, arbitration, mediation and management. An 
authoritative or charismatic leader exercise command to resolve the factional conflict. When 
there is the absence of such type of leaders the role of arbitration or mediation are performed 
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by the neutral senior party leaders, who have no factional affiliations. However the number of 
arbitrator or mediators may decrease or the kind of a person who best performs the role of 
arbitration may not be recruited when the dominant faction itself performs the recruitment 
functions for the party. Where the principle of majority role or the arbitration is no longer 
available to resolve the conflict, a real danger exists that the party organization may split 
apparently. 
The factional conflict some times is so intense that party organization may be 
occupied with their internal struggle and have failed to perceive external threats. In such case 
it is not uncommon for a party to loose most of the parliamentary seats in a general election, 
even when the party is holding popularity among the masses and got strong workers base in 
the political arena. 
Where arbitration cannot mediate conflict, disaffected and defeated faction leaders 
may run official party candidates of sabotage election campaign from within the organization. 
A disaffected faction leader does not mind participating in the defeat of entire party 
organization if this is the only way to defeat his faction rivals. 
Factional politics in a traditional society is personal politics. Conflicts of prestige 
between the faction leaders lead to intense factional disputes, which are often in their very 
natural insoluble. When prestige or honors become a primary importance in politics, the 
possibilities of resolving conflicts are reduced, for honor cannot be shared. In this case even 
political rivalry may carry the conflict between the two leaders into their business and social 
life. In Conflicts, which such extra-political ramifications are not amenable to ordinary 
political solutions. 
The disintegrative impact of factional conflict on a party organization may lead to a 
decline in the party's electoral strength. Some times pafty leadership becomes weaken by 
loosing some of its popular leaders due to the factionalism and split in its party fold. 
Integrative Functions: In fact there is direct relationship between the intensity of 
factional conflict and the size of a party membership. Factional opponents enroll primary 
members for the local organizations in order to voting strength in the organizational elections. 
Some times factional conflict broadens the bases of participations of a certain party 
organization. Not only are more members enrolled, but also new class, religious and interest 
groups become politicized and integrated into the party organization adding to its diversity 
and to its strength. The integration of different cast, creed, class, religion or interest group into 
internal factional system of an organization prevents either the dominance of particular 
conflicting group over others or the development of polarized conflict between different 
opposition class, cast or religious groups. It makes a party more moderate and more 
pragmatic. 
Factional conflict also facilitates the emergence of promising youth leadership of 
organizational capabilities. When one faction triumphs over the other, the change in the 
political fortime would not be confined to the top leaders of both factions. Other members of 
these factions, both important and not important, would also be affiliated by this process of 
fluctuation in political status. Many members of the winner faction would be immediately 
catapulted to the prominent positions whereas the coimterparts of the looser factions would be 
stripped of their power. Those who go up in the political ladder in this process include both 
elderly and youthful leaders. It is important to remember that in addition to the emergent 
youthful leaders of the winning side who get a sudden push to the top, some youth activists of 
the looser side, in spite of the side's defeat also manage to gain prominence and recognition 
by dint of their organizational and fighting capabilities demonstrated during the factional 
combat. Further more factionalism is propitious for new political recruitments. Many new 
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elements are recruited by both sides in order to enlarge their support base and increase their 
power. Thus many elements get a chance not only to join politics, but also to get hard and 
rigorous training in it. Thus many elements get chance not only to join politics, but also to get 
hard and rigorous training in it. Thus training proves vulnerable for future roles in more 
important political arenas. Thus factionalism proves to be a breeding ground for new entrants 
into politics. 
Hypothesis: In this thesis an attempt has been made to find out answers of some principle 
questions on factional politics in Bangladesh, which always comes in front of political 
scholars and analysts. 
1. That the politics in Bangladesh is factional. 
2. That factions are always lead by individual party leaders not by collective bodies. 
3. That the absence of internal democratic practice creates factional infighting inside a 
party. 
4. Frequently it is observed that the parties are formed from the infighting and defections 
of the popular political parties do not have enough mass followers. 
5. That this type of factional conflict and subsequent formation of new parties is helpfial 
in the political development of a country. 
6. That it is seen that the parties floated by the breakaway factions and faction leaders of 
the big parties cannot survive in the political arena of Bangladesh. 
7. Factionalism tends to flourish in the absence of strong leadership in a party. 
8. All the big political parties of the Indian subcontinent are led by the hereditary 
leadership instead of democratically elected leadership. 
9. The infighting in the governing parties is responsible for the abduction of power by 
the military generals, e.g. the infighting in the AL was responsible for the 
assassination of Mujib in 1975 and for subsequent long days undemocratic military 
rule in Bangladesh. 
10. The opposition parties' internal conflict helped the military regimes/ authoritarian 
powers to survive in power for a lengthy period. Military regimes are responsible for 
the factionalism and splits of political parties in Banladesh. 
11. The like-minded or fiiendly political parties play important role in the infighting of a 
political party. 
12. Prior to the every splits of AL every time first its student wing Bangladesh Chatra 
League (BCL) was divided. The BCL leaders and workers are influenced by the 
personal politics of the big guns of AL. 
13. The branch units and fi-ont organizations of the parties infected by the infighting of the 
top brass leadership of a political parity because of same ideological leaning, personal 
relation or other reasons. 
14. The sudden joining of the non-political personalities (such as retired civil and military 
bureaucrats, business people and other people from different occupation etc) creates 
infighting in the parties. The inclusion of these people in the political parties reduce 
the confidence of the lower unit leaders on the central leadership. 
15. Factionalism impedes the growth of healthy politics in a country. 
The study is divided into five chapters excluding introduction. In the first chapter an 
attempt is made to trace historical background of the creation of Bangladesh in a veiy 
brief manner. It also seeks to trace the character of Pakistan homeland movement and 
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Bengali nationalist movement, the reasons of the decline of the ML, which had fought for 
the achievement of Pakistan, the rise and growth of AL as the espouser/ advocator of 
Bengali nationalism and other parties' role in the Bengali nationalist movement in a very 
brief manner. 
The second chapter is devoted to a study of the growth of the political parties and 
party system of Bangladesh. In one course of discussion in the growth of political parties 
interparty factionalism is discussed here briefly. In brief this chapter tried to trace the 
socio-economic background of the political leaders of the country. There is the existence 
of about two himdred political parties in Bangladesh but except few parties all exist 
merely in names. Only few of the parties have party offices, constitutions and 
manifestoes. In the parliamentary election only four parties dominant presence is visible. 
Except them other parties even don't have regular representation in the parliament. As a 
result a political system is developed in Bangladesh concentrating the four major political 
parties of Bangladesh. These parties are AL, BNP, JP and Jammat. So the chapter limited 
its discussed on the programs and ideologies of these major political parties. 
The third chapter exclusively discussed and analyzed the AL organization, its nature 
and functioning. This chapter is devoted to an analysis of the AL party and its ancillary 
organizations structures. It also showed how the branch tmits and ancillary organizations 
involve in the infighting of the top-brass party leaders. Moreover characteristics of its 
leadership, workers group and support base of AL; relationship of the branch and fi-ont 
organizations with the main body AL leadership; internal working of the party; activities 
of the party's various machineries to strengthen its support base etc are discussed. 
Factionalism has been a regular phenomenon of Bangladesh politics. The history of 
political parties in the coimtiy has been that of their creation, breakup and reformation. 
The largest and dominant political party of Bangladesh is no more different from other 
parties of the country. As during the Pakistan era the AL was grown as the exponent of 
Bengali nationalism during the Bengali nationalist movement and it picked up the support 
of various group by adopting various slogans. It had both socialist as well as the country's 
leading capitalists within its fold. What is more important after independence the party 
leadership was recruited from the affluent middle class i.e. the surplus farmers from the 
rural areas and lawyers, business men and literal professionals from the urban areas. Still 
the party is leading by heterogeneous elements from professional and ideological 
background. Since the beginning the AL is full of factionalism. The purpose of this 
chapter is to discuss the origin, nature and causes of factionalism in the AL party fold. It 
also discusses how the factionalism also spreads in the front organizations and lower level 
units of the party, the role of other parties and the government regimes in the AL 
factionalism, is the infighting of the governing party responsible for the takeover of power 
by the military regime etc, the final consequences of the newly formed parties emerged 
from the breakaway factions of AL, the factional tensions among the other political parties 
in Bangladesh etc. The impact of factionalism and splits of the political parties in 
Bangladesh is also briefly discussed in this chapter. For the convenience of the analysis 
the chapter is divided into six parts. The first part traced the factionalism in AL and other 
parties during the days of liberation struggle. The second part discussed the factionalism 
and splits in ruling party AL just after the independence. It also discussed how the 
Bangladesh army and administration also affected by the factionalism in those days and as 
the resuh how AL regime was overthrown by a military coup. In the third and fourth part 
an attempt is made to show the intense factional infighting among the lieutenants of Mujib 
to capture the party leadership and as a result the party was loosing its popular support 
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base in the masses. To save the party from final destruction one potion of the party 
leadership wclcomc the hereditary leadership replaced the traditional leadership of Al.. 
The fifth part concentrales on the efforts of Mujib-daiighter I hisina's effort to establish 
solo-leadership. It discussed to make permanent her position in the party how Hasina used 
one faction against another in the party and compelled her competitors in party leadership 
to leave the party. As the result of Hasina's policy tow new parties, BAKSAL and Gono 
Forum, emerged. Finally the sixth part analyzed how Hasina reduced the remaining 
factional difference in the party and established her sole control over it. Now the party 
was well-prepared for going to power. This part also discussed the infighting in the AL 
government after its coming to power, the fi-ustration of the old dedicated local party 
leaders and workers when for the interest of an election win they were replaced by the 
non-political new-comers who were rich and more influential in their locality etc. The 
final chapter draws conclusions on the basis of the study. 
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Chapterl 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
BANGLADESH 
Chapter 1 
BACKGROUND OF BANGLADESH 
Introduction: 
The birth of Bangladesh on 1971 was the result of the struggle of Bengali Muslim 
nationalism, started in the beginning of the 20"' century to get socio-economic emancipation 
from the aggression of same ethnic Hindu-Bengalis of greater Bengal and also of the co-
religionist north-west hidian Muslims. Bengali people were the vanguard of Jinnah during the 
Muslim homeland movement against the Hindu domination in India for the creation of 
Pakistan. But when the existence and honor of Bengalis were threatened by the West 
Pakistani counterpart, the salience of religious unity declined over a year with the rise of 
Bengali nationalism. They contemplate to get liberation for the second time. In both stages of 
liberation struggle Bengali people fought for economic and political rights in the form of 
religious and linguistic movement and finally they won their ultimate gOal by a fearce-armed 
revolution. Bangladesh is the first country following World War II to achieve independence 
as a consequence of civil war'. 
In Retrospect: 
With the inspiration of great Mughal dynasty the European Business Company came to India 
to do naval trade. But later by taking advantage of the disintegrated Mughal Empire the East 
Indian Company of England engaged in power conspiracy and conflict with the local political 
elites' and became the terminal potentate. In this process with their modem war technology 
and strong economy the British established their two hundred years colonial rule in India on 
the graveyard of Mughal dynasty^. 
Emergence of Muslim Politics in Bengal: 
In the British India, Bengali Muslims the majority community of Bengal were lagging behind 
the Hindus because of their illiteracy and poor economy. The root-cause of their economic 
drawback was the result of their peasant affinity^. Moreover the permanent settlement of Lord 
Comwalish (1793) made this Muslim Cultivating community poorer and oppressed'*. By then 
the politically, economically and educationally backward Bengali Muslims needed relief from 
their disadvantageous position, this feeling considerably influenced the growth of Muslim 
politics in the 20**^  centiiry^ 
In 1905 the colonial administration opened a new dimension of Muslim politics in 
Bengal by dividing the province into East and West Bengal. Then Dhaka became the capital 
of Muslim dominated E. Bengal®. Bengal was partitioned into two provinces because of 
various reasons. One of the main intensions of the British authority to diminish/ curve the 
' Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh from Mujib to Ershad, An Interpretive study (Dhaka University Press Ltd. 1994) 
p.74. 
^ Edt by Sirazul Islam: History of Bangladesh (1704-1971) Vol. 1, p.l62. 
^ Aminur Rahman, Politics and National Formation in Bangladesh, (Dhaka, UPL, 1997) p. 118-120. 
BY investing the proprietorship of lands in the Zaminders the act virtually ruined the peasant economy of 
Bengal, see for detail Aminur Rahman Politics and National formation in Bengal, pp83-87 UPL Dhaka, Narahari 
Kaviraz, Swadhinata Sangrame (In Bengali) (Calcutta, 1957) p.33. 
By the settlement act Zamindari passed from the traditional Zaminder families into the hand of new monied 
Hindu dominated class. Who prospered under the British rule. 
^ Shila Sen, Muslun Politics in Bengal, 1937-47 (N. Delhi, Impex India, 1976) p.30. 
® For the partition of Bengal proposal see History of Bangladesh War of Independence Document, (Dhaka: 
Ministry of Information); Vol. 1; P.l. 
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Bengali Hindu society's influence in Indian politics because of their pioneer role in the anti-
British resistance movement^. The partition made the Muslims politically conscious about 
their numerical strength in the province and they felt that it should reflect in the 
administration®. In fact the new province opened employment as well as educational 
opportunities for the Muslims®. 
The partition of Bengal accelerated the formation of Muslim League (ML) was 
another significant event during that period. In the face of antipartition movement of the 
Hindus the Muslim political leaders became more active to solidify their gains. They then 
started to think of establishing a Muslim organization which would protect the interest of the 
Muslim by persuading the British Raj'°. In this stage the Raj desired to patronage the upper 
class Muslims of the subcontinent to start up their own political party. Thus the ML was 
formed in Dhaka in 1906*'. The formation of ML undoubtedly strengthened the solidarity of 
Muslims but its inauguration also strained the Hindu-Muslim relation. However until mid 
1930's the ML as a political party of Muslims was limited to the upper class and its leadership 
was drawn fi-om them'^. 
Even though the partition was not the demand of Bengali Muslims but its beneficiary 
result encouraged them to give whole hearted support to it'^. The Hindu elites found partition 
a deliberate scheme to crush their socio-economic position in India. So it met with vehement 
opposition from Congress and very bitter criticism from the Bengali Hindu community. 
Finally the British annulled the partition in 1911 under the pressure of congress movement''*. 
Muslims were terribly shocked and resented by the reversal of British policy. 
Realizing the Muslim dissatisfaction the Raj decided to establish a University at Dhaka in 
1912 to compensate the loss of the community'^. The partition of Bengal and the new 
University of Dhaka both played a decisive role to create a Muslim middle class in Bengal, 
who were the main force of Pakistan movement and Bangladesh liberation struggle. 
The annulment of Bengal partition was a disheartening blow for the Muslims and it was 
denounce by the community. The Hindu attitude during the anti-partition campaign had 
convinced the Muslims of the fiatility of expecting any justice or fairness from the Hindu 
community'^ It convinced the Muslims that their interest were completely separate and 
distinct from those of the Hindus. So the annulment of partition could not resist the 
deteriorating communal embitterment and from then communal politics played and important 
role in India. 
The other dominant reason was administrative. For it see Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, op. cit.; p. 33, 
^ Ibid., Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal p.24. 
' MKU Mollah, The new province of East Bengal and Assam (University Press Ltd. Dhaka, 1981) For detail 
pp. 151-216, 248-50. 
'"Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal p. 37-38. 
" Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada ed. Foundation of Pakistan, All India ML Documents: 106-147 Karachi National 
Books, 1967. Vol. I ,p. l5. 
Maryon Weiner, Political Change in South Asia (Calcutta: KL Mulkhpadya, 1963) p.47 and Matiur Rahman, 
From Constitution to Constitution) (London: Luzac & Company, 1970). 
" Z.H. Zaidi, The partition of Bengal and its Annuhnent - A Survey of the Scheme of Territorial redistribution 
of Bengal 1902 - 1964," (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies London, 1964). 
Muhammad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism: Case study of Bangladesh, UPL Dhaka, 1995. 
pp. 50-51. For the documents on annalment of Bengal Partition Act see History of the Bangladesh War of 
Independence; Vol. 1, pp. 335-37. 
A.M. Harun Ar Rashid and Ajoa Roy, Background of the establishment of Dhaka University, Baktobya Vol. 9 
(August 1981) pp. 32-40. 
A. Wadul Bhuyan, Emergence of Bangladesh and the Role of Awasmi League, (N. Delhi: Vikash Publishing 
House Pvt. Ltd., 1992); p. 5. 
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Rise of Bengali Muslims: 
The communal polarization took place permanently in 1928, when all the Hindu leaders 
supported the Tenants act amendment bill to protect the zaminders interest, where as Muslim 
leaders unitedly but unsuccessfully voted against it in the Legislative council of Bengal 
Although the Muslim leaders unitedly supported the tenants' interest but they were 
hopelessly divided in different conflicting groups. In the 1937 provincial election the Krishak 
Praja Party (KPP) and the ML were the main force representing two major conflicting groups 
for Muslim seats. Fazlul Huq, the liberal nationalist leader was controlling the middle-class 
progressives. The newly educated was rising youths were the vanguard of this faction. The 
Russsina socialist revolution of 1917 and the non-cooperative movement exerted a great 
influence upon the politics of India in general and of Bengal in particular. While the 
Communist Party of India was floated in 1921, there had been perceptible leftist trend 
particularly in Bengal politics. In this moment the tyranny of the Zaminders and the money 
lending class to the rural peasants and the changing political process of Bengal encouraged 
Huq and his followers to do politics for the downtrodden Muslim masses. With this intention 
they formed Niikhil Bangla Praza Samity (1929) and later it was renamed KPP in 1936'1 
Since the zaminders and the moneylenders frequently oppressed the rural masses, the party 
settled its election program for the poor peasants economic salvation by calling for the 
abolition of zamindary system and other demands popular with peasants'^. Because of its 
political programs favored the rural interests, thus in a short time it became increasingly 
popular among the rural masses. The introduction of this new style of Muslim politics where 
Huq merged the Muslim masses of the rural Bengal with the middle-class educated 
progressives on the same platform that radically changed the political climate of Bengal and 
politics came-out from the grip of aristocrat for the first time. The rural peoples involvement 
assurance in the voting politics and majority Muslim seats confirmation in Bengal by the 
communal award (1935)^ ® of British later turned it into a religious nationalist movement. 
Bengal ML was a conglomeration of zaminders, business and legal community and Khawaja 
Nazimuddin of foimding Nawab family^' was the leader of the party^^. Hussein Shahid 
Suhrawardy was the moving spirit of this group. In 1937 election they championed Islam and 
Muslim solidarity^^. The election showed the clash of class interest of Bengal Muslim 
Society. 
The 1937 election made the Muslims the main force to form Bengal government, 
although the Congress emerged as the single largest party. The parity of strength between the 
two Muslim parties made it necessary to form a coalition govt, under the Chief Minister-ship 
of popular leader Fazlul Huq '^^ . By this election Hindus lost their political power to the 
' ' Muslim Leaders wanted total abolition of the act, by supporting the tenants' interest. For detail see Shila Sen 
(p. 63) and Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987), 
pp. 30-31. 
" Foreshadowing of Bangladesh pp. 32-34 and 47-48. 
" Harun Ur Rashid pp. 60 for the main feature of VP manifestoes. 
^^  Foe details of Communal Award see Aminur Raman, Politics and National formation in Bangladesh, pp. 175-
76. Also see Harun Ur Rashid FB pp 41-44. 
Khawaja Nazimuddin was the son of Khawaja Salimullah, one of the founder members of Muslim league 
(ML). 
^^  Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing, pp. 67-68. 
^^  Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing, pp. 58-59 for the main points of Bengal Muslim Leaguers election 
manifesto. 
Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing, pp. 79-85 for election result analysis and for formation of qualities 
govt, of KPP and BPML. 
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Muslims permanently in united Bengal. After 1937 ML acquired tremendous strength in 
India, when Huq and Sikander Hyat Khan (Chief Minister of Punjab) joined the party with 
their fiill strength^^ 
Gateway of Pakistan: 
After that the Party needed an energetic program to unify Muslims on one platform against 
the fear of Hindu domination. The real momentum came to the organization when Lahore 
resolution was passed for a separate Muslim homeland scheme at 1940 ML convention^^. The 
resolution envisaged the concept of the confederate union of the two independent states^' in 
northwest and eastern zones of India. 
The Pakistan scheme, which assured ftiture cultural, political and economic leadership 
for the Muslims, created religious zeal among them. It changed the Muslim politics in a few 
years and ML became the only dear of Indian Muslims^^. Bengali Muslims joined the 
Pakistan movement for economic emancipation from the Hindus. To them Pakistan meant the 
changing of economic power from Hindus to Muslims^^. So by the active participation of 
middle and lower middle class Muslims, who were the previous KPP workers. The Bengal 
ML emerged as a revolutionary party^°. 
In 1946 election campaign in India as well as in Bengal ML fought for only one issue 
i.e. the independent Muslim homeland for the Muslims^' and with it Muslim success was 
almost total in Bengal as it gained 114 Muslim seats out of 117 against 39 seats in 1937. ML 
also achieved impressive victory in other Muslim majority provinces but now no where was it 
as successftil as in Bengal^^. 
In the ten years since 1937 the Hindus had no effective share in the administration of 
the Bengal province. So when the independence approached and they were to choose between 
the united Bengal and partition, they opted for the later. Their action was motivated by their 
desire to safeguard their position at least in one, much smaller, part of Bengal. The Bengal 
partition was formalized when a motion was put to the vote in the Bengal Legislative 
Assembly on 20 June 1947. The Muslim members as a group voted against the partition 
proposal, where the Hindus unanimously voted for it. It is an irony of history that who at the 
turn of the century, were champions of Bengal unity and considered the partition of Bengal as 
the vivisection of 'Mother Bengal' were calling for the second partition within four decades 
of the first". 
The election result confirmed the polarization of the two communities between the 
two arch rival camps, Congress and the ML and the Muslims overwhelmingly voted for 
"Independent Pakistan"^'*; which cleared that the partition was imminent. 
^^  For the growth of ML in India after 1937 see K.B. Sayeed, Paiiistan The Formative Phase (1857-1948) 
(London, Oxford University Press, 1960) pp. 183 and 177-78, Also Majyon Wiener pp. 47-48. 
^^  For a good description of reasons behind Lahore resolution see Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative, pp. 102-105 
and 110-114. 
" For a clear analysis of the text of LahoreResolution see Sayeed, Pakistan the Formative, pp. 114-17. Later in 
1946 AIML conversion Jinnah changed the original resolution in favor of a single Muslim state 'Pakistan'. 
See Lbid p. 179 and Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing, 220-21. 
Harun Ur Rashid, The Foreshadowing p. 221. Also Hasan Zaheer, The Separation of East Pakistan (Dhaka, 
UPL, 1998) p. 8. 
^^  Abdul Hasim, In Retrospection, Dhaka: Subama Publisher, 1974, pp. 170-178. 
Shila Sen, Muslim Politics, p. 253. 
^^  For the detail election result of Bengal and other province of India see Harun Ur Rashid, Fore Shadowing, 
pp.230-238. 
. Gulam Kabir, Changing Face, p. 120. 
^'Libid.,pp. 236-37. 
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Shattered Dream of Bengalis: 
Pakistan was created with a solemn pledge to establish the Quranic principal of equality and 
justice^^ for the Muslims who never enjoyed these pristine Islamic values during the colonial 
rule. The Bengali Muslims joined the Pakistan movement to achieve political, economic and 
social freedom from colonial exploitation as well as from minority Hindu domination. But the 
movement for an ideal Muslim homeland was equality and justice was promised had never 
been a reality to the Bengali Muslims. The majorities Bengali people found them under the 
same colonial and minority rule even after the creation of Pakistan. In these circumstances 
Begum Shaista S. Ikramullah member of the Constitutional Assembly of Pakistan (CAP) 
complained, "A feeling is growing among the E. Pakistanis that E. Pakistan is being neglected 
and treated merely as a colony of W. Pakistan"^^. Although in a democracy the majority 
should not have any fear of domination nor should they have to ask for political and economic 
safeguards such as regional autonomy. But the Bengalis were smarted under the cultural 
subjugation, political domination and economic exploitation by the minority W. Pakistanis. 
So in the veiy beginning of the struggle of the independence of the Bengali's were demanding 
regional equality and justice in the form of autonomous movement. Bengali sub-nationalism 
now began to gather momentum. Finally it became a radical nationalist movement to achieve 
freedom for second time. 
Pakistan began its political career under a parliamentary system and under a federal 
constitution. But neither the parliamentary system nor the federation was genuine^^. After 
independence Pakistan was ruled by a small elite with a narrow base of social support. The 
masses in whose name the state was created played no role in policy inputs. Since 
independent Bengali elite did not have real representation in the decision making process^^. 
The landslide ML victory in Bengal in 1946 was a unique organization success of Subrawardy 
and Muslim middle class^^. By this victory he became the chief Minister of the province. But 
the ML high command was determined to make a change in the middle class dominated 
popular leadership in Bengal. Just a few days before independence in 1947 the feudal 
orthodox section of Bengal ML with a tacit approval of the central leadership maneuvered 
H.S. Suhrawardy out of Chief Ministership"*®. This maneuver in E. Bengal leadership where 
middle-class suffered a serious blow made them skeptical about their ftjture partnership with 
their political partner in W. Pakistan. Following the parliamentary coup Nazimuddin group 
systemically excluded Suhrawardy followers from the party during 1948-49 to protect their 
interest'*'. It resented the middle class leadership and turned into an open revolt. Moreover due 
to language controversy, vital economic interest of the Bengalis and the misrule of the govt., 
Muslim League lost its popularity. Under these circumstances the disenchanted/ frustrated 
Suhrawardy group, the dynamic force of ML formed the most important political party of E. 
^^  CAP Debates Vol. V, March 7, 1949, Karachi Govt. Press, 1949, p. 3. 
^^  CAP Debates Vol. 11 (1) February 24, 1948, p.7. 
" G.W. Chowdhury, Bangladesh: Why it happened, International Affairs, Vol. 48, No.2, April, 1972 p. 242. 
^^  Bengali representation in the first Central Cabinet was practically nil. The two token representatives in Central 
Cabinet were virtually unknown to Bengalis. See Rownaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issue (UPL. 
Dhaka 1987); p. 27 and Md. Gulam Kibria, p 143-45. 
^'During 1946 election Suhrwardy was the President of Bengal ML. 
"" For detail see A. Hashim, In Retrospect pp. 127-133 also The Azad (Calcutta July 8, 10,23,31 and August 6, 
1947). 
Ataur Rahman Khan, Ojarotin Dui Bachar (Two years of Ministership) (Dhaka: K.M. Ahmed, 1964), pp. 20-
24. 
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Bengal named Awami Muslim league in early 1949"^ .^ From the beginning the Awami 
League'^ ^(AL) was championing full regional autonomy for E. Bengal and recognition of 
Bangla as one of the state language. This forceful and legitimate subnationalist appeal turned 
into the most organized and powerful political force within one year with the language 
movement as their main issue. 
Language Movement: 
Jinnah's demand for a Muslim state appealed the Bengali Muslim not because of two nation 
theory, but because they looked upon it a protective wall against the privileged Hindus. In 
Pakistan the vital question of Hindu-Muslim competition for job and business had eroded 
with the migration of upper class Hindus to India, but the W. Pakistanis now manipulated the 
privileged position of British and Hindus'*''. The high expectation of Bengali Muslims was 
crushed by the fear of West Pakistan/ Punjabi domination. So on the contrary of British India, 
now the Bengali Muslims identified mutuality of interest with ethnic Hindus who remained in 
E. Bengal against the same enemy, "the privileged West Pakistanis". As a result of this the 
salience of religious unity experienced by the Muslims of different regions during the 
Pakistan movement started decreasing and was replaced by the emerging secular political 
organization'*^. The ruling elite regarded this development as a serious threat to the existence 
of Pakistan and tried to impose a common cultural uniformity with W. Pakistan based on 
Islam"* .^ The Bengali reaction was very sharp and prompt. They felt just as the Muslims of 
undivided India had felt that their cherished culture and way of life were threatened'*'. Thus 
first tussle was over the language question. In this tussle all the opposition parties in E. 
Bengal including AL, Nizame Islami Party (NIP), East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP), E. 
Pakistan Congress Party became united against ML's unholy intension. 
Disturbed by the decision of Pakistan government on language issue an opposition 
member from E. Bengal Dhirendra Nath Datta moved and amendment motion to accept 
Bangla, the majority community language as one of the state language of Pakistan in the first 
session of CAP in February 1948'^ ®. But Liaquat Ali Khan, PM of Pakistan dismissed the 
Bengalis legitimate demand by saying that Pakistan was a Muslim nation and the language of 
Muslims was Urdu"*^ . The rejection of Bangla at CAP sparked a series of protest meetings and 
strikes by the students and youths of E. Bengal. To pacify the students the Provincial 
The new political party East Pakistan Awami Muslim League (EPAML) was formed in 1949. In 1950 the All 
Pakistan Awami League was formed in Lahore with Hussain Shahid Suhrawardy as its President. We shall 
discuss the detail of AL formation in S"' Chapter. For AL Formation see Bhuyan: Emergence of Bangladesh and 
B. Umar: Purbo Bunglar Bhasha Andolon 0 Tatkalin Rajniti (Language movement and contemporary politics in 
E. Bengal), 2"'' ed. Dhaka: Subama Publishers, 1979. Chapter 7. For the first manifesto and constitution of AL 
see History of Bangladesh War of Independence documents, Vol. 1, pp. 121-41. 
Awami Muslim League Later renamed as Awami League to confirm the support of the progressive leftist 
elements as well as the Hindus in their fight against the conservative ML government. See Shyamali Ghosh, The 
Awami League 1949-71; p. 21. Also see Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of 
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Government invited Jinnah the founder of Pakistan. In convocation of Dhaka University 
Jinnah firnily declared, "The stale language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other 
Language""^ ®. He further warned tliat tlie protagonist of tlie language controversy is the enemy 
of Pakistan^'.Jinnah's unjustified declaration regarding the state language issue triggered 
widespread agitation in Dhaka. Realizing the Bengali sentiment Nazimuddin the then Chief 
Minister of E. Bengal accepted Bangla as the official language of the Province^^ after less 
than one month of Jinnah's visit. But this fell far short of student's expectation. 
The language issue took serious turn in February 1952 when PM Nazimuddin declared 
at a meeting in Dhaka that Urdu alone was going to be the state language, which sparked a 
massive student agitation in E. Bengal. They observed strike all over E. Bengal on 21®' of 
February 1952. On that day students arranged protest meeting and massive demonstration 
violating the government ban on procession and meetings in Dhaka. People of all walks of life 
joined the student demonstration in support of the demand for Bangla^^. As the government 
attempted to demolish the movement bv force, five persons including 3 students of Dhaka 
University were killed in police firing^ . The news of the killing sparked like wildfire 
throughout the city. All the opposition members of the Provincial Assembly walked out in 
protest^^. The government machinery almost collapsed in the face of civil commotion in the 
next few days. The movement was only suppressed after the deployment of Army^ *^ . 
The 1952 language movement did sow the seeds of a secular linguistic Bengali 
nationalism among Bengalis who were the ardent supporters of Pakistan movement. The 
prominence/ salience of religious appeal began to decline from the Bengali Muslims. One 
astute observer had aptly described this phenomenon as 'Muslims return home^^. Its 
immediate impact was Ae ML's election debacle and Bengali autonomists' decisive victory in 
1954 provincial election. 
While the ruling elite in Pakistan had unwillingly accepted Bengla as one of the state 
language of Pakistan by the mid 1950's, their attempt at cultural domination of E. Bengal did 
not end here. 
The 1954 Election and Aftermath: 
The frustrated Bengali vernacular leaders primary goal was the ouster of the Provincial ML 
government by the re-establishment of their own hegemony and they got the chance in 1954 
Provincial election in East Bengal^^. Fueled by the Bengali vs. Urdu Language controversy 
the Awami League (AL) joined the other Bengali opposition parties in a coalition United 
Front (UF) to compete the forthcoming election. The UF fought the election on a 21 Point 
Program, which was advocating the state language issue and the demand for regional 
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autonomy on the basis of Lahore Resolution^^ The ML was virtually wiped out in the 1954 
polls because it was identified with central governments policy to establish a strong central 
govt, against Bengalis autonomous demand. Out of 227 Muslim seats the ML got only 9 seats, 
while the UF obtained 87.5% of the Muslim votes^°. The successfiil display of linguistic 
symbols and slogans led to the speculative victory of UF. This victory was the triumph of 
Bengali middle class whose rise in political power was blocked by the parliamentary coup on 
the eve of Pakistan. After the general elections the Jukta Front government formed in former 
East Pakistan headed by A.K. Fazlul Huq, who represented the Krishak Sramik Party 
(Peasants and Workers Party [KSP]) another important partner of UF Front. 
The ruling elite could not easily accept the UF victory as it challenged the central 
governments authority in E. Bengal. So through conspiracy and subtle dealing the central 
dismissed the UF ministry and installed martial law within six weeks of its assumption of 
power, on the ground that it was bringing about disintegration of the country^'. However after 
few days of the fall of UF government the UF itself was disintegrated due to the hostile 
central government's conspiracy to break the UF as well as the ambitious UF leaders 
engagement in conflict to get control over the Provincial government of E. Bengal". 
Although central government dismissed Huq ministry, it could not replace the ML 
government, nor could the government anticipate to sustain martial law indefinitely. So power 
would have to be with the indigenous politicians. AL the largest political force in Bengal took 
the opportunity and devoted its energy to capture the government in E. Bengal^^ 
In September 1956 AL took over the E. Bengal government. Few days later H.S. 
Surhrawardy became the Prime Minister of Pakistan^"*. Bengalis felt some sense of 
effectiveness and political power in the brief period of Surhrawardy ministry (Sept. 1952-Oct. 
1957) in the Center. Surhrawardy as a Bengali ordered the allocation of foreign exchange and 
foreign aid on the basis of parity between the provinces. His government appointed a separate 
controller of import and export for E. Bengal. The Bengali Commerce and industrial minister 
took firm steps toward economic disparity between the provinces^^. All these steps of 
Surhrawardy resented the vested interests of W. Pakistan and prompted them to press 
President Iskander Mirza for Surhrawardy removal® .^ 
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Bureaucrat Rule in Pakistan: 
Although ML led by Jinnah had a mass following in 1940's but it never tried to build strong 
organization. This lacking of organizational background facilitated the rapid break-up of the 
party®^ The 1954 Provincial election indicated that Pakistan is lacking a national party like 
Indian National Congress, which could build up the gulf between the two wings® .^ In the 
absence of a national party civil-military bureaucrats became extremely powerful, especially 
after 1954 they became junior partner to the political elites^^. In retrospect, Jinnah relied more 
on civil servants than on politicians in the policy input^''. Liaquat Ali followed the tradition 
Jirmah established^^ After Liaquat's assassination in the absence of a nationally accepted 
leader, effective power was transferred to the bureaucrats from the people's representatives. 
The removal of ^ a w a z a Nazimuddin from office (1958), the dismissal of the first popularity 
elected UF ministry of Bengal (1954), the dissolution of first Constituent Assembly (1954), 
the forced unification of W. Pakistani four units into one province and the imposition of the 
formula of parity of E. Bengal in 1955 were all taken by the group of bureaucrats that 
clustered around Jinnah and Liaquat Ali^^. 
Another bureaucrat General Iskander Mirza replaced Governor General Golam 
Muhammad. All the effective power remained with Mirza and his associates, down from the 
top echelon of the civil services and the army^ .^ Naturally the AL's assumption of power its 
control of the Provincial government was manipulated by the Army. When the AL faltered, it 
was not another political party but the Army that challenged its right to continue '^*. General 
Ayub came to power in 1958. With the support of civil-military bureaucracy he ruled Pakistan 
for eleven years. Bengalis were far from sharing power during Ayub reign, as their 
representative in higher civil-military bureaucracy was practically zero. 
Crisis in Constitution Making: 
Pakistan was suffering from slow constitutional making process because of the central elites, 
whose main target was to occupy power than framing a constitution, which could curb their 
extra constitutional practices. It took nearly a decade for Pakistan to form a constitution, while 
India completed that in less than three years^^ 
In the constitution making, Bengalis differed with the central elites on the issues of 
state language, distribution of seats in the National Assembly and full regional autonomy 
based on Lahore resolution. Bengali and Urdu both were accepted as state language, but 
distribution of seats on the basis of population and full regional autonomy for the Provinces 
were not honored^^. The excessive authoritative power of the president in the constitution 
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made him all powerful that even he could dismiss the PM by thinking that the PM had lost his 
majority in the house'^. 
Although Bengalis couldn't be satisfied with this Quasi-Federal type of constitution, 
they thought that it would at least stop the unconstitutional practices of the center^^. Ayub 
Khan scrapped even this constitution in 1958 and formed his own version of constitution in 
1962, which he called 'Basic Democracy'. Through this ha established constitutional 
autocracy to perpetuate his power^ ®. In his 'Basic Democracy' people had no right to elect 
parliamentary members or provincial Governors or president that created bitter experience to 
the Bengali counter elites in 1962 parliamentary election. So during 1965 President and 
Parliamentary election, Bengalis started movement aimed at the democratization of the 
constitution^ . Yahya cancelled the 1962 constitution and declared that next elected 
government would form the Federal type of constitution by giving maximum autonomy to the 
provinces^'. 
Ayub Era: 
The fall of Suhrawardy was follower by the first military take over by General Ayub Khan in 
Q'y 
October 1958 . The regime gave up parliament democracy, also restricted participation to get 
economic development and national integration. It argued that democracy had brought the 
country on the verge of economic ruination and national disintegration®^. It's true that under 
Ayub rule Pakistan had a high rate of GNP growth but the disparity in distribution of wealth 
and social justice remained. In a decade Ayub created twenty richest W. Pakistani families by 
depriving the Bengalis, who controlled 60-70% private capital^ "*. The excellent economic 
progress of Pakistan could not thrive the living standard of he majority Bengalis that caused 
uneasiness among them and the dream of the national integration remained unchanged. 
Disparity in Pakistan: 
In 1965 the Bengali National Assembly (NA) members were pointing at the serious disparity 
between East and West Pakistan and demanded a rightful position for Bengalis®^. Some 
examples of the glaring economic disparities between the two wings are given here. In an 
average budget of United Pakistan, E. Pakistan provided 60% of the total revenue, but 
received only 25% for the expenditure. By providing less W. Pakistan received 75% of the 
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expenditure for its 40% of the population®^. E. Pakistan received 24% of the development 
outlay in the 1950s and the figure increased to 34% in the 1960s^^ Its share of Pakistan's 
foreign aid never reached above 30%^®. In ten years (1958-68) in foreign trade, E. Pakistan 
exported 59% of the total export but received only 30% of the import . Throughout the 
existence of Pakistan, E. Pakistan contributed 60-70% of United Pakistan's export earning bul 
it received only one third of tlie imports'®. Major portion of the foreign exchange was spent on 
the industrial development of W. Pakistan''. In 1947 the industrial bases of East and West 
Pakistan were about the same size'^. But for almost twenty years, remarkable industrial 
growth in West was witnessed due to preferential policies of the center'^. Following Table 1 is 
an example of analysis of comparative industrial Development''^. 
Table 1.1 Industries in the Provinces of Pakistan 
Established Industries in both wings West Pakistan East Pakistan 
Year 1947 1967 1947 1967 
Textile Production in million yards 350 6,836 508 550 
Sugar production in thousand tons 10 340 25 112 
Cement production in thousand tons 350 1,934 46 75 
In 1960 W. Pakistan per capita income was 32% higher than E. Pakistan but after 10 years the 
difference increased up to 61% because of rapid industrial growth in west'^ Apart from 
economic disparity, Bengalis were deprived of civil and militaiy jobs. 
Table 1.2 Military Elite in Pakistan, July 1955 96 
Office Rank East Pakistan West Pakistan Percentage 
Army 14 894 1.6 
Navy 7 593 1.1 
Air force 60 640 9.3 
In Table 2 it has been shown that the E. Pakistan's representation in the military was 
marginal. Pakistan inherited it's military from the British India which made the force 
overwhelmingly W. Pakistani by origin. But after independence the recruitment policy of 
Pakistan military remained unchanged. Bengali representation in the military never exceeded 
10%, when their position slightly improved during 1960s'^ In civil bureaucracy Bengali 
representation was also insignificant, among the 741 senior civil servants only 51 were 
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Bengali in 1955. There was no Bengali secretary but tliree joint secretaries among these Sl'^ ". 
President Ayub Khan had taken some initiatives to improve Bengali percentage in civil 
service. But it never exceeded 35% of the total^'. 
Pakistani defense headquarters, other head offices of the Central Government and 
business establishment and Central Bank, all were located in the west. All the official bosses 
were W. Pakistani as well. The distance between the provinces was 1000 miles so E. Pakistan 
was 1000 miles away from all the Central business. Naturally East was easily deprived and 
west reaped all the central b e n e f i t s E v e n the secretary General of Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) in W. Pakistan once admitted, " it is.. .a hard fact that the E. Pakistan is indeed a 
colony"'®'. At that time, it was obvious that the political and economic injustice meted on E. 
Pakistan over the past two decades justified that she had all right to seek fiill regional 
autonomy'"^. 
Six Point Movement and Fall of Ayub Khan: 
Any kind of political activity was banned in Pakistan during the early period of military rule 
(1958-62). In 1962, in his bid for 'Civilianizing' his regime, he allowed open politics in 
Pakistan with the installation of new constitution and withdrawal of martial law. At the death 
of Suhrawardy in 1963 when AL was suffering from leadership vacuum Sheikh Mujib the 
then Secretary of the party decided to step forward as the leader and felt the need to revitalize 
the party'"^. By this time, however, the AL has directed all its attention towards the problems 
of former East Pakistan. It took on the task of championing the grievances of former East 
Pakistan. Mujib's plan was accelerated by the 1965 Indo-Pak war. During the war E. Pakistan 
was totally cut off from the West and was Vulnerable'Bengali felt completely unsecured in 
the face of probable Indian attack. This defenselessness in turn added a new militancy among 
the politically and economically frustrated Bengalis. At this opportune moment Mujib 
announced his famous six-point program for regional autonomy at a All Pakistan National 
Conference of Pakistan's opposition Political Parties held in Lahore in February 1966"'^ The 
six-point program was envisioning:'®^ (1) a federal, parliamentary government for the country 
(2) the transfer of all power except defense and foreign affairs to the province (3) separate 
currencies and State Banks for the two state (4) all taxation power in the provinces which 
would make grants to the central government for the coimtry (5) Independent authority of the 
states in the matter of international trade and (6) the formation of militia force for E. Pakistan. 
The W. Pakistan opposition leaders rejected Mujib's plan interpreting it as a secessionist 
device. For the AL the semi-independent characters of Provinces articulated in six-point 
program would ensure a healthy relationship between East and West Pakistan. Separated by 
1000 miles hostile territory, different in culture and heritage, the two wings may need a 
slightly one another but one did not require subordination to the other'®^. After his return to 
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Dhaka from W. Pakistan Mujib and his party launched a vigorous campaign to popularize the 
program. The AL started advocating for a separate identity for East Bengal. It also drew the 
attention of the people of this region to the domination and subjugation of former East 
Pakistan by the West Pakistan based ruling elites. Mujib and his people carried the message of 
Bengali sub-nationalism to every comer of Bangladesh. Though NAP (Bhasani), Jammat e 
Islami and all factions of EPML criticized the scheme and supported the Ayub regime within 
a short period it extensively changed the complexion and direction of Pakistan politics, 
evoked tremendous enthusiasm among Benplis, the urban centers of E. Pakistan seemed to 
be in the grip of sub-nationalist explosion'° . Ayub was unnerved. He preferred to meet the 
challenge with the only language that a military dictator knows - "Language of Weapon" 
rather than by political negotiation'®^. The ruthless suppression of the movement by the Ayub 
regime and Mujib's arrest gave him the halo of martyrdom. Throughout 1966-67 while he was 
in prison his popularity increased"®. 
In December 1967, several months after Mujib's imprisonment the government 
dramatically publicized that a plot had been uncovered which was designed to secession of E. 
Pakistan from Pakistan through an armed revolt with Indian help'". Mujib was described as 
the principal culprit in the conspiracy; the trial began in June 1968"^. But Bengalis were 
convinced that the case was a fabricated effort by ruling elite to suppress the demand of 
autonomy for E. Pakistan. Meanwhile an anti-government popular upsurge started in W. 
Pakistan in October 1968 by the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto"^ an ambitious Sindhi 
politician, which also spread to E. Pakistan with more voracity"'*. The upheaval swept the 
Ayub's military regime . Underpressure from different political parties and student groups 
the conspiracy case was also withdrawn just before Ayub's fall and Mujib was released 
unconditionally from the prison"^. This successful movement played an important role of 
raising Bengali grievances higher up to the political agenda and helped to popularize Mujib as 
the hero of Bengali nationalism"^. 
Since the beginning of militaiy regime Ayub Khan adopted various measures to curb 
the political elites of Pakistan in his favor. Though E. Bengal intellectuals including students 
and politicians were equally critical of W. Pakistani exploiters; though this progressive 
section of the society, supported by the rising petty-bourgeois elements, already rejected the 
idea that only Islam can unite the peoples between the two wings of the country but Ayub 
Khan in E. Bengal, by his 'distribution of favor policies to make some vocal support group', 
Talukder Muniruzzaman, Studies of Pakistan and Bangladesh (New Delhi, South Asian PubHshers Pvt. Ltd., 
1982), pp. 68-69. 
Pakistan Times, (February 17, 1966). Also Ittefaq (Dhaka, march 21, 1966). Also see A.L. Khatib, Who 
Killed Mujib?; p. 139. 
According to the Government Press note issued on S"" of June thirteen the police firing killed persons on 7th 
of June. AL demanded at least 100 persons were killed. R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics, p. 24-30 and Talukder, 
Bangladesh revolution, p. 25. 
L. Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan (1958-69), (Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1971), 
pp. 91-92. Including Mujib thirty-three Bengali Civil-Militaiy Officers and politicians were accused in this case. 
H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan 1962,1969 (Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 184-89. 
W. N. Dobell, Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 42(3), (Fall, 1969), p. 307. 
"" Zillur Rahman Khan, The Third World Charisma: Sheikh Mujib and the Straggle of Freedom, (Dhaka, UPL, 
1996), pp. 59-60. 
Shahid Javed Burki, Ayubs Fall: A Socio-Economic explanation, Asian Survey, Vol, XII, No. 3, March 1972. 
After coming from Prison Mujib emerged the only leader of E. Bengal, dominating the national opinion. M. 
Rasiduzzaman: The Awami league in the Political Development of Pakistan, Asian Survey Vol. X, No. 7, July 
1970. 
Chowdhury, The Last Days p. 48 and Zillur Rahman Khan, The Third World Charisma, pp. 59-60. 
32 
was enjoying support from a few upper bourgeois and big land holding class. These two 
sections of elites were basically representing two different type of political heritage. The 
former were struggling for regional autonomy since the inception of Pakistan and were 
enjoying popular support. The AL and NAP (Bhasani) were in this g r o u p T h e later stood 
for united Pakistan with strong central government. PML and some individual basic 
democrats (this section was newly created by Ayub Khan's distribution of government favor 
policy) were in his group. The less popular Cowmi ML, NIP and JI were representing the 
third stream of communal parties. They were in favor of one united Pakistan and believed on 
Islamic nationalism. Though there were many similarities between the second and third group 
but the third group was not ready to support the autocrat military regime, rather till 1970 they 
were involved with second group to establish democracy in Pakistan. Again, though the first 
and third group's intension was to establish democracy but the autonomous issue and 
ideological struggles were waged between the extreme right third group and the secular first 
group. Here only the first group was enjoying popular support. So when AL started 
autonomous movement the second and third group immediately loosed their weak ground. 
Ayub was depending on the government's coercive force. Although NAP (Bhasani) assisted 
help to Ayub regime, by going against the wind NAP (Bhasani) loosed itself popular support 
base and AL ultimately became beneficiaiy by gaining these loosing ground of all other 
parties because of its sub-nationalist appeal in that time it was the demand of East Pakistan 
peoples' heart. 
Yahya and 1970 Election: 
The Fall of Ayub Khan could not establish democracy in Pakistan; rather the militaiy had 
taken over the power for the second time in March 1969' To placate the discontent against 
the perpetual military regime. General Aga Mohammad Yahya Khan promised that power 
would be transferred to the people's representatives at an early date'^ . Mujib achieve a 
crucial and tactical gain by convincing the regime to allocate the National Assembly seats of 
the provinces on the basis of population'^'. Yahya also dissolved the 'one unit' scheme, which 
was the source of tensions among the four units of West Pakistan in 1956. National and 
Provincial elections were scheduled in December 1970'^^. 
The junta believed that the AL might win the majority in E. Pakistan but it would fail 
to win in the National Assembly as it was totally a Bengali nationalist party and had no 
influence in W. Pakistan if the AL would agree to share power in a coalition government then 
it had to negotiate on it's six-points program'^^. 
Mujib fought the election for regional autonomy based on his six-points program by 
encouraging secular Bengali nationalist f e e l i n g s T h e new generation of 1970 had little idea 
of Hindu elites domination but now they were facing the socioeconomic exploitation by their 
co-religionist W. Pakistanis'^^. This geared the feeling of entire middle class and Bengalis 
It should be noted here that while the AL mainly remained concerned with regional autonomy but the NAP 
equally emphasized on two vital issues: full regional autonomy of Pakistan and non-aligh foreign policy. 
" Bangladesh Documents, p. 2. Also see G. W. Chowdhuiy, The Last Days, pp. 46-47. 
Bangladesh Documents, p. 38. Also see Zillur Rahman l^an, Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh, p.l5. 
Bangladesh Documents, p. 34-35,46; Craig Baxter, Pakistan Votes, Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 
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assured its representation in National Assembly. 
^^ Election was scheduled to be in October, but due to flood of E. Pakistan, the election was shifted in 
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business class that nothing short of complete autonomy could bring them justice and equality 
and gave their firm support behind AL campaign'^^ Contrary to Mujib the main competitor 
Bhutto was preaching Islamic nationalism, strong center and a thousand years war with India, 
which suited the W. Pakistani dominated civil military bureaucra tsThough since 1969 the 
autonomous issue became the rallying cry of Bengalis but still then in East Bengal the 
Jammat, various factions of ML, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the NI party - all these right 
wing parties advocated for a strong viable central government against the autonomous 
aspiration of the Bengalis. The also propagated the Islamic nationalism against the secular 
Bengali sub-nationalism of AL. Among the leftist parties of E. Bengal the pro-Moscow NAP 
(Muzaffar) took part in the election and promised to establish a democratic government. But 
the factionally divided and weak pro-Peking NAP (Bhasani) avoided election to save itself 
from a shameful defeat and started a movement on the slogan 'Voter Age Bhat Chai' (we 
demand food before the elections) 
Just before the election, suddenly a disastrous cyclone blasted the southern districts of 
E. Pakistan. Near about one million people perished by that devastating tidal wave. The 
destitute people needed help. But the Pakistani government showed little concern for the 
victims'^ . Yahya's callousness in the incident hardened the bitterness of Bengalis. By 
capitalizing this feeling AL reaped maximum benefit and Yahya's expectation of coalition 
government was nullified'^". 
The overwhelming election victory of AL was a stirprise to all and it also repeated the 
1946 election verdict of Bengalis. The election routed out total opposition from East Bengal 
who previously had opposed the AL's view of Maximirai autonomy for the Bengalis. AL's 
victoiy in E. Pakistan was almost exclusive (167 out of 169 seats allotted to East) and a 
comfortable majority in the National Assembly (169 out of 313) could enable it to form 
government without any coalition. The PPP became the second largest party with 81 seats 
won from W. Pakistan but not so successful as AL'^'. 
The polarization of the two conflicting interests of the two wings imder two regionalist 
key party in the election verdict indicated the future tussle and tension in Pakistan and 
threatened the national integration. Moreover the previous asstmiption of the regime of 
Mujib's compromise on his six-points proved wrong alarmed the junta'^^. 
From Pakistan to Bangladesh: 
After the election General Yahya came to E. Pakistan in January 1971 to meet Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman and his party members. In the meeting with Yahya Mujib made it clear that 
he would form the Government on the basis of six-points program'^^. But Yahya knew very 
well that even if he agreed with Mujib the W. Pakistan dominated by military would not 
accept it as they felt Mujib's six-points were a potential threat to their financial and 
Talukdar, Bangladesh Revolution, p. 13. 
Election Manifesto of the PPP, (Karachi, Vision Publication, 1970). 
Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh; pp. 20 and 41. Also see A. W 
Bhuyan, The Emergence of Bangladesh, op. cit.; pp. 138-40. Also see Amzad Hossain, Politics and Political 
Parties of Bangladesh, pp. 74 and 124. 
David Loshak, Pakistan Crisis, (London, Heinemann, 1971), pp. 40-44. 
Zillur Rahman Khan, The third world Charisma, pp. 6-63. 
Bangladesh Documents, p. 30; For a better analysis of the election see Craig Baxter, Pakistan Votes, 1970, 
Asian Survey, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 197-217. The AL gamed ahnost total victory (288 seats out of 300) in its 
Provincial Assembly Election. 
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Zillur Rahman Khan, Leadership Crisis in Bangladesh, p. 17; Bangladesh Documents, p. 140, 143-44. 
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institutional i n t e r e s t T h e iniJitary ijiterest aiso assimilated with tiiose of Bhutto. However, 
prior to his departure from Dhaka Yahya told the newsmen, "Mujih is going to be the future 
Prime Minister of the country"'^^ 
Bhutto, with his devastating election victory in W. Pakistan wanted to shaie power 
with Mujib but Mujib was reluctant to do that. Moreover the acceptance of the Government 
based on six-points would have meant the loss of his massive popularity in Punjab, where he 
promised a strong central government and powerful army'^^. Failure to get Mujib to 
compromise both junta and Bhutto attempted to postpone the opening session of the 
Assembly'". On February in a public meeting Bhutto declared a general strike in W. 
Pakistan to put pressure on Yahya to postpone the inauguration of the National Assembly 
(NA) on March 3, 1971 
Threatened by Bhutto and civil military bureaucrats on March 1, just before two days 
before of convening the Assembly Yahya postponed the first session of the NA 
indefinitely'^®. Hearing this fatefijl decision Mujib called a non-cooperation movement in E. 
Pakistan for an indefinite period and paralyzed the total provincial administration''*®. Near 
about 350 protesters were killed during the first week of strike in clashes between the W. 
Pakistani military and Bengalis, which further inflamed the volatile situation'"^'. During this 
uncertain political environment the Bengali radicals put tremendous pressure on Mujib to 
declare independence of E. Bengal instead of their prior demand of maximum autonomy 
To conciliate the East, Yahya summoned the NA on 25"^  of March''*^. But his efforts to 
placate the Bengali agitation was too little and too late. Instead of declaring independence 
Mujib laid down four preconditions for joining the NA in his March 7 speech:'"* (1) Marshal 
Law must be wdthdrawn (2) The troops must return to the barrack (3) An inquiry into the 
killing of the strikers by the armed forces and (4) Immediate transfer of power to the elected 
representatives. To maintain his pressure on the regime he recommended the people to stop 
paying taxes and continued strike. To maintain law and order in the province AL also 
established a parallel administration. The entire civil service and police of E. Pakistan 
responded to Mujib's call immediately for non- cooperation. By this Mujib became the 
virtual ruler of East Pakistan'''^. AL had not declared secession but situation had degraded to a 
point where one more maneuver could produce that result' 
Meanwhile Yahya installed General Tikka Khan'"*^ to be the new governor and martial 
law administrator of E. Pakistan on March 9. Tikka's appointment revealed the determination 
"" Chowdhury, The last Days, p. 148, 154 and R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics, p. 17. 
Bangladesh Documents, p. 144; Pakistan Observer, January 15, 1971. 
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(New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1980), pp. 118-22. 
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during his years as a foreign minister. G. W. Chowdhury, The Last days of United Pakistan, pp. 103-4. 
Salman Tasser, Bhutto, pp. 123-124. Also Morning News, March 1, 1971. 
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of junta to suppress the current upsurge by force if necessary''*®. It was in public knowledge 
that the army garrison in East was being reinforced with additional force and that a showdown 
was certainly in the planning stage and awaited execution''*'. 
Faced with Mujib's defector challenge, Yahya arrived in Dhaka on March 15 and 
initiated a series of meeting with Mujib for a political settlement. President also invited 
Bhutto and other W. Pakistani leaders to join the talks'^". In this last phase of negotiation in 
Dhaka the W. Pakistani party tried to convince AL to modify six-points program. But Mujib 
did not submit himself to the combined pressure of junta and Bhutto'^'. When the President 
finally realized that Mujib would accept nothing less than the six-point program he talked 
alternative proposal. 
On his way to Dhaka Yahya knew he had two alternatives to come out from the crisis. 
Either he had to accept Mujib's confederal arrangement by ignoring Bhutto and turn the risk 
of alienating the junta. Otherwise, if Mujib did not compromise then he had to crush 
vulnerable Bengali nationalist movement by his strong military power as they successfully did 
earlier'^^. As Mujib was under pressure from his radicals so was Yahya from his hawkish 
G e n e r a l s W h e n military lost all hopes to assure any solution, Yahya chose the second path 
and agreed with the voice of junta " Pakistan's survival was now threatened by internal 
forces. The time for negotiation was over and the time for action was at hand"'^ "*. Without 
formally notifying Mujib about the outcome of the talks Yahya suddenly left Dhaka on March 
25 and in that night Pakistani military denying the AL's legitimate claim to form the central 
government in Pakistan initiated the genocide in E. Pakistan'^^ with Sheikh Mujib taken into 
the military custody. The Pakistani occupation force in East Bengal had exulted in their 
primary success of their plot to suppress Bengali nationalism. It was a common boast of 
Pakistani army officers that they would rule Bangladesh for a thousand years. In April by 
killing millions of innocent Bengalis when the Pakistani armed forces believed that they had 
crashed the spirit of Bengalis for all times, a Pakistani Colonel said, "This is no longer a part 
of Quaid-i-Azam's Pakistan but a territory we have conquered. Bengalis have been talking for 
colonialism. They will now know what colonialism means. They will never again even dream 
of independence"'^^. But Bengalis did not yielded; the brutal genocide of the Pakistan army 
did not go unchallenged by the Bengalis, their retort was very prompt and well organized. 
Thousands of radical young militants acquired training in the use of arms from neighboring 
India to fulfill their dream of 'a society free from all kinds of exploitation' by ousting the 
West Pakistani occupation force through armed struggle. The country became a battleground 
for nine months, the administration of the country collapsed. Thus the whole drama ultimately 
led to the disintegration of Pakistan and by the sacrifice of three million Bengali's life out of 
the debris of old religion based Pakistan state a linguistic nationalist coimtry 'Bangladesh' 
became the reality in the world geography on of December 1971, which was the rallying 
cry of the young freedom fighters. In this connection one prominent freedom fighters speech 
should be mentioned, "We did not want separation but autonomy. They forced us to engage in 
L. Ziring, From Mujib to Ershad, p. 64. 
"" Fazal Muqueem khan, Pakistan Crisis in Leadership (Karachi, National Book Foundation, 1973), pp. 105-14. 
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civil war. We fought them and defeated them. Our country was liberated by the sacrifice of 
three million Bengalis blood"'". 
Foreign Involvement in Bangladesh Movement: 
The 1971 civil war of East Pakistan created a delicate situation for the Indian policy makers. 
The influx of millions of refugees and the cost involved in maintaining them, the 
unprecedented scale of brutality perpetrated by the Pakistanis inside Bangladesh, the 
tremendous democratic pressure to support the victimized/ oppressed Bengali people etc 
immediately dravra India into the center stage of the drama. Also the leading elements of AL 
and other pro-Bengali forces crossed over to India and pledged the Indian help. In this 
deteriorating condition Indian Parliament passed a unanimous resolution expressing whole 
hearted 'sympathy and support' for the Bengalis before the expiry of the first week of the 
c r i s i s A t the beginning though India was helping the Bengali guerillas through training and 
providing arms, it was interesting enough that the Indians, Soviets and Americans were all in 
favor of continuing of a united Pakistan considering their strategic i n t e r e s t s B u t when the 
Chinese and US insensivity to the Bangladesh cause as against their diplomatic support to 
Pakistan was e v i d e n t ' t h e Indian policy makers reconed their risk of any hasti action. So 
they first tried to bring about a diplomatic solution favorable to Bangladesh cause'®'. Though 
the USSR, by changing its previous position, conveyed full support to India in Bangladesh 
cause later that year but the West Europe still showed their neutrality in Pakistan's internal 
matter. When India failed for diplomatic solution they started thinking for a coercive solution 
send their troops in East Bengal in December 1971 to fight jointly with freedom fighters 
against the occupying Pakistan army, which transformed the liberation struggle of Bengalis 
into a international conflict. Finally the Pakistan army yielded its defeat to the joined 
command of Bangladesh freedom fighters and Indian army'® .^ The context of Bangladesh 
movement changed qualitatively when the Indian army involved directly in the liberation 
struggle of Bengalis. It was clear that the prestige of Bangladesh freedom fighters suffered 
enormously because of the Indian military involvement in the Bengali's liberation 
movement'®^. 
Conclusion: In the British India, Bengali Muslims, the majority community of Bengal was 
lagging behind the Hindus because of their illiteracy and poor economy. In politics and 
administration their position was virtually nil. They needed relief from their disadvantageous 
position. The partition of Bengal in 1905, the formation of ML and establishment of Dhaka 
University, all played decisive roles to mobilize Muslim grievances in Bengal. Within 1937 
the University of Dhaka created an educated Muslim middle class who became the vanguard 
of Bengali Muslim society in their political struggle. The 1937 Provincial election made the 
Interview with a valiant Freedom Fighter, who is also the present President of Dhaka District Awami League. 
Surprising fact is that the Pakistani Colonel demanded to conquer a country that was known to be his own. 
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Bengali Muslims the main force to form Bengal government. After 1937 ML acquired 
tremendous strength in India. The Lahore resolution was passed at 1940 ML convention for a 
separate Muslim homeland scheme which assured cultural, political and economic leadership 
for the Muslims. The resolution created religious zeal among the Muslims and united the 
Indian Muslims in the ML platform to achieve Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims joined the 
Pakistan movement to achieve political, economic and social freedom from colonial 
exploitation as well as from the minority Hindu domination. In 1946 election ML fought for 
only issue i.e. the independent Muslim homeland Pakistan and the Muslims overwhelmingly 
voted the League for it. The Pakistan was created on 14 August 1947. But in the newly bom 
Muslim homeland, where the equality and justice were promised, had never been a reality to 
the Bengali Muslims. In Pakistan the vital question of Hindu-Muslim competition for job and 
business had eroded with the migration of upper class Hindus to India, but the West 
Pakistanis now manipulated the privileged position of British and Hindus. Although in a 
democracy the majority should not have any fear of domination nor, should they have to ask 
for political and economic safeguard; they found themselves under the same colonial and 
minority rule even after the creation of Pakistan. So fi-om the very beginning of Independence 
the Bengalis started struggle for regional equality and justice in the form of autonomous 
movement. Due to the language controversy, economic disparity between the two regions and 
misrule of Bengalis over the West Pakistani ruling elite dominated central government, ML 
lost its popularity. In these circumstances the politically deprived faction of EPML under the 
leadership of Bhasani and Suhrawardy defected ML and formed AL. From its origin AL was 
championing on fiill regional autonomy for East Bengal and recognition of Bengali as one of 
its state language. This sub-nationalist appeal turned the party into the most organized and 
powerfiil political force within few years of its inception. It became the most important and 
biggest partner of United Front (UF) and eliminated the ML as a political party in East Bengal 
in the provincial election of 1954. However through conspiracy and subtle dealing the central 
government of Pakistan removed the UF government from power. In 1958 the military regime 
of Ayub Khan captured the state power. In 1962 when Ayub allowed open politics in Pakistan 
the AL was revived under the leadership of S. Mujib. By this time the AL directed all its 
attention towards the problems of East Bengal and took the task of championing of East 
Bengal. In 1966 Mujib formulated a 6-point program and launched a political program on the 
basis of that program which extensively changed the complexion and direction of Pakistan 
politics. The pro-AL intellectuals also drew the attention of the people of their region to the 
dominion and subjugation of E. Bengal by West Pakistan based ruling elites. Bengali sub-
nationalist movement gathered momentum. In 1969 a mass upsurge toppled the Ayub regime. 
General Yahya Khan took over the power from Ayub Khan and promised the first general 
election of Pakistan - in its history. In the election of 1970 the AL, under the leadership of 
Mujib, won a landslide victory. But the Pakistani power wilders most blatantly denied the AL, 
its legitimate claim, to form the central government in Pakistan. Instead they began what 
amounted to the genocide against the Bengalis on 25 March 1971 and forced them to engage 
in a liberation war. This struggle was hard long and costly. It eventually culminated the 
emergence of independent Bangladesh. 
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Chapter! 
POLITICAL PARTIES OF 
BANGLADESH 
Chapter 2 
Political Parties of Bangladesh 
Introduction: The study of political parties provides much material to understand political 
system. Political scientists consider that an understanding of politics and its direction in a 
country requires some knowledge of political parties'. Sigman Newman remarks that 
"political parties are the life line of modern politics"^. Encyclopedia of Baritanica has given 
the definition that "The term party has since come to be applied to all organized groups 
seeking political power whether by democratic election or by revolution"^. Schumpeter 
defined "A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive 
struggle for power... party and machine politicians are simply the response to the fact that the 
electoral man is incapable of action other than in a stampede, and they constitute an attempt to 
regulate political cometition exactly similar to the corresponding practice of a trade 
association''. 
Political parties are not new to the western countries. They existed in England and 
USA in nineteenth century. But in most newly independent nations political parties started 
functioning after 1950^. However party politics commenced in Indian subcontinent in the 19"' 
century by the direct cooperation of colonial rulers. The first political party of the 
subcontinent was Indian National Congress (1885). All India Muslim League (1906) was the 
second political organization. In independent India many other parties started their political 
activities. Also a countable number of new political parties were formed in Pakistan and 
subsequently in independent Bangladesh. From its inception Bangladesh preferred multi-party 
system for herself^. 
Role and Functions of Political Parties 
In every governing system, either in democratic or in authoritarian state the necessity of 
political parties are admitted. Especially in democratic countries the importance of political 
parties is heavily perceived by all. Political parties by their creative role and functioning in 
social change and political development activate the people and government. Political 
parties however have some common functions in whatever system prevailing in a country. 
They organize public opinion, recruit workers, train people in the art of leadership, articulate 
party demands and communicate them to the centers of governmental power and decision 
making^. 
Political parties in all countries are formally organized groups performing functions at 
various stages of social and political development. They educate people about politics and 
working of government in power. An important service that they render at the national level is 
integration. They nominate candidates for elections to the legislature and work for their 
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success; operate a communication network to keep contact between the government and the 
people. They are the means through which the leaders can communicate with the masses®. 
Political parties also function as the main agents of public affairs. They give us an idea 
of the structure of governmental system. They represent the various social interest groups. In 
democratic country party encourage diverse social groups to share in their decision. There is a 
distribution of responsibility: the ability and talents of all are used and in the process the 
entire social body is activated. Political parties in democracies thus tend to create an 
intellectual climate appropriate to the functioning of democratic institutions and make the 
government really participatory in character^. Political parties are the vehicles which link the 
government and the masses with specific objectives and help the growlh of leadership. 
Party System 
The evolution of party system largely depends on the social and political conglomeration of a 
polity. From the inception of Pakistan Bengali people fought for democracy. The Awami 
League Party (AL) was spearheading the liberation movement and was also committed for 
multi-party democracy. The constitution of Bangladesh, which was written in 1972, evaluated 
the citizens' feelings and recognized multi-party system of government''^. Naturally there was 
a expectation for smooth functioning of competitive party system, an essential precondition 
for true reflection of the flmctioning of political parties as a democratic institution. History 
tells us that any breach of the principles of the competitive multi-party system leads to various 
political vices including political intolerance, disrespect of each others opinion and political 
violence". 
A stable and working party system is synonymous with a stable constitutional 
government. Usually a system of two or multiple parties with broad ideological and social 
bases enhances the chances for the smooth working of democracy. The limits of democracy in 
Bangladesh have been acknowledged and freely admitted in an almost all quarters. Since 
1947 due to the time to time military intervention in state politics and due to the absence of 
open politics, political parties in Bangladesh are characterized by the politics of conspiracy, 
and are known to have pursued narrow sectarian interests instead of broad public interests. As 
a result parties in Bangladesh are hardly based on broad principles or issues. Mostly they are 
personality oriented with followers clustering around a political leader who in turn becomes 
dictatorial leader'^. The unfortunate fact is that none of the political parties except the Awami 
League evolved from the grass-root l e v e l e v e n they don't have nation vsdde constituencies. 
Most political parties' strengths are urban and region based. The other two major political 
party Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jatiya (Nationalist) party (JP) did not evolve 
from grass-root level''*. 
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The Congress Party of India which was like an umbrella organization at the time of 
independence was successful in institutionalizing diverse elements into the party because of 
its organizational strength, clear cut policy preference autonomy and adaptability. Like the 
Congress party tlie post independent AL which was instrumental in spearheading the 
independence movement could work for the development of political institution. Although 
AL was almost the only party and its leader Mujib emerged as single leader in Bangladesh but 
it could not control internal conflict and split. Moreover he showed inefficiency to bring 
together other nationalist parties on a platform in nation building process. Finally by 
establishing one party dictatorship he himself interrupted the democracy in Bangladesh'^ 
The most significant trend of the political parties of Bangladesh are that in power they 
try to impose authoritarian rule and in opposition they demand for maximum democracy. This 
shows their opportunistic nature in politics. From its inception (1949) AL fought for 
democratic right but after getting power AL leader Muiib was the first to challenge the 
democracy by installing a one party authoritarian rule with presidential system and outlawed 
all political parties except his own. Following the fall of the Mujib government, BNP and JP 
leaders although promised for full democracy both parties built-up a substantial executive 
presidency and both party rulers subsequently restored a more restricted version of 
democracy. The first BNP leader Zia justified his authoritarian rule to build an effective 
administration to rule the country following the break down of previous parliamentary order. 
The JP leader Ershad had gone further by questioning the general applicability to Bangladesh 
of western style of democracy'^. After the fall of AL and BNP from power both party 
struggled for democracy since long and overthrew Ershad and his authoritarian regime. In the 
post 1991 election scenario both the ruling and opposition reinstalled popular parliamentaiy 
system on the basis of consensus to prevent future autocratic rule. But in power BNP ignored 
the opposition in governing the country, used mastans (hooligans) and government force to 
suppress the opposition voice and press, finally arranged virtually one party election in 
February, 1996 in oppositions boycott taking a dim view of popular opinion'^. Now AL also 
continuing a type of authoritarian rule, using force instead of constitutional way to quell the 
opposition agitation and the opposition who were previously in power are now following the 
same way accusing AL for demolishing democracy'^. 
Agitation politics is a part of party system in Bangladesh. Since 1947 because of lack 
of democratic order most political parties were prone to agitation politics such as General 
strike, mass gathering and procession etc. By these the opposition exposes their political voice 
and mobilizes public support in favour of their demands. No matter, the ruling party has 
legitimacy or not opposition always continue their movement to bring down the govt. AL, 
BNP and all other parties overthrew the Ershad's autocratic regime through mass movement. 
The same trick was followed against BNP led legitimate government and now practicing 
against popularly elected AL government'^. Both the ruling and opposition parties view 
themselves as adversaries rather than as partners in governing the country. The ruling party 
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dubs the opposition's criticism as anti-state whereas the opposition leels that it is their solemn 
duty to dislodge the autocrat and unpopular government. Lack of experience with the working 
of democratic order has installed a deep rooted suspicion between the government and 
opposition parties. The parties are more for agitation politics than to constitutional politics^®. 
For this the parties bear a major responsibility for sad political disarray in Bangladesh. 
To dominate street politics both the ruling and opposition parties heavily depend on 
their students wings. One of the most powerful and effective political force in Bangladesh are 
students^'. It has been proved in the history of Bangladesh that no political party could 
survive without student support. The AL and BNP are huge organizations because of their 
students' wing^^. All the major political parties use student groups as their front organization 
to spearhead political movement or to contain opposition on their behalf and those who were 
killed, injured or assassinated during the periods of violence were frequently the student 
activists. Student leaders are not generally afraid of being arrested or jailed during protests; in 
fact, they looked upon their agitation role as "political capital for their fijture. By and large the 
universities are treated as the power base of anti government movement^^. In recent years 
opposition have failed to give momentum to anti regime movement because of their loose 
control over student politics vice versa AL's success in containing the opposition lies on its 
control over it. 
Similar to many developing countries, the evolution of the three principal parties in 
present Bangladesh politics especially demonstrates the importance of personal ambition, 
family ties and charisma. The AL and the BNP became identified with the charisma of their 
late leader Muijib and Zia. JP's popularity heavily depends on Ershads personal image not on 
its ideology or organizing ability. BNP and JP both deliberately created by two former 
military generals, motivated by their personal ambition to perpetuate their personal rule. As a 
matter of fact the leadership of major political parties originated through inheritance and still 
they are gaining legitimacy from the emotion of the people have towards the previous 
charismatic leaders. Capability, skill and other criteria are still less accepted to the general 
masses which are hampering system building in Bangladesh^"*. Even the intellectual Kamal 
Hussain's endeavor to form a different political platform seemed impossible in this political 
climate. To popularize the party, the leaders over the year have routinely restored to the cult 
of personality - Mujib and his daughter Hasina, Zia and his widow Khaleda, and to a less 
degree Jailed Ershad and his wife Roushan. This phenomenon of dependency on one 
charismatic leader or on his successor gives rise to dictatorship and autocracy within the 
party. The leader's image and personal popularity are the main strength of the party. He is 
hardly challenged or questioned by the followers. Personalization of politics was thus a 
prominent trend in all the major political parties of Bangladesh. In fact there are hardly any 
democratic structures within most of these parties. For example party elections have not been 
held for many years to select the executives while political leaders are very out spoken about 
establishing democracy within the country^^. 
. Dilara Chowdhury, Constitutional Development, op. cit.;; p. 210. 
. The spearheading role of the students in 1952 language movement, 1969 mass uprise, 1971 liberation war, 
1990 mass upheaval proved their importance in agitation politics. 
^^. Golam Hossain, General Ziaur Rahman, op. cit.;, p . 42. 
" . M. Rasiduzzaman, Asian Survey, March 1997 op. cit.; PP.256-57. 
. Hugh Evans, Asian Affairs 1988, op. cit.; P. 315. Also Abdul Bayes and Anu Muhammad (edit.), Bangladesh 
at 25: An analytical Discourse of Development (Dhaka: UPL, 1998); p.211. 
^^. Moudud Ahmad, Democracy and the challenge of Development, (Dhaka: UPL, 1995); P. 316, Also Zillur 
Rahman Khan, "Bangladesh in 1993: Values, Identity, and development", Asian Survey Vol. XXXIV No.2 
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It is true that democratic parties like AL, BNP, JP are less developed democratically 
than the left wing small parties. But the left parties iared miserably in the post independent 
election politics. In 1979 election Jatiya Samajtatrik Dal (JSD) showed some electoral 
strength by bagging 8 seats and 4.8 % of the votes. That is the highest record by any left party 
in electoral history of Bangladesh. The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) closely 
followed the JSD with 5 seats (0.91% and 1.19% of the votes) in the 1986 and 1991 
elections^^. In the 1996 general election in literary sense left parties were totally rooted out 
from Bangladesh political scenario", only JSD fortunately bagged one seat. Although left 
parties have many dedicated workers, they sacrificed a lot in the liberation war but in the 
present politics they showed inability to play significant role. Tarek Shamsur Rahman noted 
"their future is gloomy. In fiiture they will have to be merged either with AL or with BNP^ ®. 
Lack of party discipline is another important issue facing democracy in 
Bangladesh. In the major 3 parties (AL, BNP and JP) there is hardly any discipline in 
ftmctioning among the rank and file; ambition and personality clash divided the top ranking 
party leaders and divided followers are also clustered around their own gurus (mentors). This 
is why there are so many groups, factions and sub factions within the party^^. Factionalism 
within AL in post Mujib era exacerbated the organizational strength of this party. The 
opportunistic nature of the politicians also spurred the proliferation of factionalism. 
Factionalism was fiirther compounded by Zia and Ershad's military rule. To build their own 
parties the two generals encouraged factionalism and splits into opposition political parties 
including the AL. To recruit leaders and get support from some factions of opposition parties 
they offer them position and privileges. This liberal recruitment policy made both BNP and JP 
a conglomeration of politicians who came from different political parties with various 
political belief covering a wide spectrum from the far left to far right, those creates sub-
groupings in both parties. To weaken the opposition movement the government party also use 
various tricks to create factionalism among the leaders and political parties in opposition^* .^ As 
a result there are now at least on paper more than 200 political parties in Bangladesh of which 
81 participated the 1996 parliamentary polls^'. 
Bengali people led by AL fought the liberation war on the basis of secular linguistic 
Bengali nationalism. Naturally in the new country all the religious political parties were 
banned. The constitution was framed in 1972 by the pro-AL elements where secularism was 
adapted as one of the four state principles^^. But by 1975 the fear of Indian domination in 
public mind gradually resurfaced Islam as a salient aspect of their identity^^. After the 1975 
political change the BNP rulers followed every thing opposite of what AL did to build an anti-
AL image to survive in politics. The BNP became active anti-Indian organization and it built 
. Dr. Muhammad A. Hakim, "Parliamentaiy Elections in Bangladesh: a comparative analysis", Regional 
Studies Islamabad, Vol. XI No. 2 (Spring 1993); pp. 99-100. 
" . In 1996 polls all the leftist parties jomtly bagged less than 0.5% casted votes and of them only JSD 
fortunately managed one seat out of 300. See. Tarek Shamsur Rahman (edits.) Bangladesh: Rastra "0" Rajniti; 
op. cit.; p. 223. 
. Ibid.; pp. 223,226. 
. Peter J. Bertocci, "Bangladsh in the Early 1980's: Praetorian Politics in an Intermediate Regime", Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXII No. 10, October 1982, P. 993. 
. Dilara Chowdhury, op. cit.; PP. 212-13. 
Tarek Shamsur Rahman (edt); Bangladesh; Rastna 'O' Rajniti, op. cit.; p.224. 
Muhammad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism: The case of Bangladesh (Dhaka: UPL 1995); PP. 
90-93. 
Shafiql Huque and Mohamad Yeahya Akter, "The Ubiquity of Islam: Religion and Society in Bangladesh," 
Pacific Affairs Vol., 60 No. 2 (summer 1987); pp. 200-25. 
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a pro-Islamic image '^*. Islamic parties, which were outlawed under Mujib, were legalized in 
1976. Following BNP rule JP followed the same policy to popularize the party in the masses. 
JP leader advanced one step further more and made Islam the state religion. Now BNP and JP 
want Islam as one of the ingredients of Bangladesh nationalism. In every general election 
except 1973, the voters preferred modem educated but to some extent religious leaders 
instead of orthodox Islamic or secular parties. The orthodox Jammat e Islami Bangladesh (JI) 
remained handicapped in election politics with its tremendous ideological commitment and 
organizational discipline^^ Politics had reached to a point where it was a matter of votes and 
it did not make sense to deny growing popular sentiments. AL had to compromise and thus 
began the 'Islamization' of AL in a limited form^®. To compete the election politics now 
every party even the leftists are mixing in balm their color vice versa the orthodox Islamic 
parties like JI etc. are also showing relatively moderate view to satisfy the moderate Bengali 
Muslim sentiment^ 
Previously political parties were divided into socialist and capitalist economic block. 
But after the fall of socialist ideology in USSR except few "paper parties" (parties existing 
merely in names) all the parties more or less adapted free economy in their party ideology. 
During 1972-75 AL followed socialist economic policy to govern the country but in 1992 AL 
amended its socialist view by accepting open market economy and included it in its 1996 
election manifesto^^. BNP and JP followed market economy in ruling the country and 
decentralized the major public sectors; those were nationalized by previous Mujib 
govemment^^. 
About 10% of the Bangladesh population are minorities. The overwhelming number 
of them are Hindus who generally support AL. They constitute a solid vote bank for the party. 
This resented the other parties'"'. Another significant group of minority are non-Bengali 
Muslims, migrated from India after 1947. They blame the AL for the disintegration Pakistan 
and for their present economic hardship. This ethnic minority in the country support BNP for 
its anti-AL, anti-Indian and pro-Islamic stand"". 
The ruling elite's of BNP and JP led government under Zia and Ershad were the merger of 
civil military bureaucrats and politicians. A mentionable number of civil- military bureaucrats 
are now dominating the highest decision making committee of these parties. The army-elite's 
who worked for Zia were benefited and they were also included in the cabinet of post 1991 
Khaleda Zia government. During 1972-75 AL government had taken some detrimental policy 
towards the corporate interest of armed forces and civil bureaucracy. It led the two institutions 
in the rival position to Mujib government. But now the present AL led government, by 
changing its previous policy assured the armed forces to cooperate in its modernization 
process. Moreover Sheikh Hasina included some of the ex-civil and military bureaucrats in 
her cabinet'*^. To survive in power all political parties need to share governing power with the 
civil-military elites. 
^^ Weekly Dhaka Courier 19 June 1999, P. 17. 
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The 1991 and 1996 election results and later political development confirmed the 
dominance of the two major political parties in political scenario of Bangladesh. The voters 
are also polarized between AL and BNP camp. For the development of the stable democracy 
the emergence of two party system may play a positive role. But the absence of democracy 
and internal feud within the parties, lacking of their definite programmes and their intolerance 
to each other creating crisis in the development of democratic institution in Bangladesh'^^. 
Socio-Economic Background of the Political Leaders 
The Bangalis are impregnate with politics. The high vote turnout in the general elections 
shows the enthusiastic respond of Bengalis masses to democracy'*''. Near 200 political parties 
are demanding that they are representing different group views of the society. 81 of these 
parties participated in the 1996 parliamentary election. The proper representation of masses in 
the government is a crucial factor in the evolution of democratic government of a country. But 
the fact is that like the other third world countries, the Bengalis political parties are not 
correctly showing the real representation of the 85% rural masses in their party rank and file 
rather all the parties are controlled by few urban based elite's of the society. 
The essential determinant of previously East Bengali and Bangladesh politics has been 
that the leadership of the people's party has traditionally been provided by other groups i.e. 
the minority oligarchy i.e. elected few elites. During the British and Pakistan rule, the 
leadership of the political parties came from either wealthy landlords or urban middle class 
professionals, who did emerged in the late 19*'' century or early 20^ century''^. Nawab Sir 
Salimullah the founder president of Muslim League; Fazlul Haq, the chief minister of Bengal 
(1937) and East Pakistan (1954); H.S. Suhrawardy, the Chief Minister of British Bengal 
(1946); and the Prime Minister of Pakistan (1956) and all other leaders of Muslim League and 
AL represented one of these two sections'*^. The exception was seen especially during the 
liberation struggle in 1971. Both the rural peasants and urban middle class played the vital 
role in the Bengalis sub nationalist struggle during 1966-70 and in the 1971 liberation war'* .^ 
The influence of their leadership was reflected in 1970 and 1973 general election''^. After the 
1973 election no real farmer could win the election. 
After the independence although AL came to the power because of its revolutionary 
image but we find a little reflection of 90% peasant class in its top leadership structure. All 
the party high positions were occupied by urban based higher middle class and wealthy 
section. Peter J Bertoeci introduced the 1972-75 leader-ship with petty bourgeois 
background'*^. The first president of Bangladesh and AL leader Mujib was also from affluent 
middle class background. The power base of the AL came from surplus farmers in the rural 
areas and lawyers, businessmen and various professions in urban centers^°.It is mentionable 
Ibid.; P.154. Also see weekly Main Stream June 22; p. 5. 
In 1996 general election 74.15% of the registered voters cast their votes. For detail election results see The 
Daily Star, 28 June, 1996. 
During Pakistan period the lawyers and landlords were dominated East-Pakistani parliament. The other 
groups were also urban based. But none of them were from farmer class. See Talukdar Maniruzzaman, Study of 
Pakistan and Bangladesh. (New Delhi; South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1982); p. 82. 
Hugh Evans, Asian Affairs. October 1988, op. cit.; pp. 308-09. In an study of T. Maniruzzaman it was seen 
68% of the political leaders were drawn from professional groups - lawyers, doctors, teachers and journalists ( 
see Talukder Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath; p. 8). 
S.M. Shamsul Alam, "Democratic politics and the fall of the Military Regime in Bangladesh"; Bulletin of 
concerned Asian Scholars, Vol.27 No.3, July-Sep. 1995; p. 30. 
Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics : Problems and Issues (Dhaka : UPL, 1987 2"'' ed.); pp. 149-57. 
Peter J. Bertocci, Asian Survey, October 1982 Op, cit.; p. 994. 
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that from 1970 election the empty places of the previous landlord class were gradually filled 
by business people. A survey conducted by R.Jahan on the Parliament members (MP) clcclcd 
in 1970 showed tliat out of 287 members interviewed 78 were middle class businessmen, 77 
lawyers, 28 doctors and only 50 were farmers^'. The majority MP elected in 1970 and 1973 
election were belonged to urban professions such as lawyers, teachers, doctors etc. In 1970 
business class were 26.9 % farmers 1207 %, politicians 5.2% and all other were middle class 
professionals; whereas of the MPs elected in 1973,23.7% were business, farmers 14.8% and 
politicians 12.7%. The full time politicians generally were the former student and labor 
leaders who did not undertake any other occupations". Only 28 MPs of the 300 were elected 
for the third time in 1973. Near one third were new comers to the Assembly. Indeed roughly a 
quarter of the members of Parliament had very little political experience - these MPs were 
influential local leaders, the party co-opted them for the purpose of wiiming the elections^^. 
The leaders of all political parties irrespective of their ideological differences belonged 
to the middle class background. Most of them came from rich peasant family background and 
were themselves either lawyers or businessmen. In fact they combine an income from landed 
property in the rural areas with an income from urban middle class occupation. 
Moreover including the Prime Minister and President all the ministers of the AL 
cabinet in 1973 had middle class background and three fourth of them were lawyers^''. As 
since 1958 AL was in anti regime movement in Pakistan, except Mujib no leader had previous 
ministerial experience of governing the country. Since its inception in 1949 the AL had 
essentially been a middle class organization. It becomes the vehicle by which the Bengali 
middle class could achieve hegemony. During 1970 to 975 the political leaders from middle 
class backgroimd ruled Bangladesh. But the sudden military takeover of governing power in 
1975 hindered the successive development of this group^^. 
During 1975-78 the country was imder martial law rule. Since 1979 BNP rule, the 
people from the wealthier families gradually occupied the top positions in the political parties 
as well as the state apparatus^^. The occupational background of the BNP executive 
committee members in 1981 shows that 36% of them consisted businessmen, 31% urban 
professionals and 16.5% were ex-civil military bureaucrats^^. Many of the Zias cabinet 
ministers were ex-civil military officers. In power Zia heavily depended on civil military 
bureaucrats than the politicians^^. Only two military officers were elected in 1973 
parliamentaiy election, while 40 ex-civil-military bureaucrats were elected in 1979 election. 
77% of the MPs in parliament elected in 1979 were graduate or postgraduate degree holders^^ 
Earshd and his JP followed Zia's policy in ruling the country. Ershad in 1985 included 
seven army high-ranking officers in his cabinet^ ®. After the 1986 parliamentary election he 
formed new ministerial cabinet of 26 members including 5-army officers^'. All the members 
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of his cabinet were from affluent class. It is a matter of concern that during 1985-90 JP was 
controlled and directed by the military peoples although it had 12 members executive 
committee filled with efficient political leaders". 
By an urban peoples revolt Ershads autocratic regime was wiped out in 1990 and a 
democratic government was formed by people's verdict in the 1991 general election. Political 
analysts pointed out that due to change in political recruitment process especially during 1991 
assembly election a high number of industrialists, retired professionals and established 
business sections began to enter the arena of the countries politics without having any 
previous political experienced^ Of the 300 MPs elected in the 1991 parliamentary election 
53% came from business and industrialist class^. This class comprised 66%, 55% and 63% of 
the legislature in BNP, AL and JP respectively, which clearly portrayed that the nouveau 
(new) rich section formed the majority group . The professional class-lawyers, doctors, 
teachers, journalists, students and former government officers who led the 1990 mass upsurge 
against the Ershad's military regime constituted only 36% of the elected MPs^^.This business 
and industrialist group emerged as the dominant force in the Khalida Zias ministry also. Out 
of 40-member Khalida cabinet 18 were from business group, 5 ex-military officers (now 
doing business), 8 lawyers tow former civil bureaucrats. Maniruzzaman mentioned that this 
business class was created by the encouragement of all previous political leaders who ruled 
the country since 1972, now wanted to have political power for themselves^^. 
Table 2.1 
Comparisons of Occupations for Legislators Elected in 1954, 1973 and 1991. 
Occupations 1954 1973 1991 
No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Percentage 
Lawyers 116 55 75 26 56 19 
Businessmen and 
Industrialists 
11 4 67 24 160 
• 59 
Former army officers 
now businessmen/ 
industrialist 
17 6 J 
Landholders 56 19 50 18 12 4 
Retired civil servants - - 2 1 6 2 
Doctors 12 4 15 5 8 3 
Teachers 16 5 28 10 28 9 
Religious leaders 21 7 - - - -
Journalists 11 4 - - 6 2 
Whole time politicians - - 35 12 6 2 
Miscellaneous 7 2 11 4 1 1 
Total 250 100 283 100 300 101* 
* Total percentage exceeds 100 because of rounding. 
Source: T. Maniruzzaman, Politics and Security of Bangladesh; p. 151. 
62 An autobiography of Ataur Rahman Khan, Pradhan Mantritter Nay Mash (Dhaka: Nowroj Kitabistan, 1991 
2"" edition); 
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The comparative analysis of the socio-economic background of the MPs elected in 
1973 and 1991 election shows that -
(1) The vast majority of the MPs elected in 1973 belonged to age group 45 and below. Where 
as majority of MPs elected in 1991 election belonged to the age group 46 and above. This 
group is naturally more pragmatic and careful about political forms and choice than the 
legislators in 1973 who were radical and emotional due to their role in successive liberation 
movements. 
(2) While 73% of the legislators of 1973 had graduate and postgraduate education, the figure 
is higher- 84% for the legislators of 1991. 
(3) 33% of the 1973 legislator had no legislative experience where as 68% of the 1991 
legislators had no experience. Only 4% had experience of four assemblies. This lack of 
experience in the assembly of 1991 reflected the discontinuities in the political changes in 
Bangladesh and every change of government brought new group of politicians into the 
legislature. The skill of the Khalida cabinet was also low as only 5 (12.5%) out of 40 minister 
had previous experience^®. 
The parliamentarians elected in 1996 were no different with 1991 MPs socio-
economic backgroiind. It is learned that business community formed the single majority group 
among the MPs of the parliament. Out of 318 MPs 152 are business people's, 47 lawyers, 22 
agriculturist, 12 teachers, 15 doctors, 10 politicians and 60 social workers^^. 9 of the 1996 
MPs are ex-military officers'®. Thus business class constitutes 43%, 55% and 50% of the MPs 
elected in 1996 belonging to AL, BNP and JP. About half of the MPs belonged to the age 
group 50 years or below. Out of 318 MPs 272 are graduate and postgraduate degree holders. 
Among these 318 elected MPs 127 had no legislative experience, while 27 MPs were elected 
for the time and 4 for the 5''' time''. 5 of the 26-member Hasina cabinet formed in 1996 
were ex-civil-military bureaucrats'^. 
Maximum of the ministers either have their own business or lobbying for different 
business groups in national and international level'^. 
Considering the socio-economic background of the MPs of the seventh parliament 
Hasanuzzaman found that the" MPs of the 7"' parliament were also belonged to the nouveau 
(newly) rich class'"^. This shows that all the leaders of different major political parties of 80s 
and 90s were either from wealthy and higher middle class background or firom civil military 
bureaucracy and professionals. Hasina and Khaleda the top leader of the two main political 
parties are from affluent society. G. Ziaur Rahman and general Ershad founding president of 
BNP and JP were represented the elite military background. The leadership of different 
political parties leading the 85% village peoples of Bangladesh are coming from only 15% 
T. Maniruzzaman, Politics and Security, op. cit.; p. 156-59. 
Aminur Rashid (edts), Pramanno Sangsad, (Dhaka: Tothya Seba, May 1997) P.68. (in Bangla). According to 
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fanners and small traders among the nominees are very poor in AL and BNP i.e. 3% and 4% respectively. The 
age comparisons of the majority of the candidates are from middle age groups (40 to 50). Only 12% of the 
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affluent urban class, whose living style and culture are more or less different from the 
peasants and who don't have any direct social relation with them. This class visits villagers 
during tlie election period to get votes. The representative chaiacters of tlie Parliament of 
Bangladesh came under questions by the analysis. The pertinent question is can the urban 
elites, who are having little or no link with the constituencies, be representatives of the people 
60% of whom live below poverty line and 85% live in village areas. 
The quality of political leadership is another crucial factor in the evolution of 
democratic government in Bangladesh. Examples abound when leadership with vision has 
made far reaching impact on the pattern of economic and political change of a nation. In 
Bangladesh political leadership has an added significance because people love heroes and 
often rally behind them at points of crisis. This happened in different phase of Bangladesh 
history: in 1937 for Sher-E-Bangia A.K. Fazlul Huq, in 1946 for Mr. Jinnah in favor of 
Pakistan, in 1937 for charismatic Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for Bangladesh, in 1977 for Ziaur 
Rahman and in 1990 for uncompromising Khaleda Zia^ .^ Paradoxically Bangladesh people 
have also a tendency to oppose and malign their heroes. While a part of the responsibilities 
goes to emotional nature of the people, the failures of leaders to product tangible results in the 
face of hard realities of statecraft and adverse socio-economic conditions are often the main 
reasons. This underlines the need for rational and effective leadership for governance of this 
country not leadership based on populism alone^^. 
Growth of Political Parties in Bangladesh 
Party politics was first introduced in British India by the formation of the Indian National 
Congress Party in 1885. All India Muslim League is the second such political party formed in 
1906 Although Congress Party was formed in 1885 except few aristocrats mass peoples 
especially East Bengal Muslims were far from politics. The Bengal partition and its 
subsequent annulment, formation of the Muslim League, the Krishak-Praza movement of 
Sher-e-Bangla Fazlul Haq (1928-37) and the subsequent 1937 provincial election; finally the 
1940 Lahore Resolution brought revolutionary change in the politics of Bengal. Finally the 
rallying cry of ML for Muslim homeland Pakistan and Bengali Muslims assembling under the 
banners of ML helped to grow political institution in East Bengal, now Bangladesh 
Although the growth of political institution started during the British period but still political 
parties and their activities could not reach a satisfactory level. Since 1958 one of the salient 
reasons of the slow growth of political parties is the occasional military interruption in 
governing power and the abrupt obstruction in the open politics by the military junta and 
autocrat leaders^^. 
Political Parties in East Pakistan: In the newly independent country Pakistan, practically the 
ML was all-powerful only party which did not have any competitors. Not only that, Pakistan 
The victory of BNP in 1991 election was possible to a large extent for an uncompromising and strong 
leadership of Khaleda Zia in her fighting against the authoritarian rule of General Ershad. While Khaleda's 
personal integrity and sincerity was not unquestionable. She could not show a clear vision and prove a her 
consummate skill and dynamism in tackling the enormous problems faced by the nation. So in 1996 she lost the 
governing power. However in 2001 her party again returned to the power but because of the negative votes of 
the people who were dissatisfied with AL former regime. 
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and the ML seemed to be equivalent terms; there was no difference between the state and the 
party. But the truth is that, unlike the Indian National Congress party, the ML started 
declining in both the wings of Pakistan right from 1948 especially after the death of the father 
of Nation Jinnah®". Internal conflicts of the ruling ML and the absence of far sighted policy of 
top ranking party leaders to build the party organization helped to split the popular party into 
pieces as well as encouraged regional politics. With in 1950 so many regional political parties 
emerged in both part of Pakistan because of growing weakness of ML and its split^V 
AL was formed in 1949 as a result of intense factionalism and defection of East 
Pakistan Muslim League (EPML)®^ It started to build up a viable opposition to the ML in 
East Pakistan. Soon AL became the chief spokesman of Bengali grievances. In addition to AL 
there were several opposition political parties to the left and right. The major opposition 
political parties including AL were formed United Front contested the 1954 provincial 
election in East Pakistan against the ruling ML. The only national party ML was completely 
routed in the election® .^ The United Front victory represented the triumph of regional political 
parties and till independence regional parties continued to dominate East Pakistan. It was 
however during the tenure of Ayub Khan, AL's popular autonomous movement and the 
undemocratic regimes coercive action helped to grow the strongest opposition. The failure of 
the leftist parties to understand the popular opinion also helped AL to provide itself the only 
meaningftil opposition force to the Pakistan rulers^ "*. 
Prior to the 1970 election the National Awami party (NAP)-Bhasani faction was the 
second largest party in East Pakistan. Other significant parties were three factions of Pakistan 
ML, Pakistan Democratic party, Nizam-e-Islam (NI) and JI. NAP (Bhasani) decided not to 
participate in the National election unless their demand was ftilfilled and started campaigning 
against the election with the slogan "Voter Agey Bhatt Chai (we demand food before vote)^l 
The NAP (Muzaffar) was contesting the election for an exploitation free democratic society. 
The party was in favour of full regional autonomy. All the three factions of ML, the PDP, the 
JI and the NI were advocating for Islamic Nationalism and federal parliamentary system with 
a strong center. AL participated in the election to get peoples referendum in favour of its 6-
point program. AL victory in the election as well as all other parties' defeat was almost 
total^ . The polarization of attitude between the sub-nationalist and all the religious rightist 
parties including ML was confirmed in the election- which usured in their ftiture activities in 
1971 civil war. 
Party Position in 1971: The AL was spearheading the liberation struggle and was banned by 
the Pakistan government. The pro-Moscow CPB and their front organization the pro-Mosco 
NAP (Muzaffar), Studetns Union, Krishok Samity all lent their ftill support and co-operation 
to AL in the struggle. Maulana Bhasani, leader of the pro-Peking NAP also sided with AL in 
Md. Abdul Wadud Bhuiyan, The Emergence of Bangladesh and the Role of the AL (N.Delhi: Vikash 
Publishing House, 1982); pp. 20-22. 
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election result see Abul Mansur Ahmad, Amar Dekha Rajritir Panches Bachar (Dhaka: Khushruj Kitabistan, 
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the liberation struggle and was included in the 6 member consulting committee to conduct the 
liberation war^^. 
Other pro-Peking leftists became totally conftised and were split into several factions 
when Peking preferred to support Yahya regime in 1971 civil war. One section of the East 
Pakistan Communist Party (ML) (led by Toaha) considered the Chinese attitude towards 
Bangladesh was wrong and also argued that the AL led movement was part of a conspiracy of 
Indian expansionism and Russian social imperialism and they fought both the AL led freedom 
fighters and Pak-army and finally met their end. Another group led by Matin and Aludddin 
supported the AL led liberation movement and fought the liberation war with the co-operation 
of AL volunteers^l 
The rightist political parties including all factions of ML, JI, JUP and PDP supported 
the Pakistan-armies atrocity/crackdown in the name of "preserving Pakistan's unity". They 
also formed some voluntaiy organizations cooperating the army to quell the freedom fighters 
and to remove, as they put it, the unfounded fears from the mind of East-Pakistan people® .^ By 
joining the Pakistan-army atrocity they ruined their political 
future permanently. 
Political Parties during Mujib Era : In the newly independent country Bangladesh for the 
first 6 months the AL, led by its charismatic leader Mujib, enjoyed unchallenged political 
leadership in the country. Sheikh Mujib developed a new political ideology called "Mujibism" 
which included four fundamental principles: democracy, socialism, nationalism, and 
secularism. These were also accepted in the recently formed state constitution as the basic 
principles of state policy and the AL claimed that their new political philosophy could bring 
piece and prosperity to the war-ravaged nation Bangladesh^. 
From the very beginning the AL regime followed Indian model of secular state and 
allowed all political parties to function except the pro-Islamic parties, which collaborated with 
Pakistan army during the liberation war. The left wing parties which had supported the 
liberation movement were allowed to function. But these leftist parties were factionalized and 
weak and unable to build credible opposition^'. 
However opposition to the AL developed quickly. The first overt challenge to AL and 
Mujibism occurred around May 1972 when the radical socialist students and radical youth 
faction defected from AL and formed National Socialist party (JSD). This rebel group openly 
challenged the AL and claimed that the only way by which the social political and economic 
conditions in Bangladesh could be improved was to introduce scientific socialism instead of 
experimenting with the Utopian Mujibism^^. The party drew a conclusion to follow both 
constitutional struggle and armed revolutionary path to establish scientific socialism in 
Bangladesh. The party managed to recruit a vast number of youth workers and within a short 
period it emerged as the strongest challenger to the AL regime® .^ 
The first Parliamentary elections of Bangladesh were held on March 7, 1973 where 14 
parties contested for 300 seats. The ruling party AL viewed the election was held as a 
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referendum on the constitution and four principles of Mujibism. Althougli by 1973 Muijib's 
charisma suffered but, he had enough popularity that he could carry any party to a sure victory 
at the polls®''. None of the major opposition parties opposed the ruling party on fundamental 
political issues, but all were highly critical of the deterioration of law and order, 
mismanagement of economy, rising tide of corruption and the soaring price-level of essential 
commodities. In the election campaign NAP (Muzaffar) and CPB emphasized corruption, 
political repression and the law and order problems. The NAP (Bhasani), Jatia League (JT) 
and JSD focused on Indo-Bangladesh relations and tried to exploit the rising anti-Indian 
sentiment in the country. The JSD's campaign theme was scientific socialism'^. AL was 
victorious by utilizing the charisma of Muijb, and repeated their performance of 1970®^ They 
won 293 out of 300 seats in the National Assembly. The election result virtually wiped out the 
opposition from the Parliament®^. 
In spite of the massive election victory the regime gradually lost its grip on the country 
as frustration was growing because of high price of essential commodities and increasing 
corruption®^. The pro-Islamic force began to rally around the octogenarian leader Maulana 
Bhasani who was preaching Islamic socialism. The Maulana began an open and bitter 
criticism of Indian influence in Bangladesh and AL's policy of secularism®®. In 1974 NAP 
(Bhasani) and other five opposition parties formed united front to start a movement against 
government corruption. But the regime easily suppressed the opposition movement through 
constitutional way'"®. 
However the real threat came from the radical JSD and pro-Peking ultras who had 
been trying to bring about a second revolution in Bangladesh through a mass movement as 
well as armed struggle'°'.These parties were sabotaging communication system, looting the 
police stations of the coimtry and killing AL workers and leaders and other "enemies of 
revolution". By this the radical cadres had almost broke-down the law and order system in the 
countryside. Meanwhile at the end of 1974 the JSD launched anti government mass 
movement by exploiting such popular issues as price hike of essential commodities, 
smuggling in India and widespread corruption's. The government decided to root out these 
ultra leftist opposition by force In view of the grave situation created by the hostile 
elements Sheikh Muijib abrogated the constitution, made himself a dictator, gave up 
democracy in the name of second revolution and established one party authoritarian system 
(BAKSAL) by dissolving all party including AL in January 1975 
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In the meantime an army coup on August 15, 1975 over threw Sheikh Muij and his 
one party government"^. The coup detat in August 1975 (in which Muijb and all top leaders 
of AL were killed) and a series of counter-coups took place in November of the same year, 
the country was unmistakably following a different course of political evolution ushered in an 
era of military domination in politics; the ghost of which haunted the nation for the next 
fifteen years. 
The Zia Episode: A group of army officers eventually led the brutal coup, which overthrew 
and killed Muijib and his leaders in 1975. More violent militaiy upheaval came later that 
years and several changes shocked the government. These changes made General Ziaur 
Rahman the first defacto military ruler of the country"'^ 
By establishing their authority the military regime suspended all the political parties 
and their activities, took stem action against the ex-Awami Leaguers and the radicals. On the 
national level most of the people identified with AL were in prison or in hiding. Other rural 
Awami Leaguers were temporarily neutralized by fear'°^. To eradicate revolutionary activities 
of JSD and Sarbahara party (proletariat's party) Zia tightened law and order measures and 
mopped up operations against the Radicals^ . All the top JSD leaders were imprisoned; 
colonel (Rt.) Abu Taher the commander of the JSD affiliated under ground Gonobahini 
(peoples Army) was sentenced to death 
The rightist and pro-Peking leftist groups including Maulana Bhasani'®^ declared their 
complete support to the regime to resist Indian expansionism'Although many political 
groups including CPB and NAP (Muzaffar) initially supported the regime and General Zia; 
the JSD, the AL, and two faction of Sarbahara party''' tried to overthrew the government' 
The JSD theoreticians argued that "the military junta never transfers political power 
voluntarily and the present government can be overthrown only by the peoples united 
movement" 
After the assassination of Muijib and other top national leaders there was hardly any 
national leadership or effective political institutions in Bangladesh which could provide a 
solid foundation for nation building and modernization"''. President Zias position gave him a 
sense of confidence to fill up the vacuum by formal entry into the politics 
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So Zia arranged a referendum on May 1977 to get popular legitimacy for his 
government. Some observers feel that Zia laid down the foundation of his future political 
career through the referendum and felt that he may become civilian leader by joining some 
political parties of his choice and contesting the election' General Zias ambition became a 
reality in February 1978 when a political party named Jatiya Gonotantrik Dal (JAGDAL) was 
organized to give Zia positive support. Through a combination of concession, persuasion, 
intimidation, and distribution of patronage he was able to form broad based party. Naturally 
the leaders of the party had heterogeneous orientation"^. 
From July 28,1976 the government gradually allowed resticted politics"^ but free 
political activities were restored in April 1978 after more than 3 years. Near one hundred 
political parties were affiliated for political activities and most of them were newly formed' 
Like all other political parties AL also recommenced its organizational activities. But between 
1976 & 1978 because of ideological differences as many as 4 factions of AL led by 
K.Mushtaq Ahmad, General Usmani, Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish and Mizanur 
Rahman left the party with their respective followers and formed new parties although none 
of them could survive in the struggle for political hgemony'^°. These splits made AL a 
moribimd organization for a short period. 
After being outlawed for about four years the religious parties were allowed formal 
existence in politics. The parties like ML, Council ML, Islamic democratic League, JI and NI 
were revived with their old and new nomenclature'^'. Military regime openly encouraged 
right wing forces and supported an Islamic ideology for Bangladesh. Actually these moves 
were taken to mobilize the support of Muslim forces in favor of the regime that had opposed 
Mujib and his secularist policies'^^. The JSD leaders and workers, as noted earlier were 
severely dealt with by Zia regime. Later in April 1978, the JSD was able to get approval from 
the government to work as a ftjll-fledged political party. JSD, however, abandoned its 
revolutionary strategy, dismissed its Gana-Bahini and adopted a program of mass movement 
through constitutional means to establish democratic order'^^. The recently formed 
JAGODAL also joined other political parties in the political activities but its distinction from 
the others was the official blessing of the high political authority of the country'^''. 
Before any other political party showed sizable strength Zia wanted to strengthen his 
own political position to get massive election victory in the proposed legislative elections 
M. Rasiduzzaman," bangladesh in 1977: dilemmas of the Military Rulers", Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII No.2 
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scheduled for 1979. So he suddenly declared the presidential election in 1978*". In the 
election campaign Zia was supported by election alliance called the Jaliya (National) Front 
(JF) consisting of JAGODAL, NAP (Bhasani), ML, United Peoples Party (UPP), Bangladesh 
labor party and Bangladesh scheduled cast federation. The main opposition alliance'^ GOJ 
and its candidate Osmani were campaigning for parliamentary form of goverrmient against the 
JF's presidential form of government. No doubt AL was the main force of this alliance'^^ 
The presidential election offered the first real opportunity for political activities since 
the 1975 coup. The moribund AL took the full opportunity of this scope and in the shadow of 
the election campaign it devoted its all energy to rebuild its organization network. Zia 
defeated AL supported GOJ candidates by 76.63% of the votes to Osmanis 21.70%'^^ 
Since the election politics of 1978 the AL was slowly reemerging on the political 
scene, although the defection of Mizan group in 1978 was a temporary setback for the party. 
In the post election scenario the right wing parties were out of hegemonistic competition and 
engaged in factional feud. The division of ML into 3 factions and one of the prominent 
faction leader Shah Aziz's joining the Cabinet weakened its future prospects. Opposition 
political forces, while trying to reactivate their organization but remain generally weak'^^. 
JAGODAL though began with strong official support hardly created enthusiasm in the 
political arena. So, in the fall of 1978 Zia replaced JAGODAL with a new and broader 
national organization the BNP which was actually the merger of JAGODAL and the factions 
of different political parties of JF supported Zia in the presidential election'^^. 
The parliamentary election was held in 1979 when the country was still under martial 
law. As many as 31 political parties contested the election. Although opposition parties tried 
to use the issue of the parliamentary system of goveniment for Bangladesh, it could not 
capture the public imagination to a great extent viewed as a result of peoples hard feeling on 
corruption and inefficiency of the AL government (1972-75) and JSD's violent politics. The 
BNP won 207, two third of the seats in the 300 members parliament but did so with 41% of 
the votes. The AL emerged as the second largest political party in the country by getting only 
39 s e a t s T h e surprising factor in 1979 election was the temporary revival of ML. Banned 
under Muijb regime for its alleged support for Pakistan during the liberation war and its defeat 
in 1970 election all its three factions together mustered 10% of votes and 20 seats'^^. Among 
other noticeable parties JSD pulled 8 seats and other 16 seats to the minor political parties and 
independent candidates'^^. By getting landslide victory Zia had found the way to isolate the 
AL and simultaneously neutralized the extreme left specially the JSO'^ "*. 
Since 1979 parliamentary election the opposition political parties were trying to unseat 
Zia regime through building an anti-govemment movement. To strengthening the opposition 
camp they formed a number of alliance. By forming ten party alliance the main two AL and 
JSD tried to work together but suffered a set back as bitter schism developed inside them. As 
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a result the largest opposition party AL fragmented into two f a c t i o n s T h e JSD, ML, UPP 
and JJP were splited into parts. All these splits benefited BNP as the maximum defections 
joined it'^^. Hasanuzzaman noted that Zia's shrewd politics greatly encouraged these intra-
party factionalism and inter-party feud in opposition camp^^ which helped him in controlling 
the political affairs of Bangladesh. More over Azizul Haqu noted, "The army the 
professionals and the capitalists were favoring the BNP in government, and Zia's popularity 
among the rural masses helped to build BNP base in country side"'^^. Zias canal digging 
policy, forming of village government and youth complex-two big institution which is 
accumulated popular support for him and BNP'^^. 
In spite of many shortcomings under President Zia's leadership Bangladesh was in 
favorable position to build a democratic leadership and party system but his sudden death 
changed the political situation drastically. On May 1981 Zia was assassinated by an abortive 
coup led by rival faction of army officers as it happened before''^ ®. Still then BNP was in 
power by the leadersip of acting president Justice Abdus Sattar who had succeeded 
president Zia''^^ 
After the death of Zia factional conflict within the ruling BNP surfaced 
prominently''^^. Although Sattar was elected president by a overwhelming majority''^^ but he 
could not control the irmer conflict and corruption of BNP cabinet members and party ranks. 
The politicized Bangladesh army took full opportunity of it and dislodged the second 
democracy by taking over the government power'"'". 
Ershad Episode: On March 1982 Bangladesh began its second encounter with military rule of 
General Ershad. The major action of the new regime had been to suspend all political 
activities''^^. Naturally it once again swayed the political growth of the country. 
After successfully consolidating its position the regime initiated restricted politics to 
legitimize its power. Hakim noted that an acute legitimacy crisis that stemmed from General 
Ershad's usurpation of state power through unconstitutional means threw the nation into a 
Although the party was saved for the time being from breaking to pieces by making Hasian (the Mujib 
daughter) the president of AL as a symbol of unity but the internal schesm was not wiped out. See A. W. 
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situation of protracted confrontation between the ruling groups and its political opponents''"'. 
So immediately after withdrawn restriction from politics the agitation started for the 
restoration of democracy by 15 party alliance led by AL and BNP led 7 party alliance'"^. And 
form 1983 they forcefully demanded witlidrawal of mai'tial law; pai-liamcntmy polls before 
holding of presidential elections etc''*^ But the political parties despite their common 
opposition to the martial law regime could not materialize their demands as inter party 
conflict and intra party factionalism weaken the opposition too much that they could not show 
the real challenge to tlae regime. 
Ideological conflict again splited the truncated AL and a new socialist party 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (BAKSAL) was formed by defectors. The second 
largest party BNP also was greatly irritated by intense factional feud after power loosing. 
Even many political observers expressed doubt about the survival of the party out of power 
and with Zia''^^. Late president Sattar, who succeeded president Zia had neither the skill nor 
such popularity to rescue BNP from this danger. Finally the party made Khalida Zia the 
widow of late president Ziaur Rahman the Chairperson to save it from disintegrat ionEven 
thereafter the BNP was splited into pieces. Factional feud affected both the left and right wing 
political organization including JSD, ML and Jl'^'. Ziring noted that in 1986 there was two 
ML, two Democratic League (DL), two BNP, 3 factions of JSD including all 161 masruming 
political parties were in working because parties were divided and sub divided into different 
groups'^ . Even among the party alliances were irreconcilable differences. All the chaos was 
played by the regime for its existence. 
Meanwhile a government sponsored political party "Janadal" was formed in 
November 1983 by the member of military and civil bureaucrats as well as with the 
professional politicians'^^. By distribution official positions, patronage and goodies Ershad 
recruited numerous opportunists from opposition political parties including AL, BNP, JSD 
and DL'^^ But in the face of anti government movement Janadal could not build solid 
foundation among the masses. 
To consolidate government support and to draw rural elites in government party fold, 
having scrapped Zia's Gram Sarkar, Ershad established a new rural administration scheme 
called Upozila system'^^. Where the Upozila chairman will be the head of the local 
government. The Union Council (UP) election were held in the begirming of 1984 and the 
Upozila Council election were held in 1985 under strict martial law without any participation 
of opposition parties. These local power elites elected in the UP and Upozila polls were 
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monopolized by Janadal, which enhanced the chances to gather significant rural support for 
the military government in the subsequent presidential and parliamentary polls 
Keeping an eye on the future national elections, the Ershad regime organized a 
political alliance known as Jatia (National) Front in the middle of August 1985. The front was 
a conglomeration of different party or party factions including Janadal, ML (Siddique group). 
Shah Aziz faction of BNP, UPP (Kazi Zafar faction), Gonotantrik party (GP) and former 
stalwarts of major two parties'^'. Later in first January 1986 this 
front was renamed as Jatia party (JP)'^l To build mass based political organization and for 
the support from religious groups Ershad cleverly stressed on Islamic sentiments and declared 
that "Bangladesh would be a Muslim state and Islam would be made the countries raison 
deters (where 90% peoples are Muslims) 
After neatly arranged his own mass based political organization president Ershad lifted 
the ban fi-om political activities in January 1986^ and started telling that now he is accepting 
some of the opposition demands excepts the withdrawal of martial law'^'. On the other side 
the opposition including 15 party and 7 party alliance led by AL and BNP, JI and other small 
parties started agitation movement to overthrough the regime or to realize the demands that 
the martial law must be withdrawn and the polls had to be conducted under neutral care taker 
govemment'^^. Unfortunately such movement was not materialized as open rivalry and 
bitterness exhibited between the two main opposition party and even inside the party alliances 
there were irreconcilable differences'®^. 
On the verge of fresh opposition movement G.Ershad announced decision to hold 
parliamentary election by accepting some of the opposition d e m a n d s T h e largest political 
party AL had its tremendous success in election politics and its leads Hasina had a belief that 
only through election can a people's party achieve the right to respond the people'^^. More 
over in order to topple other competitors and harvest the credit achieved through popular 
movement AL preferred to join the election. The pro-Moscow groups of 15 party alliance also 
followed AL'^ . On the other hand the organizationally weak but second popular party BNP 
was now less enthusiastic about the polls and decided to boycott it'^^.The BNP publicly 
condemned the AL for betraying the movement to oust the autocratic regime, as they 
preferred agitation politics' . For the same reason five pro-Chinese leftist parties of AL led 
alliance differed with the pro-election decision of the AL, formally left the alliance and 
formed a new front "5 party alliance". So election decision broke the 15 party alliance and 
reduced it into 8 party alliance and weaken the AL banner' 
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The election campaigns indeed created a chance for AL to renew its contacts with the 
electorate and propagate its own views against Ershad regime and its rival BNP'^''. . 
From 1983 Jammat launched its every anti regime agitation program intimating with 
the major two alliances. Although it had good understanding with BNP but to strengthen the 
organization in the masses it participated in the 1986 parliamentary election'^'. 
On 7 May 1986 polls were held in widespread violence and vote rigging by 
government party to elect 300 members of pa r l i amen t ' 28 parties took part in the election. 
By winning 153 seats JP became the majority party, the second major party AL bagged 76 
seats. For the first time of the history of J. I. it showed its credibility in Bangladesh by getting 
10 seats. Independent candidates managed 32 seats and later 23 of them joined JP camp'". 
In the post election politics, Hasina's public image came under severe scrutiny, and 
she paid a heavy political price for this at a later stage of her career. The 1986 election failure 
of AL gave opportunity to the BNP to justify its position of election boycott and to blame its 
rival AL for betraying the people's movement'^'*. The election boycott of BNP established 
itself as the people's trusted fighting force against the regime and its leader Khalida as an 
effective leader for her uncompromising attitude towai'ds the autocratic regime 'Khal ida ' s 
this recent image encouraged her to remain firmly against taking part in any election under the 
regime. 
The election served Ershads purpose very well as it widened gap between AL and 
BNP and legitimized his party to govern the c o u n t r y ' F o r AL, its participation in the 
parliamentary activities hardly proved effective to pressurize the regime to behave 
democratically. When the objective of the major apposition party, AL to fight against the 
regime from within the parliament could not be achieved, carrying the movement to the 
streets remained its only o p t i o n ' A L also started believing that only the combined 
opposition movement outside the legislature could bring democracy in the coimtry. So in the 
15 October 1986 presidential election Ershad was unable to find any viable candidates to 
contest; without the participation of any major political party it turned out to be a total 
f a r c e ' ^ l 
Despite their differences, the dynamics of politics and social condition led the three 
major alliances again to take up a common stand against the regime and relentlessly pursue 
the course of agitation to overthrow the government 'The anti-Ershad movement received a 
stimulus in November 1987; as a result of this Ershad was compelled to dissolve the 
parliament on December 6 1987'^". The fourth parliamentary election was held in 1988 
without the participation of the three major political alliances and the Jl'^'. From 1987 JP was 
loosing its acceptability to the people as it was depending on military and bureaucracy to 
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suppress the opposition movement. However the real threat to the regime and its party came 
on October 10, 1990 when the three alliances chalked out a fresh program asking General 
Ershad to hand over power to a neutral and non-political person acceptable to them. Finally 
the two month long anti-Ershad movement of the political parties supported by professional 
groups compelled Ershads quasi-military government to resign on December 4, 1990. This 
was the first and ever greatest triumph of the opposition parties and democracy after the 
independence of Bangladesh. Chief Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, neutral nominee of the three 
alliances was sworn in as acting president of the country to conduct the February 27, 1991 
parliamentary polls for the future democratic government' 
The fifth parliamentary election in February 1991 was conducted by the interim 
neutral caretaker government Shahabuddin Ahmed'®^ 75 political parties participated in the 
election. In the election campaign AL's manifesto gave special emphasis on reintroducing 
parliamentary democracy, Bengali nationalism, fi-iendly relations with India, mixed economy, 
and trial of Muijib killers. AVhere as the main rival BNP was focusing on Bangladeshi 
nationalism, pro-west leaning foreign policy, market economy, presidential democracy and 
building of a well-organized army. The JP program differed little fi-om that of BNP except for 
the assertion that the experienced JP could govern the country better. It of course demanded 
the withdrawal of the cases registered against its leaders. Jammat was propagating for Islamic 
polity and anti Indianism and its attack was against AL for laters secular policy'® . Both AL 
and BNP tried to utilize the image of their great two leaders Mujib and Zia. 
The result of the fifth parliamentary election surprised every political observer as they 
were expecting a AL victory based on their organizational superiority over the others'®^ 
People voted BNP for its anti-Indian stand and uncompromising struggle against military 
r e g i m e B y obtaining 140 seats of 300 BNP emerged as the single largest party followed by 
AL with 88; although both party bagged the same percentage of votes (BNP 30.81% and AL 
30.08%); JP won 35 and Jammat 18 seats'®^ By this election politically isolated JP was 
rehabilitated in Bangladesh politics. Over confidence of the leaders, presence of squabbles 
within the party and public allegation of its pro-Indian attitude etc. were the cause of 
frustrating election performance of AL'®®. 
Except this fifth parliamentary polls, all the pre 1991 polls were more or less rigged; 
which gradually destroyed the public confidence in the sanctity of the electoral process 
The 1986 and 1988 farce election contributed to escalation of political crisis and the resulting 
movement hastened the fall of the Ershad regime and for the first time installed a non-partisan 
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caretaker government to insiire free and fare polls'^". All the local and foreign observers 
unanimously commented that the 1991 polls were free and fare'®' and it brought back public 
confidence in the neutrality of the electoral process. 
The BNP was short of a majority, but the Jammat agreed to give support in subsequent 
indirect elections for 30 women seats' . These yielded 28 additional seats for the BNP, which 
gave the party a clear majority in parliament of 168 out of 330 seats, while the Jammat took 
the other two women's seats'^^. Begum Zia the leader of the BNP sworn in as Prime Minister 
on March 1991 and formed her government. 
The BNP government scored very high on legitimacy scale as the product of the first 
free and fare elections in the post independent Bangladesh. So without any burning issue in 
question it would be difficult for the apposition to initiate an anti government movement. 
Moreover it would not be possible to unseat the elected government without election through 
any other measures by opposition or military'^''. But BNP's ignorance to the opposition in 
governing the country and contradictions in by-elections started diminishing the peoples trust 
in it and created room for the opposition to go in agitation movement 
As noted above BNP was committed to the restoration of the presidential form of 
government, while the AL was favoring parliamentary form of government. In order to 
prevent future autocratic rule in the country the opposition pressurized the treasury to 
introduce parliamentary democracy inside and outside the legislature. The ruling party was 
under pressure for similar demands from its rank and file and also from the public masses. 
Yielding to the demands Khaleda Zia ultimately compromised with the opposition. In the post 
1991 election, both the ruling party and the major opposition established parliamentary 
democracy on the basis of consensus and thereby created a rare example in the political 
history of the country'®^. The amendment passed in the assembly to change the form of 
government was the first and last compromise in the functioning of the Jatiya Sangsad. 
Slowly in the late years BNP was loosing its control over politics as it was taking some 
unpopular steps. In November 1991 the government faced wide criticism by abolishing the 
public appreciated Upozila (sub district) councils, which had been installed by Ershad 
197 
government . 
Equipped with election success and having good relation with BNP the confident JI 
formally declared Golam Amam, an ardent stalwart of the party as its Amir. The reaction to 
Azams reinstatement in Jammat in December 1991 was immediate, spontaneous and violent. 
A new popular organization 'Committee for the Elimination of Collaborators Assassins of 
1971was formed and demanded death sentence of ill reputed Azam for his alleged 
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involvement in 1971 war crime''^''. Such AL supported popular resistance halted the growth ol" 
JI and also affected the popularity of BNP as it was known the close ally of JI. In the later 
political development Jammat lost its grip over the ruling party for its low performance in the 
by-elections. So in order to maintain its foothold in politics Jammat followed a policy of 
leaning towards the opposition force led by AL'^^. 
After the 1991 election debacle AL had won many of the 17 seats in the by-election 
which certainly showed its growing strength^"". Meanwhile in 1993 AL suffered another 
setback with the split of Dr. Kama! Hussain group which formed a new political party named 
Gono (peoples) forum^"'. Now AL needed an excellent opportunity to showdown its 
continuing strong organizing capability and to shut up the critics; the two major city mayor 
election victory-in Dhaka and Chittagong in January 1994 brought that opportunity for AL. 
The loss of Dhaka seats especially was a galling defeat since BNP had won all the 13 
assembly seats from Dhaka district. There was also a substantial drop of BNP's popular vote 
from the 1991 election^"^. 
Though emerged primarily as an instrument of General Ershad political consolidation, 
JP had a good grass-root support. It had also a good number of able politicians who came in 
the party fold in the hey-day of Ershad regime. The party was then going through an 
agonizing process and the top leaders were in jail or in hiding. Its mid-level and grass-root 
supporters were under increasing pressure to breakout the current impasse to save the party 
from being gradually co-opted by the ruling Moreover though won 35 seats but it was 
still discredited by the people because of General Ershad's nine years autocratic rule. On the 
other hand though the JI sectired 4th position in the parliament by capturing 18 seats but still 
was denounced by the masses due to its anti-liberation role. Since 1990 people were strongly 
against them. These parties were in dire need of legitimacy and an alliance with the AL could 
provide the legitimacy they needed. 
On March 1994, Magura-2 by-election for a parliamentary seat was held due to the 
death of an AL MP. This by-election was a prestige issue for the ruling party since it was 
defeated by AL in the city corporation polls. As this constituency was a safe seat for the AL 
for several years, the victory of the government candidate however was a surprise to all. The 
important political development took place when the alignment of AL plus JI & JP took place 
centering this by-election issue. Thus all the three major opposition parties promptly 
discarded the election result and alleged the government for massive vote rigging; started anti-
government agitation demanding for the appointment of a neutral caretaker government to 
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supervise tlie next parliamentary elections and isolated the ruling pai ty^"' which created acute 
political crises that had gripped Bangladesh for the next two years^"^ 
The BNP government was facing combined onslaught of the three major opposition 
parties which contrary to their own ideology and view points joined hand congruously to 
achieve certain limited objectives by overthrowing Khaleda regime. The AL wanted to 
capture power; the JP wanted the release of General Ershad; JI wanted to rehabilitate Gulam 
Azam and be allowed to carry on its activities '^^ ^. 
Khaleda Zia rejected the demand for caretaker government though her party MP's had 
been seen divided on this issue^ ® .^ From March 1994 the opposition through their various 
agitation programs tried to project the autocratic image of the BNP government^®^ and 
succeeded in isolating the ruling party^°'. In support of their demand, the opposition parties 
boycotted the parliament since May 1994 called a series of nationwide general strikes and 
when these actions failed to produce results, all the opposition members resigned en masse 
from parliament on December 1994^''' and continued their street agitation with greater vigor. 
The BNP responded the opposition by dissolving the parliament in November 1995 and 
holding the parliamentary polls in February 1996. 
The opposition boycott of the election resulted in a sweeping victory for the BNP, 
which won 289 of the 300 seats in a near vote less election. Moreover the BNP engagement in 
massive vote rigging in the polls proved the opposition demand clearly that free and fare 
election could not be possible imder the BNP rule. Vindo comments "By holding the one 
party election Khaleda Zia had perhaps committed one of the greatest political blunders of her 
career"^" . Now all sections of Bangladesh society including professional groups, journalists, 
students and business community joined the opposition movement to realize the demand for 
caretaker government to hold the foture election. The opposition responded the February 
election by launching non-stop strike for indefinite period until the demand was met^'^. 
Faced by popular opposition revolt the government finally passed the 13"' amendment 
to the constitution providing for the creation of an interim government to conduct all future 
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elections in the count^ '^. Opposition leader Hasina termed it 'the democratic triumph' of 
120 million peoples^ . 
In June, 1996 Bangladesh held its parliamentary election conducted by neutral 
caretaker government. Just prior to the election the merger of Obaidur Rahmans Janadal with 
the mainstream BNP boosted its image^'^. 
The election manifesto of BNP, Jammat and JP were same to that of 1991 '^®. Instead 
of defending its ill records the BNP resorted to negative campaign attacking the AL as anti-
democratic politically incompetent and a pro-Indian stooge; which so far failed to respond 
with the people^'^. The AL campaign was much more humble and positive. Hasina sought to 
diffuse the BNP attack by apologizing for any mistakes made by AL government in 1972-
1975. To enrich its vote bank AL also assimilated a little more Islam in its colors. By 
changing its previous socialist stand it promised for free market economy. Foiling BNP attack 
it alleged that BNP rule made Bangladesh "an Indian commodity marke t "^The result was a 
major setback for BNP and Jammat. The AL emerged as the largest single party by wirming 
147 seats of 300 and 38% of votes cast. BNP secured 116 seats (33% of the votes), JP 32, 
Jammat 3 and JSD 1. Of the 81 contesting parties 76 could not manage a single seat^'^. The 
main causes of BNP defeat are: the parties isolation from the masses and journalists, Khaleda 
Zias arrogance, malpractice's of leaders, failure to solve fertilizer crisis and abortive February 
- 96 election which exhausted the parties acceptability^^". 
By winning the election after 21 years in opposition AL returned to power with JPs 
unconditional support and its leader Hasina declared that she would run the country according 
to a national consensus^^'. The BNP refused to join the government and blamed Hasina for 
attempting to destroy the opposition by creating a version of notorious one party dictatorship 
introduced by her father "Mujib" in 1975^^ .^ However by accepting two cabinet positions JP 
and JSD joined the AL led "government of national consensus." Rasiduzzaman described 
these steps of Hasina as "a subtle move of Hasina to outflank any possible BNP led anti-
government opposition movement^^^. 
The power loss initially frustrated the BNP workers. They denounced the BNP leaders 
for their alleged involvement in corruption and nepotism. It resulted factional conflict inside 
the party rank and finally Abdus Salam Talukder the then general secretary of the party had to 
loose his office in this whirlwind^ '^*. 
AL from the very beginning was facing difficulties in governing the country as at the 
same time of its taking office the main opposition BNP also initiated agitation politics. At the 
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first functioning day of the Parliament the BNP walked out from ParIiament^^^ It became a 
regular phenomenon. The longest walkout took place on 30 August 1977 and continued till 
the beginning of 1998^ ^®. Its leader Khalida declared that she would bring down the AL 
government by March 1998^".the JI and Islam Oikko Jote (10 J), the natural allay of BNP also 
joined the BNP led agitation^^l 
In return for JP support in forming government the AL arranged freedom for Ershad in 
1997229 Ersiia^j's release however touched off factional struggle and series of splits in JP 
because of his soft-line policy towards To strengthen JP, Ershad changed his policy, 
criticized AL, withdraw JP support from AL led government and finally joined the BNP in 
anti-government movement. It resulted another defection in JP and the dissident group formed 
JP (Mizan) and continued their support to AL^^'. 
General Ershad's joining the opposition camps provided them opportunity forming a 
four party alliance to initiate vigorous movement to oust AL government from power. Since 
the middle of 1988 the main opposition stream of four party alliance have been boycotting 
parliament to realize their demand for immediate midterm election to oust the AL led 
government, who already failed to rule the country (in their language). The ruling party AL 
however rejected opposition plea for dissolution of parliament. The AL also responded the 
opposition's series of anti regime street agitation by its better organizational strength which 
led to numerous confrontations between the government and the opposition, reported 
terrorism and violence^^^. But oppositions' effort dented a little in AL's popularity because of 
absence of an appropriate issue to create strong popular movement. Moreover the internal 
conflict within BNP and lacking of strong unity among the alliances helped AL to suppress 
the agitation^^^. Adjoining the anti-regime movement the opposition are also trying to build a 
united front to challenge the AL's organizing strength in the next parliamentary votes. One of 
the top BNP leader opined that "their joint effort can defeat the AL in the polls"^ '^*. 
Jammat was loosing its popularity because of its ill-reputed leader, Golam Azam. His 
presidency also created factional squabble in the party rank and file. To strengthen the 
Jammat base before election, the party removed Azam from its leadership in November 
The long awaited water sharing treaty with India (1996), the peace accord of 
Chittagong Hilltract etc. proved the credibility of AL govemment^^^. The acceptance of a 
Daily Ittefaq, 16 July 1996. 
^^ ^ S.A. Kochanek, Asian Survey, 1997, op. cit.; p. 137-38. 
S.A. Kochanek Asain Survey 1997, op. cit.; p. 141. And S.A. Kochanek, "Bangladesh in 1997: the Honeymoon is 
over," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXVIII No.2. Februaiy 1998; pp. 136-37. Also see Dhaka Courier 26 July 1996. 
A.M. Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition, op. cit.; p. 229. Jammat leaders conceded that sided with AL in 
opposition movement was thsir wrong polity and it was one of the reason of their dismal election performance. Also 
see Maulana Matiur Rahman Nizami, "Jammat-e-Islamir Rajnaitik Bhumica O Bangladesher Bartaman poroisthitee" 
(Dhaka: central publication Division, jammat-e-Islami, 1998); p. 37. 
T.S. Rahman (edits) Bangladesh: Rastra 0 Rajniti, op. cit.; p. 41. 
Elora Shehabuddin, "Bangladesh in 1998: Democracy on the Ground," Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIX No. 1. 1999. p. 138. 
With the departure of the dissidents, JP loosed its strength but Ershad emerged in complete control of the party. See A.M. 
Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition, op. cit.; pp. 228-29. Also T.S. Rahman, Bangladesh: Rastara 0 Rajniti, op. cit.; p. 88. 
" I E. Shehabuddin, Asian Survey, 1999, op. cit. p. 148. Also see the Hindu, 31" Jan. 2001. 
Daily Prothom Alo, 20 June, 11 and 12 July 2000. Also see Daily Janakantha, 12 July 2000. Disagreeing the party 
decisions two BNP MPs joined the AL led government of national consensus (T.S. Rahman, Bangladesh: Rastra 0 
Rajniti, op. cit.; pp. 89 & 91). Another leading parliamentary member of the BNP Aktaruzzaman was also expelled from 
BNP in 4"^  December 2000 due to internal factional squabble started since 1996. Daily Jana Kantha S'*" Dec. 2000. 
Daily Janakantha 12 July 2000. 
Daily Janakantha Nov. 2000, Also the Hindu (N.Delhi.), 6*^  Nov 2000. 
T.S. Rahman, Bangladesh: Rastra 0 Rajniti, op. cit.; p. 230. 
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popular bill in parliament to reintroduce Upozila system (1998), for the need to decentralize 
power in order to better involvement and benefit to the citizen, reservation of women's seat in 
Union Council, allowance for the old citizens scheme etc. all these good deeds popularized 
the AL govemment^^^. But the real threat to the party is coming from its own party fold as the 
party rank is engaged in factional feud and it spread up to the grass-root level . Although 
this squabble defected Kader Siddique, one of the top most leader and veteran freedom 
fighter, from the party but the tendency of internal factional fighting could not be eased^^ .^ 
The weak performance of the opposition in parliament as well as in the street agitation 
vice versa the strong organizational base sustained AL in power. But the internal factional 
conflict of the party and deteriorating law and order situation in the country could not enhance 
its popular image any more. 
The 1991 and 1996 polls confirmed that the AL and the BNP are dominating 
Bangladesh political scenario with the JP and Jammat (much smaller than both of the big 
two), holding the balance. Other parties are doing no better. In reality Bangladesh politics is 
today polarized between the AL and the BNP. The people overwhelmingly made their choice 
between these two parties^'"'. 
Major Political Parties of Bangladesh 
More than two hundred political parties are working in Bangladesh. The presence of so many 
political parties in such a small country reveals the weakness of Bangladesh politics. Among 
these parties Bangladesh AL, BNP, JP and Jammat are worth mentioning. The programs and 
ideologies of the major political parties are given below. 
Bangladesh AwamiLeague: Bangladesh Awami League is the largest mass based political 
party in Bangladesh formed in 1949. Since its inception AL espoused such as Bengali 
nationalism and won the first general election of Pakistan in 1970. The party spearheaded the 
successful liberation war of Bangladesh. As it won the 1970 election and because of its 
leading role in the freedom struggle it became the first ruling party of Bangladesh and its 
leader Mujib was appointed first president^'*'. It won the absolute majority in the first 
parliamentary election held in 1973. Although at the beginning AL introduced parliamentary 
form of government but in 1975 it established one party rule by abandoning the multi party 
democracy '^^ ^. The AL was overthrown by a bloody military coup in which including Sheikh 
Mujib all the top party leaders were assassinated. Since 1975 AL was the main opposition 
party of every democratic government formed till 1996 general election^''^. By winning the 
parliamentary election in 1996 the party returned to power after a long gap of twenty-one 
year. Since then the party is ruling the country '^*''' 
AL stands on four fundamental principles: nationalism, socialism democracy and 
secularism. Sheikh Muibur Rahman the late president of the party was the exponent of these 
E. Shehabuddin, Asian Survey 1999, op. cit.; pp. 152-53. 
Prothom Alo, 3 August 2000. 
To know the consequences of Kader Siddquiq see, Daily Star 24* July 1999, Daily independence 19 August 
1999. 
Main Stream (N.Delhi), June 22 1996; p. 5. 
A.W. Bhuiyan, The Emergence of Banglaadesh, op. cit.; pp. 266-71, 
R. Jahan, Problems and issues, op. cit.; p. 131. 
AL emerged as the second largest party in every general election it participated in 1979, 1986 and 1991 
parliamentary election and also in the 1978 and 1981 presidential elections. 
Tarek Shamsur Rahman (edits), "Bangladesh: Rajnitir 25 Bachar", (Dhaka: Mawla Beothers, 1999,2"'* 
edition); P. 75. 
66 
ideologies so these are collectively called 'Mujibism'^''^ The explanation of AL on these four 
fundamental principles are given below: 
> Nationalism: As a nation people posses whole right over the country. 
> Democracy: The people's right to govern the country. 
> Secularism: The right of the people to observe their individual religion. 
> Socialism: The recognization of people's ownership on the national assets. 
AL declared that manpower is the main resource of the country. The state structure 
will be democratic where the fundamental human rights and liberty will be guaranteed. People 
will participate in the administration through election. The objective of AL is to eradicate the 
unlimited inequality. To fulfill this objective it is necessaiy to adopt compulsory limitation on 
individual income and ownership of proportion. Proper distribution of asset is also necessary. 
It is the belief of AL that the working class and the peoples of the countiy are the owner of the 
properties of the country^ "*®. But in the light of changing world order AL now is propagating 
market economy. The detail objectives and programs of AL are available in the party's 
election manifestos published during the 1991 and 1996 parliamentary election. 
AL's election manifesto released in 1991 included pledges to introduce the 
parliamentary system of government by restoring the constitution of its pre-fourth amendment 
form. The other main thrusts of AL election manifesto of 1996 are same to that of 1991 
election manifesto. In both manifesto AL promised to provide full independence to the 
judiciary and repeal all repressive and black laws. The 1991 and 1996 election manifesto 
emphasized to introducing a market economy encouraging private sectors and foreign 
investment. However the party made its position clear against the policy of massive 
decentralization of industries and financial institutions persuaded by the government of 
General Zia and General Ershad. The importance of public and private sectors for an overall 
economic development of the countiy was fully recognized. Emphasis was laid on pursuing 
non-aligned foreign policy and strengthening the country's relation with the organization of 
Islamic conference (OIC) and the south Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC). The party promised the peasant for all sorts of agro input like fertilizer, seeds, 
pesticides and irrigation equipment's at a low price. If necessary subsidy would also be given. 
Agriculture loan, modem methods of cultivation and just price of production will be 
introduced. Khash (cultivating land under the possession of the government) land will be 
distributed among the landless. The AL favored decentralization of power where autonomous 
local government would be formed. The party also expressed its commitment to establish a 
corrupt-free administration accountable to the people and create strong, efficient, well-trained 
and disciplined armed forces to defend the country from external aggression^''^. In the special 
council of AL in 2000 A.D. Hasina told the councilors in her speech that maximum election 
promises were already fulfilled and other would be fulfilled before the next coming general 
election of 200 
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) : Late president General Ziaur Rahman. He abducted the 
power by a counter-coup in 1975, was the founder of Bangladesh Nationalist Party^'*'. For 
For detail of Mujibism see Zillur R. Khan, The Third world Charismat, (Dhaka: UPL, 1996), P. 210-219. 
Manifesto, Bangladesh AL, Ashar-1379 (Bengali year); 
For a brief outline of the 1991 election manifesto of AL see February 1991 Bangladesh Observer; for 
detail of 1991 election manifesto see daily Ittefaq, Februaiy 1991. For 1996 election manifesto see daily Star 
11*^  March 1996. 
The written speech of Hasian in the special council of AL-2000 (Published by AL); 
R. Jahan, problems and issues, op. cit.; p.201. 
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legimitising his illegal power he first floated a new political party, Jatia Gonotantrik Dal 
(JAGODAL), in February 1978. Since JAGODAL was not proved itself strong enough base 
to mobilize electoral support for President Ziaur Raiunan, he again launched another political 
party by scrapping the previous one. Bangladesh nationalist party (BNP) was formed in 
September with President Ziaur Rahman as its Chairman. The BNP was an agglomeration of 
various parties and party factions such as JAGODAL and factions of NAP (Bhasani), UPP 
and ML In the 1979 parliamentary election the party got absolute majority. In an abortive 
coup in 1981 the founder president of BNP Zia was assassinated. Then Justice Abdus Sattar 
was elected tlie President of Bangladesh as well as the President of BNP^^'. By a bloodless 
coup led by General Ershad in 1982 the party was overthrown from power. After a long anti 
regime movement in December 1990 the military regime of Ershad was ousted by a peoples 
uprising, which created an ideal environment to practice democracy in Bangladesh^^ . In this 
fluid moment BNP managed to get a slander majority in the fifth parliamentary election and 
returned to power^^^. 
The ultimate goal of BNP is to establish Bangladeshi nationalism and to make the 
country self-reliance by following the 19 point program of late President Ziaur Rahman. BNP 
advocated market economy to develop the country. In the parliamentary election held in 1996 
the party could not win majority seats to form the government. At present it is the major 
opposition party of Bangladesh. 
The 19-point program of BNP is illustrated here briefly^^'': 
1. To preserve the independence, integrity and sovereignty of the state at all cost. 
2. To reflect in all spheres of our national life the four fundamental principles of the 
constitution i.e. complete faith in and reliance on the Almighty Allah, democracy, 
nationalism, and socialism meaning economic and social justice. 
3. To build ourselves into a self-reliant nation through all possible means. 
4. To ensure peoples participation at all levels of administration, development programs and 
in the mainstream of law and order. 
5. To strengthen rural economy and thus the national economy by according priority to 
agricultural development. 
6. To make the country self-sufficient in food and ensure that no body has to starve. 
7. To step up cloth production so as to ensure supply of at least coarse cloth for every body. 
8. To take possible measures so that no one remains homeless. 
9. To rid the country of the course of illiteracy. 
10. To ensure minimum medical care for everybody. 
11. To place women at their rightftil position in the society and to organize and inspire the 
youths for nation building. 
12. To give necessaiy incentives to the private sector for the economic development of the 
country. 
13. To improve the condition of the workers and develop healthy employer worker relations 
in the interest of increasing production. 
14. To create an urge for public service and nation building among the government employees 
and improve their financial condition. 
15. To check population explosion. 
^^ ^ Ibid.; p. 218-19. 
G.Hossain, G.Zia and BNP, op. cit.; p. 102. 
Daily Ittefaq, December, 1990. 
M.A. Hakim, The Shahabuddin Interregnum, p. 54. 
254 . For 19 point programs of BNP see BNP constitution (published in 1995); p. 1-4. 
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16. To buildup friendship based on equality with all countries and especially to strengthen the 
relation with the Muslim nations. 
17. To decentralize the system of administration and development and strengthen local 
government. 
18. To establish a social system based on justice and fair play and free from corruption. 
19. To safeguard the rights of all citizens irrespective of religion, colour and sect, and 
consolidate national unity and solidarity. 
The detailed accoimt of the program of BNP is available in the party's election 
manifesto published on the occasion of 1996 parliamentary election. Basically this manifesto 
was formed on the light of Zias I9-point program. In it BNP promised for honest and 
corruption free government, independent judiciaiy, rule of law and multi party democracy. 
The party would work toward the four fundamental principles of the constitutions absolute 
faith and trust in almighty Allah democracy nationalism and social and economic justice. 
BNP promised that top priority would be given to the agricultural sectors to achieve self-
reliance in food production. The party advocated free-market economy and foreign 
investment aimed at employment generation. It was promised to weed out corruption from all 
stratums of administration. To protect the integrity and sovereignty of the country the party 
promised to reestablish a strong and disciplined army. A non-aligned foreign policy on the 
basis of friendship with all countries, particularly Muslim countries and neighbors was the 
thrust of the party's foreign policy promises^^^ BNP leader Khaleda tried to convince the 
people in different meetings that in power her party would fulfill the promises. 
Jatiya Party (JP) : By a bloodless military coup in March 1982 led by chief of armed force 
General H.M. Ershad BNP government was overthrown^^^. Since his taking over power 
Ershad was facing strong opposition. So he was very much in need to legitimize his power. 
As part of this process a government sponsored political party named "Janadal" was formed 
in 1983^". Janadal was the conglomeration of AL (Mizam), a faction of splited BNP, Jatiya 
League, DL (Moazzam), NAP (Naser), United peoples party (UPP -K.Zafar), Ganatantrik 
party (A. Zahid). In January 1986 the Janadal appeared in the Bangladesh political arena with 
a new name- "Jatiya Party", under the leadership of General Ershad. In 1986 parliamentary 
election Jatiya party became victorious with 153 seats out of 300^^ .^ JP was ousted from 
power in 1990 by a mass upsurge led by all opposition party and Ershad was imprisoned. In 
both the 1991 and 1996 parliamentary election results JP maintained 3"* position^^^. In the 
post 1996 election scenario JP joined the AL led government of national consensus^^". After 
six years imprisonment JP leader Ershad was released from prison on bail by the high court 
and soon joined the BNP led opposition alliance in a bid to oust AL from power. In 
November 2000 Ershad was sent to imprisonment by a Supreme Court verdict^^'. Now JP is 
going through a difficult period since post mass upsurge of 1990 due to the absence of its 
leader Ershad in the political field although it has a substantial public support. Like BNP JP 
also claims itself the expounder of five fundamental principles of^^^: 
> Liberty and Sovereignty. 
The Bangladesh Observer, 29 Jan. 1991. Also Bangladesh Times, 19 may 1996. 
M.A. Hakim, The Shahbuddin Interregnum, op. cit.; P. 11. 
A.M. Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition, op. cit.; pp. 109-10. 
^^ ^ Ibid.; p. 118. 
Ibid.; p. 141 and 208. 
^^ ^ Ibid.; p. 214-15. 
The Hindu (Delhi), 21November 2000. Also see Daily Janakatha, 21 Novmer 2000. 
Jatiya Party Constitution; p. 2. 
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> Islamic ideology and independence to all religion. 
> Bangladeshi nationalism. 
> Democracy. 
> Social progress and economic emancipation. 
Similar to Ziaur Rahmans 19 point program Ershad also declared 18-point program 
and took initiative to bring it into reality^". 
1. Achieving rural development. 
2. To increase agricultural production in order to achieve self-sufficiency in food. 
3. To accelerate the land reform. 
4. To extend the activities of Grammen Bank in rural areas. 
5. To increase industrial production. 
6. To create investment facilities in the country through promoting industrialization in private 
sector. 
7. To develop the cooperative system and cottage industries. 
8. To reduce the difference between rich and poor through proper distribution of national 
revenue. 
9. To introduce development and production oriented educational system. 
10. To create maximum job opportunities. 
11. To ensure minimum health facilities for all. 
12. To take steps for the establishment of Islamic ideals and values in national life. 
13. To root out corruption. 
14. To hand over power to the elected representatives by decentralizing the administrative 
system. 
15. To check the population explosion. 
16. No politics for the sake of politics only, but politics for production and development to 
bring political liberty by achieving economy of self-reliance. 
17. To ensure justice for all by promoting judicial reforms. 
18. To ensure socio-economic rights and status of women. 
The programs of Jatiya Party become much more clear by the election manifesto of 
the party published on the occasion of 1991 parliamentary election. 
> The administrators controlled by publicly elected representative will be firmly 
established in all level of the country from Centre to local branch. 
> To bring a proper balance of power between president and parliament where president 
would be considered as the executive authority of the country. 
> By introducing Upozila (sub district) system an exemplary change was established in 
social and administrative level that would be further strengthened and expanded. 
> Necessary initiatives would be taken to fulfill the five basic needs- food, clothing, 
education, housing and health service. 
The other salient feature of JP election manifesto included the pledge for free market 
economy to promote industrialization in private sector. To increase agriculture production it 
promised to distribute seeds, fertilizer, irrigation equipment, power-tiller etc. in cheaper price. 
Agriculture loan would be given in minimal condition. Extensive measures would be taken in 
land reforms and land management. The basic principle of the foreign policy would be 
friendship to all and malice to none. To defend the country from external enemy JP planned to 
equipped the armed force with modem technology and would arrange modem technological 
education. JP also wanted to engage the armed force in the social development work. The 
^^^ M.A. Hakim, The Shahabuddin Interregnum, op. cit.; p. 125. 
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party also expressed its commitment to separate the judiciary from the executive and 
necessary steps would be taken to preserve the impurity and dignity. The party would work 
towards implementation of Islamic principles and also to make Bangladesh an Islamic state 
where the sovereignty of almighty Allali would be preserved^'*''. 
Jammat-E-Islami Bangladesh (JI): Jammat Islami founded by the late Maulana Abdul Ala 
Maududi in 1941 in undivided India emerged as the most influential fundamentalist Islamic 
party in Bangladesh. Because of its anti liberation role during 1971 civil war, Jammat was 
banned by the post independent AL government. It reemerged later during the military regime 
of General Zia During 1976-90 it got the opporttmity in the absence of free flow of politics 
to revive itself in Bangladesh. In the process it became one of the most powerful political 
organization^^^. Of all Islam based political parties in Bangladesh Jammat is the most well 
knit and well organized having a disciplined cadre among students and other youth^^^. Jammat 
showed its strength first in 1986 election and in 1991 general election it obtained highest 18 
seats. But in 1996 parliamentary election it faced great debacle, won only 3 seats out of 
The main goal of Jammat is to introduce the law of Quran and Surmah. In relating to 
the ideology and objectives Moududi told, "to us Islamic movement is to establish the 
sovereignty of Allah; Islam for the liberty of the whole mankind. So our target is not 
centralized to any particular nation or country. Rather it is extended for the whole mankind^^^. 
To achieve these goals the Jammat declared 7-point program^^". 
1. Bangladesh will be declared as an Islamic republic. 
(a) The recognition of the sovereignty of Allah. 
(b) To introduce the law of Quran and Surmah. 
2. To establish the government of efficient and God-fearing men. 
(a) To put an end of the leadership of dishonest and disbeliveers. 
(b) To establish the rule of honest and efficient leaders. 
3. To defend the sovereignty of Bangladesh. 
4. To restore full law and order. 
5. To implement Islamic economic policy. 
6. To introduce Islamic culture and education system. 
7. All women right will be preserved on the basis of Quran and Sunnah. 
The 1991 and 1996 election manifesto gave a clear idea of the ideology and programs 
of JI. The manifesto of Jammat emphasized the necessity of turning Bangladesh into a Islamic 
state where the tenets of Quran and Sunnah would be followed. The party favored 
independent foreign policy free from the influence of any power blocks as well as from 
hegemonisim and imperialism. If voted to power the party vowed to establish a welfare state 
in which the basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, education and Medicare would be 
guaranteed. Stressing the necessity of high-modernized armed forces to defend the country's 
sovereignty Jammat announced, " all able citizens shall be imparted optimum training in 
For detail of JP election Manifesto 1991 see the daily Ittefaq 11 February, 1991. 
S.R. Chakrobarty(edts), society, polity and economy of Bangladesh, (N.Delhi, Har-Anand Publications, 
1994); pp. 35-36. 
Emajuddin Ahmad and D.R.J.A. Nazneen, 'Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or power politics?" Asian 
Survey, Vol. XXX No.8, Aug. 1990; p. 795. 
Ibid.; P. 802.. 
T.S. Rahman Rajnitir 25 Bachar, op. cit; p. 79. 
Ibid.; pp.79-80. He quoted it from Tarjamanul Quran, Dec. 1934. 
Jamat-e-Islami promotion book, Septemer 1983. 
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defense". It made commitment to introduce subsidy in agriculture, exempt interest on farm 
loan and soften the term of credit system in the agriculture sector. Jammat also announced the 
program of introducing insurance and bank system on the basis of interest free Islamic 
economic policy*^'. 
Conclusion: After the 25 years of independence more than 200 political parties are working 
in Bajigladesh. Out of these we discussed major four pailies which have more or less public 
support base throughout the country. Others do not have even party offices in every district 
towns, some of these parties are only office based or leader oriented"^. In this circumstances 
tlie political thinkers of Bangladesh are contemplating to establish a political system on the 
basis of these four political parties. Tarek Shamsur Rahman opined that, 'since independence 
those parties could not be able to form branch committees in every district town, they should 
not be recognized as political organization'^^^. They have been misused by the successive 
military regimes to legitimize their powers. To legitimate the power the military juntas 
formed new political parties by merging those small political parties. In this process some 
power-loving leaders also formed new leader-oriented political parties by splitting the original 
one only to join the ruling party. As a result the major political parties lost their organizational 
strength, which always hindered to build a healthy party system in Bangladesh. There will be 
a balanced political environment in Bangladesh if the political system is developed by the 
domination of major political parties then it will be difficult for the illegitimate occupation of 
power by military junta. On the other hand there is the need to create public awareness against 
such mushrooming of splinter & small political parties. It will help grow a healthy party 
system in Bangladesh. 
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Chapters 
THE AWAMI LEAGUE 
ORGANISATION'", ITS PROGRAMS 
AND ACTIVITIES 
Chapter 3 
The Awami League Organization, Its Programs and Activities 
In a modem democratic state the political parties are voluntary organizations; which 
are formed to realize some specific national goal: that is to articulate the basic requirements of 
the people from inside or outside of the state power. The organizations' internal arrangement 
is comprehensible only in the light of its goal. To achieve the organizational goal the party 
prepares its programs and unites the public support under its banner through utilizing its 
power structure or party mechanism. Every organized and efficient party power structure 
includes central executive committee, various representative branches and ancillary 
organizations to allow for the functioning of the process: uphold the party in its political 
arena. Each of the party members in the power structure participates in the realization of the 
goals through performing his/her assigned role in the organizational division of labor'. 
The most significant development in the independent East Pakistan was the emergence 
of the AL party and it's espousing of Bengali nationalism, which led the way to the 
independence of Bangladesh. In the Bangladesh political arena the party also played 
significant/dominant role to establish the people's right. With the popular mandate, it 
governed the coimtry for two terms. After the formation of AL, like all other mass based 
political parties, it was organized with branches and ancillary bodies in all over East Pakistan. 
Even after independence it maintains its strong organizational base. The AL developed as a 
broad based political party with diverse elements joining hands together ostensibly for serving 
the national cause. The party has its socio-economic and political programs for national 
development. The effective party mechanism/ set up and its propaganda machineries are 
involved in popularizing the party programs. It helped the party in mobilizing its strong 
support base from all sections of Bangladesh people. However in the party's life time the 
various factions in the party continued to pull in different directions although kept within the 
party fold. 
Introduction of Awami League Structure: 
Constitution is the most essential for a political party. It directs the activities of the members, 
branches and central committees and it lays down power structure of the party. The power 
structure in a party responds to need to realize its required goals. In the constitution of AL the 
organizational power is distributed in a balanced way from the top to bottom: Central 
Committee headed by party president is the topmost organ in the party power structure and 
the primary members-the grass root workers of the organization are working for the party 
from the bottom. 
Party Members: Members are the basic elements of a political organization in its 
internal party structure. A person having a doctrinal agreement with the ideas, aims and 
purposes of a political organization and working for it can be introduced as the member of 
that political party^. The nature of membership of different political parties, however, varies 
1. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); pp. 6-7. 
2. Golam Hossain, General Ziaur Rahman and the BNP: Political Transformation of a Military Regime 
(Dhaka:UPL, ]988), p.27, 
3. Ibid. p.27. 
4. For detail AL Constitution pp.4-5. 
5. AL Genera! Secretary's Report in the Special Council- 2000, pp. 20, 52. 
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according to their particular characteristics and context. For example, in Bangladesh the cadre 
based political party CPB and Jammat-e-Islami is not the same as that of the mass political 
parties like AL or BNP. Within these parties, there are both regular and affiliated members^ 
Like all other mass parties, membership of AL is open to all Bangladeshi citizens, who 
are at the age of 18 or above, not engaged in any kind of political violence, declaring 
allegiance to the party constitution, accepting the AL manifesto and do not believe in any kind 
of discrimination in between religion, occupation or birth, can be enrolled as a member of AL 
after signing the party declaration form and paying taka two as subscription'*. For whole of the 
year the party and its primary branches recruits primary members. The parties also use to 
organize formal membership drive to enroll/ recruit new members. Recently in 1997 & 2000 
the Party organized such formal new member enrollment campaign all over the country^; 
enrolled a large number of primary members. Though the actual numbers of AL members are 
not available, it is claimed that the membership of AL is larger than that of any other party of 
Bangladesh. The maximum percentage of votes received by AL as compared to any other 
party in the 1991, 1996 & 2001 general elections gives/ reveals the credibility to the claim. 
AL has two categories of membership called primary and permanent members^. Every 
year many join the party as primary members for various social and political reasons but 
within a year or few months they loose their interest from the party and later they do not 
renew their membership. Their period of membership is brief they are not stable members. A 
stable or permanent member is one who regularly renews his membership card and is 
supposed to remain attached to his party through long period^, whether the party is in power 
or not. Among the permanent party members, those who limit themselves to paying dues and 
participating in the voluntary political work for the party in their free time only but don't have 
any political ambition are called believers^. Another minority group of active members 
represents every political party like AL are called careerist; they constitute the pool from 
which future party leaders emerges. They are full time workers. Activities from this group 
constitute the main force usually challenges to the existing leadership which leads factional 
conflict in AL and all other mass parties . 
According to the constitution of AL, the apex body of its power structure is made up 
of 6 parts: Bangladesh AL Council, National Committee, Central Executive Committee, 
Presidium, Parliamentary Party and Parliamentary Board. 
The AL Council: Bangladesh AL Council is formed for three years tenure. It consists 
of the party president, secretary, presidium, executive committee and the nominated/ elected 
members of district and city committees of Bangladesh AL. Every district and city 
committees nominate each council member for every twenty five thousand people of the 
area . In the last 1997 AL council, the total strength of the National Council was 5032". The 
constitution of the AL gives much importance to the National Council. It appoints a 50 
member -committee to elect the president and all other executive committee members of the 
party'^. It accepts any kind of proposal regarding to AL's ideology and programs; It has the 
6. AL Constitution, p.5. 
7. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, (London: Methuen & Company Ltd., 1967); pp. 86-87. 
8. Angelo Panebianco, Political Parties; pp. 25-26. 
9.1bid. p.27. 
10. AL Constitution, pp. 7-8. 
11. (ISApril 1997 Jai Jai Din, 13 April 1997, p. 9. 
12. AL Constitution, p.7. 
13. Ibid. P. 11. 
14. Ibid, pp.8-9. 
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power to amend the party constitution. It forms the parliamentary board. This body has the 
right to provide any kind of responsibility to the executive committee. It is the most respective 
bodyofAL' l 
The Bangladesh AL National Committee: The BAL national committee consists of 
the members of AL executive committee, 21 nominee of the party president, one member 
from each district and city committee. The national standing committee bears the following 
responsibilities; (a) It coordinates between working committee and the AL council; (b) It 
helps AL council to take decision on different national and international key issues; (C) It has 
the right to review the resolution and activities of AL working committee. It also executes the 
resolution, which are taken by AL national or special council; (d) It approves the monetary 
transaction of the party; (e) It reconsiders any appeal and takes final decision related to the 
punitive action taken by the AL executive committee against any party members; (f) It makes 
the rules to run the AL parliamentary party'''. National Committee is scheduled to meet in two 
sessions in a year. The AL president and other executives conduct the session as ex-officio 
executives of the national committee 
The Bangladesh AL Executive Committee: The Bangladesh AL executive 
committee consists of 67 members: the president, presidium members, general secretaries and 
other secretaries, cashier and 29 general members nominated by the president with the 
consultation of the Presidium"^. The executive committee of the AL is entrusted with many 
powers and functions. According to the constitution, it controls and coordinates the functions 
and working of the various committees of the party and supervises the execution of the party 
programs. It resolves the internal conflict with the committees and award punishment to 
members of the party, if necessary. It reviews the punitive actions taken by the lower branch 
committees against any party members and delivers the final decision. It also prepares audit 
reports to submit in the national committee meetings'^. 
Parliamentary Board: Parliamentary board is empowered to select and nominate 
party candidates for all the national level elections including national parliamentary elections. 
It is an eleven member body consisting of AL president, general secretary, AL parliamentary 
party leader and other 8 members elected by the AL national council members. In the 
selection process of the party, candidates for the national level elections, different district 
committee reports related to candidates competence or acceptability and it gets importance in 
the nomination process but the board is the sole authority to nominate candidates for AL'^. 
The Parliamentary Party: The AL parliamentary party consists of the MP's 
belonging to the party. The parliamentary party elects the leader, deputy leader, chief whip 
and other whips through an election from the parliamentary members belonging to AL. The 
AL parliamentary members decide their activities through the meetings of parliamentary party 
and maximum members opinion is accepted as party decision. The parliamentary party cannot 
adopt any resolution against the AL party constitution and its basic principles. Moreover, the 
15. Ibid. p . l l . 
16. Ibid. p.9. 
17. Ibid, pp.11-12. 
18. Ibid. p. 16. 
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parliamentary party members are obliged to do these activities according to the advice of AL 
executive committee'^. 
The AL Presidium: The AL Presidium is the most experienced organ of the party, 
which consists of a 15-member committee including the party president, general secretary and 
13 other general members^®. It is entrusted with lot of responsibilities: any one of the 
presidium members, who has been nominated by the party president, gets responsibility to 
perform presidential work in his absence. Presidium members help the president by their 
advice to select 29 general members of the executive committee. Being empowered by the 
council or executive committee, the presidium can handle any of the organizational power; is 
able to take any executive decision and also can take key decisions related to national or 
international matters for the betterment of the country during emergency period^'. 
The Party President: The councilors in a convention of the party elect the president 
of the party for a term of three years. He/She is the chief executive of the party. He/She is to 
preside over all meetings of the AL national council, national committee, executive 
committee and the party presidium. He has got the right to explain any section of the 
constitution. He can nominate any member of the presidium to execute the works of the 
president. The secretary caimot call the party executive committee meeting, council meeting 
without the suggestion/ instruction of the president. Moreover, if the secretary does not call 
meeting on the suggestion of the president then the president himself can call meetings of the 
executive body. The president can take necessary action against any AL member for his 
negligence or inefficiency in the organizational activities. In fact, he is to co-ordinate, 
supervise and control all activities of the party^^. The president occupies the supreme power 
of the AL organization. 
The Party General Secretaiy: The general secretary is elected for a three years term 
by the AL council. He is unofficially the second person of the party, also the chief of all other 
secretaries of the central committee. According to the constitution, he, with the help of the 
working committee, coordinates the functions and working of various committees of the party 
and supervises the execution of the party programs. The general secretary is scheduled to call 
all the secretaries meeting once in every month to discuss the party progress and to take 
necessary decisions; although the responsibility to take final decision is controlled by the 
executive committee. He is empowered to appoint or discharge the office employees; also 
empowered to raise or reduce their salaries, if necessary, can take punitive actions against 
them and allows their leave of absence with the national executive committees approval. He 
takes care that the resolution as passed by the executive committee, national committee, AL 
council and the presidium are fully executed by different organizational divisions and branch 
committees of the party. He also submits the report of party activities at every council 
meeting^^. 
The Branches: A branch of a party is only a part of the whole and its separate 
existence is inconceivable^''. But the branches are the most necessary elements of a party's 
19. Ibid. p.l7. 
20. Ibid. p.5. 
21. Ibid. p. 13-14. 
22. Ibid. pp. 10, 12-13. 
23. Ibid. p.l4. 
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power structure. Aimed at strengthening itself, branches are necessary for a political party to 
organize the masses, to give them political education, to recruit political workers group and to 
produce future party leaders^^AL branches are organized throughout the country. They enroll 
the members, widen the mass base and organize on a geographical basis to cover the whole 
country. Their power and functions are clearly stated in AL constitution^®. The AL branches 
from the villages to district levels are empowered to supervise and control all activities for the 
implementation of the party programs in their respective areas. It is mentioned in AL 
constitution that all the branch committees of the party have to meet at least twice a year. It 
lays down that for a meeting of the executive committee there should be at least one third of 
the total members^^. 
The party constitution narrates specific rules to form the branch executive committees 
and for their fimctioning. According to the party constitution the village executive committee 
is the lowest branch of the party. It is a 15-member body that consists of one president, three 
vice-presidents, one general secretary, six other secretaries and four members . Ward 
committee has 15-member executive body similar to that of a village committee. Furthermore, 
the ward committee has to enroll minimum 100 primary members . 15 councilors from each 
ward of a Union form the Union Council to elect the 51 member Union executive committee 
of AL. The Upo-jilla (Sub-district) councilors to elect the Upo-Jilla executive committee 
includes 10 councilors elected from each Union AL of an Upo-Jilla and 15 councilors are co-
opted from that Upo-Jilla unit of AL. Each Upo-Jilla council of Bangladesh AL elects its 57-
member. Upo-Jilla executive committee includes one president, five vice-president, one 
general secretary, 19 other secretaries and 31 general members. District AL council elects the 
district committee of AL. From each Upo-Jilla under the district for every ten thousand people 
one councilor is elected by Upo-Jilla committee to form district council. Moreover, from each 
Upo-Jilla committee 5 more councilors are co-opted for the District AL council. AL district 
executive committee consists of 63 members including I president, 7 vice-presidents, 1 
general secretary, 29 other secretaries and 34 general members. In urban areas the cities are 
enjoying the status of a district committee; City-thana and town committees enjoy the 
equivalent status that of a Upo-Jilla committee. The ward executive committees are the lowest 
branch of the party in the cities and towns. All these committees described here are elected by 
the representative councilors of the respective areas for a period of 3 years^°. 
The Ancillary Organizations of AL 
Introduction: The AL was formed in 1949 with the intention of mobilizing public opinion for 
trying to get all grievances redressed by the strength of popular will^'. To achieve the socio-
economic and political freedom of East Pakistan, from the beginning AL wanted to extend its 
influence to various social groups by having ancillary organizations. These were the means of 
obtaining support from different groups participating in socio-economic activities and 
political movements such as students, youths, women, workers and peasants. Different 
politically and economically deprived groups of East Pakistan society, who found their 
identity with the AL's sub-nationalist approach, started assembling together under the party 
shade through these ancillary organizations, which strengthened the AL support base. 
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The ancillary organizations of AL are having their own constitution and manifesto. 
They have their own programs to achieve the above said objectives. The power structure and 
programs of these organizations are dealt here with. 
Bangladesh Chatra (Students) League 
Since British India students are the advanced force in Bangladesh politics and they work with 
a spirit of self-sacrifice to strengthen the party. In the developing countries like Bangladesh, 
the absence of any effective and organized social group to realize peoples' demand through 
pressurizing the government, student play the role of pressure group to subdue the 
government to the peoples legitimate demands. East Pakistan Muslim Chatra (Students) 
League, the ancillary student organization of East Pakistan Muslim League played a vital role 
to realize Muslim homeland Pakistan. After the independence of Pakistan the internal schism 
(Orthodox vs. Progressive conflict) of EPML also affected the EPMSL and splited the 
organization. As a result, in 1948, the dissident progressive group of EPMSL formed a new 
student organization named Pakistan Muslim Chatra (Students) League. After the formation 
of AL in 1949 the EPMSL was reorganized as its ancillary organization^^. Its active 
participation in the language movement of East Pakistan in 1948-52 and in the 1969 mass 
upheaval rapidly popularized it in the Bengali students. Within a short period its branches 
were organized in every educational institution in East Pakistan. The members of this 
organization were the leading force in the Bangladesh Liberation Army, who liberated the 
country by a fierce armed revolution in 1971^ .^ In the newly independent Bangladesh it was 
renamed Bangladesh Chatra (Students) League (BSL). It helped the AL government to rebuild 
the war-ravaged country^^. During 1975-96 in the antigovemment agitation politics, it worked 
as the power base and front organization to spearhead political movements on behalf of its 
parent organization AL^ .^ A good number of AL leaders and workers are produced by BSL. 
Aims and Objectives: BSL's objective is to build a disciplined and exemplary 
charactered workers organization to establish an exploitation fi^ee society by realizing the 
programs of the second revolution of Sheikh Mujib. BSL is engaged in a long-term struggle to 
achieve an easily accessible, scientific, vocational, technical and publicly accepted education 
policy^^. 
Organizational Structure: According to the constitution of BSL any Bangladeshi 
student, not above 27 years of age can be the member of the organization. BSL has 5-tier 
organizational structure: the powerftil executive committee is at the apex; others are district, 
sub-district, union and ward committees. In the BSL constitution all the university and city 
committees are given the equivalent status of the district committee; the college and town 
committees are treated equivalent to sub-district units of the organization. The executive 
members of its national executive committees are elected for the tenure of one year^^. 
The Awami Jubo (Youth) League (AJL) 
East Pakistan Jubo League, an independent progressive organization was formed in 1951. At 
the beginning of its inception side by side the defected Muslim League youths joining, many 
32. Bangladesh Chatra League Manifesto, p. 13. 
33. M. Rasiduzzaman, "The AL in the Political Development of Pakistan"; Asian Survey, July- 1970; Vol.10, 
No.7, p.586. 
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communist youths also joined the organization due to its adoption of secularist ideology in its 
constitution ^ In 1972 the Youth League was reorganized as the ancillary organization of the 
AL in the name of Bangladesh Awami Jubo (Youth) League (AJL)^^. During 1972-75 the 
AJL was a militant organization of 100,000 militant youth members'*". Because of its leaders 
and workers dominant role in the liberation movement and its vital role in the post 
independent Bangladeshi political scenario the organization had great influence over AL. 
Even the AJL leaders tried to share governmental power with AL; they sought a significant 
number of nominations from AL to compete the 1973 parliamentary election'". Still it is the 
largest youth organization in Bangladesh, which has branches even at grass root level. 
Objectives of the organization: At the beginning of the AJL constitution it declares, it 
is working to establish an exploitation free progressive Bangladesh, where there will be a 
proper adjustment of Bengali nationalism, democracy, exploitation free social system and 
secularism'^^. In its manifesto AJL also stressed on four principles of Mujibism (Nationalism, 
democracy. Socialism and Secularism) to build an exploitation free self-reliant progressive 
society'* .^ 
Structure: The top body of AJL is made up of four parts; The National Council, the 
Advisory Committee, the Central Committee and the National Executive Committee. The 
Executive Committee includes president, presidium, general secretary and other secretaries 
and 19 general members. To supervise its activities and to implement all the programs of the 
organization in the whole Bangladesh, it formed branch committees in district, sub-district, 
union and ward level. The ward level executive committees are the primary branches of the 
organization'*''. 
Jatiya Sramik (National workers) League 
Bengali laborers of East Pakistan had been deprived by the Pakistan government's 
discriminatory policies'*^. The deprived feeling of Bengali working class encouraged them to 
form Jatia Sramik League (JSL), an ancillary organization of AL, in 1969, to realize their 
rights by achieving full regional autonomy for East Pakistan through united movement''^. 
Aims and Objectives: The JSL is working to establish an exploitation free society 
through organizing the labor class of Bangladesh under the four fundamental principles: 
nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. The organization is engaged in struggle to 
eradicate all kinds of internal and international exploitation. The other objectives of the 
organization are: To industrialize the country by defending national and international 
conspiracy; to collaborate the patriot and progressive labor organizations in the development 
of the country; for the interest of the labor class all over the world, to develop the brotherhood 
and unity with other trade union federations of all the covmtries all over the world; As an 
affiliated body of international trade union organization to extend its cooperation and support 
for the labor and proletariats of different countries to realize their just rights. It also works to 
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develop a healthy relation between the labor and workers of the industries. It struggles for the 
fare wages, pension, gratuity, bonus and to confirm job security of the workers. Its aim is to 
assure housing, Medicare and education facilities for the labors and their families; To take 
initiative to remove illiteracy from the backward labor class, to arrange necessary training for 
the workers, to increase their skills, to spread the welfare programs for the workers in every 
industrial area, to confirm economic sufficiency and increase living standard of the workers. It 
is working to establish co-operative society for the labor class'^ .^ 
Structure: The JSL constitution provides that any worker of any industry or any 
person having sympathy for the working class, who follows the ideology of the organization, 
can be the primary member of the primary branch of the JSL. The apex of the JSL consists of 
two parts: The Central Executive Committee and the National Committee. The Central 
Executive committee is a body of 30 members including president, vice president, general 
secretaiy and other executives. The other branches to execute the organization's programs are: 
District Branch Committees, Regional Branch Committees and Primary Branch Committees. 
The JSL apex committees and all of its branch committees are elected for two years term'* .^ 
The JSL is the strongest and largest labor organization in Bangladesh. It has organized 
branches in all the industrial and workers units like the Jute and Textile Mills workers Union, 
Bangladesh Railway sramik Union, Bank Employees Union, Jatiya Rikshaw Sramik Union 
and the like. 
Bangladesh Krishok (Peasants) League 
Bangladesh Krishok League is the peasant wing of BAL. In Bangladesh the peasants are the 
largest social group of the society and constitute about 85% of the total population. Although 
the peasants are not well organized in Bangladesh but their valuable support and 
overwhelming voting power determines the future of all the political parties. Moreover, the 
family background of the BAL parliamentary members of 1970 and 1973 shows that although 
they were representing different middle class professional backgrounds but agriculture had 
been the major source of their parents' income'*'. Even now the political elites are having 
strong family ties with the affluent rural peasant class. Without having good contact with the 
rural masses none can think to be the leader of Bangladesh people. To do rural based and 
people oriented politics, to ensure 85%of the Bangladesh peoples support in its party fold, the 
BAL formed the Bangladesh Krishok League (BKL), an ancillary organization of the party. 
Objectives of the Organization: The objective of the BKL is to establish a peasants' 
and workers' government by uniting the rural Bengal on the basis of Bengali nationalism, 
democracy, socialism and secularism, which will ensure the fundamental rights of the people 
including food, shelter, clothing, education and health services; which will also assure the job 
opportunities for the educated children of the peasants. The village development and 
agriculture revolution are the main objectives of the BKL. The BKL believes that without 
improving the peasant economy the economy of Bangladesh cannot be improved. For 
improving the Bangladesh economy, top priority should be given to agriculture sector. The 
BKL manifesto mentions that it is working for such a state system that will minimize the 
economic discriminations between the town and village dwellers by strengthening rural 
economy through the agriculture revolution and improving cottage industries in the rural 
areas. It is working to make the country self sufficient in food by accelerating agriculture 
revolution. To make the agriculture revolution successful the BKL objective is to establish 
47. JSL Constitution, p. 1-2. 
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effective village cooperative society in every village of Bangladesh; to ensure agricultural 
loans for the peasants by installing more agriculture and cooperative Banks; to make available 
modem agriculture machineries, fertilizers, pesticides and improved versions of seeds. It also 
give importance to the awareness of village people regarding their political rights. Without 
realizing the political right it is not possible to achieve socio-economic success^". 
Structure: The AL has its agriculture secretary to organize the farmers, to deal with 
their different problems and to propagate the AL's programs and objectives in the 
development of the agriculture sector and peasant class. The agriculture secretary also 
mediates between AL and its ancillary organization the BKL. The BKL has its executive 
committee, elected for two years term by the councilors' votes. The BKL has its branch 
committees in district, thana, union, ward and village level. Village committee is the primary 
branch of the organization. The apex body of the organization is consisted of three parts: the 
BKL executive committee, the BKL national committee and the BKL council. The BKL 
council elects the executive committee; councilors are nominated from every district 
committee. The national committee consists of each nominee from every organizing district. 
The president and the executives of the BKL are the ex-officio executives of the national 
committee^'. 
Bangladesh Mahila (Women's) Awami League (BMAL) 
In Bangladesh the women constitute about half of the total population. Unfortunately they are 
deprived from social and political power. They have little representation in legislative and 
executive body of Bangladesh government. To awaken the women folk to achieve their 
empowerment, efforts are made to assure the women participation in all social and political 
activities. In this backdrop AL formed an ancillary organization named Bangladesh Mahila 
Awami League (BMAL). 
Objectives: The BMAL propagates the programs of AL to develop the women folk of 
the country. It describes the AL's principles and attitudes towards the women folk. The 
organization highlights the problems of women by organizing seminars rallies and meetings. 
The organization is engaged in removing the obstacles of the women development and 
working for their improvement through different social service activities. 
Structure: The BMAL has its executive body at the top. According to AL constitution 
the president of the BMAL also represents the post of the women secretary of BAL's national 
executive committee. The constitution also provides that BMAL should have branch 
committees in every district, sub-district, town, union, ward, and village level. Village imit is 
recognized as its primary unit^^. But the fact is that it has branch committees in all the urban 
centers, district and sub district level. In union, ward and village level it could not organize 
any branch committees^^. 
Conclusion: The ancillary organizations of AL are having their own programs to 
articulate. Besides this they propagate the ideas and programs of their parent organization AL. 
These organizations have a tendency to declare their different programs in consonance with 
the AL programs. Some of these ancillary organizations like Students League and Youth 
League are treated as the front force of the party to strengthen the anti-government agitation 
movement and also to accelerate the election propaganda. Due to these ancillary organizations 
decisive role in the party success in different agitation movements and elections some of these 
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organization leaders played important role in the decision making of AL. All the ancillary 
organization workers have a natural tendency and ambition to join the parent organization 
AL; among these people who are efficient and vest their interest finally joined the AL. All the 
ancillary organizations of AL always heavily depend on AL for financial assistance and 
intellectual advice to run the organizations. To organize sub district union and other lower 
branch committees of these ancillary organizations they are also dependent on the different 
local unit leadership of AL. Not only that, the leadership of these organizations are decided by 
the direct influence of the AL leaders. In most of the cases, the AL leadership violates these 
organizations constitution, bypasses the democratic process and oversees the will of these 
organizations workers. They just impose upon the organizations their own candidate as the 
central leadership of these ancillary organizations. This entails a lot of criticism from the 
political scholars and think tanks, aptly conveyed to the masses by journalists. 
The Internal Working of the Party 
Eminent political scientist C. Baxter remarks, "As evident by the results of different elections, 
the organizational structure of the AL was highly overrated than that of any other parties of 
Bangladesh"^''. Because of its growing up through a revolutionary process since 1949 and its 
successful leadership in different anti-government movements as well as in the liberation 
struggle of Bangladesh, it became an organization of a group of dedicated and brilliant 
workers. This revolutionary process of growth also made the party's organizational structure 
sound to the grass root level. The AL has its various ancillary and branch committees from the 
metropolitan to the rural level. These were successfijily organized during the Pakistan period 
by utilizing the intense abhorrence of all section of East Pakistan people against the ruling 
Muslim League party, which was dominated by the non-Bengali leadership. The absence of 
viable political parties in East Pakistan, gave an opportunity to AL to take foil advantage of 
the political vacuum. Before the independence of Bangladesh the formation of all the local 
committees were completed. By the test of time only dedicated and idealist leaders and 
workers remained in the organization. All the opportunists were either expelled or left the 
party by fearing the ruling party's coercive policy to suppress the AL. Until 1995 there was 
little scope for the opportunists in the party. But during 1996 parliamentary elections and its 
aftermath, because of AL's desperate policy to capture and control power, many of the 
opportimists enrolled in AL to fiilfill their personal ambitions. They even were elected as 
MP's and ministers from the party and also occupied some positions in different local 
branches of AL. But still now they are small in numbers. 
Most of the leaders in charge of the district and sub-district organizations are 
politically experienced and dedicated to the party. AL was able to sustain its strong 
foundation at all the lower levels even though the party was out of power for twenty one years 
since 1975 to 1996^^. Contrary to the top brass of the organization the lower level committees 
are elected democratically. Although in some cases it has been observed that the union, ward 
and village committee leaders are elected by the influence of the district and sub-district 
committee leaders and local party MP's to confirm their control in primary branches but these 
branches are democratically formed at least apparently. The district and sub-district 
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committees meet on the basis of the party's organizational necessity, but not regularly as 
stated in the constitution. The union level committees meet on a few occasions. But it has 
been observed that the committees at the ward and village level do not meet besides some 
exceptional occasions. Some individuals of these committees even forget that they are the 
members of a committee. However all of these local committees were active in the AL's 
countrywide agitation movement during 1975 to 1996. While in power (in 1972-75 and 1996-
2001) the party tried to involve its local units in accelerating the development works of the 
govemment^^. However after coming to power in 1996, the AL and all its ancillary 
organizations lost real rhythm in their organizational activities. The top party leaders were 
busy with their ministerial works, not giving time in the party office. Also there was 
frustration among the middle and lower level leaders and workers regarding their future 
ambitions: when party started preferring the rich new comers to them^^. 
Since 1966 the party supreme leader Mujib was the main spirit of the AL organization. 
The massive victory of the AL in1970 and 1973 parliamentary elections became a reality 
because of Mujibs personal popularity not due to the party's organizational capability. As 
party heavily depended on Mujib to sustain its popular support, all the organizational powers 
of the party was concentrated in Mujibs hand and all the party leaders were just following 
Mujib to secure position in the party. The assassination of Mujib and other top leaders of the 
party in 1975 created a leadership vacuum in the party. In the absence of a imiversally 
accepted leader having capability to maintain unity of the rank and file of the party the party, 
leaders were engaged in factional squabble; even some of them formed new parties with new 
name. To save the party from further destruction in 1981 the councilors unanimously co-opted 
Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujib, as the BAL president^^. Mujib's symbolic 
representation by Hasina in the party played an emotional role to imite all the party factions 
under her leadership. Slowly the supreme control of all organizational powers possessed in 
her hand and now she is all-powerfUl permanent president of the party. 
AL national council is the most powerful body among the apex bodies of the party 
structure. Although AL coimcil meeting is scheduled to be held in alternative three years but 
during the twenty years tenure of Hasina since 1981 the council met only five times 
(including 2003 council session). Moreover, there is a provision to arrange special council 
meetings once in a year, which is also not regularly followed^^. The main task of the council 
is to elect the president and all other executives in the party. During her 20 years tenure 
Hasina has been reelected imanimously by the councilors four times. In every council 
meetings the councilors instead of electing other executives, empowered the party president 
Hasina to nominate the presidium members, central executive committee members and all 
other apex body members of the organization^®, which obviously increases the centralization 
of power: the democratic system to elect the top brass AL leaders replaced by autocratic 
method of recruitment. Since 1981 the AL general sectary, the second most powerful person 
of the party has been nominated by Sheikh Hasina. It virtually made him the titular general 
secretary. Hasinas nomination for the post of general secretary and other executives hindered 
the internal democracy of the party; nomination to some comparatively uncompetitive persons 
instead of dedicated and eligible others for the important posts developed differences among 
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the party workers and supporters®'. The party secretary use to present annual reports of the 
party in the party's national council sessions as well as in the special council meetings 
whenever hold but without any accountability to the council members. The national council 
thus has only constitutionally democratic right to elect the party members and to control all 
affairs of the party. There is a provision in the constitution that the executive committee 
secretaries have to meet once in a month, but no such kind of meetings take place regularly. 
The executive committee meetings and all other committee meetings held on the necessities 
of the party, not so regularly as stated in the party constitution®^. 
Sheikh Hasina and her close associates use to make party policies and programs even 
without consulting the national council, national committee and other apex bodies of 
organizational structure, although those are the real authorized bodies mentioned in the 
constitution to make fundamental decisions and programs. When necessity arises they use to 
get approvals of their deeds by calling meetings of the related body of the organization. In 
making party programs they certainly give importance to the public opinion and the wills of 
the workers - who will execute the party decision at the grass root level® .^ 
At the top, the central executive body works to materialize the party programs and 
decisions and give necessary instructions to the lower level branches whenever needed. They 
organize meetings and processions to popularize party programs with the active participation 
of AL's central leaders including Sheikh Hasina. The branch organizations from district to 
village level are very active to implement the party decisions especially during election 
periods. They arrange workers meetings, public meetings, and processions; distribute party 
pamphlets, leaflets; do works of wall writing and postering. The party leaders of different 
branch committees maintain contacts with the central executive body through vertical 
communication for the convenience of their works. The lower branches have little autonomy. 
They can have certain programs to materialize; but those programs have to be taken by 
coinciding the party's ovra principles and ideologies. As for example, to release the local 
leaders from jail during 1975-96 different district and sub-district committees of AL 
organized different agitation programs including meetings, procession and strikes. The AL 
central body also supported these initiatives. 
Since the inception of AL, it has been observed that the leaders of the party also 
becomes the leader of the Awami League Parliamentary Party (ALPP) or if he/ she is unable 
to be elected as MP, his/her nominated person becomes the ALPP leader. Here the party 
leadership is controlling the MP's. The ALPP as a body is subordinate to the party. The MPs 
follow the instruction of the ALPP. But the ALPP is not always free to make its own 
decisions; it must conform to the general policies of the party as defined by its central 
committee. An MP who is not ready to accept the party's voting decisions has to face the risk 
of expulsion from the party as well as the dissolution of his parliamentary membership. The 
MP's follow the instruction of the party leadership because they are heavily dependent on the 
party's popularity, support base, workers group for election campaign and financing etc. to be 
elected. The constitution also provides the dominant power to the AL executive committee 
61. Jai Jai Din, 29 September 1992, P.8. Also see Daily Janakantha, 7-21 August 2001, P.6. 
62. To know the irregularity of the different top bodies meetings see the list of the concerned committees 
meetings in the AL general secretary's report presented in the 1997 and 2001Alcouncil. 
63. Before taking any fundamental decisions AL use to survey public opinion to know the peoples feeling 
regarding that policy. To find out the competitive candidates for the parliamentary elections AL also survey the 
popularity of its different probable candidates in different constituencies. The research scholar collects some of 
its survey reports, conducted by Chatra League. AL conducts these surveys by different organizations. For more 
detail. Periodical Jana Kantha, 22 April-6may 2ool, P.6. 
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over the ALPP '^*. Moreover, the dissolution policy of the parliamentaiy membership is also 
ratified by the Constitution of Bangladesh®^ Thus coinciding the voice of Duverger we may 
tell that, the ALPP has no will of its own, no common action, no discipline in its voting. 
When it comes to an important ballot even the radical MPs surrender to the instructions 
imposed by the patty's executive committee^^. 
In conclusion, it may be said that although AL is a well organized party, maintains an 
elaborate organizational structure at the national level to village level, supported by millions 
of people and the party is working to establish democratic rule in Bangladesh since its 
formation but in its own party structure it lacks internal democracy. Since independence, the 
party president has been exercising supreme power. Though party leader Hasina often 
discusses the problems of the party with her colleagues, the final decisions are mostly of her 
own. By amending the party constitution and by utilize the vagueness of some part of the 
constitution all the administrative power of the party has been concentrated in her hand^'. 
Since her taking over the AL leadership, she has been selecting the AL's executive leadership 
instead of council election; by her direct involvement, the ancillary organizations main 
leadership are elected. By observing all these, one eminent journalist remarked, "The AL 
intends to be a democratic party, the party's intension is to establish parliamentary democracy 
in Bangladesh- where the practice of perfect democracy will be ensured. But when in its own 
fold, the par^ does not practice democracy, how will it establish people's democratic right in 
Bangladesh^ . Since AL supporters and workers adore Hasina as the successor of their 
beloved leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and always ready to extend their uncompromising 
support for her, Hasina faced no real challenge in her authority until now, although there are 
many subtle groupings prevails in the top body of AL. The branch committees including 
district to village level are well organized but it is revealed in different times that these 
committees are also more or less factionalized, divided and sub-divided. Especially, during 
the election period these divisions in the local committees created serious thread for the party 
to confirm its win in different parliamentary constituencies'^^. 
AL mobilized the support of various groups of the people from poor peasants to the 
rich business class, but all the party leaders representing the urban rich class and among them 
business peoples are dominating. These classes don't have real contact with the village people 
who constitute 80% of the total population. Although the committees at district level and 
lower branches follow democracy in electing their leaders and also in their decision making 
but in the top body of AL there is little practice of democracy. So in the lower level 
democratic practice gives an opportunity for some new leaders to emerge but when personal 
relation, kinship or wealth are branded as the major criteria of eligibility to reach in the top 
brass of the AL leadership, there is little scope for the new generation political geniuses to 
reach in it^ .^ 
64. AL Constitution, P. 16-17. 
65. Rounoq Jahan, Problems and Issues, op.cit. P103. 
66. M. Duverger, Political Parties, op.cit. p. 184. 
67. Jai Jai Din; 29 September 1992, p.7. 
68. Interview with Riaz Uddin Ahmed, Editor Daily Economist. 
69. Akhtaruzzaman, the previous MP and an AL candidate of Gazipur- constituency in 2001 parliamentary 
election told the research scholar that because of high ambition of another local leader of his area that person 
worked against him. It resulted loosing of a confirm seat of AL. 
70. Periodical Jana kantha 7-21 August 2001, p.6 and 22 Apri]-6May 2001 p.6. Also See Dhaka Courier, 18 
June 1999, pp.12-13, Daily Jana kantha, 29 June 2001 to get confirmation of research scholars argument. 
85 
Support Base of the Party 
In every country each political party has its distinct support base, which is developed by the 
influence of tlie party's ideology, programs and activities. Every Party also prepares its 
programs targeting the requirement of its ovm support base (that is necessary for the party to 
survive in its political arena). Some parties depend for the support base on the middle class, 
others on the proletariat; while there are some, which are supported by peasants or even by 
various social and religious groups. For example, in USA those with higher income tend to be 
Republicans, while those in the lower income groups tend to be democrats^'. In the UK 
Toiy's usually do not prefer the immigrants in their party, while these immigrants are the 
strong supporters of the labor party^^. However, it should be noted that in Bangladesh all the 
mass parties constitute broad political fronts seeking support of all section of the people 
because here the people are multi class, multi religion based and are not class-conscious. 
In Bangladesh the most important differences are those between the rich and the poor, 
the literate and the illiterate, the urban and the rural. In addition, there are important religious 
differences. About 80%of Bangladeshis live in rural areas while 20%are in urban centers. Of 
the rural population, 80% are employed in agriculture, the rest are petty shopkeepers, school 
teachers and other low-income professionals. About 65% of the people are literate; the most 
highly educated being generally westernized. 91%areMuslims and 8%are Hindus. Some 
believe in secularism and others are religious minded. In short, the composition of Bangladesh 
society is multi-dimensional although population in terms of language is overwhelmingly 
homogenous. While ethnicity, language, caste and tribe constitute the major divisions in other 
south Asian countries; 'religion' and class can be described as the sources of fission in 
Bangladesh society and politics'^. 
AL, a party having strongest organizational network and a countrywide strong support 
base, was formed in 1949. After its inception during 1949 to 71 the party mobilized support of 
various groups from virtually all areas of East Pakistan behind the cause of Bengali 
nationalism within a short time, but it expanded its support base more by the wise 
manipulation of nationalist symbols than by grass root works. Its success was largely due to a 
charismatic leader, who with a precise sense of political timing exploited various issues and 
slogans^'*. 
In the early days of Bangladesh immediately following independence due to the 
charismatic leadership of Sheikh Mujib and the party's very high image for its leading role in 
the independence movement, the party sustained the flow of popular support'^. 
Although people adore Mujib and were following him but were not ready to accept his 
secularist and pro Indian stand^®. Moreover, Mujib's socialist economic policy, establishment 
of one party rule just before his assassination and the post-1975 internal squabbles within the 
AL leadership were the main factor that turned the big section of the support base from AL to 
the comparatively less democratic Zia's military regime^^ and weakened the party. The taking 
up of AL leadership by Sheikh Hasina, the successor of Mujib, her leadership style, the 
remaining charisma of dead Mujib, changing of its previous socialist ideology, active role in 
71. Robert Lane, Political Life, (New York: Free Press, 1959); p.326. 
72. News Analysis BBC Bangla broadcasting; 10pm, 18 October 2001. 
73. Rounaq Jahan, Problems and issues, op.cit. pp. 161-62. 
74. Ibid. p.l36; Also P.207 C. Baxter, "Pakistan Votes 1970", Vol.10 No.3, March 1971. 
75. (P.94, 99 Dr. M. Hakim, 'Parliamentary Election: A comparative Analysis'; Regional Studies Islamabad; 
Vol. 10 No.2, Spring 1993; pp.94,99. 
76. M. Franda, Political Parties, op.cit p.288. 
77. Rounaq Jahan, Problems and issues, op.cit. pp 138-39. Also M. Franda, Political Parties,op.cit. p.288. Also 
Verinder Grover, Encyclopedia of SAARC Nations, (N. Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1997), pp.274 -76. 
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anti-autocratic movement, the extensive mass contact programs taken by the party and the 
positive works of AL in governmental power since 1996 helped AL to rebuild regain part of 
its support base and broaden its base all over the country so that it represented all sections of 
the people. 
Eighty percent people of Bangladesh are living in village. Sheikh Hasina's frequent 
tour of the rural areas and her usual personal contact conversation with the rural people to 
understand their problems made the rural people feel that she and her party really think about 
their development'^. The different sections of the masses therefore support AL' . 
Since its inception in 1949, the AL has essentially been a middle class political 
organization. Mujib the organizing genius was convinccd of the iniportancc of the middle 
classes political role in the Bengali society. This class was the dominant force in the Bengal's 
liberation movement®". Till date they are a force in Bangladesh politics. Various social forces 
such as surplus farmers in rural areas, small traders, industrial workers, urban professionals, 
civil-military bureaucrats, intellectuals and students identify themselves with this group. 
Table 3.1 
Monthly income of the supporters of the major two parties of Bangladesh 
(In percentage) 
Monthly 
Income 
Less than 
Taka3000 
Taka 
3000- 10,000 
Taka 10,000 
and above 
Total 
Awami League 33.9 42.1 47.4 37.9 
BNP 40.1 39.2 32.5 39.1 
Others 26.0 18.6 20.0 22.9 
Total 46.5 43.3 10.1 100% 
Source: P.7, Weekly Jai Jai Din (Dhaka), 19 December 1995. 
Table indicates that among the low-income group, who are numerically maximum in the society, AL is 
not so popular but the party's support base is formidable in the high-income group. 
The surplus farmers are the power bases of rural Bengal. They not only dominate the 
traditional, social political and religious groups, they are also predominant in modem 
economic and political institutions i.e. the cooperative society and local self-governing 
bodies, through which the government penetrates the countryside. The brokerage fimctions of 
rich peasants add to their influence®'. In East Pakistan the economically deprived surplus 
farmers became antagonistic to the Pakistan government and participated in the autonomous 
movement of AL® .^ By his charismatic appeal Mujib involved these economically frustrated 
rural protagonists to build strong support base in rural Bengal. In the post independent 
Bangladesh by involving this group in the development programs through some government 
78. Daily Jana Kantha, 10 June 1996. 
79. Foot Note: Although in 2001 general election AL faced a devastating defeat against the oppositions coalition 
but it managed maximum more than 40% of the total votes, no party of the winning coalition could manage that 
amount of votes in that election). 
80. Verinder Grover, Encyclopedia of SAARC Nations, op.cit. p.34. Also S.M. Shamsul Alam, 'Democratic 
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have won the confidence of these local leaders^^. Mujib's socio- economic strategy to sustain 
the support base also favored the upper class peasantry '^^ . 
Because of this formidable support base, AL won 307 seats out of 315 in the 1973 
parliamentaiy elections^^ Even after the death of Mujib, Zia regime failed to suppress the AL 
base. In the Union Council elections in 1977 AL captured 9750 seats out of 13000 and 80% 
posts of chairman of the local councils. In the Municipality elections held in 1977 the AL also 
won majority of the seats® .^ In another local government elections held in 1990, the governing 
Jatia Party had finished first, with the AL second and BNP trailing in the control of Upo-jila 
parishad. Failing to gain confidence of the rural leaders on November 1991 the BNP 
government abolished the Upo-Jila system established under Ershad regime^'. Afler coming 
to power, AL regime utilized this popular issue to revitalize its rural support base by 
reintroducing a four-tier lacal government system^^. In power, Hasina regime also had done 
different welfare works for the socio-economic development of rural masses, maximum of 
whom are poor. It created good impression among this class^ ®. 
The Youth League, an ancillary organization of AL, formed a strong foundation of 
support base for AL. In urban and rural areas it has thousands of militant workers. The 
primary purpose of this organization is to co-operate AL in building exploitation free 
progressive society and self-reliance economy It also finds and create employment 
opportunity for the millions of unemployed youths of the coimtry. To create job opportimities 
for the youths Zia-regime in 1979 established youth complex, which had given different 
vocational training and interest-free loans to the youths, so that they may become self-reliance 
through establishing small-scale cottage industries. The Hasina regime enlarged the branches 
of youth complex in every district and established youth clubs in every sub-district of 
Bangladesh to facilitate the opportunity for every youths of Bangladesh^'. These 
economically self-sufficient progressive sections of young support-base strengthen the hands 
of Sheikh Hasina. 
The students are the most powerful and effective force in Bangladesh. It has been 
proved in the history of Bangladesh that no political party could survive without student 
support. The AL is a huge organization because of its powerful students wing called Chatra 
(Students) League^^, It is noteworthy that during the language movement in 1952, AL was 
able to win the confidence of the student community of East Pakistan; these loyal students 
83. M. Franda, Political Parties, op.cit p. 159-60. 
84. Foot Note: AL government distributed fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, pumps, tube wells, school- collages and 
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85. Rounaq Jahan, Problems and issues, op.cit. p. 108. 
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played the key role in the liberation movement^^. In Bangladesh after the power loss of AL 
by a military coup, when political activities were banned and all the AL leaders were in hiding 
or in jail, it was the Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL) raised its voice first, demanded the trial 
and punishment of the killers of Mujib^". Since 1975 students associated with BCL were 
always in the forefront of anti-government agitation. They have also shown their efficiency in 
election campaign^^. Student League has its branch committees in every Universities and 
Colleges of Bangladesh. Its committees are also extended up to the union level^ ®. Thousands 
of students are involved with BCL activities who are known as the most dedicated militant 
support base of the party. In East Pakistan Mujib was conscious of the need for mobilizing the 
workers behind the slogan of Bengali nationalism: to give momentum to his movement. So in 
1967 Sramik Awami (Labor) League (ABCL) was formed as a component element of the 
party^^. To attract the working community the election manifesto of AL pledged the 
nationalization of heavy industries and financial institutions and also promised in the equity 
capital as well as in the management of enterprises^^ The working class affirmed their strong 
support to Al's Bengali nationalist movement by participating in the 9-month long liberation 
war The nationalization of the industries by Mujib regime (1972-75) confirmed the labor 
support for AL. AL for the second time at governing power (1996-2001) also have taken 
several acts to secure the jobs and socio-economic interests for the workers'"". However, there 
is a tendency of the trade unions in Bangladesh to support the ruling party'"'. 
Table 3.2 
Age Categories of the Party Supporters (In Percentage) 
Age Category 18-30 31-40 41-50 Above 50 Total 
Awami League 36.7 40.4 39.0 36.1 37.9 
BNP 42.3 38.8 37.0 35.1 39.1 
Others 21.1 24.8 23.9 28.7 22.9 
Total 53.5 26.3 11.6 8.6 100% 
Source: P.8, Jai Jai Din, 19 December 1995. 
A survey conducted by a leading weekly in 1995 shows that AL is comparatively 
more popular than the BNP among the males. Majority of the aged and wealthy people cast 
their votes for AL, whereas youths and women supporter the BNP. About half of the 
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electorate of Bangladesh are women and their high participation in the pools determines the 
election results'"^. Majority of the women are supporters of the BNP'°l In the 1991and 1996 
parliamentary election, they enfranchised for Khaleda'"''. To tilt the women support in its 
favor, in power AL had taken a number of steps for women's welfare/ development. Including 
those are women empowerization policy, free education with scholarship for the girls up to 
graduate level, health care scheme for women and their babies, allowance for the widows etc. 
Hasina and her party also promised to reserve 60 seats for women instead of present 30 in 
future in the future parliament"'^ Since 1969 Bangladesh Mahila Awami League is working 
for women's progress and to protect women's right. Its branch committees exist in all district 
and sub-districts of Bangladesh. More over those NGO's who are working for women's right 
are supporting AL for its moderate and progressive views""". All these activities contributed 
to mobilize a large number of women support group for AL. But the 2001 Parliamentary 
Election proved, these activities could not successfully rebuild the women's confidence for 
the party vise versa the main opposition BNP is still enjoying the privilege. 
Table 3.3 
Major Two Party's Support Base in Gender (In percentage) 
In Gender Awami 
League 
BNP Others 
Male 40 36 24 
Female 34 45 J 21 
Source: P.4, Jai Jai Din; 9 December 1995. 
The Freedom Fighters: Freedom fighters are the honorable social force in 
Bangladesh. Because of AL's spearheading role in the 1971 liberation war majority of them 
are supporting In 1972 Mujib government formed 'Mukti Joddha Sangshad': an 
organization for freedom fighters to rehabilitate them by creating job opportunity, to arrange 
proper treatment for the wounded fighters, and involve them in the development work of the 
post independent Bangladesh'"®. Mujib government preserved 20% of all government jobs 
for the freedom fighters. To sustain their support Hasina government also preserved 15% of 
the government jobs for the children of freedom fighters and stated a lifelong pension scheme 
110 
for the poor freedom fighters . Targeting the 2001 election, AL tried to reorganize the 
support base of the Freedom Fighters and engage them to propagate in favor of the party 
Professional Groups: Since its inception in 1949 the lawyers were the major force 
dominating the AL leadership. Even now a good number of the party leaders are from legal 
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105. AL Manifesto-2001. 
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background'". They are heavily representing the supporters group of AL. In the last two 
elections held in 1998 and 2001 the AL backed panel of lawyers won all the 14 posts of 
Bangladesh Bar Council Executive Committee, the sole representative body of the legal 
professions of Bangladesh"^. Among other professional groups large number of school, 
college and university teachers extended their support for AL. The pro AL teachers group is 
dominating the teachers association of the country's most prestigious and largest 'Dhaka 
University'"^. This line is also followed by journalists, doctors, engineers, agriculturists and 
professional groups"''. 
The Business and Industrial Group: Business class is a recognized social force as 
they have cash money. They are the wealthy section of the society and by utilizing the power 
of money they usually influence social and political activities. The discriminatory policies of 
the Pakistan government deprived the rising Bengali bourgeoisie from government patronage. 
Moreover they also foimd competition with the advanced West Pakistani industrialist's very 
fierce"^ To ^Ifill their aspiration in a protective market they were active in AL's 
autonomous movement and were its main fmancers"^. After the emergence of Bangladesh, by 
introducing socialist policy and nationalizing all big industries and financial corporations, AL 
government alienated its previous business supporters. On the other hand, by extending 
business facilities among its own activists through issuing permits and license for national and 
international trade, AL created a new group of nascent bourgeois class"^. These nascent 
bourgeois group and those who had commercial relation with India financed AL during 1976-
92"®. In 1973, by reversing socialist economy, AL accepted market economy. This change, in 
a favorable political situation, had a tremendous impact. With them the business class started 
renewed their relations with AL"' . They played a vital role for AL's coming to power 
through 1996 election win'^ ®. In power, PM Hasina launched her economic diplomacy to 
erase the business communities bitter memories (of 1972-75) towards the party: she visited a 
number of foreign countries including USA, Japan and European Union to increase the 
foreign investment in Bangladesh^^'. In 2001 Federation of Bangladesh Chamber of 
Commerce and Industries had elected a pro-AL executive committee. The president and 
another ex-president of this chamber were the candidates of AL in the 2001 parliamentary 
election 
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Bureaucracy: The Bangladesh Bureaucracy is a politicized institution. The tendency 
of the public to support political parties in the former East Pakistan were evident since 1952 
language movement, when the Bengali speaking civil servants supported the language issue. 
At the time of autonomous movement during 1966-69 senior Bengali officers discreetly 
helped Mujib and finally in 1971 a number of civil servants actively participated in the 
liberation war^^ .^ But in the newly emerged Bangladesh the relationship between the 
btireaucrats and AL govenmient turned to strained relations when the dominating nature of 
the civil servants, which they had enjoyed during the British and Pakistan days were checked/ 
restrained by adopting several constitutional and reformative m e a n s M o r e o v e r , many lost 
their job for their alleged involvement with occupied Pakistani militaiy. So the Mujib regime 
had lost the confidence of the officials except the few: those participated in the liberation 
war'^^. During 1976-90 the Zia and Ershads military regime were the coalition of the soldiers 
and bureaucrats'^^. From 1994 AL started regaining support of the bureaucrats because of PM 
Khaleda Zia's indifference to their demands' Since then they participated in AL's anti-
government agitation and in 1996 virtually paralyzed the entire civil administration; 
confirmed the power loss of BNP government'^®. The senior officers, who were against 
Khaleda, were rewarded heavily; 9 of them were nominated by AL for the 1996 general 
election and 3 were given important position under Hasina's cabinet'^^. Now AL has 
substantial support base among the Civil Servants of Bangladesh. 
The Bangladesh Army. The Bangladesh Army a successor of the politicized Pakistan 
Army remained entangled with politics since liberation war. Mujib's was particularly 
distrustful of this institution, suspicious of its colonial heritage and apprehensive of a military 
threat to political rule. So he was against strong military: curtailed the military budget; formed 
a paramilitary force called Rakkhi Bahani composed of Mujibs loyalist freedom fighters as 
counter force to the military with Indian help'^ . For a number of reason most of the army 
officers were anti-Indian. This anti-Indian sentiment of the armed force gradually developed 
as anti-Mujib orientation'^'. The army felt its group interest were jeopardize: except few 
Freedom fightersin the army all of the others had displeasure with the government which is 
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the ultimate reason behind the bloody overthrow of the charismatic leader Mujib'". Even in 
1981, the army openly showed their strong apathy against any AL-led government in 
Bangladesh'^ . liiis trend was reversed when the party started propagating that they prefer 
strong army for Banglaesh: a number of Generals had showed their political alignment 
towards the party'^^. In 1996 a group of retired army officers openly supported the AL-led 
anti-regime movement, later many of them formally joined the party'^^. In 1996 election 
manifesto AL promised a lot to satisfy the armed force'^'. To consolidate their support in 
1996 election surprisingly AL nominated 11 ex- army officers including two former army 
chiefs and an air force chief'^ ®. In power PM Hasina gave the armed force great importance: 
she included two former army officers in her cabinet , promoted many officers on merit, 
provided the armed force with modem weapons and improved its training facilities'''". These 
activities boosted the image of AL among the soldiers and officers of Bangladesh armed 
force. 
The Muslims: The Bengali Muslims participated 'Muslim Homeland Movement' and 
they became the part of Pakistan by their own free will. But when the economic and political 
deprivation of Bangladesh continued in Pakistan state, the salience of religious identity 
declined over the years and it was replaced by the linguistic secular Bengali nationalism. The 
earlier exclusive emphasis on linguistic identity has been replaced/lost its high spirit again 
since the inception of Bangladesh. Now both religion and language are strong elements in the 
identity focus of Bengali Muslims''". In the competitive political arena AL, a mass based 
political party, which is like an ever floating river; capable enough to change itself to adjust/ 
confront the people's timely demand and changing values in regards to their feeling for 
Bengali Muslim identity - a blend of love Bengali culture and heritage and faith in Islam. AL 
changed its religious stand again and again to maintain its popularity among its supporters. 
At the beginning AL was purely a party of Muslim citizens, founded by the dissident 
faction of the East Pakistan Muslim League. Until 1955 its membership was not allowed for 
the non-Muslims'''^. To get advantage in its Bengali nationalist movement as well as in the 
voting politics in the 1955 by tactical move secularism was adopted as the party program and 
AL also opened its membership for the non-Muslims'''^. After the 1971 liberation war 
Bangladesh became a secular state and all communal political parties were barmed by AL led 
government. Although Bengali Muslims were not stressing a Muslim identity in Pakistan now 
it got salience against the secularist view of AL. It also became a source of strength for the 
opposition against the Mujib regime'''''. No doubt people had affection for Mujib and were 
following him but were not ready to accept his secularist and pro-Indian stand. So after the 
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death of M w b the bigger section of his rural support base changed their bond from AL to 
Zia's BNP' ^ In different elections BNP used the slogan, "Defeat Awami League and keep 
Islam safe"'"^^. Such sentiments of course run directly counter to AL's secularism. In 1979 
Parliamentary Election AL won only 40 seats with 24.4% of the total votes. Its failure to 
appeal to the Muslim voters in Bangladesh indicated the fact that 23 of 40 seats came from the 
Hindu majority areas''^'. Until 1991, AL failed to confront the realities of the changing values 
of the Bangladeshis in regard to their feelings for a 'non-secular Islamic' nationalism- a blend 
of love for Bangladesh and faith in Islam''^ ®. But the 1991 election defeat convinced the party 
about the futility of its secularist appeal to the masses'"* .^ It was at this time the AL leadership 
felt the need for limited Islamization of AL character: changed its propaganda style, started 
using Islamic symbols to persuade/ convince the 90% Muslim population in the party fold'^°. 
Showing this Islamic image and changing the economic programs helped the AL to build 
right wing support base among the Bangladesh peop le s ' 'No doubt all these activities 
increased AL's right wing Muslim support base but it was not enough to fight the right wing 
BNP led four party alliance: a coalition of fundamentalist and pro- Islamic parties- which is 
proved in the 2001 general election. 
The Hindus: The Hindus, the minorities in Bangladesh are ethnically Bengali but their 
religious difference a source of separate group of identity. Nearly 10% of Bangladesh 
populations are Hindus who have the general tendency to support AL over the years. They 
constitute a solid vote-bank for the party. 
In 1955 AL the Bengali nationalist party adopted secularism as a party program to 
mobilize minority Hindus in its support base'^ . Since the center Pakistan was unrelentingly 
anti-Hindu, the Hindus felt safe with the party like AL which was not so committed to 
communalism. As Mujib started Bengali nationalistic movement, the Hindus began to identify 
with the potentials for a possible secularist state based on Bengali nationalism, where there 
would have little space for communalism'^^. In the newly found Bangladesh secularism was 
made a part of the constitution and Mujib tried to unite the Muslim and Hindu Bangladeshis 
on the basis of their common linguistic identity'^'^. Moreover, Mujib had not wanted to make 
Indian leadership uneasy by acceptance of non-secular Bengali Muslim nationalism. This is 
one of the reasons the Hindu cast block votes for the AL in different national elections. 
After the 1975 power change, Bangladesh became actively anti-Indian and anti-Hindu 
as well. The BNP rulers, who followed every thing in opposition of what AL did to build an 
anti-AL image. Since AL was considering soft to Hindus, it built pro Muslim image and 
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particularly pushed the Hindus towards AL. After the takeover of General Ershad, he made 
Islam the state religion, which revealed a clear massage that in mono-ethnic Bangladesh there 
is little space for people other than the Muslims'^^ So Hindus support AL because it is the 
party, which is not against them, and which at least seems to promise a protection for their 
vulnerable existence though there is very little presence of Hindus in its top leadership'^^ and 
even it camiot go high on secularism again, as secularism is politically unpopular in 
Bangladesh'". 
Conclusion: During Pakistan era, although, AL had a checkered life, it mobilized the 
support of various groups behind the cause of Bengali nationalism within a very short time'^^. 
The party's success in the expansion of its large support base was largely due to its 
charismatic leader Sheikh Mujib, who with a precise sense of political timing exploited the 
Bengali sub-nationalist slogans. In the independent Bangladesh during 1972-75 the AL was 
using students, youths and labor front to recruit support for the party. In addition to this the 
old method of party building through patronage was also being followed. But AL was able to 
sustain its support base not because of its various kinds of ancillary organizations activities 
but due to the charismatic appeal of its greatest asset - its leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 
Now AL has a good number of vote banks because of three reasons: (1) although Mujib had 
passed away but the appeal of his charisma has remained intact to the Bengali masses; (2) A 
large section of Bengali people still remember the leading role of AL in the 1971 liberation 
war, (3) AL's secularist approach united the secularist support in its platform, among those 
are the progressive educated class and the minority religious class of the society. At the death 
of Mujib AL lost a big section of its support base during 1976-81. The taking up of the party 
president-ship by Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujib in 1981, saved the party's 
support base from fiirther destruction. The subtle move/ tilt of party stand from previous 
secularist and socialist ideology towards moderate Islamic leaning and accepting of market 
economic policy helped AL to regain part of its old support base. During the AL rule in 1996-
2001 through distributing government patronage, economic benefit and by confirming women 
empowerization in the different tier of administration, the party tried to get confidence of 
youths and women folk; majority of which groups are supporting BNP, the main competitor 
of AL'^^. a general impression prevails in Bangladesh that the AL is a pro-Indian party. 
Maximum of the people recognize India, the main enemy of Bangladesh'^®. So the politics of 
AL was not proved enough to confirm the election win for AL'^'. Although Hindus and other 
minority religious groups are considered as the permanent vote bank for AL but in the recent 
elections it is definitely proved that these vote bank cannot play any decisive role for the party 
win in the general elections. To confirm its success against the pro-Islamic and rightist parties 
AL needs to increase its rightist and Islamic support base. For that in a country of more than 
90% Muslim population, it has to impart more Islamic orientation in its party programs vis-a-
vis has to abandon its old secularist ideology. At least this is what the situation demands right 
now. 
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The AL Leadership/ The Party Elites 
The quality of political leadership is a crucial factor in the evolution of democracy in a 
country. The leadership having visions/ foresight-ness is able to produce a far-reaching impact 
on the economic and political process of a nation. In Bangladesh the growth/ evolution of 
different political parties have always not followed democratic system, the called ideal system 
to grow quality leadership. The post-independent AL is not so different from all of these 
parties. Even after that the nature of AL leadership added some significant distinction since 
the leaders, who are leading AL, their dynamic role in the liberation movement of Bangladesh 
and in different anti-government movement in post-independent Bangladesh brought 
appreciable success to achieve peoples right - which created history; moreover, by surviving 
for 20 years in opposition struggle, against all odds, they successfully lead the party in the 
1996 general election to reach in power. 
The top leadership of AL presents a dual characteristic; it is democratic in appearance 
and authoritarian in reality. Because of the authoritarian nature of the leadership all the key 
decisions are made at the top of the organization i.e. by the party leader only. The entire 
organization identifies itself with the party leader. Sheikh Hasina has the final ward and she 
used to exercise full authority over the entire internal power structure including the party's top 
brass l e a d e r s h i p E v e n the devastating election defeat of 2001 could not raise any kind of 
threat against her authoritarian role comparing to any European political party leadership. The 
major factors that are behind the authoritarian power of Sheikh Hasina in the party are as 
follows: the charisma of Sheikh Mujib made him the unparallel leader of the nation. In his 
sudden death the leadership of AL had failed to fill up the leadership vacuum. In the absence 
of a powerful assertive leadership the party was divided into many factions, its support base 
were reduced, in spite of its strong grass root organizing base it faced election debacle in the 
1979 Parliamentary Election. The frustrated party workers and leaders were desperately 
grouping for a courageous leadership to save he party from further destruction. In Bangladesh 
people love heroes and always rally behind them'^^. In the absence of any alternative 
charisma or pragmatic leadership people finally find their emotional ties with Sheikh Hasina, 
the hereditary successor of their hero of national liberation movement Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, who could sustain the image of the former leader, father of the nation Mujib in his 
absence among the masses'^. She became the symbol of unity of different factions of the 
party leaders and workers. Party workers and supporters allegiances are to Hasina and only 
secondary to the party. This is also explains the strict dependency of AL leaders on Hasina. 
The post-independent AL was relatively a weak organization of an undisciplined and a 
little experienced Bengali nationalist leaders, those who are drown to AL platform during 
1949-70 from various strata/ groups and interest of Bengali society; including of them were: 
from leftist to rightists; moderates and radicals; surplus farmers from rural areas and lawyers, 
business peoples, trade union leaders, student leaders and professionals from urban areas to 
achieve Bengali sub-nationalist aspirations'^^.In the liberated Bangladesh when the Bengalis 
nationalist target was realized the party faced internal factional conflict due to the 
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heterogeneous character and wide internal differences of tlic top brass leaders. But Mujib's 
charisma was enough to glue the different factions together' 
Mujib's unique style to keep direct relations with the grass root leaders and workers 
resulted their loyalty more to him and less to the party and other party l e a d e r s i t reduced 
the party's influence over its support base and the other leaders influence even on their own 
local supporters. Party became subordinate to Mujib's popularity and made him the sole 
authority of its policy making. His authoritarian influence over the party decisions instead of 
sharing party authority with his colleagues slowly made the AL leadership inactive, inefficient 
and dependant on him'® .^ At his death during 1975-80 the party was controlled/ remained with 
the same quality leaders without Mujib, those who successfully led the liberation movement 
but imlike of their previous unity now were factionally divided; also was unable to show their 
previous efficiency to mobilize public masses under AL banner. 
In this grave situation all the conflicting groups unanimously elected Hasina AL 
president as the leader of consensus. But in her last 20 years in office the party also faced 
internal conflict and defection for three times. In these factional fighting every time Hasina 
herself was the leader of the winning group and these conflicts were ended by the expulsion 
of the rival senior leaders and by neutralizing others. Their evacuated positions were filled up 
by the pro-Hasina elements: the youthful section of the party'^^. Despite some small 
groupings are still present but none has the strength to challenge the incumbent leadership of 
Sheikh Hasina'^". Now she has her full command over the party. With the change of the party 
leadership since Hasina's taking up of the office the party was able to recapture the governing 
power in 1996. A demographical background of AL is given below. 
Table 3.4 
Years of Political Experiences of the AL Central Committee Members till 2001 
Experience 50-60 40-49 30-39 20-29 10-19 Total 
No. 4 10 29 5 2 50 
% 8 20 58 10 4 100% 
Source: Interview with different AL central committee leaders; Also Aminur Rashid edts, Pramanna Sanshad 
(Dhaka: Tattha Sheba, 1997). 
As examined, the political background of the top political elites of the BAL elected in 
the 1997 BAL council indicates that 86% of them have 30-60 years political experience. All 
the members are above 40+ years of age. 72% of them are in their and 22% are above 60 
years of age. 76% of them joined politics in their early life through participating in the student 
politics. This entire group was the vanguard of the Bengali nationalist movement in Pakistan. 
Others participated in the party either by joining in its lower branch office as an active 
political worker or as a successor of the previous prominent AL leader or as an ex popular 
social worker. A few number of the leaders also joined the ALL by giving up/relinquished 
their previous leftist political parties. All of them, except a few, had participated in the 
Bengali nationalist movement in Pakistan also in the historic liberation war; saw the 
triumphant victory of their armed struggle in 1971, election successes in the 1970,1973 and in 
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recentl996 parliamentary elections. They also are the eyewitnesses of the traumatic fall of AL 
government in 1975.They participated in different antigovernment movement in Bangladesh 
since 1976 and faced all miserable situations including imprisonments and political 
harassment. Naturally, these leaders proved their patience and painstaking manners in their 
activities to survive against all odds. The AL leaders at SO"' are maximum in number in the 
party's top brass. The party president is also included in tliis group. These age group leaders, 
in the society, are more pragmatic and thoughtfiil in leading the parties. In the same way, the 
elderly leaders above 60 can utilize their accumulated experience in the parly's policy and 
program making to build it a strong unparallel organization through recruiting maximum 
support under its banner and giving dynamism to its activities. Comparing to this committee 
the 1949 committee was consisted of mostly youth members; 73% of them were below 40 
years of age. A young leader below 40 can be a firebrand speaker with revolutionary mind but 
are emotional and not enough mature in organizational work. Like the 1949 committee the 
1970 committee was not fully professional in politics and lacked experience to sustain 
popularity. The leadership role in the autonomous movement and liberation war gave AL a 
rare honor and made the only peoples party in the post independent Bangladesh but their 
immaturity and absence of experience to rule the country caused the reduction of its 
mentionable number of support base and the lacking in organizational maturity also 
factionally divided the party and lost its previous effectiveness as an effective organizational 
weapon even in the lifetime of its charismatic leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman'^'. Again 
comparing the post independent position the AL is a well-organized party in the absence of 
factional conflicts in its tOT brass. The party president is enjoying the loyalty from all section 
of party men and leaders . The party was in power for five years by wirming the 1996 
parliamentary election. Although it lost the 2001 election its vote percentage is increased to 
40% from 37.5% of the 1996 election''^. It shows the pragmatism and efficiency of the 
present leadership in the office. 
Although 40% of the 1997 leaders are recognized having their main profession as 
politics but all the central committee members are known to the people because of their 
political background, not by their other mentioned professions. Among the 50 central 
committee members' bio-data I have collected, 31 of them had been elected M.P. for the first 
time in 1970. 18 of the political elites have the ministerial or equivalent experience. It is also 
necessary to note here that all the top leaders except few from their early life are doing AL 
politics and did not change the party ever even during the days of hardship. Those few who 
had previous attachment/ affiliation with some leftist parties are very renowned figure in the 
political arena of Bangladesh and engaged in politics since their student life, have more than 
30 years of political experience. These are the noted positive performances of the top brass 
AL leaders. But there is some lacking in the leadership, which is also to be mentioned. Only 
24% of the top brass leaders have more than three times legislative experience'''* and even 
18% of the leaders don't have any legislative experience; it showed their collective ' 
inefficiency in the electoral politics and also shows their constituency/ local voters/ peoples 
lack of enough confidence in their leadership. Many of them have admirable theoretical 
knowledge in politics, good social status and are recognized as good orator in public meetings 
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but where the electoral politics determines the destiny of a political party in a parliamentary 
type of democracy, there every leader's individual performance in the elections add some 
special weight for the party to reach in power. Moreover, positive electoral performance of a 
leader adds a sound/ strong recognition in his political career; certify/ recognize him the real 
peoples leader. 
Table 3.5 
Demographic Characteristics of the Party Elites of AL clected in 1949,1970, and 1997 
Demographic 1949 1970 1997 
Characteristics 
Age No % No % No % 
Over 60 1 3 0 0 11 22 
50-60 3 8 8 23 36 72 
40-49 6 16 25 67 3 6 
30-39 16 43 3 8 - -
Below 30 11 30 1 2 - -
Total 37 00 37 100 50* 100 
Education 
Graduation and Above 33 89 33 89 48 96 
Below Graduation 4 11 4 11 2 4 
Total 37 100 37 100 50 100 
Profession 
Politic - - - - 17 35 
Business 5 14 11 29 19 40 
Lawyers 21 57 21 57 7 15 
Land holders 5 14 2 6 2 4 
Journalists - - - - 3 6 
Trade Union Leaders 1 3 1 3 - -
Religious Leaders 1 3 - - - -
Former school and college 4 14 2 6 - -
teachers 
Total 37 100 37 100 4S** 100 1 
Source: P.29 T. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and its Aftermath and interview collected from 
different AL Central Committee leaders. 
Table 3.6 
Legislative Experience of the AL Central Executive Committee Members (CECM) 
Experience Experience 
o f6 
assembly 
Experience 
o f 5 
Assembly 
Experience 
o f4 
Assembly 
Experience 
of3 
Assembly 
Experience 
of 2 
Assembly 
Experience 
o f l 
Assembly 
No 
parliamentary 
Experience 
Total 
No. of 
CECM 
2 6 4 9 10 10 9 50 
In 
Percentage 
4 12 8 18 20 20 18 100% 
Source: Aminur Rashid ec ts, Pramanna Sanshad (Dha ka: Tattha Sheba, 1997). Also Ahmad Ullah, Pancham 
National Sangshad Pramanna Grantha, (Dhaka: Suchayan Prakashan, 1992). 
The socio-economic background of a political leader also helps him to flotirish his 
political career, increase his acceptability among the masses. Modem education is an essential 
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asset, which widen the world knowledge and increase the analytical capability of a leader, 
enabling him to look at a problem from different angle and find out a better solution. Since its 
inception, AL is lucky by getting educated leaders in its party fold. In 1949, 89% of the 
leaders were graduate and post-graduate degree holders. The figure is 96% for the leadership 
in 1997. Only small minorities of the leaders were recorded having graduation degree. Thus 
the party can be benefited by its highly educated leader's group wisdom through practicing 
democracy in the policy making in its high organ. 
All the elites elected in 1997 council belong to urban wealthy section and upper 
middle class profession. The biggest portion (40%) of the party's central leaders are 
professional politicians. Among the other 35% are from wealthy business community, 15% 
lawyers, 6% journalists and only 4% are big land holders- who are also city dwellers. 
Comparing to this the largest section (57%) of the 1949 AL central executive body engaged in 
law profession; others in the serial were: petty business people 14%, land holders 14%, and 
school-college teachers also 14%. A comparative study shows that the majority of the 1997 
leaders are drawn from wealthy section of the society; who are more affluent and better 
placed in the society than the leaders of the 1949 who were from pre-dominantly middleclass 
professions. The same middle class professionals also controlled the executive committee 
formed in 1970 . Money plays an important role to run an organization, to confirm an election 
victory and on economic power the local allegiances rested. The emergence of the affluent 
class in the AL leadership fiilfilled the economic needs for its organizational activities and the 
party is now able to put solvent candidates to ensure election win. 
Maximum of the AL legislators elected in the 1996 belonged to district and Upo-Jila 
branch committees of AL leadership structure. A statistical analysis of these MP's bio-data 
can give a good understanding on AL's lower branch leaders' qualities and capabilities in 
leading the party. If we consider the age, education and experience of the AL parliamentary 
members elected in 1996, we find that 76% of the members belonged to the 46 and above age 
group. The people in this group are possibly more mature than the AL leadership elected in 
1973; those who were at the age of 45 and below, had less political experience. Moreover, the 
1973 group did not face any traumatic events comparing the 1996 groups; rather they had 
high confidence on their political performance due to their great success they achieved against 
Pakistan government in the 1969 mass movement and in the subsequent armed revolution of 
1971- which ensured the birth of independent Bangladesh. Thus, they were enjoying some 
kind of unfounded feeling of optimism that permanent political power was belonged to them. 
They were thus superficies regarding their opponents and did not care for developing political 
organization'^^. The AL legislators elected in 1996 had 30-60 years political experience. A 
good majority of them were attached with all ups and dowois of AL since its autonomous 
movement against the Pakistan regime. Past experience of a person helps him to take better 
decision for the fixture, ctow confidence in his working - the AL leadership definitely enjoys 
these political benefits' . 
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original/ old party (AL). Those who joined AL by defecting other parties, their previous experience with other 
parties also included with their total years of political experience. 
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Table 3.7 
Demographic Cliaractcrislia of the AL Legislators elected in 1973 and 1996 Parliament 
Year=^> 1973 1996 
Demographic No. % No. % 
Characteristics 
Age 56 and above 13 5 54 31 
46-55 61 21 79 45 
36-45 112 40 36 21 
31-35 63 23 5 3 
25-30 31 11 - -
Total 280 100% 174 100% 
Level of Post Graduate 
40 Education and Ph.D. 78 28 69 
Degree 
78 45 Graduate 128 45 
Below 
15 Graduation 75 23 26 
Total 281 100% 173 100% 
Profession Lawyers 75 26 20 12 
Business 67 24 75 43 
Former Army - - 7 4 
Officer 
Retired Civil 2 1 3 2 
Servants 
Land Holders 50 18 16 9 
Doctors 15 5 6 3 
Teachers 28 10 7 4 
Whole time 
Politicians 35 12 7 4 
Miscellaneous 11 4 33 19 
Total 283 100% 174 100 
Source: P. 68 Aminur Rashid, Pramanna Sangshad and F. 131 laluKOer Maniruzzaman, t-oiuics miu oucicij, ui 
Bangladesh. 
Table 3.8 
Years of Political Experience of AL Parliamentary Members elected in 1996 and 1973 
Years of 
Experience 
51-60 41 -50 31 - 4 0 21 -30 11-20 1 - 1 0 Total 
1996 MPs 5 28 64 35 10 21 163 
% 3 17 39 22 6 13 100% 
1973 MPs _ - - 122 141 263 
% - - - - 46 54 100% 
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Since the Parliamentary history of Bangladesh majority of the MPs elected in different 
elections are well educated. AL MPs are also not different Irom them. Vast majority of the 
AL legislators elected in 1996 election were also highly educated. A comparative study of 
their professional background reveals, the pre-dominant middle class characteristics of the 
1973 AL MPs are replaced by the wealthy politicians elected in 1996 Parliamentary Elections, 
maximum of whom were rich business people. Bangladesh had been a rural slum in British 
and Pakistan period. In the absence of any wealthy class the newly educated middle class was 
the dominant force in that time progressive politics. This section also dominated the AL 
leadership till 1975. But in independent Bangladesh Mujib regimes patronizing policies for 
his party men created a pro-AL affluent business community . Now they are reckon with/ 
well established in the society. Moreover, all the governments followed a patronizing policy 
to create a new business class to strengthen Bangladesh economy. These new rich people 
enjoyed the sympathy of different political power centre in their career. Now they want to 
have political power for themselves and joined different political parties including AL''®. This 
explains why business class formed the majority in the national assembly as well as in the AL 
parliamentary group. 
Though the AL legislators of 1996 are highly educated, having enough political 
experience and hold better social influence in the society but their skill as a whole in 
legislative experience is very poor; poorer than the AL legislators elected in the first 
parliamentary elections in Bangladesh in 1973. 54% of the 1996 AL legislators were elected 
for the first time. This lack of experience of the AL MPs shows the previous AL leaders 
weakness in organizing public support for AL platform and the futility of its previous socialist 
economic programs to develop the society which one the party was espousing in the 
independent Bangladesh till 1991 Parliamentary Election. 
Table 3.9 
Legislative Experience of the AL Legislators Elected in the 1973 and 1996 
Parliamentary Elections 
Experience => 
% of MP's U 
First Time 
in 
Parliamen 
t 
Elected 
for 2"'' 
Time 
Elected 
for 3rd 
Time 
Elected 
for 4th 
Time 
Elected 
for 
5thTime 
Total 
1973 MPs 93 160 28 - - 281 
% 33 57 10 - - 100% 
1996 MPs 93 46 23 10 2 174 
% 54 26 13 6 1 100% 
Source: P.? UAB Razia Alcter Banu, "the Fall of Sheikh Mujib Regime: An Analysis; Indian 
Political Science Review, Vol.15 No.l, January 1981 and P68 Aminur Rashid, Pramanna Sangshad. 
The new leaders, elected in the 1992 national council of AL, accepted the market 
economic programs by changing the previous one'^^. It encouraged the previously alienated 
business community to renew their previous tie with To satisfy the 90% Muslim 
masses by changing previous secularist views the party in the post 1991 political scenario 
177. Foot Note: All the subsequent governing parties to Mujib government including BNP and JP also followed 
the same patronizing policy to build strong party base through patronization and also to build a rich business 
community to ensure a solvent party flmd to run the party and win different elections. 
178. Talukder Maniruzzman, Politics and Society in Bangladesh, op.cit. pp. 153-55. 
179. Shah AMS Kibria, Bangladesh at Crossroads, (Dhaka: UPL, 2000), p.273. 
180. Matiur Rahman, Inside Politics, op.cit. p.62. 
102 
accepted moderate Islamic views to propagate'®'. Thus the election triumph shows the 
foresight-ness of the new AL leadership who are much more educated, experienced and 
pragmatic in their policymaking. Although the party is defeated in the 2001 election against a 
coalition of all major parties including BNP, JP and Jammat but still its vote bank increased 
remarkably from 37.5% of total votes casted in the 1996 election to more than 40% in the 
2001 election'®^. 
The Propaganda Style of AL 
Introduction: Modem era is called the era of mass media. Inter party competition changes 
due to the modem propaganda style of the political parties and tlaeir dependency on these 
propaganda machineries or mass media in spreading party ideas, ideologies and programs'®^. 
Now-a-days, the indirect influence of political parties upon electors by means of propaganda 
is always present. It is natural that there can be various kinds of different opinions and parties 
tend to crystallize these opinions. By minimizing the differences they unite/ bring together the 
similar opinions/ personal idiosyncrasies into a party program'^''. Finally, they propagate the 
programs through different propaganda machineries to assemble public opinion under the 
party shade with the hope of coming to power. In the election of Great Britain the clever 
propaganda tactics of labor camp led by Tony Blare was a major reason of failure of the 
Touries. The election propaganda of Bill Clinton (in USA), even the propaganda tactics of 
BJP (Bharatia Janata Party) of India helped them to come to the goveming power by wirming 
the mass mandate'®^. Thus in modem era the publicity department of a political party bears a 
lot of responsibilities'®^. 
In a democratic system with more than one party, the citizens' function is to choose 
between the parties through choosing their ideas, ideology and programs to run the country. In 
this case the citizens of a country prefer a party through considering ideas, ideologies, 
programs and leadership among the many. To win the voters consideration in an election and 
to grow the party base among the masses all the political parties came forward towards the 
public masses with their programs: social, economic and political - to develop the country 
and its people. They approach the people and ascertain why their programs are more eligible 
than the other party programs; they criticize, they try to contradict each other's arguments in 
favor of their ovra through the propaganda machineries. Parties attractive propaganda ways 
and style influence the people to prepare their mind to become a supporter of a party or to 
favor it, to work for it and in the general election to cast vote in favor of his dear party 
candidate. Party propaganda is also to encourage the party workers and members to devote 
their maximum effort for the party.' 
As the largest and mass based political party AL is having the strongest and modem 
propaganda machineries. Like all other political parties AL use to publicize its ideas, 
programs and ideology in the masses through some propaganda machineries or media. These 
are discussed below: 
(1) Charismatic leader Mujib 's popularity and other popular leaders of AL are the 
main instruments to popularize the party in masses. They propagate the party ideas through 
181. Dhaka Courier, June 1999, p. 17. 
182. The Hindu, 29 October 2001. 
183. Angelo Panebianco, "Political Parties", op.cit. pp.234. 
184. M. Duverger, "Political Parties", op.cit. p.378. 
185. Jai Jai Din, 13 April 1997, p.7. 
186. Foot Note: The publicity department of a party controls the propaganda machineries, maintains its ways and 
style to propagate party ideology. 
187. Interview with Dr. Md. Selim. 
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different public m e e t i n g s T h e y also use to show their love and gratitude to the masses 
through direct interaction in different convenient moments. The meetings and public contacts 
continue for the whole of the years in the name of different occasion but during election 
period it took some kind of extensive measure/ shape. It should be mentioned here that many 
come to public meetings out of curiosity or for amusement and are not true supporters'®'. The 
party programs or even in some cases the party leaders approaching style influences them to 
support the party. During 1996 general election Sheikh Hasina carried out an extensive tour 
almost continuously throughout the country urging the voters to cast their votes in favor of 
AL candidates for as she said, "To continue the democratic triumph of the people, what they 
earned by maximum sacrifice and b l o o d s h e d " I n the last 20 days of her 1996 election tour 
AL leader visited 50 districts for the cause of election propaganda and addressed in 300 big 
public meetings'®'. Mentioning Hasina's propaganda tactics eminent journalist Amanud 
Dowla wrote, "In her extensive election tour she visited the remotest areas of the countryside, 
personally interacted with lakhs of people. They discussed their daily problems: their joys and 
sorrows, embraced the old mothers, took the village mothers sons in her lap, showed them her 
warm greetings. In the 1970 general election Mujib also carried out extensive tour even in the 
remotest villages, earned love and respect from the masses; introduced his party candidates in 
their respective constituencies. By using his unique charisma finally seized the election 
victory' . 
During the Pakistan era when the electronic media were controlled by and opposition 
parties news were censored from all the news papers by the governments, the leaders of East 
Pakistan developed mass meetings as the main channel of communication with the people. 
After independence until now all the news medias are far from free. So not surprisingly still 
now the habits of attending public meetings and raising the most heated issues there becomes 
an integral part of political culture in Bangladesh'®^. 
(2) Party workers personal contact with the masses help to raise vote banks as well as 
supporters group. In every primary branches of AL and its ancillary organization there is 
always to be found a small circle of very active party workers group. They are not party 
leaders but executives. Duverger called them party militants'® . They regularly attend 
meetings, share in spreading party slogans, help to organize its propaganda and prepare its 
electoral campaign' . Everyday in their respective fields: factories, College- University halls, 
Clubs, Village bazaars, offices etc. places- they spread the party ideas among the workers, 
students, youths and peasants. They deal with the local people, discuss with them different 
daily problems: social, political and economical problems known by the newspapers, radio 
and television and feed the enthusiasm within the party framework. By this supporters group 
grow; primary branches collect new members'®®. 
One prominent AL presidium member mentioned that, lacking of door-to-door election 
campaign was one of the reasons of the party defeat in the 1991 general election. So during 
188. M. Rasid, 'Political Unrest and Democracy in Bangladesh'; Asian Survey, Vol.37 No.3, March 1997, p. 
258. 
189. M. Duverger, "Political Parties", op.cit. p 104 . 
190. Daily Jana Kantha, 10 June 1996. 
191. Dr. Mohammad Hannan,Bangladesher Rajnaitik Itihash 1990-1999,op.cit p.496. 
192. Daily Jana Kantha, 10 June 1996. 
193. For similar discussion see Talukder Maniruzzaman, 'The Fall of Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and the 
Prospect of Civil Rule inBangladesh;' Pacific Affairs, Vol.65 No,2, Summer 1992; p.209. 
194. M. Duverger, "PoJiticaJ Parties", op.cit pp.UO, U 7. 
195.1bid. p. 110. 
196. For similar discussion seelbid. p. 117. 
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1994 City Corporation election campaign and 1996 parliamentary election campaign AL 
leader Hasina instructed the AL leaders and workers to approach every voter personally by 
organizing door-to-door campaign''^. Human nature is that, "every person loves himself best. 
He/ she inquires some kind of importance and honor from others". During the election AL 
leaders, workers and supporters visited every houses of their respective localities to confirm 
the floating voters in favor of the party: they explained their party policies and programs to 
the voters, distributed posters, leaflets; participated in wall writing and postering etc"®. The 
work showed positive results by confirming AL victory in both the elections. 
(3) Propagating party programs and ideology through newspapers, books, pamphlets, 
leaflets, posters, wall-writings etc. It is possible to create a specific kind of supporters group 
by publishing party newspapers. Some readers of a party newspaper are not supporters at all, 
but are simply curious. By reading newspapers some of this curious group of readers feel 
attachment with the party programs and activities and become a party's strong supporter'^'. 
AL doesn't have its own official news media. But many daily and weekly newspapers reflect 
the thinking of the party and propagate its ideas and programs. When these newspapers brand 
someone or groups (as a hero or villain), it is to be assumed that this propaganda has been 
latmched wdth the tacit approval of the high-ups in the party^°°. In East Pakistan Ittefaq was 
the mouthpiece of AL. It stood firmly to create public opinion in favor of AL and its 
autonomous movement during 1966-70 and helped the party to become Bengali peoples only 
dear political organization. But since 1973 when Ittefaq and some other leading newspapers 
including Holiday and Gana Kantha started writing against AL; the party, though, had 
unparallel organizing base, started loosing its popularity^®'. Again in the changing political 
scenario from 1992, maximum dailies and weeklies including Ittefaq, Daily Star, Independent, 
Jana Kantha, Azker Kagoj, Vorer Kagoj, Jai Jai Din, Bichinta etc started publishing the AL 
cause, it gained strong popularity in the masses and had shown its high public support by 
winning the 1996 parliamentary election. Now the most renowned editors of different 
newspapers including others Abed Khan, Mahfuz Anam and Matiur Rahman are supporting 
the AL cause^® .^ Their lovality to AL ideology is out of question and their closeness to the AL 
president is well known^ . AL has a glorious past. The history of the liberation struggle of 
Bangladesh is the history of AL. By reading the Bangladesh history from different books, the 
new generation of Bengali youths toow the glorious past of AL and feel unity/ solidarity with 
AL on some vital national issues. Some eminent writers are writing books glorifying the role 
of AL in the past and in the present political development of Bangladesh. They also show 
their deep esteem to some great AL leaders for their brave leadership in different past national 
issues, including of them are Mujib, Suhrawardy, Bhasani, Tajuddin etc. some AL leaders 
including Hasina have written a number of books stressing on the problems and prospects of 
Bangladesh society. Different ancillary organizations of AL like Mujib Memorial 
Association, Awami Cultural organization, Amra Kozon, Mujib Sena etc sell these books 
from their ovra bookstalls and in different book fares. AL also distributes leaflets, posters 
197. Interview with Dr. Mohammad Sehm, MP and AL Presidium Member. Also see Nizam U. Ahmed,' Party 
Politics in Bangladesh's Local Government: the 1994 City Corporation Elections'; Asian Survey, Vol.35 No. 11, 
November 1995; p.1022. 
198.Bangladesh Chatra League President Bahadur Bepari was in charge to organize door-to-door campaign for 
some part of Dhaka. He described it to the Research Scholar. 
199. M. Duverger, "Political Parties", op.cit. p.l04. 
200. Dhaka Courier, 26 June 1997. 
201. ReazUddin Ahmed, Salter Sandeny Pratidi op.cit. p. 11, 18-19,21. 
202. Jai Jai Din, 31 December 1996, p. 11. 
203. Dhaka Courier26 June 1997. 
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among the masses through its organized workers group. The militant section of leaders, 
workers and supporters also do the work of postering and wall writing by their own 
initiatives. By targeting the 2001 general election AL published many leaflets and posters^"'*. 
(4) Electronic Media: Since independence, the ruling parties control electronic media 
(Radio, Television etc): Only governing party news are coming through these media. From 
1975 to 1996 AL was totally deprived from electronic media facilities, except two caretaker 
governments' short period during 1991 and 1996. In these short periods along with all other 
parties AL's activities were propagated by these media. Especially, before the 1996 general 
election masses were satisfied/ pleased by the AL leaders humble speech broadcasted by 
Radio and television and many floating voters casted their votes in favor of the party^°^ 
During 1996-2001, the government party AL controlled the electronic media. They tried to 
spread AL ideology and ideas through different programs broadcasted by these media. But 
except the parliamentary debates other programs had little effect on the people as they don't 
trust/ believe the government-controlled media^ ® .^ 
(5) Meeting, procession and strikes are regular phenomenon in Bangladesh. In the 
opposition AL had declared different anti-govemment programs to throughout the existing 
government from power and to prevent or protest the government's anti-people activities. To 
propagate the AL programs and to assemble the anti-govemment popular support behind the 
party banner the AL, its branch and ancillary organizations arranged thousands of meetings, 
processions, seminars etc. and numerious hartals (general strikes) all over Bangladesh^°^ In 
Bangladesh opposition camp believe that to compel the government yielding to the peoples 
demand strike is an effective political instrument. Only during the tenure of BNP government 
(1991-1996) AL called 197 nation wide strikes^"®. In power the AL arranged several meetings 
and processions to celebrate different memorable days and occasions to encourage its 
workers, members and recruit new members and supporters group for the party^ . Another 
important objective to arrange these meetings and procession was to propagate the good work 
done by the government and to reply the opposition party's anti-govemment propaganda^'®. 
(6) Workers Engagement in Social Activities: Bangladesh is a poor country. Natural 
calamities like cyclone, flood, and drought hit the country almost every year. In the disastrous 
areas destitute people desperately need help. AL the mass peoples organization always stands 
beside the people with possible assistance: they distribute relief goods; arrange medical 
facilities and so on. To do relief works properly, AL appoints one relief and social welfare 
secretary and a powerful relief committee headed by one AL presidium member^". In winter 
AL and its ancillary organizations distribute clothes to the poor. AL family takes initiative to 
eradicate illiteracy, afforestation etc in the count ry^In power AL government worked for 
women empowerization, eradication of illiteracy, family planning, afforestation, started yearly 
allowance for the old citizens, to eradicate unemployment government encouraged the youths 
to start self- employed cottage industries and small type of Paultry-diaiy-fishaiy firms etc. for 
204. All the recent posters and leaflets are collected by the research scholar. 
205. Daily Vorer Kagoj, 20 June 1996. 
206. The Research scholar took opinion from different class of people. All of them disfavored the government-
controlled medias one-sided broadcasting of the political news. 
207. A.M Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, (Dhaka: UPL, 1998). 
208. Jai Jai Din, 30 September 1997, p.30. 
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the sake of AL led governments maximum success party workers are instructed to cooperate 
the government officials and peoples in these programs . 
To propagate the ALs good deeds, Central Working Committee is regularly organizing 
public-communication programs in a planned way. Besides the central committee activities all 
the branch committees of AL (including district, Upojila, union, ward and village committees) 
are instructed to preach the AL led governments success, its programs and to reply the 
opposition parties anti-government criticism and propaganda within the party framework^''*. 
The indirect influence of political parties upon the masses by means of propaganda is 
always present. Like all other parties AL's propaganda continue for whole of the year. But 
some distinctions must be made furthermore between propaganda carried out by AL at 
election time in its attempt to secure election victory/ success and AL propaganda when party 
at office: aims at spreading party doctrine, extending its influence in the masses and 
increasing its membership and support base. Duverger opined that the former (the election 
propaganda) is relatively moderate in order to win over the 'floating' votes situated at the 
center, the later (the party propaganda) is less so as to satisfy the militants, who are more 
extremist^ 
(a) Electoral Campaign: It is a short term but very extensive process which consists 
entirely in defining a 'platform' to attract the maximum number of electors by proposing 
particular aims to suit their interests^'^ through publishing their programs. 
In an electoral system with more than one party the voters function is to choose between the 
candidates co-opted by the parties. In this case it is apparent that the voters do not always 
choose the individual candidates, rather they generally prefer to choose a party candidate^'^. 
On the other hand, in the ultimate goal to come to power parties prime flmction consisted in 
ensuring the success of their candidates^'^. The election is the only democratic means for a 
party to come to power through ensuring the success of their candidates. To win the voters all 
the parties come forward with their maximum strength. In the first phase of election parties 
nominate the candidates: whose name, prestige or connection can provide a backing in the 
competition and provide him votes^'^, then they raise fund for candidates: provide major part 
of expenses for the campaign^^®. The greatest sums for propaganda are collected by the mass 
parties like AL and BNP in Bangladesh and which are backed by the financial powers as well 
as by a crowed of members and supporters: whose subscriptions provide a very large working 
capital^^'. Finally they engage in election propaganda. They have experts to organize 
campaigns, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a campaign^^^. 
Election Campaign of AL: In those elections AL got the victory, when the party 
successfully monopolized the popular issues and at the same time utilized the grievances of 
the contemporary Bengali society against the ruling regime. In power AL tried to convince the 
voters by espousing its previous deeds and was very conscious that opposition may not get 
213. Layout of the governments Success and Activities and the inunediate duty of the Organization- A Pamphlet 
published by AL, p. 14. 
214. ibidP.14-15. 
215. M. Duverger, "Political Parties", op.cit. p 388. 
216.1bid. p.378. 
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opportunity to create suitable issues to attract the voters imagination. The personal charisma 
of Sheikh Mujib or invoking his name in the campaign is of course always a decisive factor in 
winning the elections. A content analysis of the propaganda theme of AL in different major 
general elections would help to understand the reasons behind AL's success and failure. 
(1). In 1954 election campaign the strategy of the United Front led by AL was to 
hammer up the failure of the ML government in various fields and particularly on the 
language issue. Public feeling ran high on this question and it was easy to mobilize the 
support. Another important issue was the low price of Jute, which caused fhistration among 
the Jute growers of the province^^^. 
(2). In the first general election of Pakistan in 1970, the AL captured the imagination 
of Bengali nationalism and their grievances; the demand for provincial autonomy was 
personified by Mujib. In the election campaign the AL deployed the only issue; that is the 
issue of the provincial autonomy. The PaWstan governments negligence in the rehabilitation 
program for the devastating cyclone victims in East Pakistan in November 1970 affected 
Bengali peoples heart and AL utilized the grievances successfully in the election campaign. In 
the 1970 election AL again won a massive victory riding the tide of strong Bengali 
nationalism^'*. However, with the birth of Bangladesh in 1971 AL assumed government 
power and being the ruling party was in danger of loosing its popular support to another 
opposition party. 
(3). In the 1973 election campaign AL asked the voters to cast their vote for showing 
their confidence on newly framed Bangladesh Constitution which contained the spirit of 
liberation war. Like the 1970 election the 1973 election victory was largely determined by a 
personal appeal of Sheikh Mujib: a volatile and fierce speaker, his approach to politics was 
personal and he essentially was guided by political instincts^^^. The 1993 election result 
proved that in spite of the growing opposition to and an increased distrust on AL among the 
masses, Mujib's personal popularity was sufficient to cany the party to victory. Z. R. Khan 
expressed surprise, "How could a leader enjoy so much popularity when his own political 
party was facing so much criticism^^^. 
After the power loss of AL by a military coup until 1996 it could not win any general 
election because of various problems. Including other problems were the AL's unpopular 
policies and prograins, which they were propagating, were the self-made problems for the 
party. Even in the 1991 general election Sheikh Hasina was espousing secular nationalism and 
the issue of safeguarding the independence of Bangladesh vis-a-vis Indian expansionism was 
totally absent in Hasinas campaign. By 1975 Islamic, anti-Indian nationalism in Bangladesh 
gained preponderance over the secularist ethnic nationalism, which the AL propagated during 
the East P ^ s t a n ' s struggle with the West Pakistan. Perhaps AL failed to confront the realities 
of the changing values of the Bangladeshis in regard to their feelings for new trend of non-
secular nationalism: a blend of love for Bangladesh and faith in Islam. By keeping silence on 
the Indo-Bangla relation in her election campaign Hasina proved her pro-Indian bent, which 
put the party in an awkward electoral position^^. AL spoke on socialist economic policy 
opposite to Zia and Ershad government's private investment and privatization programs and 
223. M. Rasiduzzaman, 'The AL in the Political Development of Pakistan'; Asian Survey, Vol. 10 No.7, July 
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movements towards a market economy, which the BNP supported in the election campaign^^®. 
The realization of the dream of building Sonar Bangla (Golden Bengal) by Sheikh Mujib was 
the main theme of Sheikh Hasina's election speeches. She depicted that rule of Sheikh Mujib 
was the golden era of Bangladesh^^^. But the unpleasant memory of AL's misrule in the 1972-
75 periods was still fresh among a large section of the voters^ ^®. Thus in many ways the AL 
appeared to be a party that set itself against things but did not project a vision for the future. 
In contrast the comparatively weak BNP's positive campaign helped it to snatch the victory 
from others^^'. 
In 1991 AL nominated its own dedicated cadres to compete the election but maximum 
of them failed to win against the comparatively rich BNP candidates. In 1996 AL was 
desperate for election victoiy^^^. Now by changing their old strategy they carefully selected 
the moneyed and popular candidates; if necessary chosen from outside the party; many 
ambitious civil-military bureaucrats and business peoples were rehabilitated in AL politics by 
this move^^^. Since AL leader Hasina's arrogance had been a primary factor in her 
1991 election defeat, the AL campaign in 1996 was much more hxamble and positive, totally 
different from that of 1991. In the 1996 election campaign BNP criticized the AL as anti 
democratic, politically incompetent and a pro-Indian stooge. Hasina sought to defuse the BNP 
attack by apologizing for any mistakes made by her father's AL government (1972-75) and 
declared that she would not renew the 25 years treaty of fnendship and cooperation with 
India^ '^*. In her campaign she promised to ensure the independence of judiciary, free the 
media, eliminate terrorism from university campus, provide financial assistance to the 
farmers, end of corruption and nepotism, repeal all repressive laws, eliminate political 
interference in the administration and secure fare share of Gangas water from India^^ .^ Since 
1991 election defeat, AL realized that in this mono-ethnic country they should not deny the 
growing popular sentiment, AL had to compromise and thus began islamization of AL So 
in the election campaign AL leaders started their public speech in the name of Allah almighty. 
In the heading of all published pamphlets, leaflets and posters including AL manifesto were 
written, "Allah is almighty"^^^. Socialism or social economy was not even written in any part 
of the manifesto. Rather the manifesto promised a free market economic policy and pledged 
all assistance and investment to develop the private sector^®. The AL launched its main 
criticism on 'corruption and misrule' of the BNP government and promised that it would rule 
through national consensus. Hasina alleged that thousands of arms were distributed among the 
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BNP supporters and ensured that an AL government would be neutral, disciplined, and 
corruption free. It dismissed the BNP's anti-Indian stance as irrelevant since it was during the 
BNP rule that Bangladesh actually became 'an Indian market'^^'. The realistic propaganda 
and the strong organizational activities carried AL into the governing power through 1996 
election mandate. 
For the first time in the history of Bangladesh a democratic government led by AL 
completed its five-year tenure office- having successfully thwarted the opposition campaign 
for its premature fall^ '*®. The AL leader Hasina then appeared to the people before the October 
2001 to grant her party one more chance of governance in order to, what Hasina said, 
complete the imfinished work of development and restoration of peace in the country. For the 
2001 election the AL tried to select honest, moneyed and popular candidates^'* ^  To create 
public opinion in favor of the party Sheikh Hasina and the top leaders of the party were kept 
busy in whirlwind tour throughout the length and breath of the country addressing thousands 
of big public gatherings and met important local leaders. Highlighting the success of AL 
government Hasina told the masses, "if voted to the power for the second term, her party 
would ensure economic emancipation of the people . AL highlighted its five years success 
through its different propaganda ways^ '* .^ AL leaders in their election campaign, reminded the 
people of BNPs misrule, corruption and nepotism. They propagated, "the BNP and its allies 
don't believe in democracy; they joined hand with the Rajakars (anti liberation force) to 
create anarchy in the coimtiy and to save the killers of Bangabandhu. In the hand of these 
conspirators the sovereignty of the country cannot be secured". AL tried to utilized the spirit 
of the liberation war as well as the high tide of people's abhorrence for the anti liberation 
force '^* .^ Before the 2001 election AL also published its election manifesto where it 
highlighted its 21-point program for speeding economic upliftment and reinstall peace and 
harmony in the country if they can come to power for the next 5 years tenure through peoples 
mandate. The main promises of AL to the people in the manifesto were, "independent anti-
corruption council and ombudsman, national consensus and social movement against 
terrorism, municipal status for Upazila (Sub-District) head quarters and urban facilities for 
unions, age limit for retirement from public service to 60 from 57, sixty parliamentary seats 
for women and direct election to these, separation of judiciary from the executive, separate 
public service commission for teachers, effective steps against religious fanatics and 
239. Amera Sayeed, 'Awami League (Hasina); Rise to Power'; Regional Studies Islamabad, Vol,15 No.l, 
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240. Dhaka Courier, 13 July 2001, p.27. 
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system, success in poverty alleviation program by introducing V.G.F cards, old citizens pension schemes and 
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244. Footnote: In an public opinion survey, conducted by 'Daily Prothom Alo', shovm that 84% of the people 
were demanding immediate trial of the criminals of 1971 war. The top leaders of Jamaat-E-Islami Bangladesh 
are accused for the 1971 war crime. Daily Prothom Alo, 1" September 2000. 
110 
extremists, handloom bank, no anti-Islamic law, nationalization of primary education, free 
education for female students up to bachelor's degree, literacy for all by 2003, gas export only 
after reserve for 50 years, internet village, crash program for arsenic mitigation, bringing 
every village under satellite and cell phone network . 
In the election campaign BNFs main propaganda issue was AL's failure in 
eliminating corruption and terrorism from the country. Acceptmg the opposition charge the 
AL brought forward the oppositions non-cooperative tendency and delayance of the judgment 
of Judiciary were the reasons behind the failure of eradicating the terrorism, although the 
government was honest to root-out terrorism. In a political meeting Hasina said, "we initiated 
legal actions against terrorists even if they belonged to the ruling party; even my relatives 
were not spared from the hands of law if they were involved in any offences". Had she got 
cooperation from the opposition her government could have achieved more success against 
the evil forces that have their roots in the administration and society due to long reigning 
autocracy and misrule '^*^. 
In every election tour, the AL minded journalists were accompanied the AL leaders, 
highlighted their speeches of different meetings and also the popular activities in their own 
newspapers. With special attention during this season they published interviews of different 
popular AL leaders and AL election candidates on some important popular issues. Renowned 
journalists and intellectuals of the society wrote lot of articles to highlight AL and tried to 
assemble public opinions in favor of AL, but the actual campaign was done by ordinary party 
workers: among them there is a large number of students working throughout the country. 
Students from the cities and small tovms spread out in the rural Bengal and mobilized peoples 
in the village schools, community centers or play ground to work for the AL campaign. 
Party Propaganda in different situation: A party, to survive and to achieve political 
goals in its lifetime, arranges propaganda of different type, according to its necessities. In 
power a party's propaganda theme and style is far different from that of the same party when 
it is in opposition. AL a party of more than half a century old was in power only for few 
years. Maximum of its lifetime passed in opposition movement to realize people's demands. 
The party has propaganda experience both in power and at office. In these two positions its 
propaganda style ways and theme show little similarities. 
Party in opposition: Talukder Maniruzzaman noted, Lenin the great organizational 
genius knew very well, the sheer existence of inequality and exploitation does not 
automatically led the people to rise against the constituted government. Before attempting a 
revolution, the vanguard must succeed in creating a deep sense of deprivation and insecurity 
among the political supporters of revolution '^*®. In the new country Pakistan, the Bengali sub-
nationalist party AL was formed to realize the Bengali peoples grievances^'*^. The real 
strength of the AL organization was not its organizing skill but the growing popularity of its 
program of regional autonomy for the 70 million Bengali people of East Pakistan^^®. The 
newborn AL skillfiilly appealed to and used linguistic identity of Bengali Muslims to expand 
their support base. The first successfiil popular agitation in the former East Pakistan was the 
1952 language movement, which continued until the government was forced to recognize 
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Bengali as one of the state languages of East Pakistan^^^ During 1966-70 the AL leadership 
carried out a relentless propaganda based on well argued expose and detailed analysis of the 
mismanagement, exploitation and neglect of the Pakistan govemment^^^. They explained, how 
the Bengalis were deprived from different economic sectors, civil military bureaucracy and 
industrialization; Manipulating the Bengali grievances Mujib put forward the 6-point 
demands, which he called the charter of survival^^^. Mujib and all other AL leaders did 
whirlwind tour all over E.Pakistan. They addressed the huge public meetings, where 
enthusiastic demonstrators, students, teachers, curious journalists, industrial workers, friendly 
shopkeepers and party supporters mingled together^ '^^ . Maximum students were coming from 
villages and small towns. AL utilized its militant student group and workers to mobilize the 
Bengali masses in their respective localities by propagating the causes of economic and 
political exploitation. They gathered the Bengali masses, militate them and easily formed the 
revolutionary committee in villages and towns to realize their demands through agitation 
politics. To secure their newly educated sons' career, the farmers joined the AL programs. 
Different Bengali popular presses were espousing the cause of autonomy. It (the agitation) 
sparked a nationalist explosion among the politically discontented and economically 
fioistrated Bengalis^^^. Opposition against liie authoritarian Ayub regime culminated in the 
1969 mass movements and compelled the regime to contact a fare election in1970; what 
began as anti-Ayub protest turned into a full fledged independence struggle in 1971, when 
president Yahya Khm refused to transfer power to the AL, which had won the majority in the 
election"^ 
The first AL led Bangladesh government was expelled by a military coup in 1975. 
Smce then till 1996 AL played the role of main opposition political party. In November 1996 
by getting permission from government to do indoor (limited) politics the leaders of AL 
began to revive 'the cult of Sheikh Mujib' at indoor meetings of the party workers^^'. The 
intension was clear, the party tried to reorganize its support base by utilizing the widespread 
image of Sheikh Mujib, the father of the nation. By 1977 AL began to denounce the violent 
overthrow of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, started organizing meetings and rallies defying the ban 
on open politics. They also started observing '15 August' a day of grief and sorrow and was 
trying to influence public opinion to pressurize the regime to punish the killers of Mujib^^^. 
Despite the government repression AL, in 1977, decided to laimch mass movement 
demanding the restoration of democracy, release of all political prisoners, to strengthen the 
secular political culture etc. The party used Union Coimcil election held in 1977, presidential 
and parliamentary elections held in 1978,1979,1981,1986 to reorganize itself and strengthen 
its support base. These election campaigns were the good opportunity for AL to deepen its 
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contact with the electorate. The party propagated its own views against Zia and Ershads 
military rule and was espousing for a parliamentary form of democracy for the country^^'. 
Although AL was trying to reorganize itself but due to internal party conflict during 
1976 to 1978 it was split into many parts and level of its propaganda was sharply declined. 
The desperate leadership finally picked Mujib's Daughter Hasina as the president of AL to 
save the party from further destruction. By observing this surprising change in AL. Amera 
Sayeed noted that 'In Bangladesh Politics went by names and not by programs^^°. 
Since 1981 the presence of large crowd in the AL meetings was mainly due to the sentimental 
attachment of the masses to Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Bangabandhu (Friend of Bengal) 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman^^'. This picture shows that AL's popularity among the masses is still 
heavily dependent on the charisma of its dead leader Mujib and the party's main propagating 
theme was to expose the heroic image of Mujib and get Ae public sympathy for itself 
The high tide of anti-autocratic movement led by opposition parties finally compelled 
Ershad to give up power in 1990 and a favorable wind for AL to come to power was blowing 
but the party failed to cash the situation because of various reasons. The important political 
issue of the time 1978-91 was whether the country should have a parliamentary or presidential 
form of government. AL was propagating to introduce a parliamentary system for tiiie country 
that received a maximum response. But the party was still espousing the BAKSHAL (unified 
one party) system. There was much wondering among the masses, 'how the bakshalist one 
party system could be reconciled with the functioning of a multi-party system for a 
parliamentary form of govemment^^^. More-over AL was still propagating socialism and 
secularist ideology, while religion and anti-Indian sentiment play a significant role in 
Bangladesh politics. AL could not show its flexibility to adjust itself with the demand of time. 
Along these AL's pride and over confidence in its organizing capability, its leaders' arrogant 
speech etc. hindered the party's success in the 1991 election. 
The painful defeat was a lesson for AL. Since then it started refurbishing itself to 
adjust itself with the people's desire. In the 1992 national council the party accepted market 
economy by giving up socialism. Following this, the party leaders started mixing little more 
Islam in its color to satisfy the religious minded Bengali Muslim community^^^. Besides, the 
anti-government movement the party started intense mass contact program. AL leaders visited 
remote areas of Bangladesh, addressed huge public meetings, created favorable public opinion 
behind their current movement; also reminded the people that BAKS ALite one party system 
and socialism are no more the part of AL programs^^"*. By utilizing contemporary situation, 
like fertilizer shortage, rape and killing of a teen-age girl, corruption and nepotism of the BNP 
ministers, the movement was getting popular. But the movement got real momentum when 
AL charged the BNP for vote rigging in the Magura parliamentary by-election. The AL joined 
by JP and JI began to agitate for the demand of a neutral caretaker government (NCG) to 
supervise all the future general elections. In support of its demand the opposition parties 
boycotted parliament, called a series of nation-wide general strike and finally all the 
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opposition MP's resigned from the parliament^^^. In March 1996 the civil society including 
the business community, officers, teachers, journalists, doctors, lawyers, trade unions and 
NGO's in public rallies demanding the restoration of the NCG and conduct the new elections 
under it^ '®. The movement originated in Dhaka, but gradually moved to other cities, small 
towns and small villages due to the militant participation of the workers^^^ The intensity of 
the movement compelled the BNP regime to hand-over power to the NCG to conduct the 
parliamentary election. In this the peoples mandate brought AL in power. The unified 
opposition parties allout campaign exhausted the BNP, tarnished its image and isolated the 
party due to wide spread charges of rigging^ ®®. 
In 1975 the first government of the independent Bangladesh was overthrovra by a 
military coup. Since then until 1990 the military regimes either banned the political activities 
or allowed it in limited form. Press was also not allowed full liberty. But the AL needed to 
survive and reorganize itself in this hostile environment. To rebuild the party and for the 
sustenance of its strong support base it took some alternative side by side/ together with the 
regular party campaign. 
(1) Building party subculture in the Bengali society: It is possible to build party's 
subculture from either party is in power or from opposition. Angelo opined, 'only an strong 
institution- one capable of dominating its social base can develop a strong and extensive 
subculture resembles a society within a society^^^. AL a popular organization, which has party 
branches in every village, successfully manipulated the feelings of Bengali nationalism and 
the spirit of liberation war in building the party subculture. 
Since 1952 AL and its ancillary organizations observed February 21,1952 as the martyrs day 
all over E. Pakistan; Even in these years when political activities were banned and observing 
this day was treated treason by the central government. Including this day by observing some 
days of Bengali feelings, AL sustained the sub-nationalist feelings in E. Pakistan as well as 
strengthened its support bases among the Bengali masses. In the post- independent 
Bangladesh, AL monopolized the victory and feelings/ spirit of liberation war. By the party's 
open and tacit approval freedom fighters' association was formed, side by side, the 
government approved freedom fighters' association^^®. The inspiring songs, dramas, movies 
on liberation war are being introduced in different cultural programs and in the propaganda 
ways of Alto create positive public opinion. These laudable assets of the nation are also 
slowly accepted in the Bangladesh society as the part and parcel of AL culture. The 
government of Bangladesh celebrates many memorable days including 21 February- the 
language day, 16 December- the Independence Day, 26 March- the day of victory etc. with 
much more importance. AL also celebrates these days side by side the government with great 
splendor as it shows its special right on these days. The AL minded dailies and weeklies 
publish special supplement; glorifying the role of AL on these days. The party, its all grass 
root organizations arrange cultural programs, relay the audio- video cassettes of songs, 
dramas and movies of liberation struggle and of Mujib's famous speeches. Every village and 
town exhilarate breaking the long silence in these days. Mujib and AL's glorious role in these 
memorable days of liberation struggle comes forward to the new generation of Bangladeshis, 
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encourage them to be the part of the historic party AL. In these special days AL leaders' 
speeches in the public gathering are remarkable. In their speeches they glorify the liberation 
war as well as AL leaders' and workers' heroic role in the Bengali nationalist movement. 
Except the AL, no other party had the leading role in that movement, so their special 
propaganda in these days is loudly accepted by the nation"'. AL observes 15th August and 3''' 
November as the days of sorrow and grief^^^. AL and all of its primary branches feed the 
poor; arrange prayer programs in every religious shrine for their dead leaders; arrange 
meetings, seminars, glorify the leaders sacrificing role for the Bengali nation. The party also 
demands the punishment of the killers of their leaders who are given shelter by the different 
governing party of Bangladesh since 1975 for their own political benefit. These activities 
create people sympathy for AL, for the successor of Mujib family. Mujib's personality cuU in 
these days helps to develop emotional support of the masses under the leadership of Hasina-
the successor of Bangabandhu Mujib^^^ 
(2) In the election season since public is in particularly receptive mood as far as 
politics is concerned, an election campaign offers exceptional opportunity to a party to 
influence opinion. Moreover, during election period in Europe party candidates are getting all 
propaganda facilities from the government. There the weak party also avail the election 
opportunities to strengthen its organizing base. Although the party has no chance of success in 
election, it systematically put up candidates everywhere, pursue election propaganda: use the 
election campaign for its candidate. The actual aim is not to wan the election but to make the 
party known Here elections are means and building the organization is the primary/ 
principal aim/goal. Contrary to modem democratic countries the political scenario of 
Bangladesh is different. From 1976 to 1990 different military juntas arranged general 
elections to give democratic color to their authoritarian regime, it was absurd for an 
opposition party to come to power through these fake elections. But AL participated in these 
elections as a part of its political tactics to survive in these adverse political situations to build 
its organizing base and to sustain of its support base^^ .^ In the rule of General Zia and General 
Ershad, during election campaign of AL, propaganda on behalf of party always tend to take 
precedence over propaganda for election. Even though AL, in some cases, tried to increase its 
representations in parliament or in the local government councils: successes in these elections 
are themselves judged by means for increasing the power of the party^^^. Following the 
tactics, AL was able to expand its propaganda in complete security during the two military 
regimes of Bangladesh: who were hindering the opposition parties to organize themselves 
through doing regular organizational activities; who were used to ban political activities and 
continued different repressive actions to suppress anti government movement. By utilizing the 
election opportunity especially in 1978,1979,1981, and 1986, AL strengthened its internal 
solidarity and deepened its influence in the masses. The tactics helped the party in the long 
run. It competed 1991 election as the best organized party of Bangladesh and finally in the 
1996 parliamentary election it secured majority, as it came to power after a period of 21 years 
heart and soul endeavor. 
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Even now there is no possibility for a AL win in many parliamentaiy constituencies; 
but in those constituencies the party nominate candidates, engage in campaign to survive its 
support base and to strengthening organizational activities expecting to achieve future 
success^ ' ' . 
Party at Power: AL, the revolutionary party, formed its first government in the newly 
independent Bangladesh. Following the past, it was still using its student, youth, and labor 
front to propagate AL cause and to recruit new support base for the party^ . To ensure the 
league's predominance over other parties, Mujib replaced the Leagues old 6-point program, 
which had effectively served the AL's political goal. The new program of Mujibism 
comprised nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism: these are also called the spirit 
of liberation war^'^. But the new program had shown limited success in sustaining the AL 
support base. 
Students are playing key role in the country's political development. In the opposition 
movement, they are the main force, they manage election campaign and mobilize popular 
support for the parties. To confirm the student support AL established a number of schools 
and colleges at local level. These are also means of earning popular support in the local areas. 
To sustain peasant support base AL supplied pumps, seeds and pesticides to the farmers; gave 
subsidy in agriculture sector, distributed relief materials and arranged programs for the war 
trodden people^®". AL also used the government controlled electronic and news media to 
propagate AL's role in the liberation war, in relief and rehabilitation work and in all other 
good deeds during its tenure to increase support for the regime. But the charges of corruption 
against the regime eroded/ wiped out public sympathy^^^ Failure to promote its activities AL 
had to depend on the charisma of its leader Sheikh Mujib. In spite of growing opposition and 
increasing distrust about AL, Mujib, the Bangabandhu was still dear to the Bengdi society^^^. 
For the second time AL came to power in 1996 by getting peoples mandate. After 
coming to power AL's main target was to develop the popular opinion in its favor through 
materializing its all election promises. The AL had exemplary success; which included the 30 
years Ganges water sharing treaty; Hilly Chittagong peace treaty; Bangladesh achievement 
self sufficiency in food production through proper management and giving subsidy in 
agriculture sector; poverty alleviation program: it introduced V.G.F (relief) card, old citizens 
and divorcee women's pension program and housing programs for the shelter-less people; 
eradication of illiteracy: now Bangladesh's literacy rate reached at 65%; reestablishment of 
the spirit of liberation struggle; establishment of a government of national consensus; AL's 
selection as the president of Bangladesh to a non party, non partial, and all accepted 
personality etc^ . 
Half of the Bangladeshi voters are women. In the 1991 and 1996 election AL was 
lagging far behind of BNP in gaining women support. A public opinion survey was held in 
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1995 that showed that majority women were in favor of the BNP^ '^^ . To influence the women 
opinion AL took some steps such as: free education with government scholarship for women 
up to 12 class and promised to give these facilities up to graduation level in future; created job 
facilities as soldier and officer in Bangladesh Army; improved health and family planning 
schemes for the mothers and their children and confirmed women empowerization through 
confirming women participation in every tier of local govermnent by direct votes^ ® .^ 
To established Hasina's image as a dedicated Muslim, after coming to power, PM Hasina 
frequently visited Saudi Arabia to perform Haz and Umrah. AL minded media displayed 
Hasina- a regular prayee to satisfy the right wing AL supporters^^^. 
AL had taken steps during its tenure at government to propagate its success through 
different electronic and news medias. It again and again instructed the grass root party 
branches from district to village level to reflect the successes of the party in government 
through organizing public meetings, street meetings, workers meetings, processions and 
meetings vwth the villagers in every village. The party advised the villagers to alert/ aware the 
masses of the opposition's conspiracy and negative propaganda and build public opinion 
against the opposition tendency to create anarchy through declaring different anti-government 
movements and strikes. Without this they were instructed to distribute pamphlets, leaflets, 
posters, doing work of wall writing, posturing in their respective localities. The party stressed 
that the regular public commimication had to be increased and had to develop a social 
movement to accelerate the development work of the govemment^^'. Hasina in her every 
public speech propagated the AL's successes and achievements. She stressed on the grass root 
workers, students and youths to engage in publicity work and said that, "In the case of party 
propaganda, the personal promotion activities through mixing and interacting with the masses 
at priman' level is much more effective comparing to using all other modem propaganda 
medias^^ . 
Different survey, taken by AL and other sources, revealed that to the masses the 
leadership of Hasina is more acceptable than her main competitor Khaleda Zia of BNP^^ .^ 
Pensions for the old citizens and widows, housing for the homeless peoples, distribution of 
VGF cards to the flood affected peoples etc. scheme especially the proper management of the 
post-flood situation with skill hands enlarged popularity of the AL and its leader Sheikh 
Hasina. Although the welfare activities of AL had tremendous exposure but in some 
opposition dominated areas peoples were not enough aware of the AL's good deeds^ ^®. 
Specially the law and order situation in the last six month's tenure of AL had deteriorated 
remarkably and in these months the criticism of all the mass medias including some of the AL 
minded newspapers affected the AL popularity and it resulted in election defeat in the 2001 
general election . 
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Propaganda related to AL's internal conflict: Internal factionalism at different time 
affected the AL and its leadership, which created confiision in the masses and in its own 
support group about the party competence/ capability. To eradicate the confusion from the 
public mind, AL followed different propaganda strategy at different time. 
We usually observe whenever one internal conflict germinates inside AL, all the opposition 
media use to publish the news with great importance. To save the party image from this kind 
of evil propaganda AL also publish its views/ statements. By different newspapers and 
arranging public meetings provided their own version of information to the masses. But when 
the internal rivalry comes to a climax, defection takes place and the defected/split faction 
publish their opinion in different media, criticize the party leadership and programs from 
different angles. In their endeavor to mobilize the public opinion in favor of them they took 
intensive propaganda measures. To survive in the aftermath of the split AL also take 
necessary actions: the Awami minded journalists and intellectuals write lot of articles to 
defend the party's current stand and its ideology vice versa the defected factions weakness, to 
glorify the party and its leaders image among the support groups and to bolster/ encourage the 
depressed workers. They also counter the criticism of the opposition newspapers and splited 
factions of AL. The AL minded newspapers in these days highlight the important party 
leaders and public their positive statements and public speeches related to the factional 
conflict. 
When a strong group of AL leadership leave the party and form a new party it effects 
the entire country wide organization: splits also take place in the branches and ancillary 
organizations up to the grass root level. In this case propaganda by different medias of AL is 
not enough. To sustain the party's organizational strength at grass root level and support base 
the party leaders need to take intensive mass contact programs. They visit whole of the 
country, arrange workers as well as public meeting, give reasonable argument of their stand 
vise versa the defected group. By this they try to reduce further defection. Sometimes the 
leaders personally meet the lower level leaders and workers to refrain them from joining the 
defected group; through persuasions, rewards or by threatening. This mass contact program 
continues for long and its results are effective. It is also seen after eveiy defection of AL that, 
AL leadership/ high command instructs its all branches and ancillary organizations at grass 
root level to arrange frequent public meetings to explain the AL position, to do favorable 
propaganda that the support base remains intact with the AL. 
Concluding discussion: The AL was formed in 1949 by the breakaway progressive 
faction of East Pakistan Muslim League (EPML). Because of its grovving up through a 
revolutionary process and its successful leadership in different anti-government movement as 
well as liberation struggle of Bangladesh, it became an organization of a group of dedicated, 
militant and brilliant political workers. The revolutionary process of growth also made the 
party's organizational structure sound up to the grassroots level. The party has branch 
committees from the metropolitan to the rural level. In every village of Bangladesh it has 
active village committees. To consolidate its position among different interest groups of the 
society AL also has its front organizations among the peasants, women, labors, youths, 
students etc. Some of these front organizations of AL like student and youth league play vital 
role to strengthen anti-government movement - when the party is in opposition; when the 
party is in power engage themselves in materializing the party promises to the people. 
However these front organizations are not totally free to execute their own plantings and 
programs rather to declare any programs they need the consent of the mother organization 
AL. They heavily depend on AL for financial assistance and intellectual advice to run their 
respective organizations. By disregarding democratic principles the AL leadership also 
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imposes its choice of leadership upon the top positions of the front organizations. Ail the 
lower unit and ancillary organization leaders and workers have natural tendency to be the big 
leader of AL. For that in their respective organizations or units they engage in leadership 
competition. Always these competitions turn to factional conflict. It was seen because of 
ideological or personal relations with the top-brass party leaders the conflict of the central 
body AL always spread to the lower level vertically. 
The top leadership of AL presents dual characteristics: it is democratic in appearance 
and authoritarian in reality. Since 1966 Sheik Mujib is the main spirit of AL organization and 
the sole authority of its policy making. As to survive and maintain internal unity the party is 
still heavily depends on dead leader Mujib's personal image. Hasina, the daughter of Mujib 
and now the party chief, is playing emotional role to unite the party factions under her 
leadership. Since 1966 the supreme control of the party has been concentrated on the hands of 
party president and made him/ her all-powerful personality. The national council of the party 
has the constitutional right to elect the executive body of the party but party chief personally 
nominates all the executive committee members including the party GS. The party President 
decides the party's line of action, even sometimes without consulting the executive body of 
the party. All the party leaders have been just following the incumbent president to secure 
their position in AL. In the district and sub-district level there is some practice of democracy 
in electing those party units. However, the party leadership is well-educated and experienced 
in their policy making. From centre to the district/ sub-district level the party meetings as well 
as council sessions do not held regularly. However, the party activities are going on smoothly 
within this limitation. 
AL mobilized support from various groups and interest of the society. Including of 
"them were leftists to rightists, moderates and radicals, surplus farmers from rural areas and 
lawyers, business peoples, trade union leaders, student leaders and professionals from urban 
areas. AL has the vote bank in all sections of people from poor peasants to rich business class. 
With the peoples election verdict it already ruled the coxmtry for two times. 
The party has its socio-economic and political programs for national development. Its 
effective party set up, its propaganda machineries are involved in popularizing the party 
programs. Those help the party in strengthening its support base, in recruiting new dynamic 
workers group from all strata of Bangladesh society. However, the party is still depending 
heavily on the image of its dead leader Mujib and its past leading role in the liberation war to 
maintain its support base. Still the party highlights 'Mujib and Bengali nationalist movement' 
in the public meetings and processions, postering, distribution of handbills and leaflets etc to 
sustain its image in the mass. 
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BANGLADESH AWAMI 
LEAGUE (1971-97) 
CHAPTER-4 
Factionalism in Bangladesh Awami League (1971-97) 
Introduction 
Factionalism in Bangladesh politics is not a new phenomenon. It came into sustenance 
with the growth of political parties in the region. In order to properly identify the trends of 
factionalism in this country, politics, it is imperative to start a discussion of this phenomenon 
since 1906 when Muslim League was formed in Dhaka to spearhead the Muslim politics in 
this sub-continent. 
It is significant to note that the first Muslim political party AIML was formed at 
Dhaka at 1906 and Nawab Sir Salimullah of Dhaka was its first president. At the begirming, 
the party was mere a platform of Nawabs, Knights and Muslim aristocrats, who never 
believed that the British would leave India. With his demise in 1915 the Bengal Muslim 
League politics began to change due to the joining of a good number of middle class 
progressive elements in the organization. Nevertheless in a struggle between the aristocrat 
Nawabs and the rising Muslim middle class elements for the party leadership the former still 
could maintain its hold due to the constant encouragement of the British Raj, who viewed 
with great concern the rise of the new generation Muslim leadership with liberal outlook and 
popular support'. 
Till 1937 the AIML was a moribund organization. The BPML was no different from 
that of AIML. Outraged by the state of affairs of the provincial branch of the party, the cashier 
of the BPML and a trusted friend of Jinnah, M.A.H Ispahan! wrote to him in 1937, when it 
was a dominant partner of the ruling coalition government, that it is a 'dead organization' and 
recommended him to disaffiliate this BPML branch which was leading by Nawab Khawaja 
Nazim Uddin^. 
But after 1937 the party acquired tremendous strength when Fazlul Huq and Sikander 
Hyat Khan (primer of Bengal and Punjab respectively) rejoined the party with their fiill 
strength^. No doubt ML was definitely a rising party in these years. But Huq's personality 
clash with Jinnah involved him in a conflict with Jinnah's loyal aristocrat and conservative 
faction of BPML and finally compelled him to leave the party just after his moving of 
Pakistan Resolution at the Lahore session of AIML in 1940''. 
However although Fazlul Huq left BPML and the party consolidated its position in 
Muslim Bengal but still it was not free from internal factionalism. Suhrawardy-Hashim group 
of Bengal was struggling for the BPML leadership and in 1943 they toppled the old-guard 
1. Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, (Dhaka: UPL, 1986), p.33. Even in the conflict between 
Huq and Jinnah during 1939-41, the British helped the loyal group of Jinnah. For detail see Haroon-Or-
Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Asiatic Society of Bangladesh, 1987), pp. 154-56, 
2.M.A.H Ispahani, Quid-e Azam Jinnah as I know hun, (3"* edition, Karachi: Rayal Book Co. 1976), 
p.86; Also Muhammad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism: The Case of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: 
UPL, 1995), P.85. 
3. For the growth of ML in India after 1937 see K.B.Sayeed, Pakistan The Formative Phase (1857-
1948), (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp.183 and 110-14; Also Maryon Weiner, Political 
Change in South Asia, (Calcutta: K.L Mukhpadya, 1963), pp.47-48; And Muhammad Gulam Kabir, 
Changing Face of Nationalism, p.80. 
4. According to R. Sen, Huq-Jinnah tussel was not the clash of two personalities, but in fact it was a 
clash of two opposing interest which involved the British Imperialists. Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in 
Bangladesh, p53. Also Haroon-Or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, op.cit. pp.157-58, 115-
34 and 88; And Muhammad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism, pp.111-12. 
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leadership of Sir Nazim Uddin who were supported by Muslim aristocrats, non-Bengali 
business community and the conservatives. The BPML now left practically in the hand of the 
rising middle class progressives. Their progressive leadership infused new life into the Bengal 
league, attracting the service of the younger generation^ There were both quantitative and 
qualitative changes in the League and both owed much to Hashims excellent organizing 
techniques. It reached its highest stage of g rov^ and development^. By 1945 Jinnah's trusted 
Nazim Uddin lost his control from the newly developed progressive middle class dominated 
organization but the infighting for parliamentary leadership continued till the election^. 
Viewing this awkward/ embarrassed trend within the party Nazim Uddin with his utter disgust 
decided to retire from politics®. It was no wonder when the League achieved total victory in 
the 1946 Assembly elections in Bengal largely through massive rural votes. It also confirmed 
Suhrawardy's Prime Ministership in the Bengal province of British India duribg the period 
March 1946-August 1947. It must be noted here that for the first time a ministiy was formed 
in Bengal, which did not include any member belonging to Dhaka Nawab family^. 
The internal conflict of the BPML did not cease with the resounding success of the 
Suhrawardy-Hashim group in the 1946 election as the ML high command was determined to 
make a change in the middle class dominated popular leadership of Bengal. It again 
reappeared when H.S, Suhrawardy and Abul Hashim sponsored and worked for a 'sovereign 
independent united Bengal ' instead of Jinnahs brand of Akhand (undivided) Pakistan 
including a central Leadership. At this stage Nazim Uddin who went out of politics during the 
election of 1946, and who was always supported by the conservative BPML president 
Maulana Akram Khan and top ranking leadership of the AIML, reemerged on the political 
scene with renewed strength for a united Pakistan with strong central government. Just a few 
days before independence in 5 August 1947, in a meeting of BPML parliamentary party, with 
a tacit approval of the central leadership the fudal-orthodox section of BPML maneuvered 
H.S Suhawardy out of chief ministership. Nazim Uddin was elected leader of it and 
consequently he became the first Chief Minister of East Pakistan". It means that it was the 
feudal-orthodox ML of Bengal supported by the non-Bengal Muslim business community, 
who came to exert their authority in the initial years of East Pakistan politics. By this 
maneuver the middle class leadership, the youthful architects of ML victory in the 1946 
election, suffered a serious blow. But this defeat was not only for the middle class dominated 
Hashim-Suhrawardy group, it was also a disastrous defeat to the East Pakistan Muslim 
League. The victory of the Khawaja group was not to last long. With the removal of 
Suhrawardy group, Bengali sub-nationalism came to be arrested more prominently in the 
5. The inner-party struggle between the Suhrawardy-Hasim group (representing the rising middle class) 
and Khawaja oligarchs (who were dominant in the league parliamentary leadership) had a bearing on 
the expansion of the BPML since the former could expect to dislodge the latter only through broadening 
the support base of the organization outside. Another reason for the remarkable expansion of the BPML 
during the time was the economic interpretation of thePakistan movement as given by the members of 
the Hasim-Suhrawardy group which has raised high hopes among the poverty striken Bengali Muslim 
peasants. 
6. Haroon-Or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, Op.Cit. pp.343-44. 
7. Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal (1937-1947) (N. Delhi: Impex India, 1976), p. 194. 
8. Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, opxit. p.64. 
9. Haroon-Or-Rashid, The Foreshadowing of Bangladesh, opxit. pp.242-43. 
10.For ditail. Ibid, pp.273-340; Also History of Bangladesh War of Independence, (Dhaka: Ministry of 
Information, 1982),pp.22-27and33. 
11. The Azad (Calcutta), 6 August 1947; Also Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op.cit. p.70. 
Also Abul Hasim, In Retrispect (Dhaka: Subma Publishers, 1974). 
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post-1947 Pakistan polity and the politics of the ruling regime only contributed to sharpen it, 
culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as an independent state in 1971. 
The AIML and particularly the BPML was a political forum of those deviating 
Muslim elements, who were assembled in the party especially since 1940 Lahore resolution of 
AIML to achieve a single objective i.e. the 'Muslim homeland Pakistan''^. In response to 
Jinnah's fervent calls, various sections of Indian Muslims, temporarily withheld their 
differences to project an image of identity of interest through the demand for Pakistan. Jinnah 
himself was aware of the differences. Once he observed, "we shall have to quarrel among 
ourselves and we shall have time when these differences will have to be settled, when wrongs 
and injuries v^ll have to be removed". He said that the foremost priority of the Indian 
Muslims should be 'a territory and a government' of their own. Domestic programs and 
politics could be decided later'^. So Indian Muslims, particularly the progressives of the 
BPML did abide by Jinnah's advice though there are grave differences^in the provincial ML. 
Once the objective of the party was fulfilled through achieving Pakistan, the hollowness of the 
enforced imity loomed large. 
The beginning of the decay of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) had started at the 
birth of Pakistan, if not earlier. Many new parties with varied emphasis were formed in the 
newly bom Pakistan State and due to old factional rivalry inside ML various splinter parties 
also cane into existence. Thus by the end of 1949 there were about twenty opposition parties 
in Pakistan. In Punjab alone there were thirteen recognized opposition parties; eight of which 
were formed by the dissident Muslim League r s In the very early years of Pakistan state 
opposition in East Bengal (E. Bengal) came from only two organizations, namely Congress 
Party (EPNC) and East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP). The first was largely composed of 
few upper class Hindu Zaminders and business peoples and the second was dominated by 
Hindu middle class elements'^. The ML leadership of E.Pakistan in the initial stage was 
virtually divided into four factions. The Nazimuddin-Akram Khan group represented the 
upper Muslim land owning and orthodox section of theBPML supported by non-Bengali 
commercial interests, who were mostly Urdu speaking; the Suhrawardy-Abul Hashim faction 
largely represented the urban educated middle class elements, who were relatively modernist 
in political approach; Fazlul Huq, who had personal popularities in rural Bengal as a 
representative of the liberal Muslim land owning (Jutdar) and small rising Bengali Business 
stratum,remained politically inactive because of the political setback suffered by his party (the 
KPP) in the 1946 elections; and Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani, a popular peasant 
leader, previously who was the president of Assam Province Muslim League and came to E. 
Bengal after the partition of India in 1947 represented the relatively poor section of the 
12. For some details see Abul Hasim, In Retrospect, op.cit.; Also Kamruddin Ahmed, Banglar 
Madhyabitter Atmabikash, (Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1975), Vol.2, pp. 1-88; And Shyamali Ghosh, 
'Fazlul Huq and Muslim Politics in Pre-partition Bengal, International Studies, (N. Delhi), Vol.13 
No.3,July 1974, pp.441-64. 
13. Shyamali Ghosh, The Awami League 1949-1971,(Dhaka: Academic Publishers, 1990), p.2; For 
more detail see Khalid Bin Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formatove Phase (Second edition, London, 1968); 
For Jinnahs unity call see Jamil-ud-din Ahmed edt. Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah, 
(Lahore, 1947). 
14. Shyamali Ghosh, The Awami League, op.cit. p.2; For more detail see M. Rafiq Afzal, Political 
Parties in Pakistan, 1947-1958, (Islamabad, 1976); And K.K Aziz, Party Politics in Pakistan, 1947-
1958, (Islamabad, 1976). 
15. Rangalal Sen, The Political Elites, op.cit. p.78; Accordmg to M. Franda by 1947 less than 5% of the 
CPI members in Bengal were Muslims. Moreover the Communist movement in E.Pakistan was also 
confmed almost the petty bourgeois or lower middle class; Marcus F. Franda, "Communism and 
Regional Politics in E. Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol.10 No.7, July 1970, pp.588-606. 
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society. Primarily the frustrated popular leadership belonging to the second and fourth faction 
of EPML became more resentful with the first group since this Nazimuddin group, with the 
blessing of the PML leaders, systemically excluded the second and fourth group from the 
EPML leadership during the new membership drive in 1948-49 to protect their vested 
interests''^. The BPML working committee and council were dissolved and Maulana Akram 
Khan, an orthodox leader, loyalist of the center was made the 'chief organizer' of the ML in 
E. Bengal. Although Punjab was partitioned along with Bengal, the Punjab ML organization 
was allowed to continue there. But the BPML, which attract thousands of people, especially 
the Muslim youths, during the years of struggle for Pakistan was now turned into a party of 
few oligarchies. Even the membership of the party was denied to the middle class elements 
who were instrumental in popularizing the demand for a Muslim homeland in Bengal. These 
elements tried to persuade the leadership of E. Bengal to give up their exclusionist policy. 
After being disappointed at the provincial level they had been to Karachi to convince the 
central leaders of the party about the state affairs in the EPML. But they were told that Jinnah 
was against keeping the mass character of the party, so the membership of the party is going 
to be restricted. The failure of the mission resulted in further frustration for the middle class in 
E. Bengal'^ 
Thus when Pakistan came into being, not only emerging middle class leaders were 
excluded from the ministerial office, they were also systemically kept out of the ML 
organization and lacked any avenue to articulate their grievances. All the posts of the 
Provincial ML organization and the government were distributed to the loyalist feudal and 
non-Bengali origin group. Bengali representation in the central leadership was practically nil. 
The two most prominent leaders, Huq and Suhrawardy, were deliberately excluded from the 
central cabinet as well as in E. Bengal provincial cainet'^. As a result of the lacking of 
participation by the middle class, peasants and workers a sense of fhistration began to grow 
among them immediately after the formation of Pakistan'^. Moreover due to language 
controversy, vital economic interest of the Bengalis and the misrule of the government ML 
not only became unpopular in E. Bengal but also a split within itself became apparent. The 
first open revolt inside the EPML came from the pro-Suhrawardy group of the ML. The 
Central Government's negligence to the E. Bengal especially in the field of education 
fortunate them also inspired them to form a separate independent students organization named 
E. Pakistan Muslim Satra League (EPMSL)^°. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was the Organizing 
16. Rangalal Sen, The Political Elites, op.cit. pp.78-79. Also Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics 
and the Emergence of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Bangladesh Book International Ltd. 1975), p.3I. 
17. For detail, Abul Mansur Ahmed, Fifty Years of Politics as I Saw It, (An Autobiography), (Dhaka: 
Khushruz Kitab Mahal, 1995), pp.209,139-43 and 246; Ataur Rahman Khan, Two Years of Minister 
ship, (An Autobiography in Bengali), (Dhaka: Avijan Printing House, 1964), pp.20-24; Also 
Muhammad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism: The Case of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: UPL, 
1995), PP. 143-45. 
18. Muhanmiad Gulam Kabir, Changing Face of Nationalism, op.cit. pp. 144-45. 
19. The discontent of the deprived middle-class Bengalis were demonstrated in the first manifesto of the 
Awami League formed by this group in 1949. the manifesto contains, 'The PML which pretented to 
inherit all the glories of its predecessor was in fact not meant to be a popular organization but a party 
whose sole aim was to maintain the ministry in power, people who actually sacrifice their every thing in 
the struggle for freedom could not enter the organization, thangs to the machination by the organizers, 
while a large number of erstwhile 'nationalist' and anti Pakistan elements and opportunist power-loving 
people became Muslim Leaguers over night and formed what is called ML by a coterie'. For this see 
History of Bangladesh War of Independence, op.cit. p. 121. 
20. See the first programs of the EPMSL published in 1948 in History of The Bangladesh War of 
Independence, op.cit. pp.47-48. 
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Secretary of it. This anti-Nazimuddin faction of the previous ML affiliated students were the 
vanguard of Pakistan movement. Here history again turned back/ re-written. This same group 
of students those took the initiative to launch a vigorous movement to achieve 'Bengali as one 
of the state language of Pakistan^' against the central governments oppressive tendency. The 
senior group of this organization gave birth to a political party under the leadership of 
Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani. 
The intra-party conflict in the EPML reached a climax in early summer of 1949 when 
in a by-election the official ML candidate and a prominent party leader Zaminder Khrrum 
Khan Panni was defeated with a big margin of votes by a young party worker 'Shamsul Huq' 
belonged to the disgruntled Suhrawardy group^^. The election result revealed the growing 
dissatisfaction of the large section of the population with the policy of the ruling faction of the 
ML; it also exposed the ruling ML faction's precarious position in the E. Bengal province^^. 
This declining tendency of ML led its pro-people but politically ousted faction to form a new 
parallel ML^^ In June 1949 a number of ML MLAs' and workers who were disillusioned 
with the undemocratic functioning of the party bosses met at a two days convention in Dhaka. 
A peoples ML, namely the Esat Pakistan Muslim League fEPML) was founded at this 
convention by challenging the authority of the ruling ML^ . From its origin the EPAML was 
championing on full regional autonomy for E.Pakistan and recognition of Bengali as one of 
the state language of Pakistan and other regional issues^^. 
Meanwhile, H.S Suhrawardy, the leader of proved parliamentary experience and 
ability soon undertook the task of organizing the EPAML into All Pakistan Party. By his 
remarkable ability to maintain support and outmaneuver his opponents, the AML gradually 
assumed the character of a national opposition party. In February 1950, at a convention of 
political workers in Lahore the formation of APML was announced with Suhrawardy as its 
president^®. But it could never be a mass peoples front in W.Pakistan; and its high tide of 
popularity was limited with the geographical boundary of E.Pakistan till the split of united 
Pakistan^l 
Soon after the emergence of EPAML it started movement to have autonomy for the 
majority Bengali people of Pakistan and to have Bengali, a language spoken by the majority, 
21. Ibid, p.48; Also Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, (Dhaka: UPL, 
1979), p.21. 
22. For detail of the Tangail by-election see Badruddin Umar, Language Movement of East Bengal and 
Politics of the Time, (In Bengali), (Part-I, Dhaka: Mawla Brothers, 1976), pp.223-33. 
23. By this by-election the ruling faction of the EPML became so frightened that they never again dared 
to face the electorate. Only it tried to extent its life by passing acts. Preceding that by-election EPML 
avoided as many as 34 by-elections to avoid any further defeat. See Keith Callered, "The Political 
Stability of Pakistan, Vol.29 No.l, March 1956, pp.5-20. 
23. This decision to form Awami Muslim League was prompted by their failure to gain entry to the 
official ML recognized by the center. 
24. Maulana Bhasani was its founder President; Ataur Rahman Khan, Abdus Salam Khan and Abul 
Mansur Ahmed were elected Vice Presidents; Shamsul Huq was elected General Secretary; Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, Khondokar Mustaq Ahmed and Rafiql Ahsan were elected Joint Secretaries; See 
Ataur Rahman Khan, Two Years of Ministership (An autobiography in Bengali), p.24; Also Badruddin 
Umar, Language Movement and Contemporaiy Politics in East Bengal (Dhaka: Subama Publishers, 
1979), Chapter.7. 
25. For the detail of the fu-st program of the EPAML see Bangladesh War of Independence History, 
op.cit. pp. 122-23; Also Statesmen (Calcutta), 29 June 1949. 
26. Abdul Wadud Bhuyan, The Emergence of Bangladesh and Role of Awami League, (N. Delhi: Vikas 
Publishing House Pvt. Ltd., 1982), p.23. Also. Shyamali Ghosh, The Awami League, op.cit. p.6. 
27. The AML could not get his foo^old in W. Pakistan politics. The APML was just a committee to 
preserve AML's image as a national party. So my discussion will be limited on EPAML. 
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as a state language. These forceful and legitimate demands of the AML quickly gained 
support of the middle class and the AML's base of support started to spread fast into the 
district towns of the province at the decline/ loss of ML's popularity^®. The whole atmosphere 
of the country in general and of E.Pakistan in particular assumed a radical turn. The EPAML 
thus, within a short time, came to the forefront to crush the ruling ML in E. Bengal. Although 
the emergence of the EPAML as an opposition organization promised democracy in contrast 
to the Muslim nationalism of the ruling party, it was by no means free from conflicting 
ideologies, even in its origins, three political ideas could be identified. The first group led by 
General Secretary, 'Shamsul Huq' wanted to do politics in the style of ML but for the 'Have 
Not' Muslim masses; the second group led by the Vice President, 'Abdus Salam Khan', was 
eager to introduce bourgeois democracy in western style; and the third group led by the 
President, 'Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhasani', aspired to develop the EPAML as an anti-
feudal, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist political organization. There were hardly any basic 
differences between the first two factions of the party. Thus it may be maintained that, the 
founding of AML was laid on two conflicting forces: On the one hand there were the 
frustrated and dissident Muslim Leaguers whose political philosophy and ideology were not 
fimdamentally different from those of the ML. On the other hand, the AML had a large 
number of followers, mostly young, who were secular in their attitude and anxious to 
establish true democracy in the country^^. 
Since the independence of Pakistan the East Pakistan Communist Party (EPCP) 
members (maximum of them were Hindus) were manifested as enemy (Indian) agents by the 
government. In this hostile environment communists found the EPAML president, Maulana 
Bhasani, a natural sympathizer^® to their cause and AML may provide them shelter. Therefore 
they joined EPML in large number^' to execute their programs by using this popular party as 
their front organization instead of their own party banner and slowly worked to win over 
Maulana Bhasani to their side. Within 1952 they successfully consolidated their position 
through exploiting Maulana Bhasani^^. They also continued to exert considerable influence on 
the overall policy decisions of the party. They pressed for the adoption of a secular approach 
by the AML. With the result that the AML (through a resolution of its council) deleted the 
word Muslim from its name in 1955 and renamed as the East Pakistan Awami League 
(EPAL)". This is the first time a political party, dominated by Muslims and of considerable 
28. W.H. Moris Jones, Pakistan Psst-Mortem and the Roots of Bangladesh; The Political Quarter, 
Vol.43 No.2, April-June 1972, pp. 194-95; Moudud Ahmed, Bangladesh: Cnstitutional for Autonomy, 
op.cit. p.21. 
29. Khondoker Mohammad Illias, Mujibbad (Mujibism), (Dhaka: National Publications, 1972), pp.522-
24: Also Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op.cit. pp.83-84; And Abdul Wadud Bhuyan, 
Emergence of Bangladesh, op.cit. p.23. 
30. Maulana Bhasani was a natural leftist revolutionary. He was also called Islamic Socialist. Though 
he never red Marxist literature, his life-long struggle for the peasant folk made him the hero of the 
'Have Nots'; See Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics, op.cit. pp.8-9. 
31. One faction of the communists led by Hazi Mohammad Danesh by disagreeing the maximum to join 
EPAML formed new party named Gonotantrik Dal (Democratic Party) in 31 December 1953. For this 
see Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op.cit. p87. 
32. In the 1953 convention of AML through the nominating power of Maulana Bhasani as President of 
EPAML, the leftists gained 9 out of 37 members in the executive committee. See Tallukder 
Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics, op.cit. p.9. 
33. Ibid, pp.6-9. Suhrawardy extremely opposed the resolution to make the AML a non-communal 
organization; Khondoker Mustaq Ahmed - one of the Joint Secretaries A. Salam - Khan one of the Vice 
Presidents and other 27 members of the committee out of 55 followed Suhrawardy. On the other hand, 
Sheikh Mujib, although was the blind supporter of Suhrawardy, supported Maulana Bhasani in this 
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significance in the political life of the country, has decided to open its door to the members of 
all commimities residing in Pakistan '^*. More over in 1954, when Pakistan signed mutual 
defense assistance agreements with USA and later joined American-sponsored defense pact 
(SEATO and Bagdad pact), Maulana Bhasani and his leftist associates were able to get 
official resolution passed by the executive committee of the EPML condemning the defense 
Assistance Agreement and the defense pacts. Since then with autonomous demand anti-
imperialism also became the dominant themes of the political speeches of Bhasani^^ 
Although the AL remained to be only political party enjoying support of the liberal leftists, 
the communist continued to exert considerable influence in the overall policy decisions of the 
party. This gradually drawn a line divided the AL between the workers having ideological 
orientation and guidance and the others belonging to the middle of-the-road liberal stream. 
The general stream in the AL was more interested in pressing for an election to go to power as 
they thought that only by going to power they could solve both the problems of language and 
autonomy issues. Amzad Hossain manifested them the pro-US stream. H.S. Suhrawardy, 
Sheikh Mujib^* ,^ Ataur Rahman Khan and Khondoker Mustaq Ahmed were the key leaders of 
this stream. Whereas the leftists having an ideological bias were more interested in economic 
emancipation of masses. These created the obvious differences between the two groups^^. 
These ideological differences, later in 1957, engaged the party stalwarts in an open conflict 
during the party's convention in Kagmari. 
The provincial election of E. Bengal was held at the end of 1954. After the language 
movement to oppose the ML in E. Bengal, under the leadership of three veteran politicians of 
Bengal (A.K. Fazlul Huq, Maulana Bhasani and H.S. Suhrawardy) an alliance of major 
opposition political parties was formed in the name of United Front (UF)^^and it adopted the 
famous 21-point programs at its manifesto^^. The front promptly succeeded in routing the ML 
from E. Bengal by this election'^''. But within a few months after the victory and formation of 
the provincial government due to the ML led hostile central governments conspiracy the 
alliance lost its provincial power'^^More over the high ambition of the major two part (AL and 
KSP) leaders and central governments conspiracy to divide the UF, the alliance as well as the 
change. { For more detail see Oli Ahad, National Politics: 1945 to 75, (Third Edition, Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Mono spool Paper Manufacturing Co. Ltd. 1997), pp. 178-79. Also Shyamalima Ghosh, The 
Awami League, op.cit. p. 11}. Opposing this resolution K. Mustaq, Abdus Salam Khan and some other 
top ranking leaders left AL and formed separate AML. Later in 1966 when AL's six point movement 
gained momentum in E. Bengal and high public enragement was grown against Ayub Khan's autocratic 
rule, in this hey days of the party they again rejoined the AL (weekly Roabbar, 29 June 1986; p. 17 and 
weekly Bichitra, 13 Februaiy 1981; p. 30). 
34. Histoiy of Bangladesh War of Independence, op.cit. p.451. 
35. Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics and the Emergence of Bangladesh,op.cit. p.9 
36. In the AL council of 1953 Mujib was elected General Sectary of EPAML. See Oli Ahad, National 
Politics, opcit. p. 192. 
37. Moudud Aluned, Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, op.cit. pp.30-31; Also Amzad Hossain, 
Politics andPolitical Parties of Bangladesh, (Dhaka: Porua, 1996), p.80. 
38. The major parties in the front were Awami League, Krishak Sramik Party of Fazlul Huq and Nejam-
e- Islam. For the detail of the formation of the UF see Histoiy of Bangladesh war of Liberation, op.cit. 
p.372. 
39. The language issue and autonomy for the E. Bengal were the main attraction of the UF manifesto. 
For the detail of 2I-point manifesto Ibid, pp.373-74. 
40. In the 1954 election the ML secured only 9out of 237 Muslim seats. Other seats were won by UF. 
Among the partners of UF largest party AL won maximum 143, KSP 48. NI22 and Khelapoth e 
Rabbani secured 2seats. For more information see Abul Mansur Ahmed, Fifty Years of Politics as I 
Saw It, p.259; Also Oli Ahad, National Politics, pp. 159-60. 
41. A.W. Bhuyan, The emergence ofBangladesh, op.cit. pp.33-34. 
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AL also broke-up and one faction of AL also joined the second biggest partner of the UF 
Fazlul Huqs KSP by defecting the party banner''^. So though ML was perished from E. 
Bengal, the UF was also unable to bring about a radical change in Pakistan's political life 
largely because of its internal factional rivalries and split and due to the same reason even E. 
Bengal could not achieve its autonomous demand though it was the main issue written in 
UF's manifesto. 
Although central government dismissed UF government and the unity of the front was 
no more remaining but it could not replace the ML. AL the largest political force in E. Bengal 
took the good opportvmity and formed its own provincial government in 1956^^1 Few days 
later AL also formed a coalition government wdth the Republican Party in center and H.S. 
Suhrawardy became the Prime Minister of Pakistan'*'*. After having power when Suhrawardy 
diverted his activities towards consolidating the party position, the leftist group led by 
Bhasani refiised to cooperate him because Suhrawardy began to defend vigorously Pakistan's 
alliance with the USA and also opposed the granting of 'fiill autonomy' to E. Bengal. Those 
who were in the government supported Suhrawardy's pro-western policy and had chosen him 
as their sole leader by ignoring Bhasani''^. Meanwhile after coming to power the AL 
government in center as well as at province adopted certain steps to allure the businessmen 
and land-owing people to join the party with a view to reduce the influence of its left wing. 
With the entry of the propertied and business peoples in the party the influence of its leftwing 
cadres greatly dwindled"* . In fact during this time the E. Bengali elites were virtually divided 
into pro-west and anti-imperialist group and this however led to open conflict at the Kagmari 
conference of AL on 1957. There Bhasani spoke of exploitation of E. Bengal by W. Pakistan 
and expressed that if the exploitation was not stopped, a stage might come when the people of 
eastern wing might want separation from western wing. Thus, he was in favor of regional 
autonomy of E. Bengal and non-aligned foreign policy. Whereas Suhrawardy claimed in the 
same council that E. Bengal had already been granted 98% of the regional autonomy and 
produced argument in favor of his pro-western foreign policy'*^. This grave difference 
between the two main leaders'*^ in Kagmari conference took a serious turn and formalized the 
split in AL when the EPAL president Maulana Bhasani took the foreign policy issue to the 
EPAL council meeting in Dhaka in July, 1957 and the ministerial group inflict a defeat on the 
42. One of the AL vice president Abdus Salam Khan and other 25 MNAs by defecting the party joined 
KSP. For detail see Abul Mansur Ahmed, Fifty Years of Politics as I Saw It, pp.273-75; Also Oli Ahad 
Oli Ahad, National Politics, pp. 170-73. For the detail of the central governments dismissal order see 
Histoiy of Bangladesh War of Liberation, op.cit. pp. 406-09 
43. For more detail see History of Bangladesh War of Liberation, op.cit. pp.579-80; Also see L. Ziring, 
Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad, pp.22-23. 
44. L. Ziring, Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad, p.30. It should be mentionable here that though the 
AL leadership were from middle class background, the Republican Party was the organization of big 
business peoples and feudal class. 
45. A.W. Bhuyan, The emergence of Bangladesh, op.cit. p.39; Also Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical 
Politics, op.cit. p. 10. 
46.YU.V. Gankovosky and L.R. Cordon-Polonskaya, A Histoiy of Pakistan 1947-1958, (Moscow: 
Nauka Publishing House, 1964), pp.290 and 284; Also Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, 
op.cit. p. 156. 
47.For detail speeches of Bhasani and Suhrawardy see History of Bangladesh War of Independence, 
op.cit. pp. 593-98; Also Oli Ahad, National Politics, op.cit. p.200; And Also Moudud Ahmed, 
Bangladesh: Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, op.cit.57-58. 
48. It was also a personality clash between Maulana Bhasani (who still was only a provincial leader but 
was having mass base) and Suhrawardy (a national leader operating mainly within the urban educated 
section). 
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party's leftist group led by Maulana Bhasani by a vote of 800-60. In this final tussle 
Suhrawardy was supported by provincial chief Minister Ataur Rahman Khan and EPAL 
general secretary Sheildi Mujibur Rahman. At this Maulana Bhasani together with nine leftist 
members of the executive committee resigned from the AL'* .^ 
Due to this split inside AL Bengali nationalist movement lost its momentum. The split 
in AL not only weakened the Bengalis autonomous movement but also gave a new 
opportunity to the W. Pakistani ruling elites to maneuver further for a strong center for the 
integrity of Pakistan. By weakening autonomous movement it also lost the faith of the 
autonomist leaders of Sindh, Baluchistan, and N.W.F.P. they no longer continued their 
support at the central government for AL^". On the other hand the defection of Maulana 
Bhasani and his followers opened the way for the birth of first radical political party namely 
National Awami Party^^ (NAP) and it became the platform of the radical political forces of E. 
Bengal. Soon emerged as the largest national party having broad support base in both part of 
Pakistan as its manifesto included two popular political issues^^; (i) Full regional autonomy 
for all provinces and breakup of one unit in the W. Pakistan, (ii) Independent and neutral 
foreign policy for Pakistan and abrogation of military pacts v^th the imperialists^^. 
However the heydays of the NAP did not last long. The split in the international 
communist movement also affected this leftist party. Therefore in 1967 the EPNAP broke up 
into two separate parties namely NAP (Bhasani) and NAP (Muzaffar). The pro-Chinese NAP 
(Bhasani) was remained imder the leadership of Maulana Bhasani and Muzaffar Ahmed 
became tiie leader of the breakaway pro-Soviet faction of NAP (Muzaffar)^"^. When the EPAL 
started its famous 6-point movement for ftill regional autonomy, to replace the autocrat Ayub-
regime by a national democratic government NAP (Muzaffar) wholeheartedly supported the 
movement. Though the pro-Moscow NAP did not disagree with the view of pro-China NAP 
(Bhasani) that US imperialism was the main enemy of the masses of Pakistan but for the time 
being they decided to give more importance on national political issue^^. On the other hand to 
the pro-Peking NAP foreign policy was much more important than the internal politics and 
US imperialism was the main enemy to the toiling people. After the Sino-Indian conflict of 
1962 when the USA and UK revised their foreign policy towards India, President Ayub made 
close alliance with India's natural enemy China and began to woo the pro-Peking faction of 
49. Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics, op.cit. p. 10; Also A.W. Bhuyan, The emergence of 
Bangladesh, op. cit. p.39; Also Shyamali Ghosh, The Awami League,op.cit. p.24. Though Mujib and 
Ataur Rahman finally supported their mentor Suhrawardy but till the final tussel personally they were in 
favor of full autonomy for E. Bengal. For this see Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op.cit. 
pp. 155-56. 
50. Moudud Ahmed, Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, op.cit. pp.59-60. 
51. In a convension of the lefl-leaning democratic leaders of both wing of Pakistan eventually led the 
formation of NAP at Dhaka in 1957.Maulana Bhasani became the president of both the national and E. 
Bengal unit of the new party. Among the notables joined the NAP were Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan of 
N.W.F.P, G.M. Syed of Sindh, Prince Abdul Karim Khan of Baluchistan. During the course of next 
decade some of the top leaders of the EPCP became the executive committee members of the EPNAP. 
52. Moudud Ahmed, Constitutional Quest for Autonomy, op.cit. p.60. 
53. Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op.cit. pp. 152-58. The social background of the main 
leadership of both AL and NAP were same. All the NAP leaders of W. Pakistan were from land-owing 
families. Where as both NAP and AL in E. Bengal were representing middle class background. For the 
social and economic background of the AL and NAP leaders see Talukder Maniruzzaman, The 
Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath, (Dhaka: UPL, 1988), pp.22,29 and 48. 
54. Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics, op.cit. p. 13; Also Amzad Hossain, Politicsand and 
Political Parties, op.cit. pp. 123-24. 
55. For more detail description of the pro-Moscow NAP's tactical line see the speeches of Professor 
Muzaffaar Ahmed and Mohiuddin Ahmed in the Sangbad (Dhaka), 17 December 1967. 
128 
NAP. The NAP (Bhasani) also started cooperation with Ayub regime, moved away from their 
previous string position they were holding for the cause of E. Bengal's autonomy and also 
stayed away from the EPAL's struggle for the provincial autonomy. Not only that by 
criticizing the cause of EPAL they called it a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois movement which 
would only strengthen hands of the imperialistic force^^. But it only reduced their popularity 
in E. Bengal. 
Though the defection of the leftist from AL reduced its internal ideological conflict 
and made Suhrawardy the unanimously accepted leader of the party, there was another serious 
disagreement between his two-trusted lieutenant Sheikh Mujibur rahman (GS and the 
undeclared leader of the EPAL) and Ataur Rahman Khan (Chief Minister of the AL led 
provincial East Bengal government). This conflict started since AL's coming to power in 
1956. The issue of their infighting was that in the parliamentary democratic system whether 
the ministers of the governing party should have autonomy to govern the country by their own 
without the advice of the governing party caucus or the supremacy of the party organization 
over the party-led regime should be attributed. Khan, the Chief Minister, heading the 
administration, strongly believed in the traditional administration that the party should not 
dictate the ministers or the administration in their working. The ministry and bureaucracy 
should have full liberty to govern the country. They should not be accountable for their 
functioning to the ruling-party organization. He favored an administrative system free from 
the influence of party workers. On the other hand Mujib (as the party secretary was aspuing to 
build an strong organization) was very much aware of the near-hostile attitude of the 
bureaucracy towards his party, as maximum of them were the sympathizers of the ML. So to 
execute the party plans and programs Mujib insisted for constant vigil the party workers and 
the bureaucrats at different level and areas of administration. He also insisted that the 
ministers duty in the government was to execute the programs of the party as they came to 
power through getting votes as the party candidates to execute the party's election promises to 
the peoples and the organization had the legitimate right to supervise over the ministers to 
successfully execute the party programs^'. Mujib was also arguing that party system could not 
be developed without a network of patronage. 
This debate over the party's internal disagreement continued till the Military's take 
over of the governing power in 1958 and also affected the district organizations of the party. 
Since 1958 party politics were banned in Pakistan. After a four years interval when the 
Ayub's military regime permitted political activities in 1962 one united forum of all political 
parties formed in E. Bengal namely 'National Democratic Front' under the leadership of H.S. 
Suharawardy instead of reviving the old parties in their old names. The only target of this 
NDFP was to reestablish democracy by overthrowing the Ayub's martial law regime^^. But at 
the sudden death of Suhrawardy in December 1963 the NDFP was divided and all the old 
parties of E. Bengal revived on their own names. Mujib, the leader of strong organizational 
56. For detail see Talukder Maniruzzaman, Radical Politics, op.cit.; pp. 14-17. 
57. For detail see Abul Mansur Ahmed, Fifty Years of Politics as I Saw It, op. cit.; pp. 425-33. During 
Mujib's short tenure of office as Minister of Industries in 1956-57 and through his influence on his 
successors, S. Mujib did help some AL supporters to get various types of government assistance and 
bank loans. In subsequent years Mujib helped his party workers by various means - direct monitory 
assistance, arranging for jobs, helping their professional advancement through his influence among 
administrators and the like. He used to assure party workers repeatedly that he would always stand by 
them in bad as well as good days (for this see T. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its 
aftermath [Dhaka: UPL, 1980]; p. 158). 
58. Ibid. pp. 454-55. 
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capability, took the opportunity of the existing leadership vacuum and revived the EPAL in 
1964. Many of the old executives of the party did not join the meetings to revive the AL. Ex-
Chief Minister of E. Bengal and one of the ex-Vice President A. Rahman Khan did not join 
AL, as he was not assured the president ship of the party. And due to his old rivalry he also 
criticized the attempt of Mujib . 
Mujib not only revived the AL but also added new militancy character in its support 
base and workers force. Suhrawardy's moderate influence within the AL during his late years 
was ended. By his unique organizing skill AL turned into a revolutionary party and Mujib the 
moving spirit of the party became the all-accepted leader of the party. When in 1966 Mujib 
declared the famous 6-point programs, 'A charter for the Bengalis survival', the militant 
workers of the organization successfully turned the politically and economically deprived 
Bengalis sub-nationalist sentiment against the W. Pakistani military junta. The refusal of the 
military junta to transfer the governing power to the AL party elected in the 1970 general 
election and finally the planned massacre in the E. Bengal led the autonomous movement into 
liberation movement. Bengalis under the leadership of AL declared independence in 
December 1971 and started a prolonged guerrilla war under the leadership of AL. How AL, a 
party followed democratic way to come to power led a fierce armed revolution with its 
inexperienced administration and cadre force: it is still an unique chapter for the researchers 
to know and explore. 
59. Among the prominent leaders of ex-EPAL, who were opposing tlie revival of AL were Abul 
Mansur Ahmed, Ataur Rahman Khan and Kamruzzaman. See Abdul Huq, Lekhoker Rujnamchai Char 
Dashaker Rajniti Porikrama (1953-1993), (Dhaka: UPL, 1996), pp.86-87; Also, Awami Leaguer 
Chacha Kaahini, (Dhaka: Anupam Prakashani, 1995), pp. 18-19; And see Amzad Hossain, Politics and 
Political Parties, op.cit. p.81. Later Ataur Rahman Khan formed his own new party named National 
League but it became die party of some leaders without much following. Other Leaders joined different 
parties like Pakistan Convention Muslim Leageu, NAP (Bhasani) etc. 
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Part. 1 
Conflict within the Conflict 
In 1969, the dictatorship of Ayub Khan ended through an enormous people's movement. The 
leader of the movement Sheikh Mujib, lead the movement with his 6-point demands which 
included the demand for the regional economical autocracy of East Bengal (EB). Naturally, 
after the fall of Ayub Khan Mujib became very popular. In this situation, in the December of 
1970, the first election in the history of Pakistan was held. Especially due to the economical 
oppression towards EP and political sufferings the election result was overwhelmingly on the 
favor of Awami League's (AL) 6-point. AL acquired 167 seats out of 169 seats in EB; 
therefore they had the majority of the seats in the national assembly of Pakistan, which was 
consisted of 313 seats in total. This in result gave AL the power to organize the government 
of Pakistan'. The ruling government of Pakistan was shaken vigorously by the election result. 
In this situation there were only two choices for the ruling government: 1) to decentralize the 
governmental power between two regions of Pakistan by following the 6-point and thus try to 
regain the faith of the general people, otherwise 2) to ignore the election result and impose 
colonial rule in EB by using the military force. Owing to the professional influence Pakistani 
present Junta decided to impose military power in EB. On the midnight of 25 March, the 
military of Pakistan launched genocide on the unarmed, innocent people of EB. From the 
political point of view, this attack was basically suicidal, and eventually that caused the burial 
of the united Pakistan. 
On 1 March 1971, AL started a non-cooperation movement against the Pakistani Junta 
because of the delaying tactics and the reluctance of the Junta to hand over the governmental 
power to AL. AL leadership established a functional shadow government in the province 
influencing the movement. The three-week long movement changed the consciences of the 
general Bengali population, and created a new political spirit and hope in them. Therefore 
once the genocide started the goal of Bengali swiftly changed to achieve independence from 
Pakistan^. The 1971 independence war was a political war by all means, even though there 
was social support for it but there was no citable political preparation for the war. 
Although the begirming of the war was on 25 March, AL did not have any agenda for 
the revolutionary movement. AL main leader Mujib was arrested on the midnight of 25 
March. Most of the executive committee members of AL literarily hide out for the self-
defense from the Pakistani military, they moved either to the remote rural areas of the country 
or to the neighboring India. In that position the East Bengal people's party AL was scattered 
and leaderless. But the Bengali society determined to fight back for their independence as 
their only defense against the brutal attack of the Pakistani military. Thus they promptly got 
involved in the armed resistance. Within ten days of the 26 March attack, three different 
independent organized initiatives were perceptible^. 
The first initiative included the attack on East Bengal Regiment (EBR), EPR (East 
Pakistan Rifles) and East Pakistan police both soldiers and officers. The involvement in the 
war of independence for this group was unintentional, spontaneous, and a matter of instant 
decision. The Pakistani military attacked this group the first and whoever survived that 
massive killing participated in the armed resistance. Later they had only two options, either 
face the court marshal or fight for the independence of the country. Thus after a week of the 
' For the detailed election result see "History of Bangladesh War of Independence", Vol.2, p.586. 
^ Bangladesh Declared Independence on March 26'''. For details see Bangladesh Documents, Vol.l, p. 280 
^ Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,pp.7-9 
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first attack of Pakistani military there were about eleven thousands ot'EBR and EPR 
participation in the independence war"*. 
The second front of resistance was constructed by the four student and youth AL 
leaders, Sheikli Fazlul Hoque Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzak and Tofael Aimied. 
These four leaders were renowned as the trusted lieutenant of the Sheikh Mujib and they were 
very influential among the young workers of AL. They have increased their influences 
especially during the non-cooperation movement. In the first week of April after their 
migration in the neighboring supporting country India they emerged as an individual group to 
contribute in the armed resistance for independence. These four leaders openly demanded that 
Sheikh Mujib had only given them, not anyone else, the responsibly to train the armed force, 
to organize the freedom fight and to direct the war. This demand and role of them remained 
unchanged till the end of the freedom struggle. In their leadership and patronization of Indian 
foreign detective organization. Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), they formed an armed 
organization named Bangladesh Liberation Force (BLF) parallel to the Exiled Government of 
Bangladesh; which was later renamed as "Mujib Bahini (Mujib Force)" and now is well 
knovm in Bangladesh as 'Mujib Bahini'. After a while the activities of that armed force had 
divided the independence war largely. 
The third force of resistance, even though they were very much unorganized in the 
beginning of the war eventually became the foremost front of the resistance. The largest part 
of AL organization migrated to India to be safe from the genocide. Despite the unimaginable 
brutality of the attack, the arrest of the all-powerftil chief leader, the uncertainty of fiiture 
activities and leadership, and the other dangers of the time, the mainly middle-class driven 
organization AL was able to launch an agenda for the rare revolutionary situation. The 
contribution of the numerous AL workers and the public in general was enormous in this 
effort of AL. Aside the vast differences in opinion among the workers, this group became the 
absolute political engine for the war of independence. The role of one person as the director of 
this engine, the East Pakistan AL general secretary Tajuddin Ahmed, without any doubt was 
extraordinary^. 
After the attack of Pakistani military, the AL leaders were busy with their own safety; 
therefore Tajuddin had no way to communicate with them. But he came up with two major 
goals and methods without any delay, 1) The only way to save Bengali nation from the 
inhumane attack of Pakistani government is armed resistance, 2) The foremost and essential 
step is to attain support from India and other sympathetic lobbies to establish an organized 
armed resistance without any ftirther delay*^ . 
To realize his plans On April 1, Tajuddin with his accomplished lieutenant Amirul 
Islam crossed the Indo-Bangla border and arrived at Delhi to convince the Indian government 
to support and assist the independence war of Bangladesh. By that time the other leaders of 
AL were not able to cross the border. In Delhi, after meetings with different forums, the need 
According to the commander in chief of the Freedom Fight Colonel Ataul Gani Usmani, "If Pakistani military 
limited their attack only against some particular political leaders then the Bengali soldiers and police might have 
been secular. When they indiscriminately killed the intellectuals and the members of the Bengali armed force, 
and tiie news about the killings spread out, only then Bengali police and military as a body built the resistance". 
By this attack Pakistan army helped Bengalis to form liberation force to fight the Pakistan army (Abu Sayeed, 
War Behind of the War; p. 115). 
^ Tajuddin, the general secretary of EPAL, was one of the intimate colleagues of Mujib for over two decades. 
After the revival of AL in 1964, he was involved m all the activities and decision m^ing of the party. As he was 
not so much of a media person, this imminent organizer was always at the background of the party. He was 
involved as the second in command after Mujib, with AL's non-cooperative movement in March of 1971. 
® Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.9 
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of an interim "Bangladesh Government" was obvious to him, because without that 
establishment it was impossible to obtain any support or aid from India or any other interested 
nations'. Consequently, he consulted with the Member of Parliament and the whip of the 
party, Amirul Islam; together they decided to form a five member presidential government 
with Sheikh Mujib as its president. On 4 April meeting with the Indian Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi he presented himself as the Prime Minister of the Government of Bangladesh^. 
This instant decision of Tajuddin strengthened and accelerated the independence war 
of Bangladesh. Indira Gandhi promised to provide support and aids for the independence war 
according to the appeal of the Bangladesh government . As a result, the establishment of 
independent Bangladesh was promising. The success of Tajuddin to have a promise of having 
independent Bangladesh however created an unwanted conflict of leadership within AL 
politics. This inner conflict of leadership influenced the politics of the nation immensely 
during and even after the war. 
On 4 April, while Tajuddin was in Delhi deciding the structural plan for the freedom 
fight, the commanders of the rebellious units of East Bengal Regiment (EBR) of Pakistan 
Army gathered in the Teliapara tea garden of Shylhet district to decide the combined agenda 
and the problems of the war. Among them was the founder of EBR and the MP of AL Rtd. 
Abdul Gani Usmani. Instead of waiting for an organized government, under the pressure of 
the current situation they combined all the rebellious units and formed united liberation force, 
under the leadership of Colonel U s m a n i I n the beginning of the war the EPR was fighting 
under the command of three majors therefore Usmani was bound to form three brigades for 
the united force for practical and political purposes. Major Khaled Musharraf in command of 
'K-force', Major Shafiullah for 'S-force' and Major Ziaur Rahman for 'Z-force'*'. Thus the 
brigades were named after the initials of the brigade commanders. This nomenclature of the 
brigades influenced the power politics within the military of Bangladesh during and long time 
after the war was over. It was proved in postwar Bangladesh, with the instances of coup, 
counter-coup, and the anti-disciplinary factionalism in military, that the classification of the 
brigades with the commander's initials was a severe mistake. 
When Tajuddin came back to the border city Calcutta, he realized that the power 
conflict had begim. It was predictable to have the dispute and indiscipline within AL leaders 
to decide who or which group will lead the nation in the absence of Mujib. Meanwhile many 
of the MP As, MNAs and AL leaders had gathered in Calcutta. Among them were the cabinet 
' Moudud Ahmed, "Shaiotta Shason Theke Shadhinota (From Autonomy to Independence)", UPL, Dhaka, p217. 
Also see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.ll 
But according to Professor Abu Sayeed, "Tajuddin played the clever/stout game on right time. He went to Delhi 
without informing the other leaders and formed the government. In result, the inner-circle was bound to follow 
junior Tajuddin's leadership. Later on this established Tajuddin's leadership during the war. 
See Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 205 
^ Amirul Islam, " Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
35-37. The other cabinet ministers were, Sayeed Nazrul Islam, Kamruz Zaman, Mohammad Monsur Ali, and 
Khondokar Mustaq Ahmed. 
' There are three conditions to ftilfill to direct a successful liberation war: 1) massive support of the people 2) 
Proper training and shelter for the freedom fighter and 3) A constant supply of weapons and other accessories. 
To fulfill the 2"'' and the 3^"* conditions Bangladesh was dependent on India's aid and support. 
Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.l5. For details also see Professor Abu 
Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", pp. 156-157. Contribution of Usmani to form a Bengal Regiment in the British 
Armed Force was immense. Therefore the EPR members and officers were very obedient to his commands. 
" Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 157-158. Later in October this three sectors were divided 
into eleven sectors of freedom fighters. For detail see Major Rofiqul Islam, " Lokkho Praner Binimoie (The 
Legacy of Millions)", pp. 192-196 
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ministers of Exiled Bangladesh Government Kamruz Zaman and Mohammad Monsur AH, AL 
leader Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Sheikh Moni and many others. There was an initiative 
to create a lobby with All Pakistan AL secretary, Kamruz Zaman in the center. Many of them 
believed that Tajuddin went to Delhi that early to obtain the power, and he should have waited 
for the other leaders. On the other side the young leader Sheikh Moni was busy with his 
showdown, he demanded that only the student and youth leaders had the command from 
Bangabandhu to lead the war'^. 
It should be especially mentioned here that Bangabandhu formed a five member iimer-
circle in his party, those leaders were involved in the policy making of the party. Among them 
were Sayeed Nazrul Islam, Kamruz Zaman, Mohammad Monsur Ali, and KJiondokar Mustaq 
Ahmed and Tajuddin. Among the workers of the party position wise after Mujib, Sayeed 
Nazrul Islam was second, and Tajuddin was third. Khondokar Mustaq Ahmed was the senior 
most among them the five leaders. After the 1970 election, in the Awami league 
Parliamentary Party (ALPP) Mujib was elected the leader and Tajuddin the deputy leader of 
the ALPP respectively, but in the party he was still in the third position. Naturally, in the 
absence of Bangabandhu Sayeed Nazrul Islam should have been the Prime Minister in 
succession. But Tajuddin declared himself as the Prime Minister and promptly crafted an 
effort to be the leading actor of the war'^. 
Kamruz Zaman was a leader of good judgments, instead of having different lobbies 
he proposed to have unified decisions for the war. On 8 April in Calcutta, in the presence of 
Kamruz Zaman and Monsur Ali, the workers and leaders of AL and its student-youth wings, 
Tajuddin presented the results of his Delhi meeting. He explained to the crowd the importance 
of forming government before meeting Indira Gandhi. The present leaders did not question 
the importance of the meeting with Indian PM and Tajuddin's request to have support from 
the Indian govermnent. The question was raised about the validity of Tajuddin's claim to 
declare himself as the Prime Minister''^. Many MP As, MNAs and leaders criticized Tajuddin 
because they did not have any position in the planned government. They wanted to increase 
the number of members in the transitional government. The young leader Sheikh Moni was 
one of the four renowned student and youth leaders; he maintained the strongest lobby among 
the students and youths because he was the nephew of Mujib. Foundation of the Independent 
Government of Bangladesh was an obstacle/ barrier to his high ambition in Bangladesh 
politics. He totally opposed the formation of the assembly of the ministers and said, "No 
cabinet of the ministers can be formed now,... and it's the time for war. Now everyone 
should be in the battle filed and in there we will find our genuine leaders. We need to form a 
revolutionary force to administer this war". In response to Sheikh Moni's proposal Tajuddin's 
trusted lieutenant and the ALPP whip Barrister Amirul Islam delivered the logic, "If the 
peoples of different ideology and opinion form two, five or seven separate individual 
Revolutionary Councils, which is proposed, then which one of them the general people or the 
freedom fighters should follow? Which one of the councils foreign governments should 
cooperate with?" Then he talked about the transitional government of Tajuddin, "Of course 
we need a legitimate government, because no foreign government will acknowledge or aid an 
Mohanunad Abdul Mohimen," Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar" Pioneer Publication, Dhaka, p.84 
Also see Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 
1991, pp. 39-40 
" Interview with Abdur Razzak, he was one of the renowned four youth leaders during liberation presently he is 
one of the presidium members of AL. 
Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.l6, Also see Professor Abu Sayeed, 
"Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 205 
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illegitimate government. In tlie history of the world during vvai" or revolution there was rarely 
any elected government to lead the war. The right of the government formed with the elected 
members of the parliament is equivalent to the rights of the people. If we don't establish the 
rights of the people and form the Revolutionary Council then we will be denouncing the 
fundamental rights of the people". It was obvious that the rights of the public is preserved by 
forming a government with the elected members of 1970 election, instead of founding a 
wartime Revolutionary Council and thus that government has legitimacy over the council. 
All the leaders including Kamruz Zaman agreed with the reasoning of Amirul Islam, except 
for Sheikh Moni and Mizanur Rahman'^ It was decided that the new Government would be 
officially aimounced on 10 April. 
Sheikh Moni was not satisfied with the decision of this meeting. Later he collected 
signatures of forty-two AL and youth leaders, and appealed to the Indian PM to stop the 
broadcast of Tajuddin's first speech as the PM of Exiled Bangladesh government from the 
Independent Bangladesh Radio (Shadhin Bangla Betar)'^. Sheikh Moni including the other 
four student and youth leaders asked Tajuddin to have more elaborate discussions wdth all the 
MP As, MNAs and the leaders and then announce the formation of the government. Moni 
threatened Tajuddin that if he did not halt the radio speech for the time being then the reaction 
would be dangerous'^. 
Tajuddin worried that the picture of the independent Bangladesh which was almost 
visible due to the sacrifice of so many freedom fighters (including both soldiers and general 
public), might be obliterated because of the inner conflict of AL leaders. Especially any big 
change in the transitional government might have made Indian government doubtful and 
effect could be very harmfol for the independence movement. Therefore, Tajuddin was 
steadfast to his decision to broadcast the announcement of the Independent Government'I On 
10 April Tajuddin's speech was broadcasted on the Radio. In his speech as the PM, he 
pleaded to the world for the acknowledgement of the newly bom country, Bangladesh'^. Later 
on, the English translation of the speech was distributed among the journalist. 
Afiter that Tajuddin, Kamruz Zaman and Monsur Ali traveled different regions around 
the border to locate the leaders of AL with a small aircraft. They were able to locate two 
members of the proposed Exiled Bangladesh government Sayed Nazrul Islam and Khondokar 
Mustaq Ahmed and many of the MPAs, MNA's around the border cities. Khondokar Mustaq 
Ahmed came to India to save his life. He was religious and a rightist, therefore, was reluctant 
to have involvement with India, and was hesitant to enter the Indo-Bangla border. He was the 
exception of the irmer-circle of Mujib; he wanted absolute autonomy, not independence for 
Bangladesh. Nevertheless, when he realized the situation is in favor of independence and 
Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Proitashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
41-42 
Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p. 16. Ex-provincial assembly member 
of Barishal, Chittarangan Sutar was very active to try to stop Tajuddin from forming the assembly of the minister 
and the broadcast of Tajuddin's speech from the independent Bangladesh radio. He was very acting supporting 
Sheikh Moni's lobby up until the beginning of 1972. 
" Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
44. Also see Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 206 
" Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.l6-17. Also see Amirul Islam, 
"Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 45 
' ' For the frill radio address of PM Tajuddin Ahmed see "Bangladesh Documents", Vol. 1, pp.282-286. Also see 
Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
50 
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there is no way to reverse the process then he decided to stay in India at least to save his life 
and kept his discussions limited in the question of leadership^®. 
The five members of the proposed assembly of ministers were the members of the 
Mujib's inner-circle and in 1971 all of them were the candidates for the PM position. None of 
them were happy about Tajuddin's declaration of PM in Delhi without any prior discussion 
v^th all of them. However, Tajuddin, who already initiated the foundation of the government 
and had alliance with the Indian government, was now in a stronger political position than rest 
of the leaders. In the presence of all five of them, after long discussions and debates, they 
accepted the proposed cabinet formed by Tajuddin and the size of the newly formed cabinet 
of the ministers. Monsur Ali and Kamruz Zaman, in that crucial time, abandoned their 
demand to be the PM of the government for the sake of the acceleration of the 
independence^'. Sayed Nazrul Islam was made Vice President and in the absence of 
Bangabandhu, he was the acting president; therefore, he did not disagree much with 
Tajuddin's position as the PM. It was hardest for Khondokar Mustaq to let go off the PM 
position; he was hoping to obtain that position. He also mentioned that as the most senior 
leader, he was the genuine candidate for the position. At last, he agreed to serve as a minister 
on one condition that he should be in charge of foreign ministry. Everyone agreed with him, 
as that was a way to have understanding in the group In the absence of Mujib, it was 
expected to have inner conflict within AL leaders about their position in the government, 
considering that it was a huge political success to be able to construct an interim government. 
In the same meeting, the council of ministers acknowledged Usmani as the commander-in-
chief of the armed force. 17 April 1971 is thus a memorable day in the history of the Bengali 
nation. On that day, the members of the first government of Bangladesh were officially 
inaugurated, at the village of Mujibnagar in the border district of Meherpur^^. After the 
inauguration, the acting president and the PM gave speech to the present public and the 
journalists. Thousands of voices were then overwhelmed with the slogans "Joy Bangla 
(Victoiy to Bangladesh)", Joy Bangabandhu (Victory to Bangabandhu)", and "Courageous 
Bengali pick up weapons and bring liberty to Bangladesh". Until the surrender of the 
Pakistani militaiy on 16 December, Mujibnagar was the capital of the transitional government 
of Bangladesh. 
Two large parties of Bangladesh NAP (M) and NAP (B) expressed their absolute 
support to the newly formed independent Bangladesh govenmient. They also appealed to the 
world leaders to use their good office and raise their voice against the barbarism and brutality 
committed by General Yahya Khan on the innocent and unarmed people of Bangladesh. In the 
Moudud Ahmed, " Bangladesh: Shaoittashason theke Shadhinota (Bangladesh: Autonomy to Independence)", 
p.218 
' On April S"* 1971 at night after alkalizing the current situations told MP professor Abu Sayed, "The political 
behavior and ethics of Tajuddin was not correct, but considering the current situation there is no way to move on 
without agreeing with his decision". Sayed Nazrul Islam also could not agree with Tajuddin's decision to be the 
PM whole-heartedly. However, considering the present situations an educated and knowledgeable person like 
him could not think of any other alternative than to go along with Tajuddin. Also see Professor Abu Sayeed, 
"Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 205-206 
^^  Moudud Ahmed, "Bangladesh: Shaoittashason theke Shadhinota (Bangladesh: Autonomy to Independence)", 
p.218. Also see Aminil Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, 
Dhaka, 1991, pp. 43-44 
^^  Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
53-55. For more details also see "Bangladesh Documents", Vol.1, p. 289-98 
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first week of May, CPB appealed to all the communist countries including Soviet Union to 
support Bangladesh in its war for liberty and to recognize the government of Bangladesh '^*. 
With the formation of Bangladesh government, it was possible to appeal to the whole 
world for the support for the liberation war and at the same time, two forms of assistance was 
assured from the Indian government, 1) Diplomatic support and 2) the training of the guerrilla 
force by the Indian military and the supply of the weapons fi-om Indian goverrmient^^. India 
agreed to give training to 100,000 guerrillas and the supply of their weapons. The guerrilla 
camps were built throughout the Indo-Bangla border. Indian army gave food, clothing and 
training to thousands of himgry and inspired students and youths. Therefore, the liberation 
war of Bangladesh could not go astray^^. 
Although Tajuddin was successful in the government formation, he was continuously 
facing challenges from the student and youth leaders. They started propaganda against him 
saying that he acquired the PM position by force. They favored Sayed Nazrul and Nazrul was 
also lenient to them. The renowned four youth leaders continued their efforts to oppose the 
government and for the formation of a Revolutionary Council^'. In May, the youth leaders, 
Tofael Ahmed and Abdur Razzak, met the commander-in-chief of the freedom fighters, 
Usmani with a proposal to recruit the good youths for the liberation war. Usmani, gladly gave 
them his written approval to recruit "the golden youths"^^ but later on, the recruitment was 
not in control of Usmani anymore. Sheikh Moni, Sirajul Alam Khan and some other leaders 
took advantage of Usmani's approval letter and with the direct help of RAW, they formed 
Bangladesh Liberation Force (BLF), later on this special force was renamed as "Mujib 
Bahini"^'. Right after the establishments of this force, the acting President, without consulting 
with the PM, provided not only with responsibility to recruit the youths but also to organize 
and direct them^°. Tajuddin did not agree with the formation of this special force but at the 
time he was busy with the debates over the legitimacy of his govenmient and of his own 
position. Because of his fi-agile position in the party at the time it was impossible for him to 
oppose the power expansion of that force. 
^^  Bangladesh Documents, Vol. 1, pp.298-303 and 307-317. 
^ Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 181 
Ibid p. 197 
" Ibidp.206 
^^  Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
65 
Masudul Hoque, "Bangladesher Rajnitite RAW ebong CIA (RAW and CIA in the politics of Bangladesh)", 
pp.77,79&92. There is no clear explanation for the purpose of the foundation of the Mujib Bahini. According to 
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formed in the name of Mujib. But in reality Mujib Bahini did not fulfill the expectations of RAW because 80% 
of the members within the force were leaning towards left". Amirul Islam wrote, "RAW thought that the current 
AL leaders might not be able to lead the war for longtime at that moment BLF leaders could fiinction as the 
alternative force. Besides, after liberation of Bangladesh this particular group could help to form an anti-China 
government. The Indian government took this decision with thought of not to keep all eggs in the same box and 
spoil it all at once". See Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj 
Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 66 
In the personal Interview of the renowned Freedom fighter and AL leader, Kader Siddiqi with the author he 
said," Some clever political leaders had the ambition to capture the power by forming that force with the help of 
an Indian general and RAW. Their goal was to prepare a force beforehand, to take over the power from the 
victorious freedom fighters after the liberation". 
^^  Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.72. Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer 
Arale Juddha", p. 206-207 
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Mujib Bahini was trained under the supervision of the special section of RAW in 
Dehradun. The members of this forcc were recruited from the educated youths of the society 
and they were especially obedient to the ideology of AL. They were decorated with the more 
modem weapons than the regular liberation force cadres. They were in total ten thousands in 
number. It was also obvious from the beginning of the formation that Usmani had no control 
over the activities of the force^'. The group who had the responsibility only to recruit the 
student and youth freedom fighters eventually founded an independent force by themselves 
among the freedom fighters and they became their own commanders. Thus they emerged as 
the parallel freedom fighter force of the Exiled Bangladesh government. 
Although Mujib Bahini emerged as the parallel force to the government, there were 
conflicts among the leaders of the Mujib Bahini. There were pre-existing conflicts between 
the two major leaders of Mujib Bahini, Sheikh Moni and Sirajul Alam Khan, even before 
March 25'^ of 1971. But there was another conflict sprouting before the foundation of Mujib 
Bahini; it was a conflict of leadership as well as ideological one. Sirajul Alam Khan used the 
socialistic ideology to establish his individual leadership, but that in effect 80% of Mujib 
Bahini elements into the devoted soldiers of socialism. Sheikh Moni was unsuccessful in this 
rivalry because most of the recruits in the training center of Mujib Bahini were socialist from 
the very beginning^^. Even though Mujib Bahini was anti-Tajuddin in public, Khan kept his 
connection with Tajuddin in secret because of their proximity in ideology^^. Among the other 
major leaders of Mujib Bahini, Tofael Ahmed, for the time being, supported Sheikh Moni and 
Abdur Razzak was closer to Sirajul Alam khan because of his leaning towards socialistic 
ideology. However, Abdur Razzak had indisputably obedient to Mujib. Therefore, he played a 
role of moderator for the Moni-Siraj conflict. 
From the month of August 1971, the trained Mujib Bahini members started to move 
into Bangladesh. Two months before that, the other trained freedom fighters moved in to 
Bangladesh, initiated their insurgency activities and also involved some of the leftist in the 
direct battles v^th the Pakistani Military^''. On the other hand, the Moni-group of Mujib 
Bahini had a main goal to destroy the leftist. Not only the leftists sometimes to assure their 
leadership, they even fought battle with the regular freedom fighters, without any hesitation 
they even killed the other Mujib Bahini fighters, who were followers of Sirajul Alam Khan-
Abdur Razzak- and Hasanul Hoque Enu's leftist ideology. These activities of Moni-group 
against the leftist continued after the liberation war as the way to achieve the political 
ambitions of Sheikh Moni. Eventually in 1972, Moni, with his armed workers, formed Awami 
Jubo (Youth) League (AJL). On the other hand, the Sirajul Alam group joined and fought 
with the rest of the regular freedom fighters in the count^y^^ 
Mujib Bahini's propaganda and rebellious protests against the transitional government 
in public, the killing of other freedom fighters, and pressuring the workers to be obedient to a 
particular group within Mujib Bahini started to divide the liberation war. Moreover, the 
regular armed force of Bangladesh was suspicious about the goals of the supportive 
' ' Ibid p.72 
^^  Masudul Hoque, "Bangladesher Rajnitite RAW ebong CIA (RAW and CIA in the politics of Bangladesh)", 
pp.79-81 
" Ibid p.82. Also see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.l32. It is possible 
that because Sheikh Moni was political enemy to both Sirajul Alam Kahn and Tajuddin and that brought them 
close together as political friends. 
Masudul Hoque, "Bangladesher Rajnitite RAW ebong CIA (RAW and CIA in the politics of Bangladesh)", 
pp.95-97 
" F o r details see Ibid pp.95-97 
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governments role in the war^^ It was obvious that if the activities of the Mujib Bahini cannot 
be controlled then soon the liberation war would turn into a suicidal war for the Bengalis. 
Besides the attempt of the Bangladesh Government in Exile to form a united front consisting 
all the leftist parties to strengthen the power in the war was opposed by the Mujib Bahini as 
well and they tried to influence the other lobbies within AL to support them. Thus, it was 
becoming harder to acquire the support of Soviet Union. Colonel Usmani was a believer of 
strong discipline, to stop indiscipline and suicidal activities, he withdrew the letter, he gave to 
Mujib Bahini, back in April, which gave them recruiting power. He also demanded to have 
Mujib Bahini under his command^^. In the middle of August, Tajuddin demanded to the 
Indian administration to lead and control Mujib Bahini^ ®. 
The Revolutionary Council was not formed to administer the war as the youth and 
student leaders have suggested, AL government mainly under the leadership of Tajuddin was 
doing that job of administering the war. On the other hand, the leaders of AL were always 
trying to assure that the government running according to the directions of the party. In the 
begirming, there were frequent executive committee meetings and the government was 
working with the consent of the party. But later on Tajuddin and his government feared about 
the inner conflict of the party and started to work independently^^. In the meanwhile even 
though Tajuddin was able to come into an understanding with the irmer-circle, but the 
executive committee members of AL and many MPs were still opposing the Exiled AL 
government and the Tajuddin. The youth group and the Mustaq faction of AL were among the 
other leaders of AL, who were inspiring this opposition against the government. In different 
forums, they questioned the ability of Tajuddin as the PM and also the legitimacy of his 
foundation of the government continuously. 
From the very begirming, the student and youth leaders were reluctant to acknowledge 
the cabinet of Exiled Bangladesh Government. This youth group was continuously acting to 
harass and embarrass the Exiled Government by all means. They made it their business to 
inspire the AL leaders to oppose the cabinet of the Exiled Bangladesh Government. They 
criticized the goverrunent and made it even known to Indira Gandhi, the PM of India. As the 
part of the propaganda they mentioned that Tajuddin did not have the support of most of the 
AL leaders"*". In this situation on 5 & 6 July, AL executive committee and the parliamentary 
party members hold a conference in Shiliguri to prove the unity of the party and the party's 
absolute support for Tajuddin. 
In the Shiliguri meeting, about 300 members of the Pakistani National and Provincial 
Assemblies participated. Some groups were busy in the meeting criticizing and demanding the 
removal of the ministers of the Exiled Bangladesh Government specially Tajuddin to achieve 
inter-party benefits. One group out of them lead by Khondokar Mustaq also criticized the 
Indian government. They demanded that Indian government was not interested in the 
independence of Bangladesh for that reason they are not proving Bengalis with enough 
weapons for the war, avoiding the diplomatic issues with lame excuses. They expressed 
suspicion that Indian government might not formally recognize Bangladesh Government until 
For details see Professor Abu Sayeed, "Juddhaer Arale Juddha", p. 207 and Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 
(Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, i995,p.73 
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Mohammad Abdul Mohimen, " Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp. 117-118 
Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddher Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, pp. 
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the end of the war. The number one joint secretaiy of AL Mizan Chowdhury openly criticized 
the Exiled Government and demanded the resignation of Tajuddin from the general secretary 
position of the party'". 
Kamruz Zaman, Monsur Ali, Professor Yusuf Ali and Nazrul Islam dealt with all the 
debates and controversies about the government and Tajuddin with their intelligent arguments 
and they also illustrated the successes of the government up to that time. As a result all the 
doubts and suspicions about the government were erased from the mind of the councilors. The 
majority of the elected members of the parliaments expressed their absolute faith in the 
transitional government. As a result, the propaganda, confusion, and divisions created by the 
intra-party groups, was eradicated"* .^ The representatives of the people through this 
conference, at last, recognized both the AL govenmient and Tajuddin. 
During the war the political ambitions and power conflicts was at its peak. This 
ambition was ubiquitous in the leaders of student youth wing of AL, armed freedom fighters, 
and the regular military of Bangladesh. Among the politicians there was power conflicts but 
not as much of the ambitions. The political ambition started in the military of the Bangladesh 
in the early 1971. The three main competitors were Shofmllah, Khaled Musharraf and Ziaur 
Rahman. Even though, the war commander-in-chief, Colonel Usmani was a retired person of 
the armed force but he was also an elected member of the National Assembly of AL. 
Therefore his activities and leadership were assumed to be balanced both in politics and in 
armed force. But, even for him, it was a hard task to organize and discipline the scattered, 
undisciplined armed force rapidly"* .^ Many military officers, who thought of themselves as 
warlords, had a tendency to avoid Usmani. According to Ziaur Rahman and Khaled 
Musharraf, the commander-in-chief should not be a retired officer'^ '*. A major part of the 
military leaders were overlooking the leadership of the Exiled government very cautiously 
and consciously in the beginning of the war. Ziaur Rahman and some other ambitious youth 
military commanders in several meetings v^th the government, from 11 to 15 of July in the 
main office of the Bangladesh government in Calcutta, proposed to form a "War Council" 
consisting of seven military commanders. These young and inexperience commanders also 
proposed the War Council to have the responsibility to administer the war. Because of the 
opposition of the sector commander, Khaled Musharraf and the conflicts in opinions among 
the military leaders the proposal of "War Council" did not attract much attention'*^. The 
rebellious attitude of these young commanders by passing the political leaders cooled down 
because of the Indian administration's strong support to the Exiled Bangladesh Government'*^. 
Tajuddin expressed his thoughts about the matter, "They (military officers) should realize that 
with out political leadership the liberation war would be immobile and building the new 
country would be impossible. Therefore, all the people, who picked up the weapon out of 
"" Mizan Chowdhury's argument was," It is impossible for a person to administer the party and the government 
at the same time"- personal Interview with Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury with the author. Also see Moidul 
Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995,p.48. Mizanur Rahman himself was a candidate 
for the general secretary position of the party and was hoping that Tajuddin will resign from the position since he 
is the PM of the government. 
^^  Mohammad Abdul Mohimen, " Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp.118-119. Also see Moidul Hasan, 
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patriotism, should back up the political leadership for the same reasons'*^. The commanders of 
Bangladesh militaiy pledged their obedience to the Exiled Bangladesh government on 17 July 
1971. 
On 9 August, the India-USSR friendship treaty was signed. This treaty had a very 
affirmative effect to strengthen the liberation war of Bangladesh. Although India was a 
regional power but it did not want to be involved in the war until a super power was in accord 
with them in this matter. The India-USSR treaty minimized the possibility of other regional 
great power, China, to attack India, during the India-Pakistan war and therefore, India could 
expand its supporting hand to Bangladesh rapidly''®. 
In the beginning of the liberation war, the AL leader (among whom the rightist were 
the majority and stronger) opposed to the armed-training of the members of the leftist parties. 
The training was limited among the students and youths of AL and these youths were 
admitted for training after they were recognized by the regional AL MPs. The ruling Congress 
party was a bourgeois dominated party and because, the political character of AL was 
bourgeois, therefore, the Indian government wanted to train only the AL obedient youths''^. 
Therefore, at the time, big parts of the youth were disappointed and fioistrated as they could 
not be a part of the liberation war. Also the NAP and the Communist Party leaders were 
optimistic about securing positions in the ministry of the Exiled Government, but it was not 
realized because of the opposition from the rightist leaders of AL. Tajuddin was entirely 
leftist, he was eager to recruit and train the leftist and even the Maoist youths to act as 
counterbalance against the Mujib Bahini^°. 
Since the Indo-Soviet treaty, the leftist faction of the governing Congress Party 
became more powerfiil and the rightist influence in the government was decreasing. There 
was significant transformation in Congress in the matter of Bangladesh as well. Till August, 
the matters of Bangladesh was handled by the Indian PM Secretary P.N. Haksar, but a leftist 
cabinet minister of Congress government, D.P. Dhar replaced Haksar. D.P. Dhar convinced 
AL leaders to include the relatively small leftist parties and form a united front to ensure the 
support from the Soviet Russia. This proposal stuck and agitated the AL leaders. In this 
situation, under the pressure of India and Soviet Union the Exiled Government formed the 
'National United Front' in September. The front was "all-party advisory Front" without any 
administrative power and therefore, was only an advisory committee to the government^'. 
Basically, AL agreed to treat NAP and CPB with some importance to influence the decisions 
of Soviet Union. As a result the leftist youths got the opportunity of training for the war^ .^ 
Several groups of AL leaders were very unhappy to loose the sovereign power of AL as the 
controler of the war. Sheikh Moni and Mustaq Ahmed, especially, took this opportunity to use 
"" Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddhaer Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, 
pp.94 
The Times (London), August 12'^  1971. 
For details see Mohammad Abdul Mohimen, "Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp.72-73 and 82. The power 
control of the country after the war was main target/ thought of both the leftist and the rightist political leaders. 
Both side wanted more of their workers to be trained thinking that later on their training will help the lobbies to 
obtain and control the power. Also see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, p. 
22-23. 
Mohammad Abdul Mohunen, "Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp.82, also see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 
(Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, p.95-96,83 
S. M. Ali, "After the Dark Night: Problems of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman", p. 28. 
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Mohimen, "Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp.85 
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1984, p.7 
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the dissatisfactions of the other leaders against Tajuddin. Moreover, Sayed Nazrul was a 
supporter of Mujib Bahini as his son was one of the dedicated members of Mujib Bahini. 
Collectively, Mujib Bahini was always against the activities of the leftist political parties and 
especially, Tajuddin. Thus, Sayed Nazrul was not at all satisfied with the idea of United 
Front". Also, it is suspected that the behavior of Sayed Nazrul was also influenced by his 
effort to be close to the rightist and also the majority of the party. 
During the months of August-September, as the freedom fighters were rapidly fighting 
back the Pakistani attackers and liberating different regions of Bangladesh, and Soviet Union 
was openly supporting the liberation war; the same time, internal groups of AL were coming 
up with new activities and agendas. Besides the rivalry of Khondokar Mustaq and Sheikh 
Moni, from the districts of Khulna-Potuakhali- Barishal and part of Faridpur forty National 
and Provincial Assembly members together formed a regional group annoimced their distrust 
against the PM. The leaders of this group were the father-in-law of S. Moni (Abdur Rob 
Semiabad), Sheikh Abdul Aziz and Shah Muajjem and the group and was against any 
initiatives of the leftist United Front. In a meeting of this group held on 11 September, they 
jointly declared that: 1) they requested the AL high command to force Tajuddin to withdraw 
from both his position as PM and the party general secretary, 2) they decided to organize the 
other regional committees to support their distrust against Tajuddin^'*. In October, they 
circulated this resolution^^. From the activities and intra-group dealing of this group it was 
clear that the main goal of Sheikh Moni and Mustaq and this group was nearly the same i.e. to 
overthrow Tajuddin from power. The other right wing politician and the number one joint 
secretary of the party, Mizan Chowdhury, from the beginning of the government formation, 
wanted Tajuddin to resign from the post of general secretary of AL by himself According to 
him, "As Tajuddin has become the PM, he should resign from the post of GS. By this, the 
organization will get dynamism"^®. Behind the effort of Mizan Chowhdhury his personal 
ambition was working. Even though, the political patronizers of Mustaq and Moni were 
different but in the issues of Tajuddin they were united. Comparatively Moni, who was 
patronized by the leaders of the armed force of the Indian government and supported by the 
enthusiastic youth organization Mujib Bahini, was the possessor of the real power and 
therefore, the prime intra-party danger. At the same time, there emerged another group 
initiated by Kamruz Zaman and Yusuf Ali. According to Maidul Hasan, "This group believed 
in socialist Bangladesh and at the same time was interested to keep diplomatic relationship 
vidth USA and China"". The goal and objective of this group was to gain the majority support 
of the public representatives and leaders inside the party to establish its control over the 
Exiled Government of Bangladesh. To realize their objectives they started their endeavor to 
influence the party leaders, MNAs and MPAs with their proposals. This group was, 
especially, able to secure their strength among the leaders of the northern region of 
Bangladesh. 
Although, there was inner conflict among AL leaders, they were united in the question 
of the liberation of Bangladesh. Among the leaders of the transitional government, the only 
" Tajuddin individually took the decision to involve tlie leftist in the liberation war. Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 
71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, p. 60,86 and 99 
Amirul Islam, "Mukti Juddhaer Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, 
pp. 96-97. Also see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, pp.91-92 
"Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, pp.91-92 and 262-263 
" Interview of the author with Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. 
" For detail see Moidul Hasan, "Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, pp.93 and 264-266. This 
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this group. 
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exception in that question was Khondokar Mustaq. Mustaq was assumed as a long term 
American lobbyist senior leader. The US foreign Minister Henry Kissinger was working as 
tlie supporter of tlie Pakistani Junta in 1971. The US diplomats, in Calcutta communicatcd 
with Mustaq to generate conflict in AL and that way destroy the potential of independent 
Bangladesh On 7 September, the tribunal of Sheikh Mujib reopened secretly in a military 
court in West Pakistan. Before, tlaat on 5 August, the tribunal was adjourned because Yaliya 
himself claimed to punish Mujib for treason. There was fear in all levels of AL leaders and 
workers for the protection of Mujib's life. It was a matter of anxiety and emotions for the 
whole Bengali nation^^. During that time, suddenly one day there was a contradictory leaflet 
distributed to all the AL leaders and workers which read "Either Independence or Sheikh 
Mujib". That leaflet was an anonymous inquiry if AL was willing to welcome independence 
of Bangladesh by sacrificing Mujib®°. Realistically, it was very surprising that even though, 
Mujib was arrested on the day of first attack by the Pakistani military, he was unequivocally 
popular and his persona was beyond criticism. He was the source and spirit of all the activities 
of the liberation war. The war was lead by someone who was in the jail for the whole duration 
of the war and during which it was not obvious if he would return alive to the country where 
people were following his leadership^\ When the principal aid of the PM of Bangladesh 
government went to consult with the foreign minister Mustaq on the issue of international 
awareness for the safety of Mujib's life, Mustaq said" You must decide whether you want 
Sheikh Mujib or Independence"^^. The other tactic of Pak-US lobby was the promise of the 
autonomy of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh and Indian government became aware of the 
communication between Mustaq and the US diplomats through the intelligence department of 
India. As a result, it was proposed to withdraw Mustaq from his position of Foreign Minister. 
Mustaq was not fired from his position to keep the governmental unity intact externally, but in 
the later months of the war, he had very little administrative power as a Foreign Minister as he 
was cornered in the cabinet^^. 
The inner-party AL activities against Tajuddin which were very prominent during the 
month of September, slowed down in October. Some of the main reasons behind that were 1) 
continuous success in the battlefield at the end of September, 2) the increasing international 
' ' Ashfaq Alam Shapan, "Mojib Hottar Chakktranta (The Conspiracy of the Assasianation of Mujib)" Tridhara 
Prokashon, Dhaka, 1988, pp. 32-33. Also see Lawrence Lifschultz, "Deconstruction of a Revolution: 25 years 
journey to the truth" Daily Prothom Alo, August 13* 2000. 
" The statements of the transitional government's acting President and the Prime Minister reflected the fear of 
the Bengali nation for Mujib's life. Bangladesh Documents, Vol. 1, pp. 342-44. Once several countries in the 
world were concerned about Mujib, the Pakistani government was bound to adjourn the tribunal. The Daily 
Telegraph, October 13*^  1971. 
^ Mohammad Abdul Mohimen, "Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pp.124 
Moudud Ahmed, "Bangladesh: Shaoittashason Theke Shadhinota (Bangladesh: Autonomy to Independence)", 
p.220 
Amirul Islam,"Mukti Juddhaer Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1991, 
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independence or Independence without Sheikh Mujib, both are incomplete". 
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Mujib)" Tridhara Prokashon, Dhaka, 1988, pp. 32-34. The few renowned leaders involved in the communication 
with the US diplomats in Mustaq group were EPAL Senior Vice Precident Kazi Zahirul Kaiyum, Mustaq, and 
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from the representative group of the Bangladesh government to the United Nation Assembly in New York to 
consult the issues of Bangladesh in September. Later in November Mahbubul Alam Chashi was fired from his 
position as the foreign secretary. Also see Mohammad Abdul Mohimen, "Dhaka-Agortola: Mujibnagar", pl25. 
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support in favor of the freedom fighters, 3) strengthening of the Soviet support, and 4) failure 
of US-lobby in the party. The leaders of AL started to realize that Tajuddin's decision to form 
United Front to have Soviet support in the war was a proper decision for the time. The 
government's activity accelerated and they were united more than ever, due to those 
realizations and successes. As a result, the government could take steps to make the war more 
successful, decrease the power conflicts within the party, and have the government 
administration united and acting on the issues concerning post war Bangladesh®''. 
Even though the oppositions against Tajuddin were decreased on the point of ideology 
but a lot of his colleagues still had personal dissatisfactions against him. The leaders still 
encouraged propaganda against Tajuddin, just the subject matter of the opposition had 
changed. Before October, the main campaigning of the anti-Tajuddin groups were that:-
Tajuddin's policy to administrate the liberation war was wrong, the role of India and Soviet 
Russia in favor of liberation war is unclear etc. After October, the major complains against 
Tajuddin was that he was not proficient in his responsibilities, both in his position in the 
government and in the party, he was neglecting the party interest of AL severely and he was 
encouraging the anti-AL political foce disregarding the ideology of Bangabandhu®^. In this 
circumstance, there was a demand for the convention of the AL Executive Committee. 
Several of the inner-party groups, secretly, joined the Semiabad-Abdul Aziz group with their 
demand of Tajuddin's resignation from PM and the general secretary positions. Khondokar 
Mustaq became a new devoted supporter of liberation war and announced and made an effort 
to build a persona expressing that the independence of Bangladesh is possible only under his 
leadership. He was still interested to establish himself in the position of PM. At the same time, 
he encouraged the open rebellion of Semiabad-Abdul Aziz group, and Mujib Bahini against 
Tajuddin. The other central leader Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury demanded that Tajuddin 
should resign from the general secretary position as he is already the PM^®. He discussed this 
issue with different lobbies. To put an end to this opposition, Tajuddin following the advice of 
the other leaders of the party, on 20 and 21 October, called for meetings of the AL executive 
committee. This meeting was the meeting of the executive committee, three and half 
month later than the first meeting in Shiliguri. The discussions in the executive committee 
meeting were useful for the improvement of the administration of the war. Those who were 
spreading propaganda against Tajuddin realized that their number was shrinking. Therefore, 
their representatives abstained from the demand of Tajuddin's resignation in the meeting. 
They were diplomatic in their demands. They proposed to have a sub-committee to foresee 
the expansion of the control of the AL party over the Bangladesh government. After two days 
of the sub-committee was formed with Kamruz Zaman as the president®^. 
It is natural for the politicians to have ambitions. In the beginning of the liberation 
war, Tajuddin was able to fulfill his personal ambition because of his timely decision. Even 
though, most of the senior AL leaders were not happy with Tajuddin's position as PM but 
Monsur Ali and Kamruz Zaman did their best as ministers of the Exiled Bangladesh 
Government. The acting President, Sayed Nazrul Islam, supported Tajuddin in all 
administrative jobs. But they all had personal disappointment for the PM position of 
Tajuddin. Because of that, they could not always be personally united with the PM during the 
" Moidul Hasan, ''Muldhara 71 (Original Track 71)", UPL, Dhaka, 1995, pp.130 
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6 8 war . However, during the war, they kept the disappointment in personal levels instead of 
using it against the PM in the party politics, for the sake of independence of Bangladesh. On 
the other hand, the personal ambitions of the Mustaq, Serniabad-Aziz and Moni groups 
sometimes even endangered the issues of independence. The activities of these groups 
continued until October-November. Tajuddin's selfless sacrifice, sincerity and impartial 
administrative leadership kept his reputation intact and that eventually helped him to 
overcome the controversy of his process of becoming a PM of the government without 
discussing any of the top leaders of the party. Moreover, the support of the PM of India in the 
liberation war, her faith in Tajuddin as an excellent administrator, and her opposition of the 
anti-Tajuddin lobby helped Tajuddin to consolidate his position. AL leaders realized that it 
was impossible to continue the liberation war without the help from Indian government; 
therefore, eventually, they surrendered to the leadership of Tajuddin^^. The AL leadership 
was weak and divided in the absence of Sheikh Mujib. Once, India was involved in the 
liberation war, they always tried to make sure that the war is in their control, as for India, the 
war was not only a humanitarian issue but it had national and international ramifications as 
w e i r ° . 
The commander-in-chief of Mtikti Bahini (Force of Freedom Fighters: combined force 
of Gono Bahini [Peoples Army] and the regular regiments) Colonel Usmani was a person of 
high self-respect. During the war, because of high self-respect, some yoimg sector 
commanders questioned his efficiency and power, as a result, he threatened to resign from his 
position several times. In that case, it was sometimes impossible for the defense minister 
Tajuddin to control Colonel Usmani^'. From the beginning of October, the Indian government 
was thinking to solve the problems of Bangladesh by force; they decided to form a imited 
command combining the Mukti Bahini and the Indian Army in command of an Indian 
General. But Colonel Usmani was in favor of dual-command and opposed the idea of united 
command. In the dangerous and critical military activities, such as was, it is veiy dangerous to 
have dual-command to incorporate instant decisions. This realization was not enough to 
convince Usmani of unique commander for the war. Once the establishment of Bangladesh-
India combined, ally-force decision was approved under the command of Indian General 
Aurora, Usmani kept himself aloof from the decisions of the war administration. As a result, 
Tajuddin involved the Deputy Chief of Staff A.K. Khondokar to collaborate with General 
Aurora to form the alliance-force. On 16 December in the surrender ceremony of the Pakistani 
military in the absence of Usmani, A.K. Khondokar functioned as his alternative. Kader 
Siddiqi on behalf of Gono Bahini (Peoples Army) and Haider, on behalf of Regular Regiment 
were present in the ceremony'^. 
It is relevant and essential to mention here that although AL led the liberation war, a 
small part of the party opposed the independence of Bangladesh. They supported the 
undivided Pakistan and tried to increase the popularity of the military Jtmta of Pakistan. 
Among those, sixteen leaders were the 1970 election elected AL leaders, Zahir Udddin, A. K. 
' ' Amirul Islam,"Mukti Juddhaer Sriti (The Memories of the Liberation war) Kagoj Prokashoni, Dhaka, 199], 
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Faizul Hoque, Abu Sulaiman Mondal. Right after the liberation, they were discarded from AL 
for their anti-liberation, anti-party activities^^. 
Conclusion: The 1971 liberation war of Bangladesh was a national freedom struggle. 
The struggle began on the 25 March; on that day, the Pakistani government attacked Bengali 
to demolish their dream to have autonomy in the eastern province of Pakistan. Once the 
genocide was started against the innocent, unarmed people the legendary leader of Bengali 
announced the independence of Bangladesh on behalf of the people of Bangladesh. The 
people of Bangladesh joined the freedom fight for their safety from the Pakistani Junta and to 
bring the long desired political and economical emanciaption for the nation. In this liberation, 
the nation sacrificed beloved three millions martyrs. From the beginning of the war, the 
neighboring country worked as a helping hand and delivered all kinds of help and support 
needed. They gave shelter to ten millions of refugees, trained hundred thousands of freedom 
fighters with necessary weapons, presented the validity of the war on behalf of Bangladesh, 
and above all gathered international support against the barbaric attack of Pakistan on 
Bengalis. After nine months of bloody war the military rule of Pakistan over Bengalis ended 
by the surrender of the Pakistani Military to the united command of Bangladesh-India 
combined force. Even though, AL, very efficiently, conducted the war but during the war in 
the absence of Mujib, conflicts and divisions cropped up within the party, the party could not 
avoid the influence of that even after the war. It is clear from the activities of the AL leaders 
during the war that the reasons for those power conflicts were: political ambitions of the 
young leaders, the discords of the senior leaders over the positions in the Exiled Bangladesh 
Government and the party, and the prestige issues of the AL leaders. 
The legendary, undisputed, charismatic leader of East Bengal, Mujib, was arrested on 
the first night of the fireedom struggle by the Pakistani government. The establishment of post 
1964, AL was the creation of his individual popular leadership. There was no other 
acknowledged second leader in the party to replace him even for the time being; therefore, it 
was natural to have competition among the leaders in his absence. Politically, competent and 
intelligent Tajuddin, in the absence of Mujib, quickly filled up the leadership vacuum without 
consulting with any other leaders. He just seized the opportunity with his clear thinking of 
action. Once the genocide started, he planned the actions and went to Delhi and met the 
Indian government to ask for support for the liberation war. Indian government informed him 
that the only way to help is through a transition government of Bangladesh. In the process, he 
announced himself as the Prime Minister of the transitional government of Bangladesh and 
Indian government acknowledged his claim to be the PM as he was the general secretary of 
AL. This strengthened Tajuddin's position in the party but leaders of AL, including the inner 
circle of AL, were dissatisfied with him during the rest of the war for his quick approach to 
the power. But considering the bigger issues of Bangladesh, the leaders of the inner-circle 
approved him as the PM and formed the cabinet of the Exiled Bangladesh Government. But 
fGiondokar Mustaq, among the four leaders could not ever give up his dream and was 
unsatisfied with Tajuddin for the rest of his life. He demonstrated open propaganda against 
Tajuddin and the government throughout the war. Mustaq was pro-American and pro-Islamic 
leader, therefore, he was against the independence of East Bengal, his dream was autonomous 
East Pakistan and undivided Pakistan. His secret communication was revealed to the 
" For the names of all AL public representative worked against the freedom struggle of Bangladesh see A.S. M. 
Shamsul Arefin, " Mukti Juddher Prekkhapote Bektir Abossthan (The Position of a Person in the Perspective of 
the Freedom Fight)", UPL, Dhaka,1998, pp.384-86. Also see Daily Azad, April 7* 1972. For the details of the 
expulsion order from AL see Abdul Hoque," Char Doshoker rajniti Poricroma (The Chronology of Four 
Decades Politics)", p. 282 
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transitional government and the Indian government; thus, he became cornered in the power 
competition. The forerunners of the power competition were the leaders of the Student and 
youth wings of AL. Mujib Bahini leader, Sheikh Moni, was representing them. The liberation 
war was both political and a combined struggle; therefore, the efforts of the leaders and 
workers of the ancillary organizations of AL became very important. It was well established 
that the student and youth groups of AL were very efficient through the national movements 
during 1966 to 1970. They were renowned for their sacrifice and bravery in those movements. 
Eventually, they started to believe that they were the major source of Mujib's power and 
success. They also believed that in the absence of Mujib they should lead the war as the 
second in command. With this in their mind, this group, with Mustaq and others, started their 
propaganda to overthrow Tajuddin from his PM position. To keep Indian authority/ control 
over the Bangladeshi issues and in the AL party the Indian administration also sustained the 
inner conflicts within the AL, and formed parallel force (Mujib Bahini) to fight the liberation 
war. However, they were always with the Exiled Bangladesh Government in the issues of the 
liberation war. The role, and interest of Indian government was as controller and long-term. 
They were the kingmakers; it is possible to think that they might have thought about having 
their obedient group governing Bangladesh if Mujib was not able to return from the Pakistani 
jail. Both pro-India and pro-Soviet leaders within the party and NAP (Mujaffar) and CPB 
recognized Tajuddin as PM, and international support was needed for the independence 
therefore, despite all the oppositions, he survived as the PM during the war^ '*. On 16 
December Bangladesh emerged as an independent country on the face of the earth under the 
leadership of Tajuddin, of course the government of the country was pro-Indian. 
It is essential to mention that possibly the Sheikh Moni youth's group was the second choice for the Indian 
authority. That group was blessed by the Indian authority as a parallel group, if by any chance the senior leaders 
of AL were unable to lead the war Moni's group would be the alternative group to do the job. 
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Part 2 
The Power Conflict in the Party in Power 
Ideological Conflict in the Youth Section of AL and the Emergence of JSD: In the post 
liberation politics of Bangladesh, the new characteristic that was observed was that emergence 
of the constant increase of youth force in the national polities'. Youth of Bangladesh had 
strengthened the major political parties and made immense sacrifice especially during the 
language movement in 1952, the people's movement in 1969 and eventually in the war of 
independence 1971. This involvement of youth made them an inseparable part of the national 
politics. Therefore after liberation it was natural for the youth to have a tendency to emerge as 
the driving force in every sector of the national politics. The ambition of the student and the 
youth to influence the politics of the government had created conflicts between the youth and 
the main governing body of the political parties. 
Bangabandhu was the heart of the AL in the newly independent Bangladesh. The 
students and youth had enormous faith in him. There was no question among the youth about 
the position and leadership of Bangabandhu but they had conflicted opinion about the rest of 
the political leaders and their ideology even before the liberation. On 12^ August of 1970, the 
Rob-Siraj student followers, of the Jubo League (JL) leader and the unannounced philosopher 
of Chattra League (CL) Sirajul Alam Khan, the dominating part of the central committee of 
CL was able to pass a bill to develop hidependent socialist Bangladesh. But the moderate 
faction, Siddik- Makhon group of CL opposed the socialistic notion of the Rob-Siraj group^. 
The power behind Siddik- Makhon group was Sheikh Moni. During the war most of the 
radical and nationalist CL worker supported Sirajul Alam Khan's idea of the socialistic 
Bangladesh and made his leadership strong. On the other hand Moni was unsuccessful to 
strengthen his leadership after a lot of effort^. According to the AL presidium member Abdur 
Razzak, the conflict between Sirajul Alam Khan and Sheikh Moni was the conflict of 
establishing a solo leadership and Khan was clever enough to present this conflict as an 
ideological conflict"^. 
From 1969 the student-youth faction of AL controlled by S.A. Khan was more 
influential as well as larger in number. After liberation the leadership was in control of those 
Data collected by R. Jahan indicates that the MP's elected in 1970 and 1973 general elections were on the 
Years of 
Election 
Age Range 
25-30 
(%) 
Age Range 
31-35 
(%) 
Age Range 
36-45 
(%) 
Age Range 
46-55 (%) 
Age Range 
56 and 
above(%) 
Total 
Number 
1970 4.9 13.9 47.5 24.7 9.4 267 
1973 11.1 22.5 40.0 21.8 4.6 280 
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new radicals^ This majority faction of student-youth leaders called on Sheikh Mujib to build 
a National Revolutionary government and by including all the political parties v^ho 
participated in the war of independence. Mujib struggled, suffered and been to jail for 
democracy throughout his whole life. He believed in parliamentary democracy and therefore 
ignored the call for socialism^. There were other reasons for Mujib's rejection as well. The 
most of the AL higher rank leaders were mostly rightist, were from rising capitalist or 
ambitious middle-class background. Majority of the leadership were gravely against a 
fundamental change of the multi-party democratic system^. Mujib also comprehended the 
magnitude of the demands of the nationalist and the radical youth of the party in the post-
liberation changing political scenario. Even though he rejected the radicd youth's demand of 
the formulation of a revolutionary socialist government but he made an effort to have 
intermediary solution to it. He made an announcement to establish a socialist system for 
Bangladesh through the democratic government. He also added that a socialistic economy 
would be established for the country through parliamentary democracy^. But the radical 
socialist- youth group refused to step down from their revolutionary demand and due to that 
Mujib was faced with a hard reality. It was not possible for Mujib to move on any further with 
the radical socialists, who were the heart of the nationalist revolution. In result, division in AL 
started following the conflicts in CL and JL. AL was a petty - bourgeois party. The middle 
class of the party saw the liberation as their opportunity to have economic freedom; on the 
other hand the common people saw it as their opportunity to be free from the oppression and 
misfortunes'. Mujib tried to balance this difference by introducing a socialistic economy 
system'". In the 1970 election manifesto, Mujib and his party announced the promise of 
socialistic economy system besides the democracy. But AL did not have the desire to 
establish a pure socialist government. Besides, the petty - bourgeois leadership of the party 
did not have any respect towards the socialist ideology of*'. 
^ Moudud Ahmed, "Sheikh Mujiber Shasonkal (The Ruling Era of Sheikh Mujib)", U.P.L., Dhaka, 1994, p. 284. 
Masudul Hoque, "Bangladesher Shadhinota Judha RAW ebong CIA (RAW and CIA in the Independence War 
of Bangladesh)", Mouli Prokashani, Dhaka, 1997, pp. 100-101. Also see Zauadul Karim, "Mujib and 
Shomokalin Rajniti (Mujib and the Synchronic Politics)", pp. 128-125. 
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presented their proposal of Socialistic Bangladesh to Sheikh Mujib. Later on he explained why Sheikh Mujib did 
not accept their proposal. During one session he said, "The day my friends and coworkers constructed the 
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activities. The current situation of the country at the time would allow that. It had happened in all countries after 
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Also see the speech of Sheikh Mujib in " Bangladesh Peoples Parliament Debate: Constitution Bill 
Considerations", Vol. 2, No. 17, p. 700 
Moidul Hassan, "Muldhara: 71", U.P.L., Dhaka, 1992, pp. 228-237. 
\ "Dainik Bangla", "Shangbad", 15 January, 1972. Also see M. A. Wazed Mia, "Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibke 
Gheere Kisu Ghatona 0 Bangladesh (Some Incidents Surrounding Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib and 
Bangladesh)", U. P. L. , Dhaka, 1993, p. 124. 
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Eighty)", Dana Prokashoni, Dhaka, 1985, p. 11. 
Zillur Rahman Khan, "The third World charismat", U. P. L., Dhaka. 1996, p. 170. By introducing socialist 
economy of BD Mujib nationalized all banks, insurance companies, and heavy industries. But the small business 
industries and fenning lands remained in private hand. 
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Taher and JSA politics)", Pathak Samabesh, Dhaka, 1995, p. 66 
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Despite the rejection of the idea of national revolutionist government from Mujib and 
the central leaders, S.A. Khan and his radical followers proceeded to gain the total control of 
the leadership of the CL to realize their own ideology. Within few days S.A. Khan started to 
preach and tried to implement his "scientific socialism" within CL. The student leaders A. S. 
M. Abdur Rob and Shajahan Siraj joined him in that effort. His opposition included Sheikh 
Moni, Abdur Razzak, Tofael Ahmed, Abdul Kuddus Makhon and Noor-e-Alam Siddiki. This 
liberal group with the leadership of Sheikh Moni started a publicizing to establish a 
Democratic-Socialist system in Bangladesh'^. Moni with his followers thought that it was 
intelligent to side vdth his uncle Mujib in politics'^ Sheikh Moni came up with a new 
ideology called "Mujibbad" (Mujibism) in contrast to the all-party revolutionary 
governmental ideology of S. A. Khan. On February 17'*' 1972, the renowned leader Tofael 
Ahmed of Mujib Bahini armounced the emergence of the organization "Mujibbad". In his 
speech he said, "The third principle of the world is the Mujibbad. Through establishing 
Mujibbad we will reach to our ideal goal. The pillars of it will be Democracy, Socialism, and 
Secularism". In the explanation of Mujibbad he said, "Great American leader Abraham 
Lincoln gave people democracy and independence but he could not give communalism to the 
people. The German leader Karl Marx espoused socialism but he couldn't assure democracy 
and freedom for people. In Mujibbad we have captured both democracy and communalism 
and therefore it is the 3"* doctrine/ ideology of the world. Mujibbad will be established as an 
example to balance the capitalism and the socialism"''*. In short, Mujibbad is a mixture of 
democracy and socialism after elimination of the errors in those two governmental systems 
and it is possible to establish the system with the leadership of Sheikh Mujib. Under this 
circumstances, there began the crisis in CL on the question of accepting Mujibism or 
socialism from the being of the year of 1972. On 12 May 1972 the main four leaders of CL 
divided in public. A. S. M. Abdur Rob and Shajahan Siraj were on one side and Abdul 
Kuddus Makhon and Noor-e-Alam Siddiki were on the other side. Rob and Shajahan said that 
they do not agree with Mujibbad and they are determined to establish scientific socialism. On 
the other hand Abdul Kuddus Makhon and Noor-e-Alam Siddiki said that Mujibbad has to be 
established by any means'^. In a statement, publicized on May 1972, the three leaders of 
CL Rob, S. Siraj and Sarif Noorul Ambia demanded, "Emergency should be declared in the 
country, the people's council and the ministry should be dissolved. Then National government 
should be established under the leadership of Bangabandhu". The very next day the other 
three leaders of CL A.K, Makhon, N. A. Siddiki and Ismat Kader Gama in their opposing 
statement opposed the idea of dissolving the people's council'^. Thus CL was divided into 
two major groups through the debate over the future governmental system of the newly 
independent Bangladesh. The split in CL became even clearer in May 1972, when CL 
submitted two different panels for the Dhaka University Students Union Election' 
The dilemma of CL and JL also spread in AL. Meanwhile from the CL the slogan of 
Mujibbad was picked up by the young leaders of AL and later by the party hierarchy. On May 
' I Altaf Pervez, "Aushamapta Muktijudha; Colonel Taher 0 Jasad Rajniti (Unfinished Freedom Fight: Colonel 
Taher and JSA politics)", Pathak Samabesh, Dhaka, 1995, p. 125. Also see Moudud Ahmed, "Sheikh Mujiber 
Shashonkal", p. 285. 
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decision to stay with his Uncle later on helped him to secure a comfortable position in his conflict with Tajuddin. 
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23rs 1972, then current director of the Volunteer force and the Organizing Secretaiy of AL, 
Abdur Razzak announced that the process of implanting Mujibbad would be started on the 
June y"*. On June 13"* CL leader Siddik-Makhon demanded tliat tlie foundation of the 
constitution should be Mujibbad. On July 16"' AL Secretary Zillur Rahman said, "An 
oppression free society can be established by implementing Mujibbad. Mujibbad is the 
symbol of hope for the people and people's optimum freedom lie within the realization of it". 
In an open public meeting AL leader and Cabinet Minister Zohur Ahmed Chowdhury said, 
"The country will be ruled with the four basic principle of Mujibbad"'®. On the other hand 
Tajuddin started to help and encourage the "scientific socialist" group with money and other 
essentials'^. He opposed Mujibbad and said, "I want to establish scientific socialism. Pure 
socialism needs to be established in Bangladesh, not anything else"^°. The rightist president of 
Bangladesh Abu Sayed Chowdhury had his opinion outside of both Mujibbad and scientific 
socialism. On July 18*'' he said, "The country will be lead following the principles and 
ideology of democracy"^'. However the internal conflict within AL went on over the issues of 
Mujibbad and scientific socialism. 
In the beginning of this ideological debate Bangabandhu has neutral position. Both of 
the disputing groups were hoping for his sympathy and support because still he was the only 
undisputed leader of Bangladesh. In the meanwhile it was decided that on July 21'" 1972, CL 
would have its national counciln. But as the council day was coming closer Mujib was 
becoming more supporting towards the Siddik-Makhon group. Even the day before the 
convention the Rob-Skaj group requested Mujib to be in his neutral potion but by then Mujib 
had decided for the future political plan for AL^ .^ 
From July 21 '^ to 23'^ '', two groups of CL had two different conventions. The Scientific 
socialism group had their council session took place in Polton and Mujibbad group had theirs 
in Racecourse. Mujib was the principle guest for both of the conventions but he showed up in 
the Mujibbad convention. According to Moudud Ahmed, "By doing that Mujib supported to 
decide the political positions through the family blood relation"^^. Mujib's presence in the 
Mujibbadi (follower of Mujibbad) convention officially spitted CL and after that it became 
impossible for the Socialist to be within AL. Altaf Pervez mentioned, "Many people believe 
that the ambition and conflicts between both of those young leaders were responsible for the 
split in CL" '^*. Wajed Mia said," One of the reasons for the conflicts between the AL leaders 
was to have personal ambitions of the leaders in politics"^^. 
But by denying any personality clash or rivalry for leadership between Khan and 
Moni, Khan mentioned, "They (Khan and his followers) were aware that a stage would come 
after the independence that either they would go into the leadership for a revolution keeping 
Rizwan Siddiqi, "Kothamalar Rajniti (The Politics of the speeches):1972-1979", 1980, p. 5-6. 
Ahmad Sofa, "Rajnitir Lekha", p. 50 
Dainik Bangia, April 2° ,^ 1972. 
Dainik Bangia, Shangbad, July 19*, 1972. 
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served the leagues political goal of ending Pakistani domination and liberation of Bangladesh. The new ideology 
Mujibism, Mujib followers claimed could accomplish the Bengali nation what the old 6-point program had 
before the country was liberated. 
Also see Zillur Rahman Khan, "Leadership, Parties and Politics in Bangladesh", The Western Political 
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Mujib in the front or they would have to leave and create a separate stream for their 
revolution"^^. On the other hand Moni referred the uprising of the JSD as the middle-class 
dissatisfaction against the Bangabandhu's agenda of socialism. In his language the reasons for 
that dissatisfaction were mainly: political and economical. The political reason was that the 
group (Khan and. his followers) could not get rid of their middle-class mentality. The 
economical reason was that because Bangabandhu nationalized all the industries/factories that 
group had no way to gain monetary benefit through corruption^^. In the Siddik-Makhon 
group council session the main topic of discussion was Mujibbad. They proclaimed their 
determination to establish Mujibbad by pronouncing the slogan, "There arrived new ism in 
the world - Mujibism Mujibism". According to them the four pillars armounced by 
Bangabandhu is the Mujibbad^®. This group advocated transition to socialism through 
parliamentary means under Mujibism^ . They said that because we did not achieve our 
independence through the scientific socialism and our government is not following that 
system therefore the socialist scientific group is rejected by the major part of the population^". 
From this convention they also labeled the Rob- Siraj group as the "spy of the imperialist-
America and Maoist-China". In regards to Mujibbad Mujib said," It is for the philosophers to 
expound on ideologies. If you think Mujibism is one, I can tell you what I think whether you 
call it Mujibism or by any other name. First, I believe in democracy; supremacy of the will of 
the people, government based on the consent of the governed, Along with my conviction in 
democracy is my belief that the democratic experience is only possible in a society free of 
exploitation and that is why I want socialism with democracy. I also believe that all religion in 
Bangladesh must exist on equal footing and that is what I mean by secularism - freedom of 
religion. Last but not the least; I want Ae people to draw inspiration from Bengali culture, 
language, folklore, homage, and general Bengal environment. Such inspiration will act as the 
motivating force for the betterment of their golden Bengal and this is again what I mean by 
nationalism"^'. Soviet political scientist Putscov had different opinion about Mujibism. In his 
view, "Mujibism is the prescription for AL to avoid all the class conflicts and empowering the 
Bangladeshi nationalist bourgeois and the other political powers from all levels of the 
society"^^. 
In the Rob-Siraj group convention the main topic of discussion was "Scientific 
Socialism". They were not at all enthusiastic about the personality cult developing around the 
"Father of the Nation". This rebel group openly challenged Mujibism and told that those who 
propagating Mujibism are only strengthening the hands of the exploiters. They claimed that 
only way in which the socio-politico-economic conditions in Bangladesh could be improved 
was to introduce scientific socialism (which emphasis class struggle and ultimate victory of 
the working class) instead of experimenting with Utopia in socialism (which does not 
Moudud Ahmed, "Sheikh Mujiber Shasonkal", p. 305 
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Moudud Ahmed, "Sheikh Mujiber Shasonkal", p. 305. 
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incorporate class struggle as the means of securing justice for the working class) of the Mujib 
brand. They claimed that unless Bangladesh want all the way with socialism and establish a 
revolutionary government to enforce Socialist goals no real progress would be possible, and 
vwthout tangible results the masses would rise against the Mujib government and start a full 
fledged revolution to establish scientific socialism". Rebel leader Rob said," We need to 
establish scientific socialism by wiping out the enemy of the class. No one could give a new 
definition to socialism after Karl Marx. His verdict is final on socialism and in our country we 
need to establish this socialism, Mujibbad is not any kind of socialist sketch"^''. The slogan of 
this group was, "Revolution, revolution - social-revolution; Action, action - class-action". 
In the simultaneously held national conference of the two groups of the Bangladesh 
CL, Mujib encouraged the pro-Mujib faction by accepting an invitation to open their 
conference there by snubbing the rebels. A few months earlier such a direct denuncial by 
Mujib could have destroyed the new group but in July 1972 such a gesture against the rebels 
did not have the desired effect^^. Moreover a real surprise came when leaders of this group 
openly challenged Mujib's leadership and raised slogans to the effect that Mujib should resign 
and let a competent leader govern the country^®. It goes without saying that at the time the 
present socio-reality of the young veteran freedom fighters (just became victorious in the war 
of independence) stimulated them to be rebellious and favoring socialism. This rebel group 
rejected old style democracy and also understood the futility of the old style commimist 
activities not that much by their intelligent thought but it was more an outburst of emotion. In 
result, fascinated by the scientific socialism in majority of the armed radical groups of CL and 
the youths of AL supported the rebel group in the council session '^^ . This support in July of 
1972 indicated that the anti-Mujib group had come to stay and could probably start a viable 
political opposition in the country. At the very last day of both conventions there was a heavy 
skirmish between the two groups^®. In the convention both groups elected their executive 
committee members. The president and secretary of the Mujibbadi group were Sheikh 
Shohidul Islam (another nephew of Mujib) and M. A. Rashid respectively. The president and 
secretary of the scientific socialist group were elected Sharif Noorul Ambia and A. F. M. 
Mahbubul Hoque. The rebel group soon showed its popularity by defeating the other student 
organizations in the student union elections in six different universities and major colleges in 
Bangladesh^^. 
Besides this split in CL there was conflicts over the same ideological issues, in the 
front organizations of AL, Jatio Krishok League (JKL), Jatio Sromik League (JSL) and 
eventually they divided officially in May and July respectively. The divided JKL leaders 
Abdul Malek, Shohidullah and Hassanul Hoque Enu; and JSL leaders Mohd, Shahjahan and 
Ruhul Amin Bhuia supported the scientific socialist group of CL. It is important to mention 
that even though the ancillary groups of AL had divisions due to the split in CL, the main 
organization stayed intact. Some of the AL leaders in the beginning of the split had different 
opinions but at the end they stayed in AL. 
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After the official split, the rebel group started strong criticism of AL, its main leader 
Mujib and other party leaders"". To propagate their own views just before the national 
conference of Bangladesh CL this group already started publishing one daily newspaper'". 
Finally on 31 October 1972 the rebel group floated a new political party Jatio Samajtantric 
Dal (JSD) with ex-student leaders A. S. M. Abdur Rob and Major M. A. Jaiil"*^ as the general 
secretary and president respectively of the party"^ .^ But the newly founded party was revolving 
around Sirajul Alam Khan as their center . Before the birth of JSD A. Rob confirmed that it 
will include the milititamt students and youth workers of AL'* .^ No senior leaders of AL 
joined JSD. Altogether it was a organization of the youth. Therefore the party did not have 
any other youth front except for their student front, CL'^ .^ Talukdar Moniruzzaman mentioned, 
"Since its inception JSD was considered by its top leaders to be the mass front of a correct 
proletarian organization - Bangladesh Socialist League. The Bangladesh Socialist League was 
an underground party led by the former CL leader Sirajul Alam Khan, which was established 
in 1962. Bangladesh Socialist League was an anti-Indian and anti-USSR organization but was 
soft on China'''. 
On the other side on 4 November 1972, the National Assembly accepted Bangladesh 
constitution. In the constitution Mujib's four principles, Nationalism, Democracy, Socialism, 
and Religious-secularism was acknowledged as the core governmental ideology . But the 
ideology Mujibism offered little that was new, especially to the intelligentsia. The majority of 
the intellectuals viewed Mujibism as a cult of personality and anti-socialist ideology. AL 
leaders themselves gradually became less enthusiastic about Mujibism and in the later days of 
44 months of AL rule took a less ideological approach to the nations many problems"^ .^ 
In 1972 when JSD emerged from AL the major agenda of debate was socialism. In the 
manifesto of JSD scientific socialism was the main goal of the party through which they 
would be able to establish a society free of oppression, no class system and the government 
would be the government of the peasants and laborers i.e. the goal of JSD was to establish a 
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socialist society^®. The curious part of which as, in the manifesto JSD criticism of AL leaders 
and to oppose the theorist of Mujibism they mentioned, "This party (JSD) does not oppose the 
principles of nationalism, socialism, democracy and religious-secularism. But the party 
believes that the definition AL has presented to the people is wrong. The meaning of 
democracy is to have equal rights, but the current democracy in the country does not deliver 
equal rights. The economical discrepancy between person-to-person and class-to-class and the 
anti-people social education system have made the democracy a weapon to make a tiny 
percentage of the population to be rich at the cost of suffering of the biggest part of the 
population. Therefore democracy is meaningless in the country until the economical 
discrepancy is removed and socialism is established. So socialism is the precondition to 
establish the real democracy^'. The current world politics at that time socialism was 
celebrated and attracted the radical youth as the key weapon of the oppressed to fight against 
the imperialist governments. After 24 years of oppressed and boorish rule of Pakistan and the 
nine months of bloody war the socialism was the vivid expectation of the conscious youth. 
This conscious youth of the country was such a key element of the country politics that no one 
including bourgeois, petty - bourgeois, revolutionary and the great legendary leader Sheikh 
Mujib could do politics excluding them. The intellectuals of JSD tried to overthrow the 
socialistic manifestation of Mujibism by saying, "It is not possible to establish socialism with 
the current practice of democracy. Scientific socialism can be established by class-revolution 
and social revolution. Without scientific and revolutionistic understanding socialism cannot 
be establish through law and the oppressors cannot be wiped out^^. 
The emergence of JSD founded by the rebel sons of Mujib had an immense effect in 
the politics of Bangladesh. The nationalist Bengali inspired by socialism, good number of 
true patriots and the honest freedom fighters gathered under the JSD flag. Masudul Hoque 
observed that when there was no one to utter a word of opposition against Mujib then 
supporters of JSD were the first one to oppose him in a stroikg voice They did not even 
hesitate to criticize Mujib v^thin a year of independence. They identified Mujib as the ghost 
of Ayub-Yahia-Hitlar-Musolini-Chiang Kai Shek-Halaku Khan and said that Mujib had 
betrayed the common people of Bangladesh. In a public meeting they announced, "The people 
of Bangladesh will overthrow the Prime Minister Sheikh Mujib, his son Sheikh Kamal, his 
brother Sheikh Naser and his nephew Sheikh Moni for their fascists activities, the same way 
the people had overthrew the notorious Pakistani government"^'*. 
JSD instantly became veiy popular in whole Bangladesh. According to one of the ex 
Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Moudud Ahmed," The emergence of JSD from within the 
roots of the AL created a new volatile situation. A vast majority of the younger elements in 
the party broke away and in the absence of any substantial political opposition from the 
existing parties, the birth of this party caused a tremendous impact. It changed the existing 
political dimensions and with the sliding and law and order situation fast deteriorating, the 
JSD quickly emerged as strong political party vindicating people's grievances against the AL 
government. Soon it started drawing crowds in its public meetings. The workers and 
supporters of the banned right wing parties attended their meetings to enlarge the crowed^^. 
Moreover, the JSD could not be called a non-patriotic party as most of their rank and file took 
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".TheManifesto, JSD, 1973. 
The Manifesto, JSD, 1973, p. 12 
Masudul Hoque, "Bangladesher Shadhinata Juddhe RAW and CIA", p. 109 
Dainik Sangbad, JonoKantha, December 26*^  1972. 
Moudud Ahmed, "Era of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman", UPL, Dhaka, 1994, p. 286 
155 
part in the war. With its commitment to serve for a scientific revolution led by foreruimer 
freedom fighters like Abu Taher, Sirajula Alam Khan and others it also drew the support of 
many left wing workers spread all-over the country. Before the first year was over the JSD, 
therefore, emerged as the strongest opposition party in the country. The significance of the 
organized political opposition to Mujib by his own rebel sons (JSD) opened the floodgate of 
criticism of the regime fi-om other opposition parties^®. 
The defection of the political radical faction of AL threatened the newly established 
government of Sheikh Mujib. Open challenge to Mujib by his rebel sons put Mujib's charisma 
and ideology to the test. Only his overwhelming victory at the 1973 polls saved his 
charismatic leadership for the time being". JSD participated in the first parliament election of 
Bangladesh within six months of their foundation of the new party. Despite the fact that it was 
a new political party, it was able to have candidates for 237 seats and obtained 6.52% of the 
balloted votes. Though all the opposition parties fared badly in the election in front of Mujib's 
charismatic image but the new JSD showed some success in picking-up some support^ ®. 
JSD believed that democracy and socialism couldn't be practiced together. Democracy 
needs to be destroyed first to establish socialism otherwise socialism cannot be moved 
forward^'. Therefore no good can be done with Mujibism in the country. According to JSD, 
"Even though Mujib tried whole heartedly for two and half years he could not manage to 
make people happy because he tried to establish socialism through democracy, he could not 
do any good for the people". JSD believed that Bangladesh parliament was the 
birthplace/factory of the capitalism. The parliament had helped the capitalists to engulf the 
wealth of Bangladesh and to enjoy JSD also believed that election couldn't bring freedom 
for the people. Only revolution can bring change in the society. Therefore they would educate 
the farmers, laborer, students about the class system and provide them knowledge on class-
revolution^'. The leaders of JSD said that they had participated the 1973 national Parliament 
election because they were trying to create public opinion against the bourgeois AL 
government through the election. JSD considered election as one of the steps of the 
revolution^^. 
Though acute factional tension in the AL, Mujib was able to keep some stability in the 
country in the first two years (1972 and 1973) after the liberation®^. But in 1974 the country's 
food problem in the wake of devastating flood, coupled with world wide shortage of food 
grains and extremely high price for oil made AL government's task to reconstruct the war-
ravaged country even more difficult. The devastating famine of 1974, due to the shortage of 
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food supply created a tragic and dangerous situation in Bangladesh. This social instabiliW of 
this time contributed to the rise of anti government movement by the opposition parties . 
JSD tried to use famine to overthrow AL government. In the first two months of 1974 
JSD successfully lead protests-strikes all over the country. On 17 March, the birthday of 
Mujib, JSD aimounced as the beginning day of the mass movement. After a public meeting 
they lead a procession to blockade/ siege the home-ministers house and there the JSD workers 
had an armed clash with the police and paramilitary and in result six people died and more 
than hundreds were wounded® .^ The next day AL called for a resistance action against JSD 
and the process they burned dovra the JSD office. The government also baimed Gonokantha, 
the spokesman newspaper of JSD^®. After the incident of 17 March the government stated to 
unruffled the activities of JSD and started to arrest the JSD workers all over the country. 
Because of the excessiveness of the actions, the whole revolution went astray. Besides their 
vast popularity JSD could not construct any constructive revolution against the government 
for the rest of the Mujib rule^'. 
This seize-movement of 17 March later on was an issue of many debates within JSD. 
The JSD leader at the time Mahbubul Rob Saddi later wrote about that incident," Party 
decided to have armed clashes and obtain control over 29 palaces allover the country through 
that barricade-revolution on that day, the decision was followed in two places. After all that if 
we want to say that we did not want a bloody conflict with the goverrmient in March of 1974 
then it would be a complete lie"^^. To encircle the house of the home minister knowing that 
the minister was not in the house was quite imintelligent and during the conflict it was clear 
that both side used firearms. During the procession police and the paramilitary force were 
attacked by vulgar words and later on the first bullet was shot from the procession to the 
police-paramilitary force®'. Actually the party was involved in both open politics and armed 
politics from the very beginning and after March 1974 a part of JSD went under ground. Even 
though the armed force was pre-existing in JSD, they openly founded their armed force called 
"Biplobi Gono Bahini", under the leadership of Retired Colonel Taher in July of 1974^°.Mujib 
goverrmient was against the idea of having a monstrous armed force who would be able to 
take over the power from the democratic government like that of Pakistani army. To resists 
the ambition of the armed force to take over power Mujib founded a paramilitary force called 
"Rokkhi Bahini" to control the law and order of the country. Thus Mujib lost his popularity in 
the Military^'. At this time a branch of Gono Bahini was extended within the military called 
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"Boiplobi Soinik Shongtha (The Revolutionary Soldiers Institution)"'^. The agenda of Gono 
Bahini was to educate the JSD workers with the ideology of Marx and make them skillful 
with the armed insurgency. Thus at the end of 1974 the politics of JSD totally became armed 
politics'^. In connection to armed revolution the secret newspaper of the party coated Mao-Se-
Tong," The country is in war now. Here revolution means war and party means military". In 
the later days of 17 March of 1974, JSD called the nation to have a war of the people and they 
engage themselves into armed war. Gono Bahini killed AL leaders and workers all over the 
country '^*. It seemed that after the foundation of Gono Bahini, JSD was addicted to secret 
armed politics and armed insurgency instead of open politics. Eventually, the public 
organizations of JSD diminished their activities and became weak and separated from general 
public. In the name of armed revolution against the govenraient the party lost the potential of 
having public revolution against the government in the fixture. The main source of any 
successfiil revolution is common people but unfortunately JSD became isolated from them'^. 
Thus JSD entangled itself in the wrong political decisions one after another. Therefore due to 
the uprooting strategy during AL government and later BNP government most of the 
dedicated workers of JSD lost their life. Out of frustration a major part of the JSD workers 
engaged them in anti-social and terrorist activities and thus became even more isolated from 
the public and started conflicts within the party and eventually split into small parties'^. The 
renowned intellectual of JSD analyzed the present condition of the party," Everyone knows 
that the wave of youth in JSD had stopped, the party is dying. The name of JSD still exists but 
there is nothing more left there. There are so many skeleton of it roaming around as ghosts. If 
they could not find other political parties to live on as parasites they would be vanished long 
time ago"''^ 
AL became weaker as the radical youth of the party left it and the inspiration of the 
liberation was lost real fast. The movements of JSD against AL on one hand encouraged 
people to criticize AL government severely on the other hand it gave the opportunity to the 
anti-independence rightist party to be organized. Before this anti-independence party did not 
have the moral courage or social acceptance to talk against independence and AL^ ®. The 
wrong politics of JSD^^ (1) gave an easy way to kill Bangabanc&u; the founding father of 
Bangladesh (2) gave the military an easy access to politics 3) made the revival of the anti-
independence fimdamentalists possible. Numerous leaders have expressed their opinion about 
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the emergence and fall of JSD. One JSD leader recognized, "The JSD movement was a leftist 
movement of the emotional petty- bourgeois leaders and workers, who were emerged from 
the unfinished armed revolution (of 1971), due to the betrayal of the bourgeois leaders"®®. 
JSD at one stage limited their class movement into the movement to overthrow the Mujib 
regime. Nazrul Islam talked about this kind of non-futuristic activities, "The slogans in 1972 
to overthrow Mujib in short was imprudence and in exact meaning was an act which was 
favorable to fulfill the desire of imperialism"®'. Ahmed Sofa compared the activities of JSD 
during Mujib era as the protest of the rebel son against a father. Ahmed Sofa wrote, "The JSD 
leaders made the JSD workers to believe that they have the legitimate right to seize the power 
from AL". Then he commented, "Their announcement of revolution and establishment of 
Marxism through armed revolution was all talk. The main point was they wanted share in the 
power". Numerous honest workers sacrificed their life to fulfill the ambitions of a few JSD 
leaders i.e. in an endeavor to smoothen the path of the leaders taking part in the power; many 
had to suffer the unthinkable repression of the ruling party. All the dedication and sacrifice of 
lives of the devoted youths went in vain and a third party (the military) encapsulated the 
power. Ahmed Sofa wrote," After the death of Mujib the demand notice to achieve the power 
(throne) were erased with blood. When someone else takes over the throne by overthrowing 
the father where can the son get the courage to take over". He further observed, "AL was 
weakened by the defection of JSD and after the power loss of AL, the JSD pretty much died. 
Both the mother and the son died in the Maternity ward". This intellectual of JSD also talked 
about the split in JSD and joining of the leaders to the other political parties, "Mujib gave 
birth to baby tigers but now other people are showing circus with those tigers"® .^ 
In the post-independent Bangladesh politics the most dangerous anti-Mujib 
propaganda was done by the rebel youths of CL after their defection and formation of JSD. In 
the words of Abu A1 Saeed, "As if the party was bom to rebel against Mujib"®^. The pro-
liberation pavilion's irrational quarrel not initiated the devastating end of Bangabandhu but all 
of them, connected with liberation movement, had to pay immensely. Bangladesh was faced 
v^th irreversible devastation. Right after the independence the people lost their spirit of the 
freedom fight, which spirit was very essential to rebuild the country. AL, JSD and overall the 
whole nation have been paying for the wrongful politics of JSD ever since. 
Sheikh Moni's Engagement in Power Conflict with Awami League and Chatra 
League Leadership 
In the political polarization of Bangladesh after the independence the elements to create 
disunity was more prevalent than the constructive one. After liberation, at first Chatra League 
(CL) was spitted and JSD was bom. One of the chief lieutenants of Mujib, Tajuddin, resigned 
from politics due to conflict in opinions. Then there started the disputes between Jubo League 
(JL) and CL. JL was lead by Sheikh Moni and his opponents Tofael Ahmed and Abdur 
Razzak were leading CL. This dispute was able to weaken the foundation of AL and at the 
same time it strengthened and unified the reactionary US lobbyist within the party. 
Sirajul Alam Khan and Sheikh Moni had a constant brawl going on between them 
since before the independence that was about to establishment of their personal leadership 
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over the student and youth front of AL and manipulate that time popular socialist slogan 
cleverly Khan transformed the leadership conflict into a ideological conflict. Majority section 
of the radical student and youth fronts of AL who had a major role in the liberation war 
supported Khan in the conflict®'*. As Sirajul Alam Khan became doubtful about his vital 
le^ership position in the future AL leadership structure so in 1972 he and his followers left 
AL with a intension to establish scientific socialism and formed JSD® .^ Thus through the 
formation of JSD the conflict between the two rising leaders to fulfill their ambition was 
ended. Though in the establishment of personal leadership Moni could not fare/ do better in 
the opposition of Khan but by sided with his uncle Mujib against Khan groups endeavor to 
establish scientific socialism for the time being Moni was succeeded in establishing his 
supremacy over the student and youth wing of AL. 
Moni was very cunning, intelligent and ambitious®^. He became immensely popular 
through family connection and his influential position in the ruling party®'. Parallel to his 
influential leadership in the youth group he was relentlessly active to secure his position in the 
national politics of AL. In the absence of Mujib during the independence war he refused to 
acknowledge Tajuddin as the interim prime minister of exile Bangladesh government and 
started an effort to think and publicize of him being the major strength and foundation of the 
war®®. Through out the whole independence war Moni opposed PM Tajuddin and his 
government. Tajuddin also failed to have Moni and his organization (Mujib Bahini) to obey 
the exiled Bangladesh government®^. The members of the interim government was so scared 
about the possible assassination attempt by the Moni led faction of Mujib Bahini (force) that 
even though Bangladesh was liberated on 16 December but they waited till 22 December 
1971 to return to Dhaka, When the Indian Military secured the security of Dhaka and also 
ensured the security of Tajuddin and other members of exiled government then Tajuddin and 
his associates returned to Dhaka'". Tajuddin, in the post 1971 politics of AL was widely 
considered the most honorable member of the party next only to Sheikh Mujib'' but Moni 
wasted all of his efforts to be the in command in AL politics. Moni's thought was that he 
would be the heir of his uncle Mujib and he was doing everything to make that happen'^. 
Since 1971 civil war Tajuddin was the main headache of Moni as Tajuddin was considered 
one of the two probable successors of Mujib'^. So to confirm his position as Mujib's 
successor he started to destroy Tajuddin politically. 
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During Pakistan era as students and youths played the spearheading role in the anti-
regime movement the leaders of the student and youth wings of AL became very close to 
Mujib. After Mujib's return from Pakistani Jail in 1972 youth leaders led by Moni complained 
that during the liberation war they were neglected by Tajuddin, the interim Tajuddin 
government did not properly respect Mujib and Tajuddin wanted to have all the credit of 
independence alone. Thus Moni and his organization started to make Mujib annoyed about 
Tajuddin constantly®'*. According to one of that time AL MP Abdul Mohaimen, the leader of 
AL and M.P. at the time, Moni used to suggest Mujib against all of Tajuddin's ideas. Due to 
Moni's suggestion Mujib discarded the idea of the formation of National Militia Force of 
Tajuddin® . There was conflict of opinion about the participation of Bangladesh in the Islamic 
conference held in Pakistan. Pro-Indian Tajuddin was completely against it®^  but Moni 
engaged in convincing the AL leaders that Mujib should join the conference to improve the 
relationship with the Islamic countries®'. Mujib participated the conference despite the 
disappointment of India. Moni took advantage of this situation; he started propaganda against 
Tajuddin by calling him Indian collaborator. In his newspaper 'Banglar Hani' he also 
mentioned that during the liberation war Tajuddin had a treaty with India, which was against 
the interest of Bangladesh and equal to sell Bangladesh's sovereignty to India. He also tried to 
manipulate Mujib by saying that the towering image that Tajuddin built as the Prime Minister 
of exiled government during the war, could put challenge to the leadership of Mujib in the 
future. So he should be removed from the minister-ship . Moni had an enormous influence 
00 I nn 
on Mujib . Tajuddin lost his position as a minister in the October of 1974 . Tajuddin's loss 
of minister ship and his long lasting conflict in decision making with Mujib came as good 
news to Moni. 
The main characteristic of the post-war politics of Bangladesh was the domination of 
the youths over national politics. At the time the youth organizations were not satisfied only 
as the helping organizations of the national political parties but they also wanted to be the 
intensive part of the political parties. Cause of their high expectation was their immense 
contribution during Ae pre-independence nationalist movement and the war of liberation 
In this situation besides CL, another ancillary organization of AL, the Awami Jubo League 
(AJL) was floated by Moni consisting the progressive, young workers, maximiun of whom 
were the participant in the liberation struggle. The leaders of AJL announced that their main 
goal is to build happy, affluent Bangladesh by establishing "Mujibbad" under the leadership 
of Bangabandhu' . The other goals of AJL were'°^: i) to organize the youth support base of 
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AL more systematically that the politics of AL is established in a more strong base*"'*; ii) to 
resists JSD politically, which was consisted of breakaway radical youths of AL. Following 
these goals, in the first biennial conference of AJL the General Secretary of AL said," hi the 
name of'another revolution (2"^ revolution) is needed after the revolution (of 1971)' when a 
section of people (JSD) is conspiring against the independence of the country in this crucial 
moment the youth of the nation gathered in JL to destroy the non-democratic activities"'"^. 
When JSD was busy criticizing Mujib and AL during 1972 and 1973, Moni the JL president 
said," Those who use vulgar language against Bangabandhu would be wiped out 
vigorously"'"®. In March 1974 JSD tried to strengthen the movement against the government. 
The president of JSD Major Jalil said, "If necessary the hard-working people will be armed 
a g a i n " T h e secretary of the party announced that there would be people's war against the 
suppressive AL government'"^. In criticizing JSD Moni said, "The meaning of independence 
is not the egocentricity. Those who speak against independence will not be excused"'"®. In the 
replay to the threat of JSD to use arms and have expedition against the government Moni said, 
"If Major Jalil- A. Rob or the Naksalites (one under-ground Maoist insurgency group) uses 
arms against government then the response will be in arms also". In the same public meeting 
addressing the JSD he said," Those who try to spread propaganda against Bangabandhu, the 
father of the nation, will be snatched from their mother's lap and be CLaughtered in the field 
of Polton""". When JSD formed their so called Peoples Army Moni decorated his workers 
with arms. M. Franda wrote, "After the liberation of Bangladesh, Moni built a network of 
youth organization as head of his uncle's national Jubo (youth) League members of which 
were allowed by Mujib to carry arms"'". 
The attack of Moni and JL was not only limited against JSD and Tajuddin, they also 
started criticizing the leaders and the workers of AL as well. Even though JL was not directly 
the opposition of AL but they became the heinous/ strong critic of it. In 1974, they hold the 
leaders of AL responsible for the economic depression and the decline of the law and order of 
the country alongside the opposition parties. Moni described all the AL leaders except for 
Mujib as corrupts, and traitors so AL politics should be done by Mujib only. In 27 January 
1974 Moni said, "There is corruption in the ruling party, and he will not be part of it. He 
fiirther added, the leaders of AL are using Mujib as the overdraft and destroying his 
image""^ In another public meeting accusing the AL workers and leaders he said, "Today 
Bangabandhu government is in big crisis and people are suffering immensely. A group of 
corrupts have created this crisis by misusing Mujib's name they are dong corruption, they 
became a problem for the nation. The regulations of the government became corrupted by 
a district convention Moni accused the AL government for the high price of 
essential commodities and said," The price of the commodities have gone beyond the 
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purchasing ability of the general population but no effective steps has so far been taken by the 
government to appease their selfish ends""''. He added that a section of AL leaders were 
using the slogan of socialism only to meet their selfish goals. In a public meeting he 
threatened the AL leaders by saying that it is necessary to have a war against the people who 
are dishonest in the government''^ Following Moni his organization the AJL in its central 
committee meeting called all progressive forces to identify the enemies of social progress and 
rightist influence in the govermnent and ruling party and unmarked their real character before 
the people. According to JL these elements never accepted socialism and democracy 
sincerely"^. While Sheikh Moni was bringing corruption allegation against the AL leaders, 
meanwhile the major opposition party JSD newspaper 'Daily Gonokantha' identified Moni as 
the invisible PM of the country and rest of the MPs of the country as corrupt. In the 
Gonokantha editorial Moni was described as the juvenile leader of the capitalism. The 
newspaper published that he was disclosing the corruption of the other leaders to hide his own 
shortcomings. In public meetings he was making an effort to separate himself from the rest of 
the party leader's corruptions, because he did not want to be a part of the slander of his 
government. But the newspaper added that the people would not leave him alone because they 
toow that he is already a part of the misconduct of the government. Then the daily further 
added, "But after destroying a nation completely those who says - 1 shall not be the part of the 
offence (the AL government did) - will they be escape""^. On this account M. Franda wrote, 
"By far the worst reputation among Mujibs relatives was gained by Sheikh Fazlul Hoque 
Moni, commonly known as the nephew of the nation, the son of Mujib's own sister. After the 
liberation of Bangladesh, ....on the basis of political connection and his control of this 
militant youth league, Moni took over the pasban press and pasban building (properties left 
behind by the non-Bengali ovraer in 1971 pre-liberation time) in Motijheel commercial area 
of Dhaka and began publishing newspapers and magazines. He also controlled a number of 
the agents and firms that import relief goods into Bangladesh, preliminary through permits 
and licenses and this enabled him to accumulate considerable personal wealth, including 
several cars and two homes in one of the prestigious residential areas ofDhaka"lOnthe30 ' ' ' 
March of 1974 in Dhaka Chattra League, one of the daughter organizations of AL released a 
long list of corrupt leaders; Sheikh Moni was included in that list. Chattra league accused him 
of take illegal possession of the press business and the abandoned houses in Dhaka"'. 
From the middle of 1974 the disputes among the AL and Jubo League (JL) regional 
leaderships reached its climax. At one point of this several district JL leaders were arrested on 
account of the murder of the Rajshahi district AL Organizing Secretary'^". In other parts of 
the coimtry several AL leaders and workers were arrested accused of possessing illegal 
firearms and of other misdeeds/ connections'^'. According to Sheikh Moni, the president of 
JL all those arrests concocted by AL was attempted to destroy JL'^^. He also added that 
among the anti-JL conspirators were the president of AL Kamruz Zaman at the time, the 
Dhaka city AL president Gazi Golam Mustafa and some other notable AL leaders, and all 
those leaders were responsible for the disastrous condition of the country. Addressing the 
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Pabna district JL conference the JL chief claimed that a small section of AL leadership 
responsible for the present famine and economic ills and demanded their punishment . In 
different meeting the JL chief said, "the relationship of JL with AL has declined to a 
dangerous level. The partiality of the president of AL has even worsened the relationship". He 
also added that some of the AL leaderships have divided Bangladesh into hundreds of small 
feudal constituents and thus forcing the country to destruction. This situation had to end 
immediately^ '^*. In a meeting the JL presidium member Amir Hussein Amu said that the AL 
leaders separated the devoted leaders from Bangabandhu and as a result the workers of the 
party were becoming downhearted/ frustrated. Amu also added that the trusted workers did 
not want to see Kamruz Zaman as the president of AL; they want Bangabandhu in that 
position'^^. The JL General Secretary in his speech accused Kamruz Zaman for conflicts 
between AL and JL in the district level'^^. The JL chief in another, speech claimed that the 
people whom Bangabandhu appointed in responsible positions turned against him and were 
responsible for the corruption concerning T.C.B., luxuiy items and Red Cross etc. JL would 
not compromise with those traitors. In Moni's opinion, those traitors used Chattra League 
against JL^^'. After all those complaint Sheikh Moni bluntly announced that JL had no 
connection with nor did it owes its allegiance to any body in AL except for Bangabandhu. 
This decision of JL had deteriorated the relationship between this ancillary organization of AL 
and the main body AL'^^. 
In 1974, the exceptional tendency prevailed in the AL internal politics was that 
follovdng the JL the student labor wing of the AL engaged in criticizing AL leaders'^'. The JL 
chief proclaimed that they would only be obedient to Sheikh Mujib, and only Mujib can lead 
to the promised Golden Bangla. In the following months like JL, all the ancillary 
organizations separately announced that Mujib would be the sole creator of prosperous 
Bangladesh and only they were the devoted soldiers to realize the ideology of him. All of 
these groups wanted to get Mujib among them and they were in no mood to tolerate each 
other. They wanted Bangabandhu among them because they knew that in his absence all of 
their existence in the party could be in jeopardy, and only his attachment with them could 
assure the fulfillment of their political ambitions'^". On 30 August 1974, the corrupt leaders 
list disclosed by Chattra League (CL) included the leaders of the AL and its ancillary 
organizations, Sramik League, JL, JSD, NAP (Bhashani) etc. The list also had the names of 
some of the high-ranking officers of the government and semi-government institutions, and 
the central AL leaders'^ . The General Secretary of the CL in a meeting complained against 
the AL and the JL leaders and said, "The leaders and the workers of the party in power has 
given birth to the black marketers, the fraudulent businessman wdth the license and permits". 
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He also added, "People has come to know these elements very well who took position of the 
cars, houses, and presses after the independence"'^^. On April 1974 in a press conference the 
president of CL complained that the AL government is mostly responsible for the frustration, 
anarchy, corruption and the decline of the law and order going on all over the country'^^. This 
was particularly true in 1973 and 1974 when a number of protests were marched against high 
prices of the essential goods and government corruptions, organized not only by the 
opposition parties but also by some of the pro-AL elements of the student organizations'^''. 
On 7 March 1973, right after JL was founded; general election of the country took 
place. Before the election JL chief demanded the elimination of the corrupt AL leaders from 
the party'^^. The JL also requested nomination for 151 JL leaders in the baimer of AL. This 
claims of the JL made the AL nomination process difficuh'^^. AL president and the Prime 
Minister of the country, Mujib was very disappointed with the corrupt MPs, elected in 1970. 
Meanwhile 42 public representatives in the parliament were ousted from the party because of 
their alleged involvement with corruption'^ . Before of the election one of the prominent daily 
of the country wrote that the country people had faith on a few former MPs'^^. In the place of 
these corrupt MPs Bangabandhu nominated 92 bold, dedicated and honest fresh-bloods to 
contest the 1973 parliamentary elections. The parliament was consisted of 300 seats. About 
one third of the I ^ s , elected in the 1970 elections, were deprived from party nomination'^^. 
In this process Bangabandhu also wanted to establish mass participation of the young 
politicians in the party''*®. By analyzing the biodata of the MPs elected in the 1973 election R. 
Jahan wrote, "The sharp increase in the number of young parliamentarians over a period of 
only three years was significant. In addition to the fact that one third of the MPs of 1973 were 
35 years of age or less; one third were also the first time parliamentarian''*'. According to 
Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury among the AL MPs elected in 1973, 90 or more of them were 
JL members. Sheikh Moni was preparing himself to be in power speedily''*^. Because of the 
patronage of Bangabandhu the young leaders of AL were becoming dominant in all parts of 
the administration very quickly''*^. The ex-leaders of CL Abdurrazzaq and Tofael Almied 
were employed to oversee the organizing part of the party''*'*. Bangabandhu started to like the 
fresh young cadres of the party over his old colleagues. In 1974 AL minister Mofiz 
Chowdhury brought the question on this account to Kamruz Zaman, the close colleague and 
cabinet minister of Mujib, "Why the old leaders has left Bangabandhu with the youth cadres 
of the party and accepted to be the ministers. If the youths occupy the vacancies you (the old 
leaders) have created and convince Bangabandhu towards their ideology - how will you 
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prevent them?" In response Kamruz Zaman said that for why he did not know but 
Bangabandhu did not like his old colleague and did not listen to them either'"^^. 
The appeal of Mujibism could not unite the party leaders and workers for long. It 
could not secure the party from factional conflict after the defection of the radical youths 
those led to the establishment of JSD. Another cleavage occurred within the vouth groups of 
AL platform, who took the initiative to propagate Mujibism. Abdur Raazaq , the Organizing 
Secretary of AL at the time, and Tofael Ahmed, the Political Secretary of the PM at the time 
were leading one faction of Mujibites youths. Bangabandhu was very affectionate of Tofael 
Ahmed; he compared their relation with his relationship with Suhrawardy (the guru of Mujib). 
He said that he wanted to train Tofael politically as Suhrawardy shaped him'"*'. The other was 
leading by Mujib's nephew. Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, who founded the rival JL'''^. Moni 
had great influence over Mujib. According to Jawadul Karim after Tajuddin Ahmed no one 
was as influential as Moni in the AL of Mujib''*^. Although in 1972 in the struggle of the 
establishenmt of Mujibism Moni, Abdurrazzaq, and Tofael worked together against the 
radical socialist youths; but on the question of accomplishing the leadership of AL they 
emerged as rivals very quickly. 
A. Razzaq-Tofael group included Sheikh Shahid (the other nephew of Mujib), the first 
President of CL in post-independent Bangladesh; Monirul Hoque Chowdhury, the incumbent 
President of CL, and Shafiul Alam Pradhan, the incumbent General Secretary of It was 
an astonishing matter that the above mentioned three leaders, who became the Presidents and 
General Secretary of the post independent CL organization, harmonized and stood against 
Moni were the direct recruits of Sheikh Moni'^^ On the other hand the first General Secretary 
of CL in the post-independent Bangladesh and few other leaders of CL remained with 
Moni'^^. As in their conflict, majority CL leaders assembled in A. Razzaq - Tofael group 
and Moni was having the support of JL, so the conflict was well known to the political 
observers as the CL versus JL conflict. Though since the middle of 1973 Moni was projecting 
his ideology towards left, Tofael had his moderate rightist view'^^, but no political group 
viewed the conflict as an ideological one. According to Jawadul Karim, the main reason of the 
conflict between the two ancillary organizations of AL was the personality c l a s h ' H e also 
mentioned that the leaders of AL encouraged the ugly fight between those two organizations 
for their personal interests. In 1974 daily Janapad (the newspaper owned by the incumbent 
President of AL and a leader of the inner ckcle of Bangabandhu, Kamruz Zaman) described 
the conflict between CL and JL as the fight of the youth leaders to establish their personal 
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position in the future power structure of AL'^^ The newspaper also cautiously mentioned the 
indirect involvement of the AL leaders in the conflict. 
After the liberation the youth section of AL was divided into the leaderships of Sirajul 
Alam Khan, the unannounced philosopher and guide of youths, and Sheikh Moni, the nephew 
of Sheik Mujib. Then Abdur Razzak and Tofael Ahmed were the two main pillars of Moni 
group. After the departure of Alam Khan fi'om AL to establish JSD, Moni in the name of 
organizing the youA of Bangladesh and to use them as the supporting power of AL founded 
JL in 1972. Abdur Razzak and Tofael Ahmed were left to guide CL'^^. In 1973, during the 
selection of the new CL central committee leaders Sheikh Moni had conflict with Abdur 
Razzak, Tofael Ahmed and Sheikh Shahid. When in the 1973 BCL national council Sheikh 
Shahid, the outgoing president of CL, the new CL committee; the followers of Sheikh Moni in 
the leadership of M, A. Rashid, the out going general secretary of CL, aimounced a parallel 
new committee of CL. As Sheikh Mujib recognizeed the Razzak-Tofael supported Sheikh 
Shahid announced CL committee then the Moni supported committee faced natural death'^'. 
This event was a red signal to the highly ambitious leader Sheikh Moni; his calculation was 
that A. Razzak and Tofael superceded him in the political game. Moni's thought was that A. 
Razzak was the organizing secretary of AL at the time and in fiiture Bangabandhu would give 
him the responsibility of AL. He would be the fiiture GS of the party. Bangabandhu made 
Tofael his Political Secretary. Probably to make his successor i.e. the nest PM of Bangladesh 
after him, Bangabandhu at present made him his Political Sec re t a ry ' In this situation Moni 
(the nephew of Mujib) was doubtftil of his fiiture leadership. He thought in fiiture 
Bangabandhu might not provide him any important position than that of making him a simple 
cabinet minister of AL. From then though there was no ideological difference between CL 
and JL but as the CL and JL were administering by Moni and ruval his rival A. Razzaq-Tofael 
a constant animosity spread between CL and JL leaders and workers. 
Right before the 1973 national election, Sheikh Moni called the nation for the 
"purification campaign" to eliminate corruption in the country. JL led by Moni accused some 
of the public representatives of AL, the party leader-workers, the corrupt bureaucrats (who 
were busy in the black markets, smuggling, and accumulating wealth) and some other anti-
social elements firo the disastrous economical situation of the country. He announced in 
several public meetings that 'these people ought to be eradicated''^®. However, Moni and his 
followers in their "purification campaign" put more emphasis on the elimination of the 
corrupt and anti-public bureaucrats In different meetings Moni also said that those 
government officers had the record of serving Pakistan administration for more that ten years, 
they should not have their job anymore. They must be screened out and new recruits should 
be taken in the administration fi-om the former Mukti Bahini, Mujib Bahini and the political 
cadres of the national liberation struggle etc'^'. The General Secretary of JL Noor e Alam 
Siddiqi said that the bureaucrats who are creating hindrance in the way of establishing 
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socialism would be removed in the process of "purification campaign"^^^. Another ancillary 
organization of AL, the National Labor League (SL) also joined the Moni led purification 
campaign. The "purification campaign" became the main topic of speech for JL and Sramik 
League (CL). They said that they would soon start a purification campaign to cleanse the 
administration, party and country of unpatriotic and corrupt elements From the beginning 
of the "purification campaign" JL and SL targeted the opposition lobbies within the AL. Once 
General Secretary of SL Abdul Mannan's supporters ki^apped Ahmed Fazlur Rahman, a 
business man and AL supporter, and brought him for questioning. Then Mujib had to 
personally intervene to get Fazlur Rahman released'^. 
The preliminary agenda of the "purification campaign" which was announced by the 
JL President on 11 April 1973 in a public meeting demanded that the people who do not 
believe in the four principles of the nation and Mujibism should not be in the administration. 
In that meeting Tofael stressed on the necessity of'self-purification' before the inception of a 
'purification campaign''®^. From the beginning of the "purification campaign" in opposing 
statements Razzak and Tofael and some other youth leaders stressed over self-purification. 
According to them impurity caimot be removed by an impure soul, innocence can not be 
established by a corrupt. The people who wanted to be the refinement teacher of the nation 
could not be characterless, because in the process of correction, they could actually mislead 
the innocent nation towards destruction. Therefore the goal should be to watch out for self-
purification instead of purification or correction campaign'^^. 
It is essential to mention here that in the post independent political scenario a good 
number of such elements, having notorious reputations among general people, intruded in CL 
and JL and contaminated the organizations. Among them there were some accused of 
abducting governmental assets and some had the reputation of the musclemen. By joining CL 
and JL they were able to have connections to built wealth. As a result it was observed that 
later on so many of the CL and JL leaders and workers used to join the party in power and 
oppressed the leaders and the workers of AL c o n s t a n t l y M o m ' s opinion about those 
opportunists was that after the independence a lot of people joined AL for their selfish 
benef i t s '^^ 
While CL and JL leaders were busy debating over the importance of purification and 
self-purification at the same time the main body CL was using anti-Moni s l o g a n s a n d that 
sometimes caused physical fights among the CL and followers of Moni (JL and a minor part 
of CL workers)'^". In 1973 Dhaka University Student Association Election, CL and one of the 
leftist student organizations, Student Union made a coalition to go for the election. On the 
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other hand the rebellious "A. Rashid group" of CL patronized by Moni formed a different 
panel for the election"^ Thus the conflicts between the two strong ancillary organizations of 
AL kept increasing relentlessly. Both of the organizations started to gossip, spread 
propaganda, and exchange statements against each other. However both of the organizations 
were devoted to their favorite leader Mujib and were determined to realize Mujib's 
ideology''^. 
At the climax of this conflict CL demanded that the government have to release the list 
of the people with in the government, who in the post-independent Bangladesh illegally 
became the owners of cars, houses, presses and n e w s p a p e r s A t one stage of this process 
CL revealed a list of corrupts in a public meeting on 30 March 1974. In that list Sheikh 
Moni's name was mentioned among the corrupt government and the opposition party leaders 
and bureaucrats. He was described as one of the illegal abductors of cars, houses and presses. 
CL also claimed that all of his business establishments were possible because of his privileged 
connection to the governments'''*. The internal dispute between CL and JL was in extreme; at 
this point on 4 April one of the supporters of Tofael group CL was beaten up by the 
supporters of Moni in CL and on the same night seven pro-Moni CL activists including 
Kohinoor was murdered by a group of CL activists led by that time CL GS Shafiul Alam 
Pradhan'". 
Mujib, by himself was playing the arbitrator between the two organizations to 
minimize their differences. But in the middle he had to leave to Moscow for treatment on 19 
March 1974, before he could make any final decision''^. Meanwhile before his coming back 
this heinous killing took place and astonished the general masses. It is an obvious question 
that what the other prominent leaders of parent organization AL were doing in that crisis. 
According to Daily Shamaj, even at the climax of the conflict between the two daughter 
organizations the AI leaders were completely mot ion lessRather some of them sometime 
indirectly encouraged the conflicts. That was the observation of Jawadul Karim as well'^^. 
When CL called Moni a corrupt and started to pressure AL to take step against all the corrupt 
leaders and bureaucrats, Tajuddin, the Finance Minister of AL, said that there was no reasons 
to be worried of those personals (corrupt peoples)''^. Matiur Rahman, the Cooperative 
Society Minister at the time supported CL on their campaign again corruption, and said that 
the government should help the students to eradiate corruption; if the government failed to 
fulfill the demands of the people to eradicate the corruption the general public would not 
forgive the government'^". Moni in his defense against the accusation brought by CL said that 
CL was accusing him for totally political reasons and they did not like him. They attacked 
him because he did not support their unjust causes. He also mentioned that some of the 
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corrupt AL leaders from behind the curtain were using CL against JL for their own political 
ambitions. In his opinion, CL was trying to save some of the AL leaders, who were corrupt 
and illegal user of the power by accusing the leaders of JL'®'. It was only after the seven 
murders when AL leaders realized the gravity of the problem and also understood that if they 
did not solve the problem immediately then it can affect the whole politics of AL'^^. 
After the return of Bangabandhu in the country he took steps to control the conflicts. 
In his order Shafiul Alam Pradhan and some of his colleagues were arrested in charge of the 
seven murders in the Dhaka University area'® .^ According to Jawadul Karim and Poresh 
Shaha, even though Pradhan was one of the pioneers to bring corruption accusations against 
the JL and AL leaders, his main goal was to create conflicts in the party and weaken AL. It 
was disclosed later that one ultra radical organization was using Pradhan to work on behalf of 
them for long time. Pradhan was convicted of murder and was imprisoned for long term. Later 
when President Ziaur Rahman was busy establishing himself in the political arena he released 
Pradhan on special pardon. After his release the first thing Pradhan did was to pray in the 
grave of the Siraj Shikdar, the ultra radical leader of the Shorbohara party. Then he formed a 
leftist political party named Progressive Socialist Party and still he was relentlessly vocal 
against AL^^ '*. Poresh Saha fiirther wrote Pradhan's target was to involve the CL in the 
conflict between AL and JL and crush the party' 
Sheikh Moni at the end of conflict with CL wanted to found a parallel student 
organization. In one of his speech he said that the CL at the time did not have any ideology. 
They were busy in corruption, hijacking and other anti-social activities. Thus he needed to 
form a new student organization with ideology'®^. On the 19 July 1974 issue of Janapad this 
thought of Moni was disclosed: JL is contemplating to float a new student organization'®^. JL 
President Sheikh Moni also was a central committee leaser of Jatia Sramik league. In the 
biennial congress (convention) Sramik League (SL) held in 1974 Moni had conflict with 
Abdul Mannan, the general secretary of SL . Tough Abdul Mannan previously joined Moni 
in his "purification campaign" but he became resentftil of Moni's growing support among the 
labors of the Tejgaon industrial belts besides D h a k a ' L a t e r on 2 January 1975 Abdul 
Marman (MP) was imprisoned by AL government because his alleged involvement in 
corruption'®". Moni was pretty much involved and was central committee members of most of 
the ancillary organizations of AL and eventually his conflicts with all of them were 
increasing. As a result he dramatically resigned from the central committees of AL, JL and 
CL and at the same time he withdrawn his resignations'^'. In this situation the JL led by Moni 
indicated the possibility of the formation of a new political party. As in the absence of 
Mujib's blessing there was a strong possibility of immature political death of any such 
planning or of any of the that time leaders so Moni group also campaigned that though the 
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new party was going to take a opposition role against AL but it would be allegiance to 
Bangabandhu^®. However finally Moni did not float any political party. Probably the 
propaganda of Moni and his people to form a new party was merely a stunt to create 
nervousness/ tension among the AL leaders. Moreover it is possible that though this drama he 
wanted to show his political importance in AL party and to create pressure in the AL rank and 
file for a favorable settlement of the current functional conflict. 
All the political analyst agreed that the conflicts between CL and JL, the two ancillary 
organizations of AL, and their trying to abuse the counter group had damaged the reputation 
of AL. Jawadul Karim wrote that this damage of AL happened when Mujib was sunken with 
thousands problems both in the country and abroad'®^. Poresh Shaha wrote that the corrupted 
peoples list revealed by CL diminished the shiny reputation of both AL and Mujib for good. 
At that time CL and JL were able to weaken Mujib even more than all the opposition 
parties'^''. Rafiqul Islam wrote that the conflicts started in AL when the country was in deep 
danger. The internal party conflict between Sheikh Moni and Tofael Ahmed diminished the 
reputation of Bangabandhu and his govemmet extremely'^^. In 1974 Janapad commented that 
the conflict between CL and JL damaged both of them. The conflict between the two daughter 
organizations of AL also spread in the parent body itself and its lower units. As a result the 
party was internally divided into grassroots level. This conflict damaged the strength of AL'^^. 
It vvdll not be irrelevant to mention here that that time people knew Mujib and his party. They 
knew that CL and JL activists are the workers of his party. This conflict reduced the 
popularity of AL in the masses, provided the issues to the opposition to criticize AL. So 
expressing its unhappiness over the CL versus JL conflict daily Janapad wrote, what was the 
use/ benefit of the infighting between the two? Rather if there could be a joint endeavor of the 
two by a collective contemplation both would progress. There could be coordination of 
strength. And if they could have any constructive steps the country would be benefited'®'. The 
public opinion was that if they stopped complaining about each other then both organizations 
could be beneficial to AL and the people of the country. Columnist Zohur Ahmed Chowdhury 
commented later on that if the AL leaders could restrain their dependents fi-om mfighting and 
could put behind their personal interests and be part of the general publics sorrow then the 
unity of the nation during the liberation struggle would be intact. They could make general 
public to do the impossible good for the country, the ultra political parties would not gain any 
public support and the Pakistani collaborators would not dare to come out of the caves'®^. 
Factionalism In The Main Body of AL 
The conflict between CL and JL, and the conflicts between the aforementioned organizations 
and AL weakened AL. In a similar way, the conflicts among the senior leaders in Ae 
organization also damaged AL, which would impact even the members at the lower level of 
the organization. If we notice carefully, we would find that the young larders who became the 
members of the AL central committee after the liberation war and also continued to run CL, 
JL and SL among them political ambitions were extreme'^® - it lead to various types of 
" I Daily Janapad, 24 July 1974. 
Jawadul Karim, Mujib O Somokalin Rajniti, op. cit.; p. 104-105. 
Poresh Shaha, Bangladesh: Sharajontrer Rajniti, op. cit.; p. 27. 
Major ShafiquI Islam (P.S.C.), Shadhinotar Baish Bosor, op. cit.; p. 26. 
Sub-editorial: "Chattra Jubo Fronter Birodh Boro Bipod Deke Ante Pare", Janapad, 21 April 1974. 
Daily Janapad, 21 April 1974. 
Sub-Editorial: "Darbar-e- Zohur"; Songbad, 20 April 1977. 
The youth leaders who were included in the central committee of AL were A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed, A. 
Mannan and two nephew of Mujib named as S. Moni and S. Shahid. 
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conflicts in almost all levels of the AL family. On the other hand the senior leaders in AL 
were not free from power conflict but the conflict among the senior leaders were more along 
the line of personality conflicts rather than along the line of political ambitions. Politically 
ambitious senior leaders were few in number, and until 1975, the concern was about the 
distribution of leadership positions in the party chain of command after Bangabandhu Mujib. 
Leaders like Nazrul Islam were trying to have this issue resolved. Their preference was that 
the pre-war line up/ chain of command of the party remains intact. Some of them even wanted 
to marginalize Tajuddin; they wanted to deny/ forget the heroic role of him in the liberation 
war^°°. On the contrary, leaders like Tajuddin would like to have the leadership distribution 
according to the contributions of leaders during and after the liberation war. 
After the independence, the major role of the post liberation AL in Bangladesh was the 
establishment of a new political system. The establishment of a political system involves the 
task of establishing both a national government and a national party. The government in exile 
headed by AL leaders, came back to Dhaka on 22 December 1971, and designated them as the 
revolutionary government^®' and started the task of building the national government as their 
main goal. But at that time the internal turmoil of the party rather than the outside parties' 
resistance became a big obstacle in the process of establishing the government system and the 
party structure. This internal factional conflict rather than outside forces or oppositions was 
the main challenge of the AL's stability^"^. 
Immediately after the war of liberation, the main reasons of disagreements among the 
leaders were on 1) the operating system of the government, 2) whether the government 
formed by a coalition of all the parties or only AL elements would run the country, 3) the size 
of the ministiy or the number of ministers in the government and in the leadership hierarchy 
who would be the second leader after Mujib. 
Tajuddin in the post-1971 politics of AL, was widely considered the most powerfiil 
member of the party, next only to Mujib^® .^ After returning to Bangladesh on 22 December 
1971, Tajuddin quickly took necessary steps to safe guard and establish his position in the 
government with the wholehearted support of the Indian government^"''. Due to the 
sympathetic/ supportive and opposition role of some of the regional and international powers 
such as India, USA and USSR was quite substantial in the autonomous movement and 
liberation struggle of Bengalis, a huge difference between the pre-independence and post-
independence political contemplation of Bangladesh was observed. After getting liberation 
Bangladesh was trying to come out of the capitalist economic system that Pakistan had been 
following before the war. Majority of the wealthy class and generally well to do 
Bangladeshi's, who were known the supporters of the Pakistani ruling class and were 
subscribing to capitalist views and also promoting that, got somewhat subdued for the time 
being because of the hatred campaign of the freedom fighters against them after the war. 
Along with them the colonial bureaucracy, to whom Pakistan and Bangladesh inherited from 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib?; p. 32. 
Ashraf Kaisar, The Political killing of Bangladesh; op. cit.; p. 38. 
. The liberation struggle of Bangladesh was a democratic revolution of the petit-bourgeois class. All the 
discontent classes, groups and different section of the Bengali masses joined the struggle. Business people, 
bureaucrats, teachers, students, labor, landless farmers all participated in the liberation struggle. The party MP's 
of various class characteristics elected in the 1970 and 1973 parliamentary elections reflected various and 
dissimilar class contemplation in the post-independent AL government. \VTien in a comparatively peaceful 
environment different groups in the party came forward to defend/ achieve their parochial class interest the 
internal party factionalism also became inevitable. 
Zillur R. Khan, The Third World Charismat, op. cit.; p. 220. 
Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib (in Bengali), op. cit.; p. 4. 
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the colonial British rule and who were known as the supporter and protector of the capitalism 
also became weak and less influential due to their involvement in corruption and many of 
them played contradictoiy rule during liberation struggle. The power and size of the military 
was also limited. Even though the newly created wealthy class and the rising middle class, 
who were eager to make money, were strong in the AL leadership and had sympathy towards 
some of the capitalist views but the lower level party leadership and especially the youth 
members of the party caucus, who were majority in the party and were the active freedom 
fighters, were strongly opposing the capitalism. They were expecting a much more equitable 
society and subscribed mostly to the socialistic views. After a successful end of the liberation 
war the difference between the rightist elements of the party caucus and youth freedom 
fighters was increased. In this situation it was not difficult to establish a socialist economic 
system in the country with the majority and radical youth section's support by opposing the 
rightist faction of the party. Given this situation, it was totally unviable to think about a 
situation where the political right could thrive^°^ In this situation timely contribution and 
cooperation of the USA in terms of money and goods for rebuilding the war-ravaged country 
could be instrumental in reviving the capitalist system in Bangladesh. 
Under the leadership of Sayed Nazrul Isalam, and Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed the right 
wing lobby in AL was favoring of a democratic Bangladesh where private ownership would 
be secured and in the rebuilding of the country the material support of the capitalist countries 
especially of USA would be accepted. On the other side, to contain these kinds of views, on 
19 December 1971 the PM Tajuddin, who was very bitter about US role in the liberation war, 
announced (via a radio broadcast) that because of the opposition of the USA in the 
independence of Bangladesh, the country would not be interested in any contribution of the 
USA in rebuilding its economy^® .^ Tajuddin along with other cabinet ministers returned to 
Bangladesh on 22 December 1971. In the next day he announced that Bangladesh would be 
rebuilt on the basis of democracy, socialism, and secularism. He stressed, "Only through 
establishing socialism it is possible to guarantee the basic livelihood of the people of 
Bangladesh"^°l 
The prominence of communist views was apparent in AL close to 1970 (after a long 
period since the defection of Maulana Bhasani group in 1956)) due to their increasing 
intrusion/ entrance in the students youth and worker wings and also in the main body of AL. 
Pressured by this growth, AL incorporated socialistic economic policies in its election 
manifesto for the first time in 1970 The popularity of communism and the anti-western 
views among students during the pre-war and post-war periods helped Tajuddin in wirming 
the support of extreme radical leftist section of the student groups who had extreme hatred 
feeling for the USA. Tajudding's growing popularity and control could not totally deter the 
capitalist aspirations of the rightist lobby in AL. To facilitate the way to socialism fiirther, in 
the name of national unity and the unity of the freedom fighters, Tajuddin pursued the 
cooperation of the other leftist parties such as NAP and If this inter-party 
communication were to succeed that would give Tajuddin the absolute leadership and totally 
Maidul Hassan, Main Stream '71; op. cit. p. 228. Also see Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge 
of Development, p. 123. These youth freedom fighters were mainly came from middle and lower middle class 
families with strong roots among the rural poor. 
Bangladesh Observer, 21 December 1971. 
Bangladesh Observer, 24 December 1971. 
Interview with Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury, Ex-Cabinet Minister of AL government during 1972-73. For 
the 1970 election manifesto see History of Bangladesh War of Independence Documents, Vol. 2; pp. 467-74. 
Bangladesh Observer, 26 December 1971. 
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marginalize the rightist lobby in AL. The single other motivation that was working behind this 
initiative was inspired by the observation of the unquestionable loyalty of the party towards 
Mujib. Tajuddin was trying to get rid of this unquestionable loyalty from the party in a subtle 
manner '^®. Incidentally, all these activities were taking place when Mujib was still jailed in 
Pakistan. 
For the post-war Bangladesh government, 100,000-150,000 members of the Freedom 
Force, Mukti Bahini, posed a major problem. Without proper repatriation this well trained, 
heavily armed, and factionally divided force could be misused by special interest groups, 
which can inflict huge lose to the war ravaged coimtry. So the rehabilitation of the members 
of the liberation force was a key concern for the government. To address this issue, on 18 
December 1971 the cabinet ministers, in a meeting, decided to form the National Militia with 
the members of the liberation force^". By forming the National Melitia, Tajuddin wanted to 
engage the energy and motivation of these dedicated youths for constructive activities in 
rebuilding the country. A plan was considered which would allow individuals to hold 
positions in all strata of National Melitia irrespective of party affiliation^'^. To avert potential 
opposition from the members of Mujib Bahini in joining the National Militia General Uban 
(the Director General of RAW), who was the main organizer of Mujib Bahini, was brought in 
Dhaka on 26 December 1971. After Uban reached Dhaka Sheikh Moni, in a meeting, 
announced that after the formation of the National Militia the Mujib Bahini would cease to 
exist^'^. On 2 January 1972 the government of Bangladesh formed the National Melitia Board 
where single representative was taken from each of the different political parties whereas two 
representatives were taken from Mujib Bahini. 
The existing factional discontent within the AL leadership was alleviated somewhat 
through the appointment of five of Its members to the cabinet on 27 December 1971. The 
newly appointed cabinet ministers were Abdus Samad Azad, Fonibhushon Majumder, Juhor 
Ahmed Chowdhury, Yusuf Ali, and Sheikh Abdul Aziz^''*, In the same time Prime Minister, 
Tajuddin, removed Khandakar Mostak from foreign ministry and assigned him to relatively 
less prestigious ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs. Abdus Samad Azad, one of the 
pro-leftist leader of AL, was replaced in his position. Given the interpersonal conflict between 
Mostk and Tajuddin due to Mustak's ambition for power, wartime disregard for ministry 
decisions and conspiracy against the liberation of Bangladesh, and Tajuddin's pro-Indian and 
socialistic attitude, and persistent commitment toward the independence of Bangladesh, this 
ministry reshuffling was na tura l^The change did not come as a surprise at all. The political 
rivaby between Tajuddin and his politically senior colleague Mustaq was known to all. 
Moreover Mustaq had done enough mischief as foreign minister. But the associate press of 
America reported that the PM had replaced his anti-communist foreign minister by a pro-left 
Abu AI Sayeed, Era of Awami League (in Bengali), (Dhaka: Agami Prakasani, 1995); p. 104. 
The Central Controlling Board members of the National Militia were: PM Tajuddin Ahmed (President), 
Home Minister Kamruzzaman, Maulana Bhasani (NAP-B), Monoranjan Dhar (AL), Prof. Mujaffar Ahmed 
(NAP-M), Moni Shing (CPB), Tofael Ahmed (Mujib Bahini), Abdur Razzaq (Mujib Bahini), Rafiq Uddin 
Bhuyan, Gazi Gulam Mustafa, and Captain Sujat Ali. For this see Bangladesh Observer, 3 January 1972. 
Maidul Hassan, op. cit. Also Bangladesh Observer, 3 January 1971. 
Bangladesh Observer, 27 December 1971. 
Bangladesh Observer, 28 December 1971. Also Morning Sun and Morning News, 30 December 1971. And 
Abdul Huq, op. cit.; p. 270-71. 
For more detail see Wajed Miah, Mujib Ke Gherai; op. cit,; pp. 114-15. Mostaq was not ready to accept this 
humiliate demotion in the cabinet of Tajuddin. As some of the close relatives of Mujib advised him that after tiie 
return of Mujib he would be rewarded in better place of the cabinet then he agreed to be in the cabinet. 
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with a expectation to strengthen ties between Bangladesh and Soviet block^'^. By this 
reshuffle Mustaq was downgraded. He was unhappy and wanted to be relieved of his post, but 
he was too shrewd to press for the acceptance of his resignation. His cabinet colleagues were 
against him and the freedom fighters were in militant mood. Once he was out of government 
he could be in serious trouble. His well wishers also advised him that it is better to work with 
this mischief till Mujib came back^'^. In the national politics, the leader of NAP (one of the 
groups in favor of the independence of Bangladesh), Professor Mmaffar Ahmed became 
restless in forming the ministry of all-party national government^ . But unfortunately, 
Tajuddin did not have much choice other than forming a cabinet, which mirrored the election 
result of 1970. But he also tried to keep all the other parties united on the issue of rebuilding 
the country collectively. 
Upon his return to Dhaka, Tajuddin as a Prime Minister (PM) started to promote his 
socialistic and secular views. He declared that soon the constitution of the country was going 
to be formulated^''. The usage of Islamic terms in the greetings in radio and television 
broadcasts and the recitation of Quran in these media were banned. Secular terms for all 
practical purposes, such as 'good morning and good evening' etc, were introduced in these 
venues of commimication^®. The ordinary people in Bangladesh did not take this dramatic 
change easily. Even though Bangladeshi Muslims were treated in a terrible maimer by the 
Pakistani side, even after the war the affection for the religion was intact among the people in 
Bangladesh. So when Taiuddin started implementing his secular views, general people got 
jfrustrated on this issue^^ . Further more, Tajuddin, antagonized a large group of freedom 
fighters when he asked them to surrender their arms. They denied to do so and clearly told 
that they would not agree to do so until the return of Mujib. After the come back of Mujib 
from Pakistan jail they would surrender their arms in his hand^^^. Most of the leading 
members of the freedom fighters were young students, youths and working men who had been 
involved in the mass movement under the leadership of Mujib during the burning days of 
1966-1970, and hence have been part of the struggle all along. It was hard for them to 
negotiate with anyone other than Mujib. Mujib led them in the struggle, encouraged them in 
the good days, and inspired in the bad days. Mujib was their only leader and in the hard days 
of liberation war was Aeir only inspiration. It was too much for them to accept the leadership 
of Tajuddin. When Mujib's return was delaying some groups inside AL started propagating 
that actually Tajuddin was not enough sincere/ interested to free Mujib from Pakistan jail . 
So right after the war, extraordinary number of conflicts was visible within AL and outside of 
AL. Following conflicting characters were extremely visible^ '^^ : 1) Internal factionalism 
inside the government, 2) conflict between the freedom fighters and the government, 3) 
conflict between the freedom fighters and the collaborators of Pakistan, and 4) conflict 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib?, op. cit.; p. 72. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Mujib Ke Geri Kishu Ghotona, (in Bengali) op. cit.; pp. 114-15. 
The Statesman (Calcutta), 23 December 1971. Also see A.L. Khatib, op. cit.; p. 180. 
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Abul Monsur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchas Bachar, (Dhaka: Khushruj Kitab Mahal, 1995); p. 594. 
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between the freedom fighters themselves. Even the freedom fighters were divided in their 
ideological point of views and in different regional groups. 
Even though during the civil war all the people of Bangladesh were united on the issue 
of the liberation struggle, in the absence of Mujib AL was divided in many factions. The 
extension of the size of the cabinet to increase the ministerial positions failed to reduce the 
conflicts much. There seemed to be persistent power struggle among the faction leaders in the 
absence of Mujib^^^. In the post liberation period the differences among various factions 
seemed to be irreconcilable. These persistent internal conflicts weakened AL, and the rift 
between AL and its ancillary organizations such as the labor (SL), youth (JL) and the student 
(CL) vdngs aggravated the situation. Many of these groups were not ready to accept Tajuddin 
in the highest position (PM post) of the government. The grip of the Tajuddinn government 
was weakening. PM Tajuddin tried to pursue constructive programs for long term but the 
masses, most of the groups and ancillary organizations of AL were considering Tajuddin's 
government as an interim/ transient one, and were waiting for the return of Mujib^ 
Basically, most of the people in Bangladesh along with political leaders were not comfortable 
with having Tajuddin at the helm of the country. In this situation being the PM of the 
factionally divided government and in the absence of Mujib the new regime continued to be 
weak^^l 
In this transitional period, the key factions within AL were^^^: 1) the pro-India and 
pro-Moscow group led by Tajuddin (supported by pro-Moscow NAP [M] and CPB) that 
already proceeded towards the establishment of socialist economy in the country, 2) pro-
western groups led by Sayed Nazrul Islam and Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed (two separate 
groups led by the two leaders but had the same motivation), 3) the centrist group led by 
Kamruz zaman (with the support of the MPs of Northern Bangladesh), and 4) various other 
groups within AL led by youth leaders of the party. While freedom fighters led by youth 
leaders were leaned towards the left, may senior AL leaders were rabidly/ vehemently anti-
socialist, even though they occasionally talked of socialism. Though there was factional 
competition among the second, third and fourth factions but all the three groups other than 
PM's one were always against Tajuddin's leadership during the pre and the post-war periods. 
Some of these groups even tried to deny any role of Tajuddin during the war^^. Despite the 
factional differences and reservations inside AL, all the factions were inclined in working 
under Mujib's leadership. Some disagreement arose after Mujib's return between him and 
some of the faction leaders. But loyalty toward Mujib would always rise above those 
disagreements. Mujib was the undisputed leader, a symbol of unity for AL since the early 
days of the liberation movement. That is why R. Jahan aptly said," AL had one exceptional 
asset i.e. Mujib ^ d his charisma, and for the time being he had used his charisma to glue the 
different factions together"^^®. There were some AL leaders who actively avoided being part 
of any factions such as Mansur Ali and Zillur Rahman, and due to their closeness to Mujib 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 25 December 1971. Also Rangalal Sen, Poliitcal Elites in Bangladesh. 
R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. clt.; pp. 61-63. 
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A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib; p. 132. Just immediate after independence it was a heavily loaded question, 
"If S. Mujib were released now, could he heal the serious factional strife that had ah-eady split the leadership of 
Bangladesh?" See ibid. Khatib, p. 101. 
R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; pp. 62-63. 
176 
they used to be considered as the key men for Mujib^^'. About the immediate post-
independent situation of Bangladesh R. Jahan wrote, "While the bloody birth of Bangladesh 
created widespread sympathy for the new nation, it also led to doubt about its viability and 
stability.... in the absence of any well-organized administrative political structure in the new 
nation. With its charismatic leader Seikh Mujibur Rahman in prison in Pakistan AL regime's 
ability to hold the new nation togetlier and create a political community out of various warring 
factions was doubted by many. It was widely believed that chaos and bloodshed would follow 
the liberation of Bangladesh"^". 
Bowdng to the world opinion Pakistan government decided to release Mujib on 
January 1972. When Mujib returned from Pakistan, he also faced a hard reality within his own 
party hierarchy. He realized that during his absence a lot of changes took place in the rank 
and file of the party which he was not aware of. In a sense, he felt side tracked, and went 
about reclaiming his supreme role over the party and the government. Due to his political 
stature and role in the liberation war, he was able to gain the control without any 
impediment^^^. So after his return from Pakistan he first felt the need of establishing a 
political structure. He quickly reaffirmed his government's commitment to parliamentary 
democracy. 
In the prevailing structure of the parliamentary form of exile government, Mujib was 
the President (in abstentia) of the state and Tajuddin was the PM of the government. In the 
parliamentary form of the government there is not much role for the President in running the 
government. The PM was the centre of all power of the government. All party members 
including the leaders wanted Mujib in the role of the PM^ '^', and on 12 January 1972 he met 
this expectation by stepping down from the Presidency and assuming the PM's position, the 
effective head of Ae government (rejectmg a Ghandi type role in the government that some 
AL members including Tajuddin expected him to play) . Mujib nominated Justice Abu 
Sayed Chowdhury, son of a former Bengali political leader, as the president of Bangladesh. 
Justice Chowdhury's elevation was not without any significance. Unlike his father, Justice 
Chowdhury had never actively participated in politics and therefore Mujib could rely on him 
to play the role of a constitutional figurehead without posing any threat to his position as PM. 
Moreover, in the post liberation power struggle, Mujib was at pains in finding a man who 
would not be controversial. With his judicial background and international recognition as the 
spokesmen for the Bengali cause in the international arena, he seemed to be the right person 
for the position. Finally, Mujib knew that because Justice Chowdhury had a history of high 
blood pressure so he would not accept any position, which would be physically exacting. The 
Presidency of a parliamentary democracy seemed to be a placid enough post for him^^ .^ Upon 
the formation of AL government by Mujib, NAP (M) and CPB decided to support the new 
government without any share in the power^^^. But NAP (B), pro-China parties and other pro-
right parties (those are present only merely by name) joined the opposition. 
Interview with Khondoker Harunur Rashid MP. But after the death of Mujib, the subsequent happenings 
proved that many of the leaders of the party mstead of showing their allegiance to AL or Mujib gave more 
importance in fulfilling their personal ambitions. 
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PM Mujib fonned the new cabinet. All the ministers of the previous cabinet were 
included in the new cabinet; in addition some new cabinet ministers, deputy-ministers and 
step-ministers were included in the new cabinet^^^. Most probably Mujib increased the size of 
the cabinet to reduce the workload of some ministers, and to contain some of the discontents 
among the faction leaders. Sayed Nazrul Islam, the Vice President of the government during 
the war, was given the position of first senior minister in the cabinet and was made the deputy 
leader of the parliament. Tajuddin held the position of the second senior minister in the 
cabinet^^^ and was given the charge of the ministry of finance and planning. Even though 
Tajuddin expected to have the position of the first senior minister i.e. the second position in 
the cabinet just after Mujib, but Mujib maintained the pre-war party hierarchy in assigning 
different positions. The importance of Tajuddin, who had been the PM till then, was greatly 
diminished. Nazrul Islam took precedence over him in the cabinet, but this was by virtue of 
his seniority. Some saw in the change a deliberate downgrading of Tajuddin^'^". Despite 
Khandakar Mustaq's departure firom AL in 1955, and conspiracy against the liberation, due to 
collegial feelings Mujib gave him the important ministry of electricity, irrigation, and flood 
control. Popular student leader, Tofail Ahmed became Mujibs personal secretary, and was 
given the status of step-minister. Mujib had high affection for Tofail, and he always wanted to 
mentor Tofail in the way Sharawardy mentored him^'". The national and provincial 
assemblies were merged into one body to be called "Constitutional Assembly" and the task of 
drafting the constitution was given to the Assembly. Shah Abdul Hamid and Mohmad Ullah 
were elected as the Speaker and deputy-Speaker of the Constitutional Assembly, respectively. 
The total number of members in the Constitutional Assembly was 470 but about 425 members 
joined the Assembly meetings. All of them did not participated in the meetings because the 
Pakistani army killed some of the members and some were ousted fi:om the party due to 
different political reasons '^^ ^. 
The denigrating law and order situation was the major challenge for the new regime. 
Mujib disbanded the Mukti Bahaini and asked its members to surrender their arms. Despite a 
large number of the guerillas did not surrender their arms, a substantial number of guerillas 
did so^ "^ .^ Maximum of the guerillas were motivated to do so due to their sense of deep respect 
and loyalty to Mujib^'^. However, Mujib was not so fortunate in his effort to persuade a 
Maoist group led by Abdul Matin and Md. Allauddin to surrender their arms and to relinquish 
control of an area that it seized fi-om the Pakistani military control during the war. When all 
possible peacefiil means of Mujib failed, the army was ordered into the area, and the area was 
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Abdul Huq, op. cit.; pp. 273-74. Also R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; p. 64. 
Abdul Huq, op. cit.; p. 281. 
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brought under control. About 50 to 60 Maoist cadres were killed in the skirmish '^*^. The law 
and order situation improved considerably in a short period of time, which would not be 
possible to achieve without a leader like Mujib '^*®. The new government of Dhaka was slowly 
getting in shape and the administrative authority over the districts was slowly being 
redesigned. 
Tajuddin damaged AL by proposing initiatives against the religious values, practices, 
and expectations of the regular people in Bangladesh. Religious group, which were lying low, 
started agitation on the issues. It was too good a chance for them to miss and they would have 
received encouragement from some AL leaders who were to the right of the centre and hostile 
to Tajuddin '^*^. Mujib was the leader of the masses. He was the man of strong common sense. 
He could understand the pulse of the people. Mujib was aware of the public feeling and tried 
to rectify the situation promptly. Upon his return to Bangladesh, in a public speech on 10 
January 1972 he reminded the people. "Bangladesh is the second largest Muslim nation in the 
world next to Indonesia, India is the third, and Pakistan is the fourth" '^*®. He acceded to the 
popular demand of restoring the recitation of Quran in the national TV and radio. He further 
prohibited drinking of Alcohol, as it was anti-Islamic '^^ ^. To nourish and propagate Islam in 
the country, his government established Islamic foundation. Even though many of the Muslim 
countries supported Pakistan during the war through financial, military, and logistic means, he 
started rebuilding relations with the Muslim countries. He attended the 1974 Islamic summit 
in Lahore. This tactical change of policies of Mujib encouraged the rightist of the centre in 
Mujib believed in parliamentary democracy. He spent a considerable amount of time 
in the prison since 1949 in his struggle for establishing democracy. Tajuddirm's plan of all-
party goverrmient of the basis of national consensus to foster socialistic social and economic 
structure was shelved. Instead of having all-party government of national consensus, AL 
formed a one party goverrmient on the basis of absolute majority. The plan of building 
National Militia, similar to China type People's Army, with the freedom fighters was 
dropped. Instead National Para-military was formed in order to safeguard the narrow political 
goals, and announcements were made to secure US help in rebuilding Bangladesh within 
weeks^^'. Unlike Tajuddin Mujib had no reservation about from where the help come. Bengali 
needed help on a scale that perhaps only a worldwide response could meet^^^. Mujib's appeal 
for help from all countries was a departure from the former policy of the government. Many 
Mujib ordered to crash the resistance of this particular group, because tolerating it would have encouraged 
war-lordism by other groups including Marxist-Leninists. See, Zillur R. Khan, The Third World Charismat, op. 
cit;p. 161. 
^^ Abdul Huq, op. cit.; pp. 273 & 281. 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib?, op. cit.; pp. 110 and 116. These groups were hardly distinguishable from 
Muslim Leaguers m their outlook despite their secular professions. 
For Mujib's 10 January 1972 public speech see Zahid Hossain (edits.), Voice of Freedom, (Dhaka: 
Bangladesh Parishad, 1999), p. 247,. 
Zillur R. Khan, The Third World Charismat, op. cit; p. 179. Also see A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib?, op. 
cit; pp. 115-16. 
Because of Tajuddin's initiative to ban recitation holi Quran and other Islamic practices in radio and 
television broadcastings and because of his not inclusion of some of the Muslim festival days in the list of 
national holidays a large section of religious Muslims became discontent over AL. Though Mujib took different 
measures to reduce their unhappiness but their discontent and suspicion on AL was not reduced totally. In the 
post-1975 politics different governing parties and anti-AL pohtical parties utilized this discontent of the masses 
and propagated that if AL came to the power agam Islam would be in danger. 
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of the freedom fighters were waiting to join the National Militia proposed by Tajuddin as a 
permanent source of employment, and this group went extremely fhistrated by the 
announcement of Mujib. Unemployment level was really high among the freedom fighters. So 
some of them picked up terror as a way of meeting their financial needs^^^. 
In the absence of Mujib, Tajuddin ran the government in exile as the PM, and ran the 
war. Instead of waiting for the return of Mujib and not by giving any heed/ importance on the 
contemplation that AL was a party of the people of various ideology and thinking (who were 
united in the platform by the nationalist appeal of Mujib to achieve the economic 
emancipation of the country) Tajuddin advanced a lot in formulating the planning to govern 
the country according to his own chosen ideology. But it was the reality Tajuddin was made 
the PM as a lieutenant of Mujib and depending on the popularity of Mujib^^'' (in the name of 
him liberation war was fought) as a skilled administrator ran the government in exile as the 
PM, and ran the war. Not only that when Mujib returned from the Jail of Pakistan all the AL 
leaders mcluding Tajuddin became dim in front of his charismatic image. But for long one 
year Tajuddin was handling enormous political power and became habituated by with applaud 
of the media and press. In such situation when Mujib did not accept Tajuddin's contemplation 
he and his associates started feeling ignored. They became unhappy. In their private 
conversation they discussed that Mujib had no reservation about accepting help from any 
quarters because he had been in prison during the war. They called it a turn about and feared 
that this would be the beginning of a reversal in declaring policies^^^. But as Mujib's authority 
was supreme and no one dared to criticize him openly. Moreover as Tajuddin was posing 
himself as the hero of the successful liberation war of Bangladesh now he was not ready to be 
satisfied by feeling himself as one of the prominent lieutenant of Mujib. Rather he wanted to 
claim his right as a leader in a subtle manner. But it should be mentioned here that Tajuddin 
would never rise high in AL, if it had not been for Mujib. According to Khatib from the very 
beginning many to the exfreme right in the AL were against Tajuddin. Mujib shielded him, 
build him and made him the GS of AL despite opposition from Mustaq and some others. 
Mujib saw in Tajuddin a good and entirely dependable lieutenant who would faithfully carry 
any task entrusted to him . In these developments, a power conflict between Mujib and 
Tajuddin was not unexpected. Many of the AL leaders and the youth wing of AL, led by 
Sheikh Mony (who were not ready to abide by the leadership of Tajuddin) were not unaware 
of this newly developed conflict/ disagreement and wanted to capitalize on it. 
Form the beginning of the liberation war the youth leaders disagreed to follow the 
leadership of Tajuddin. They were never friendly towards the leadership of Tajuddin, and this 
was one of the groups, which denied Tajuddin's request for surrendering the arms. They 
denied it on the ground that they are not going to surrender the arms until Mujib is freed from 
the Pakistani prison^^'. After Mujib's return to Bangladesh JL leaders complained to Mujib 
how they were unfairly freated by Tajuddin during the war and after the war. They alleged 
that they were neglected by Tajuddin during the war and were harassed by him after the war. 
They further alleged that during the liberation war Tajuddin did not give proper honor to 
Bangabandhu (Mujib). Tajuddin did not have any respectable feeling for Bangabandhu and he 
(Tajuddin) wanted to be the sole claimer of all the achievement of the war. Mujib always had 
Mohammad Abdu] Mohaimen, Dhaka-Agartala-Mujibnagar, op. cit.; p. 138. Also see Major Rafiqul Islam, 
Twenty two Years of Liberation War, op. cit.; pp. 7-8. 
Moudud Ahmed, Constitutional Quest for Autonomy (in Bengali), op. cit.; p. 220. 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib?,"op. cit; p. 113. 
Ibid. 134. 
Badruddin Ahmed, Sadhina Sangramer Nephattha Kahini, (Dhaka: Begum Rehana Sultana, 1986); p. 117. 
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a soft comer for the youth groups due to good reasons. This was the group (youths) that stuck 
with him throughout the struggle; they contributed the most in blood and in time. Mujib heard 
their allegation but did not get opportunity to verify the truth of it. He became very busy in 
rebuilding the war ravage country. Hence Mujib tried to address many of their concerns 
immediately, and to gain their confidence placed some of the youth leaders in the important 
positions of the party and administration, j^pidly they established their influence everywhere 
of the administration. Though Tajuddin was the cabinet member according to Badruddin 
Ahmed Bangabandhu started ignoring him and gave importance to the youth leaders^^®. 
Tajuddin hardly got any opportimity to make his case to Mujib. After his return to 
Bangladesh on January 11, 1972 Mujib met with Tajuddin for a short period simply to 
reassign the leadership positions in the government. But there was never enough time for 
Mujib to go in details about Tajuddin's activities with Tajuddin. Mujib got busy with his work 
of rebuilding the country and its economy. Tajuddin on the other hand could not do much 
other than being saddened^^'. In some occasion he regretted that Mujib never wanted to know 
his side of the story, what kind of problems he faced and how he addressed those problems^^®. 
Though Tajuddin as the PM of the exiled Bangladesh government worked in the shadow of 
Mujib's charisma and even though the liberation war was fought in the name of Mujib, the 
nine months liberation war, where his job as the PM was very crucial, gave him a chance to 
prove him mettle. The role of Tajuddin in 1971 definitely increased his inner feeling of 
confidence and prestige. Like others Tajuddin was not ready to loose newly developed 
importance. Khatib wrote, if Tajuddin felt that Mujib did not fully appreciate his work during 
the nine months of the war, it would have been only a human^^'. 
Soon after getting the power, Tajuddin announced that socialism would be established 
in Bangladesh. At that time questions arose regarding the class characteristics of AL, whether 
they are conducive to socialism or not. The pro-Chinese political parties said that it is just an 
empty statement by AL. For a party consisted of middle class and petty bourgeois people, 
which believed in capitalism to certain extent, it was not possible to establish socialism. On 
the contrary, the pro-Moscow NAP (M) and CPB believed that it was possible for AL to 
establish socialism, and if AL were to do so they would support AL. But after Mujib's return, 
the youth wing started to propagate another view Mujibism. They declared that Mujibism had 
to be established^®^. Tajuddin, who believed Bangladesh could be build only on socialist line, 
said, "Scientific socialism have to be established. Pure socialism will be established in 
Bangladesh, nothing else"^ ® .^ All the leaders of AL and ministers supported the Mujibism and 
also engaged in campaign to popularize it. The student leaders said those who would create 
hindrance in the establishment of Mujibism they would be eliminated^®'*. Sheikh Moni said 
that any criticism against Mujibism would not be tolerated. If any quarter tried to frustrate the 
establishment of Mujijbism Aey would be fighting against it^ ®^ But Tajuddina, and his group 
continued to propagate their views on socialism. He said, "It is not possible to establish 
socialism by the current machineries of capitalism (i.e. AL party). I believe on pure 
socialism"^®®. On 12 August 1972 Tajuddin said that if democracy were to be a hindrance inn 
Ibid., Badruddin Ahmed; pp. ] 17-20. 
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the way to socialism, democracy would be sacrificed^^^. In response Nazrul Islam said, "If 
socialism stands in the way of democracy, we can do without socialism"^^®. President Abu 
Sayed Chowdhury also got involved in this conflict, and on 18 July 1972 announced that the 
country would be ruled according to the democratic rules and values^® .^ All these events led to 
an extreme confusion. 
Democracy and socialism were two of the four principles of Mujibism. Mujib got 
concerned about the situation and wanted to put a stop to it. But the damage was done already 
in the highest leadership of For the purpose of party building by institutionalizing the 
charisma of Sheikh Mujib the so-called new ideology 'Mujibism' it became popular after the 
independence. It was based on four principles: nationalism, democracy, socialism, and 
secularism^^'. The President Abu Sayeed Chowdhiuy, Na2xul Islam, and other party members 
believed in Mujibism but Tajuddin never promoted it. He stressed and promoted socialism. 
Mujinb did not like it, and the members siding with Tajuddm started to be marginalized 
witliin the party^'^. Which led to Tajuddin's departure from the AL cabinet in 1974. 
In the middle of 1972, AL had its First National Council in the independent 
Bangladesh^'^. According to the constitution of AL, if AL forms a government a person 
holding a post in the government will not be allowed to have any executive position in the 
executive committee of AL. Mujib was holding the position of the President of AL and the 
position of PM simultaneously. As within 1972 opposition parties became active in the street 
politics the party needed to reorganize itself and strengthen its organizational base up to the 
grassroots level. Though Mujib wanted to surrender the party President-ship but to keep the 
party unity intact and to strengthen its organizational base by using the popularity of Mujib, 
the party workers and leaders decided to allow Mujib to continue in both of the positions 
along with his cabinet ministers some of whom were also playing dual role^ '^*. Most of the 
nominations for most of the positions in the executive body remained relatively unchanged 
except for the position of the general secretary (GS) of the party. In the pre-independent 
period Kamruzzaman was the GS of Pakistan AL and Tajuddin was the GS of the East 
Paksitan province AL. The number one Joint Secretary was Mizan Chowdhuiy and since long 
he had been interested to be the GS of the party^^^ No one of them was made GS. Rather 
comparatively young and unknown but loyal to Mujib and honest Zillur Rahman was made 
the party GS as he was acceptable to Mujib^'^. Tajuddin and Kamruzzaman were made the 
Vice President of the party with Syed Nazrul Islam, Monsur Ali and Mustaq Ahmed. Zillur 
Rahman was physically relatively weak to deliver his responsibility as the party GS. To 
address this issue Abdur Razaak was designated as organizing secretary (OS). Ultimately, 
Abdur Razaak and Tofail Ahmed were in charge of organizing the party. By this change 
Mujib was confirmed his absolute control over the executive body of the party. AL started 
rebuilding its organization form the grass root level. Since its inception though AL was only 
Daily Purbadesh and Dainik Bangla, 21 Auugst 1972. According to Khatib, Tajuddin said, "If democracy 
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and a very popular party in the country but the party organization was election and movement 
oriented. The party leaders and workers used to inspired and became active centering on 
different popular issues or when any general election was declared. And on the basis of the 
popularity of its issue based movement it could get the support of the ordinary people. Except 
these issue based activities the party did not have any other workings. So grass root 
organizations (in union or ward level) were virtually nonexistent for AL. Though there were 
presence of thana (sub-district) committees but those were also disorganized/ in disorderly 
condition and in maximum case committees were incomplete. After the independence relief 
committees were formed at thana, union and ward level by including the AL workers to 
rehabilitated the war-ravaged families, to deliver food and other necessities, hi order to spread 
regular party activities in the grass root level, the party decided to convert these small relief 
committees to grass root party organizations^^^. hi this way with relative ease, AL was able to 
establish it strong and well-organized grass root level organizations. 
Through the National Councils of 1972 and 1973, much change took place within AL, 
especially in leadership structure. Many youth leaders from the CL and JL got position in the 
central committee^^^. This input of fresh bloods those believed in Mujibism and loyal to 
Mujib certainly helped in getting rid of some of the conflict ridden factional leaders vdthin 
AL. One of the important developments of the latter council was the resignation of Mujib 
from his position in AL. He left the presidency of AL to show his respect for party 
constitution and set an example. Kamruz Zaman, the number five leader of the party lineup, 
became the president of AL . Sayed Nazrul Islam and Monsr Ali were the 2"" and leaders 
in the party lineup but they gave up their top positions in the party hierarchy to maintain their 
assignments as cabinet ministers^^ . Tajuddin's position in the party lineup was third but he 
was not preferred for the post due to Mujib's reservation about him. In some ways, Mujib 
wanted to distance himself from the party for various reasons that was also one of the factors 
of his giving up the party President-ship. Given the rampant corruption, greed, and conflicts 
among the members of the party, and the deteriorating law and order situation in Bangladesh, 
AL as a party became a burden for Mujib instead of being a blessing^^'. So he was not ready 
to bear these burdens for no reason. He figured it out that his authority came from the mass 
and as long as he serves the mass he would be in shape, and as a leader serving the mass was 
his main priority. So instead of bearing the burden of corruptions and misconduct of the party 
he preferred to be remain as the Father of the Nation of Bengalis, Bangabandhu and the 
unparallel leader of the country, hi this way he tried to maintain a good relationship with the 
majority of the people irrespective their political persuasion but slowly and artfully 
^^. Interview with A. Razzaq. 
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maintained a distance with his own party^^ .^ Moreover, like the opposition parties he became 
much more candid/ vocal in criticizing some of the activities of his own party leaders^® .^ Due 
to these the popularity of AL declined somewhat in late 1973 but Mujib's popularity remained 
relatively intact. He remained in the heart of the Bengali masses. In 1973 elections Bengali 
voted the AL candidates for a individual man (Mujib) not really for his party^ '^*. 
In post-war AL politics, selection of Mujib's relatives in top AL positions was quite 
noticeable . This bias persisted and became a topic of discussion. The charge that Mujib was 
building a family dynasty received substantial credence beyond any doubt^ ® .^ Abdur Rab 
Semeabad, the husWd of one of Mujib's four sisters enjoyed the position of a cabinet 
minister during the Mujib government. He also was a central committee member of AL. His 
son Abul Hasnat Abdullah was the secretary of Barisal district Jubo (youth) League. As a 
youth leader Abul Hasnat organized his own private army, intimidated political opponents, 
and was elected the chairman of the Barisal Municipality in elections by doing unfair means. 
As the chairman of the municipality and nephew of Mujib he was creating a fairly strong 
political base for himself in Barisal on the strength of his power to grant licenses and permits 
of businesses and he too had amassed considerable amount of wealth. The worst reputation by 
far of any of Mujib's relatives was enjoyed by another of Mujib's nephew (son of one of his 
sister), Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni, commonly known as the nephew of the nation. In 1970, he 
was a newspaper reporter. After the liberation, he built a network of militant youth 
organizations as a head of his uncles JL. Member of this group were allowed to carry arms. 
Most observers viewed the band of armed youth as Mujib's private armed force. By becoming 
owner and operator of two major newspapers, Banglar Bani and Bangladesh Times, Moni 
wielded considerable amount of power over the opinion building elite of the country^^^. After 
1972 he also became member of central AL, and Jatio Sramik League (the labor wing of 
AL)^ ^ .^ Another nephew of Mujib, Sheikh Shahidul Islam, became the president of CL in 
1972 at the age of 24. He was a ranking member of the AL central committee, and was 
involved in a number of private enterprises as a board of director^®'. Mujib's elder son. Sheikh 
Kamal, was a student in Dhaka University but was well connected with the central AL 
members even vwthout a position. His introduction to AL politics seems to be simply a matter 
of time^^°. Furthermore, he was already holding the position of secretary of the Bangladesh 
Sports Federation^®'. Kamal's yoimger brother, Jamal was in the army. It seemed he was 
being groomed to take over the Bangladesh Army, and in some occasions Mujib did make 
explicit statements along this line. He used to say, "He (Jamal) will be the head of my army 
some day"^'^. In addition to these, Mujib's other brother Sheikh Nasir and sister's husbands 
were enjoying unrestricted illegal privileges due to Mujib's absolute control over the 
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governing party and his sustained popularity^^^. The allegation of Mujib's dynasty building 
activity took root. This dynasty building efforts coupled with strong rumor about rampant 
corruption of members of Mujib's close circle alienated many of the AL leaders and the 
people of Bangladesh in general^''*. Many of the AL leaders felt helpless in this situation by 
realizing their limited auAority within the party when Mujib's nephews and other relatives 
were engaging in controlling AL and its ancillary organizations^® . 
The constitution formulated in 1972 accepted a parliamentary type of government. In 
this constitution the Presidential post of the country is an honorable position; constitutionally 
President is a titular head of the country without having any significant administrative power. 
As constitutionally the President was not assigned any administrative power Abu Sayeed 
Chowdhury, the then president, was unhappy^'^. The other reason of the President's 
discontent was that PM Mujib and his colleagues in the cabinet also showed their negligence 
to the provision included in the constitution by not coming to the President to attend the 
formal courtesy meetings. According to the constitution the head of the government (PM) and 
other ministers would formally meet the President and would inform him about the 
happenings of their respective ministries^® .^ He was very unhappy that he is the head of the 
state but he has no say in the state affairs; even he is not regularly informed about the 
happening of the country^ ®®. He was discontented to Mujib as he was not giving proper 
respect in different state affairs, hi December 1973 President was hearted when bypassing 
constitutional provision, in the place of the President, the PM Mujib declared the general 
amnesty to the people who were imprisoned on the accusation of their involvement in the 
anti-liberation activities^®'. During the state visit of President Chowdhury in hidia, by 
breaking the state protocol PM Mujib was not present in the airport to see off him, though 
President deserved that from the PM because of his supreme status in the constitution. It made 
the President sorrowful^"". 
An ideological difference was developed between PM Mujib and President Sayeed in 
1974 when day-by-day Mujib was showing his inclination towards socialism and was 
concentrating all the governing power in his hand. President Chowdhury was a pure democrat. 
His contemplation was that only democracy could achieve the social and economic goal of the 
nation. According to him it was right that before taking over of power Mujib was the espouser 
of democracy but after becoming the head of the government he was deviated a lot from the 
mainstream democracy. President used to say - a difference is arisen between democracy and 
the Father of the Nation (Mujib)^°'. In his personal circle President also said, "Democratic 
practice has not been established in the country. Bangabandhu concentrated all the power in 
his hand. He is acting like a dictator.... Democracy is more important than any individual"^®^. 
Personally President was discontent with many of the undemocratic activities of the 
government. During his tenure of Presidentship he had to give approval on some repressive 
acts against his own free will like that of 'Special Power Ordinance'. But he was not ready to 
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sign such undemocratic files. Instead of involving himself in such undemocratic activities (i.e. 
signing such undemocratic files) he preferred to resign^® .^ 
That time contemporary Bangladesh society was confused on the issue: between the 
'Father of the Nation' and President, who would be given more protocol. Though PM Mujib 
was the govenunental head but the newspapers used to give preference on Mujib over the 
President. Though President was the chief of armed force, but in different state ceremonies 
Mujib used to accept the guard-of-honor. The president used to avoid those ceremonies^®'^ . 
Two reasons were working behind it: i) there was no one in Bangladesh who could reach 
towards the towering personality of Mujib. So some people crossed the limit of adore/ respect 
because of their too much emotion for Bangabandhu. (ii) Moreover according to Aziz Missir, 
"The wind is in favor of Bangabandhu. So some flatters have been flattering Bangabandhu in 
a skilled way without bothering protocol - they don't bother the limitation of their flattery"^°^ 
The people were giving privilege to Mujib over President in showing their respect as the 
'Father of the Nation', which created dilemma between the 'Father of the Nation' and the 
President. 
The honesty, simplicity and strong personality of the President some times created 
irritating situation for Mujib. A deep difference could be developed in-between PM Mujib and 
President Chwodhury. That was not happened, because, the gap between the two was 
removed by enormous respect of the President for the 'Father of the Nation'. The internal 
dilemma of President Chowdhuiy was that he had a lot of love and respect for Mujib. 
Moreover as the 'Father of the Nation' Mujib's position was above the President.^°^. However 
in this awkward situation President Chowdhury preferred to resign from the president-ship. So 
one day President requested PM Mujib to accept his resignation. He added that as the 
President of the country he was being neglected. Rather he might be appointed the special 
envoy of Bangladesh in the foreign countries. There he would have scope to do some work for 
the coimtry^® . On 23 December 1973 his resignation letter was accepted and immediately he 
was appointed a roving ambassador with special privileges befitting an ex-President^°^. 
Afterward, Mujib preferred that time Speaker Mohammadullah as the next President 
of Bangladesh. The replacement of Mohammadullah in the position of Chowdhury was a big/ 
clear change for the dignified presidential post. President Chowdhury had been the former 
Chief Justice, former Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University, during liberation war had been 
the visiting ambassador of exiled interim government of Bangladesh to assemble the world 
opinion in favor of Bengalis liberation struggle against Pakistan regimes atrocity. He was also 
well known for his wide intellectuality and expertness in literacy and cultural line. Though the 
President Chowdhury did not have Political background and was not well known in the 
political arena but because of his strong personality and contribution to the liberation war he 
was well known in the coimtry and abroad. Side by side President Mohamadullah was the 
office secretaiy of AL organization for long before the independence. In 1972 he became the 
Deputy Speaker of the National Parliament of Bangladesh and just before his appointment in 
the presidential post he was elected the Speaker of the Parliament because of the former 
Mahbub Talukder, Five Years in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; pp. 82-85. 
Dally Ganakantha, 25 December 1973. 
Aziz Misir, Political column: "Aina (Mirror)", daily Banglar Hani, 3 October 1972. 
Mahbub Talukder, Five Years in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; pp. 83 & 93. 
Ibid. 71. Also see Syed Mudasser All, Unkle Story of AL, op. cit.; 60. Also see Moudud Ahmed, Era of 
Sheikh Mujib, op. cit.; p. 303. 
Mahbub Talukder, Five Years in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; pp. 82-83. Also A.L. Khatib, op. cit.; p. 41. And 
daily Ganakantha, 25 December 1973. 
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Speaker's sudden death^°'. Though Mohammadullah had a long political career he was not a 
renowned politician. He has risen to the presidential post through a lucky chance of events. 
The new President did not engage in personality clash with Mujib as from earlier he had 
believed Mujib as his leader. As Mohammadullah did every thing according to the wish of 
Mujib, as the new President did not try to interfere in the decision making process of the 
government - for the reason Chowdhury resigned - and the new president accepted the reality 
that 'Mujib is supreme over every one' so any difference did not arise between him and 
Mujib^'°. Moreover according to Moudud Ahmed, "By sending Chowdhury to abroad as the 
special ambassador of Bangladesh S. Mujib cleared the path to bring about any kind of 
change to the constitution and replaced a simple and loyal personality like Mohammadullah in 
his position. It became convenient for Mujib to get any work from Mohammadullah, the then 
President of the country"^'V Mohammadullah was the President of the country for one year. 
On 25 January 1975 one party BAKSAL system was introduced in Bangladesh. At the 
same time by changing the parliamentary system, presidential form of government was 
introduced. From the beginning to end Mujb was the centre of power. After the introduction 
of the new governing system he became the President of the country. The two ex-Presidents 
of Mujib, Mohammadullah and Chowdhury, were appointed the ministers in the Mujib 
cabinet^They were taken into the cabinet against their own free will. That was a terrible 
comedown for two distinguished ex-President 
Tajuddin, the jSnance minister, was pro-Indian, pro-USSR and rabidly anti-USA. He 
was committed not to accepting any investment or contribution for the USA. He reasoned that 
the worldwide US patronage and promotion of capitalism made the poor poorer and the rich 
richer. This is a system through which a hand full of people controls the capital and the rest 
suffers. Additionally, the USA provided arms and economic supported to Pakistani Junta 
during the war and indirectly participated in the oppression and genocide^ '^*. When in the 
rebuilding of Bangladesh Mujib accepted the help of the capitalist West European countries 
including USA, Tajuddin openly criticized all initiatives in getting help from the west. He 
said, "By accepting resources from the capitalist countries it is never possible to establish 
socialism"^Even, though China collaborated with Pakistan during the war, his voice toward 
China was more reconciliatory. He used to consider China as a great nation with some 
reservation of its role during the war. Once he told, "Chin is a great nation, it always 
struggled/ fought against the imperialist countries"^'®. In another place he said, "We are 
dishearten by observing the conduct/ manner of Chin towards us during our liberation 
struggle. But we are ready to forget that if realize the reality and agree to/ accept it"^* .^ On the 
contrary, Khandakar Mustaq was preferring to pursue the capitalist path^'^; always the 
supporter in favor of the west. Since before the liberation war he was leading the pro-USA 
lobby in AL. He was also from a Muslim saint (Pir) family. From the beginning: i) he was 
keen on accepting investment and help from the USA and ii) building firm relationship with 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib, op. cit.; pp. 40-41. 
Mahbub Talukder, Five Years in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; p. 120. 
Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib, op. cit.; p. 303. 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib, op. cit.; p. 41. 
Ibid. p. 41. Also see Mahbub Talukder, Five Years in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; p. 161. 
Shmin Hossain Rimi (edits.), Tajuddin: Glimps from Histoiy (in Bengali), (Dhaka: Pratibhas, 2000). Also 
see Ashfaq Alam Shapan, The Conspiracy to Kill Mujib (in Bengali), (Dhaka: Tridhara Prakasani, 1988); p. 71. 
Damik Bangla, 27 January 1973. 
Daily Purbadesh, 26 December 1971. 
Daily Ittefaq, 26 January 1972. 
Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 298. 
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all the Muslim countries^ (even with the countries which opposed the independence of 
Bangladesh). Ideologically he was the opposite of Tajuddin. Sayed Nazrul Islam was a 
centrist with regards to economic policy^ He was grateful to India and the USSR for their 
help during the war, and was also interested in getting the help from the west in rebuilding the 
country. Kamruz Zaman, Monsur Ali, Mizan Chowdhury, Sheikh Abdul Aziz and maximum 
of the AL leaders were also having the same attitude and they were centrist on economic 
issues. Sheikh Abdul Aziz and Mizan Chowdhury were deeply interested in having good 
relationship with the oil rich Muslim countries^^'. Actually the AL was a heterogeneous party. 
Mustaq and Tajuddin represented two wings of it. While Tajuddin was a socialist and wanted 
a socialist order in Bangladesh, Mustaq was somewhat pro-western and a little more Muslim -
in the sectarian sense than the others and believed in free enterprise. Tajuddin was anti-USA 
and pro-Indian. Opposite to Tajuddin Mustaq was pro-USA and anti-Indian. Tajuddin was 
intelligent enough, methodical and outspoken, but Mustaq was bom schemer. Unlike 
Tajuddin and Mustaq Mujib had no reservation about any country. Moreover while Mujib was 
responsive to the radical suggestions, he was reluctant to exercise his authority on the 
conservative section of his party^^ .^ 
Mujib was a nationalistic leader. AL was an umbrella organization and in 1964 when 
the party was reorganized the people of different ideological leaning - from left to right, 
moderate and extremist - without any discrimination all joined the party. All the that time 
leaders of AL were having middle class background^^^. Since its inception in 1949, AL had 
been the party of the progressive Bangali middle class. Many members of the communist 
parties joined AL due to the ban on communist parties in Pakistan^ '^* but one of the prominent 
characteristics of the party was to oppose the communism in public. During 1956-1957, in the 
debate on pro-western foreign policy for Pakistan Mujib supported Hussain Shahid 
Suhawardy. This made some of the communist leaders leave AL and form NAP. Until close 
to 1969, Mujib had been opposing socialism consistently'^^. Interestingly, in the 
reorganization of AL since 1964 people from both the left and the right came into the fold of 
AL. With these mixed blessings, under the pressure of progressive socialist youth, Mujib 
agreed to incorporate socialism in the election manifesto of 1970, and promised to maintain a 
parliamentary democracy and a socialistic economy. Due to the help of India and the USSR in 
the liberation war, Mujib had to deviate from his earlier political alignment, in addition he had 
to promote socialistic economic system but he maintained his continuous support for 
parliamentary democracy. Furthermore, in 1972 he opened up the door for US aid to rebuild 
the economy despite fierce opposition from Tajuddin . After the 1973 election victory by a 
reshuffle of his cabinet now confident Mujib replaced his previous pro-Moscow Foreign 
Minister by a pro-western Dr. Kamal Hossain. Though Tajuddin remained the Finance 
Minister, Mujib also took additional charge of Planning Ministry, which was previously at the 
Interview with Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. 
Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 298. 
Interview with Sheikh Abdul Aziz and Mizan Chowdhury. 
^^^ Khatib, pp. 22,45,63,110,125 and 133. 
See the occupational background and annual Income group of AL MPs elected in the 1970 and 1973 
parliamentary elections in R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; pp. 151- 54. 
. The that time leader of Pakistan Communist Party Moni Singh encouraged even the top rank (even those who 
were enjoying the dignity of 'red star') leaders to Join AL in order to save them from the repression of the 
Pakistan government. Interview with Mizan Chowdhuiy. 
Ahmed Sofa, Political writing, op. cit.; pp. 24-25 and 33. 
On May 1972 for the first time the US government signed an agreement with Bangladesh to give ninety 
million nonrefimdable cash US $ (dollar) as economic assistance. See Abdul Huq, op. cit.; pp. 287-88/ 
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hand of Tajuddin^^'. This change confirmed the new pro-western trend of Mujib goyemment 
though it was for a short period. According to Abdul Huq, "By this maneuver of Mujib's 
cabinet the pro-western forenign policy of Bangladesh is strengthened"^^®. One US journalist 
reported it a change to resist leftist pressure^^^. After this, Mujib visited capitalist country, 
Japan. To revitalize the war-torn Bangladesh economy, Mujib invited the Japanese capital in 
Bangladesh. In the same time he also assured the leftist of Bangladesh tliat by his capital 
investment policy in Bangladesh, his previous nationalization policy (the policy to 
nationalization of the heavy industries, banks, and insurance companies etc) would not be in 
danger. Socialist Tajuddin could not accept such big change of government policy^^®. In a 
'56 October Revolution Anniversary program' arranged by Bangladesh-Soviet Friendship 
society as the chief guest Tajuddin said, "We shall convey boom basting speech on the name 
of socialism but in imagination we shall hope/dream to make friendship with the enemies of 
socialism - it is a deviation"^^'. But Mujib was not ready to come out from his own thought. 
On 19 February 1974 the ardent pro-USA Mustaq was allotted the charge of Commerce 
Ministry, for which he was hoping since long^^ .^ Bangladesh is a poor country. After the 
independence it was extremely suffering from severe economic crisis. When socialist 
countries were not able to provide enough economic assistance, Bangladesh was bound to 
depend on western countries especially on USA. To get their kind favor Mujib changed his 
policy and tilted towards capitalist countries i.e. USA"^ On July 1974, six mimsters in 
addition to the state minister resigned from the cabinet of which majority was believed to be 
the supporter of finance minister Tajuddin Ahmed^ '^*. Jugt before the resignation of the pro-
Tajuddin ministers from cabinet some newspapers reported that a tug of war/ tussle between 
pro Indo-USSR Versus pro-USA ministers of Mujib cabinet was going on. Many of the 
cabinet members might be removed from the cabinet^^^. The Tajuddin's group within AL 
became weaker around this time. On 23 October 1974 Mujib went to the USA for a state visit, 
by the end of the same month US Foreign Secretary Henry Kissenger visited Bangladesh. 
Many analysts considered it as an introduction to a permanent relationship. They also 
mentioned that due to the newly developed relation between the coimtries in the internal 
politics of AL the pro-USA lobby was strengthened^^^. As a consequence within AL, an 
extreme polarization took place. Members of AL got separated in two camps within the party, 
the pro-India and pro-USSR camp and the pro-USA camp. 
The Bangladesh Observer and Sangbad, 17 March 1973. 
Abdul Huq, op. cit.; p. 303. 
A.L. Khatib, Who Killed Mujib, op. cit.; p. 98. When Dr. Kamal first entered in the Mujib cabinet US 
journalist reported AL was recruiting youths to resist leftist pressure (Khatib, p. 98). 
^^ ^ Political column: "Satta boi mittha bolibo naa (i shall tell the truth not the lie)"; daily Bangabarta, 23 
November 1973. 
Daily Bangabarta, 23 November 1973. 
" I Dainik Bangla and The People, 20 February 1974. 
Ganakantha, 20 November and 5 December 1973. 
Rangalal Sen, Political Elites in Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 298. Bangladesh Times, 8 July 1974. Many 
newspapers akeady predicted that due to proUSSR Vs pro-USA conflict some of the ministers of Mujib cabinet 
might loose their minister-ship (Dainik Bangla, 24 June 1974). Osmani and Matiur Rahman were among the six 
ousted ministers. Though they were not with the socialist group but were ousted due to their inefficiency in 
running their respective ministry (daily Samag editorial, 9 July 1974). 
Dainik Bangla, 24 June 1974. 
Abdul Huq, op. cit; p. 340. On 30 December 1974 in a press conference Heniy Kissinger commented on 
Mujib, "A man of vast conception. I had rarely met a man who was the father of his nation and this was a 
particularly unique experience for me" (see daily Ittefaq and Bangladesh Observer, 31 October 1974). 
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Mujib was willing to maintain a good relationship with India for their contribution in 
the war but was unwilling to solely depend on India on other domestic and foreign policy 
issues. Mujib once said," I am not the dancing partner of Indera Gandhi. If I were not to 
return you (Bangladesh) would be Shikim"^^^. As a token of appreciation for India's help, 
when Indira Gandhi came to visit Bangladesh Mujib signed a peace and cooperation treaty for 
twenty-five years on 17 March 1972. The design of the treaty was very similar to the trea^ 
that India signed with the USSR. By this treaty Mujb made both India and USSR happy'^ . 
According to ex-foreign secretary of India, J. N. Dixit, even though Mujib knew that from the 
inception of Bangladesh, it needed the help and cooperation of India, he was not willing to 
become totally dependent on India. Given that West Pakistan was successful in exploiting 
East Pakistan from a good distance concerned Mujib. He suspected that India might end up 
doing that. Even some political analysts were suspecting that India might have been 
pondering on having Bangladesh as a client state. For some of these reservations, Mujib was 
actively trying to reduce the influence of India, and limit the relationship with hidia. 
According to Dixit, Mujib wanted people in Bangladesh to be recognized not only on the 
basis of language and Bengali culture but also on the basis of their Muslim identity. He 
wanted to be recognized as Bangali Muslim. Simply put he did not wanted to be swamped by 
the identification with West Bengal and India. For this reason he wanted that the Muslim 
countries of the country should recognize Bangladesh^^^. To promote his views and 
conviction, he went to the Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974 with the approval of his cabinet. 
Definitely India was displeased with Mujib on the issue '^'®. Before his visit to Lahore to attain 
the Islamic summit when he asked for the formal approval of his cabinet except for Tajuddin 
all other minister approved of it, Tajuddin vehemently opposed it^'". According to Dixit as the 
head of the goverrraient the leadersWp of Mujib did not met India's expectations^''^. In 
international politics neither the USA nor the USSR was pleased with the dealings of Mujib. 
Given that he was trying to maintain good relationship with both of the countries in economic 
and political terms frustrated them, and towards the end of 1974 USA, USSR and India 
became increasingly impatient and discontent '^^ ^. 
By utilizing the famine of 1974 and deteriorating law and order situation, JSD and 
other leftist organizations became active to remove Mujib from power and started armed 
movements, which exacerbated the political and economic situation^'*''. In these days within 
AL the pro-Tajuddin group was busy to control the governing power within the framework of 
parliamentary democracy by moving Mujib to the post of presidency i.e. By having Mujib as 
Riazuddin Ahmed, Salter Sandheney Pratidin, (Dhaka: Ananna Publishers, 2000); p. 28. 
Masudul Huq, RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 107. 
Informal interview with J.N. Dixit. Also see J.N. Dixit, Liberation and Beyond; India -Bangladesh Relations, 
(Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1999). 
^^^ Masudul Huq, RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 107. Participating the Islamic 
Summit proved to be net diplomatic gain to Mujib because Pakistan used it to legitimize the decision to 
recognize Bangladesh. It also opened the door for Bangladesh to enter UN and contact the Middle East countries 
which offered aid to the new nation (see M. Rasiduzzaman, "Changing Political Pattern in Bangladesh: Internal 
Constrains and External Fears"; Asian Survey, Vol. 17 No. 9 (September 1977); p. 798. It is necessary to 
mention it here that Moni supported Mujibs participation in the Summit. 
It is notable that in this time the anti-Indian feeling was visible clearly and openly. See Mofuz Chowdhury, In 
the Cabinet of Bangabandhu (in Benglai), op. cit.; p. 103. 
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the figurehead of the state^''^ The fiaistration and accusations against Mujib was mounting 
within AL, Many accused him of nepotism, and according to them SheikJi Moni was a virtual 
dictator under the shed of Mujib. The only way of containing individuals like Moni was to get 
to his main power source, which was Mujib. Tjuddin's group believed that Mujib's whim and 
discretion had been damaging the country '^'®. 
The famine of 1974 was devastating. The Mujib government made each and every 
effort possible to secure some help. Tajuddin, the Finance Minister, ran from one countries to 
another including both socialist and capitalist countries (including USA and USSR) with the 
hope to get help but without any success. When he returned to Dhaka on 13 October after a 
37-day foreign tour, he gave an airport interview to the press which was highly critical of the 
government. He said, "The country is suffering from famine. The present situation can't be 
continued. We cannot go on hiding our heads in the sand"^'*'. By remaining the cabinet 
member of the incumbent AL government Tajuddin openly criticized it, and blamed h for 
bringing the economy to shambles in public. He blamed Mujib and his misguided policies, 
and noted that there was no way that the Mujib government can deny the fact that there was a 
famine in the country. Instead of criticizing the administration in pubic he could do it in the 
cabinet meeting or in the internal party forum, which created additional turmoil within the 
party. Some supported Tajuddin's views and acts and some opposed it. Khondakar Mustaq, 
the head of pro-US lobby, criticized Tajuddin, and demanded immediate resignation of 
Tajuddin^''^. He told the son-in-law of Mujib, "Tajuddin can't remain in cabinet after this. It is 
a question of Bangabandhu's prestige. Either Tajuddin or Bangabandhu will have to go. But 
how can one think of Bangladesh without Bangabandhu" '^*®? The student and the youth wings 
of the party never had good impression about Tajuddin. They were always opposing him. 
These groups became considerably arouse by Tajuddin's blatant statements. They wanted to 
make sure that Tajuddin was dropped from the cabinet. They also started to promote another 
leader, Khaled Khurram, fi-om the constituency of Tajuddin so that he could compete with 
Poresh Saha, Bangladesh: Politics of Intregue, op. cit.; p. 105. And Mofiz Chowdhury, In the Cabinet of 
Bangabandhu, op. cit.; pp. 111 -12. 
Poresh Saha, Bangladesh: Politics of Intregue, op. cit.; pp. 105-06. Tajuddin group wanted to reduce the 
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1975 event. 
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M.A. Wajed Miah, Mujib ke Gherai Kishu Ghatana, op. cit.; pp. 192-93. Also see M. Rasiduzzaman, 
"Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh", op. cit.; p. 804. 
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op. cit.; pp. 192-95. there was disrespectful rivalry between Tajuddin and Mustaq. Once in an oblique reference 
to Mustaq, Tajuddin said, "Such a person is in root of all corruption that without ablution whose name should not 
be told" (see Political article: "Cheat Your Name is AL [Vondami Tomare Nam AL]", daily Ittefaq, 11 April 
1977). Although there was the presence of negligible opposition members in the National Parliament but the 
rivalry between Tajuddin group Versus Mustaq group and other anti-socialist (anti-Tajuddin) MPs during the 
parliamentary session inflamed it. There was no need of opposition MPs in fmding out the weakness or misdeeds 
done by AL. the factionally divided AL MPs were enough to disgrace the party by disgracing the AL ministers. 
For some examples see Debates of the Bangladesh National Parliament, speech of Moinul Hossain and Momin 
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speeches of Noor e Alam Siddiqui on 10 July 1974, and the speeches of Serajul Huq and Tajuddin Ahmed, 2 
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him in the election^^®. This way these two groups were trying to reduce Tajuddin's control 
over his constituency. By his criticism Tajuddin helped his rivals to engage Mujib against him 
and confirmed his own exit from the government. 
During the hard days of famine when Bangladesh was asking help from the 
world society USSR and India were incapable to fulfill the requirement of Bangladesh. 
Whatever aid Bangladesh received in those days mostly came from the capitalist countries 
rather than from India or the USSR. In this situation, the influence of Tajuddin led pro Indo-
Soviet group inside AL was decreased^^^ According to some of the political analysts in order 
to please the USA, Mujib removed, his long time ally and head of the exile government, 
Tajuddin, from the cabinet on 27 October 1974, as there was an allegation from American 
side that Tajuddin was extremely pro-Indian^^^. Most probably it was also the outburst of 
Mujib's extreme annoyance against Tajuddin's persistent support for Indo-Soviet block 
without any type of preponderance - for a poor coxmtry's external policy which did not suit 
rather created trouble for Mujib in his decision making policy. Another section of political 
observers believed that due to Tajuddin's popular image, which he achieved by his active 
involvement in the liberation war and his in successful handling the wartime administration as 
the PM of the exiled interim government of Bangladesh, Mujib became annoyed/ suspicious/ 
jealous over Tajuddin^^^. According to Abdul Muhaimen, a pro-Tajuddin leader in AL and 
MP (1970), Mujib could not take the appreciation of anyone else other than him easily, that 
was why he was not willing to give any credit to Tajuddin for liberating the country^ '^*. By 
partially contradicting these views, I want to argue that it might be the case that Mujib was 
somewhat jealous of Tajuddin's newly achieved popular image that Tajuddin achieved during 
1971 war. But there was no public manifestation of it. Rather Mujib praised Tajuddin since 
his return to Bangladesh and at his first public speech among the million of mass in the 
independent Bangladesh^^^ Before 1971, Tajuddinn was the third person in AL hierarchy, and 
Mujib kept him in the same position till 1974. But a big change was seen between the pre-war 
and post-war attribute of Tajuddin. Before 1971 Tajuddin was simply a trusted follower of 
Mujib^^® and he was satisfied with that. Only due to Mujib he became the General Secretary 
of EPAL. Tajuddin views were always aligned with Mujib's views before the war and he had 
been loyal to Mujib but after the war he wanted to have more recognition^^'. During the war 
time and afterwards, he wanted to move the AL's policies and political views from the middle 
toward the left, which Mujib did not approve of till the end of 1974. Whereas side by side the 
friendly relation with India and USSR Mujib wanted to improve relations with the western 
countries especially v^th USA for the convenience of rebuilding the country with US aid. In 
opposition to it^ ^^ Tajuddin only wanted to maintain relationship with India and socialist 
Jawadul Karim, Mujib and Contemporary Politics, op. cit.; p. 41. 
Abdul Huq, op. cit.; p. 340. 
Masudul Huq, RAW and CIA in the Liberation War of Bangladesh, op. cit.; pp. 10. 
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Ibid. pp. 134-38. 
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countries. Against Mujib's personal will he promoted scientific socialism in private and in 
public and also became critical to Mujib in different drawing room meetings , which created 
disagreements and factions within AL. These weakened the party both internally and 
externally. Mujib had been prominent in AL since 1964, and no one ever questioned his 
prominence and his control over AL. In his private meetings with the followers Tajuddin 
started to question Mujib's authority and went as far as calling him an outright dictator^®". He 
(Tajuddin) indirectly questioned Mujib's recognition as the Father of the nation. In his 
drawing room meetings Tajuddin used to comment like this: Colonel Nasser (of Egypt) is the 
founder of Arab nationalism but he is not the Father of the Arab Nation^®'. This ward was a 
jeer/ mockeiy against those who used to tell Mujib the 'Father of the Nation' and against the 
established truth among the mass that Mujib is llie 'Father of the Nation'. He forgot that 
whatever achievement he has achieved through AL was due to Mujib's genuine organizing 
skill and personal popularity. Mujib's unquestionable popularity made AL popular and AL 
gave him the opportunity to be in the position that he was at. It was a very traditional sub-
continental ploy in getting to higher positions. From Mujib's perspective it was a challenge to 
his authority and prestige but from Tajuddin's perspective it was a way of getting the 
recognition and respect that he deserves at the same time it was a way to advance one more 
step to fulfill his high political ambition. Through these developments, Tajuddin got into a 
conflict vsdth whole of the AL family in general. But Mujib was the vmquestionable leader of 
Bengladesh as well as AL, friend of Bengal and Father of the Nation. Mujib was a person who 
could do without AL but Tajuddin was a person almost in the other extreme. It was hard to 
separate Bangladesh from Mujib, the survival and the unity of Bangladesh depended in many 
ways on Mujib. Figures like Tajuddin were not that rare in Bangladeshi politics. Mujib had 
been patient till October 1974, and at the end he had to let him (Tajuddin) go. After 1974 
Tajuddin did not hold any important AL post or any ministry. He was not even included in 
Mujib's so called second revolution in 1975, which led to (BAKSAL). 
Tajuddin had a close relationship with the youth leaders of JSD since 1971. Before 
JSD was formed, he used to participate in the meetings of this rebel radical group of CL, and 
even used to encourage them, provided economic help in the formation of JSD. Many 
observers used to believe that if Tajuddin gets in any kind of conflict with Mujib he would 
join JSD but he never did^^ .^ There might have been various reasons. Certainly many JSD 
leaders did not want him to join JSD because of power sharing issues. They thought if the 
senior leaders like Tajuddin join the JSD they would loose the party leadership. Moreover 
these young JSD leaders and workers were not ready to follow the breakaway AL leaders' 
orders^^^. Tajuddin was aware of these realities. He was also afraid that if he joined the JSD 
he would be only used by the radical youths and would not be honored properly^^. Political 
observers also viewed, for the fear that Mujib would demolish his political career if he joined 
the opposition^^^ instead of forming a new party or joining any other party, he remained in AL 
without any ministry and without the GS position. In 1974 he was dropped from ministiy and 
To see some of the anti-Mujib criticism by Tajuddin see Oli Ahad, National Politics: 1945 to 975 (Dhaka: 
Khushnur Kitab Mahal, 1997), p. 422. Also see Abdul Mohaunen, Dhaka-Agartala-Mujibnagar, op. cit.; pp. 141-
42. Also see Mofiz Chowdhury, In the Cabinet of Bangabandhu, op. cit.; p. I I I . 
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before of that in 1972 he was ousted from the GS post of the party. As war time PM he had 
been very spirited, but he was now a broken man. 
Since 1971 liberation war Tajuddin was the main headache of S. Moni, the nephew of 
S. Mujib, who was doing everything possible to confirm his future position as the successor 
of S. Mujib in the AL party and government. Tajuddin's sudden loss of the minister-ship and 
his long-lasting personal strain relation with Mujib was a happy news to Moni. But still he 
was facing competition from: (i) the CL, which was controlled by two youth AL leaders A. 
Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed, who previously supported him in his fight against Tajuddin and 
other pro-socialist CL and youth group members (who in 1972 by defecting AL family 
formed JSD); (ii) a good nimiber of AL leaders who were close to Mujib and had strong base 
in AL organization and in adminisfration. 
In the internal politics of AL the anti-Tajuddin camps especially Moni-Mizan-Mustaq 
were always united against Tajuddin during the war. In the post-independent politics one type 
of working partnership was develop among them. In early 1972 Mizan Chowdhury was made 
one of the minister of the Mujib regime but at the middle of 1973 he was dropped from the 
cabinet because of unknown reasons. Since then he was trying to get back his minister-ship. 
As Mizan was close to Moni the AJL led by Moni also tried to convince Mujib that Mizan 
Chowdhury might rehabilitate in the cabinet of Mujib^^^. As there was rivalry between Moni 
and Tofael the AJL was trying to remove Tofael from his post of PM's Political Secretary by 
allotting him a post of Deputy-Minister. The AJL was contemplating to replace Taheruddin 
Thakur, the trusted disciple of Mustaq, in the position of Tofael. However at the same time 
Thakur was also engaged in a competition to elevate himself in the post of cabinet minister 
from step minister-ship^^'. In the politics of AL Mustaq was a bora schemer^® .^ He knew how 
to manipulate every opportunity and how install his people in the expected positions. 
Like Tajuddin when Mijanur Rahman Chowdhury, Mujib's cabinet minister and one 
of the top ranking AL leader, was asked by Mujib to resign he did so without public protest 
and did not join any opposition party'^ ®. following Mizan Chowdhury because of the 
allegation of corruption two prominent ministers of Mujib cabinet Shamsul Huq and M.R. 
Siddiqui were dropped from their respective position. Mollah Jalal Uddin, one of the very 
renowned leader of AL and minister of Mujib cabinet was also dropped at the same time due 
to his involvement in one confradictory affair^'®. But in public none of dare to show their 
discontent. There is a proverb, all roads lead to Roam. In Bangladesh politics it meant, "All 
roads lead to PM's office". Because who would be the ministers and who would be ousted -
Mujib was the only decider of these^^'. All of the leaders of AL and ministers of AL 
government depended for their political survival on the support of that time PM Mujib^'^. 
Daily Sangbad, 28 Januaiy 1974. 
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When unity among all the leaders and general public was much needed right after the 
war, AL leaders and the ancillary organizations engaged in factional conflicts within the party 
and caused civil unrest. This led to an irreparable damage for the country and the 
organization. The party was internally divided into numerous factions, some wanted to gain 
advantage over the others. Internal conflicts mate ways for the pro-US group and the 
traditional bureaucrats to reorganize who were never in favor of the independence of 
Bangladesh^'^. The weaker Mujib and AL got, the stronger the bureaucrats became. During 
the last days of Mujib regime the bureaucrats became powerful^ '^* which was not beneficiary 
for the nation. Ultimately, and under the patronage of the west the domestic collaborators with 
the help of the pro-US faction of AL killed Mujib and all the top ranking leaders and jailed 
many of others of AL. The sufferings made its way from the top to the grass root level of AL. 
Leaders and of workers of all strata were killed, tortured, or jailed under the new regime after 
the death of Mujib. The post 1975 history of Bangladesh is the history of dictators. BCilling 
Mujib wiped out the democratic values and the values of dictatorship were rooted. Death of 
Mujib brought death to nascent democracy of the country, the politics of the country again 
moved backed to the Pakistan era - the country and its people became hostage in the hand of 
the military dictators, the largest party of the country that was having long tradition of 
democratic practice sustained enormous sufferance. For the prolong period of dictatorship, the 
nation has lost its long nourished dream of political freedom and prosperity. 
Three Party Alliance and Emergence of BAKSAL 
Though CPB and NAP (M) being opposition organizations had to criticize the government 
from time to time, intrinsically they followed the policy to maintain continuous support for 
AL government and their main motivation was to bring AL on their own track, i.e. to 
pressurize it towards the Soviet policies^'^ However, the rejection of AL to forge any kind of 
election alliance with the two pro-Moscow parties revealed that imtil 1973 election the 
friendly rapprochement of AL with them was not to being any dividends to the pro-Moscow 
parties . Moreover, just before the 1973 election, on 1 January the police shooting at a group 
of pro-Moscow Student Union demonstration protesting the American bombing of Hanoi and 
joining of Mohiuddin Ahmed, one of the founding member of NAP (M), in AL by defecting 
his old party frustrated the pro-Moscow groups for the time being^^'. Soon after the 
independence CPB and NAP were trying for a broad understanding with AL. The AL was 
initially reluctant as it had a tradition of "going alone" politically. Moreover, the rightist 
elements in the AL were very much opposed to such an alliance v^th the communists^'®. After 
the demoralizing/devastating election results of the opposition CPB and NAP (M), soon they 
went back to their old policy to seek an alliance with the AL '^®. On the other hand, despite the 
sweeping election victory, tiie regime started loosing the confidence of the masses because of 
its inability to control inflation, corruption and law and order situation. This was particularly 
significant in 1973, when a number of protest marches against high prices and government-
corruption were organized not only by opposition parties but also by some of the pro-Al 
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elements of the student organizations^^". Since middle of 1973 the regime was facing serious 
challenge from the radical leftist (those wanted to over through AL government by force). The 
regimes authority in the countryside was seriously threatened by the rising incidence of armed 
attack on local law enforcement agencies. To isolate this far-left radical force and crush them 
and to divide the opposition criticism: Mujib regime {a) released near 40,000 detained rightist 
collaborators, who were arrested in 1972 for treason; {b) In October 1973, formed an alliance 
with the less radical pro-Moscow NAP (M) and CPB known as "Gono Oikya Jote" (GOJ)^®'. 
Some of the other reasons to form GOJ were^^^: (/) The A1 was faction ridden down to grass-
root level and corruption vdthin the members earned a bad name for the party - there was no 
real reason why he should carry the bad name of the AL, (n) There was no real opposition or 
alternative in the country and so there was no necessity of allowing those non-existing parties 
to create uimecessaiy chaos, {iii) To establish a socialist economy strict disciplined and 
doctrinal workers were essential and the party like AL could not provide such workers force 
alone. The opinion in favor of theses arguments and many more was gradually being built up 
in party caucus and now with an official tripartite alliance, the mobilization became easier to 
. vindicate these thoughts. The GOJ pledged joined action against the anti-socialists^^^. 
Sheikh Moni played a vital role in the formation of the GOJ. Moudud Ahmed 
observed, "The CPB maintained a very close link v^th Fazlul Hoque Moni, the nephew of 
Mujib, who had the maximum influence on Sheik Mujib. As Mujib used to pay more heed to 
personal relation than political colleagues, concentration on Sheikh Moni was considered to 
be most worthwhile. Once Tajuddin, on whom they depended heavily for a long time to 
represent their views, fell from grace. Sheikh Moni assumed new importance from CPB's 
strategic angle^ '^*. CPB also had warm relation with M. Mansur Ali, one of the closest of 
Mujib and cabinet minister of Mujib's government. Though all the inner circle member of 
Mujib, in the post independent Bangladesh, had their own view and factions but Mansur Ali 
was particular from them. He preferred to be wdth Mujib instead of creating a separate faction 
and provided his unconditional support behind Mujibs all causes. Mansur Ali was also among 
the few senior leaders, encouraged Mujib in forging 
Although the leadership of GOJ was with the AL the rightwing elements within the 
ruling AL could not appreciate the formation of GOJ. Some AL leaders to the extreme right 
blamed CPB and NAP (M) for what they called the socialist path Mujib was follovdng. 
Moinul Hossain, an extreme rightist AL MP said by blaming the communists, "They 
apparently support AL but they are really working through AL.for their own ends. It is their 
party line". He believed that Moni Singh, the CPB chief, was an evil influence on Mujib^^®. 
There was also tremendous pressure on the AL government from the USA to make the GOJ 
ineffective. As a result the GOJ remained a loose structural alliance. In a meeting of GOJ held 
in March 1974, it was decided to form committees of the Jote at the lower level organization. 
But the leadership of the AL wanted to go alone. They declared that they would form the 
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mass committees with their own people only. Hence the GOJ practically remained inoperative 
till January 1975^®'. 
After the independence the militant faction of Junior Awami Leaguers demanded to 
establish a revolutionary government under Sheikh Mujib's personal rule^ ^®. The moderate 
faction of youths by the leadership of Sheikh Moni were against it and declared a new ism, 
Mujibbad, one kind of democratic-socialism within the parliamentary type of governing 
system^^^. Mujib came out against the personal rule and in favor of parliamentary democracy 
and ironically enough, the radical vouths finally defected from AL and foimded and 
opposition party in October \912 . Surprising enough that since the beginning of 1973 the 
JL of Sheildi Moni, who previously were opposing total socialism, and the Labor League 
(Moni himself was one of its top leader) intermittently demanded the abolition of 
parliamentary democracy and the establishment of revolutionary government under Sheikh 
Mujib^®'. Sheikh Moni in his public speeches and through his newspaper repeatedly called for 
a "second revolution" by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman where the masses would be benefited from 
their leader's direct rule^ ® .^ He was propagating that parliamentary democracy was not 
capable of delivering the goods and regime would give up parliamentary democracy in the 
near fiiture by installing Mujibs direct rule. On 13 October 1974 in a district JL convension 
Moni said" Some leaders in AL are trying to sell the independence of Bangladesh to the 
imperialists. The cost of goods is out of buyers reach. The country is now approaching to a 
famine and devastating situation. Anarchy and corruption in every level of life is leading the 
country to destruction. The ruling system that leads a nation to devastation and anarchy 
cannot last for long. The parliament is unable to show any eligibility in that case. The 
parliamentary democracy of the country might not last for long"^® .^ Moni and his group also 
worked in two ways to undermine the parliamentary system and to pressurize Mujib for 
"Second Revolution". (First) by advocating the necessity of Mujibs personal rule and by 
threatening to launch a "Purification Campaign" (Suddhi Avijan) to cleanse the 
administration, party and the country of unpatriotic and corrupt elements; (second) after 
making the parliamentary system ineffective and weak through criticism and violation of 
democratic principles Moni group advocated the establishment of a stranger system^''*. This 
internal criticism created a division within the rank of AL elites and generated a crisis in 
confidence. 
Though one powerfiil faction of youthful leaders led by Moni ideologically opposed , 
the parliamentary system; the old party leadership had some ideological commitment to 
parliamentary democracy since that was the only model they were familiar with^^^ These 
rightist and centrist elements in the A1 were very much opposed to such an alliance, which 
they thought would allow infiltration of communist influence in the party^'®. They were also 
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afraid that "any unity with these parties would hitherto confirm the diminishing strength of 
the AL in the public eye. The rightist also thought that any kind of formal alliance with the 
pro-Moscow parties would antagonize the forces opposed to Soviet Union both at home and 
abroad^'l When Sheikh Moni from the AL side, was playing a key role, in evolving the 
doctrine for a authoritarian revolutionary government the supporters of the parliamentary 
model however, preferred to concentrate their efforts on persuading Sheikh Mujib against it, 
rather than take their cause to the people. Though AL leader Kamruzzaman's newspaper 
"Daily Janapad", Moinul Hossains "Ittefaq" tried to create public opinion in favor of their 
cause they failed to launch any popular movement in support of parliamentary democracy 
because Sheikh Mujib still had his charisma. He also had state power of coercion^^^. Since the 
attack on the parliamentary system came from Sheikh Moni, Mujib's nephew, one was not 
sure whether it was a trial balloon by the leader himself. For more than one year there were 
debates between the pro-changers and no-changers of the parliamentary system. In this long 
time it was also revealed that though the parliamentary model did not work as it ideally 
should but it was not rejected as a result of any mass demand. It lost its support not v^th the 
people but with a section of ruling AL leaders'"'®. At this stage the Nap (M) and CPB who 
formed GO J with A1 in October 1973 directly participated in the internal factional feud of AL 
and began to demand for the formation of a new government by Sheikh Mujib consisting of 
the honest persons of the "patriotic " political parties in order to drive out the corrupt elements 
from the cabinet'"'^ From Ae beginning of November 1974 the leaders of the pro-Moscow 
parties had also been advocating the abolition of parliamentary system. The USSR embassy in 
Dhaka was reported to have encouraged Mansur Ali, Sheikh Mujib's trusted home minister, to 
opt for a single party system'*''^ . The old leadership of AL resisted the change for more than a 
year but finally gave in, when Sheikh Mujib himself persisted in favor of his second 
revolution. 
The charisma of Mujib, leader of the independence movement and the AL, contributed 
enormously to the reconstruction program of the goveniment in the first year, But the 
economic and political situation started deteriorating since last of 1973. The prices of 
essential commodities went beyond the purchasing ability of the low-incoming public. 
Corruption permeated all levels of government and administration and the law enforcing 
agencies proved to be almost ineffective in fighting the armed thugs and miscreants. Finally, 
the famine of 1974 resulted a total destruction of the Bangladesh economy. The Mujib 
regime's inability to prevent the destructive famine and to improve the law and order situation 
resulted in the people's disillusionment with the AL party. Different socio-political forces that 
joined hands to achieve the common goal of liberation disintegrated soon after 
independence'*''^. These encouraged the revolutionary forces especially to the JSD's 
underground ancillary organization the revolutionary Gono Bahini (People's Army) and 
different radical Maoist groups, to gear up their campaign of over through the government 
through armed struggle. Radical insurgency, especially in the rural areas, threatened the 
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security of life and property of the people'^ "'^ . The AL leaders and workers in the rural areas as 
well as police stations became common targets of radical revolutionary forces. In December 
1974, Mujib himself admitted that the terrorist had killed more than 3000 AL leaders and 
workers, including members of parliament''®^ The security force failed to quell the insurgent 
groups despite harsh measures t ^ e n against them. Mujib's other adapted measures were also 
could not provide him expected result. This prompted Mujib and his close associates to 
consider that the democratic of government utterly inadequate to deal effectively with the 
armed challenge to the regime. In his first speech to introduce BAKSAL Mujib said that to 
defend independence he had to introduce his new system of unyielding controls. Mujib 
claimed that nothing short of a system change would halt the political assassinations and the 
deteriorating law and order situation"*®®. 
Moreover, considering the declining economic situation of the country, Mujib 
disappointed the socialist community, who helped extensively during the independence war, 
by leaning the government policies towards the capitalist world. To satisfy US Mujib 
removed Tajuddin in October 1974, who was disfavored by US, fi-om the cabinet ministry 
right before the US secretary of foreign ministry Henry Kissinger's official visit in 
Bangladesh. Mujib expected that he would obtain political and economical support from US 
at the impoverish situation of the country by sacrificing the internal socialist economy of the 
country, altering the regulations in accepting the foreign aids, and removing the recognized 
anti-US members from the ministry. Actually, Mujib had made all those amends due to the 
increasing instability of the country. There was no particular agreement of obedience towards 
USA in it. Besides Ae youths in AL, who were the major source in the grass root level, was 
very much against US at that time. Therefore it was hard for Mujib's patronizes to have faith 
in those amendments, it carried very little importance to US, but Mujib kept persisting. Mujib 
could not obtain any substantial economical benefit out of his relationship with US. When he 
realized that his persuasion policy towards USA could not bring any major benefit, the 
political crisis was declining even rapidly after the famine, he focused his attention towards 
the communist world to seek for a solution. Bakul wrote depending on the old political 
machineries (petty bourgeois elements) he declared the second revolution, it was as if he was 
trying to show a new magic with his old machineries''®^. The comment of Noor e Alam 
Siddiki about Mujib on this issue "We want to acquire independent trade policy not 
independent foreign policy. Bangabandhu is not the kind of person to anchor and be stagnant 
in one port. He is the sailor who can direct the nation's economy to the right direction during 
a stormy weather"'*® .^ It should be noted here that since the beginning of independence Mujib 
as a leader of his people received better treatment from the socialist block than form the 
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capitalist one'*" .^ Mujib was a nationalist leader. He was not following any particular 'ism'. 
Whatever did benefit to his country that was his 'ism' first. 
On January 1975, in the three-day conference of the AL Parliamentary Party the 
proposal of a new socialist governmental system to establish the democracy of the oppressed 
was raised up. The proposal was accepted after a long debate. The opposition attendees of this 
formula were Khondakar Moshtak Ahmed, Gen. Osmani, TaheruddinThakur, Brst. Moinul 
Hossain, Obaidur rahman, Norul Islam Monju, Shah Muajjem, Noor-e- Alam Siddiki etc'"". 
Some of the leaders, who attended the session, could not support the changes but they were 
not brave enough to protest against Mujib"*". Noor e Alam Siddiki in his long speech 
opposed the one party ruling system. Gen. Osmani in his speech said, "We do not want 
another Mujib Khan after the removal of Yahia Khan"'*'^. Mujib said that if there was any 
opposition in the parliamentary party to the changes he proposed he would ask for a fresh 
mandate from the people. He was confident that the people would support him. The dissenting 
were silenced. Their election prospect without Muji's support would be dim'*'^. Khondakar 
Moshtak and some other clever leaders abstained from direct opposition of the amendments. 
However, they feared about the declining political power and fUture political ambitions of 
them in the party and cabinet after the formation of BAKSALite government in the ftiture. 
Those leaders were especially anxious about the thought of higher rank replacement of Sheik 
Moni and other youth leaders in the party and government'*^''. It should be mentioned here that 
ten of the party members who were opposed to the changes met in the house of Obaidur 
Rahman, a state minister, on the second day. They formulated 19-point proposal to discuss 
and choosed Noor e Alam Siddiqui as their spokesman'"^. 
Finally^ on 25 January 1975 Mujib announced the program of his 'second revolution' 
at the national assembly. According to Mujib, the second revolution was designed to establish 
an exploitation free society and to bring about economic emancipation by uniting the whole 
nation against the enemies of the nation - the corrupt officers, black marketers, smugglers and 
perpetrators of political violence'*'^. The objectives of the second revolution, as spelled out by 
Sheikh Mujib were less than revolutionary; they were rather reformist in nature. The core 
objectives were'*'^: A) to weed out corruption, b) to increase production in agriculture and 
industry, c) to control population growth and d) to foster national unity. 
For the introduction of Second Revolution amendment of the constitution was 
necessary. The AL, which had always proclaimed itself adherence to democracy, amended the 
constitution, suspended the activities of all other political parties by introducing a national 
party named BAKSAL (Bangladesh Peasant, Workers Awami League) on the initiatives of 
Sheikh Mujib and against the private sentiment of the; majority of the members of the 
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parliament belonging to AL'"®. In a secret poll AL MPs, conducted my Mujib a week before 
his death, only 117 of 315 supported the BAKSAL scheme'*". Apart from the pro-Soviet 
parties i.e. the NAP (M) and the CPB, all other opposition parties were opposed to the 
constitutional change'*^. The JSD MPs' opposition was very strong. Protesting the 
amendment with some other parties they staged a walkout from the parliament'*^'. Within a 
month of the constitutional amendment a signal party called BAKSAL was launched and all 
the other political parties were dissolved. Members of the political parties were asked to join 
the BALSAL"". When by the merger of AL, CPB and NAP (M) as a whole and many 
individual or groups BAKSAL was formed Mujib was elected its President'*^^. Leaders from 
various political parties joined personally and in a group. Out of seven opposition party 
members of the national parliament five of them: Ataur Rahman Khan (JL), Abdussattar 
(JSD), Khoai Beojor (Independent), Sayed Kamrul Islam and Mohammad Salhuddin (JSD) 
joined BAKSAL . They preferred to include themselves with the governing power instead 
of remain stick on their former ideological commitment. This amendment of the constitution 
refused to recognize any other party in the country except BAKSAL. Section No. 117 A (5) 
(a) of this amendment also said that if any of the MPs do not join the national governing party 
he/ she would loose his/ her parliamentary member-ship''^^ Following the party line up as the 
two of JSD members (Abdullah Sarkar and Mohiuddin) did not join the BAKSAL 
government they loosed their parliamentary membership"^®. On 24 February 1975, BAKSAl 
was created mainly by AL, CPB and NAP (M) and elected Mujib as the chairperson of the 
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath"; Asian Survey, 
Vol. 16 No. 2, (February 1976); p. 120. 
Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade; p. 66. The 4"" amendment of the constitution envisaged that 
there would be only one national party in the country and no other political party or organization would be 
allowed to fimction. Secondly, there would be a President to be elected directly by the people on the nomination 
of the single party under a one party system. Thirdly, the President would be the Chief Executive of the country. 
Fourthly, there would be a Council of Ministers to aid and advice the President. Fifthly, The President could 
appoint ministers including the PM from outside the parliament at his discretion and such ministers would not be 
responsible to the Parliament. Sixthly, the President could veto any bill of the parliament by withholding assent, 
thereby making the fimction of parliament virtually meaningless. Finally, no person could be a member of 
parliament unless he was a member of the national party and nominated by the party (for detail see Moudud 
Ahmed, Democracy and The Challenge of Development; p. 99. 
R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues; op. cit., p. 122. 
See the debates of the first Bangladesh National Parliament, Session, Vol. 1 No. 1,25 January 1975; pp. 
45-46. It is mentionable here in 1972 when Mujib disagreed to form a socialist type of one party revolutionary 
government in that time opposing Mujib these former youth leaders defected from AL and formed JSD. Now 
those claimers of the one party revolutionary governments started shouting for a multiparty parliamentary form 
of government (for this see Jawadul Karim, Mujib and Contemporary Politics). According to Moudud Ahmed 
the demand for 'multiparty democracy' was a tactical approach of JSD to get support of the masses (see Moudud 
Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib (in Bengali); op. cit., p. 334). 
R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues; op. cit., pp. 118-19. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Incidents Surrounding SheilA Mujib and Bangladesh, (in Bengali), op. cit., p. 222. 
Also see T. Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath"; Asian Survey, 
Vol. 16 No. 2, (February 1976), p." 120. 
Abdul Huq, The Chronology of the Four Decades Politics m the Writers Diary, op. cit., p. 346. 
Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib (in Bengali); op. cit., p. 334. 
Abdul Huq, The Chronology of the Four Decades Politics in the Writers Diary (in Bengali), op. cit., p. 346. 
Also see Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib (in Bengali); op. cit., p. 334. In this time the total parliamentary 
strength of JSD was three. The other one was Syed Kamrul Islam who joined the BAKSAL government. 
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party"*^ .^ NAP (Bhasani), JSD, and all the pro-Peking leftist parties retrained from joining 
BAKSAL. These parties accused Mujib of murdering parliamentary democracy and 
establishing dictatorship'*^®. On 11 February 1975, the ex-minister of AL Gen. Osmani and 
Briset Moinul Hossain resigned from the national parliament in the protest against the one 
party governmental system In this process some of the leaders such as Ataur Rahman made 
their position secured in the central committee of BAKSAL''^". If through the formation of 
BAKSAL the democracy was assassinated then the leaders like Ataur Rahman had played a 
vital role in the assassination of democracy. However, after the assassination of Mujib, those 
leaders announced BAKSAL as the reason for the death of democratic system in Bangladesh 
and hold Mujib and AL responsible'*^'. 
The amended constitution provided for a presidential form and one party system of 
government. Mujib was declared the president of the country for five years and the president 
was authorized to form a national party by the amendment'*^^. On 6 June 1975, Mujib 
announced a new constitution for his new national party BAKSAL. The BAKSAL 
organizational structure included one executive committee, a large central committee and a 
party council at the national level. The party had district, thana (police station) and union/ 
primary committees in the lower level. BAKSAL had five ancillary fronts: peasants, workers, 
youths, students and women front. During this time Mujib also nominated the members of the 
executive and central committees of the party, as well as executive committees for the party's 
five v^ngs. Though the pro-Moscow parties and some of the leaders of the opposition political 
parties joined BAKSAL, only a few of the opposition political party leaders were included in 
the 115 members party central committee, none of them were given any role in the key 
executive committee or in the five front of the party. The executive committee of BAKSAL 
was consisted of Sheik Mujib as the chairperson and fourteen additional members, who were 
all close and dedicated followers of Mujib. With one exception all members were the 
prominent leaders of former AL. Mujib nominated all the General Secretaries and the 
majority of the members of the executive committees of the five wings of the party and they 
were the leaders of former AL, AL-affiliated: labor, student, youth, peasant and women 
organization. BAKSAL, in fact remained the AL under a different name'*^ .^ 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Incidents Surrounding Sheikh Mujib and Bangladesh, (in Bengali), p. 222. Also see 
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath"; Asian Survey, 
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Bangladesh government promised to establish a SociaUst social-system through the 
establishment of BAKSAL. After accepting the 4"' amendment to the constitution in 
parliament on 25 January Mujib in his speech said, "Here we want socialism, here we want to 
keep the democracy of the oppressed"'*^ . The leaders whom Mujib gathered to establish 
socialism were from the middle class of the society, petty bourgeois. Most of the 
parliamentarians elected in 1973 were lawyers, businessman and from rich farming class'*''^ . 
At this point it is appropriate to mention some of the speeches of Tajuddin. In the biennial 
Council of January 1974 he said, "Today we do not have the situation, environment and 
worker to establish socialism, as a whole the nation is not ready for it. It does not suffice if 
there are workers the whole nation needs to put effort. Here in the back the dissenters secretly 
spouse dissimilar views"'*^ .^ In another place he said - without having socialist cadres group it 
is not possible to establish socialism'^ ^^. Bangabandhu was trying to establish socialism with 
the help of bourgeois workers force. Mujib's trusted Mansur Ali was nominated for both of 
the key positions, the secretary general of the national party BAKSAL and the Prime Minister 
of the country'*^ .^ Monsur Ali was 4^ in the line up of the party leadership'^^^ but Mujib moved 
him up to the position. Nazrul Islam was appointed the Vice President of the newly 
formed government. All the centrist moderate and rightist leaders who were opposing the 
socialist ruling system eventually secured their positions in the Executive and Central 
committee of BAKSAL'*^". Moreover, the executive committee had both Sheikh Moni and 
Abdur Razzak the leaders of two opposition youth factions. The executive committee also 
included Dhaka City AL President Gazi Gulam Mustafa who earned international notoriety 
for misappropriating Red Cross and UN relief goods'*'*' and who had intense rivalry with 
Sheikh Moni'*'* .^ Significantly two youth leaders Sheikh Moni and Abdur Razzaq were 
included with previous general secretary Zillur Rahman as the secretaries of the party. The 
most important of the five wings of BAKSAL - Jatia Satra League (National Students 
League) was headed by Sheikh Shaidul Islam, another nephew of Mujib'*'* .^ All the factions of 
AL, except for the followers of Tajuddin, were given participation in BAKSAL. BAKSAL 
committee members and district governor designates were selected by Sheikh Mujib, Sheikh 
Moni and Abdur Rob Semiabad (a minister of Mujib's Cabinate, BAKSAL central committee 
member, Mujibs brother-in-law and Sheikh Moni's father-in-law) the hard-core political 
committee, central committee and five wings of BAKSAL were published in Bangladesh Tiems and dainik 
Bangla, 7 June 1975. 
The parliamentary speech of Bangabandhu Mujib in the parliamentary debates of Bangladesh National 
Parliament: Government Account, 25 January 1975. Also see Major Rafiql Islam, Bangladesh: Twenty two 
Years of Independence (in Bengali); op. cit., p. 19. 
R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues; op. cit., pp. 152-53. 
Simin Hossain Rimi (Edit.), Tajuddin Ahmed: From the Glimpse of History (in Bengali), p. 409. 
Daily Purbodesh, 11 March 1974. 
Abdul Huq, The Chronology of the Four Decades Politics (in Bengali), op. cit., p. 347. 
Interview with Khondoker Haroon ur Rashid (he was elected MP in the 1973 general election and now he is 
the member of Dhaka District AL). Also see Abdul Wahed Talukder, From 70 to 90: Chronology of the 
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elites'*^. On 26 of Januaiy, after Mujib took over the chair as the President he selected 
Monsur Ali as the prime Minister and formed a 17-member ministry. All the former members 
of deftmct AL government were included in the new-formed ministry except for Tajuddin'*'* .^ 
Tajuddin commented," I believe in the uncontaminated/ pure socialism. By the present 
capitalist forum (parliamentary system of government) socialism can not be establish"^''®. The 
surprising aspect was that to bring about a socialist revolution when national party BAKSAL 
was formed the most celebrated pro-Moscow politician of the country Tajuddin was not 
included in the all-powerful Executive Committee of it; even he was not included in the 
central committee - which was formed with numerous members'*'^'. Before the assassination 
of Mujib on 15 August 1975 the party bearers at the district-thana-primary level had not yet 
been settled. But according to R. Jahan, all factions were going to be balanced and 
accommodated in the new setup'^ ®. In fact the new model was being put into the operation by 
the same old leadership with the same factional cleavage and the same style. 
Under the parliamentary system the civil bureaucracies (Distric Magistrates) were the 
administrative head of the districts. By a presidential order on 21 June 1975 Mujib replaced 
the district Governors in the district magistrates post'*'* .^ According to Mujib, any political 
worker is better than any bureaucrat if the political worker is sincere''^''. He also said, "one 
political worker can be as valuable as a parliamentary member or governor if he is 
believable"'*^ ^  On 16 January 1975 Mujib announced the names of 61 governors designated 
who were to take over district administration on 1 September 1975. Not surprisingly 44 
governors designated were AL leaders and activists (including 27 sitting members of 
parliament)'*^^. By this all the administrative positions were going to be controlled by the party 
members, which made bureaucrats completely subservient to the party. However he also 
appointed thirteen bureaucrats in the district governor's post. Probably the intension was to 
establish a national unity by removing the conflict between the professional bureaucrats and 
the politicians. But Moudud Ahmed wrote Sheikh Mujib was displeased over the traditional 
colonial bureaucratic structure and he expected to establish total political control over the 
state administration by eliminate this colonial system'*^ .^ 
Thus the major features of the new BAKSAL model were: a) presidential form of 
government, b) one party system, c) a re-organized administrative structure with a scheme of 
politically appointed district governors, d) compulsory multi-purpose village level co-
operatives to boost productions, where the private land ownership would be left intact and the 
landed would get back a share of the produce in proportion to their land holding and e) limited 
civil liberties: since 16 January the number of the newspapers had been reduced to four 
Talukdar Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Fall of Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath"; op. cit., p. 
121. Abdur Razzaq demanded that to select the BAKSAL central committee members and district governors 
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Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib, op. cit.; p. 335. 
Dainik Bangla and daily Ittefaq, 22 June 1975. T. Maniruzzaman, The Bangladesh Revolution and Its 
Aftermath; op. cit., pp. 179-80. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Incidents Surrounding Sheikh Mujib and Bangladesh, op. cit.; p. 233. 
Among the governor-designated Mujib also included 13 public-servants and a colonel in Bangladesh army. 
Bio data of the governor-designates was published in dainik Bangla, 23 and 25-27 July 1975. 
Moudud Ahmed, Era of Sheikh Mujib (in Bengali); op. cit.; p. 337. 
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national dailies - two in English and tow in Bengali''^ '*. Mujib thus assumed absolute control 
over party, state and government. Armed challenge to the stability of Mujib regime was made 
an excuse for demolishing the democratic structure and replacing it with a framework of a 
totalitarian control. In explaining the rationale behind the repudiation of the parliamentary 
model and the introduction of the new model Mujib in his speech singled out the pressure 
from the forces outside the system i.e. the underground communist parties. He argued that the 
acts of political opposition had resulted in the murder of thousands of his party workers 
including four members of parliament. Mujib contended that the rising incidence of political 
violence had created a milieu of terror, where it was difficult to practice constitutional 
politics. So Mujib said that he had to make complete change and he had to change the 
system'*^ .^ But Mujib also assured the liberal democrats of his party and country that this 
system was for a temporary period; after the normalization of the country's law and order 
situation and improvement of the national economy the country would go back to the old 
parliamentary system"*^ ®. 
In 1974 R. Jahan commented, Sheikh Mujib's major political problems lay not with 
the (weak) opposition but with the factions in his own par ty '*R. Jahan again wrote the 
success of a new model in creating new system depends very much on the success of 
BAKSAL's party building efforts. But given the dominance of old leaders and old factions in 
BAKS AL, it appears that building organizations and institutions would remain as difficuh in 
the future as it had been in the past"*^. She further added the previous parliamentary system 
was proved ineffective not due to the opposition of underground communist or constitutional 
oppositional parties. The regimes politics were blocked and flouted by its own party 
members; this lost the regimes credibility with the masses. The AL and its factions were the 
regimes main problem. Factional disputes with in the regime made its policies incoherent and 
contradictory. The new system did not do away with the AL faction. It accommodated them 
and added a few more. Finally, she wrote, "As there is no channel for constitutional 
opposition, factional disputes within the regime can be expected to intensify and if that 
happens the government would continue to remain ineffective even under the new system"^^^. 
The western parliamentary model was rejected mainly because the ruling elite found it 
' ineffective for purposes of regimes maintenance. It was still too early to say whether the 
altemative would ensure more stable system with the same fractionally ridden party structure 
and by totally alienating the bureaucrats. But suddenly in 15 August 1975 Mujib was 
assassinated by his own people, it halted the experiment of the suitability of his so-called 
second revolution in this poor country. 
Politics of Intrigue: The Brutal Downfall of Mujib and Its Aftermath 
As the economy continued to flounder, criticism about the inefficiency and corruption of AL 
party members mounted, the regime was also under considerable pressure from the 
underground pro-China Communist parties Mujib started being intolerant of opposition'*^''. 
Finally on 25th January 1975, Mujib by a constitutional amendment imposed an authoritarian 
For detail R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, op. cit.; pp. 118-120. 
Bangabandhu S. Mujib's speech in the National Parliament; Bangladesh National Parliamentary Debates: 
Government Account (Vol. 1 No. 7, 1975); 25 January 1975. 
Interview with Mianur Rahaman Chowdhury and Matia Chowdhury. Both were BAKSAL central committee 
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one party rule under presidential form of government against the advice of most of the senior 
members of the AL and his cabinet'*®'. The second revolution not only alienated the regime 
from the masses, it threatened the major social groups. The government's policy of 
nationalization of different industries and banks threatened the nationalist bourgeoisie. The 
lawyers felt threatened by Mujib's promise of reforming the British style legal system. The 
press was antagonized by the complete state takeover of newspapers and publications. 
Students and teachers, the major source of leadership for all opposition political movements, 
fell threatened by the total state control of thought and action implicit of the one party system 
and press restrictions. The civil bureaucracy was threatened by the proposed District 
Governor scheme, which made bureaucrats completely sub servant of the party. The affluent 
farmers were antagonized by the compulsory cooperative structure. Although the regime 
repeatedly promised that land ownership would be left intact, affluent farmers feared that 
compulsory cooperative were prelude to state ownership of land. In short, the second 
revolution proposed to introduce a number of new experimental schemes, which created 
uncertainty and fear in the minds of the major groups in the society. What was worse though 
that the "second revolution" proposed democracy of the destitute, Mujib still was dependent 
on the same old Awami Leaguers who did not belong to that social cjass. As the 
representative of the new rich class who were benefited in the three years of the AL rule, they 
were hated by the old power groups and did not win support from the poor'*® .^ Moreover 
strangely though Mujib introduced one party socialist BAKSAL system - a completely new 
ideology to the Bengali people, for long who were introduced only with the multi-party 
democratic system - but for the shortage of time yet he and his party could not take any 
opinion building measure in favor of the new program. Even maximum of the defunct AL 
workers did not have clear concept about the BAKSAL system. The opposition by utilizing 
this weakness of the AL started telling them the 'traitor to democracy''* . Mujib overthrow 
thus came at a time when he had successfully alienated all his support groups, even majority 
of his own party members who wanted to continue with parliamentary democracy. The army 
majors who planned the coup calculated on winning the support of all the groups dismayed by 
the "second revolution"^^. 
Talukder wrote that Sheikh Mujib's blueprint for total control of state power had a 
major scantiness. He completely overlooked the possible reaction of the regular armed force. 
For a number of reasons most of the army personnel's were rabidly anti-Indian. The anti-
Indian sentiment on the part of the armed forces gradually developed an anti-Mujib 
orientation'*® .^ But still one did not expect a military coup in the new nation because the armed 
force was known to be weak and factionalized. The ruling party AL, in spite of growing 
unpopularity, was regarded as strongly entrenched. And Mujib still had his charisma, though 
it was a little tarnished in the three years of his rule'*®®. 
On 15 August 1975, Mujib and his family (except two of his daughters-who were 
living abroad) were assassinated by a coup planned by a small group of junior army officers. 
Some of the rightwing AL party members, who were against total autonomy of Bangladesh 
Ibid, 138. Also interview with Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury 
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R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, p. 131. 
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joined hand with the military rebels'^^'. The participation of Mujib's own party men and 
cabinet members with the assassins in his killing, revealed that Mujib's assumption of 
absolute authority and the introduction of one party system did not diminish personal rivalry 
and factionalism in AL, In this coup, Mujib's nephew Sheikh Moni and Mujib's brother-in-
law Semiabad (also a cabinet minister) were also killed including their families'*^®. After the 
assassination of the nations charismatic leader the coup chiefs established Khondokar Mustaq 
Ahmed, the right wing commerce minister of Mujib's cabinet, as the president of Bangladesh. 
Soon after assimiing the office, he declared martial law all over the country. At his first radio 
speech, Mujib's this one time close associate hailed the 'heroic overthrow' of Sheikh Mujib 
and also mentioned the change a 'historic necessity'''^®. According to Khatib, "Bangabandhu 
was the supreme leader. But the real politicians in the AL were Tajuddin and Mustaq. 
Tajuddin was constructive but Mustaq was destructive. Tajuddin worked wholeheartedly for 
the liberation of Bangladesh, Mustaq worked surreptitiously against it"''^ ®. Ashfaq Alam 
Shapan mentioned, "Since two years before the coup JSD, NAP (Bhashani) and other pro-
Chinese leftist parties in the underground level were active in building up public opinion 
against the Mujib regime. But the incidents of August had destroyed all the potential of the 
leftist uprising. The rightists in AL and the bureaucrats of the country also had their own 
plans. Once they realized that Mujib was not going to serve their purposes properly they 
advanced with their won planning. As a result the coup was executed with the help of few 
junior army officers"^''. The leftist chiefly contributed in keeping the anarchy in the country, 
but at the end the rightist circle had the control of the exclusive power. 
In course of time it became clear that the army officers, who took the lead in the 
operation, had no plan of their own"*'^ . Then the question remains, why and for whom did they 
do it? Although it is not precisely proven, different circle claims that the American secret 
agency (CIA), Khondoker Mustaq led right wing section of AL, a faction of the bureaucrats, 
and few ambitious junior army officers communication and conspiracy was liable for the 
killing of Mujib'*^ .^ The US foreign secretary Roger Morris on this account said, " In the 
foreign enemy list of Kissinger (US secretary of state) the most hated trio were: Allende, 
Theo and Mujib". Kissinger thought that Mujib is a very stubborn politician who does not 
listen. Morris added," Nixon was criticized in the congress and in newspapers for his faulty 
strategies in south east Asia. After the event of the return of Castro riding on a tank in 
Havana, Mujib's return (to liberated Bangladesh) from Pakistan as the leader of the oppressed 
Bengalis was acutely embarrassing moment for the US government... Mujib's establishment 
as the head of the state in Bangladesh was similar to an open announcement of rebel against 
USA and its subservient Paksitan and a huge shame for the presidency.., By nature Kissinger 
is a person of retribution.... He truly believed that all the leaders including Mujib, Allende, 
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Theo and Macarius who embarrassed him were only evolved to wound him. He took the birth 
of Bangladesh as his personal failure.... It was viewed as a big damage for the presidency. 
For some days every thing was floundered/ squandered.... Allende, Mujib, Theo, Macarious 
who became who became obstacle towards US interest tliese peoples (US adminisUration) 
tendency towards them was like that - you have grovm enough audacious, wait we shall teach 
you a good lesion"'^''*. If it is said that Kissinger could not accept the independence of 
Bangladesh in easy way it will not be a mistake. On October 1974 he came to Bangladesh as 
an official guest and criticized Bangladesh in a vulgar manner by calling it 'bottomless 
Basket'. He had done everything possible in his power to make sure that Bangladesh suffers. 
It was blatantly obvious from the behavior of the US government towards Mujib during his 
state visit to US'*^ .^ According to Morris Kissinger took the birth of Bangladesh as his 
personal defeat. He also thou^t tfiat the US strategies in South Asia would face constant 
challenges if Mujib is At the time his mentality was that those leaders were way out 
of their limit and they should be eradicated as soon as possible. 
Thus the armed force, for the first time in the post independent Bangladesh, captured 
the state power with the help of the pro-US faction of AL. The coup shattered the democratic 
expectation of the people for long. A. Hakim commented, " The coup ushered in an era of the 
military supremacy that haunted the nation for many years. It was also the beginning of a 
period of conflict and confrontation for power among different conflicting groups within the 
armed forces and also between the military elites and political elites"''^^. 
At the instant of Mujib's death Khondokar Mustaq was the mostly benefited person'^ ^ .^ 
He was in charge of all political power after the coup. Until the very end Mustaq, the veteran 
AL political was among the closest of Mujib'^'^. In Mujib's ministry Mustaq was one of the 
loyalist of US, but his pro-US ideology did not escort him to be Mujib's closest associates'*^". 
Mustaq was a member of both the central and executive committees of BAKSAL but his 
opinion was that BAKSAL was built imder the shadow of India and communist USSR. So 
every progressive Bengalis should oppose Mujib's submissive policies towards India and 
Soviet Union'*^^ However as Mujib was leaning toward socialism Mustaq tried to keep Mujib 
away from it. In his opinion the changes Mujib was about to make in the constitution was not 
only a big mistake but also it would destroy Mujib's reputation both in the country and all 
over the world"*® .^ The constant opposition between Mustaq and Mujib was not only because 
of ideological differences but their high political ambition also was responsible. In 1949 when 
Awami Muslim League was founded popular leader Mowlana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani 
was elected the first president of the party. The brilliant young leader of Tangail Shamsul 
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Hoque was elected as the General Secretary of the party, Mustaq was the senior Joint 
Secretary and Mujib was the junior Joint Secretary. In 1953 when Shamsul Huq was suffering 
from unrecoverable illness by overlapping Mustaq, Maulana Bhasani Maulana Bhasani gave 
the responsibility of General Secretary to Mujib. The extraordinary organization capability of 
Mujib persuaded Mowlana to appoint Mujib in that position. Before the split of the East 
Pakistan AL in 1957 Mowlana-Mujib pair was serving as the president and the general 
secretary of the party respectively. According to Mowlana in his long political life he did not 
meet any such efficient general secretary like that of Mujib. In the provincial election of East 
Pakistan in 1954 AL made a pact with other provincial parties and found United Front (UF) to 
run against Muslim League. Though Mustaq was the Joint Secretary of AL but failed to attain 
the nomination from UF for the election because of Mujib's opposition. Mujib's calculation 
was that if he could prevent Mustaq at that stage of politics to be the parliamentary member 
naturally his political progress would be ended and in AL Mujib would be able to drive his 
competitor into comer. In a ultimate result he could progress for his own political ambitions 
in AL easily without competition in future. Even though Mustaq was not nominated by UF, 
with the help of Suhwardy he was able to run from his constituent as an independent 
candidate and was able to secure his seat in the Provincial Parliament. Later in 1957 he 
became the chief whip of the Krishok-Sromeek parliament party. All political activities were 
banned in Pakistan from 1958 to 1963. In 1964 when AL was rejuvenated under the 
leadership of Mujib Mustaq came back to AL. However, Mujib could not replace his former 
political colleague above Sayeed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin, Mansur Ali and Kamruzzaman. In 
the party lineup Mustaq was fifth, and this kept him unsatisfied politically for long time. 
Mustaq was older in age than Mujib and was an established lawyer. Even though Mujib 
started in a lower position than Mustaq in AL but over time his ability to organize, bravery in 
facing challenges, and indisputable popularity lead him in a position where he became 
invincible by anyone in his party let alone Mustaq. Eventually Mustaq was bound to be happy 
with the Vice President position of AL, but he created his own lobby within the party to 
strengthen his position in the party'*^ .^ After the formation of BAKSAL, according to the 
former line up of seniority Mustaq became the fourth person in the new ministry. In the 
BAKSAL executive committee he was also the fourth in command (in the absence of 
Tajuddin)'*®'* and in the BAKSAL central committee his name was fifth'*®^ Mustaq was very 
confident of his intelligence and decision-making ability therefore he was not at all satisfied 
with his political positions. 
TTie political leadership in the assassination Mujib came from Mustaq, the minister of 
commerce of Mujib's government. The two other junior members of the ministry who were 
very active with Mustaq from the beginning in the integrue were Taheruddin Thakur and 
Wabaidur Rahman. After the death of Mujib he assembled the support of some more rightist 
AL leaders, e.g. Shah Muazzem Hossain, Nurul Jslam Monju, Shafiul Azam etc''® .^ 
Taheruddin Thakur was a chief reporter for the pro-AL Bengali daily Ittefaq. In the 1960s, he 
gained a reputation for his powerftil writing in support of Sheikh Mujib and AL. When Sheikh 
Mujib was looking for bright young candidates for the national assembly in 1970, Thakur was 
given an AL ticket and he had subsequently been elected to the National Assembly of 
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Pakistan in 1970, the Bangladesh Parliament in 1972 and appointed by Mujib as the step 
minister of information and broadcasting''®^ Though Thakur was a step minister of Mujib 
government and also was a central committee member of BAKSAL"*^ . Louis Simon, writer of 
Washington Post, alleged that Thakur had comprised with the coup leaders to hand over the 
radio station on the morning of 15 August'*®'. Thakur was one of the close associates of 
Mustaq since 1971 liberation war'* °^. Mujib's followers believed that Thakur indeed was a 
treacherous person, who led Mujib to believe that he was one of the staunchest supporters of 
the one party system''^'. The move to reduce the number of newspapers in the country was 
initiated by him. Even journalists, who had previously welcomed his appointment as state 
minister for information turned against him. He was highly ambitious and was hoping to be 
raised from state minister ship to the rank of the cabinet minister. But Mujib told some of his 
friends that Thakur had inflated notions of himself The information ministry was under 
Mujib. When Mujib reshuffled the cabinet on 26 January 1975, he made Korban Ali, an old 
Awami Leaguer, the information minister. Thakur, who was hoping to be elevated, found his 
importance reduced and was bitter'*'^. However, this was not the main reason of his 
involvement in the conspiracy of the assassination of Mujib. Once a friend of Mujib warned 
him that Thakur was loyal to Mustaq, but not to Mujib. On hearing this Mujib said "and 
Mustaq is loyal to me". It was widely known that Mustaq had an animosity against Mujib''^^. 
Mustaq, Thakur and some of the army majors, who carried out the operation on August 1975, 
were from the district of Cumillah'*'''. Obaidur Rahman, the other major contributor of the 
coup of 1975, was the president of the AL's student wing during 1964-65. Obaidur Rahman 
was removed from the post of social welfare secretary of AL in 1972 on charges of misusing 
relief fimds and sheltering collaborators in his district for monitory consideration'^'^ When 
Mujib was looking for bright, courageous and honest young leaders against the senior corrupt 
AL MPs elected in 1970, surprisingly Obaidur Rahman was also given AL nomination with 
many promising youth leaders for the 1973 parliament election and he was elected a MP'*'^ . 
Subsequently he was also included in the Mujibs cabinet as a Step Minister'*'^. Obaidur 
Rahman too was hoping to be the cabinet minister but when the promotion he was expecting 
did not came about he was sore'*'®. A. L. Khatib wrote, "It would be mistake to think that 
Obaidur Rahman and Taheruddin Thakur turned against Mujib because they did not get the 
promotion they had been talking about. They were frilly involved in the conspiracy to 
eliminate Mujib at least a few months before the reshuffling of the cabinet on 26 January 
1975"^". Nurul Islam Monzoor was appointed as a step minister of BAKSAL ministry but 
later was removed from ministry as well as suspended from BAKSAL on grave charges of 
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corruption^"". The only new minister in the Mustaq cabinet was Shah Moazzem Hossain, 
whose name was closely linked with the conspiracy against Mujib. He was the chief whip of 
AL parliamentary party, but he was never made a minister, though at one time he was 
believed to be the close to Mujib. Mustaq appointed him a step minister^"'. Another very 
important companion of Mustaq was Moinul Hussain. After Mustaq's abduction of power his 
newspaper 'Ittefaq' was propagating strongly in favor of Mustaq and was trying to build 
public opinion in favor of Mustaq regime. Before and after the coup Moinul Hossain had very 
intimate relation with Mustaq. After the fall of Mustaq government in Novmeber Shah 
muazzem and Taheruddin Thakur were arrested on charges of misuse of power'®^. When 
Mustaq gave up hopes of vanning the Awami to retain his position in his old party then he 
formed an extreme right wing Democratic League The strong ideological leaning and 
hobnobbing of Mustaq with Shah Muazzem, Taheruddin Thakur, Obaidur Rahman, Noorul 
Islam Monzu, Moinul Hossain became evident as these four and Abdur Rouf (diuing Mustaq 
regime he was appointed Chief Whip) joined in the same political league^°^. 
After the over through of Mujib regime the new military controlled Mustaq regime 
was unable to provide any alternative hegemony in the post AL power block. No alternative 
mechanism capable of replacing the AL and manintaining an equilibrium within the power 
block materialized. The only force to play that role at that time was the military but it was 
factionally divided^"^. So the military controlled civil regime of Mustaq Ahmed was installed 
consists of mainly the right-wing members of previous AL government. All of the members 
of the new ministry also were the ministers of Mujib's mmistiy, they were, Cabinet ministers: 
1) Justice Abu Sayid Chawdhuiy, 2) Prof. Mohammad Yusuf Ali, 3) Sree Foni Bhushon 
Mojumdar, 4) Sohrad Hossain, 5) Abdul Mannan, 6) Dr. Azizur Rahman Mollik, 7) Dr. 
Muzaffar Ahmed Chowdhury, 8) Sree Monoronjon Dhaor, 9) Abdul Momin, and 10) 
Assaduzzam Khan. The step ministers: 1) Shah Moazzem Hossain, 2) Taheruddin Thakur, 3) 
Obaidur Rahman, 4) Mohammad Nurul lalam Monzur, 5) Riazuddin Bhola Mia, and 6) 
Sayeed Altaf Hossain. The Vice President was Mr. Mahmudullah^"^. Osmani was egar to be 
the Defense Minister since the independence of Bangladesh but that dream of him was never 
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realized during Mujib era, and he also resigned from his MP position after the formation of 
BAKSAL^°'. Now in a compromising formula General Osmani was also co-opted as the 
defense advisor of the new government^ ®®. Mustaq only used his name for better reputation of 
his government. By agreeing to serve as a defense advisor to the president Mustaq Osmani 
created some confusion and compromised himself with an illegal undemocratic system^® .^ 
Maleq Ukil remained speaker of the parliament^President Mustaq's twenty one-member 
cabinets included four members of Mujib's fifteen men BAKSAL executive committee (the 
other eleven had either been killed or arrested) and a number of Mujib's ex-cabinet members. 
Among the cabinet members were two Hindus, at least two men that were generally 
considered to be pro-Indian and two more of them were said to be pro-Russian and a several 
of them were thought to be pro-West^". Although all the ministers were from civil 
background, their presence in the government was nominal and symbolic. The real power 
remained at the hand of the young army majors, who were responsible for the coup directly 
and who reftased to go back to the barrack^'^. Mujib had enormous trust in these AL leaders. 
During Mujib's presidency Mahbub Talukdar was his assistant secretary. He wrote, " The 
people who came in power were crazy about Mujib even yesterday. They were very eagerly to 
get a little attention from Mujib. But he is the bad person to all of these people; the overnight 
change of these people is astonishing"^'^ While Malek Ukil was still the Speaker of the 
parliament, the picture of Bangabandhu was removed from the house of parliament^''*. Not 
only that, Ukil also said that "God has saved the country from Pharaoh" while he was holding 
a press conference in London as the representative of the Mustaq govemment^'^ The foreign 
minister of the Mustaq government was Abu Sayid Chowdhury, the first president of the 
Mujib ear. In the press conference in the airport of London he told the journalists that the new 
government had absolute control over the whole'country. The people of the coimtry ftilly 
supported the new government; established new president was a democratic leader^'^. Also 
the new president was veiy eagerly initiating the recovery of the lost full democracy in the 
land^''. Abu Sayid Chowdhury held a meeting with the US foreign secretary in New York and 
let the secretary know that the present government had frill support of the nation. Kissinger 
expressed his satisfaction about the political situation of Bangladesh^'®. President Mustaq 
appointed Mohiuddin Ahmed, who joined AL from pro-Moscow NAP (M), as the special 
envoy to Moscow. Mohiuddin met USSR Vice President and Foreign Minister and discussed 
very intimately about the improvement of the superb relationship between two countries^''. 
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ministiy went for a tour to Washington in September"". The two ex-ministers of Mujib's 
ministry M. R. Siddiki and Samshul Hoque who were appointed by Mujib as ambassadors to 
USA and USSR respectively, after Mustaq's taking over the power they served under him^^'. 
It was also true that at the beginning of Mustaq's rule Shamsul Huq and some other MPs 
pressured President Mustaq for a judiciary inquiry of the assassination of Mujib^^^. After the 
death of Mujib almost all of his colleagues became ministers. When the ex-Awami League 
ministers were going abroad as the appointee of the Mustaq government a lot of people 
thought they might not return to the country. Like in 1971 Aese leaders would protest against 
the brutal assassination of Mujib and the illegal government of Mustaq and try to build 
international support for the justice"^. However, the leaders showed their passion for power 
by asking support to the foreign countries for an illegal, undemocratic government of 
president Mustaq. 
Mustaq was expecting to gain support of the parliamentary members because of his 
constant opposition to Mujib's BAKSAL scheme and maximum MPs also could not accept 
BAKSAL by heart"''. Even though Mustaq had the armed force behind him to support still for 
the sake of strengthening his position in power he needed support of political leadership. He 
neither suspended the constitution nor dissolved the parliament, which allowed all 
parliamentary members including the Speaker to enjoy their usual priviledges"^. He probably 
had a shrewd intension that he would be able to get legitimacy of his unauthorized 
government by the legislators, though the MPs had not any mood to recognize him"^. Most of 
the AL MPs did not resign from the parliament in the protest of the assassination of Mujib, 
except for 4/5 MPs who left the country after the death of Mujib"'. Mustaq kept all the AL 
leaders in his government (where among 315 MPs only 7 were in opposition) and tried to 
prove to the world that like Mujib's government his one is also the AL government and 
followers of democracy. Though President Mustaq successftilly retained the support of AL 
cabinet members and legislators but these bodies were largely homogeneous and Mustaq was 
not sure of their united support on crucial issues^ ^®. The Mustaq faction of the AL, which was 
in power obviously wanted to purge its rivals from the party and at the same time wanted to 
rally the support of the other parties behind the regime. Most of the top ranking leaders of AL 
(who were not ready to support the new regime) was taken into prison on charge of corruption 
and misuse of power^^'. Some of the noteworthy leaders among the arrested leaders were ex-
Vice President Sayeed Nazrul Islam, ex-Prime Minster Monsur Ali, the Prime Minister during 
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the liberation war Tajuddin, Kamruzzam, Abdus Samad Azad, Korban Ali, BAKSAL 
Secretaty Zillur Rahman, Abdurrazzak, Tofael Ahmed, ex-student leader Abdul Kuddus 
Makhon, Amir Hossain Amu etc"°. Mustaq tried to convince most of the arrested leaders to 
join his ministry. Among the leaders who refused to join Mustaq's government were Sayeed 
Nazrul Islam, H. M. Kamruzzam, M. Monsur Ali, Abdus Samad Azad etc^^'. The enmity 
between Mustaq and Tajuddin was never reduced^^^. Even though Mujib removed Tajuddin 
from his ministry in 1974, it would be wrong to hope that Mustaq would embrace Tajuddin as 
his minister. It was also impossible for Tajuddin to accept the leadership of Mustaq as the 
President^^^. After the liberation as a Prime Minister, on one of the major issues Tajuddin 
concentrated was to replace Mustaq from the Foreign Ministry to safer and lesser important 
Ministry. Mustaq took that replacement as an insult and always vividly remembered the 
satisfaction of India on that account. In 4 November 1975, while Mustaq was being removed 
from power he ordered to kill his old AL colleagues Sayeed Nazrul Islam, H. M. Kamruzzam, 
and M. Monsur Ali including Tajuddin. The objective behind this death ordinance was to 
assure that after the death of Mujib's four main colleagues there would not be any revival of 
the pro-Mujib political leadership or politics that follows Mujib's ideology in Bangladesh^ '^^ . 
Also by this killing, the four political leaders who could have challenged the military rules 
were eliminated. The conspiracy against the ftjture of the democracy was completed^^^. The 
AL leaders who joined Mustaq's government later said that they joined the ministry to save 
their lives. Mizan Chowdhury one of the prominent AL leaders at that time, who did not 
joined Mustaq's cabinet supported his colleagues' position on this account. But this logic of 
theirs is not acceptable because the people who were killed were the family, relative and close 
colleagues of Mujib. A lot of AL leaders who were appointed abroad by Mustaq could protest 
the assassination of Mujib from abroad but they did not. Instead all the leaders who once were 
affectionately looking for Mujib's attention started to look for that from Mustaq. The only 
exceptions were Sayeed Nazrul Islam, H. M. Kamruzzam, M. Monsur Ali and Tajuddin and 
they proved their trust towards Mujib by sacrificing their lives; they did not compromise their 
morality by any means^^^. Mujib's intellectual foreign minister Dr. Kamal Hossain always 
followed right of the center leaning in AL politics, at the time he was abroad. Mustaq had 
tried his best to convince him to include him in his minister but Kamal Hossain did not^^'. A 
numerotis number of AL leaders preferred prison over serving Mustaq's illegal government, 
and did not sell out their morality like the top rank AL leaders. The coup leaders knew that the 
sole source of AL are the workers, once the workers are disabled the foundation of AL will be 
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Ghire Kisu Ghotona 0 Bangladesh, op. cit.; p.245-46. Also see A.L. Khatib, op. cit.; p. 12. 
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crumbled real fast and easy"®. The students and the youths are the chief strength of AL. 
While the top rank AL leaders were looking for their self-interest in the Mustaq government 
still they were committed to the party^^'. Because tlie party had tliousands of dedicated 
workers in all over the coimtry the organization was very strong. So the Mustaq regime 
imprisoned thousands of party workers. Many of the grass root level AL leaders and workers 
to avoid arrest migrated to the neighboring country India, and hid in different places of Dhaka 
and other cities of the country '^*®. It was expected that there would be a huge revolution in 
Bangladesh after the assassination of the father of the nation and protest and condemnation 
would be voiced against the brutal death everywhere in the coimtry. But none of that 
happened; the grass root level AL leaders and workers were confused by the nature of the first 
rank leaders of AL. Most of the leaders who did not join Mustaq's government, instead of 
leading AL in protest were hiding for their life right after the assassination and later they were 
arrested^'^'. In this situation the young leader Kader Siddiqi was an exception, he protested 
this heartless assassination and demanded the justice for the killing^"^ .^ Not only that, he tried 
to build a peasants army in the country side with the help of some of Mujib's ardent 
supporters to take revenge of Mujib's killing and to return the peoples power to their hand by 
over throwing the illegal Mustaq government through armed revolution^''^. 
Many thought that Mizan Chowdhury would join Mustaq's ministry '^^ '*. He lost his 
position as a minister in 1974 as a result of his demand and sulking behavior to be the general 
secretary of the party '^* .^ Though Mustaq invited this disheartened lieutenant of Mujib in his 
cabinet, but Mizan Chowdhury did not respond. In a personal meeting he technically told 
Mustaq that he was a man of organization and he prefers to be with organization i.e. AL, not 
in the govemment^"^^. 
The Mustaq regime passed much of its time by playing the "ins" and "outs" game 
inside AL as well as with the opposition parties. Among those who were against Mujib (pro-
China leftist and pro-Pakistani forces etc) were in the regime and those who were very much 
with Mujib regime (pro-USSR and pro-Indian forces such as CPB and NAP [M]) were out '^^ '. 
Maulana Bhashani, the popular old leader of pro-China, NAP (B) gave blessing to the regime. 
The banned political party leadership of Muslim League and Jamat-e-Islami conveyed their 
wholehearted support to Mustaq regime. They were exhilarated and felt relieved by the 
change. The government had released a number of political prisoners including many war 
criminals fi-om the pro-right religious parties and also some from pro-China political parties. 
Though president Mustaq showed his positive posture, JSD that was extremely popular 
among the student body of Bangladesh and also was equipped with an armed ancillary 
organization, GonoBahini (where some ex-army officers were also involved) rather had gone 
Abu A1 Sayeed, Eighty One days of Mustaq, op. cit.; 1995, p.54. 
Jawadul Karim, Mujib and contemporary Politics, op. cit.; p. 110. 
M. A. Wajed Miah, Mujibke Ghire Kisu Ghotona 0 Bangladesh, op. cit.; p.254. Aslo interview with Harun 
UrRashid(MP). 
Muhammad Ali Talukder (Faruk), Prescription Achol: Awami League-a Cancer, (Dhaka: Kintu Prakasani, 
1992), pp. 18-19. Also see A.L. Khatib, op. cit.; p. 12. 
Muhammad Ali Talukder (Faruk), Prescription Achol: Awami League-a Cancer, op. cit.; pp. 18-19. 
Interview with Abdul Kader Siddiqi. 
Abu A1 Sayeed, Eighty One days of Mustaq, op. cit.; p. 18. 
Interview with Mijanur Rahman Chowdhury. 
Interview with Mizan Chowdhury. 
R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; p. 142. 
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into opposition of the Mustaq govemment '^*^. Though JSD was happy by the overthrow of 
Mujib regime but it did not forget to criticize the brutal killing of Sheikh Mujib and his 
family®^'. 
After attaining the power the regime did undertake a number of measures including 
shifting of certain policies. To gain quick support from various aggrieved, offended and 
injured groups the new regime scraped the BAKSAL idea and the 61-district governor scheme 
and reinstated original 19 districts with bureaucrats as the head of the district 
administration®^". On political front the regime scrapped the single national party and also 
abolished all political parties. But it pledged to conduct a multi-party national election in 
February 1977. On the economic front a number of measures were taken to boost the private 
sector. The government announced its intention to diversify foreign trade. Main trade of 
Bangladesh, Jute export was de-nationalized"'. On the ideological front though the regune 
pledged support for the four guiding principles of the state i.e. democracy, nationalism, 
socialism and secularism but more demonstrative emphasis was put on Islam^® .^ Though the 
regime declared that the country's foreign policy would remain unchanged. It was announced 
that efforts would be committed to establish friendly relationship with other countries, "who 
had not been friends before"- an obvious reference to Pakistan and China. Indeed, Pakistan 
was the first country to recognize the new regime. Saudi Arab and China, which until then 
had refiased to recognize the existence of Bangladesh, announced diplomatic recognition. The 
regime aimed at pwsuing a policy of equidistance between Delhi, Islamabad, Moscow and 
Peking. Though the regime hoped that a pro-Islamic posture at home and abroad would gain 
then rapid mass support, however its base remained tennous"^. Though Mustaq regime was 
backed by a group of junior army officer, it is also true that cantonment cannot be the 
powerhouse of a civilian leaders or ex-army personals® '^'. Moreover, though the army high 
command accepted the change and expressed their allegiance towards the new president, but 
stayed in the barrack without taking part in the government"^ The few junior majors who 
planned the coup did not have the absolute support of the army. Senior officers, who were not 
involved in the coup, resented the power of the junior majors. The conflicts within the army 
finally lead to an open conflict in the first week of November resulted in the overthrow of the 
Mustaq regime^® .^ 
Abu A1 Sayeed, Eighty one days of Mustaq in Bangabhaban, op. cit.; pp. 15-16, 56 and 66. Some other 
political parties also had gone against Mustaq regime. These include the Bangladesh Communist Party 
(Leninist), The East Pakistan Communist Party of Abdul Hoque, Bangladesh Communist Party (Taha), and 
Bangladesh Communist Party (Matin-Alauddin). Also see Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade, op. 
cit; p. 71-72. 
Lawrence Lifschultz, Taher's Last Testamant: Bangladesh the Unfinished revolution" (Bengali Translation), 
(Dhaka: Cornel Taher Sangshad, 1988), p. 14. 
Talukder Maniruzzaman, "Bangladesh in 1975: The Falll of the Mujib Regime and Its Aftermath", Asian 
Survey, Vol. 16, No. 2, Febmary 1977, p. 126. 
The Movement of Bangladesh was actually patronized by the growing capitalist class. During the Mujib ear 
AL's nationalization project interrupted the capital accumulation process by this nascent bourgeoisie. The 1975 
coup and overthrow was a resumption of the promotion of the capitalist development. For details see S. M. 
Shamsul Alam, " The Military and Crisis of Political Hegemony in Bangladesh", op. cit.; p.l32. 
Mustaq would have declared Bangladesh an Islamic republic but he had no political base of his own among 
the people. Even only a miniscule section of the army supported him. He had to consolidate his position first 
with the help of his old AL colleagues, who were from various ideological backgrounds. See A. L. Khatib, Who 
Killed Mujib?, op. cit.; p. 22-24. 
" I R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; pp. 141-142 
Abu A1 Sayeed, Eighty One days of Mustaq, op. cit.; p.22. 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge of Development, op. cit.; p. 15. 
R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, op. cit.; pp. 142-143. 
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Parts 
The Years of Survival and the Emergence of Hegemonic Leadership in AL 
According to Samuel Finer armedforce has the full control over arms. They have 
the absolute domination on exercising power. So it is not surprising why do they revolt 
against their civilian masters rather it is the question why do they respect them. [Samuel E. 
Finer, The Man of Horse Back: The Role of the Military in Politics, (London: Palmal Press, 1962); p. 6.] 
The futile dream of JSD: In 1975, Bangladesh went through a number of coup deetat - the 
coup of the junior officers on 15 August in which Sheikh Mujib was assassinated and 
Khandokar Mustaq Ahmed brought to power, the coup of Khaled Musharraf on 3 November 
in which Mustaq was toppled from power and finally the 7 November sepoy mutiny was 
instigated by the Bipplobi Gana Bahini (BGB) (Peoples Revolutionary Army) an underground 
ancillary armed organization of JSD within the armed forces led by retired Colonel Abu 
Taher, in which Khald Musharraf was killed and General Zia was installed as the de-facto 
leader of the military regime'. Though Taher and the leftist JSD masterminded the soldiers 
mutiny of November 1975, Taher played the role of power broker, Zia was their choice as 
leaders of the regime. Similarly, Zia was acceptable to the rightists. Zia was acceptable to 
both the groups because of his popularity within the rank and file soldiers^. Because of Zias 
such acceptability to ensure national consensus over the revolutionary government, Zia was 
installed as their leader^. JSD expected that keeping Zia in the forefront they would be able to 
achieve their 12 point demands - for which they executed the Sepoy revolution. Their main 
demand was to form a classless peoples' revolutionary army like that of China'^. 
Shortly after having been put in such a powerftil position Zia realized that his personal 
class-based hopes and ambitions would not be materialized if he remains under the influence 
of progressive forces^. The conventional logic of sustaining state power did not allow Zia to 
go along with the ideology of Taher and his JSD. So, almost immediately Zia came into 
conflict v^ dth Taher and his men over the establishment of a 'classless people's army', to form 
the revolutionary council and other demands of BGB troops and its main organization JSD^. 
Not only he severed his relationship with the group who had helped in restoring him to power, 
by November 23-24 he started crackdown on JSD. By an extensive program the regime 
R. Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues, pp. 201 and 203. Though by the change Sayem was made 
president and CMLA and Zia retained his previous position as army chief of staff. In reality however Zia 
remained the real power behind the Sayem government. The new President himself behaved publicly in a way 
that showed Zia to be the boss. Ziilur Rahman Khan, Martial Law to Martial Law, pp. 160 and 174. 
Rawnaq Jahan, Problems and Issues, p. 203. During 1971 war Taher fought in the same sector and known to 
be ever close friends for a long time. Zia was beloved to the soldiers because of his role in the 1971 liberation 
war. On the other hand, in the difficult situations after the independence - when Safiullah, junior to Zia - was 
made chief of staff of the army - Zia had to strike a balance with the repatriate officers (during the liberation war 
they were in West Pakistan Jail) to strengthen his own position within the army. The officers who had not taken 
part in the war, had found a new allay in Zia (see Moudud Ahmed, Development and the Challenge of 
Democracy, pp. 29-30). 
^ Lawrence Liftschuldge, Unfinished Revolution: Last Testament of Colonel Taher, p. 77. Also Altaf Pervez, 
Unfmished Revolution: Colonel Taher and the Politics of JSD, p. 127. 
For 12 point demands of Biplobi Gana Bahini see Hyder Aqbar Khan Ronu, Marxism and Armed Revolution 
(In Bengali) (Dhaka: Ganamuki Prakasani, 1982. Also Altaf Pervez, Unfinished Revolution: Colonel Taher and 
the Politics of JSD, pp. 135-36. 
^ Ziilur Rahman Khan, Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 166. 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, p. 23. 
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arrested and imprisoned more than 10,000 JSD members including all the top leaders. Finally 
by an imfair trial the head of the BGB, Taher was hanged and many of the JSD top ranking 
leaders including the President and Secretary were long term imprisoned'. Thus by following 
a very clever strategy - first going along with the rebel radical soldiers to control power from 
the counter part and then turned his guns against themselves - General Zia captured the power 
of Bangladesh. After crushing Taher's radical group within the army Zia restored military 
discipline and brought stable military rule in the country^. As a protest against such 
oppression, JSD called for a general strike on 31 July 1976 but could not arouse people's 
sentiment in its favor. 
The manipulation of the prominent interest groups by military regime: The military 
takeover of the governing power in 1975 ushered in a new era of military rule in Bangladesh. 
Major General Ziaur Rahman emerged as the de-facto ruler of Bangladesh and he imposed 
military rule in the country. All political activities were banned. The parliament also was 
dissolved and open competition among the politicians subsided under strict martial law order. 
Many political leaders were also jailed under numerous charges®. For all practical purpose the 
post coup system of Bangladesh was a partnership of military and civil bureaucracy. To win 
the anti-AL support of various groups he immediately took some steps: much of the prestige 
of civil service has been restored under General Zia's martial law government. Ziaur Rahman 
reinstated several civil servants who had been dismissed by Mujib by political and personal 
reasons. He also took the initiatives in restoring the confidence of military-bureaucracy. In the 
absence of political regime most of the high level decision making was done by senior 
military officers and bureaucrats'®. To win the loyalty of the defense in his every cabinet he 
formed, there were handsome number of members from military personnel. Many prestigious 
positions of government jobs were filled by Zia's trusted military colleagues. Further the big 
business and government contacts were also allotted to the ex-army officers. The military 
budget was also increased rapidly. In 1975, the last year of Mujib regime, the defense budget 
was $ 34 million or 0.7% of the GNP. In 1978, it had increased up to $ 130 million or 1.8% of 
the total GNP". 
Since tiie Zia regime took over ti-he state power, to manipulate tiie unhappy business 
community - who were hostile towards Mujib government's nationalization policies - with 
the assistance of bureaucracy it declared itself the custodian of the capitalist order. It actively 
involved itself in promoting capitalist development. The regime had followed a policy of 
divestment (process of selling of units through public tender) and denationalization (returning 
of business-industrial units to former owners). This involved the sharp acceleration of 
privatization'^. 
Zillur Rahman Khan, Martial Law to Martial Law, pp. 67-70. 
Zillur Rahman Khan, Martial Law to Martial Law, p. 174. 
M. Rahsiduzzaman, "Changing Political Pattern in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears"; 
Asian Survey, Vol. 17 No. 9, September 1977; p. 804. 
Ibid, p. 796. 
S.M. Shamsul Alam, "The Military and the Crisis of the Political Hegemony in Bangladesh"; South Asia 
Bulletin, Vol. 10 No. 2, Fall 1990; p. 35. Also see Ahmed Safiqul Huq and Muhammad Yeahia Akhtar, 
Militarization and Opposition in Bangladesh: Parliamentary Approval and Public Reaction"; The Journal of 
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics; Vol. 27 No. 2, July 1989; p. 175. 
Between 1976 and 83 a total of 217 units have been divested or denationalized or were in process of being so. 
See S.M. Alam, "The Military and the Crisis of the Political Hegemony in Bangladesh"; p. 37. Also see Md. 
Nurul Amin and Md. Rafiquel Islam, "Twenty Years of Bangladesh Politics: An Overview"; Regional Studies 
Islamabad, Vol. 10 No. 2, Spring 1992; p. 109. 
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During the nationalist struggle, secularism was used both as counterpoint value against 
Islamic Pakistan and to win support of the various radical force. After liberation secularism 
played a less significant role. Mujib showed his feeling for Islam to broaden his support. After 
Zia came to power, the constitution was simultaneously amended, deleating the word 
'secularism' and replacing it v^th 'absolute trust and faith in the 'Almighty Allah'. Zia then 
introduced the concept of 'Bangladeshi nationalism' rather than 'Bengali nationalism' in 
order to distinguish Bengali Muslim identity from the Bengali Hindus of West Bengal'^. Zia 
used the concept of 'Bangladeshi nationalism' in favor of the idea of 'masses' which 
strengthen his popularity against the secularist idea of AL. 
The revival of opposition politics under the first military rule: In summer 1976, after nine 
months of his abducting the power Zia allowed limited political activities by issuing a 
political party regulation act. Once the quarantine of political activities was lifted parties 
proliferated. As many as 54 parties emerged''* and of these parties maximum were new, which 
were no better than personalistic groups headed by competing individual factional leaders'^. 
Evidently the emergence of 54 parties showed too much factional characteristics in the 
political environment of Bangladesh. As the AL was displaced from power, the Islamic-based 
parties received a fresh lead on life. President Zia, mainly with a view to broadening his 
power base by enlisting the support of the right wing elements and wooing the affluent West 
Asians, lifted ban from these Islam-based parties helped rehabilitated them through a 
constitutional amendment and eventually brought some of them into the political limelight'^. 
Under the political parties regulation (PPR) every party needed to submit a manifesto and 
program along with their constitution in order to obtain government clearance to operate as a 
legal political entities. This political party regulation was issued with the intension to control 
free political activities of the political opposition. Among other restrictions, Zia regime added 
an interesting condition that no party can use/ promote a cult based on any living or dead 
personality. This was obviously aimed at the AL so that they were debarred from reviving the 
cult of Mujib on which they relied heavily'^. 
Especially in the political, social and economic envirorraient of this subcontinent 
coimtries elements of division is much more active than elements of unity. Here the mental 
impatience of the masses does not permit the social and political issues to be settled; the 
political condition of Bangladesh is similar to it. The post liberation social and economic 
disorder, restlessness, agitation and excitement made the political enviromnent uncertain and 
unstable. The governing party AL could not escape from that situation. The party led the 
liberation movement but immediate after the liberation because of ideological conflict it was 
divided into two streams. One of the defected section of the AL today known as JSD. It is true 
because of Mujibs established personalistic leadership till 1975 any fiirther split did not take 
S.M. Shamsul Alam, "The Military and the Crisis of the Political Hegemony in Bangladesh"; p. 35. 
Sangbad, 26 October 1976. 
M. Rasiduzzaman, "Changing Political Patterns in Bangladesh: Internal Constraints and External Fears"; 
Asian Survey, Vol. 17 No. 9, September 1977; pp. 804-05. 
Emajuddin Ahmed and D.R.J.A. Nazneen, "Islam in Bangladesh: Revivalism or Power Politics"; Asian 
Survey, Vol. 30 No. 8, August 1990; p. 807. Also Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, pp. 44-45. 
These political parties at a later stage constituted a solid political base at Zia's rise in Bangladesh politics. 
Although these p ^ i e s had no popular support among the electorate and their leaders had been denounced by the 
people in the early elections, the revival of pro-Islamic sentiment had a considerable psychological impact. 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, ibid, pp. 44-45. 
Other restrictions referred to 'foreign aided parties', 'underground activities' armed cadres and so on. See 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, pp. 47-49. 
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place in the party but if any more defection could take place in it then people of the country 
would not be suiprised. Till before the assassination of Mujib infighting was continued in the 
governing party . The news of AL's deteriorating relations with its different front 
organizations was very regular. In the party leadership there were differences on ideology and 
principles. Journalists regularly reported the probability of the formation of some new 
political parties by the leadership of liberation war time PM Tajuddin Ahmed and JL chief 
Sheikh Moni respectively'^. But AL leaders did not dare form new parties by leaving AL as 
they were afraid that if they leave AL their political career would be jeopardized. They were 
really afraid that in front of gigantic image of S. Mujib their endeavor to build a new party 
would be ruined even at the beginning of its germination^®. But when Mujib had been to 
USSR for treatment in 1974 due to his serious illness, in his absence there was factional 
competition among the top-brass AL leaders on the question, "Who will be the next after 
Mujib?" From then even many diehard Awami Leaguer started believing that after Mujib 
there would be intense factional strife in AL^'. 
The factional infightings and splits in different political parties took epidemical 
proportion just after the end of Mujib era and beginning of Zia era. The disgruntled AL and 
the BAKSAL - which was subsequently formed by Mujib through the merger of AL and 
some other parties - were also jolted in this time. Actually in a more explicit way it can be 
said split in deftmct AL took place before 1976 i.e. in August 1975 - when Mujib was brutally 
assassinated by the intrigue of his own party men. 
The era of indoor politics was started from July 1976. In a vigorous way with pomp 
and pleasure and high expectation all the political parties started the formation of their 
organization. At the same time the political parties internally engrossed in parochial 
v^angling/ debates, skirmishes and splits. Meanwhile many political parties were broken into 
twice, thrice or into multiple parts and all of the newly formed splinter party factions declared 
that they were the aboriginal and real government recognized parties and by giving statements 
and counter-statements in the newspapers verbally they propagated their existence. A lot of 
hand to hand skirmish internally took place among the party stalwarts in different political 
parties. But as still government did not allow open politics, and as still party activities were 
limited into indoors these skirmishes could not come into open rather remained unpublished. 
Because of the absence of open political activities the factional strife, which could not take 
place in the open public meetings or in the parliamentary sessions, were limited to the party 
offices and political leaders' drawing rooms^^. It was in the backdrop of this scenerio that the 
then military regime allowed the formation of political parties and party activities on a limited 
scale. The AL and BAKSAL (formed by Mujib) also could not keep themselves aloof from 
Political article: "Politics of Breakup and Formation"; Daily Janapad, 26 July 1978. 
See - "A new Political Party is going to be formed under the leadership of Sheikh Moni" - in Daily Janapad, 
24 July 1974. Also see - "Contemplation is going on of the formation of a new party keeping Tajuddin in its 
head. Some of the former ministers have been seen moving together with him in connection of the new 
contemplation" - in Daily Janapad, 28 October 1974 etc. The unhappy AL leaders could not form new parties 
because they knew it very clearly in front of Mujib's gigantic image their endeavor to form a new party would be 
ruined even at its germinating stage. 
Mujib was the main strength of AL. It will be much more exact if we say in the 1970 and 73 the people 
enfranchised vote in favor of Mujib's party instead of saying that diey had given vote to AL organizations or its 
leaders (daily Sangbad, 28 January 1973 and daily Purbadesh, 11 March 1973). Though AL removed as many as 
43 public representatives front parliament (daily Ittefaq, 3 March 1973) and Mujib sacked many ministers from 
his cabinet, they could not dare challenge Mujib because they knew that their talking against Mujib could not be 
able to create any dent on peoples faith for Mujib. 
Interview with Khondoker Haroonur Rashid MP. 
Political article: "Politics of Bangladesh", weekly Bichitra, Vol. 16 No. 46, 14 April 1978; p. 19. 
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this scenario because of internal skirmish. In 1975 one party BAKSAL was formed mainly by 
the merger of three political parties: AL, CPB and NAP (Muzaffar). Besides this some 
prominent personalities also joined BAKSAL. Some of these figures had been the leaders of 
some personality-centered parties, which had no political base in the country. Among of these 
prominent leaders Ataur Rahman Khan and Hazi Mohammad Danesh were mentionable. 
The BAKSAL led government was in the power only for three months which ended 
with the assassination of Mujib and because of the irrmiature death of this new one party 
system still it was not possible to investigate its merits and demerits due to non-availibility of 
data but after the death of Mujib it was severely criticized by near one and all. Becaue of the 
propaganda of the government propaganda machineries rapidly BAKSAL was branded an 
autocratic system. The other component-partners of AL, those who together had been merged 
to BAKSAL, were not ready to carry these dishonorable charges of BAKSAL in their 
shoulder. In that time no one also had any eagerness to revive and reorganize the BAKSAL^^ 
The constituent parties, who had previously been merged in BAKSAL, instead of 
reviving a single party naming BAKSAL, revived their original parties in old names. The 
parties were CPB led by Moni Singh, Prof Mozaffar led NAP (Muzaffar), Ataur Rahman led 
Jatia League and Gana Mukti Union of Hazi Mohammad Danesh. Later these parties were 
divided into many pieces^''. The CPB and NAP (Muzaffar) had directly inspired Mujib to 
form BAKSAL but after the changing over of power in 1975 they joined in the anti-AL camp. 
In 1977, to legitimize his military government when Zia arranged a referendum among all 
other opposition secular political parties only CPB and NAP (Muzaffor) appealed the people 
to give vote in favor of President Zia. Both Ae parties also supported the 19-point 
development programs of Ziaur Rahman^^. However in the 1978 presidential election they 
again formed an alliance with AL. After the presidential election, Mozaffar Ahmed of NAP 
again was involved in a pro-Ziaur Rahman and anti-AL campaigning. Thus after two weeks of 
the presidential election NAP leader Muzaffar, in a public meeting, said, "None of the poor' 
of the country have voted in favor of boat (AL led alliance's election symbol)^®. They gave 
vote to President Zia, because, their provision for bread and butter was made during Zia 
regime"^'. According to him President Zia talked about pro-people politics and public rights. 
In another meeting he said in the tWrd worid countries the army could play progressive role^^. 
In the 1979 parliamentary election from among one hundred NAP (M) candidates only 
Muzaffar Ahmed was succeeded. Allegation was raised in the party's internal forum that 
Muzaffar Ahmed was involved in collaboration with Zia regime. His election was seen by his 
party men as the award of Zia regime because of his support to them^^. Though from the 
beginning of the formation, his party NAP (Muzaffar) had been involved in socialist-
secularist politics, but in 1976 when NAP was revived, in the prelude of party ideology and 
objectives the party said to get salvation in the hereafter we need religion and to ensure liberty 
Weekly Roabbar, 4 August 1991; p. 33. 
Rezwan Siddiqui, Politics of Talking, p. 69 and for the news of reviving Jatia Ganamukti Union see daily 
Sangbad, 21 November 1976. 
Jaglul Alam, The Activities of the Leftist Politics of Bangladesh, pp. 105-06. Also Tareq Shamsur Rahmen 
(edits), Bnagladesh: 25 Years of Politics, p. 49. Through this referendum held on 23 June 1977 General Zia 
made his position as the country President permanent. 
^^ Boat is the election symbol of AL. In the 1978 presidential election the election symbol of AL led Democratic 
Alliance was 'Boat'. In that election NAP (Muzaffar) was the component of Democratic Alliance. 
Jaglul Alam, The Activities of the Leftist Politics of Bangladesh, p. 105. 
Ibid., p. 106. 
Political feature: "Indoor Politics", weekly Bichitra; Vol. 15 No. 21, 22 October 1976. 
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in the world we need exploitation free society^®. Infighting also arose in the NAP (Muzaffar) 
because of the contradictory role of Prof. Mujaffar. The rebel groups opined that Muzaffar 
Ahmed was trying to achieve dishonest political objectives (i.e. ministership in Zia-cabinet). 
Protesting the contradictory activities of Muzaffar Ahmed under the leadership of Altaf 
Hossain and Suranjit Sengupta one faction of party defected from NAP (M) and on 30 
December 1978 formed a new party named Jatia Ekota Party (National United Party). 
Another faction led by Chowdhury Harunur Rashid and Pankaz Bhattacharia formed a 
counter NAP (Harun). Including Matia Chowdhury 18 NAP leaders defected from the party 
and joined AL^'. Later on however in 1980 CPB and NAP joined the AL led 10 party united 
alliances. 
On the other hand the CPB and NAP (Muzaffar) were known to have relationship 
between them as a parent Communist Party and a mass political organization (front 
organization). But from time to time conflict arose between them. During the Mujib regime, 
particularly during 1973 election, sharp polarization took place between them when the parent 
organization CPB was allowed to operate in the open, the existence of the mass front (i.e. 
NAP) became bitter^^. But in the mass front the NAP had already established its own position 
independent of the CPB. After the revival of both parties in 1976 they again engaged in 
quarrel on the division of cadres between them. This polemic cleavage apparently brought 
about an open cleavage between them in 1976-77". During 1977 and part of 1978 the CPB 
was not allowed by the regime to ftinction due to its alleged role in anti-regime coup in 
October 1977^^ but later due to its persuading policy to the regime CPB was permitted to take 
part in the politics in the wake of parliamentary election. CPB however remained weak since 
schism centering on ideology penetrated the party. 
A. Rahman Khan and Hazi Mohammad Danesh, with their parties Jatia League and 
Gana Mukti Union respectively previously had merged in BAKSAL and they had been 
included as the central committee members of it. But after the overthrow of BAKSAL regime 
in 1975, they were engaged in hard criticism of BAKSAL government. According to them 
because of the intoduction of one party BAKSAL system the democracy of the country 
suffered heavily. They depicted the three and half years Mujib rule as the period of 
corruption, looting, misuse of power, political killing and humiliation. So they declared the 
death anniversary of Mujib, the 15'*' August, the day of deliverance^^ One of the pro-right 
dailies of Dhaka 'daily Azad' in one of its sub-editorial mentioned these anti-BAKSAL 
criticisms of A. Rahman as the 'opportunist politics'^^. In another widely circulated daily one 
columnist wrote, "A. Rahman & associate use to mention the formation of BAKSAL as the 
arrangement of burying the democracy. But at the formative stage of BAKSAL by joining in 
this one party BAKSAL system he also became a participant in the program of striking the 
last nail in the coffin of democracy. However now a days Mr. A. Rahman is showing his 
eagerness for democracy. In the killing of democracy he was also involved, now he is calling 
to assemble en masse to establish the democracy. The people of Bangladesh will not forget 
the role of Mr. Khan very soon"^^. In the following years during the anti-Ershad democratic 
Jaglul Alam, The Activities of the Leftist Politics of Bangladesh, p. 106. 
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movement his opportunistic nature was exposed clearly. In 1983 he participated in the 
movement to get back democracy in the country and portrayed that time military rule of 
Ershad - the killer of democracy. But suddenly on 29 March 1984 he withdrew himself from 
the movement and became the PM of the same military regime as well as also joined the 
government patronized party Janadal (Peoples party) as one of its Vice President^®. In 1976 
when A. Razzaq was going to revive his party Jatia League (JL) the former GS of it Amena 
Begum by leaving A. Rahman formed separate political party named Bangladesh Jatia Dal 
(Bangladesh National Party)^^. In the following days many of the JL leaders and workers also 
joined the government sponsored JAGODAL. The Jatia Dal of Amena Begum was also 
broken into two pieces; the other section was led by Sirajul Huq"®. 
MULTIFEROUS DEFECTION IN AL 
Mujibur Rahman abolished the AL in the month of January 1975 and formed a one party 
BAKSAL combining AL and some other socialist minded parties. By leaving its traditional 
nationalistic principles and its very familiar established program multiparty parliamentary 
democratic system AL and the like minded parties moved on to the totally new path of one 
party dictatorial socialist program. Some months later, in August 1975, Mujib and his close 
associates were assassinated by an intrigue done by the rightist elements of Mujibs own 
defunct AL and some junior army majors. The conspiring part of AL took control of the 
country for few months. These two national incidents brought about a tremendous change in 
the survived leaders contemplation of the defimct AL party. Some sorts of polarization took 
place among the survived AL leaders. On 1976, when the political parties were reviving under 
the PPR of General Zia, splits first took place in the largest political party of the country 
Bangladesh Awami League. While an attempt was made to revive the AL, the only aim of 
leaderless AL was to survive in the hostile environment as well as against the hostile attitude 
of the government and make the way easy for a future political advancement by ignoring all 
personal and ideological rivalries. Then it was seen that some of the rightist elements of AL 
by defecting the mainstream organization formed several parties and divided the party into 
many parts. Under the leadership of Khondoker Mustaq Ahmed, General (Rtd.) Ataul Gani 
Usmani, and Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarka Bagish the Democratic League, Jatia Janata Party, 
Gana Azadi League was formed respectively'* ^  Probably the target of these newly formed 
party leaders were to form a separate powerful party by the beak away factions of mainstream 
AL. 
Democratic League (DL): After the taking control of governing power by 
assassinating Mujib through a bloody military coup, K.Mustaq had shown his wish to form a 
new party beside AL. He discussed Aat v^th different AL leaders'*^. But he failed to float a 
new party during his reign because he was too busy with administer his unstable government. 
Meanwhile he lost the governing power by another counter coup in November 1975. When 
there was a possibility to begin political activities in 1976 K. Mustaq made an effort to form a 
powerful rightist (Islam based) political party on the basis of larger unity of the political 
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leaders and targeting this he formed a convening committee. Among the prominent members 
of this committee were: the defunct Bangladesh Jatia League President Ataur Rahman Khan, 
defunct Krishok Sramik Dal President Azizul Huq (Nanna Miah), Jammat-E-Ulama-E-Islam 
leader Pir (religious saint) Mohsen Uddin (Dudu Miah), defunct Convention ML leader 
Hasem Uddin Ahmed, former President and Speaker of AL government Mohammadullah, 
defunct Bangladesh Jaita League Leader Oli Ahad etc. Many prominent leaders also showed 
their eagerness to participate with Mustaq in his political process. Among of them were 
former deputy Speaker of AL goverrraient Mr. Baitullah, former minister Prof. Yunus Ali and 
some more ministers, deputy and state ministers, MP's and district AL leaders'*^. A 
subcommittee including Ataur Rahman (as Chairman), Mohammadullah, Hasimuddin, 
Mujibur Rahman and Oli Ahad (as the members) were given charge to prepare the 
constitution and manifesto of the party'*'*. Mustaq named his party Democratic League. On 
first October, after getting government approval, in a press conference Mustaq Ahmed said, 
he agreed to assume power in undemocratic way to save democracy and national well being. 
In 1973 AL moved away from its declared policy of democracy. He had not been able to 
agree with the one party program of AL. For that it was not possible for him to work with AL 
any more and that is why he formed a new party. On a question whether Mujib would be 
proclaimed father of the nation Mustaq answered, "Can a nation have father? Which nation 
has a father? It is not essential that a nation must have father or uncle""* .^ Socialism was 
discouraged in the manifesto and program of the Democratic League. In this context he told 
the journalists that his party believed in free economy, not in socialism'*^. He declared the 
Farakka problem was a national problem. He further said that the problems with India should 
be solved with the help of international mediators. Other wise it would bring unavoidable 
loss/ disaster for the nation'*^. The other dominant principles, on which the DL believed, were: 
people's sovereignty, parliamentary type of democracy, Bangladeshi nationalism, to preserve 
the independence and sovereignty of the country, open market policy and work for peace and 
prosperity of the world'*®. 
In 1976 under the leadership of Khondoker Mustaq Ahmed the Democratic League 
was floated with great possibility. It was assumed that a powerful rightist party would come 
into existence. But later on many of the members of the party left it one after another before 
even getting the government recognition in l " October 1976. Among the prominent who gave 
up the DL were: Khan a Sabur took initiative to revive ML, Ataur Rahman Khan also 
involved himself to revive his deflmct JL, Narma Miah also left Mustaq'*'. As a result the 
party of Khondaker Mustaq, at the beginning of its birth, was cofined within a limited circle. 
He was able to take away a small faction of AL leaders with him at the time of his formation 
of new party. Immediately after the formation of DL a number of splits took place in it. At the 
time of the formation of the DL many joined the party with the expectation that it was soon 
going to control the governing power. Mustaq and his party men calculated that they would 
return to the power in the election, which Zia and Sayem promised to hold in February 1977, 
vwth the mandate from the Islamic right wings, pro-independent forces- who were opposed to 
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Indian domination, and a huge number of AL supporters- who had deserted the party for its 
wrong policies^". But General Zia, whom Khondoker Mustaq previously appointed as Chief 
of Army Staff in the place of pro-Mujib General Safiullah, was planning the same thing for 
himself Both Mustaq and Zia represented the same politics but one was a politician and other 
was a military General- now in power, trying desperately to become a politician. An 
extremely bitter conflict developed between them and Mustaq started criticizing Zia. In 
addition Mustaq began to rebuild his cormections with the army officers inside the 
cantonment. But the army officers who brought Mustaq to power were mostly out of the 
country^'; his military supporters could not make any further headway as they were 
considered to be outside the mainstream 'chain of command of the army'. Zia wanted to be 
absolutely sure of his own position in the future political arrangement. To crush Mustaq 
General Zia was also getting support of the AL who continued to hold Mustaq responsible for 
the assassination of Mujib. Th AL leaders, who were in touch with Zia and his men, always 
gave the military junta an assurance that they would support any action against Mustaq. In 
addition Mustaq's party was new and as politics remained 'indoors' he lacked a wider 
national expouser. Zia took advantage of the relatively week position of Mustaq by instituting 
charges of corruption against him to eliminate him firom the political scene. He was 
immediately arrested and by a trial in a military court was imprisoned for a period of five 
years^^. 
The conviction of Mustaq made the dream of DL to control power far away. It created 
confusion and fhistration in the rank of DL^ .^ At the absence of Mustaq the party could not 
spread itself in the grass root level. Those had joined the DL in the lust for power started 
leaving the party. In this fhistrating situation including Moinul Hossain fourteen leaders also 
deserted the party and tried to form a non-political forum to establish democracy in the 
country '^*. Following this three more split took place in DL within 1986. One faction left the 
party by the leadership of DL Secretary Shah Moaijem, another one Oli Ahad led faction and 
the third faction led by A. Rouf left DL separately . Later Oli Ahad joined the governing 
party of General Zia. Mohammadullah, K.M. Obaidur Rahman, Monsur Ali of Khulna etc 
leaders left DL in 1978, joined Zia regime and became ministers^^. Though later Mustaq was 
released from prison but he could not play any role in Bangladesh politics. When in 1986 
Ershad floated his Jatia Party the breakaway faction led by Shah Moajjem joined it and 
strengthened the hand of Ershad regime. 
Bangladesh Gono Azadi League (GAL): Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish was the 
East Pakistan AL president m 1957. During 1958 to 1962 all the political activities of were 
banned by the military regime of Pakistan. When Mujib revived the AL in 1964 Tarkabagish 
was elected the party President and Mujib was elected its General Secretary. Till Mujib's 
taking the responsibility of AL president ship in 1966 Tarkabagish was in the post^'. In 1966 
he had difference with Mujib on the issue of 6-point movement and became inactive in 
politics. However on 1969 during the heydays of AL after the successful mass upheaval he 
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conveyed his support in favor of 6-point movement and rejoined the party^". In 1970 
parliamentary election he was elected as AL MP. In the post-independence politics for some 
years he was inactive. In 1975 when one party BAKSAL was formed, he was invited to 
participate in it but refused the proposal . Always he was with the people. He was a believer 
of constitutional politics. But when Tarkabagish conveyed his support for President Mustaq in 
1975, who occupied the government power illegally by an intrigue, it was unbelievable^*^. 
When Mustaq abducted ^ e power he supported him and prayed for his success. He also 
praised the new foreign policy of Mustaq 
In 1976 when AL was trying to survive and was facing bitter criticisms, in his 
octogenarian (very old) age he formed his own party named Bangladesh Gono Azadi 
League^^. The declared principles of this party were: Bangali nationalism, democracy, the 
establishment of rule of law, pro-people balanced economy, religious liberty etc. The main 
theme of its programs were: the denationalization of all industries except the heavy industries 
of Bangladesh, formation of only one trade union in each industry, free and compulsory 
primary education, arrangement of compulsory military training in the educational institutes 
and industrial belts^^. Though he defected the AL, his party joined the AL led anti regime 10 
and 15 party alliances formed against General Zia and General Ershad's military regime^. 
Thouhgh the GAL was a personality oriented political party, except Tarkabagish there was no 
prominent figure in it and was depending heavily on Tarkabagish's personal image to survive 
in politics, it also had no other lower level committees except a central committee but even 
then like that of all other small political parties it was divided time to time. Just after the 
formation of GAL in 1977, one of the prominent leaders of the party Golam Rabbani deserted 
the party and formed his own separate party^^ After the death of Tarkabagish the party was 
divided for the second time. In 1987 the General Secretary was ousted from the party and 
formed another GAL (Samad)^^ 
Jatia Janata Party (JJP): When in 1967 General Usmain was the Colonel of Pakistan 
army, he left it with a deprived feeling. In 1970 he joined AL and as a AL candidate he was 
elected MP in the same year. He was designated as a General during the liberation war of 
Bangladesh in 1971 and was given the charge of the Chief of Bangladesh freedom fighters. 
Because of his dignified position immediately gave him extensive popularity in masses and 
helped him for coming to the political limelight. For the second time he retired from 
Bangladesh Army in 1972. In 1973 parliamentary polls he was elected MP for the second 
time and subsequently also became a Cabinet Minister. In 1974 he was ousted from Mujib's 
ministry. In 1975 at the formation of one party BAKSAL government he protested it and 
resigned from parliamentary membership, hi 1975 after the power change he was appointed 
as President Mustaq's defense adviser. 
Though in 1976 by leaving the BAKSAL name, AL was revived but Usmani did not 
join his old party because although AL believed multmarty democracy it did not leave the 
economic and administrative programs of BAKSAL^. Though he was with President Mustaq 
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after the power change in 1975 and was appointed as his defense advisor but according to 
Usmain there was difference of opinion between them^^ Besides this according to him, there 
was a need of scientific evaluation of the social and economic problems of Bangladesh; by 
realizing the real situation of the country he and his followers wanted to reach in a conclusion 
to solve these problems. To execute their contemplation in 5 September 1976 Jatia Janata 
Party was formed and General Usmani was elected its convener . JJP leader General Usmani 
in a conference said, his party believed in parliamentary democracy based on the principles of 
equality and justice. He advocated a 300-member parliament with reservation of seats for 
different professions. His party wanted to uphold the constitution of the country as it was in 
1973 by repealing the fourth amendment of the constitution^®. While Mustaq openly said that 
he did not believe on socialism rather he believed on pure capitalism, there Usmani differed. 
Osmani said he would be abiding by the four principles written in the constitution". His party 
believed in mixed economy. Osmani said, if the ownership of the heavy industries were 
transferred to the private hand they (private entrepreneurs) might influence in goveming 
system. That is why, his party believed in nationalization of the heavy industries'^. While, DL 
of Mustaq mentioned the date 15 August (Mujibs death anniversary), a national resistance and 
revolutionary day and also a democratic day'^, there Osmani said, history would respect 
Mujib. Noboy would be able to do what Sheikh Mujib did for Bangladesh^'*. Not only that, 
later in 1978 he also said, Mustaq's capturing of the goveming power by overthrowing Mujib 
was illegal'^. In the political programs of JJP it was written, this party wanted to establish 
social justice, pledged to establish pure democracy, promising an exploitation free society, 
believs in individual freedom of every human being and favored both private and public 
sector for the economic development of Bangladesh'®. 
Usmani could not include any national level leaders in his party. Ferdous Ahmed 
Qureshi, formerChatra League President (during 1967-68) and post independent prominent 
leader of Ataur Rahman led Jatia League, was elected joint convener of JJP. As Usmani was a 
great son of Sylhet district his party had some popularity in greater Sylhet. The party was 
absolutely depended on Usmanis personal image to survive. Later when a difference was 
developed between Usmani and the Joint Convener of the party Ferdous Ahmed Qureshi 
charged that the party was floated by Usmanionly to buildup his personal image''. 
Although he was opposed to BAKSAL program, which was still AL's party 
program'^ in the following days Usmani and his JJP joined the Democratic Alliance, formed 
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by some of the likeminded parties under the leadership of AL, and contested the 1978 
presidential election as the alliance candidate'®. Usmani tried to be the AL candidate again in 
1981 presidential election but instead of supporting Usmani AL fielded its own candidate. So 
Usmani contested the election as the candidate of National Citizens Forum- a group of people 
comprising of some left wing intellectuals, businessmen and journalists. His JJP and Mijan 
Chowdhury led AL (Mijan) was also the components of the forum. In the election Usmani 
managed only 1.35% of the total votes and forfeited his security deposit^". 
Like all other political parties JJP also faced factionalism and splits. Split fist took 
place in JJP in 1978 when some of the members of the JJP and its youth and labor wing 
joined the government party by defecting it®'. According to them, they deserted JJP by 
protestmg Usmani's joining with Awami BAKSALites elements in the same political alliance. 
Another difference developed in JJP just before the 1979 parliamentary election. Though 
Usmani was not ready to participate in the incoming parliamentary election, the Joint 
Convener of the party and his group was adamant to participate. Finally by defecting the main 
stream Ferdous Qureshi group formed their own party JJP (Qureshi)®^. Later Qureshi joined 
the govenunent party BNP. During the conflict with Usmani Qureshi depicted Usftnani an 
autocratic, undemocratic dictatorial minded leader. He also alleged that party chief General 
Usmani was not ready to accept majority opinion in the party forum, because of which 
differences and disputes developed in the party. Usmani was more interested to consolidate 
and enhance his own individual image than to organize the party and he was using the 
workers of the party as the instrument to this effort. Qureshi further said, they were working 
to resist autocratic and selfish individual's whimsical tendency and to establish inner-
democracy in the party® .^ For the both splits Usmani accused Zia regime for its engagement in 
'palace conspiracy' to break the opposition parties. According to Usmani, since the formation 
of General Zia's government party the regime was engaged in 'palace conspiracy' to create 
conflict and split in opposition parties; the regime was encouraging the opposition party 
leaders and workers to leave their parties or to betray their parties® . In another place he said, 
to crash the opposition political parties' effort of restoring people's political rights the 
government was engaged in conspiracy to break the opposition parties. By attracting the 
opposition leaders for power positions in the government and other incentives the government 
was splitting the opposition parties. The ministers were directly involved in breaking the 
opposition parties . After the death of Usmani the JJP was divided into four parts: JJP 
(Khan), JJP (Wadud), JJP (Sujat Ali) and JJP (Sheikh Asad)®^ 
Conclusion: By split of the main body AL in 1976 the several new parties came into 
existence. All were rightist or right of the centre parties. Though there was some difference in 
ideology and programs of the parties with main body AL but in subsequent years it was seen 
that actually the ex-AL leaders, who left the main stream, did never leave it because of their 
difference with party ideology or programs. Rather they left AL and formed new parties 
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because of their conflict with the dominating group in the party or because of their personality 
clash with dominant party leaders or because of their leadership aspiration. Previous 
achievement and personal image/ popularity of the defected party leaders' were the main 
assets for their newly formed political parties to survive in politics. Most of these political 
parties had no political base in the masses. It had been observed that those leaders who 
deserted AL for one reason or other, never succeeded in their goal. They suffered a loss of 
their images, popularity and chances of acquiring political power. As a result their followers 
also deserted them in the quest of greener pastures. Factionalism, it shows further, in a matter 
of give-and-take between leader and followers. These findings also apply in the case of those 
parties which were revived in their own name by defecting the defianct BAKSAL party. It was 
also seen that in the following years by splitting AL and BAKSAL, the parties, which were 
formed, again they were divided and subdivided. In some cases it was also seen that some of 
these subdivided parties totally joined the parties formed by the General Zia and General 
Ershad's military regime. 
The main reasons of the division of the parties formed by the split in AL are: (a) the 
leaders of the defected parties were lacking of organizational skills; (b) their old age 
prevented them in organizational work, these parties did not have second popular leader to 
whom people would pay attention. As a result the parties could not spread their base in lower 
level; (c) all the leaders including the main leaders of these parties were highly ambitious and 
were full of opportunist mentalities. Due to personal aspiration whenever the peripheral 
leaders of these parties saw any opportunity immediately joined the government party; (d) the 
dictatorial mentality of the main leaders of the parties and the absence of internal democracy 
in these parties; (e) in the process of consolidating their positions the military government and 
tried to demolish the opposition parties and anti-regime movements. By observing the 
tendency of division and subdivision of the small parties and emergence of the personality 
oriented parties the journalists remarked that 'by the division in Foxwagon (a car made by 
famous German company) parties they converted into Honda parties'^'. These small parties 
which were evolved by the breakup of AL to fiilfill some leaders personal interest could not 
play and positive role for the development of the country^^. Masses don't have any relation 
with these small political parties^^. Regarding to the multiplicity of the parties weekly Haq 
Katha said, "This question did not arise if ideological differences between the party leaders 
were the over-riding factors in the division of the parties. Instead, it appears that personality 
clash and leadership aspirations are the motivating force behind the majority division of the 
parties". Then the weekly further wrote that mushroom growth of political parties would not 
help the country in ensuring political stability sorely needed during the current national 
crisis^". 
Factionalism and Splits in Different Political Bodies during Zia Regime (1976-78): On 
July 1976 since the prohibition over the political activities was partially lifted the process of 
forming political parties also started. It was expected that political elites would assemble 
together in two or three broad national political parties to give a constructive shape to the 
party system in Bangladesh. But it was observed that because of the breakup of the former big 
parties into pieces small groups and personality oriented parties emerged in the political 
milieu of Bangladesh. Instead of the formation of ideology and program based political 
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parties a trend of the formation of leader-based parties was seen. Only the old Awami 
Leaguers were leading four new parties: main stream AL, DL, JJP and Gana Azadi League. 
Like the old days there was no presence of BAKSAL party and no one of its former leaders 
was telling for the revival of it. Those who by abolishing their parties merged themselves into 
BAKSAL also revived their old parties in old and new names. Those parties were emerged 
because of the division of AL and because of the abolition of BAKSAL. All of them, except 
the CPB, divided soon due to ideological differences, personality clashes and leadership 
aspirations of the party leadership. Another reason was very active behind the infightings and 
division of the parties - i.e. 'lust for power'; many of the prominent leaders from AL, JJP, DL 
and JL defected to governing party because of the aspiration for power and government 
incentives. In a discussion the JJP convener depicted the then advisers of Preident Zia as the 
notorious 'humanity-trader/ sellers' and told the people to keep distance from them. To the 
politician he said, "In this hard time of the nation, lead the nation in the correct path - don't 
do treachery - don't make connection (with the government) by telling one thing in public 
and different in secret"^\ It is note-worthy that in the process of revival of parties within the 
framework of multi-party system factional trends were clearly visible among the major 
political parties. NAP (Bhasani) was revived under the leadership of Mulana Bhasani in 1976. 
Mashiur Rahman was appointed as the GS of the party. Splits also occurred v^dthin NAP 
(Bhasani) as its senior Vice-President Dr. Alim Al- Razee formed a separate political party 
called the Bangladesh Peoples League (BPL)® .^ After the demise of Maulana Bhasani, NAP 
(Bhasani) leadership passed on to Mashiur Rahman who occupied the position of President 
and made S.A. Bari the General Secretary (GS) of the party. In reorganizing the party NAP 
leaders received patronage from General Zia regime and in return in the 1978 presidential 
election this party extended its support to General Zia. Later the majority section of the party 
joined the government sponsored Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)^^. In spite of the 
merger of the largest section in BNP, however, efforts were made by other NAP (Bhasani) 
leaders like Anwar Zahid, Abu Naser Khan Bhasani, Gazi Sahidullah and Nurur Rahman to 
maintain a separate existence of the organization. But later in the process of continuous 
division the remaining NAP (Bhasani) was divided into many segments and the remaining 
party leaders had shown their inefficiency to maintain its effective existence. The leaders of 
these party factions did not have any relations with the masses '^*. 
The leading role of JSD in the sepoy mutiny of 7 November 1975 and the subsequent 
deteriorating relation with General Zia in fact decided its political fate. The JSD leadership 
and the rank and file, as noted earlier, were severely dealt wdth by Zia regime. Later, imder 
PPR, A. Awal led moderate section of JSD was permitted to operate party activities but was 
again banned in October 1977 because it its alleged involvement in an anti-regime militaiy 
coup'^ In April 1978 the JSD was able to get approval from the government to work as a frill 
fledged political party'^. The JSD, however, abandoned its former violent revolutionary 
Daily Deshbangla, 24 Febniaiy 1978. 
Abul Fazal Huq, Government and Politics of Bangladesh, p. 359. The BPL, which was formed by the 
leadership of Dr. Razee, was divided again centering the 1978 presidential election issue (see Dainik Bangla, 17 
August 1978). 
Abul Fazal Huq, op. cit; pp. 359-60. for detail reasons of factionalism and splits in NAP (Bhasani) see Daily 
Deshbangla, 5 November 1977 and 14 Febniaiy 1978. Also see Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, 
op. 90-93. 
. Amzad Hossain, Politics and Political Parties of Bangladesh, p. 134. 
" Abdul Huq, Bangladesh 1953-93 (Four Decades in the Political Diary of the Writer); pp. 410-11. 
One theory on why the JSD had been allowed in is that the JSD was reckoned by Zia regime to be the only 
force capable of providing resistance to the AL. The regime wanted the party to join its political front in order to 
% 
230 
strategy, dismissed its Gana Bahini and adopted a program of mass movement through 
constitutional means to estabHsh democratic order But the deviation of JSD from its old 
ideology encouraged factionalism in its party fold. In 980 one faction of JSD leaders by the 
leadersliip of Khalequzzaman defected from the party and floated Bangladesh Samajtantrik 
Dal (Bangladesh Socialist Party - BSD). The defected leaders charged that after deviating 
from its old ideology now the JSD was neither a Marxist nor a socialist party®®. Due to the 
intense personality clashes during 1984-90 JSD was divided and sub-divided into several 
factions such as JSD (A. Rob), JSD (Siraj), JSD (Inu) etc®®. But these remnants of main JSD 
were surviving as inactive leader based parties without having significant followers. 
The Revival of AL under PPR Act during Zia Regime 
In the 1975 putsch/ coup S. Mujib and all first ranking leaders of AL were assassinated'®". 
Though the only first ranking leader Khondoker Mostaq Ahmed still was alive, he was 
ahready recognized as the betryar - most hated person in AL family. There was no possibility 
that he would be accepted in the AL again. He knew it; even then at the beginning of the 
revival of the AL he tried to be in it but failed. He and his followers, however, formed the 
The AL faced leadership vacuum in the absence of the first ranking leaders. The 
second ranking leaders came forward to make up the vacuum. When Zia regime permitted 
political activities in the midst of different form of adversity the main stream Awami 
Leaguers - mainly the old guard leaders - came forward to revive the defimct AL. Till then 
the promising youth leaders were in jail. During that time as the beginning of the revival of 
the party started the leadership struggle and side-by-side with it the ideological confusion 
inside the party divided the party leadership into multiple camps. The affairs of that time can 
be explained in this way: 
(i)Mujib was the sole controlling power of the party till he was alive. Through 
mcreasing the power of the party president Mujib became the paramount leader of the 
party'"^. Probably he had no confidence on collective leadership to run the party. He also did 
not recognize any second person in the party. Many of the seniors as well as junior leaders 
tried to express themselves as the 'second person' in the party. Comparatively the second 
ranking leaders were more ambitious. Mujib himself was giving importance to the youth 
leaders and replacing them in the place of old-guard leaders. The youth leaders (such as S. 
Moni, A. Raz^q, Tofael etc) contemplated that after Mujib one of them was going to be the 
party leader. The factionalism was already present during the days of Mujib but it was in 
dormant form. So in the absence of Mujib even if Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin, Mansur Ali, 
Kamruzzaman and S. Moni would remain alive (not dead) even then there was inevitability of 
conflict in the party on the question of ideology and party leadership. Only the intensity of the 
conflict could be different from today - as they were more astute ad skilled players in the 
game of politics. During the 1971 liberation struggle, when Mujib was in Pakistani jail, in his 
absence there was strong infighting in the party but it was not disclosed in the masses. The 
contain the growing political juggernaut of the AL. It was commonly known that there was no love lost between 
JSD and AL. See New Nation, 30 April 1978. 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 73. 
Amzad Hossain, Political Parties, op. cit., p. 180. 
Amzad Hossain, Political Parties, op. cit. pp. 183-85. 
Among the other top ranking leaders died in the coup were Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddm Ahmed, M. Mansur 
Ali and Kamruzzaman.. 
Interview with Khondoker Haroon or Rashid MP. 
See the AL President's power in the AL constitution published in 1973. Also Interview with Zohra Tajuddin. 
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causes behind these were: (a) Mujib was the unparallel leader of the party; still he was alive 
and all were obedient to his leadership. During the liberation war all the deprived leaders -
who were not included in the Bangladesh government in Exile - were waiting for the return of 
Mujib from Pakistan jail, (b) During the liberation war Mujib was the source of inspiration of 
the freedom seeking people. People's loyalty was for Mujib and that time Exiled Bangladesh 
Government was performing their activities as the representative of Mujib and in the name of 
Mujib. (c) On the issue of achieving freedom the whole nation was united. In this condition 
whoever opposed the exile government, including the AL leaders and workers and also the 
other party leaders, people portrayed them as the betrayer to the cause of their liberation 
struggle; they were rejected by the masses. Even the opposition parties did not dare to 
criticize the exiled-govemment. (d) For a successful end of the war the assisting country 
India, for its own interest, was mediating among the conflicting leaders of AL. Though India 
kept the exiled-Bangladesh government in the leading position to lead the liberation war but it 
provided different kind of incentives to other conflicting groups and restrained them from 
feud. All the conflicting groups knew very well that without Indian help they would not be 
able to survive in that hostile situation. So they were bound to accept the mediation of India. 
But the factors, nature and field etc of internal conflict of the post 1975AL were different 
from that of 1971. Such as: (a) In 1971 on the issue of achieving independence a strong 
unanimous unity was present among the masses. In the post independence Bangladesh that 
unity of the masses could not last long. Subsequently, in the changed environment, the public 
support was divided into different political parties abd dye to the absence of Mujib the leaders 
and workers of AL were also divided into different conflicting groups, (b) There was no 
possibility of Mujib's return in AL politics like that of 1971. So among the survived leaders 
there was hard competition to become the leader of the largest political party of the country, 
(c) In 1971 the leaders and workers of the party was united to achieve the independence of 
Bangladesh. There was no any such alternative unanimous issue in front of the party similar 
to that of 1971, which could unite the party rank and file, (d) In 1971 India played a vital role 
to redune the infighting of AL. In the post-1975 political scenario there was no any such 
alternative mediating power in the conflict of AL. 
(ii) At this time another very important question raised in front of the party leaders 
was to decide, which type of governing system the party would follow: Since the beginning of 
the formation of the AL during 1947-74, the party was the believer of multi-party 
parliamentary democracy. It was also the espouser only of this system. In a more explicit way, 
it can be said that by the way of inheritance from the British regime. Congress Party and 
Muslim League, the AL leaders and the country people were infroduced with this 
parliamentary system. Would AL follow this only familiar/ known path or the alternative one 
- that dictatorial one party system (totally new system to the politicians), Mujib government 
had accepted in 1975 by amending the state constitution in a changed difficult situation of the 
country to bring back the law and order situation under confrol. Including it the party leaders 
were facing some more problems such as: (a) By loosing governing power in a sudden coup 
the remaining AL leaders were in confrision about their future planning as they were not 
prepared to face the strange situation. When a part of AL leadership was involved in the 
intrigue to assassinate Mujib and some other top leaders and in the following days some more 
leaders joined the betrayer Mustaq's miistry, the remaining AL leaders were not ready to 
believe each other - they were fri^tened to discuss every thing with their own party 
colleagues with the fear that any of them might have secret connection with the 
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government^(b) Meanwhile, some of the breakaway leaders of defunct AL formed separate 
new parties and started criticizing their former party AL. (c) The party was in power during 
1972 to 75. Usually when any party is in power the organiazational activities of that party 
become irregular as the party leaders and workers become bussy with state activities or in 
building their fortunes. After the fall of AL regime there was a ban on political activities in 
the coimtry for one year. Moreover the Mustaq and Zia regimes were following a suppressive 
policy towards AL to secure their governing regime. In these days, the AL leaders lost their 
regular communication with the lower level leaders and workers, (d) NAP (Mujaffar) and 
CPB, the well known, trusted and old friends of the party also started anti-AL criticism. The 
religious rightist political parties, which were banned during AL regime, now during Zia 
regime, were allowed to continue political activities and the other pro-China leftist political 
parties engaged in strong anti-AL criticism. The main theme of their anti-AL propaganda 
were the 974 famine, the deteriorating law and order situation of the country during the AL 
regime, the AL leaders engagement in corruption and nepotism at the last days of Mujib 
regime and the establishment of one party BAKSAL rule by killing the growing democratic 
system of the country. Because of these failures of AL at the beginning of its revival the party 
was cornered by the opposition propaganda, (e) After the fall of AL government the 
subsequent ruling regimes were very inimical to the AL party. Both Mustaq and Zia regime 
propagated the AL - a party of corrupt people and was still maintaining relationship with 
those countries (India and USSR) who were threat to the independence and sovereignty of 
Bangladesh. AL was responsible for all miseries and sufferance of Bangladesh people. 
Because of corrupt AL leadership many people died in 1974 famine, (f) In 1975 after 
abducting power, Mustaq regime arrested all those leaders - who could go against him and 
thousands of grassroots level AL workers; inflicted psychological and physical torture on 
them'"^. To save them from government tyranny many of them took shelter in the neighbor 
country India, and others were hiding in underground. This situation continued till the 
beginning of the 1978 presidential election campaign'°^ 
By loosing the first ranking leaders as well as governing power in the face of these 
suppressive activities of the hostile regimes the party leaders and workers mental strength was 
at the lowest ebb. In this hostile environment to the AL leaders, who came forward to revive 
the AL, the survival of the party and its existence with separate identity seemed to be the first 
plan on their list of priority. The leaders of the defimct AL seemed to be confident that if they 
can manage to operate their party activities and survive with their ovra separate identity, the 
huge but scattered workers group of AL would reassemble automatically in the party platform 
and this party would automatically be stronger/ powerftil simply because of it its advantage of 
having a vast countrywide network'®^. 
The party activities were stopped for about two years, since January 1975. The party 
leaders did not have any contact with the district and lower level leaders and workers. To 
initiate the activities for the revival of the AL, at the beginning (of 1976) the party did not 
have any office'®' and economic solvency. In this hostile situation there was the scarcity of 
courageous and moneyed leaders - who could provide necessary economic backing to the 
Interview with A. Razzaq. When some of the Chatra League members were discussing with Tofael Ahmed, 
one of top ranking AL leader, he also told the same thing. Fortunately the research scholar was with those BCL 
leaders in that occasion. 
See the interview of former AL President A. Malek LFkii in weekly Bichitra, 26 December 1980; p. 46. 
Weekly Bichitra, 26 December 1980. 
Weekly Holiday, 29 August 1976. 
See the interview of former AL President A. Malek Ukil in weekly Bichitra, 26 December 1980; p. 46. 
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party, take the risky responsibility to lead the party activities and rebuild communication with 
the former party workers. Defying all the odds Mizan Chowdhury, the one time Organizing 
Secretary of the party, came forward with his personal strength and surrounding him the 
activities of the party workers and leaders to revive the AL was started'®^. To revive the party 
activities, he utilized full of his economic strength, carried on the party expenses lavishly; for 
the interest of the party used his own house as the temporary party office^ . All the meetings 
to revive the party were held there and it became the centre of all the activities including the 
communication centre of the lower level leaders with the central leaders. In 1976, the youth 
leadership of the defunct AL - the main expounder of Mujibism during 1972 to 1974 - were 
either in prison or in political shelter in India. So the old-guard leadership of the party 
spearheaded the process to revive the defunct AL. Probably the first informal meeting of 
defiinct BAL leaders, to chalk out their future line of action to revive the party was held on 31 
January 1976, in the residence of A. Makek Ukil, Speaker of the former National 
Assembly''". The first two meetings were also presided by Ukil''*. As Mujib and all the first 
ranking leaders were assassinated the junior most Vice President of former defuct AL, 
Mohiuddin Ahmed, took the leadership of the party. At that time defunct AL Secretary Zillur 
Rahman and Organizing Secretary A. Razzaq were m prison. As government repression on 
the party leaders and workers was a very regular phenomenon, to save the AL GS from 
government repression and for the smooth progress of the party activities, the defunct AL 
leaders unanimously elected a woman from them, Sajeda Chowdhury (the junior most Joint 
Secretary of defunct AL and Women Secretary of defimct BAKSAL), as the GS of the 
party"^. Mohiuddin Ahmed and Sajeda Chowdhury's taking over the responsibility in that 
time was a bold step from their side. In this way, party activities were started and most of the 
top ranking AL leaders, the important district level leaders and a large number of party 
workers jomed these activities. During these days a large gathering was taking place outside 
the house of Mizan Chowdhury, the meeting venue of AL leaders, for affection with the 
p a r t y " ^ 
As the leadership responsibility to re-organize the party transferred to the second 
ranking leaders hand, a new leadership crisis emerged. Many of them immediately engaged in 
the leadership competition to get the position of former party leader Sheikh Mujib. The first 
two/ three meetings were presided over by the former Speaker A. Malek Ukil" . Meanwhile 
when Mohiuddin was elected the Acting President of the party and began to preside over the 
party's WC meetings, Ukil stopped attending the meetings showing the excuse of his illness 
However he informed the party caucus that he would abide by the decision taken in the 
meeting"®. Later, two sub-committees were formed: one preparatory committee with Mizan 
108 . Political article: "The breakup and rebuilding of AL", weekly Roabbar, Vol. 6 No. 13,20 November 193; p. 
12. 
Interview with Mizan Chowdhury, A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed. Also see weekly Sachitra Sandhani, Vol. 3 
No. 38,11 January 1981; p. 9. During 1976 the daily newspapers used to report that all the meeting venues 
except few, of the defiinct AL working committee and its sub-committees to revive the party, was the house of 
Mizan Chowdhury. 
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Chowdhury, as convener for liaison with party men in districts and sub-districts and other 
organizational workers''^ and the other sub-committee, for drafting constitution and 
manifesto, with A. Malek Ukil as its Chairman"^. With giving dignified responsibilities to 
these two powerful faction leaders - the AL caucus managed the factional conflict for the 
time being. 
One extended meeting, called by the preparatory committee Convener Mizan 
Chowdhury of the defunct AL, was held on 25 August 1976 in Mizan Chowdhury's house. 
More than one thousand leaders and workers including the party stalwarts 240 former MP's, 
district Presidents and Secretaries, were present in that meeting. After the conclusion of the 
meeting Mizan Chowdhury said to the journalists that the meeting gave the charge to the 
party's preparatory committee to submit party's constitution, manifesto and programs to the 
concerned government office to get approval for floating party activities"^. 
At the beginning of the activities to revive the organization there were lot of confusion 
in party leadership: Under the PPR Act whether the party would be revived by excluding the 
name of Bangabandhu Mujib from the party documents; in that hostile environment would the 
party's name be remaining AL or would it be revived in another new name; even some were 
contemplating that in this hostile environment the leaders and workers should take temporary 
shelter under the banner of another like minded political party. All these contemplations, 
conflicting each other, raised confusions and frustrations in AL workers force'^°. Mizan 
Chwodhury and Mollah Jalal Uddin thought that if Bangabandhu's name or BAKSAL 
ideology was retained the military regime at the time would not recognize the party. Also, 
without the government recognition under the new PPR Act, the government would not allow 
the party to continue its political activities. The other group led by Mohiuddin and Sajeda 
Chowdhury was adamant that they would not revive the party if Mujibs name was not 
included in t the party manifesto and by leaving the BAKSAL ideology of Bangabandhu they 
would not involve in the political activities'^'. In this extended meeting of the deflmct AL a 
decision was taken that the party would be revived on its old name 'Bangladesh Awami 
League' and Mujib name would be projected in the party manifesto'^^. Then, according to the 
situation the leaders would take necessary subsequent decisions. 
The 25 August meeting was the first such gathering of former MP's and district level 
leaders of AL from all parts of Bangladesh. So the old-guard party leaders were cautious, they 
demonstrated a fa9ade of unity in the meeting. But the show of unity was maintained only by 
sweeping the inner party conflicts under the rug'^^. Meanwhile, the AL leadership was 
polarized into tow main streams: one stream was known as the left of the centre; its leading 
figures were still in the jail. For the time being Mohiuddin, Sajeda Chowdhury etc were 
leading this stream. They were committed to uphold the name of Bangabandhu and his 
BAKSAL ideology. The other right of the centre stream was led by Mizan Chowdhury'^ "*. 
Gradually this stream was able to strengthen its position among the workers' force. Two 
factors helped Mizan Chowdhury to organize the workers force in favor of the pro-right 
Bangaldesh Observer, 11 & 14 August 1976. Also see daily Sangbad, 17 August 1976. 
Bangaldesh Observer, 14 August 1976. Also see Sangbad, 18 August 1976. 
Daily Sangbad, 26 August 1976. 
Political article: "The breakup and rebuilding of AL", weekly Roabbar, 20 November 193; p. 12. 
Interview of A. Razzaq 
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One prominent columnist wrote m daily Sangbad in September 1976 that in spite of leadership crisis inside 
the party AL showed more fa9ade of unity among the revived political parties. See political article: "Some more 
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elements: (i) As the convener for liaison with party men in districts and sub-districts and other 
organizational workers Mizan Chwodhury could communicate easily the district and sub-
district level party leaders of whole of Bangladesh, and (ii) Mizan Chwodhury's economic 
power helped in his endeavor to expand his support base. The moderate democratic leaders 
(the opportunist section of the party leadership - who previously had compromised with 
Mustaq regime etc) also helped him in strengthening his personal base in the p a r t y B u t the 
tactics, the both side of the available AL leadership adopted, were obviously not to go in open 
leadership conflict at least for a temporary period to reassemble their old party structure. 
Survival seemed to be the first and foremost priority for the defunct AL leadership. 
Though, at that time the pro-B AKS AL elements were strong enough in the party but they 
followed tactical silence over their issue now. They did neither uphold Mujib's last program 
(one party BAKSAL system) nor eschewed it'^^. The party leadership also maintained 
absolute silence about die-hart Mujibites'^', who were known to be engaged in armed struggle 
in the border area of Bangladesh against the regime to take revenge of the killing of their 
leader 'Bangabandhu' and to change the current regime by installing a pro-Mujib one. The 
leader of this faction Kader Siddiqui was operating his armed struggle from India'^ ®. 
Though the old-guard leaders had a good intention not to engage themselves in 
internal factionalism, at least for the time being, to ensure the smooth revival of their beloved 
party AL, but they could not avoid it. The first open factional division appeared in the party 
when the government refused them permission to function as a political party because of its 
mentioning the name of their great leader Mujib in party documents. In these documents, 
submitted for the government approval, the Mujib image was sought to be prompted and such 
expression as 'Bangabandhu' (Friend of Bengal) and 'father of the nation' were used for him. 
However the promotion of any individual, alive or dead, in the party document was a 
violation of government issued Political Parties R e g u l a t i o n T h e government's refusal to 
the AL to flmction frustrated the partymen. The party men were eager to revive the party 
activities as early possible but the controversy over S. Mujib's name desisted the party from 
proper fimctioning. Over the issue - how to get government approval to initiate party 
activities - the party caucus was divided into two streams. Mizan Chowdhury, A, Malik Ukil, 
Kazi Zahirul Kayum and their like minded were preferring to submit the party documents by 
keeping Mujib's image out, by forsaking Mujib's name. To them that was a mere tactical 
move to get government approval'^". Acting President Mohiuddin Ahmed and Acting GS 
Sajeda Chowdhury were, however, determined to organize AL drawing inspiration from S. 
Mujib. This group had the support of Mujibites now in jail and in abroad'^ . When the 
difference was widen pro-change faction leader Mizan Chowhury convened a meeting on 27 
October to make necessary change in the party's documents. To counter the opposition 
factional activities pro-Mujibites Sajeda Chwodhury also convened a separate meeting on 10 
November 1976. Over the fact that Mizan Chowdhury had convened a meeting Sajeda 
Chowdhury said on 25 August, the central executive committee of former AL appointed a 
preparatory committee with Mizan Chwodhury as convener. But it was a temporary sub-
Political article: "The broken field of AL (Mizan)", Vol. 3 No. 38,11 January 1981; p. 9. 
Weekly Holiday, 29 August 1976. Also see that time newspaper reports. 
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committee under the central Executive Committee. Convening party meetings and other such 
activities were beyond its judiciary. Such actions were beyond Mizan Chowdhhury's 
authority and were aimed against party unity'^^. By observing this development inside AL one 
weekly, well knovm for its anti-AL and pro-NAP (Bhasani) role, reported 'The AL close to 
split'' As both factions were the tested activists of AL they ultimately compromised. They 
cancelled both the meetings and instead called a new meeting of the central working 
committee to discuss the further course of action of the party . In that meeting, a decision 
was taken to hold an extended meeting vwth an agreement that the majority decision of the 
meeting would be binding on all'^^. 
The central committee members, including about 250 former MP's and ministers. 
Presidents and OS's of all the district units attended the extended meeting. Delegates of all 
district units of the two front organizations namely Jubo League and Chatra League attended 
the meeting as observers. In the meeting majority of the party men threw their support with 
Mizan Chowdhury. So Sajeda Chowdhury and others agreed to the party decision to submit 
the party documents wdthout the names of S. Mujib'^®. The Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) 
finally received government clearance on 4 November 1976. On 4 November the party's 
Acting President and Acting GS in a statement instructed all the party units to start 
functioning. The statement said the committees of all party units stand revived as on 6 June 
1975'". 
On 4 November, the AL leaders said that the party pledged a new to work for the 
welfare of the people and for the 'establishment of an exploitation free society' on the basis of 
the four state principles'^^. However they remained silent on BAKSAL issue i.e. neither they 
openly accept it nor did they criticize it. The party revived in a traditional form; and it was 
propagating its old politics of 1972-74 - the programs of nationalism and welfare economy. 
On 3 September, when the party had first submitted its documents to the government for 
approval under the PPR Act, a press release on behalf of the party said, "The AL programs 
has been formulated in keeping with the four state-principles enshrined in the second part of 
the Bangladesh constitution namely nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism. No 
fundamental changes had been effected in the constitution and manifesto of the erstwhile 
A L " ' ^ ^ 
In 1976, had the AL not drop Mujib's name from party documents they would have 
not been allowed by the government to begin the party activities. If they had engaged in anti-
government movement on the issue of realizing their demands of getting party's recognition 
from government authority or on the issue of the inclusion of Mujib's name in the party 
documents even then there was no possibility of getting success in their efforts''*®. Because: (i) 
Meanwhile the government took stiff repressive actions against AL leaders and wsrkers. To 
secure its own existence Zia regime was not ready to give any special lease to reorganize a 
strong AL. One prominent BNP leader wrote in his book''*' tiiat PPR Act formulated, was 
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obviously aimed at the AL so that they were debarred from reviving the cult of Mujib on 
which they relied so heavily, (ii) Most of the leaders, who were capable to lead the 
movements, were either in jail or in hiding. In the absence of proper leadership, any AL led 
movement could be ended soon without achieving its target, (iii) If the movement was 
initiated to include Mujib's name in the party documents at the time the party could not be 
able to gain public sympathy. Because: (a) The people did not forget the miss-rule corruption 
and nepotism, deteriorating law and order situation of the country etc during Mujib regime 
and above all the famine of 1974. (b) Extensive anti-AL propaganda was alive from the side 
of ruling regime, as well as other political parties and social forces (rival to AL). (c) There 
was no any leader alive in AL on whose appeal people could respond en-masse. Moreover, if 
the natural characteristics of AL is observed we will find that: AL is a mass based political 
party which depends on election process for going to power. It is not a concrete ideology or 
religion based political party, unlike that of CPB or Jammat e Islami. The party does not have 
well-organized cadre group - who can continue the party activities for several years by the 
secret command of the party leadership. Like that of other nationalist political parties the 
workers of the AL assembled together in its platform on the basis of some certain political 
programs and principles. But unlike CPB and JI, since the AL party does not have permanent 
ideology so it is very natural that the loyalty and commitment of the workers and supporters 
of the party remained contemporary. With this party position in 1976 if the Mujibites did 
remain adamant then there was a less possibility of reviving the united old AL. In that 
condition it was almost certain that: (i) Some more breakup could take place in the party; (ii) 
If the party could not be revived the remaining workers and supporters group who were still 
loyal to the party could either be neutralized or could join any of the factions defected from 
AL or could increase the strengths of some other prominent nationalist parties; (iii) After the 
revival of AL, since 1977, the Mujiites strengthened their positions in the party and 
established themselves in the national politics - that was not possible if the party did remain 
inactive. As many of the politicians would not be able to adjust themselves in the other 
political parties their political career would be ended, soon they could be depicted as the dead 
horses or political orphan in Bangladesh politics. As the conflict was ended: (i) the party 
survived from fiirther division; (ii) the anxiety of the leaders, workers and supporters group 
was relieved. The party was able to run its political activities and reorganize itself Within few 
days it started reviving the cult/ image of Mujib. The AL was rebuilding itself by using the 
image of Mujib; (iii) the Mujibites were benefited mostly by revival of the party. For the 
greater interest of reviving the party the district and lower unit leaders and workers supported 
Mizan group. But that support was issue-based and contemporary i.e. for the time being. 
Though Mujib was already dead, still he was the leader of the party workers and supporters. 
Weekly Holiday wrote the AL and S. Mujib had become s y n o n y m o u s L i k e that of Indian 
National Congress party as the Mujibites successfiilly utilized image of Mujb in their 
favor that group became more powerfiil in AL family. As the Mujibites later proved 
themselves the real expounder of Mujibism maximum district and sub-district leaders' support 
turned to them by leaving their previous loyalty for Mizan group. Indicating this feeling of the 
AL family weekly Holiday in 29 August 1976 wrote, "How long the old guard Awami 
Leaguers would be able to contain the open and the hidden Mujibites. After all, the AL and 
Sheikh Mujib had become synonymous"''*^. 
" I Weekly Holiday, 29 August 1976. 
Weekly Holiday, 29 August 1976. 
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AL's Strive for a Unanimous Working Committee and the Defection of Mizan 
Group 
Genesis of leadership conflict in the newly revived AL: The AL for the second time 
was revived in November 1976 under PPR act. There was a big dissimilarity rather than 
similarity between the AL of 1972-74 periods and the contemporary AL which was newly 
revived after its passing over a short period in the midst of one party BAKS AL system and 
President Mustaq's regime. The old AL was a ruling party under the gigantic leadership of 
Mujib and the contemporary AL was an opposition party engrossed in intense leadership 
crisis. The former AL had been the only prominent political party in Bangladesh believer of 
parliamentary democracy but the newly revived AL was one of the many political parties in 
opposition, multiply divided on ideological and leadership conflict. In this situation the 
glaring questions came in front of AL were: what would be the politics of AL? Between the 
socialist BAKSAL and liberal democracy which one of the programs the party would follow 
- if the party leadership showed its inability to settle their difference in deciding their future 
policies? That time AL was united under the unchallengeable leadership of Mujib. Now, in 
the absence of a universally acceptable individual leadership the question was raised in front 
of the factionally divided party leadership: what is the alternative of Mujib? For such a mass 
based nationalist political party like AL could collective leadership be the alternative of 
individual leadership?*'^ Would that be able to create unity in the party platform by removing 
the leadership vacuum? - AL had to contemplate on such type of many questions. Also it was 
not proper to compare the political conditions of 1972-74 and 1976-77 with the same 
viewpoint. The foremost necessity in 1976-77 was to bring together the scattered workers 
group of the party who were scattered because of the long-time stormy situation. Was it 
possible to reorganize the party without settling all type of differences in the party leadership? 
Since like all other politicd parties of third world countries to unite the workers group of a 
political party of Bangladesh, to enroll/ collect new workers, to inspire the workers the mass 
based political parties used to depend on mainly two strategies: (i) by participating in the 
elections and achieving (total or partial) successes and (ii) by compelling the government to 
bow down to the popular demands through successful political movement. AL had to start its 
organizational activities In the midst of many unsettled differences among the party 
leadership. It was also not possible to expect that all the problems of a large family would be 
solved overnight. 
After getting government's approval in mid 1976, all the parties involved themselves 
in political activities. Till April 1978, politics was limited into indoor activities. Only indoor 
meetings, seminars and other programs were allowed. Open public meetings, processions etc. 
were restricted. Later on, AL also initiated its activities when it got approval from the 
government. From 21 November 1996 onwards, it initiated its extensive mass-
communication/ public relation programs. Its target was to reactivate its thana (sub-district) 
and district unit organizations . The leadership competition, which had already been started 
inside the AL body, at the assassination of Mujib (including other top ranking political 
leaders), also was revived. Two trends were visible in this competition: (i) because of 
leadership vacuum leadership aspiration was grown in many of the party individuals; (ii) on 
the question of ideology the party leadership and workers were divided into two major 
conflicting groups- (a) Nationalist group: the old guard leadership of the party who believed 
It was also a glaring question while collective leadership had been formed in the cadre based disciplined 
political party would it be able to bring success in the mass based political party like AL; by introduced it could 
leadership crisis be overcome or would the mtra-party conflict be eradicated? 
Daily Ittefaq; 21 November, 15 and 26 December 1976. 
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on parliamentary democracy and wanted to go back to the old (1949-73) politics of the party. 
The major section of this group had lost their minister-ship during Mujib regime and joined 
the regime of President Mustaq Ahmed after die assassination of Mujib. All tlie members of 
this group were the believer of right of the centrist ideology. As the larger section of them was 
outside of the prison they got opportunity to be active in party politics from the very 
beginning. But as a good number of members of this group were the claimers for the President 
post so they were engaged to fulfill their personal aspirations side by side in their engagement 
for group politics, (b) The Mujibites: Since this group was very close to Mujib during his 
lifetime, they were in favor to uphold Mujib's last political philosophy 'one party BAKSAL' 
thought. The youth group of the party, which was comparatively much active in 
organizational activities and had strong link with the workers group of the party, was leading 
this faction. As this faction was not ready to compromise with Mustq and Zia regime and was 
not ready to take any type of government patronage so since after the 1975 military coup 
maximum leaders of this faction were in jail. Among the remaining elements of them except 
few all others were in exile (in India) for shelter. They were much more organized than the 
old guard leadership and were attached with left of the centrist politics. Their interest for 
socialism was created probably due to the rise of socialist movement in the world after the 
First World War and youth and student group's attraction towards the socialist movement in 
third world countries. The role of two international powers USA and USSR in the 1971 
liberation war of Bangladesh also influenced this youth section towards socialist ideology. 
The lower middle class peasant backgroimd of the parents of these youth leaders also made 
them close to the mass people. The main problem of these group leaders was that though AL 
was permitted to involve in political activities but most of its activitists were still in prison. 
After getting permission the party started projecting 'Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib- the 
father of nation'. To create appeal and sympathy among the masses in different public 
meetings they started demanding the judgement of the killing of Mujib and other four top 
ranking leaders of AL; invited the masses to engage in antigovemment resistance movement 
by getting inspiration from the 1971 liberation war^ '^ .^ The party leaders also demanded that 
the parties should be allowed to undertake political activities openly*'*'. To resist any possible 
opposition movement on 29 November 1976 many of the AL leaders including Sajeda 
Chowdhury, A. Maleq Ukil, Salahuddin Yusuf, Abdul Momin Talukder and Mujaifar Hossain 
Poltu were imprisoned. The Acting President of AL, Mohiuddin Ahmed, had gone into 
hiding. In this critical situation the elderly leader of the AL, the former Cabinet Minister of 
Mujib regime, Foni Bhusan Majumder was temporarily given the charge to lead the party'"*®. 
In December 1976, when all the leaders of youth Mujiites (Mujibbadi) group were in jail, the 
old guard leadership of AL. especially Mizan Chowdhury put pressure on the central 
committee to form a fiill committee of the party by conducting a special council meeting. To 
organize the council meeting on 3 January 1977 a meeting of AL central committee was also 
held. Foni Mojumder presided over the meeting. Though the old guards of the party were 
outside of the jail but in the absence of a universally accepted single leader in this group there 
was intense leadership competition among them to be the future leader of AL. Though the 
'Convener' post of the preparatory committee was temporary but well dignified as there was 
better possibility for the Convener to be the next President of the party in the coming special 
council session. Thus a difference initiated on the issue that who would be the convener of the 
preparatory committee. After many sittings, grouping and lengthy discussions, the old guards 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhury, Bangladesh Politics and The Role of Awami League; p. 19. 
'" l POT, 17 November 1976; p. 370. 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhury, Bangladesh Politics and The Role of Awami League; pp. 19-20. 
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failed to select a single Convener'*". Finally, for the preparation of the council session and to 
run the organization in this interim period by a patch up formula a 65-member preparatory 
committee was formed by making Mollah Jalal Uddin Ahmed and Mijanur R a ^ a n 
Chowdhury as the Joint Conveners of the party. In that meeting it was also decided that the 
council meeting of AL would be held on 7 March 1977 to elect the future leadership of the 
party'^°. 
The old guard's failure to capture AL Leadership in the special council session of 
AL: As the pro-BAKSALites were still in the jail Mizan Chowdhuty and all other old guards 
decided to form a full committee of the party by holding a special council session'^'. Probably 
they intended to establish their control over the party before the formation of any tuff 
resistance from the youth group of pro-Mujibite elements. Among the oldguards Mizan 
Chowdhury was the number one claimer for the post of party chief'". One strong group was 
already working hard to make him the party chief Among the other claimers to be the party 
chief were: Abdul Maek Ukil, Zahirul Qioum, Korban Ali, Abdul Marman, Mollah Jalal 
Uddin and Matiur Rahman'^^. At that time among the Mujibites there was no one competent 
to be the candidate for the post of party chief and they were unable to make up their mind to 
whom they would nominate as their candidate. In this situation Zahirul Kayum, one of the 
weak Presidential candidate, advised the comparatively inactive Mujibites, who were still in 
the outside of imprisonment, to nominate Zohra Taj uddin, the widow of late AL leader 
Tajuddin Ahmed as the candidate for party president-ship from their side^ '^^ . Probably Zahirul 
did it to deprive his other colleagues from the post of party president-ship from his 
jealousness. Though Zohra Tajuddin was unknovra figure in the national politics of AL, she 
was a former leader of Mahila Parisad- a women organization influenced by CPB'^^. She was 
also the Vice-Presidnet of AL's women front Bangladesh Women's AL*^ ®. The Mujibites 
took decision secretly that Begum Zohra Tajuddin would be the presidential candidate from 
their side. As in national politics Zohra Tajuddin had no alternative identity except as the 
widow of Late Tajuddin Ahmed, it was very hard for the Mujibites to fight for her 
candidature. But the plus point was that Tajuddin Ahmed was the successfiil PM of Exiled 
Bangladesh Government during the liberation war-1971 and because of his loyalty to 
Bangabandhu S. Mujib he was brutally killed with other top ranking AL leaders. The 
Mujibites expected that by utilizing an emotional appeal they would be able to get sympathy 
of the party councilors for Zohra. According to their planning to overcome this hard situation, 
as all the top leaders of this group were still in jail, they secretly engaged in communicating 
with the AL coimcilors, and personally (in some cases by letters) contacted the district and 
thana leaders of AL and appealed for support in favor of Zohra Tajuddin for the interest to 
uphold the ideology of Bangabandhu Mujib. The campaign proved effective, and they 
received a positive feedback/ response from the lower unit leaders of allover the country'^^. 
Political Article: Pala Bodoler Pala (The time to changing over the group); Weekly Bichitra, Vol. 12 NO. 12, 
12 August 983; p. 22. 
Daily Ittefaq, 4 January 1977. 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhurry, Bangladesh Politics, p. 20. 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhurry, Bangladesh Politics, p. 20. 
Political Article: "Hypocrisy- Your Name is Awami League", Daily Azad, 11 April 1977. 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhury, Bangladesh Politics, p. 20. In that time Golam Aqbr was active in favor of 
Mujibite faction. 
Political Article: Pala Bodoler Pala (The time to changing over the group); Weekly Bichitra, Vol. 12 NO. 12, 
12 August 983; p. 22. 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhuny, Bangladesh Politics, p. 20. 
Golam Akbar Chowdhurry, Bangladesh Politics, pp. 20-21. 
241' 
Mean while, the differences of the AL central committee also spread in its ancillary 
student organization BCL. One faction of BCL led by the acting President Abdul Awal was 
supporting Mizan Chowdhury. The other faction led by Fazlur Rahman was supporting the 
cause of the Mujibites'^l On 7 March 1977 both groups of BCL held separate meetings, to 
observe the "Historical March Speech Day of Mujib", at the same place in Dhaka 
University campus and at the same time. Both the groups freely traded abusive and caustic 
remarks against each other. Pro-Mujibite group alleged that pro-Mizan group was the CIA 
agent, while the later characterized the pro-Mujibites group as the agents of India and Soviet 
Union'^^. Both groups meetings were ended in a chaos of slogan and counter slogan. By 
observing this open difference inside BCL the 'Desh Bangla' commented with the splitting of 
the BCL, the AL would also split into the 
1977 Special Council Session of AL: A two-day session of the national council of the AL 
was inaugurated on 3 April 1977. By disobeying government bar a bold projection of S. 
Mujib was evidenced at the council session with chanting frequent slogans 'One leader, one 
country- Bangabandhu, Bangladesh' and portrait of S. Mujib, that was hung on the 
background of the dais, was garlanded. The portrait of other former AL leaders, who were 
killed in the jail in 1975, such as Syed Nazrul Islam, Tajuddin Ahmed, M. Mansur Ali and 
Kamruzzaman were also garlanded. The meeting adopted a condolence resolution paying 
homage to 'Bangabandhu Mujib' and other AL leaders who were killed in the jail and also the 
martyrs - who laid down their lives since 1952 language movement. The AL leaders also 
urged the government to hold a judicial inquiry into the killing of AL leaders and punish those 
responsible for the killings'®'. 
The inner party leadership rift, which was going on since the revival of the party, 
became public at this council session. One of the conflicting issues of the sharply divided two 
groups in the council was the tenure of the next committee. The old guards were advocating a 
full-fledged committee for a term of two years and the supporters of the Mujibites - who were 
then detained in the jail, were in favor of an interim organizing committee for one year. They 
held that if the full-fledged committee was formed in this meeting the detained leaders would 
not get right places in it But the key issue of the disagreement in the council session was 
that who would be the President and the Secretary of the AL'® .^ Candidates were many and all 
of them, except Zohra Tajuddin, were from old guards. All of them were the claimers for the 
leadership post and were not ready to sacrifice their demands for others; they could not reach 
in any agreement. The party was about to split. To save the party from further destruction the 
Mujibites played their trump card; they proposed the name of Begum Zohra Tajuddin as the 
party convener for one year. The councilors also showed their sympathy for Zohra Tajuddin, 
the widow of their late leader Tajuddin'^. As they could not find a common single candidate 
from among themselves, and by understanding the workers opinion in favor of Zohra 
While the infighting between the groups reached to the pinnacle both group leaders declared the expulsion of 
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Tajuddin, the old guards, after long bargaining, retreated from their leadership demands'®^. 
For the convenient reason they also withdraw their old stand for the formation of a two years 
committee and finally agreed to make Zohra Tajuddin as the party Convener for one year'^ ®. 
In this council session the party stalwarts failed to elect a unanimous working committee, but 
formed an interim organizing committee to run the party for one-year tenure with Zohra as the 
convener'^' - though there was no such type of provision in the party constitution'®^. 
Though Zohra Tajuddin, the new comer in AL family, was elected unanimously the 
convener to preserve the party unity but in the absence of one credible leader the leadership 
crisis remained intact in AL. Failing to reach a consensus over the election of other 44 
members of the Organizing Committee, the council authorized the Convener Begum Tajuddin 
to nominate 44 general members in consultation with the preparatory committee , The AL 
Council also decided that the new organizing committee headed by Mrs. Zohra Tajuddin 
would run the organizational activities till December 1977 and would hold the party's next 
council session. The council also decided that AL leaders of the former central committee, 
who were now under detention, would be 'de-facto' members of the organizing committee on 
their release from detention'^''. All the happening in the council meeting was a big defeat for 
the old-guard leadership in group and disgracefiil setback for Mizan Chowdhury individually. 
Since June 1976 when the political activities started, Mizan Chowdhury was trying to be the 
leader of the party. Among all party leaders he invested maximum money for the revival of 
the party, and all the big meetings were arranged at his own house. Also he visited every part 
of the country to reorganize the lower level party units. He did his best but it was very 
unfortunate for him that he was not accepted by the party caucus as their leader'^'. Moreover 
he was shocked by another reason: Above all his sacrifice it was also true that he was attached 
with the party for more than twenty years. On the other hand Zohra Tajuddin was a fresher in 
AL politics. She was known only because of her husband. She did not have any previous 
direct sacrifice for the party but her sudden appearance like a blast/ gust reversed every hope 
of Mizan Chowdhury. How an unknown lady could be the competitor/ substitute of well-
experienced politician Mizan Chowdhury and how did one section of AL leadership present 
Zohra as their candidate by ignoring sacrifice and political maturity of Mizan Chowdhxiry. 
While Mizan deserved the reward/ approval of his work, it was really hard for him to accept 
Zohra as party convener"^. However in an interview Mizan Chowdhury told the journalists, 
"A difference of opinion has been arisen among us, but that is not disimityi Still today we are 
working together' . 
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Spread of infighting all over the party: The election of Zohra Tajuddin as the convener was 
the result of a compromise formula. But this did not succeeded in bringing about the desired 
unity in party leadership. In the council session it was decided that Zohra Tajuddin would 
nominate the 44 members of the 45-member organizing committee in consultation with the 
preparatory committee'^''. According to the council decision the committee finalized a list of 
names for the Organizing Committee and passed it on to Mrs. Tajuddin for public 
announcement. But when the list was finally published, eight names were alleged to have 
been dropped by the convener and replaced by eight others who were said to be supporters of 
Matiur Rahman'^^. This was reported to have been done without consulting the former 
preparatory committee. It should be mentioned here that during the council session there was 
intense rivalry between Mizan Chowdhury and Matiur Rahman, a former minister of Mujib 
Cabinet- who, after his release from detention, quickly established his influence over a section 
of Awami Leaguers to get the post of AL President-ship'^^. The Mujibites gave some 
priviledges to Matiur Rahman, one of the leadership aspirants of the party, probably to make 
permanent rift in the old-guard leadership. Though there were difference in the old guards, as 
maximum of them were interested for the AL leadership, they were having strong roots in the 
lower organization leadership because of their better cormection with former MPs and MLAs 
comparing to youth Mujibites but the youths were having support in the militant workers-
who were majority in the party. Following the poublication of the list such senior AL leaders 
as Mizan Chowdhuiy, M.A. Marman, Mollah Jalaluddin, Moizuddin, Sohrab Hossain, Yusuf 
Ali and some others raised their objection for dropping of the eight names by Zohra. This 
group organized a informal meetings of Presidents and Secretaries of district AL committees 
to discussed what it said to be unconstitutional and undemocratic action of the convener. They 
decided to launch a strong campaign to requisition a council meeting. Maximum district 
leaders supported this group in this occasion. As a counter move, Zohra Tajuddin on her part 
called a meeting of Organizing Committee on 4 May 1977. Many members did not attend the 
meeting'". From the begiiming after her election as the convener of AL, Zohra and her group 
dubbed the senior Awami Leaguers as reactionaries'^^. In a reception ceremony, arranged by 
Mujibites dominated Dhaka City AL, Zohra urged the AL leaders and workers to be alert 
about further influx/ entrance of any more reactionaries in the organization in future"'. 
Matiur Rahman was still with Zohra and expected that with the combine strength of Mujibites 
and his own he would be the party leader in the next council session. Meanwhile, a third 
group emerged which maintained its distance from those two groups. This third group was 
was neither favoring Mizan Chowdhury nor Zohra Tajuddin as party leader. They also 
believed that a split in the party would be suicidal and therefore the rank and file of the party 
would not allow final split to occur. At that time a trend of the lower level workers was also 
Bangladesh Observer, 5 April 977. 
According to Golam Akbar Chowdhury, one prominent Awami Leaguer and an that time aid of Zohra 
Tajuddin, "The responsibility to nominate the members of the Convening Committee was in the hand of the 
Convener. As she was not personally did not know majority of the party leaders and workers of the party, so 
gave this responsibility on us (the aids of Mujiite leaders in the outside of the jail).... Mr. Kamruzzaman gave 
me the list of the probable convening committee members and told, if any of Ae nomination of tiie members is 
not perfect I may change that name. After changing a little I gave the list to Zohra Tajuddin. Without any 
hesitation she declared the names in the list as the Convening Committee memberrs". See Golam Akbar 
Chawdhury, Politics of Bangladesh and The Role of Awami League; p. 21. 
Weekly Holiday, 8 May 1977. 
Weekly Holiday, 8 May 1977. 
Weekly Holiday, 8 May 1977. 
Daily Sangbad, 6 April 1977. 
244' 
seen that the present leadership of the party might be split but the district and sub-district 
leaders and workers of the AL, by and large would remain together and would swing to any 
one side'^°. This factor finally forced a compromise between the feuding factions till the next 
council session, as both groups were not ready to take big risk of open conflict till they were 
not sure that to which side maximum workers would swing together, in case any split takes 
place. Probably, another two reasons prevented old-guard leaders to split the party: (i) pro-
Mujibites candidate Zohra Tajuddin was not selected by the few party elites for the post, 
rather she was elected party convener unanimously in the council session and she was having 
public sympathy as the widow of one of the AL's top ranking leader Tajuddin Ahmed, who 
accepted martyrdom but did not compromise with the betrayer President Mustaq Ahmed; (ii) 
Maximum of the organizing committee members were already form Mujibites and their allies/ 
intimates. In this condition they decided to create pressure on Mujibites to remove as many as 
possible of the Matiur Rahman group members and substitute old-guard members in their 
place. The rift in AL leadership which appeared so pronounced finally ended for the time 
being, on the initiative of the newly emerged third group. A compromise formula wasw 
accepted for the greater interest of the party i.e. through dropping four members from the 44-
member Central Organizing Committee the leadership included another four new members 
from the nationalist group (old guards). The notice by a large section of members from 
various districts requisitioning a fresh council meeting was also withdravra'^^ Though the 
party was not divided but as the two factions remained rival to each other, this rivalries spread 
to the lower level leader-ship and the organization remained immobilized to a large extent. As 
the party was factionally divided it could not go for any anti-regime movement to achieve 
people's right. 
By making Zohra Tajuddin a 'compromising convener', the conflicting AL leaders 
thought that they would at that time be able to reorganize the party. But it was considered as a 
wrong decision from the side of Mizan Chowdhury-Malek Ukil and all other old-guard 
leadership. They were unaware about the secret planning of the pro-BAKSAL group. The 
BAKSALites supported Zohra Tajuddin because of her CPB coimection - they were confident 
that socialist Zohra would work in favor of them. And, in the subsequent one year she showed 
her high regard to the trust of the pro-BAKSAL group on her'® .^ According to weekly' Jahan-
E-Nau' the most outstanding characteristic of the April 1977 AL council session was that its 
leadership was passed into the hands of the pro-Soviet group through a process of conflict 
between the pro Indo-Soviet and nationalist forces, hidividually who had re-sustained and 
convened the AL council (i.e. the old guard AL leadership) found no position in the 'new 
leadership'. Instead, the pro-Soviet elements had captured the leadership by getting Zohra 
Tajuddin being accepted as the convener by violating the party constitution . It was then 
pronounced that Phani Bhusan Majumder, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Matiur Rahman were the 
principal allies of Zohra'^'*. 
After getting the responsibilities Zohra Tajuddin started organizational tour all over 
the country. In this connection it is to be mentioned that all of her organizational tours were 
party tour but wherein Mizan Chowdhuiy and many of the old guard party leaders were 
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seldom included in the tours'^^ Against strong opposition of the old guards (pro-democrat 
elements) she found some middle rank leaders and youths as her allies in her organizational 
activities and group campaigning'^^. During her countrywide tour the main theme of her 
campaign was the last program of Bangabandhu S. Mujib i.e. the Second Revolution or 
BAKSAL program. According to this group, to build a happy and prosperous Sonar Bangla 
(Golden Bengal) by leaving AL, Bangabandhu had declared his programs of Second 
Revolution and formed BAKSAL party by merging all parties in it. The implementation of the 
Second Revolution on the basis of four principles- it was the last philosophy of Bangabandhu. 
And Mujib-followers needed to be united behind this BAKSAL philosophy'®'. However in 
the changing situation, as the primary step of the party, the workers had to be engaged in the 
struggle for the establishment of parliamentary democracy. According to the speech of Zohra 
after being accepted as the party leader she engaged herself in forming new district and thana 
committees by included those dedicated party workers, who were inspired by Mujib's 
philosophy. Definitely she wanted to mention only the pro-BAKSALite elements in her 
words. According to weekly 'Bichitra' in this one year by utilizing her executive power she 
formed maximum district committees of AL comprising the pro-B AKS AL e l e m e n t s S h e 
completed the district and thana coimcil level sessions; in different areas arranged workers 
meeting to give dynamism to the party. With her strenuous effort she visited all over 
Bangladesh, engaged herself to strongly organize the party and inspire the party workers by 
the spirit of Mujib's second revolution (BAKSAL) program'^®. 
After the 1977 council-session the BCL backed by Mizan Chowdhuiy was becoming 
weak day by day. The reasons behind the weakness of this student faction were: (i) the youth 
and student group had special interest in socialism movement during those days and the 
Mujibites were propagating socialist ideology; (ii) the students, supporters of AL, had a craze 
for Mujib- all were fascinated by Mujib's charisma and they were not ready to leave their dear 
leader's last BAKSAL philosophy; (iii) the student leaders of 60'*' decade who were engaged 
in AL politics and were leading the Mujibites group still had direct connection with the 
student wing of AL. On the other hand the old guards were also isolated from the student 
group because of big-age difference. The other reason of their isolation was that they were not 
having special charisma like Mujib. The pro-Mujiite faction of BCL started a vigorous 
campaign in favor of Zohra Tajuddin in tiiis rivalry of Zohra with the old guards. The main 
theme of their campaign was that: "as a philosophy the BAKSAL was effective in the past, 
still it is appropriate and for the ftiture it will be up to date"'^°. In Bangladesh politics these 
students are always very active piong all. It is saying that as Dhaka Cantonment is the head-
quarter of the Bangladesh Army, the students of Dhaka University are the germinator of all 
democratic national movements'^'. According to former BCL leader and former AL leader 
M.M. Montu, "the first outburst of any change takes place from the students. Afterwards the 
main (national level) organizations use it successftilly"'®^. 
See the reporting of different AL programs in different daily newspapers during May 1977-March 1978. For 
some examples see Daily Sangbad and Ittefaq, 6April 1977; Daily Azad, 27 September 1977; and Saturday Post, 
31 December 1977 etc. 
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On the other hand just after the 1977 council session the old guards, especially the 
Mizan group, started organizing themselves targeting the next council session; engaged to 
spread their influence over the district, sub-district units and other front organizations of AL. 
To increase its support base among the councilors of incoming 1978 council session since 
November 1977 Mizan group intensified their district and sub-district visit programs 
Meanwhile Mizan Chowdhury, the believer of liberal democracy, could not get success in the 
leadership competition twice. He had belief in the parliamentary democracy and the political 
philosophy followed by two great AL leaders -Suhrawardy and Mujib. He did not have any 
kind of trust on Bangabandhu's socialist Second Revolution programs. He was not of the 
opinion that one party BAKSAL system could provide democratic rights to the people. He 
rather believed that by this system public rights would be curved. Within the limited strength 
of Bangladesh only multi-party democracy could fulfill the economic and political rights of 
the people. In an interview he further added, "When I opposed one party BAKSAL system 
Bangabandhu told me - 1 am also against of this system. But for an interim period this system 
is introduced.... I could not resolve/ remove the economic crisis. I am hopeful that within 
19801 shall be able to settle the problems. Meanwhile if any general election is declared prior 
to 1980 your performance will be very bad"'^ '*. Then, Mizan Chowdhury mentioned Mujib 
had accepted BAKSAL as a temporary strategy but he (Muji) had been a real believer of 
democracy. Since 1976, Mizan Chowdhury and his followers tried to return to the pre-1973 
parliamentary democratic stream i.e. to the original party funda of AL'^^ The old guards 
including Mizan Chowdhury told, "Among the masses an anti-BAKSAL sentiment is 
developed. By propagating the BAKSAL thought now it is not possible to reach close to 
them. Now we have to tell in favor of democracy. And reestablishment of democratic system 
will be our target"'^®. In an interview to the daily 'Morning Post' Mizan expressed his 
preference for what he called 'imfettered parliamentary democracy'. He pleaded for the 
annuhnent of the fourth amendment because he thought that that was the easiest way to switch 
over to parliamentary democracy. Mizan Chowdhury, who was a vocal member of the 
opposition in Ayub regime's parliament from 1962 to 1969 and was again returned to 
parliament in the 1970 and 1973 polls, said firmly, "We are against giving any extra power to 
the President"'^'. But the BAKSALite one party system was ushering a presidential form of 
government and all the governmental power was concentrated in the all-powerful President's 
hand. 
It is a regular disciplinary task and part of the constitution of AL that before convening 
the national council session it completes the council sessions of its district, sub-district and 
other units in all-over Bangladesh. Though, it was decided in 1977 council session that next 
council session would be held on December 1977, but it was delayed till March 1978 due to 
factional feud in AL leadership, which already spread in the lower units of the party 
organization. Factionalism complicated the task of convening lower level coimcil sessions and 
formation of new committees. The central organizing committee of the AL had not been able 
to finalize the formation of all the district committees till February 1978. So far 41 district 
committees out of 64 had been formed and approved by the central committee'^^ Of the 
remaining districts: because of factional conflict council sessions did not held in some 
Daily Desh Bangla, 5 November 1977. 
Interview with Mizan Chowdhury. 
Weekly Sachitra Sandhani, 11 Januaiy 1981. 
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districts, two counter committees were formed in some districts by factionally divided two 
groups'^'. The central committee tried to patcii up the differences in those conflict-ridden 
district committees without success^ ®®. 
The formation of two parallel national committees at the recently concluded council 
session of BCL indicated that the long-standing rift between the Mujibites (inclined towards 
Moscow via Delhi) and nationalists-liberal democrats (who were favoring pro-western line 
via Delhi) widened recently. Even the pro-Mujibite BCL was temporarily divided between 
pro- A. Razzaq and pro-Zohra Tajuddin factions. But they immediately merged into one body 
by reconciling theu- differences. Now, the Nurul Islam- Mustafizur Rahman panel of office-
bearers was being supported by Mizan-Maleq group and the pro-Mujibite Kader-Chunnu 
panel was favored by A. Razzaq- Zohra Tajuddin group^°'. \\^atever had happened at the 
council session of the student front of AL had had the support of one section of the senior 
leaders or the other. The long-standing factional conflict in the main body AL finally surfaced 
at its lower level units and front organizations. By the time factionalism within AL became 
more complicated, there were differences between party leadership and Sramik (Labor) 
League leaders, between youth and senior members in mainbody AL and rival groups 
appeared within nearly all district committees^"^. 
The subtle grouping before the 1978 National Council Session: On the eve of the three-day 
national council meeting of the AL beginning in Dhaka on 5 March 1978 the central 
organizing committee had failed to resolve the leadership differences. Till that time, the 
leadership contest was seemed to have been confined to two major groups, one led by Zohra 
Tajuddin and the other by Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. But the newspaper reporters 
revealed that several factions were then aspiring for leadership^"^. One of the senior AL 
leaders told daily 'New Nation' that the party was at the time rived into four factions^®'^ . One 
group led by Mizan Chowdhury was in favor of retrieving the party's pristine glory as the one 
which fought for the democratic values, for the human rights for a society free from 
oppression and dictator-ship and for restarting politics from the AL's post-independence 
manifesto which gave it a sweeping victory in 1973 general election. Mizan Chowdhury had 
the backing of some known stalwarts like A. Mannan and Prof. Yusuf Ali. Second group 
consisted of the most powerfril insiders like Mohiuddin Ahmed, Sajeda Chowdhury, Phani 
Majumder, Barrister Amirul Islam and Abdur Razzaq - the young AL leader just released 
from his long incarceration. These choirs of men were all-out for reviving BAKS AL. They 
argued that this was the latest dispensation given to this nation by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib 
and thence there was no scope for turning away from it no matter how strongly the scum of 
criticism was built against the same. They said that Bangabandhu must be remembered 
through his deeds and that would be like blatantly bringing the dead leader down to contempt 
if his real followers had deviated from his path and attempted to go back to the place already 
discharged by him. Third group was a tiny legion of rabid, socialists, basically more loyal to 
late Tajuddin Ahmed than Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. The leader of this group was obviously 
For detail see Saturday Post, 11 Februaiy 1978; Bangladesh Observer, 7 Februaiy and 3 March 1978; 
Sangbad, 24 Februaiy 1978. 
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Zohra Tajuddin and it had full support from leaders like Matiur Rahman (now in prison) and 
Mohammad Moizuddin. They advocated a complete socialist state in Bangladesh and 
believed that nothing short of that would provide the real answer to the famished nation 
groaning under a state of lingering penury and worsened by the constant injection of western 
aid that worked like an artificial respiration. They did not believe that S. Mujib was ever a 
socialist; rather he incorporated socialism as one of the four pillars of statehood only in order 
to circumvent the socialist world which gave wholehearted support to the emergence of 
Bangladesh after a bloody war. But this group admitted that B AKS AL had been a step 
towards socialism and for certain tactical reasons, wanted to prefer their ideological stance 
with their pronounced respect for late S. Mujib. The fourth group was an amazing 
combination of people, always watchful of the direction the wind was blowing. They 
euphemistically called themselves the middle-of-the-roaders, they were at heart democrats, 
but they scarcely commanded any support from the rank and file. They shied away from 
making any positive political assertions for fear of being isolated from the young and the old 
alike. The prominent in that group were A. Malek Ukil, the former speaker of the parliament, 
Korban Ali and Sohrab Hossain, who served as a minister even in the cabinet of Mustaq 
regune also. As an explanation for their current postures, they pleaded that the time was not 
yet ripe for any definitive political moves, because open air politics was yet to be started. The 
best thing under the circumstances at that time, they said, was to bid time and see what 
happens in the ultimate analysis. 
Each of the four groups are discussed above was determined to capture the helm of 
party's leadership. But in doing so- and which was indeed peculiar- they did not propagate 
their ideologies as much as they propagated the fact that the AL at the time needed a dynamic 
and vibrant leadership much more and that an election was in the offmg^®^ Though AL was at 
the time rated as one of the country's major political parties, the cracks in the AL were then 
widening. The cracks were more demonstrated in the council session of Dhaka City AL^"^ 
where the pro-BAKSAL leader Mohiuddin Ahmed said, "Sheikh Mujib, through his second 
revolution and by forming B AKS AL, started the process to establish socialism and the 
process have to be advanced ahead by us". In reply to it Mi?an Chowdhury said, "Mohiuddin 
Bhai, if the people of this country would prefer socialism then Prof. Mozaffar would not 
forfeit his security money in the hand of AL candidates in 1970 and 73 election. And AL 
could not win the elections"^®'. In the same speech he invited the AL workers and said, "We 
have to advance through the dictated path of our leaders Hossain Sahid Suhrawardy and 
Sheikh Mujib to elevate ourselves in democracy". Dhaka City AL session was ended by the 
formation of two counter committees. Circle close to the AL told 'Sangbad' that if by any 
chance Mrs. Tajuddin was elected President and A. Razzaq the General Secretary (GS), the 
AL would be split up in the coming council session itself Mizan Chowdhuiy and Matiur 
Rahman and oAers had already given such indications and were also reported to have been 
taking necessary steps^°®. The reasons behind it were that the present leadership was divided 
on the question of party programs and both A. Razzaq and Zohra were from socialist groups. 
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It needs to be mentioned here besides these four groups there was another neutral- middlemen 
group, who were working in between different feuding groups to settle the party leadership 
competition in a compromising manner. But always it was seen the members of this group 
were impermanent and changing. During the pre-1978 council session days the members of 
this lobby were: Zohrul Kayum, M. Korban Ali, Sajeda Chowdhury, A. Mannan, levey 
Rahman and Zillur Rahman (he was imprisoned since long)^ °®. According to them a split in 
the party would be suicidal and therefore the rank and file of the party would not allow final 
spht to occur^'°. They were also leadership aspirants but were lagging behind in the 
competition for various reasons. All the leaders of this group were centrist. On the first day of 
the council session one of the dominant leader of this group Sajeda Chowdhury said that a 
section of the party leaders were engaged in creating 'chaos and factionalism' in it. The 
reactionary rightist and also leftists inspired by foreign ideology within the party were trying 
to deviate the organization from lines charted for it by its great leader (Sheikh Mujib)^". 
When the internal factional strife affected whole of the party organization, even many 
were predicting that the AL would split up after the council session. The AL workers and its 
supporters were gripped by intense anxiety^'^. Some AL workers and supporters wrote articles 
in different daily's and weekly's expressing their affectionate love for AL, criticized the 
factionally infected AL leadership and suggested them how to rescue the party from further 
factional conflict. An AL worker, in an article, published in pro-AL weekly 'Mukti Bani'^^^, 
warned that internal conflicts and palace intrigues would bring a disintegration of the AL. He 
wrote that the ordinary party workers, the backbone of the organization- spreading in all over 
the country, had felt offended by the factional squabbles of the AL leaders in quest of 
leadership. The well-wishers of the party surprised that the ministers and leaders who had 
come to power after great sacrifices during the freedom struggle were not able to overcome 
greed. Their inability to overcome greed was the main reason behind the assassination of the 
father of nation. Wlmt surprised the AL workers more that even the supreme sacrifice of 15 
August^ '"* was no lesson for these AL leaders. Then he wrote, once its great leader Mujib had 
electrified, the whole country had enthused every human to wage struggle. But at present 
leader should realize that there was no body among them like Mujib, who could sway the 
party workers merely by the movement of a finger- if any leader hoped so without acceptable 
reasons he would be wrong. In such a circumstances, the AL workers and well-wishers felt 
that while the nation were at crossroad a collective leadership should be build up with leaders 
and workers who had passed the test of patriotism, idealism, hard work, honesty and freedom 
from greed. Unless this was done there was danger that AL which was built up over 35 years 
bit by bit would be dashed to pieces through the internal conflict and palace intrigue of the 
leaders. 
The youth force of the AL organizing committee foreseeing a crisis in electing the 
President and GS, was trying to get the party constitution amended just before the 1978 
council session. They had proposed the formation of a party Presidium which could 
accommodate all the aspirants^'^. To solve the leadership conflict in the absence of a gigantic 
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leader like Mujib AL convener Zohra Tajuddin also proposed, "Today it is not possible to do 
any thing with individual leadership. We have to develop collective leadership... By getting 
political training we have to develop cadre-based organization"^'®. In thel978 AL council 
session, by recommending to amend the party constitution, Sajeda Chowdhury said that the 
party President had been given paramount power because at that time such a figure like 
Bangabandhu was the party lerader. She proposed to distribute the Presidential power to the 
collective leadership in the absence of Bangabandhu^''. Though the collective leadership 
issue was discussed m the party forum but the party was not ready to amend its 
constitution^'®. 
On the eve of the 1978 council session two new developments took place in AL 
leadership which again reversed/ confused every calculation of the leadership aspirants: (i) 
just before the AL council session A. Razzaq and a number of Mujibites were released from 
prison. The main strength of the party in 1978 was the youth force and they all were hard core 
Mujib-badi. After the death of number one Mujibite youth leader Sheikh Moni, the Mujibites 
concentrated their support behind A. Razzaq as Tofael was still in prison. Though, before the 
release of A. Razzaq, Zohra Tajuddin was enjoying contemporary support of the Mujibites 
due to her propagation of BAKSALism^'^ however, the release of A. Razzaq changed the 
Mujibbadi youth sections politics. Though, still they had sympathy for Zohra, but total 
balance was now changed, all the youth leaders assembled surrounding stunt Mujibile - A. 
Razzaq. The organization then came to the hand of A. Razzaq, the pre-1975 Awami 
Voluntary Lague chief and former Organizing Secretary of the AL. The main leadership then 
concentrated in his hand^^°. (ii) Mizan Chowdhuiy, the liberal democratic stalwart of the 
party, was enjoying the support of maximum old-guards and of different lower level party 
units. His organizational activities created a handsome support base for him in AL. But just 
before the council one rumor spread in AL family was that Mizan may compromise the party 
interest with the Zia regime. Even, he was questioned indirectly by the journalists, whether he 
was going to join in any pro-government party or a front. Describing it a baseless rumors he 
said, "I was an Awami Leaguer and till the last day of my life I shall continue it, I shall 
continue it"^^'. When he was asked by the research scholar, how this rumor was spread 
against him, Mizan Ghowdhury replied, "In 1976, when we the 14 representatives (of AL), 
went to meet President Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayeem there the three Deputy M.L. A.s 
(Martial Law Administrator) of that time Mosharraf Hossain, Bashar and General Zia were 
also present. During our discussion Zia openly said- who is the better Awami Leagurer than 
me? I have transmitted the massage of Bangabandhu from Chittagong Radio Station (in 27 
March 1971). After coming out from Bangababhan (Presidential House) I told A. Malek Ukil-
come, let us befool one enemy by another. Let us utilize Zia. Instantly it became a instrument 
for them against me. They immediately propagated that I am aligned myself with Zia's 
group"^^^. The allegation of secret relation of Mizan Chowdhury with government party and 
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the youth Mujibites anti-Mizan propaganda- these two related incidents reduced the image of 
Mizan Chowdhury in the lowest ebb. So even before the final showdown it became clear that 
in the competition for Presidential post he had already lost the game. 
Three-day council session of Bangladesh AL began on 3 March 1978. For few 
months, prior to the AL council session, different newspapers published the names of aspirant 
candidates for the President and Secretary post of AL. In last of January 1978, weekly 
'Saturday Post' reported that the president-ship aspirants were M. Korban Ali, Syed Zohra 
Tajuddin and one from the liberal democratic group which led the party before the last (1977) 
council session. Mizan Chowdhmy, A. Malek Ukil and Yusuf Ali were the likely candidates 
from amongst whom one might be chosen by the group. For the post of GS newly released A. 
Razzaq was formidable candidate. The name of A. Mannan, Matiur Rahman and former GS 
Zillur Rahman were also being mentioned in many quarters as the probable candidates for the 
post. Mrs. Sajeda Chowdhury, who was earlier holding the post as the acting GS extended her 
support to A. Razzaq^^^. On the first day of AL's day long coimcil session 'Sangbad' reported 
that the possible candidates for President-ship of the party were Mrs. Tajuddin, Mohiuddin 
Ahmed, Korban Ali, A. Malek Ukil, MoUah Jalal Uddin and Mizanur Rahman Chowdhury. 
The aspirants for the GS post were A. Razzaq, Zillur Rahman and Matiur Rahman (was 
imprison). The central organizing committee in quest for unanimous future party leadership 
discussed the issue during 28 February to 2 March but failed to reach a decision^^''. Sangbad 
wrote Mizan Chowdhury, Mollah Jalal Uddin, Matiur Rahman, Sohrab Hossain, Prof. Yusuf 
Ali and A. Maiman - all the old guards were together in a group, Khandaker Ilyas, 
Kamruzzaman, Salahuddin Yusuf and Phani Majumdar were with Zohra Tajuddin. It was not 
known which leaders were sided with pro-Moscow Mohiuddin^^^. 
The 1978 National Council Session of AL: About 32oo Councilors attended the three-day 
biennial council session of AL. The council session began amidst pandemonium and disorder. 
The disunity in the party was manifested even in the first day though Mrs. Mansur Ali, widow 
of former PM and AL leader, inaugurated the council session. She urged all party members to 
maintain unity in their ranks so that the party could flourish^^^. The beginning of the conflict 
occurred at the protest of one group of youth leaders as former AJL leader, Sheikh Fazlul Huq 
Moni's portrait was not included with the portrait of other former top AL leaders hung on the 
background of the dais. The session was adjourned till the portrait of Moni was not arranged 
to hang^^^. Second conflict took place on the second day of the council session on the issue of 
shortage of councilors' and delegates' cards. The councilors of Dhaka City alleged that they 
had not received the councilors'-cards yet. The central leaders explained that as in the Dhaka 
City AL council tow coimter committees were formed so they did not distribute cards for the 
Dhaka City unit of the party. When hue and cry further increased many unexpected people 
entered the coimcil venue without any councilors' or delegates' cards. In this cormection A. 
Malek Ukil's a-oup alleged that willingly Zohra Tajuddin brought her own men inside the 
council venue At that time slogans and coimter slogans were started chanting from 
release of former ministers and MPs and all the freedom fighter from prison and withdrawal of cases brought 
against them. 
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different groups: 'O Russ-US agents - beware, beware'; 'we don't want to understand Russ-
US - we don't want to know anything except Bengal'; ' 0 reactionary US agents - beware'; 
'the agents of Russia - beware'; 'conflict or unity - unity, unity' etc . At one stage of 
slogans and counter slogans the meeting was declared adjourned till the afternoon of the next 
day. Previously distributed cards were also withdrawn and it was declared that new cards 
would be distributed in the next day. It was also declared that only the councilors would be 
allowed to participate in the council session^^®. Meanwhile the organizing committee sat to 
elect the party leader. The names of Korban Ali, Zohra Tajuddin and A. Malek Ukil were 
discussed for the post of party Presidentship. A. Mannan and Sajeda Chowdhury were with 
Rorban Ali, A, Malek Ukil was enjoying the support of liberal democrats and Zohra Tajuddin, 
the claimer of establishing socialism through the path of BAKSAL, was supported by A, 
Razzaq^^'. A. Razzaq and Matiur Rahman's names were raised for the GS post. After many 
debate and war of words as the compromising candidates A. Malek Ukil and A. Razzaq were 
selected President and Secretary respectively^^^. 20 office bearers' names of the working 
committee were also declared; maximum of them were from A, Razzaq group^^^. Every thing 
of the formation of the new WC was done out from the councilors sight. On 5 March, in the 
midst of hand-to-hand skirmish and slogans and counter slogans, A. Razzaq announced some 
of the names of newly incomplete working committee. A section of councilors demanded a 
change in the presidential post. Ultimately when a great noise and slogan started to subside it, 
Zohra Tajuddm at her speech said, "To save the party from destruction the panel is declared 
by making A. Malek UWl as the party President" Newly elected President A. Malek Ukil 
told the councilors, "We shall prove it in fiiture the dead Mujib is much more powerfiil than 
the presence of Mujib"^^^, 
On 5 March 1978, the council session continued for less than one hour. At 5 pm A. 
Razzaq hurriedly announced the names of the party President and Secretary and also declared 
the council session closed. He also urged the councilors to accept the names of the panel. But 
the councilors were not happy as A. Malek was declared as the new president^^^. They said 
with sorrow that the leadership was imposed on them without giving heed to the councilor's 
opinion In this council meeting, the senior leaders compelled the two main presidential 
candidates, Mizan Chowdhuiy and Zohra Tajuddin, to accept A. Malek Ukil as the party 
president to achieve a compromise solution . It is noticeable that any political proposal was 
not accepted in this council session of AL, Because of the difference among the party 
leadership a fiill-fledged committee could not be declared. Only the names of twenty office 
bearers were declared. Reports of the organizational activities of the party presented earlier by 
Mrs. Tajuddin and reports of the district committees were not discussed at the council session 
as scheduled^^^. Though leadership was transferred to the hand of left of the centrists but the 
seeds of difference remained even after the council session. On this context the speech of 
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Sajeda Chowdhury, gave on the first day of the council session, is mentionable, "In the 
absence of ideological unity it is meaningless to maintain party unity by patch up"^ '^ ". 
The significant aspects during the days of council session were that many new 
polarizations took place due to the opportunistic policies persuaded by some AL leaders. 
Mizan chowdhury was the victim of it. In Mizan Chowdhury's own language, "The leftist 
peoples of the party have propagated strongly against me. I know some of the AL leaders' 
names who visited entire Bangladesh carrying handbills. But I did not have these types of 
strong propaganda machineries. As leftist do organization works by dedicating their 
maximum but democrats caimot be active like them. For that reason even after distributing 
aids to whole of the world still USA is known as an imperialistic nation. And those who do 
not do any thing are well-known as progressives"^'*^ Though many leaders were supporting 
him in the early d^ys but during council session by observing strong anti-Mizan propaganda 
they left him. The other reason of their leaving Mizan was their week commitment for the 
liberal ideology vice versa the leftist group. Observing the strength of Moscow-Delhi lobby 
A. Malek Ukil tilted towards that group. For the same reason many of the old allay of Mizan 
chowdhury including Abdul Mannan also left him '^* .^ Understanding new equation of the 
polarization Mizan Chowdhury withdrew himself form the post of party's President-ship^"*^. 
Though Ukil built a new relation with BAKSALites but Mizan Chowdhury did not 
dissociated himself with his this old fi-iend. Rather, when he understood that he did not have 
probability to be the party president, his lobby strongly supported A. Malek Ukil against other 
anti-democrat candidates. In this way, to save the party from break up, as a compromising 
candidate A. Malek Ukil- the former Speaker and liberal democratic leader, who was 
comparatively more acceptable to the leftist - emerged as the compromising candidate for the 
presidential post of the competing groups^ '*'*. Thus, in the leadership conflict Mizan 
Chowdhury's democratic lobby, which was depicted as anti-progressive lobby by the 
BAKSALites, was defeated in the hand of Moscow-Delhi lobby. The defeat of Mizan 
Chowdhury was very sorrowftil. He did his best among all for the reemergence of AL but had 
to leave the party's council venue carrying with him a heinous blame that he wanted to merge 
AL with President Zia's Nationalist Front^ '* .^ It should be mentioned here that those who 
cooperated President Mustaq's regime, which abducted the power through the assassination of 
Mujib, in her first day speech Sajeda Chowdhury depicted them the fi-audsters and 
betrayers^''^ A. Malek Ukil was one of the associates of President Mustaq. Because of his 
opportunistic nature, in those bad days of AL, he did not hesitate to compare Mujib rule with 
the oppressive rule of 'Ferown'. On the other hand the third group, comprised with Korban 
Ali, Zillur Rahman, Sajeda Chowdhury, A. Mannan and Ivey Rahman etc, though worked as 
the third faction but in the leadership fight they were also defeated by the BAKSALites 
(Moscow-Delhi lobby)^'*'. Then, as Moscow-Delhi lobby was seen stronger they tilted 
towards that group. 
Dainik Bangla, 4 March 1978. 
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The rivalry between the AL Presidenta and GS in nominating the Working Committee 
(WC) members: The internal crisis of the party became open to ail in the 1978 council 
session. After the conclusion of the AL council session Bichitra remarked, "On the 3 March 
the AL council session began in the midst of hand to hand skirmish and slogans - counter 
slogans. On 5 March it was concluded in the midst of throwing bricks and stones" '^'®. Though, 
by a compromising formula between the groups, only the election of president, secretary and 
some office bearers was completed but in the absence of a universally accepted leader the 
leaders of the party at the time showed their failure to elect a full committee in the council 
session. So, in the midst of skirmish the council session was closed hurriedly but a fresh open 
rivahy was started between the two major groups. It was decided that the president would 
declare the names of other working committee members by consulting with the party GS and 
senior Vice President. But they could not come to any understanding in the selection of other 
WC members. After 16 days of the council session was concluded the party president A. 
Malek Ukil, in a statement declared the names of the remaining 27 general members of the 
47- member central working committee according to the Article-13 of the party 
constitution '^*®. The socialist group led by A. Razzaq and Zohra Tajuddin could not imagine 
that even after acknowledging their defeat the old guards could hit back. On the next day, A. 
Razzaq bitterly criticized his party president for what he called violating the party decision 
with regard to the announcements of general members of working committee in press 
published on 22 March 1978. With a view to create a joint leadership A. Razzaq said that it 
was decided in the organization that the party president would announce the names of 63 the 
WC members after discussion with an approvd of the GS and the first Vice President as par 
the revised constitution of the party. He said that he was fiirther surprised to see some names 
in the presidents list who were far away from the party in the crucial period. Further he said' 
there were allegations against them (Ukil & associates) for hobnobbing with those responsible 
for the death of Sheikh Mujib. He also reminded that the majority council members did not 
support A. Malek Ukil but another one (Zohra Tajuddin) was supported. In fact Ukil was 
accepted as the party chief as a compromise candidate for the greater interest of the party. 
However A. Razzaq (GS) and first Vice-President Zohra Tajuddin had jointly issued a list of 
names of 63-member AL working committee^^®. Both the lists had 15 names in common. 
Refiiting the statement of A. Razzaq and Zohra Tajuddin on 23 March, A. Malek Ukil said 
that the WC members, nominated by him, were tested, well-known and leading personalities 
of the party. He also demanded that in nominating the 27 WC members he had detailed 
discussion with GS, first Vice President and several other party leaders. He flirhter added that 
A. Razzaq and Zohra Tajuddin had separately submitted the names of 27-members in their 
own handwriting to him and he had nominated the WC members from among the suggested 
names of the two leaders. Particularly he mentioned, "Both the lists are with me at the 
moment". Ukil also mentioned that the party constitution had no provision for consultation 
with the GS or Vice President as regards the nomination of the WC members and that their 
statement was untrue and confusing. As the President of AL, Ukil said that he possessed the 
absolute authority to nominate and announce the names of WC, and that according to the 
constitution the total number of WC would be 47 (20 office bearers + 27 general members) 
and not 83 (20+63)^^^ Rejecting Ukil's statements, A. Razzaq said that Article No. 12 of the 
Weekly Bichitra, 29 December 1981; p. 21 
For the A. Malek Ukil declared least of remaining 27 general WC members see Dainik Bangla, 22 March 
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AL constitution had been amended extensively. To fulfill his personal evil will Ukil totally 
concealed it, though he and his friends knew it very well that, in the amended constitution, the 
number of office bearers and general members were increased. According to the decision of 
the former organizing committee and in the light of constitutional sub-committee discussion 
in the Article No. 13 of the Constitution the power to nominate the WC members had been 
authorized to President, first Vice President and the GS collectively. This decision was taken 
for the greater interest of the party to form a collective leadership in the absence of 
Bangabandhu^^^. 
It need be mentioned here that the party constitution was not amended in the last 
council session - which was the only authority for the purpose. A constitutional sub-
committee formed by the former organizing committee of the party had suggested some 
changes in the party constitution. Although, the proposed amendments to the Constitution 
were not placed before the council session, six Vice-Presidents and two Joint-Secretaries, as 
proposed in the amendments, were elected though the party Constitution provided for only 
three Vice-Presidents and no Joint Secretary^^^. 
This inflamed the rivalry between the factions to a large extent. Two separate WC 
meeting were convened by two different groups: A. Razzaq group convened meeting in the 
AL party office and Ukil in a private house^^''. To celebrate the 'Independent Day' they also 
arranged two separate meetings at separate places^^^. Ukil was enjoying support from the old 
guards. During the WC meetings of the old guards it was also seen that maximum of the party 
leaders and workers who were locally influential and well off, capable to contest 
parliamentary election, were supporting the old-guards. But they were less in number. The 
fi-eedom fighters and comparatively youth section were with A. Razzaq group and majority 
party workers were from tiiis section. The core ideological conflict was - whether the 
programs of the second revolution of Bangabandhu BAKSAL or the previous pro-western 
liberal democratic program of AL as followed by Suhrawardy and Mujib till 1973. Facing this 
crisis, the party workers were divided and a good number of them became confused. One 
thmg was clear that: the senior leaders (including the district and sub-district) of this party 
wanted to return to that pre-1971 programs of AL and the new generation leaders preferred to 
highlight only the changes that took place in AL since 1972. It means they were mainlv giving 
stress on Mujibism (so called Mujibs philosophy) and formation of BAKSAL in 1995 . 
The main reasons why workers were gathering behind A. Razzaq group were: (i) 
during 1973-75 periods A. Razzaq was the Organizing Secretary of AL. As that time AL 
secretary was mostly inactive and the party activities were mainly managed by A. Razzaq and 
Tofael Ahmed. At that time A. Razzaq was also the chief of the Awami Voluntary League. 
And this organization was involved with the local development and relief works. Most of the 
voluntary workers were dedicated^". Consequently AL leaders A. Razzaq's relation was vefy 
strong up to the grassroots level; (ii) during 60s A. Razzaq was the GS of AL's student wing 
BCL. During this period for the interest of the organization the AL leadership made him the 
GS of BCL for two times consecutively. He was a skilled organizer and very hard-working 
" I Daily Sangbad, 25 March 1978. 
Bangladesh Observer, 29 March 1978; Also POT Bangladesh, Vol. 3 No. 64,30 March 978, p. 393. 
Bangladesh Observer, 24 March 978. Also see weekly Bichitra, 14 April 1974; p. 20. It should be mentioned 
here as youth workers and mass support was with A. Razzaq by his militant youth workers he took control of the 
party office. 
Weekly Bichitra, 14 April 1978; p. 20. 
Weekly Bichitra, 14 April 1978; p. 20. 
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and a full time organizer. During his secretary-ship the BCL became well-organized and it 
transformed into a strong organization^^'. Besides in 1971 he was one of the four top 
commanders of Mujib Bahini. The active BCL workers of 60s and the freedom fighters of 
1971 were the main stream workers group in whole of Bangaldesh. Automatically, in 1978, 
A. Razzaq emerged as the leader of a large followers group; (iii) From the very beginning he 
was the left of the centrist leader. After the defection of big number of leftist youth and 
student section of AL, under the leadership of Sirzul Alam Khan in 1972, there was no leftist 
young leader in AL having equal weight of A. Razzaq. Sheikh Moni, though, later preferred 
leftist stream with an intension to well-organize his leadership in the party but in 1975 he was 
assassinated by a military coup. As a result, A. Razzaq was established as the sole leader of 
the leftist and left of the centrist group of AL; ftuther more, at that time, inside the party this 
group was dominating. 
Meanwhile, during the conflict of the socialist group with liberal democrats on the 
issue of nominating general members of WC of the party, the leadership of the youth wing of 
AL (the AJL) due to infighting in that front organization was also divided. The AJL central 
committee was in favor of unity in the party and its President Amir Hossain Amu took a 
neutral role in the conflict of mother party^^ .^ As a result some of the central leaders of AJL, 
the stunt followers of S. Moni, such as Mezbah and Hannan joined the group of A. Malek 
Ukil and A. Razzaq failed to manage total support from AJL. The internal division in AJL 
brought important youth support for A. Malek Ukil. Weekly Bichitra commented, "Malek 
Ukil became strong from empty position due to the internal division of 
On 27 March, the meeting of the two separate WC led by the two rival groups were 
held at two different places. One WC meeting was presided over by AL President Ukil. The 
other prominent leaders who were present in that meeting were: three Vice-President of the 
central committee Matiur Rahman, A. Mannan and Rafiq Uddn Bhuyan, Treasurer Fazlul 
Karim, Mizanur Rahman, Abdur Rouf, Mohd. Mohsin, Mollah Jalal Uddin, Sirajul Huq, 
Azizur Rahman, Akkas, Abdul Momin, Fazlul Karim, Abdur Rahman, Khaled Mohammad 
Ali, Prof Yusuf Ali, Dewan Farid Gazi, Sohrab Hossain, Mozaffar Hossain Paltu, Women 
Secretary Ivey Rahman, Kazi Zahirul Kayum, Korban Ali etc; a totall of 28 leaders of the 
party participated in this meeting. Probably, to avoid participation in any of the group 
meetings deliberately, Sajeda Chowdhury, the Joint Secretary of AL, had left for outside 
Dhaka. She conveyed a message to the party President by expressing her sorrow for her 
inability to attain Ae WC meeting^^^ Probably Sajeda, at that time, wanted to maintain a safe 
distance from both group till she was not sure that in case any split split took place to which 
side maximum workers would swing. Moreover Sajeda, with some more AL leaders, also was 
trying to build up third group in leadership competition. Korban Ali was the senior Vice 
President of AL during Mujib Era in post independent Bangladesh. During the council session 
in the competition to be the fu-st Vice President of the party he was defeated by Zohra 
Tajuddin; then just to take revenge he joined the WC meeting called by Ukil. Zahirul Kayum, 
who was one of the instrumental to make Zohra Tajuddin the party Convener in the 1977 
Syed Modasser Ali, Santrasher Majhei Basabas (Living Within Terrorism), (Dhaka: Ananna Publishers, 
1993); p. 33. During 60s Modasser Ali was one of the Vice President of BCL central committee in the same 
committee with A. Razzaq. 
In the fight of Sheikh Moni till 1975 against A. Razzaq-Tofael group Amu, that tune Vice President of AJL 
was with S. Moni. Still that difference was working among A. Razzaq and Amu. So he did not support A. 
Razzaq. 
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special council session, also joined the WC meeting presided over by Ukil. But Korban Ali 
and Zahiruj observed that majority of the party workers were with A. Razzaq group. They had 
clear calculations, Korban Ali was the leadership aspirant. In the next council session he had 
to face Mizan Chowdhury for President Post. Zahirul Kayum was also the aspirant of 
Presidential post. To get success of their future planning for the time being by forgetting the 
contemplation to take revenge at the time they turned to become the mediators between the 
groups for resolving the differences^^^. 
Another WC meeting also took place in the AL Head Office on the same day and 
Zohra Tajuddin, the senior Vice-President of the party, presided over the meeting. Among the 
central leaders the two other remaining Vice-Presidents Mohiuddin Ahmed and Abdul Momin 
Talukder, party GS A. Razzaq, second Joint Secretary Salahuddin Yusuf, Social Welfare 
Secretaiy Yahya Chowdhury Pintu, and a good number of the, A. Razzaq decalred, central 
WC members attended the meeting^^^. The WC meetings of both of the groups continued the 
following days. Due to the latest developments - (i) after the internal division was over a 
group of AJL leaders supported Ukil and (ii) a good number of old guard leaders were having 
local influence and economic capability to contest the elections - due to these reasons on the 
second day, the gathering of workers outside the meeting place of A. Razzaq group was 
reduced to a little. On the other hand workers' gathering was little increased in favor of 
U k i P ^ , 
Meanwhile, rival factions of AL held two separate discussion meeting in two separate 
places to celebrate the independent day. Instead of the speeches related to independent day, 
the discussion on the differences between the groups dominated in both of the rival group 
meetings. The meeting of the liberal democrats, held in 'Hotel Eden', was presided over by 
party President A, Malek Ukil. The leaders participated in this meeting stressed on immediate 
establishment of democracy in the coimtry. They also declared that the brand of socialism, 
hired from foreign countries, would not be established in Bangladesh rather that would be 
indigenous one. They conveyed their speech in favor of parliamentary type of govemance^^^, 
Ukil, the party President and the main leader of this group, said, "Those who do not believe 
on parliamentary democracy; do not wish to establish fundamental rights of the people, liberty 
of the newspapers, right to speak and human rights; inspired from foreign countries want to 
push the fundamental principles of the state towards east or west there is no place for them in 
the AL, The doors are open for them. They may go anywhere they wish,,.. Uniting the pro-
liberation forces together AL will go advance in the straight path following democratic and 
constitutional way. In the past, the thoughtless forces (BAKSALites) encouraged by foreign 
inspiration tarnished the image of Bangabandhu enough that will not be allowed in the further. 
AL will get inspiration from the soil of Bengal.... If any one wants to hire foreign inspiration, 
at any cost we shall defend them"^^^. Mizan Chowdhury, the main controlling figure of this 
group, portrayed A. Razzaq as an agent of a foreign company and a highly ambitious leader. 
He also said, "Because of leadership aspiration A, Razzaq formed a counter working 
committee and engaged in conveying contradictory statements in the newspapers. He further 
added, '^In 956 one group of people defected from AL on the issue of foreign policy; today a 
group insisting that socialism should be established first. These claimers don't understand that 
if in 1970 Bangabandhu could tell let us leave democracy now. We first establish socialism. 
Weekly Bichitra, 14 April 978; pp. 19-20. 
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Then neither the election could take place nor the country would get independence.... There is 
no alternative of socialism in Bangladesh. But socialism will be established following the path 
of democracy. We shall go to the power following democratic process and then establish 
socialism... .Do not you wish that the people of Bangladesh should govern the country by 
their elected representatives". Professor Yusuf Ali, one of the prominent leader of this group, 
said, "AL is the centrist organi2ation. Those who did not believe this centrist school of 
thought after the formation of the party they defected to here and there. Those who had leftist 
or rightist leaning they also were thrown out of the party scattered. As there is no place of 
atheism in AL like that there is no scope of communalism in it"^^ .^ 
The other meeting of the BAKSALites held at the central office building of AL. Zohra 
Tajuddin, the former Convener and incumbent Vice President of the party, presided over the 
meeting. The leaders of this group projected the rival group leaders as opportunists having 
compromising tendency (with the government) and as the intriguers. Opposing the 
compromising tendency of some of the leaders this group leaders opined to accept party 
programs with fiill of fighting spirit. They mentioned the current difference among the AL 
leadership: a difference of principle in the way to establishing socialist ideology. In her 
presidential speech Zohra Tajuddin said, "It is not possible to maintain unity with the leaders 
not interested to go for struggle and with those who want to convert AL into a compromising 
organization by using the name of Bangabandhu. Our core difference with them is on 
principle, not on the question of party leadership. We don't want to follow the compromising 
or surrendering attitude.... For the establishment of Mujib-ideology, we want to go for 
struggle by risking our life in danger. We don't want to be minister as the participants of 
power.... Betraying the principles and ideology of Bangabandhu AL do not want the 
partnership of power.... Those who are dreaming for power at this moment the AL workers 
want to get releaf from serving them.... There is no place of opportunists and palace 
intriguers in AL. AL got the heritage of struggle.... Today in this (odd) environment AL will 
continue its struggle in the democratic-constitutional way. The leaders, who are engaged in 
conspiracy for the lust of power, please vacate your positions (of the party) for the dedicated 
leaders, and for those who have been engaged in struggle". A. Razzaq, the moving spirit of 
this group, said, "The difference is not on the issue of leadership on the ideological issue. Till 
we are alive, it is not possible for us to burry the four principles of Bangabandhu, it is not 
possible to tolerate a little betrayal against it (the four principles). Those who are vocal about 
Bangabandhu but betray his four fundamental principles, look forward to be the ministers of 
national government and engage in conspiracy to send us in jail, a unity is not possible with 
them. Even then we have maintained harmony with them. Mr. Zahirul Kayum is the witness 
of every thing. It was decided that- party decision would be taken through a unanimous 
opinion of Mr. A. Malek and me, we the two brothers and our sister-in-law. But... vwthout 
any discussion with us Mr. Ukil sent the working committee list in the newspapers.... Today 
they have done conspiracy about (WC) list, tomorrow they will engage in conspiracy over the 
party programs, and next day we shall be thrown in jail. They afraid Aat in the presence of A. 
Raz^q it would not be possible to participate in national government.... Bangabandhu 
wished to establish the democracy of exploiters that is our target.... We don't want capitalist-
democracy, we deserved for that democracy of Bangabandhu - where 95% peoples right is 
preserved. According to the circumstances of Bangladesh indigenous socialism will be 
instituted here, not through borrowing others one - Bangabandhu also desired it. In spite of it 
whenever the democracy (of Bangabandhu) is discussed they feel burning on their skin/ 
Daily Sangbad, 28 March 1978. 
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heart". Mohiuddin, the aged theoretician leader of this group, said, "The rival group is giving 
erroneous explanation of the principles of Bangabandhu. Bangabandhu did not snatch 
democracy. He desired to establish the democracy of 95% exploited people. Through the 
socialism of Bangabandhu the state will fiilfill all the fundamental demands of the people 
including food and clothing. According to him it is not the killing of democracy - rather the 
highest level of democracy"^^^. Thus a bitter quarrel followed between the two ideologically 
divided groups over the nomination of the party WC members or over the domination of the 
party central committee. Like in the past, at this time the rivaliy of the two groups was not 
limited only in the central leadership of the party. When both group leaders separately had 
been to National Martyrs Memorial, at Savar, to dedicate garland of flowers, the emotional 
strain of rival group workers was exposed there through an unexpected skirmish. As a result, 
three cars of A. M^ek Ukil and his associates were damaged^ *^ ®. 
According to apro-BAKSALite weekly all this was happening because of Mizan 
chowdhuiy and his associates influence over that time AL President Ukil. That weekly further 
wrote, "In the 1978 council session the Mizan group, known as the anti-progressive section in 
AL, was defeated. Even after this, for some days by influencing the elected AL President A. 
Maiek Ukil they continue their struggle to run the party according to their preferred programs 
(liberal democratic stream). This is manifested when some of members were nominated in the 
central committee by the President. It is known that Malek Ukil nominated maxunum number 
of the followers of Mizan Chowdhury as a consequence of his (Mizan's) influence over him. 
As a result the party has been divided for some days"^'°. On the other hand, the huge working 
force of AL was also confused and fhistrated due to the infighting in the leadership though by 
any means they were in favor of party unity. According to them the division of the party was 
only weakening itself^''. A delegate of AJL, the youth front of AL, met the leaders of both the 
rival groups and impressed upon them the need to maintain party unity. They made it clear 
that they would support neither of the groups if unity were not maintained. Telegrams were 
also being sent from the district, union and thana (sub-district) units of the party urging the 
central leadership to maintain unity^'^. 
Some of the peace-movers, from the top leadership, immediately came forward in 
resolving rifts in the party. The prominent figures in the mediating group were: Sri 
Monoranjan Dhar, Kaji Zahirul Kayum, Korban Ali, Asaduzzaman Khan, Abdul Momen, 
Fazlul Karim and Sramik (Laor) League President Abdur Rahman^'^. After a continuous and 
strenuous effort of the peace makers, to arrive at a unanimous list of WC members, the 
leaders of the both rivsd factions agreed to sit for talk to maintain party unity through 
resolving the internal differences^ On 4 April both the rival faction formally agreed 'on the 
basic principles for reaching an accord on organizational matters'^^^ But still they were yet to 
reach to an agreement on some issues: (i) how to accommodate each others' nominees in the 
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committee and make it acceptable to all. Ukil was not ready to drop 'some controversial 
names' from his list of ALWC as, according to some close source of Ukil, if any body from 
the list of 27-member WC of the party announced by its president was dropped the allegation 
in public made by A. Razzaq that there were some members in the WC announced by Ukil 
who hobnobbed with those responsible for the death of Sheikh Mujib would only be proved. 
Moreover the political career of such 'dropped men' would be seriously impaired^^®. On the 
other hand there were some names in the 63-member WC list announced by party Secretary 
A. Razzaq (such as Gazi Gulam Mustafq, Nurul Huq, Rawshan Ali, Rahmat Ali) whom Ukil 
group was not ready to accept in the ALWC as they had bitter personal enmity with some top 
leaders of Ukil group^^'. Mizan Chowdhuiy had an inimical relationship with Gazi Golam 
Mostafa. There was an allegation that Gazi played an important role to remove Mizan from 
Mujib Ministry in 1974. And Ukil had a long term bitter relation with imprisoned Nurul Huq; 
(ii) some Ukil group leaders, at the beginning of rapprochement talk, demanded the 
unconditional with^awal of the 63-member working committee list declared by rival group 
leader A. Razzaq and unconditional acceptance of the authority of the party president to 
announce the list of WC members. But AL GS termed this demand of Ukil faction on the 
question of unconditional agreement as propaganda had launched by those who did not want 
unity in the party '^®. Finally, both the rival factions of the AL headed by party President and 
GS had reached a compromise formula to iron out their differences^^^. It was also decided that 
the working committee would consist of neither 27-members nor 63 but would have a new 
size. Seven new members from the A. Razzaq group in addition to 27-member central 
working committee (CWC), earlier announced by Ukil, would be nominated. The 63-member 
CWC announced by A. Razzaq were withdrawn. According to the new settlement the number 
of nominated members of the party WC expanded from 27 to 34 accommodating the new 7-
members from A, Razzaqs panel. Ukil (President) and A. Razzaq (GS) of the party jointly 
announced a 54 (34+20) member WC including the 20 office bearers elected in the party 
council sessions^®''. It is worth mentioning that though a settlement came into being but by his 
strenuous effort A, Razzaq could not include Gazi Golam Mostafa, Sheikh Rowshan Ali, 
Nuril Huq and Rahmat Ali in the new committee. Zohra Tajuddin and Mohiuddin also failed 
to include prominent Mujibbadi theoretician and writer Ilyas Ali, Barrister Sawkat Ali and 
former Step Minister for defense Prof. Nurul Islam. Besides Asadduzzaman Khan, one of the 
prominent old guard leaders and one of the peacemakers was also dropped from the 
compromise list^®'. Failing to include the above names Zohra Tajuddin, Mohiuddin Ahmed 
and Salahuddin Yusuf walked out of the meeting in an angry mood on 6 April 1978. On 8 
April, the final day of the peace making process, A. Razzaq could not bring back these pro-
BAKSALite elements in the compromise meeting. On the other hand, Mizan Chowdhury did 
not accept this compromise formula, wherein Ukil agreed to include seven new members 
from A. Razzaq group in the new AL committee. Thus on 8 April Ukil also failed to bring 
Mizan Chowdhury on the discussion table^ ® .^ Observing all these latest development weekly 
'Bichitra' commented, "Especially the absence of the dominant leaders of both the A. Malek 
Bangladesh Observer, 4 April 1978. 
Weekly Bichitra, 14 April 1978; p. 19. 
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and A. Razzaq groups on the 8 April discussion meeting widen the path of rivalry rather than 
Although through a 13 days (27March to 8 April) lengthy strenuous effort both group 
leaders came to a compromising settlement but immediately the question was raised: for how 
many days this unity would be existed? One columnist wrote in the daily Sangbad, "Though it 
is written in the newspapers that the difference is wiped out. But is it possible to remove the 
difference so hurriedly! The difference which has been continued on since long, which has 
just got maturity, in the course of talking if anyone says that it is removed - will every one 
agree with it? Mien split has taken place in all other parties, when many of the parties have 
been broken into pieces then AL will remain unbroken/ solid - it cannot be said. There is a 
proverb that which country doesn't have king, there every one is king. The condition of AL is 
same. All are trying to be the leader in the leader-less party"^ ®'^ . Moinul Hossain, an ex-AL 
MP and at the time one of the strong criticizer of AL, wrote, "Although, because of the 
pressure of your foreign-masters you have patched-up the differences contemporarily but have 
you really removed the internal confusion and differences? Or is it possible to remove"^®^? It 
was also reported in daily Sangbad, "The conflict of AL though is seen as a difference 
between A. Malek and A. Razzaq actually many issues remain secret"^® .^ Few of the secrets 
were revealed from the interview of former AL leader M.M. Montu. According to him, in the 
Bangladesh Military industry Ziaur Rahman was the recruit of USA. To server their (US) own 
purpose they engaged/ set him in Bangladesh Politics. Since AL was considered as an anti-US 
party due to 1971 liberation war and some other reasons the USA wanted to form an 
alternative political party of AL, side by side also wanted to weaken the AL. Utilizing the 
restlessness of the AL leaders about their internal difference in a very calculative way 
factionalism was created in the party through involving Ziaur Rahman. In this process of 
factional conflict later Mizan-AL was formed.... India has a very big role in the subsequent 
ups and downs inside AL. Which is clear from the election of A. Razzaq as party GS in 1978. 
India played a good role in the 1978 AL council session etc^^'. Through their speeches on 26 
March 1978 both the factions of AL also blamed the involvement of foreign hands in the 
infighting of AL. In that day A. Razzaq said, "International conspirators are giving opposite 
mteipretation of socialism. We don't want capitalist democracy; we need to establish that 
democracy where 95% exploited people's rights is preserved"^^®. On the other hand on behalf 
of democrat group Ukil said, "Encouraged by foreign inspiration, they (A. Razzaq group) 
have inflicted enough damage to the image of Bangaandhu that will not be allowed in fUrther. 
AL will get insph-ation from the soil of Bengal.... If any one wants to hire foreign inspiration, 
at any cost we shall defend/ stop him"^®', Mizan Chowdhury, the main controlling figure of 
this group, portrayed A. Razzaq as an agent of a foreign company and a highly ambitious 
leader^'". By these speeches it became clear that some of the regional and international 
powers were active in this infighting. In their speeches on 26 March the socialist group 
leaders also demanded that the opportunist leaders of Mizan group engaged in creating 
conflict in AL from the aspiration of power sharing. According to A. Razzaq if he was 
Weekly Bichitra, 14 April 1978; p. 19. 
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holding the post of GS it would not be possible for the opportunists to become the ministers 
of the Ziaur Rahaman regime; for that they were engaged in the conspiracy^''. According to 
Modasser All, Mizan Chowdhuiy was engaged in breaking the AL as the associate of Zia in 
executing his planning. Later on, although he could not adjust himself with Zia, he made close 
association with the generals. As a result he became the PM of the subsequent General 
Ershad's Militry regime^'^. Weekly Sachitra Sandhani also claimed that Mizan Chowdhury 
had a secret relation with the then government party^'^ On the other hand some journals 
observed that some of the socialist parties were also involved in this infighting from outside. 
The weekly 'Holiday' observed that the infighting among the AL leadership was the result of 
the bid by the group 'led by pro-communist AL leader Zohra Tajuddin to capture the AL 
leadership'. The weekly also alleged that CPB leader Moni Shing had a big hand in this 
factional tussle^''*. The 'Holiday' also wrote, "It is not only Mizan Chowdhury's unconcealed 
suspicion of the CPB and NAP (Muzaffar) which is responsible for the growing schism within 
the party, Malek Ukil is also become worried about the future of the party, in case too much 
emphasis is put on its immediate past performance (BAKSAL program)". However according 
to weekly Bichitra, "because of this conflict the party would be broken" and it described the 
reasons for why the party was going to be divided^' : (a) in the preceding month of January 
1978, immediate after A. Razzaq was freed from jail the student wing (BCL) of AL was 
divided into two; (b) the youth wing (AJL) of AL was also internally divided due to the 
internal factionalism in mam body AL; (c) the indecision of the labor wing of AL and the 
gesture of its breakdown; (d) the tendency towards the strengthening of the ideological 
mfightmg; (e) the absence of the all-accepted single leadership in the party. Because of the 
declaration that the presidential election of Bangladesh would be held on June 1978 
temporarily the squabble inside AL was reduced for the time being. 
The formation of AL led GOJ and the 1978 Presidential Election: In order to civilianize 
his military regime Zia favored his own design to restore democracy in phases from local 
level to the national level. Therefore, he planned to hold local government elections before the 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Despite all the anti-AL propaganda and repression 
and more over though mtemally it was confronting its own factional feuds, the AL was slowly 
regaining its old ground in Bangladesh politics^^^. In the Union Council (UP) elections held in 
February 1977, it captured 9,750 seats out of 13,000 and 80% posts of Chairmen's of the 
Councils. In Dhaka University syndicate elections pro-AL candidates won, defeating the pro-
regime candidates. In the Municipal elections, held in August 1977, the AL won majority of 
the seats^^'. Both UP and Municipal elections were held on the basis of direct adult franchise. 
After die UP elections 'Desh BangIa' observed that though the UP elections were not 
contested on the basis of political parties it had benefited the AL indirectly. Many AL leaders 
and workers who would fmd it difficult to take part in a national election because of existing 
political repression were able to contest in the non-political UP elections on the strength of 
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local issues, money and organization. This election however had enabled the AL to be active 
again in rural areas '^®. Since June 1976, though indoor party politics was allowed but so long 
open public meeting, procession, wall writing or other political rights of the people was 
restricted. After a long gap of 3 years, since 1 May 1978 Zia regime allowed open political 
activities for the political parties. Bestdes it also declared that on 3 June 1978 the first 
Presidential election of Bangladesh would be held - through direct participation of the 
masses. General Zia became the candidate of an electoral alliance of diverse groups called the 
Jatiatabadi (Nationalist) Front consisting of JAGODAL, NAP (Bhasani), ML, UPP, 
Bangladesh Labor Party and Banglades Schedule Cast Federation (an Hindu organization). 
The AL and some other political parties including NAP (MuzaffarX Krishak Sramik Party, 
Janata Party, Gana Azadi League and Bangladesh Peoples League also formed Ganatantrik 
Oikka Jote (GOJ) or Democratic Front and nominated JJP chief, General (retd.) Ataul Gani 
Osmani, as their candidate to contest against General Zia. Although there were ten 
presidential candidates the real contesters were Zia and Osmani. Though there were several 
political parties in both the above electoral alliances, the battle was seen by the observers as a 
fight between the ruling regime and the major opposition AL^^ .^ General Osmani in his 
election campaign said that if he were elected he would introduce parliamentary system^®®. As 
was expected, the election results show General Zia victorious while the opposition candidate 
Osmani received about 22% of the total votes casted^°'. 
Prior to the presidential election many thought that the AL would boycott it. But, 
when AL President Ukil in a press conference declared, "nothing will go unchallenged"^"^ all 
the confusions about AL's participation were cleared. The party had selected its candidate for 
presidential election very carefully. One section of AL was thinking to nominate their ovm 
candidate. Ukil, Zohra Tajuddin, Mizan Chowdhury and Dr. Kamal Hossain etc party leaders 
name were discussed as party candidate to contest the election. But both the groups of the 
party were certain that whoever from among the above mentioned leaders was selected as 
party candidate to contest the election he would enjoy only partial support of the party^°^. The 
other part of the party thought that instead of directly nominating its candidate in this farce 
election AL and some other like-minded political parties should form an election alliance and 
nominate an unanimous single candidate. The reasons for providing a single candidate were 
mentioned as below: (i) In 1978 anti-AL propaganda was very strong. In this situation 
according to Mizan Chowdhury, "if we would follow go alone policy all (the paries) might go 
against us - we were afraid of it. With the intention that all the other parties can not move 
together against us we formed this front"^"^; (ii) According to weekly Bichitra, election win 
was not the main target of AL. Rather they needed to politically rehabilitate themselves in 
Bangladesh and they achieved it through this election During the election campaign, the 
daily 'Desh Bangla' wrote, "In this time for AL, sitting idle means give another blow on the 
organization. It is the proper time for the AL to revive the organization. For the betterment of 
the organization the party has to be come forward.... On the question of one party BAKSAL 
system now AL is following enough soft line. They have now changed their opinion in favor 
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of parliamentary democracy. The present role of AL and the unshaken believe of JJP leader 
General Osmani and his party finely helped to form the Front"^°®. According to former AL 
MP and at present one of the strong critics of AL Moinul Hossain, "the AL, the killer of 
democracy and the founder of one party governing system, has not directly gone in front of 
the masses. Rather as a tactics kipping Osmani, the real follower of democracy, in the 
forefront has been engaged in talking for parliamentary democracy. Now it (AL) has followed 
a tactics of shooting by keeping the gim on the shoulder of Osmani; has been trying to 
continue politics from behind the shade of Osmani"^°'. In short, not to vwn the election rather 
in order to reorganize the party by a proper use of the election facilities in a hostile 
environment AL made Generd Osmani its presidential candidate. In the presidential election 
political observers, however, saw a sudden blast of AL's return to the Bangladesh political 
arena. For the years, since August 1975, all the parties' main criticizing issue against AL was 
its 'one party presidential rule'. Whereas in 1978 election, when Ziaur Rahman was 
propagating multi-party presidential rule - by taking advantage of this golden opportunity AL 
changed its 'one party BAKSALite' garb; started backing up a cause to unite the politicians 
and leaders in the long-drawn struggle for the parliamentary form of goverrmient in 
Bangladesh^"®. This propaganda issue of AL helped the party regaining of its old support 
base. 
Though the AL was propagating multiparty parliamentary system, its central WC in a 
resolution also said that under the changed circumstances only the parliamentary form of 
govenmient could restore the rights of the people^®'. But, still it did not totally relinquish one 
party BAKSAL system; rather they were propagating it. The party GS A. Razzaq told a press 
conference that the parliamentary democracy was the preliminary phase for establishing 
socialism^'". With tihis probably he indirectly hinted that the next step in the process would be 
formation of one party BAKSAL. During the election campaign the main target of AL was 
the organizational propagation and to reactivate the organization upto the grassroots level. To 
achieve this target the party leadership tried to distance them from internal conflict and 
refrained from direct attack to each other. But since the differences had alradey spread till to 
the lowest level of the party the election campaign faced a little bit jolts and the election 
campaign was advancing in a disorderly way^^'. In different election meetings, it was seen 
that the rival groups of AL were engaged in slogans and counter slogans against each other. 
Although in 1975 Osmani himself had resigned from parliament protesting the 
introduction of one party rule by Mujib but at present the men around him and the principal 
parties on whose behalf he was contesting had all been active participants in the process that 
had destroyed the country's democratic institutions. Because of AL's BAKSAL programs 
when AL had revived, he had not joined it; rather he had separated himself from it and had 
declared the formation of a new political party JJP. But at present he contested the 
Political Column: "Observer's Diaiy", Dainik Desh Bangla, 9 May 978. 
Political Column: "Answer to the sovereign masses, don't run away", Daily Azad, 7 May 1978. For more 
detail also see Daily Ittefaq, 28 May 1978. Daily Sangram, 6 and 28 May 1978. 
Daily New Nation, 30 April 1978. The greatest advantage of the parliamentary system is that the countiy is 
not run by individual's whims and caprices. It is constantly govern by common consent. It ensures checks and 
balances among the Parliament and the President and the PM. 
Bangladesh Observer, 24 and 27 April 1978. 
Bangladesh Observer, 27 April 1978. 
Political Column: "The court ofZohur"; daily Sangbad, 28 June 1978. 
265' 
presidential election with getting the support of AL only to accelerate his personal fame^'^. In 
an attempt to accelerate his personal fame now he surrendered his previous ideological 
firmness. Another breakaway leader Abdur Rashid Tarkabagish also joined the AL led 
election front to survive his personal existence in political arena of Bangladesh. Osmani and 
Tarkabagish willingly and consciously engaged in self-contradiction by forming election 
alliance with AL. 
At the end of presidential election, the Democratic Alliance, formed by AL and some 
other like-minded parties, was disintegrated. At that time some of the component leaders of 
the former GOJ became vocal in anti-AL criticism. In a public meeting Mujaffar Ahmed, the 
leader NAP (Mujafifar)-one of the components of GOJ, said, "The poor of the country have 
not enfranchised for boat (the election symbol of Osmani). They have given vote to President 
Zia. As during the Zia regime they were provided with facilities to earn their livelihoods". In 
the meeting he openly supported the 19-point programs of President Zia. He said if President 
took initiative to execute his programs he would help the president if necessary by sacrificing 
his life. He further said that by participating the GOJ the NAP had made a mistake. He also 
did not hesitate to tell that after achieving freedom the AL looted the public properties^'^. 
Mujaffar was criticizing AL to have government incentives for himself through developing 
relation with president Zia. 
The defection of Mizan group from AL: Though after a strenuous effort through patch up 
AL was able to form a Central Working Committee in April 1978 and could bring unity in the 
party temporarily. But as ideological difference was not reduced, the established party unity 
proved fragile in the subsequent days. During the presidential election campaign BAKSALite 
leader A. Razzaq used to tell that the parliamentary system of democracy was the preliminary 
phase for establishing socialism^ Especially Ukil and A. Razzaq conveyed specific public 
speeches in two separate meetings on 31 May and 1 June^'^. On the other hand in some of the 
election meetings of GOJ Mizan Chowdhury extremely criticized the one party governing 
system^'^. During the election campaign in an interview to weekly 'Bichitra' he said, "I 
believe AL made a mistake (by forming one party government).... I am in against of 
amendment of the constitution and in the opposition of BAKSAL. By forming BAKSAL we 
the Awami Leagures have made mistake"^After the presidential election the factions, 
active in AL, continued to give their own group speeches. Election was held on 3 June; on 7 
June, in a party seminar, one of the AL Vice-President Mohiuddin said, "Formation of 
BAKSAL was a pragmatic and perfect step". AL President A. Razzaq said, "In the way to 
establishing socialism, the formation of BAKSAL was an exact and brave step of 
Bangabandhu". He, by forwarding one step more, fiirther said, "To make successfiil the 
second revolution Bangabandhu left AL among us". In the same seminar Begum Zohra 
Tajuddin, the senior Vice President of AL, contradicted the pro-right parties' speeches when 
they depicted the USSR as a socialist imperialist and India as an imperialist force^'^. 
The JJP of General Osmani had a limited support base. Even it did not have organizational committee in 
every districts of Bangladesh. On the other hand, AL was an organization having strong organizational base in 
every remote villages of Bangladesh. 
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During the election campaign both of the groups propagated their own views but 
because of understandable reason remained abstained from direct conflict with each other. But 
in the council session of Dhaka district unit of AL, held on 18 February 1978, the ideological 
conflict became open and clear '^®. Later on, though apparently both the groups came to an 
agreement, but the AL working committee in its meeting held on 21, 22 and 23 April accepted 
a resolution that the introduction of one party BAKS AL system of government in January 
1975 and that time politics of Mujib were correct and proper decisions. The resolution also 
adopted that under the changed circumstances establishing parliamentary democracy was the 
first step towards achieving the objectives of the second revolution on the basis of the four 
principles of Bangabandhu for which BAKSAL was launched. The acceptance of this 
resolution by the initiative of pro-B AKSAL group in the AL working committee and the 
following of extreme line by both the groups in their speeches till 7 June 1978 widened the 
cracks among them permanently. Only a suitable time and situation to cause an explosion 
remained undeclared, by which the AL- grown up through the love and dedication of both of 
the groups- would be divided into pieces. 
The infighting in the party reached its climax during the continuous 5-day long 
extended meeting of the party WC held on 10 to 16 June 1978, Mean while as Ukil reached in 
a compromise with A. Razzaq and defected to A. Razzaq group his archrival Zohra 
dissociated herself from this BAKSALite group. She understood that by remaining with A. 
Razzaq now it would not be possible for her to become the par^ President. According to 
'Holiday' Zohra Tajuddin was trying to capture AL leaderships , Zohra also engaged herself 
in propagating that A. Razzaq and Tofael etc B AKSALits were very weak and that they were 
opportunist leaders^^^. Socialism could not be established by this group. On the question of 
party leadership AL was then internally divided into three broad factions. 
Differences surfaced in the first day of the extended meeting of ALWC with reference 
to rhe contradictory speeches and comments by party leaders on the issue of BAKSAL^^^ On 
7 June, A. Razizaq, in his speech, talked about carrying to consummation the 'second 
revolution' of late leader Mujib. Some members of ALWC questioned the party GS A. 
Razzaq why the BAKSAL was being defended when it was no more. On the oAer hand, 
another group of WC members questioned Mizan Chowdhuiy as to why he said in an 
interview to the government won weekly Bichitra that the formation of the BAKSAL was a 
mistake. All these conflicting issues were raised informally in the meeting and engaged both 
the group in face to face skirmish. A section of the central members also criticized Mizan 
Chowdhury for his interview^ '^*. The pro-socialist section by their dominant majority also 
accepted a resolution that no one had the right to give any news about the party except its 
constitutional spokesmen^^^ (i.e. the party President, Secretaiy or the one appointed on their 
behalf). 
The Presidents and Secretaries of the district organizations were also invited to join 
the extended meeting of AL. The district committee leaders pressurized the central committee 
leaders that before deciding the future course of action the leadership had to settle the party 
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principles first^^^. Though, in the 5-day long extended meeting the majority members 
advocated that the fiiture course (programs) of the party would be based on BAKSALite 
principles^^', the faction led by Mizan Chowdhuiy opposed it extremel/^®. When in the • 
fourth day of the meeting the debates between the groups turned to a extreme point Mizan 
Chowdhury, by defending his interview to the weekly Bichitra, criticized tht the one party 
BAKSAL rule in Bangadesh had been 'tyrannical' and reiterated his old view that the AL had 
committed a mistake in taking this step. Commenting to the view expressed by some leaders 
of the party that the formation of the BAKSAL was a correct step in the then circumstances 
Mizan Chowdhury asked, "If one party rule is again established on the same pretext what then 
would be the role of the AL"? He appealed to his colleagues to formulate a clear policy on the 
party's ideology and beliefs without getting involved in confusions. He said that if the AL 
seriously believed in parliamentary democracy then it should not create confusion with 
statements like 'in the present changed circumstances' and 'the need for parliamentary 
democracy as the primary step towards the transition to socialism'; it should refrain from 
harboring any views regarding the one-party rule and workout a clear policy for the 
establishment of a 'genuine parliamentary democracy'^^^. Then the majority BAKSALite 
group made blistering attack against the anti-BAKSAL leaders in the party. Zohra Tajuddin 
accused some of them as the betrayers as they, according to her, were betraying the party and 
the country joined Mustaq goverrraient and said, "Opposition to BAKSAL amounts to 
disrespect to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman"^^®. However, after another two days WC meetmg, in a 
resolution AL again accepted its old resolution of 21 and 22 April that "AL believes that 
under the changed circumstances parliamentary democracy is desirable for the establishment 
of an exploitation free society on the basis of four principles of Bangabandhu: nationalism, 
socialism, democracy and secularism". This resolution also defended the introduction of one 
party BAKSAL, saying that the then "sovereign parliament took that decision under the extra 
ordinary circumstances prevailing at that time and that the steps was right and correct"^^^ 
Because of AL's acceptance of a pro-BAKSAL resolution Mizan Chowdhury, who wanted to 
relinquish BAKSAL ideology for ever as a 'wrong step was taken by AL', boycotted the last 
two days WC meeting^^^. Another probable reason of his boycotting of WC meeting was that 
he was proved unsuccessful to assemble maximum strength in the WC meeting in hisfavor^". 
After heavy criticism against BAKSAL now it was difficult for Mizan Chowdhury to survive 
in a pro-socialist group dominated AL. The Bangladesh Observer wrote, "A split in BAL now 
appears to be certain with Mizan Chowdhury ... boycotting the two day long central WC 
meeting"^^^ On 13 June, AL leader Ukil said, "If the party fails to reach at a consensus in 
defining the line of action of the party then there is a possibility to call a council session""^ 
Weekly Bichitra wrote, "AL leaders decided that by holding a council session in the next 
month final decision will be arrived at. This means that from the party the anti-BAKSAL 
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group will be ousted permanently. As a result the AL will split again - it is the observation of 
the political observers"^^^. 
From the beginning of the internal conflict though Ukil was with Mizan group but 
after becoming the party President a big change took place in his contemplation. He was the 
incumbent party president. In this situation, if the party was divided the liberal democrat/ anti-
BAKSAL faction leader Mizan Chowdhury would become the newly formed AL central 
committee President and Ukli had to loose his incumbent leadership. In this currently changed 
situation, when personal leadership/ interest conflict was already arisen between the two, it 
was veiy difficult for Ukil to accept the leadership of Mizan Chowdhuiy^^^. Whereas the 
leaders like Ukil and A. Mannan etc were not ready to remain in the same group with the 
extreme leaders like Zohra Tajuddin^^®. A. Razzaq group tried to create rift in Mizan group. 
To ensure the crack in liberal democrat camp they had no hesitation to accept the president-
ship of Ukli for the time being. More over Ukil also observed that maximum of the party 
workers were with A. Razzaq group. Therefore to survive his party Presidentship he separated 
himself from the Mizan group . 
When comparatively fit and acceptable AL President Ukil by leaving Mizan group 
sided with A. Razzaq group, the new comer in AL politics, Zohra Tajuddin understood that 
now she was no more the foture president candidate of A. Razzaq group in AL. So her 
leadership aspiration was halted. Moreover Begum Tajuddin and her supporters were in favor 
of a complete reversion to BAKSAL - its structure and politics^'"'. Ukil's joining in A. Razzaq 
camp created a suspicion in Zohra Tajuddin group that their plan could not be executed by 
this current leadership. The failure of the tactic apparently led Begum Tajuddin criticizing her 
old faction-mates bitterly. She in her speech at the central WC meeting on 15 June termed 
party GS A. Razzaq Organizing Secretary Tofael Ahmed as 'political criminals' for 
mobilizing 'goonda (hooligans) elements', who, she felt, took control of the proceeding of the 
party's last council session. She also accused A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed for failing to act 
quickly by mobilizing AL volunteer corps and Rakkhi Bahini (paramilitary force) respectively 
on 15 August 1975. She claimed that the party had assigned them to act on any emergency 
situation but they had disappointed it in 1975. Mrs. Tajuddin was of the view that the party 
under the present 'weak' leadership of Ukil and A. Razzaq had failed to meet the aspirations 
of the people^'*'. Then she boycotted the 16 June WC meeting. Because of her criticism of A. 
Razzaq, Tofael and Ukil she had fallen from the grace of newly developed A, Razzaq-Malek 
faction. The party president and GS made a scatching criticism of Zohra Tajuddin on 16 June 
WC meeting in her abssence '^*^. Later Zohra Tajuddin, in a mood to reconcile her differences 
with A. Razzaq-Ukil group said that her speech was miss-coated in the newspapers^''^. But a 
rapport between Zohra and A. Razzaq-Ukil was unlikely because of the rivalry for leadership 
and deep-rooted mistrust. Ukil, in particular, viewed Mrs. Tajuddin as a positive rival for the 
party's number one post^''^. Since then the party was divided in three broad groups: anti-
BAKSAL forces led by Mizan Chowdhury, pro-BAKSAL elements with Zohra Tajuddin in 
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the forefront and A, Razzaq-Ukil group with their supporters towing to somewhat middle road 
without disowning the BAKSAL poIitics '^*^ 
After the WC meeting a sharp polarization took place. A number of senior leaders of 
AL led by Mizan Chowdhury, who were opposed to the party's stand on BAKSAL met 
separately in a series of meetings held during June-July 1978 '^* .^ Through their long 
discussions they had finally arrived at a decision to break away from the present AL body led 
by A. Malek Ukil and A. Razzaq. 
Mean while due to the conflict wiin the main-body AL, its associate organization 
Bangladesh Chatra (Students) League had already divided before the March 1978 council 
session of AL. Splits also occurred in Juba (Youth) League and Sramik (Labor) League. The 
Jatia Sramik (National Labor) League, the labor front of AL was also broken into two on 21 
June^ "*^  and Awami Youth League was divided on 26 June '^'®. Now the divided factions of the 
three front organizations of AL- the BCL, AJL and JSL- openly came out in support of the 
stand taken by Mizan Chowdhury on BAKSAL issue. Some moderate leaders tried to 
reconcile the differences of the two groups^''^. A four-day meeting of AL WC ended on 2 
August v^thout being able to solve the political and organizational disputes that threatened to 
split the party. Rather the meeting concluded with a verbal duel between the top leaders of 
two groups^ Finally, on 11 August the party was broken as the consequence of the factional 
tussle between the pro-BAKSAL and anti-BAKSAL factions. In a meeting of over 500 anti-
BAKS AL leaders of AL and its ancillary organization the Mizan group formed a convening 
committee with Mizan Chowdhury as its convener^^'. It should be mentioned here that in 
March 1978 council session when Mizan Chowdhury was asked by the journalists that why 
did he withdrawn his name from the party's presidential candidateship, he replied that he did 
not want to take the responsibilities of breaking the party^^^. But now by breaking up of the 
united AL formally he launched a new party under the same name and nomenclature. 
At a press conference on 12 August 1978 Mizan Chowdhury declared^^^ that there was 
no room for BAKS ALites in his party. His party was the true AL. His AL was a centrist party 
believing in multi-party parliamentary system of govenmient. His party also believed on 
Mujib's four principles: democracy, socialism, secularism and Bengali nationalism. To his 
party, socialism means equitable distribution of wealth. It did not believe in the imported 
foreign explanation of socialism. Mizan Chowdhury said that the section inside AL still 
believed in one party authoritarian BAKSAL system they should not bluff the people in the 
name of democracy. He also asked them not to use the name of AL for spreading their 
BAKSAL ideology, pointing out that the AL had a democratic tradition. He requested the 
BAKSALites to practice their own politics under some other name. 
Explaining the background of the split in the party, Mizan Chowdhury told that 
because of existence of two ideologically different factions inside the party separate 
committees were formed in many districts before its council session in March last. The 
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covincil session ended in a fiasco without adopting any definite program or manifesto^^''. He 
said that a section inside AL still believed in presidential system and one party authoritarian 
rule. On the other hand other section believed in parliamentary rule and multiparty democratic 
politics, A party having two ideologically opposing/ conflicting group could not survive for 
long. He said in the platform of AL there was no room for BAKS AL ideology. AL had to 
revive with its democratic tradition and that AL was neither an ultra leftist party nor a tail of 
capitalism^^^. Mizan Chowdhury further said, "After the independence many who do not 
believe in AL's ideology have emerged in party leadership. Their only intension was to divert 
AL in opposite direction and make Bangabandhu confused and separate from the masses by 
not giving right counsel. It is a sorrowful truth that still they are active in AL". In reply to a 
question he told that he was personally not inclined to accept Mohiuddin Ahmed and Zohra 
Tajuddin^^®. The dissident leaders denied that they had a secret imderstanding or clandestine 
liaison with the present government and that this group was trying to weaken the AL by 
breaking away at the behest of President Zia. He furthrer added that at present there was no 
possibility of making any alliance with President Zia but no one could predict the future^^'. 
In the press conference Mizan Chowdhury cited eight examples of the intemal-
infightmg of Ae party^^®: (i) in the March 1978 council session a group of workers, wearing 
red-bands indulged into lawless activities, slandered the party workers and the leaders and 
created a chaotic situation - making the council session a sorrowfol mockery. As a result even 
the party manifesto was not presented to get approved by the councilors, (ii) After three 
weeks of the council session got concluded the central committee member names were 
declared by the party president but immediately another counter committee was declared by 
the party GS; (iii) the abusement and harassment of the old-guard leaders on 26 March; (iv) 
Acceptance of the resolution in the party WC meeting held in April that the formation of the 
BAKSAL has been a correct step; (v) because of the activities of some individuals it became 
clear in the folliowing party meetings that they do not believe in parliamentary democracy at 
all; (vi) the rejection of the proposal to hold a new council session to arrive at a conclusion of 
this strenuous situation; (vii) the division of the party's front student organization BCL into 
three parts by party GS and his followers and (viii) the breakup in the Labor League (another 
front organization of AL). 
Of course a portrait of Sheikh Mujib was hung at the venue of the press conference to 
impress upon that they were the real followers of their great leader Bangabandhu Mujib. A 
large number of dissident AL and its students, labor and youth wing leaders were present at 
the press conference. The prominent among them were Prof Yusuf Ali, Shamsul Huq, Sohrab 
Hossain, Rafiquddin Bhuyan, Dr. Ashabul Huq, Sirajul Huq, Abidur Reza, Kazi Mozammel 
Huq of Sramik League, Syed Hyder Ali, Nurul Alam Siddiqui, Anwar Jang, A.K. Mujiur 
Rahman, Muzaffar Hossain Paltu, Kamal Bakht, Azhar Ali, Mohiuddin Ahmed of Barisal, 
Khaled Mohammad Ali and M.A. Rashid of youth wing^^'. 
Much before the split of the party, the senior section that had been involved with main 
party AL before 1970 (among them many were controlling the district /sub-district leadership 
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and many were also representing the central WC of the party) and was having the socio-
economic capability to contest the elections, assembled in the Mizan group^ . By raising 
different allegations against the party secretary A, Razzaq, Mizan group tried to organize 
themselves. They alleged that the party GS was misusing the vested power in him, he was 
trying to establish his personal influence over the organization, he had shown disrespect to the 
senior leaders, tried to form illegal pocket committees in the district committees, especially 
the GS was showing unnecessary support to particular country and ideology etc. F u ^ e r they 
said that these conditions would finally destroy the party and should be ended immediately. 
By using these speeches Mizan Chowdhury and his group was advancing towards the final 
stage of destruction^^'. 
In August 1978, when Mizan Chowdhury formed counter AL on the first day of the 
split it was assumed that out of 54 central WC members 20/ 22 were with him in that 
development^^^. On 12 August press conference such of the leaders were also seen who 
wanted to rehabilitate them in AL politics by using the anti-BAKSAL politics of Mizan 
Chowdhury. Altogether a big section of the party was assembled v^th Mizan Chowdhury and 
he also expected that some more old-guard leaders would join him after the finalization of the 
breakup of the party and that especially many would join him before the coming 
parliamentary election (probable date of election was December 1978) by defecting from the 
pro-BAKSAL camp^". He though that soon his party would be the main stream of AL, and 
would be the largest party of the country. There were some reasons behind such type of 
contemplation. In those days the masses of the country were having very negative notion 
about BAKSAL concept. And other parties used to admonish the AL leaders-workers by 
calling 'BAKSAli'^®^. During these days the word BAKSAL turned to the stage of bad scold 
or a word to humiliate the Awami Leaguers. By observing the harsh criticism to BAKSAL 
concept one pro-AL columnist 'Charan' even suggested, "Bangabandhu formed BAKSAL. 
Now he is no more in the world. If the formation of BAKSAL was incorrect decision then I 
don't feel any reason for hesitation to acknowledge the mistakes. Bangabandhu made mistake 
- if we agree it Bangabandhu will not be abused. His prestige will not be reduced.... For the 
masses, for a nation who worked for whole of his life, if we agree that the formation of 
BAKSAL was wrong then there will not be any loss to that dynamic, vigorous leadership". He 
further wrote, "The AL says for which situation BAKSAL was correct now that situation is 
not prevailing. They are very carefully using the term 'changed situation'. But till today no 
leader of them has given the explanation of the changing situation. If they do not clarify 
which type of change took place in the situation probably people will not accept their 
speeches.... it cannot be said that the formation of BAKSAL was accepted by all the quarters 
of AL. Many were against of it but in front of strong personality and leadership of 
Bangabandhu they did not dare to go against of him. But why is the hesitation now? Why 
don't they clearly say that as during the era of Bangabandhu it was not possible to oppose it 
so in the absence of Bangabandhu they are now declaring the unreasonableness of the 
formation of BAKSAL? By not doing these they unhesitatingly are saying the words of 
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'changing situation'. This situation is the derath of Bangabandhu. Still yet they do not dare to 
tell this real truth. As they are not able to tell it at present many unwanted elements and 
parasitic elements are criticizing Bangabandhu, using hard words against him. To get the 
public-confidence, to establish wide much communication in masses the present AL have to 
prefer clear-cut policies. There should not be any hesitation on the question of BAKSAL"^^^ 
But in politics the logic does not work exactly every time. Here, emotion plays a very 
dominant role. Because of the emotion in the masses the image of the dead leaders are used to 
win the election politics. The youth section of the third world countries by giving more 
preference on emotion instead of on reasoning/ logic till the 70^' decade of 20"' century 
learned to love socialism. Like the dominant youth leadership of the AL (which was having 
large number of conscious and educated radical youth workers), the workers force of it also 
loved Bangabandhu and his socialist BAKSAL politics by their emotion. It is not possible for 
anyone to understand the depth of that love if he cannot be able to go back to those days^^ .^ In 
front of that politics of deep emotion the politics of Mizan Chowdhury could not survive. 
There were some more reasons for why Mizn Chowdhury led AL could not survive in the 
competition with A. Razzaq-Ukil led AL. According to Mizan Chowdhury: (i) BAKSALItes 
were having better propaganda-machineries and public-relation capability compared to the 
Mizan group. Those who were known as leftists in AL they used to engage in organizational 
activities for 24 hours with dedication and honesty. But the pro-Mizan workers could not 
show their fiill time expertness; their propaganda machineries were also not strong, (ii) The 
BAKSALite group established strong allegation against Mizan-group that Mizan group was 
breaking the party only to get share of power, only to become ministers. By making 
conspiracy Mizan-group leader (Mizan Chowdhury) was breaking the party and inside the 
party they did such a strong campaign that in front of it he could not survive, (iii) AL was a 
huge organization. The strong economic capability was needed to strengthen the party base 
upto the grass-roots level, Mizan Chowsdhury personally did not have tiiat amount of money. 
Usually political parties' operating expenses come from the donations from party workers and 
supporters, different charity groups and organizations, business people and industrialists, and 
personal funds from top party leaders etc, Mizan Chowdhury said that he did not have the 
capability to collect necessary fund for the party and to run the party his personal fimd was his 
only source. On the other hand the BAKSALites were having sufficient sources to collect 
party fimd. They also received assistance from India and USSR. There were some more 
reason because of which Mizan - AL could not survive in Banglades political arena: (iv) 
Mizan Chowdhury and his associate old-guards were the right-wing politicians. On the other 
hand due to the heydays of the socialism during 60^ and 70'*' of 20 century the workers and 
supporters group of AL were moderate socialist, (v) The last program of Mujib was his 
BAKSAL ideology. The workers force of dead Mujib did have special emotional attachment 
towards his last wish, to materialize his last wish, (vi) In the process of establishing a new 
party in the masses of third worid countries which type of political, economic, social or 
religious appeal was needed to be created Mizan Chowdhury, by his party programs and 
activities, failed to create such type of appeal, (vii) Though in the past Mizan Chowdhury had 
been the Organizing Secretary and Joint of the party but he was discharged from the cabinet 
of Mujib government. It was known to all that Mizan Chowdhury already had loosed the 
confidence of Mujib. Moreover after the independence Mujib had not given enough 
importance to Mizan rather had given importance to the Mujibite youth leaders now who were 
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known as BAKSALite leaders among of them A. Razzaq and Tofael's names were 
mentionable^^'. (viii) Mizan group could not strengthen some of the front organizations such 
as student, youth and labor fronts of the party. Especially in Bangladesh to gear up a political 
movement and to spread the party base student fronts role is unavoidable, (ix) The present 
youth pro-BAKSAL leaders were having direct rapprochement with the active workers group 
during Mujib regime as this youth leaders were active in the grassroots level movement in the 
60"', had been directly engaged in the 1971 liberation war, had been given responsibility to 
reorganize the main body AL by Mujib and had been in the commanding leadership of the 
associate/ front organizations of AL. On the other hand the old-guard leaders were having 
loose coimection with the grassroots workers and supporters. Maximum of them were living 
in the city areas. The district/ sub-district senior leaders who were economically solvent were 
dependent on the active youth leaders of their area for the organizational activities and 
election politics. Many of the old guards, who supported Mizan Chowdhuiy before the 
breakup, but from the begimiing of the division they slipped away from Mizan group just to 
survive their existence in politics. At first A. Maiek Ukil left Mizan Chowdhury to save his 
present leadership. Then the close friends of Mizan Chowdhury A. Mannan, Rafiquddin 
Bhuyan (both of them were the Vice Presidents of AL) and Molla Jalal Uddin changed their 
old lobby^^^. In this way at the beginning of the formation of the new party Mizan Chowdhury 
got association of a few of his old friends. Like the days of 1976-78 he failed to assemble 
wide support behind him. Though maximum of the old-guards left his lobby but with the 
remaining associates Mizan Chowdhury completed the council session of the new party. 
Through the council session Mizan Chowdhury became the AL (Mizan) party President and 
made Prof. Yusuf Ali the party GS, being an un-disturbing candidate^^'. Matiur Rahman, 
another candidate for the GS post, became unhappy with it and since then withdrew himself 
from the organizational activities of AL-Mizan^ . Later on, he resigned from the central 
committee of AL-Mizan^^'. In the March 1978 council session Matiur Rahman was the 
aspirant for the GS post of AL; but he was elected one of the Vice President of it. In the 
following days of March-April when Ukil-Mizan faction engaged in intense factional conflict 
with A. Razzaq group on the issue of nominating the WC members of the party, Matiur 
Rahman did the w o r ^ of GS for Ukil-Mizan faction"^. He was aspirant for the AL secretary-
ship since long. For the reason before of these events in 1977 in another time leaving the old 
guards (Mizan group) had joined the pro-BAKSALite Zohra Tajuddin group. However as 
from AL (Mizan) his political ambitions were not fulfilled, he returned to the mainstream AL 
i.e. the AL (Ukil- A. Razzaq). Understanding the futility of remaining in AL (Mizan) a, large 
number of the district/ sub-district level leaders and workers also returned to the mainstream 
AL^'^. As the majority of the followers of Mizan defected to mainstream AL from AL 
(Mizan) naturally an adverse reaction was reflected on it. 
Some of the politically conscious quarters expected that in the opposition contrary 
to one party BAKSAL system believer AL (Ukil-A. Razzaq) and that time autocratic 
government of General Zia, the Mizan Chowdhury led AL would be a secured shelter for the 
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liberal-democratic minded political leaders and workers of AL. But Mizan led AL failed to 
give life to that expectation and belief® '^*. Mizan Chowdhury failed to give dynamism to his 
organization. Definitely it is always very difficult to lead a huge party like AL. The leadership 
of AL (Mizan) extremely/ tenibly failed to maintain/ keep up the workers enthusiasm in party 
activities and their trust on them. On the issue of participating the 1979 parliamentary election 
Mizan's imposing of personal decision over the party and because of not being ready to 
accept the council decision of the student front of AL (Mizan) the crisis in the party reached 
to the peak. As a result the organization'became inactive^^^. In the 1979 parliamentary 
election AL (Mizan) won only two seats out of 300 and received 2.78% of the total votes. On 
the other hand the main stream AL led by Ukil-A. Razzaq returned to the parliament as the 
second biggest political party and largest opposition in the country''^. By this election result it 
was clear to all that the existence of the AL (Mizan) is not for long days. And as the party of 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, A. Malek Ukil - A. Razzaq led AL would be 
established^^^. 
In this frustrating condition of the party many of the leaders were not ready to observe 
the ruin of their won political career by remaining with Mizan Chowdhury. On the other hand 
that time governing party Chief President Ziaur Rahman availed the advantage of this critical 
situation of AL (Mizan); encouraged the frustrated leaders to join the governing party by 
alluring them for different government incentives including the positions in the cabinet of his 
ministry. At the end of 1980 including AL (Mizan) GS Prof Yusuf Ali, Viice presidents-
Sohrab Hossain and Mohammand Mohsin, Labor Secretary Kazi Mozammel, WC member 
Subudh Mitra a large number of party leaders, and a number of former parliamentary 
members joined the governing party BNP. Many of the party workers and supporters also 
followed them '^®. About the joining of this extreme opportunist group of the party, Mizan 
Chowdhury's remark was that, "They betrayed with principle and ideology awfully only to 
fulfill their selfish-interest and for the aspiration of cash benefits"^'^. 
As many of the important leaders defected to BNP, AL (Mizan) held its second 
council meeting on the necessity to fill the vacant positions of the central committee. In the 
contest for GS post Moijuddin Ahmed could not win against youth leader Noore Alam 
Siddiqui. When Noore Alam was elected the party GS an allegation was raised by the anti-
Alam group against Mizan Chowdhury on violating the election rule. On the issue of the 
election of the party GS the party was internally divided into two major faction. The rift 
between the groups was widened prior to the 1981 Presidential election when Mizan-Siddiqui 
group decided to support Nagorik Forum candidate General (ret.) Ataul Gani Usmani, On the 
other hand Farid Gazi-Mohiuddin group preferred to support AL (Ukil-A. Razzaq) candidate 
Dr. Kamal Hossain. When the crack became permanent Moijuddin Ahmed, Mosleh Uddin 
Khan (Habu Miah), the two former student leaders- Abdur Rowf and Khaled Mohammad Ali, 
Dhaka City AL (Mizan) President Mozaffar Hossain Paltu, Dewan Farid Gazi and Mohiuddin 
Ahmed (of Barisal) etc defected from AL (Mizan) and formed a separate party. Dewan Farid 
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Gazi and Mohiuddin Ahmed were elected President and GS respectively of this new AL 
(Gazi). After the defection of the A. Razzaq led BAKSALites from mainstream AL in 1983 
the Farid Gazi led splinter faction of AL (Mizan) merged itself with mainstream AL on 
December 1983. Weekly Roabbar wrote, "As a result of the defection of A. Razzaq group to a 
altemative banner the inclusion of Farid Gazi group in the organization became easy and 
quick. Though it was delayed enough but by their return, the party leadership felt relieved and 
comfortable"^®®. After the defection of Farid Gazi faction from AL (Mizan) it converted into a 
personality-oriented party without significant mass following. Though Mizan Chowdhury had 
not joined the BNP of General Zia but when General Ershad formed Janadal (Peoples Party) 
to consolidate/ make permanent/ secure his governing power through assembling different 
self-seeking political leaders and breakaway party factions, Mizan Chowdhury-Shamsul Huq 
and their remaining fragment of the party joined it^ ®'. hi the following days Mizan 
Chowdhuiy was made PM of the country and the senior Vice President of Ershads Jatia Party, 
hi this way AL (Mizan) was disappeared from the political scenario of Bangladesh. On 2001 
this octogenarian leader returned to his original party AL. Before his return to AL when it was 
asked that if there is any possibility for his coming back to AL, he answered, "Every thing 
return to its own roots" . 
In 1976 a lengthy cold war had began inside the party simultaneously both on the 
question of ideology and leadership. Later on A. Razzaq pledged to carry on the BAKSALite 
second revolution on the whereas hand Mizan group pledged to continue the politics of AL in 
the democratic path as dictated by Shurahwardy and Mujib by root-out the BAKSALites from 
the organization. As a result the long lasting obligatory/ compulsory unity of the party -
which was still remaining intact due to the pressure of the party workers - now broken into 
pieces. Through this breakup of the party the first and most intense internal conflict of AL in 
the post 1976 period was ended. 
Every political party of former East Pakistan and present Bangladesh has sustained 
damage due to the inflating and breakups. In the post 1976 Bangladesh political scenario the 
intensity of the split in different political parties was so strong that as a result all the old 
political parties were divided into pieces. Their political strength was totally exhausted. Only 
one political party which was saved from its total destruction was AL. Although this party 
could not save itself totally form split, but the split could not demolish AL totally, unlike that 
of other parties. Very few of its leaders were defected from it. According to political 
columnist 'Charon' by a sudden gust only one or two leaf was loosed off from a big tree. 
Charon further wrote, "The party which is widely expanded, whose branches are enlarged 
from village to village, the roots of which tree is spread every where a sudden gust will not be 
able to harm it. About these few disconnected leafs some of the AL workers use to say - from 
a banyan free if one or two leaf fall of, then nothing happens to it. Even the big banyan free 
does not feel it. Those who has separated themselves they permanently fell of from the 
political horizon. The separated leaf (from the free) do never get place anywhere"^® .^ The past 
history of AL reveals these truths. In the past, it was seen in different times those left from AL 
for different reasons, in the following days they could not get any big success. On the other 
hand even by loosing the big leaders like A. Salam Khan, Ataur Rahman Khan, Sirajul Alam 
Khan, AL did not feel any loss. Rather, they directly or indirectly sustained loss. Modasser 
Ali wrote, "such prominent leaders like Ataur Rahman Khan, Korban Ali and Shah Moazzem 
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spoiled their whole life by canying the garbage of autocracy"^®'^ . In the same way after the 
recent breakup of AL in Ae following days the leaders of the Mizan group also joined the 
General Zia and General Ershad's government parties and strengthened the hands of 
autocracy. But after their defection from AL, these breakaway people could never establish 
their past glory in Bangladesh politics. In 1981, after two years of the formation of AL 
(Mizan) weekly 'Sachitral Sandhani' remarked, "the present distressed condition of multiply 
divided broken party of Mizan chowdhury witnesses that no one can survive politically for 
long by separating themselves from the main stream AL"^^^ But it is not possible to avoid the 
infighting and split of AL by comparing its loss with other small parties - divided at the same 
time. Or it is not possible to escape by telling only one or two leafs has been fell off and by 
this there will not be any loss. Because it is true that if few leafs of a tree are fallen off, it does 
not feel any harm but if the infighting begins to get control of the roots of the tree, there is a 
possibility that the tree can be uprooted. Now the AL is an organization and not an individual. 
Under the leaership of Sheikh Mujib AL was an individual. Mujib himself was the AL. 
Though there was infighting in AL during that period of Mujib, but that was limited and in 
some cases secret. That infighting could never get strong roots. Such as under the shade of a 
big tree other small trees can not raise their heads, similar to that till Mujib was alive no 
second leader was publicly recognized and infighting could not take place permanently in 
main body AL. However, 'Charan' wrote, "When the big tree was cut down since then the 
small trees, which were beneath the big tree, started raising their heads.... For the first time 
they looked at the unlimited blue sky above them. And started thinking that - why cannot I 
reach to the sky? .... This high ambition, aspiration for power and the expectation to become 
the leader are the main reasons behind the internal conflict of present day AL and other 
political parties"^ ®®. When, after the death of Mujib AL was trying to establish itself under a 
collective leadership, it was seen that everyone wished to become the leader in the absence of 
a universally accepted leadership and no one was considering himself less eligible than others. 
Since there was no any problem to be engaged in leadership competition every one became 
over ambitious. In addition to this tendency of the party leaders some more important factors 
were responsible in the infighting in AL. Before the breakup of the party during the 
continuation of the infighting the ideological difference between the two groups, the 
generation gap between the youth and old-guard leadership and side by side with these things 
the governing regimes encouragement in the infighting etc highly influenced the polarization 
in both sides. All these factors brought this well-organized party towards the final destruction. 
This split of the party was only the beginning of the manifestation of some difficult and 
unsolvable/impenetrable problems of AL. So after the defection of Mizan group the suspicion 
remained persistent that some more division could take place in AL if the problems were not 
solved in near future. 
To save the further division of the party the pre-cautions necessary at that context 
were: (i) It was very urgent to start internal democracy inside the organization, (ii) For the 
interest of the country, society and the people the leadership should realize that they needed to 
be united. They also should avoid the self-seeking tendency and aspiration to become party 
leader, (iii) It was necessary for the party leaders to give up the lust to become ministers or to 
get different government incentives (such as business, bank loans, cash bribe etc), (iv) It was 
necessary for the party to take unanimous pro-people programs to prepare for initiating a issue 
based movement or to contest next coming election by resolving its left-right ideological 
Syed Modasser Ali, "The Uncle Stoiy of AL"; pp. 80-81. 
Weekly Sachitra Sandhani, 11 January 1981; p. 9. 
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differences. And, as the party could not get such type of right decision after the defection of 
Mizan group soon again infighting started in the party. As the party could not prevent it for 
long it could not engage itself in any strong movement to achieve people's right. The 
expectation of the country to have a parliamentary democracy or to begin a democratic 
movement remained hardly possible. Besides as AL and another large political party (BNP) 
leaders could not settle their internal disputes both of the parties were advancing towards 
gloomy future even in the presence of thousands of dedicated and tested workers. Then in this 
situation, to save the two parties from final destruction, both of the party leaders were 
compelled to accept hereditary leadership. Both the party leaders were compelled to obey the 
guidance and command of the newly enrolled students in the school of politics and did not 
have any previous political knowledge. 
Searching for Party Leadership: who will be after Mujib 
The new polarization & dark clouds in the sky of AL: Though many observers hoped that 
after the defection of Mizan group from BAKSALites dominated AL there would be an end of 
factional feud and a clean fashion of politics would be started. But in the presence of Mizan 
Chowdhury the AL was already divided into three internal factions so though Mizan group 
had left the party but conflict inside the pro-BAKSALite AL was inevitable. Moni Singh led 
CPB had intimacy v^th Zohra Tajuddin - Mohiuddin - Salahuddin Yusuf etc so called pure 
BAKSALite leaders of the party - they wished to form a 'revolutionary AL' by ousting the 
opportunist leaders from the party^®'. While A. Malek Ukil, A. Mannan etc were not ready to 
stay together with the extreme BAKSALites. Some more problems were prevailing. Since the 
last council session, after loosing party convener-ship the dejected lady, Zohra Tajuddin, had 
been waging almost a crusade against the party leadership. During the March 1978 council 
session she was an aspirant for the party president-ship. Though she had the support of the 
majority of the councilors during the last council session but Ukil was elected President as a 
compromise candidate to satisfy the warring party groups. She was eager to recapture the 
number one position since then^^^. On the other hand at that time it was veiy difficult for Ukil 
to accept the leadership of Mizan Chowdhury by sacrificing the party President-ship. He was 
not ready to loose the dready achieved AL president-ship. For this reason, though he was well 
known as a liberal democrat, he remained with the BAKSALites dominated AL. On this 
platform he knew that there would not be any compromise with Zohra Tajuddin. Side by side, 
A. Razzaq formed a temporary alliance vwth Zohra Tajuddin but still it was in his mind that in 
the internal polarization of AL he and Mr. Tajuddin's had been totally in opposite poles. Not 
only that in the last days of his politics Bangabandhu also had deserted Tajuddin. hi the 
beginning of 1978 after getting release from imprisonment though A. Razzaq became 
temporaryly active in the same group but as the liberation war time Mujb Bahini leader and a 
close disciple of Bangabandhu there was very less possibility for him to make permanent 
alliance with Zohra Tajuddin. More over Zohra, at that time, was the beginner in AL politics. 
Whereas, politically experienced and ready-minded Ukil, who was more acceptable to the 
moderate section of the party, rapidly agreed to accept BAKS AL programs by leaving his 
former ideology. A. Razzaq then preferred to accept Ukil as his mate in the internal political 
polarization of AL. With this new polarization in AL, the AL President in an interview 
declared that his party had dropped the political programs (not economic and administrative 
programs) of the BAKSAL system^^' in November 1978. The so called pure BAKSALite 
Weekly Bichitra, 18 August 1978; p. 10. 
Weekly Holiday, 19 November 1978. 
For that interview of A. Malek Ukil see Bangladesh Times and Daily Ittefaq, 11 November 1978. 
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elements of the party, who were still in favor to execute full BAKSAL system in Bangladesh, 
viewed that the dominating A. Razzaq-Ukil group turned the party to the rightist course. 
These pure BAKSALite elements, who were connected with the line of that time banned pro-
Soviet CPB and the CPB circle (which took a keen interest in the politics of AL) itself also 
seemed to be very dissatisfied with the present leadership and planned to oust both Ukil and 
A. Razzaq in the next coming special council session scheduled to be held on 24 and 25 
November 1978. They also tried to persuade party's Organizing Secretary Tofael Ahmed, the 
second popular leader in the party after A. Razzaq, in their favor though without success. 
Zohra at that time was their presidential candidate^'". But the planning of Zohra and the pro-
Soviet pure BAKSALites was proved futile, as their group was not enjoying the support of the 
workers. Moreover, by disobeying the party decision when Barrister Amirul Islam, one of the 
dominant AL leader and Tajuddin's disciple, and two other pro-Zohra leaders were contesting 
the 1979 parliamentary elections as independent candidates they were ousted by the party 
decision^ . 
After the defection of Mizan Chowdhury, A. Razzaq rapidly strengthened his position 
in the party. It was said that near about total leaders and workers of the party assembled under 
his leadership^^^. Due to his organizing skill and capability, the party was slowly regaining 
some of its old strength and fame. In the parliamentary election held in February 1979 in a 
hostile environment and imder adverse opposition from the government party and all other 
opposition parties AL (Ukil-A. Razzaq) won 39 seats out of 300 and 23% of the total votes 
casted. Comparing to mainstream AL (Ukil-A. Razzaq), AL (Mizan) won only two seats and 
2.8% of the total votes^^^. Other parties, emerged due to the deviation of AL strength, could 
not win any seat. Had the party was not broken muhiply certainly there would be considerable 
increase in the number of seats in the parliamentary elections. AL was slowly but steadily 
regaining its old mass-bases. Golam Aqbar Chowdhury wrote, "Under the leadership of A. 
Malek Ukil and A. Razzaq, day by day, AL was becoming well-organized and stronger"^ '^*. 
Later, weekly Holiday also witnessed that in 1978-81 A. Razzaq regrouped and reorganized 
the party^^ .^ But still the party was far from such organizational strength which could bring/ 
cany it to the governing power. 
After the defection of Mizan group AL was getting dynamism with new initiative. 
When all the opposition political parties were broken into pieces, and practically there was no 
opposition party except AL many of the opposition leaders, who were not ready to join the 
governing party BNP for different reasons but were trying to divert the politics in the correct 
democratic path, started joining the only organized opposition party AL. Meanwhile, the CPB 
of Moni Singh realized that their purpose could not be served by Zohra Tajuddin and they 
changed their old policy of antagonizing A. Razzaq. Moni Singh personally knew one thing 
that in 1972 after the defection of Sirajul Alam Khan and his youth radical followers from AL 
(now in 1979) only A. Razzaq was only popular and capable organizer who could lead the 
party towards socialist stream. So, by irritating their old friend Zohra Tajuddin. they 
reconciled their relation vwth A. Razzaq group. Since then the CPB connection in AL was 
Holiday, 19 November 1978. It should be mentioned here that A. Razzaq never gave up BAKSAL ideology 
till 1992. During 1979-80 he was just only propagating that he abandoned the political party of BAKSAL 
system. 
Bangladesh Observer, 29 January 1979. 
Weekly Bichitra, 12 August 1983. 
Bangladesh Tiems, 19 Februaiy and 9 March 1979. 
Golam Akbar Chowdhury, Politics of Bangladesh and the Role of Awami League; p. 21. 
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working for A. Razzaq^® .^ In the parliamentary election all the recognized leaders including 
Ukil, A. Razzaq, Zohra and Tofael were defeated. In their absence a triangular contest took 
place among the contesting factions to elect the party's parliamentary wing leader, while the 
party GS A. Razzaq was backing pro-communist theoretician Mohiuddin Ahmed, the Jubo 
(youth) League (JL) and Zohra Tajuddin, senior Vice President of AL, were in favor of 
Asaduzzaman Khan - a former AL Parliamentary Party leader in the East Pakistan Provincial 
Assembly. Zohra Tajuddin's support for Khan, instead of pro-CPB leader Mohiuddin Ahmed, 
was a new development within the party. The JL's opposition to A. Razzaq was reported to be 
due to the decision of Shiekh Moni group in the youth wing to oppose A. Razzaq - who was a 
rival of their late leader. On the other hand, Ukil, the AL President suggested the name of his 
old friend Mollah Jalal Uddin as a compromise candidate^^^. Finally Asaduzzaman and 
Mohiuddin were elected as leader and deputy leader of the ALPP. 
Rift in A.Razzaq-Tofael Alliance: Realizing the dominant position of A. Razzaq, CPB, step 
by step, put its full weight in favor of him. The pro-Moscow group in AL including 
Mohiuddin Ahmed, A. Samad Azad, Ali Aksad and Khondoker Ilyas sided wdth A. Razzaq. In 
this peripd Prof Mozaffar, the leader of the front line party of CPB, was supporting the cause 
of General Ziaur Rahman and his policies by leaving his previous socialist course. He was 
also strongly criticizing secular socialism and AL both^^^. His self-seeking and opportunist 
politics created rift in NAP (Muzaffar)^'^. Finally, in December 1979, Maita Chowdhury, 
Organizing Secretary of the NAP (M) and nine other central leaders, who were the believer of 
BAKSAL program by leaving NAP, joined AL. In their joining ceremony A.Razzaq said, 
"Those who believed in BAKSAL have united the banner of AL. they will unitedly struggle 
to implement BAKSAL program in the country"''°°. In the same meeting, Matia said that they 
would put their might to implement their ideals of Bangabandhu. Matia in an interview also 
said, "When Bangabandhu formed BAKSAL government, I was the central committee 
member of BAKSAL. Then in 1976 when the political parties were reviving NAP leader Prof. 
Mozaffar Ahmed had diverted towards Ziaur Rahman. During those days, for those, who 
believed in democratic practice, and were determined to save democratic ideology, NAP was 
no more suitable. For them, joining the AL was natural'^ ®^ This entrance of Matia group in AL 
was seen by different observers with different angles. Weekly Bichitra observed, "The CPB of 
Moni Sing has come forward to help the Moscow-Delhi leaning leader A. Razzaq with an 
intension to strengthen their lobby. By showing an excuse of infighting in NAP (Muzaffar) 
from Muzaffar NAP ... Matia Chowdhury, Monaem Sarkar etc leaders finally infiltrated in 
the AL. One section of AL leaders alleged that CPB and its associate NAP member's 
infiltration has been continued in AL since 1966"'^ ° .^ These leaders also alleged that prior to 
this infiltration, A. Samad Azad, Mohiuddin Ahmed etc pure BAKSALite leaders penetrated 
in the party from NAP. Weekly Roabbar wrote, "The pro-Moscow parties are always 
following AL like its shadow. ... The policy to work by infiltrating in other parties, probably 
the leftists, accepted this as a part of their strategy. But even many of the AL workers and 
silent-supporters became confiased on it. Matia Chowdhury - Mohiuddin etc were probably 
Interview with Yahya Chowdhury Pintu. 
Daily Desh Bangia, 19 March 1979. 
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engaged in Awami BAKSAL as the part of communist strategy""*® .^ Because of their 
following of confused policy in 1971 and as a result of government repression by different 
governing regimes since 1972, though the leftists sacrificed maximum but thir success in 
politics was negligible. When by involving in politics for a long time did not get success then 
they loosed their patience. Because of the absence of eligible leadership and engagement in 
internal infighting, many of them already left politics. Following opportunist policies some of 
the fortune seeking leaders during 1976-81 had joined the BNP and during 1984-90 joined 
Jatia Party (JP). Among the prominent leftist leaders who joined BNP were Captain Abdul 
Halim, Mirza Golam Hafiz, Oli Ahad, Enayetullah Khan etc. On the other hand among the 
prominent who joined JP were: Kazi Zafar Ahmed, Anwar Jahid, Sirajul Hossain Khan etc'*"'*. 
Thus, according to the interview of Matia Chowdhury one section of pro-Moscow leftists 
infiltrated in AL to survive in the politics as well as to direct the party in the real democratic 
way. Probably, they thought that by entering the AL they would convert the democratic AL 
into a socialist AL; they would use this mass support based AL as their mass organization for 
the future powerful socialist movements. But when in the following days when AL abandoned 
socialist principles to survive in politics they also had to abandon their socialist ideology. 
When in 1979 a large section of NAP (Muzaffar) and CPB workers and leaders joined AL, A. 
Razzaq became more powerful inside the party. But, the moderate democrats' party leaders 
identified this joining of socialist elements in AL as infiltration and expressed their 
dissatisfaction by their joining. Zohra Tajuddin, Zillur Rahman, Tofael Ahmed etc were not 
even present at the Matia groups joining fimction'"'^ Specially Tofael Ahmed and A. Mannan 
were very much critical at their joining But party President Ukil, who was well known as 
liberal democrat leader, welcomed the communist in AL. 
The infiltration of a good number of leaders in AL opened a new chapter of conflict in 
the party. Since the joining of these pro-Moscow leaders in AL strengthened the pro-Moscow 
lobby of AL - who were supporting A. Razzaq, so discontent developed among the old AL 
leaders. They were suspicious on the activities of the pro-Moscow leaders in the party, and 
started believing that the pro-Moscow group was going to get total control over the party by 
influencing A. Razzaq. In February 1980 by forming new committee the pro-Moscow group 
got total control over the AL's peasant wing Krishak League'^"'. The discontent further 
widened in the old Awami Leaguers when the pro-Moscow group established total control 
over the two other front organizations - Bangabandhu Parishad and Mukjoddha Sanghati 
Parishad''®^. Since long A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed remained strategic partners in AL 
politics and Sheikh Mujib had been instrumental in getting the two together as the counter-
weight to Sheikh Moni though previously Zohra Tajuddin had been proved unsuccessful in 
her long-lasting effort to create rift between the two but now Tofael showed his displeasure in 
the growing strength of the pro-Moscow group. Tofael also feh that by confirming the 
domination of pro-Moscow group A. Razzaq was building his own personal leadership in 
AL"*'®. If A. Razzaq became the only leader of the party his political aspiration would be in 
jeopardize. So he went against A. Razzaq. Those pro-democrat old-guard leaders, who 
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previously did not join Mizan Chowdhurys new party in 1978, rather remained in AL but due 
to the mighty dominance of the BAKSALites had been remained silent, now joined Tofael 
and increased his strength. Among of them A. Mannan, Zaliirul Kaium, Salahuddin Yusuf, 
Mollah Jalal Uddin etc were prominent. Though Ukil was among the liberal democrats but by 
observing the domination of pro-Moscow group sided himself with them''". The relation 
between A. Razzaq and Tofael became strained. It was clear that this conflict between the two 
would last long as Tofael was somewhat pro-American while A. Razzaq was clearly pro-
Soviet. The former was also believed to be in favor of treating the BAKSAL concept as dead 
issue and was not at all keen on any fresh alliance with old BAKSALites''*^. In this situation, 
after living in foreign coimtries for long the pro-US leader of AL, Dr. Kamal Hossain returned 
to Bangladesh and became active in party politics. Dr. Kamal's re-engagement in party 
politics was a boast to Tofael's strength. Excepting Kamal-Zohra etc one section of the 
capitalist group of the country, led by prominent businessman Abidur Rahman, was also 
backing Tofael Ahmed'** .^ In this new development it was a surprise to all that pro-communist 
Zohra was sided with Tofael and liberal democrat Ukil sided with socialist A. Razzaq. This 
strange marriage of opposite ideologies which usually not possible but politics has a way to 
make strange bed partners on convenience. Internal division also started taking place in the 
district units of the party''*''. For the first time in the biennial council session of Dhaka City 
unit AL both the groups were engaged in show down their respective strength'"^. A. Razzaq 
was supporting his old ally Mohd. Hanif. Tofael group was defeated badly. Dr. Moazzem the 
former GS, who was supported by Tofael Ahmed, lost his old position and with the feeling of 
deprivation resigned from AL'"^. Following him some of his followers also resigned from 
different lower bodies of Dhaka City unit of AL'"^. A. Razzaq group strengthened its position 
by installing its own men on the important posts of Dhaka City AL 
In the biennial council session of Dhaka City unit of AL the party chief announced, 
"We have decided to have a major operation against those who criticize Bangabandhu and 
BAKSAL program". He lashed out at those who did not believe in BAKSAL but kept the 
portrait of Bangabandhu on their chest and observed his birth and death armiversaries. He 
said, "They are worse than BNP Jammat and ML"'"^. Actually by his provocative speech he 
indirectly attacked newly emerged strong Tofael group. Now in the changed situation Zohra 
Tajuddin, who sided with Tofael by leaving her pro-CPB track, in an attacking speech told 
that the implementation of BAKSAL program would not be possible under the present party 
leadership. The implementation of program would be possible only through a strong and 
disciplined cadre. She criticized the party leadership for failing to deliver the goods. She said, 
the government was still in power because of the vascillary attitude of the party leadership. 
Contradicting the Vice President Zohra, in the same seminar A. Razzaq said that BAKSAL 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981; pp. 23-24. As a result of this new polarization Ukil lost his old friends 
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was only alternative for the establishment of an exploitation free society'^ ^". In another 
meeting, referring to the role of Ukil just immediate after the fall of Mujib, Zohra asked the 
party workers - how Ukil could remain in the leadership of the party. She also made an open 
call at the meeting to overthrow that time party leadership"* '^. 
Reasons behind the recent differences in AL: Both of the group leaders at the beginning 
were not ready to say that the new polarization, which took place in the party centering A. 
Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed, was due to the ideological difference. Rather different political 
scholars mentioned it a personal enmity between the two party leaders to establish their 
authority over the party. 'Holiday' wrote, "The difference however seem to be more a matter 
of a personality clash than they have any definite political or ideological overtone. Both the 
groups have been strongly airing their total commitment to BAKSALism"''^^. In an interview 
to 'Holiday' AL Vice-President and one of the stalwart of A. Razzaq group Mohiuddin 
Ahmed said, "There may be some differences at the personal level only, since the party is 
united over the political and ideological questions""^ . According to Tofael Ahmed the 
question of political and ideological differences did not arise as all leaders and workers of the 
party were adherent to BAKSALism. But he admitted the fact of personality clashes in the 
organization. Not mentioning the name of A. Razzaq he said that if any body tried to promote 
the personality cult he would simply isolate himself from the workers'*^''. In an interview he 
also said that in those days he was working for collective leadership instead of individual/ 
personalistic leadership in the party. He maintained that the workers of the organization did 
not belong to any individual because they were all followers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman''^^. 
One of the party source said the weekly 'Holiday', "The faction opposed to the present A. 
Malek- A. Razzaq leadership resents that A. Malek and A. Razzaq are the stooges of the 
USSR and under complete control of Moscovite elements who have infiltrated in large 
numbers into the AL both during the Mujib time and later"*^ ®. A prominent AL leader Abdul 
Latif Siddiqui, who was in jail published a booklet for distribution at the AL council meeting. 
In this booklet he hit out at the central leaders of the party for their divisive activities to reap 
personal benefits. He also discussed in detail the nature of the factionalism in the party''^'. 
According to Mostafa Mohsin Montu, "At the beginning there was no difference between A. 
Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed. The conflict first surfaced between the followers of the two. 
During the 1978 council session Tofael bhai (brother) was imprisoned. During that stage the 
men of A. Razzaq bhai were controlling total politics of AL. The men of Tofael bhai were 
very few in number in the controlling position of the main body AL and its ancillary/ fi-ont 
organizations. After the coming out of Tofail bhai from jail his men took initiative to 
strengthen their positions. As a result in different places of the party difference was 
developed"^^®. According to AL Presidium member Dr. Mohammad Selim, "It was a internal 
conflict of the two in their endeavor of strengthening both of their personal power/ influence 
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in the party"''^^ According to Harunur Rashid MP, "When quiet a good number of NAP and 
CPB leaders joined AL and controlled some of its associate organizations, a section of AL 
leaders and workers felt that their position in the party was threatened because of the influx of 
outsiders. By the leadership of Tofael Ahmed they alleged that party secretary was favoring 
the newcomer, pro-Moscow elements, at the cost of the dedicated and original AL workers. It 
created factional feud in AL""*^ ". And weekly 'Bichitra' wrote, " The main reason of the 
internal conflict and grouping was not as much of ideological rather it was more of 
personality oriented.... Maximum of the central committee leaders and former ministers were 
believing themselves the President of the party. About half a dozen leaders were strongly 
expressing their confidence for their respective eligibility as the party General Secretaiy and 
always their high ambition inflicted tensions over all of them"'^ ^ . Apart from these reasons 
many believed behind that the internal feud of the party government machineries were also 
responsible. A former student leaders who was then in AL told weekly 'Holiday' that the 
government was trying to engineer a split in the ortanization through the instrumentality of a 
central intelligence department''^^. According to some newspapers, the Tofael-Zohra faction 
also openly charged Ukil and A. Razzaq with clluding with BNP government. They had also 
campaigned in the party circle that both the President and GS had taken favors from President 
Zia and hence deliberately tried to halt any move by the party to go for a mass movement 
against the government. On the other hand the A. Razzaq-Ukil group branded Zohra Tajuddin 
and Tofael as conspirators to destroy the party at the behest of imperialist forces'^ ^^. While the 
AL leaders were telling that the governing elements of the country were working to create 
rifts inside the party, even some anti-AL Medias like 'Holiday' also published an article on 
government party's initiative for collecting some selected opposition leaders by creating rift 
in the parties'^ '^*. By observing the activities of a quarter of the press AL President and GS also 
told that some newspapers of the country were trying hard to break the party into pieces''^^. 
They told that the press was motivated and misleading and was fed by interested quarters. 
They appealed to the party workers not to be misled by 'such wild propaganda' of that type of 
newspapers'*^^. According to all these observations it can be said that the causes of this 
factional feud were many. Such as: (a) High ambition of the top-brass AL leaders to ftilfill 
their aspirations. These old-guard leaders knew that if the two popular leaders A. Razzaq and 
Tofael remained united they would be in nowhere of the party. So they created rift between 
the two, in a planned way; (b) The tendency of the two head of the conflicting groups to 
confirm their own future leadership in AL; (c) The joining of CPB and NAP (M) elements in 
AL and their getting control over some associate organizations of AL which created anxiety 
among some of the deprived old AL leaders; (d) The differences were more personal than 
ideological; (e) The governments tendency to create rift in opposition to we^en the 
opposition movement and to collect popular leaders for government party; and (f) Finally the 
wild propaganda of anti-AL press was also responsible for spreading the factional conflict at 
the lower level in a violent way. 
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The disorderly situation in the AL before the 1981 council session of AL: In this tense 
situation, the date of the party national council session was fixed on 3 March 1980. Keeping 
an eye on the party's national council schedule, both group leaders started confronting each 
other. To assert their respective supremacy among the councilors in the forth coming national 
council both groups were tiying to strengften their support in the lower level units of the 
party by including their own faction members in different district committees or by excluding 
the vocal and radical opposition faction members from the reconstructed committees. In this 
way, the difference which already had surfaced central leadership that spread to the whole AL 
body, during the reconstruction of the AL committees at the lower level. The large workers 
group and district/ sub-district level leaders of the AL were divided under the leadership of A. 
Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed. 
Following the regular practive/ custom, when the district/ sub-district level biermial 
council sessions were taking place before the national council session, the lower level rival 
leaders' comments and counter comments opposing one another and both groups' endeavor to 
have control over the district/ sub-district committees brought the infighting in the open. In 
different district units the internal feud between the two groups was so intense that situation 
turned into open hand-to-hand skirmish. As a result when district/ sub-district level council 
sessions were taking place reports of hand-to-hand skirmish were also regularly coming from 
different district/ sub-district level council sessions. At many places, because of hand-to-hand 
skirmish started in the council venues at the beginning of the council sessions the meetings 
were postponed. Many district councils could not held due to the difference between the two 
groups. In many districts though council sessions were held but the local leaders could not 
reconstruct new committees due the rivalry between them.''^^. In many of the organizational 
districts of the party parallel committees were formed. As for example: during the biermial 
council session of the Chittagong (north) organizational district AL, even the party GS A. 
Razzaq was not allowed to address it. Zohra Tajuddin and Tofael Ahmed addressed the 
councilors highlighting the failure of the leadership of Ukil-A. Razzaq'^^l However with the 
blessing of Tofael- Zohra a new committee, dominated by Tofael group leaders, was elected 
in the council meeting. But A. Razzaq rejected it and at his initiative afterward another 
parallel committee was formed''^^. Due to hand-to-hand fighting between the two groups the 
Rajshahi District AL conference was postponed indefinitely'^ ''®. Following it on 5 January 
1981 in Narayangonj district AL council meeting'''^', and on 8 January in Chittagong City AL 
council''''^ hand to hand skirmish took place between the conflicting groups and several AL 
workers were wounded in these clashes. These district unit council meetings were disrupted. 
Because of similar violent internal clash many more district unit councils were disrupted. As a 
result of a clash between the two groups of AL Naril district AL conference was not only 
postponed, even A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed, the two main faction leaders, were escorted by 
police to take safe shelter'* . On 31 January even in the presence of A. Razzaq when the main 
council venue (Press Club) of Chittagong district AL was surrounded by the armed cadres of 
A. Razzaq group, the Tofael group could not reach there to attend the council meeting. They 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 Febmaiy 1981. Also Dainik Desh, 4 September 1980. Some district level committees of 
the organization including Kustia, Chittagong, Narayangonj and Rajshahi could not hold their conference as a 
result of factionalism at the centre. 
Weekly Holiday, 7 September 1980. 
Weekly Holiday, 5 October 1980. 
Ganakantha, 8 October 1980. 
Ittefaq, 6 January 1981. Also see weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981, p. 21. 
Dainik Desh, 9 January 1981. 
Dainik Desh, 7 June 1980. 
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arranged separate council session at J.M. Sen Hall. As a result two separate district 
committees for Chittagong (south) unit were formed'''^''. In this way due to the inability of the 
party caucus to reconcile their differences and delaying of reorganizing the district units the 
conflict between the two groups became more violent. Due to this crisis in AL, its national 
council session was postponed again and again. Since March 1980, after changing the dates 
for four time finally it was scheduled on 14 February 1981in the midst of a heavily hostile 
and conflicting environment 
The council date for BAL was fixed as 14 February but due to intense tension between 
the two groups no one was certain whether council session would really be held on time. 
Finally, on 11 January 1981, the hand to hand factional clash - which already spread in the 
district units, also affected the party's central committee. When the party leaders were 
engaged in serious discussion a group of pro-Tofael Youth League and Student League 
members led by M.M. Montu entered the party office and charged the party GS that he was 
misusing the party's General Secretary post for his personal business purposes. Montu and 
others called him a money maker. They also termed him as 'Dubai wala'. As in those days A. 
Razzaq was fi-equently visiting some Arab countries for business trip'^ "^ they chanted slogans 
'Manpoer Businessman - leave the party of Bangabandhu' and demolished the party office. 
They also violently attacked the A. Razzq group leaders by which Syed Ahmed (Office 
Secretary), Rahmat Ali (GS of Awami BCrishak League) and Hasimuddin Pahari (GS of Dhaka 
district AL) were injured. S.M. Yusuf, the Education and Cultural Secretary of AL, was 
injured seriously and was hospatilized''''^. Since then the leaders were so worried about their 
safety that for six days they did not visit the party's central office'^ '*^ 
Since the beginning though three groups' presence was visible in this factional conflict 
but as A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed - these tow popular leaders of two main groups were 
enjoying the workers confidence - centering/ sorounding these two leaders all the lower level 
party leaders and workers polarized together into two major factions. Mean while Zohra 
Tajuddin established herself as the second person of Tofael group, just after Tofael Ahmed. 
The mentionable leaders of the third group were Korban Ali, Sageda Chowdhury, Zillur 
Rahman, Ivey Rahman etc. As the third group leaders understood that virtually their 
popularity in the lower level was nearly nil they remained silent in this hurly-burly between 
the major tow factions for many days. Just before the council session they broke their long 
silence and declared their open support for Tofael group. 
After the 1978 council session though Zohra was contemplating herself as the 
alternative President of the party but before the 1981 council session she could not remain as 
the only President nominee of Tofael group. In the political game when Tofael tilted towards 
Bangladesh Observer, 3 February 1981. 
The different dates of the council session of AL, previously declared by AL CWC, were 3 March, June, 3 
November, 23 December of 1980 and 14 February 1981. See weekly Bichitra, 13 February 981, p. 20. 
Prior to this incident dainik 'Desh' commented on A. Razzaq's visit of Arab countries, "Politically A. 
Razzaq is a strong critic of Saudi Arabia and the Sheikh dominated Middle Eastern countries. He always 
associates USA, China, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia with the events of 15 August and the blue-print for Mujib 
murder. Thus his sudden visit to these countries has caused adverse comments in the AL circle". The daily also 
wrote that A. Razzaq's visit to Arab countries provided the Tofael group opportunities to criticize him (See 
Dainik Desh, 10 January 1981). 
Bangladesh Observer, 12 August 1981. A. Razzaq retaliated of this attack on 31 January in Chittagong 
(South) unit AL council session. There S.M. Yusuf was also present with A. Razzaq. At there presence heavily 
armed A. Razzaq group cadres did not allow Tofael group to attain the district AL council (See Bangladesh 
Observer, 3 Februaiy 1981). 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 Februaiy 1981; p. 26. 
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Dr. Kamal, Zohra showed her anger on Tofael's attitude. According to Zohra Tajuddin Dr. 
Kamal suddenly returned to the party and usurped her position, depriving her from her right -
really that is true. The AL family knew that Dr. Kamal was having cordial relation with 
Sheikh Mujib's two daughters, who had been survived from the 1975 military cue. After the 
death of Mujib Kamal took care of them just like their guardian; extended all types of help. 
Because of the tense internal feud within the party many of the party members started 
thinking about the elder daughter of Mujib i.e. S. Hasina"'''^. Due to the personal relation of 
Dr. Kamal with Mujib-daughter Hasina any one of both A.Razzaq and Tofael group could not 
avoid his presence. During 1975-80 Kamal was living abroad. For this reason his name was 
not present even in the central WC. But prior to the 1981 council session he emerged as one 
of the dominant figure of the party. His arbitration role in the infighting of the party also 
increased his dignity in some extent. Moreover just before the council session to reduce the 
difference between the conflicting groups a collective leadership formula draft composed - he 
was the architect of it. But still one group of Tofael group believed that as for long Dr. Kamal 
was out of the country it would be difficult for him to gear up the activities of the party. Their 
argument in favor of Zohra Tajuddin was that she successfully shepherded the party during its 
most crucial time. However Dr. Kamal and Zohra both were likely to offer themselves as the 
candidates of Tofael group'^ ^°. As already Tofael and Dr. Kamal were known to have their 
pro-American leaning some newspapers started mentioning them as the pro-US elements in 
Razzaq was the moving spirit of the A. Razzaq group. Mohiuddin, A. Samad Azad, 
Khondoker Ilyas, Abdul Momin Talukder etc well-known figures were with him. Moreover 
by the leadership of Matia Chowdhury of NAP (M) and Mazharul Islam of CPB a large 
number of leaders and workers influx/ entered the party and strengthen his hands. At the 
beginning Dr. Kamal gained esteem from both the major conflicting groups but as he was 
tilted towards Tofael group, he rapidly lost the support of A. Razzaq. As a result Ukil 
remained the presidential nominee of A. Razzaq group. A. Razzaq also contemplated that in 
future if there was any need to change the presidential candidate even then - why Dr. Kamal; 
rather A. Samad Azad was more acceptable to A. Razzaq. According to him in the hard days 
of the party at least Azad would be remaining with the party (he would not go abroad by 
leaving it) - in the old days Dr. Kamal could not demonstrate that. More over Azad was a 
leftist, ideologically close to A. Razzaq. According to weekly Bichitra because of the hurried 
support of Tofael, Dr. Kamal had to suffer a considerable loss in factional politics. A. Razzaq 
had gone against him'*^ .^ 
During his performance as AL GS in some cases A. Razzaq was criticized but still he 
was enjoying maximum workers support. He was the most powerftal person in the party. After 
the 1978 council session by creating personal cadre-group rapidly he accumulated impressive 
strength behind him. During the holding up of different district council sessions and 
reconstruction of district committees he succeeded to strengthen his support base by getting 
elected his men as the party councilors and delegates in a planned way and no one else could 
manage it. A. Razzaq group was able to set their men in 68 to 70% of the councilors and 
Meanwhile when in 1980 and January 1981 the infighting of the party turned to the bitter condition and rift 
was developed on the question of elect the party chief in that time to avoid the further division some of the party 
leaders started contemplation to install Mujib-daughter Sheiidi Hasina as the party leader, see Syed Modasser 
Ali, Uncle Story in Awami League, p. 81. 
Weekly Holiday, 11 Januaiy 981. 
Daily Ittefaq, 23 Januaiy 1981. 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981; p. 35. 
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delegates posts'^ ^ .^ A. Razzaq was the GS candidate and bccause of appraisable organizational 
capability there was a strong rumor that he would remain on the GS post. 
Targeting the council session day by day, the intensity of the crisis inside the party 
was increasing. Following the violent incidents of Chittagong, Dhaka and other places of the 
country on 29 December 1981, the two conflicting groups involved in a violent clash in front 
of the central party office, in which six persons were injured. During the clash the supporters 
of Tofael group shouted slogans against the party GS. Where as A. Razzaq group supporters 
were demanding the expulsion of M.M. Montu and Manik Chowdhury, the two prominent 
youth leaders of the party - who were involved in the physical assault on some central AL 
leaders on 11 January. However because of the violent clash, the ongoing WC meeting of that 
day was hindered. The party caucus had to shift their meeting venue in an unidentified 
place'^ '^*. Later it was toown that the secret venue was the house of Dr. Kamal Hossain. In 
that meeting the WC accepted a resolution, decided to serve show-cause notice on six 
members of the student and youth wdng of the party, including Manik and Montu. According 
to A. Razzaq group the decision of the WC was unanimous, while Tofael group propagated 
that that was a ruling of A. Malek Ukil'*^^ After the adjournment of the meeting on that day 
the AL WC was practically divided into two parts. 
In this strained situation between the groups, at first A. Razzaq group in their separate 
meeting took the initiative to divide the party. In that meeting they analyzed the situation and 
contemplated that now the time is matured to overthrow Tofael group from the party. At the 
end of this meeting to provide future leadership to the AL a probable WC panel was also 
formed where many of the Tofael group leaders' names including Tofael Ahmed was 
dropped. Responding to this initiative of A. Razzaq group a counter committee was also 
formed where many of the A. Razzaq group leaders, including A. Razzaq, were not 
included'^ ^^. The situation was so tense that, when a rumor spread in Dhaka on 17 January 
evening that Tofael Ahmed and some others has been suspended, the two feuding groups 
immediately engaged in conflict. Few crackers were also exploded in front of the party 
office'*^'. In this situation many said that the division of the party already completed and only 
the declaration of the division was awaiting'^ ^ .^ 
One of the greatest achievements of any successftil political leader during his political 
career is his organized followers group. Like all other politicians AL leaders did have their 
own disciples. In the past it was always seen that the infighting of the main-body AL always 
influenced the associate organizations as those organizations were being run by the growing 
future leaders of the party - who were some how the followers of influential leaders of main-
body AL. The case of 1979-81 was no more different from that of the past histories of that of 
the associate organizations of AL. Like the main-body AL the associate organizations 
including the student, youth, labor and women wings also faced un-ceremonial vertical split 
since long"*^ .^ 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 Febmary 1981; p. 35. 
Bangladesh Observer, 30 January 1981. 
Daily Ittefaq, 1 February 1981. Also see weekly Holiday, 1 February 1981. For more related information also 
see Bangladesh Observer, 2 February 1981. 
^^^ Weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981; pp. 23 & 26. 
Dainik Deshm 18 January 1981. Also Bangladesh Times, 19 January 1981. 
It should be mentioned here that in September 1980 the AL Parliamentary Party was already factionally 
divided. Even the MP's loyal to Tofael group tried to remove Mohiuddin Ahmed, one of the stalwart of A. 
Razzaq group, form the office of the Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament (for this see weekly 
Holiday, 7 September 1980). 
Holiday, 7 September 1980. 
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One of the main associate organizations of AL Bangladesh Chatra (Student's) League 
(BCL) had been divided into A. Razzaq and Tofael groups due to factional feud since the 
defection of Mizan group from AL in August 1978'' . Since 1978 the conflicting groups 
could not participate united in any meeting or procession. The difference between the two 
groups was so bitter that only a formal declaration for the division was needed. Though in the 
Dhaka University Students Union election the BCL was able to provide a single panel but to 
contest the Hall committee elections the main two conflicting groups of BCL nominated 
counter panels. Some of the Hall Unions were won by Obaidul Kader group that was blessed 
by Tofael Ahmed. In the DUCSU election both the BCL candidates Obaidul Kader and 
Bahlul Maznun Chunnu contested in the Vice President and General Secretary posts 
respectively, but both were defeated. After the election Obaidul Kader group alleged that the 
followers of Chunnu did not give vote for Kader. On this issue hand-to-hand scuffle took 
place between the groups. It should be mentioned here that BCL President Kader was backed 
by Tofael Ahmed while GS Chunnu was loyal to A. Razzaq. Kader was strong in Dhaka 
University campus, the controlling point pf Bangladeshi student politics. He was stronger 
because he was getting support of the private army of Montu, Mohan, Ataur and Awranga -
the pro-Tofael youth leaders, who were powerful in those areas. The conflict in the BCL to a 
large extent was because of ideological reasons. Kader used to propagate that imprudent, 
ultra-revolutionary and opportunist section of the organization had to be ousted from the 
organization. According to him the intruders were trying to divert the party from its real track. 
On the other hand the speech of Chunnu was that: the enemies of progress had to be ousted 
from the party. Following the centre, the district/ sub-district committees of the BCL were 
also divided. Even in the student union elections of different unimportant colleges in the semi 
towns of the country the rival factions of BCL were nominating counter panels to contest''^'. 
Despite repeated efforts the leaders were failed to come out with a single panel during Chatra 
League's national conference held in Dhaka University campus in 1980. Finally the AL 
leaders, as a compromise solution, had allowed the sitting President and GS to continue the 
organizational activities'*^^. Both the groups came to a violent clash on 4 September where fire 
arms were freely used and several persons received grievous injury'*® .^ 
Following the BCL the youth wing of the party Bangladesh Jubo League (BJL) was 
also divided into two groups. Amir Hossain Amu, the BJL President, was supporting Tofael 
group and the BJL Secretary Fakir A. Razzaq belonged to A. Razzaq group. Though it was 
decided that BJL national congress/ council would take place on 4 February but it was 
postponed to avoid a showdown between the two warring factions before the AL coimcil 
session"^ ®''. Like the students and youth wing the women and lobor wing of AL was also 
drowned in factonal feud'^ ^^ hi this extreme situation of AL weekly Bichitra wrote, "Only 
ceremonial declaration of the party's breakup remained to declare"'*^^. 
The long-standing infighting between the two popular leaders created deep confusion 
as well as frustration in the party's working force. Since 1976 the party, due to leaderships 
engagement in bitter infighting and splits, could not go for any effective mass movement. 
Weely Bichitra, 18 August 1978; p. 9. 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981; pp. 31-32. 
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Hasanuzzaman wrote, "Opposition movement against Zia regime suffered a setback as bitter 
schism developed w i^thin the ranks of major opposition parties due to differences in ideology, 
leadership, national and international alignment etc"'*® .^ He further wrote, "Factionalism 
created burrows in the body of opposition where mutual differences, jealousies and 
confusions dwelt and made the opposition weak from within"''^^. Unhappy supporters of the 
AL were not ready to listen to demagogic speech only without any pro-people party program 
and successful mass movement. So the party was loosing its appeal. Many started telling that 
the AL was going to accept the same pathetic fait of ML. It was going to be a divided and 
sub-divided moribund organization. Especially those parties, groups and individuals who 
suffered terrible jolt and death due to the emergence and high g"owth of the national party AL 
during 1949-73 showed their happiness by observing the miserable infighting of the party. 
The ruling BNP which was expecting tuff competition from AL was also glad by feeling the 
poor futxire of AL. They observed that AL was exhausted. It might survive some more days 
by getting inspiration fi-om its past history but was going to face the same fate of divided and 
sub-divided ML. According to them the AL was unable to satisfy the demand of the time''^ ®. 
The workers and supporters were astounded, disappointed and some of them also were 
fhistrated for their political future. According to 'Holiday' at this time, on the verge of 
collapse of AL, the BNP hierarchy had assigned a number of their leaders to contact some 
selected popular but fhistrated leaders'*^®. Weekly Khabar wrote, "A leading member of the 
ruling party was reported to have prepared a budget of Taka 50 million to bring about a 
division inside AL Hasanuzzaman wrote, "When opposition struggled to regain strength 
and counted too much on alliances. General Zia planned to tamper with their efforts through a 
policy of divide and rule and distribution of patronages and benefits. Zia's meddling tactics 
greatly encouraged factionalism and intra-party feuds in the opposition camp'^'^. So when the 
infighting surfaced even from the lower units of AL, to save their political career, many of the 
fhistrated district/ sub-district AL leaders joined BNP. Many of the loosing faction leaders of 
district and sub-district units joined BNP by leaving their dear party - with which they had 
been attached during their student life and in the past had devoted all their youthful energy 
and sprits to build it up'*'^ . BNP's recruitment was increased by this shrewd tactics of General 
Zia. 
Many were predicting a sorrowful breakup of the party as the feud between the groups 
was sharpening day by day'* . But since 3 February 1981 the situation turned to a positive 
mood when all-out efforts from different comer started to overcome the crisis. Daily Sangbad 
wrote, "The party workers have, in the midst of various crisis, kept the organization running/ 
active in the last few years. If the leaders have failed the workers have not. . . rather they have 
shown the leaders the path. These workers want unity, not a division in the party"''^^ Weekly 
Bichitra wrote facing international pressure or (authoritarian) council A. Razzaq group agreed 
A.M. Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 99. 
^^Ibid. ,p. 99. 
Political Column: Choturanga (Political games), Daily Ittefaq, 4 February 1981. 
Holiday, 10 September 1980. 
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For some examples of AL cadres defecting to BNP see POT Bangladesh, 8 August 1980; p. 1418; Weekly 
Holiday, 10 August 1980; Bangladesh Observer, 2 November 980; POT Bangladesh, 6 January 1981, p. 21; 
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p. 34. 
Bangladesh Oserver, 30 January 1981; Also weekly Roabbar, 5 July 1981, p. 10. 
Political column, "Darshak (Spectator^, daily Sangbad, 7 Februaiy 1981. 
to come to a compromising solution'*'^. According to Bangladesh Observer, "... the elderly 
top notches of the party are making all-out efforts for a consensus in choosing the leadership 
... they are meeting every day to avert a show-down at the council session. They believe that 
the crisis will be overcome" . Bangladesh Times observed that the party leaders were trying 
in a bid to keep the warring factions of the party together"^ ^®. There were some more reasons 
those diluted the bitterness between the leaders of the two groups: (i) A. Razzaq group was 
internationally following pro-Moscow socialist line-up but religious Bangladeshi Muslim 
masses felt that it was an un-Islamic ideology. They had strong resentment against Russian 
communism. Since 1937 from the beginning of electoral politics in Bangladesh, excepting 
1986 and 1991 elections"*^ ,^ the communists could not secure a single seat in the parliamentary 
elections. A. Razzaq was afraid that if AL was going to be totally controlled by the pro-
Moscow socialist it might loss a large number of workers and supporters'^ ^®, (ii) Like all the 
good organizers A. Razzaq is always simple and honest in his words and activities. He is easy 
to reach. He told, "In this conflicting world-society we should tiy for peace and harmony. I 
believe on imity of masses - if not possible in all issues, in minimum ftmdamental issues to 
develop the country. He also said, "A good organizer is comparable to a mother. Baby bites 
mother, slaps her and even in every moment annoys her. But mother tolerates the baby with 
smiling face. She knows when the baby will be matured enough he will not do it'* '^. A. 
Razzaq, that time GS, was a genuine organizer and though he had big ideological difference 
with Tofael since 1960s they maintained cordial personal relations. In this tense internal 
situation of the party there was no communication between the groups after 29 January for 
three days. Facing party workers and international pressure A. Razzaq group - the more 
powerful section of the party, against its will - agreed to have a joint meeting to find out a 
compromising solution, to keep the two warring factions together'*^^. 
The top notes of the party were trying to keep the party together by accommodating 
President and GS from two warring group. As both Ukil and A. Razzaq were belonged to the 
same lobby there was a possibility that one had to quit his present party position for 
accommodating either President or GS from Tofael group. A consensus was built-up in the 
party that the party GS A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed, the Organizing Secretary, the main 
protagonists of the two rival factions would retain their present incumbent positions. In this 
case Ukil would have to quit to accommodate/ in favor of either Dr. Kamal or Zohra 
Tajuddin"*® .^ But Dr. Kamal had better possibility to be the compromising candidate for 
presidential-post because of his high connection with Mujib-daughters and India. Ukil, by 
realizing his vulnerable position in this new development, just some days before of the 
council session, by little bit deviating from his old pro-A. Razzaq lobby (but not by leaving it) 
also came close to the Tofael group and to the old-guard leaders (his old friends) - many of 
whom were still in the party. By cWging his politics a little, he was trying to maintain a 
middle course, was trying to get sympathy of his old friends. He was trying to become the 
compromise candidate like that of 1978 council session. He was trying to contest for the 
Weekly Bichitra, 13 February 1981; p. 26. 
Bangladesh Observer, 4 February 1981. 
Bangladesh Times, 4 February 1981. 
In 1986 and 1991 elections the CPB won 5 seats each. But that was not because of its own strength. Rather 
by making alliance with AL and by contesting the election with accepting AL's election symbol 'Boat' they won 
those seats. 
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Presidential post as also the representatives of the old guard AL leaders (who were 
representing Tofael group) instead of the sole nominee of A.Razzaq group. The supporters of 
A. Razzaq were meanwhile stepped-up their maneuvers to retain the incumbent President and 
Secretary of the party. In this situation Dr. Kamal was not ready to stain his image by 
becoming the president nominee of the minority group. So he (Kamal) met Ukil on 7 
February and declared his support for Ukil in the presence of A. Razzaq and A. Samad 
Azad'* '^*. Though Dr. Kamal conveyed his support for Ukil but he had a secret plan, a secret 
mission - which would be open on 16 February, in the last day of the coming council session. 
In a bid to cover the widening schism in AL both groups in this meeting agreed to 
accept the collective leadership formula - which was a widely discussed agenda in AL family. 
By accepting it, the party was deviated from its traditional unitary/ individual and strong 
leadership. As the collective leadership formula was going to provide bigger say of every 
presidium member in running the party affairs by reducing the president's power, the political 
observers believed that the crisis was over'^ ^ .^ Dr. Kamal, also toown as the country's topmost 
barrister, was entrusted with a task of preparing a scheme for the presidium'*^®. Finally, the 
party leaders were agreed to a proposal of a constitutional sub-committee to have an all-
powerful 12-member Presidium and 12-member secretariat. The proposed constitutional 
amendment contained that: (i) The GS and the treasurer of the party would be ex-officio 
members of the Presidium; (ii) The post of the chairman of the party would be rotating among 
the members of the Presidium; (iii) The leaders were also agreed to have a working committee 
in the centre; and (iv) The Presidium, it would act as party politburo'*^'. The central WC in an 
extended meeting decided that the proposed constitutional amendment would be presented in 
the council session to get approval of the councilors''^^ 
The background behind the invitation of Sheikh Hasina in AL politics: Since 1976 
because of the continuous constrain of leadership feud and ideological difference the party 
was gradually weakening. The party, in the last five years had been wandering in a confused 
and aimless track. It could not build up any program or issue based movement. To warm up 
the party workers it observed few sudden general strikes, seize (Gheraw), procession and 
meeting etc activities. The party workers were passing the days in frustration. Under the 
leadership of Maulana Bhasani, Hossani Sahid Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujib repeatedly it 
had faced factional conflicts but as the party was leading by these gigantic/ charismatic 
personalities, it was able to overcome the crisis. The post 1976 backdrop was, however, 
different i.e. in the absence of such unanimous/ unitary leadership all were trying to be the 
leader, all the top party leaders were trying to impose their chosen flmda/ doctrine over the 
party. The mass based nationalist party AL, a conglomeration of the believers of centrist and 
different moderate ideological views - which had been built up by a 30 years strenuous effort. 
Some were trying to make it an ideology based political party - that was totally impossible. 
On one side, as the party was under the control of some BAKSALite leaders it could not 
abandoned the BAKSAL ideology, on the other hand as discontent was visible in the masses 
the party was afraid to propagate the BAKSAL program among them. The leaders, however, 
continuously said, "In the changing situation we believe on parliamentary democracy". 
Because of confusion and infighting v^thin the party from 1976 it could not declare any 
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planned pro-people party program, and could not build up any pro-people or anti-government 
movement. There was no hope that the continuous infighting in the organization was going to 
be ended. Because of the personal charisma of the dead leader Mujb and the leading role of 
the AL, in the liberation war and in all other preceding nationalist movement a huge 
supporters and workers' group grew up. Even in 1981, a significant part of this support base 
was with the party. Moreover, in the post independent Bangladesh politics, as any alternative 
pro-people political party did not emerge and could not provide effective challenge to the 
party, any large collapse in its huge public support did not take palace. Even then, some 
prominent leaders' endeavor to establish their personal domination in the party and because of 
the ideological difference among the party leaders and workers, multiple divisions took place 
in the party. Many leaders & workers defected from the party and the party strength was 
eroded. Even then the infighting did not reduce; rather it intensified day-by-day. The 
government party, other rightist parties and the newspapers controlled by them also 
intensified their activities to demolish AL. In this situation the party leaders and workers, who 
loved the party without any self interest, contemplated that - how the AL can maintain its 
existence and accelerate its support base in the midst of these multiple crisis. To unite the 
frustrated workers' force and support base, and to regain its old political spirit, at this moment 
there was a need to create a wide appeal in the masses. According to one section of that time 
Awami Leaguers: Sheikh Hasina, the survived eldest daughter of Bangabandhu, was 
considered appropriate to create that appeal. Depending on this contemplation a section of the 
well-wishers of the party took initiative to bring back 'S. Hasina' the daughter of the 
undisputed leader Mujib - on whose name the party was still surviving. By the proper use of 
different propaganda medias and wall-writings, they strengthened the demand of Mujib-
daughter Hasina's come back to Bangladesh . Probably, behind this initiative, one kind of 
logic was working that being the Mujib-daughter, Hasina was more acceptable to AL workers 
and leaders than any other politicians. But, at the beginning, she did not show any enthusiasm 
to become an AL leader"^ ^®. However, because of the pressure of different national and Indian 
lobbies, she agreed to become the party chief before the council session. 
There was another lobby inside senior AL leadership, who also were working for 
Mujib-daughter Hasina, The prominent figures in this pro-Indian lobby were: Dr. Kamal, 
Sajeda Chowdhuiy, Zillur Rahman, Korban Ali etc. Due to the failure of AL leadership to 
reconcile thir differences, the AL's friends in India, that time PM Indira Ghandi, noticed the 
danger signal of disunity and division within the very first postponement of the AL council 
session. From them the Indian lobby engaged themselves to keep the party together and to 
make fertile the AL organization to put Shikh Hasina on top of it"*''. By this, the Indo-westem 
lobby wanted to re-establish their supremacy over the AL through reducing the influence of 
pro-Moscow group'*^ .^ To execute their blueprint the pro-Indian group, in AL, intruded in the 
Tofael group and strengthened it. Keeping even Tofael in dark, they silently kept continue 
there activities. Targeting the national council of the party when the lower unit councils were 
taking place in those days they raised the demand to bring back Mujib-daughter in the country 
through their public speeches and statements in newspapers. In the party's central WC 
meeting prominent party leader Sajeda Chowdhury told the central leaders to take the moral 
responsibilities to bring back the two orphan daughter of Mujib. But the party leaders showed 
their helplessness to bring back the Mujib daughters by showing their inability to take the 
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responsibility of their security"^^. As the frequent discussion was going on about the Mujib-
daughters, the top leaders of the party became alert on this issue. Though during 1975 to 1978 
the AL leaders had not taken any information about Mujib-daughters' well being, who were 
leaving in foreign countries for long, but since the end of 1979 the prominent leaders of the 
party including Ukil and A. Razzaq started making contact with them, visited them in 
Delhi'* '^'. A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed knew very well that as the daughters of Mujib they 
would have wide influence over the AL family. On the other hand, in these days, S. Hasina's 
attitude was not satisfactory towards the AL leaders. She lost faith from the AL leaders for 
various reasons. On this affair weekly Bichitra wrote, "Till 1978 no AL leaders maintained 
any contact with them Mujib's daughters. Even did not inquire about: how they are surviving. 
Even they don't prefer extensive campaign on the issue of their come back to the country". 
Bichirta further wrote, "Hasina preserves a veiy ill attitude/ view towards the present party 
President. Whatever he commented in London in 1975 about the death of Mujib is still in 
Hasina's memory. In the talking Hasina frequently says: what a sorrow, those who have 
enjoyed at the death of Bangabandhu (now a day) they are the leaders of AL. About Abdur 
Razzaq-Tofael she tells the same. What have they done in 19 August (19975). They had 
abundant powers in their hand. The Voluntary force was in one's hand and the other one was 
controlling the paramilitary force (Rakkhi BaJaini). About Mohiuddin, Hasina says: those who 
killed Bangabandhu by going to Moscow in their (Mustaq) tenure Mohiuddin have witnessed 
vindicating the innocence of them""*^ .^ However the pro-Indo-Western lobby was also active 
in seizing political advantage through engaging Mujib-daughter in active politics. They could 
not get any big success in the primary level of their activities. So they were waiting for a 
suitable time and they availed that chance in the last day of 1981 national council session of 
AL. 
The 1981 council session, the emergence of hereditary leadership and the structural 
change in AL central committees: The three-day long biennial council session of the party 
began on 14 February 1981. In the first day of the council session during the presentation of 
General Secretary's report A. Razzaq confessed that the recent internal skirmish and disorder 
of the party tarnished its image in a large extent. Tofael invited the councilors to elect new 
leadership in the light of the latest happening''^^. Though on electing the GS there were no 
such serious difficulties but the AL leaders failed to reach a concensus to elect a new 
President even in a lengthy two days (14 and 15 February) discussion. Dr. Kamal Hossain, A. 
Malek Ukil, A. Samad Azad, Zohra Tajuddin and Sheikh A. Aziz were the aspirants for 
presidential post. At the beginning, the councilors demanded to elect the party leader through 
the unanimity of the top party leaders not through direct votes of the councilors. When the 
conflicting groups coulod not come to a unanimous decision by reducing their difference in 
the question of electing the new President, the councillors pressurized the leaders that the 
party chief will be elected through ballot'^^l As the preparation of electing the party leader A. 
Razzaq group workers also engaged in strong campaigning in favor of their candidate'*^^. 
Since January 1981 they had stepped-up their maneuvers/ activities to retain the incumbent 
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President and General Secretary of the party"*® .^ During the council session the activities of a 
foreign embassy (the reference obviously was to the Indian High Commission office) was also 
visible in the outside the council venue . Even in the afternoon of 16 February, the party 
could not reach to any unanimous decision. Confined in the midst of the slogans of the two 
conflicting group-workers, since 14 February, the councilors were bewildered. Many workers 
and leaders were afraid that the party was going to be divided^®'. 
Meanwhile in these hectic days, probably Kamal convinced Tofael that S. Hasinas 
nomination as the party's presidential candidate could be the best alternative for the loosing 
Tofael group to block the A. Razzaq group's bid for capturing the AL leadership. On 16 
February morning S. Hasina who was living in Delhi, through telephone conversation with 
Kamal and Tofael gave her consent to fight for the post of party President. This was kept a 
close-guarded secret till the evening as they were waiting for the right time to propose the 
name. Dr. Kamal at afternoon said to the journalists, "We will have a surprise belying/ 
beyond all expectations"^®^. He, in the mean time, withdrew his name from the party 
presidential candidature. In the evening, in the meeting of selected party leaders, by an abrupt 
change of strategy of Tofael group, Dr. Kamal proposed the name of their late leader's 
daughter S. Hasina as the next president. It took both A. Razzaq and Ukil by surprise. A. 
Razzaq was the dominant leader of the party. He thought he needed some one who would be 
pliable and loyal to him as the party chief^ . Ukil was expecting to be re-elected for the next 
term as AL president. They were not ready to loose their current status quo. But though, they 
did not like the idea they, could not dare to oppose Hasina's name directly fi-om party's 
president-ship because it was on Mujib's image that the politics and popularity of the party 
still based. They tried to oppose Hasina's entrance in the party by raising some questions^ : 
(i) Hasina, only 32 years old daughter of Mujib was too young and immature to head the party 
and (ii) According to the party constitution the party-President had to declare the names of 
party WC. How could that be possible by Mujib-daughter as still she was living in New Delhi 
etc. Meanwhile facing opposition fi-om A. Razzaq group, according to Dr. Kamal's advice 
Sheikh Selim (MP) (cousin of Hasina), Sajeda Chwodhury and Korban Ali circulated the 
name of S. Hasina as the President candidate among the councilors at the conference venue 
and also at the party office^"^. This made all the calculations of political observers' topsy-
turvy. It was clear that despite the sudden appearance of this name, it carried with it a clear 
indication firom AL councilors that they were unanimously with Hasina. These old faithftil 
workers and cadres by exerting and pulling their pressures on the conflicting leadership 
almost dictated a compulsion of unity^°^. Though, since 14 February A. Razzaq group was 
controlling the council venue, but after the declaration of Mujib-daughter's name in the 
evening, they lost their supremacy sharply. The previous loosing faction headed by Tofael 
Ahmed became dominant over A. Razzaq group by their sudden tactical change. Even the 
majority councilors of A. Razzaq group were favoring Hasina as the party chief for two 
reasons: (i) they had very deep emotional tie with the late leader Mujibs name and (ii) when a 
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frantic search went on to look for a compromise candidate, the councilors and delegates felt 
that Hasina's election as party chief would keep the AL into one piece. Since evening Tofael 
group supporters had been in control of the council venue, vice versa the dishearten A. 
Razzaq group supporters activities' were noticeably near absent^ ® .^ It was indicative of a pro-
right nationalist swing among the councilors. Then it was difficult for A. Razzaq group to 
ignore Mujib-daughter and was left with no choice but to accept her. However Sheikh Hasina 
Wajed, eldest daughter of late Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was away from the country for 
the last eight years and A. Razzaq the incumbent GS were unanimously elected President and 
GS by the councilors. Hasina, who was still living in Delhi, elected President in absentia. 
After being elected as the President of AL, in an interview to BBC, Hasina describe 
her election as an expression of respect and affection for Bangabandhu. To express her 
political expediency she said, "Politics is in my blood - 1 have been in the midst of hectic 
political atmosphere since my birth.... I was a Chatra League worker in my college and 
university days"^°®. In another interview to AFP she said that she would demand the trial of 
her father's assassinations. She also added, "Besides demanding the trial of my father's killer, 
my next important job will be to unify the party"^"'. 
The election of Hasina as AL president brought mixed reaction from different comers. 
AL workers and supporters were happy as they were having Mujib-daughter with them. It 
roused hope among them that the party was saved from further destruction. Welcoming the 
'unanimous election' of S. Hasina in absentia, the pro-AL weekly 'Khabar' pointed out "It 
will not be enough for S. Hasina to only return to her country. She would have to take-up the 
leadership of the party and the nation" . The former AL leader (already ousted from the 
party) and former Trade minister commented, "As a possible solution to preserve the unity of 
the party S. Hasina has been elected the party President. I believe if she is getting help of 
other leaders of the party she will be successful in the politics"^". Bangladesh Chatra League, 
one of the front organizations of AL, by welcoming the election of S. Hasina said that her 
election had roused hopes among the leaders and workers of the AL and BCL activists. 
Similar views had also been expressed by the leaders of various front organizations^'^. 
According to 'Dainik Desh' it was not clear that despite the sudden appearance of the name of 
Mujib-daughter, it carried a clear indication that the p a ^ was going to regain its strong 
supporters groups and soon it would be engaged in anti-government mass-movement^' . 
Before her election as the party President S. Hasina was not even a member of AL. 
She was living far from politics as a house wife of a nuclear scientist, was having two 
children. Her acceptance of the AL president-ship perplexed many including the politicians 
and political observers. The weekly New Nation called the election of Hasina 'a political stunt 
unheard of in the history of a mass organization' and said, "Such a measure of expediency 
was accepted by the councilors just to keep the party in one piece, but how far this measure 
will serve its purpose is very much in doubt"^''^. Ruling party BNP Finance Minister Saifur 
Rahman said the BAKSALites were split over the party leadership and failing in their search 
for a leader, they had elected a young lady without any political experience who had been 
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staying abroad from several years^'^ The weekly 'Ittehad' by identifying the AL as a 'stooge' 
of India claimed, "We know that Indira Gandhi herself held the trump card. This trump card is 
Sheikh Mujib's daughter Sheikh Hasina - who is under her protection". It further wrote that 
after many defections in AL India came to the conclusion that the division within the AL 
could not be tolerated any more. When the situation further deteriorated with the open 
physical assaults in various places over the questions of AL leadership the Indian diplomatic 
mission in Dhaka became active. To avert fiuther breakup of the party Indira Gandhi decided 
to use the trump card she had. She put up Sheikh Hasina on the top of the AL throu^ a 
nocturnal game of the local diplomatic mission with the help of Kamal and Tofael^ . 
'Holiday' remarked that since her childhood Hasina had opportimity enough to watch the 
national politics from the door of her father's drawing room. Like an irmocent child she also 
witnessed many coming and going of rising stars as well as setting suns of the party hierarchy. 
Then the periodical remarked, "Beyond the fact that she is a child of a great political leader, 
her political career is hardly countable. Her adult life so far covered the period of her 
completion of university studies and early marriage^Daily Sangram remarked, "The 
formation of the committee with Mujib-daughter S. Hasina as President has made it possible 
to temporarily bandage the huge crack in the AL organization"^'^. Ganatantrik (Democratic) 
Party President Nurul Huq Mizan said, "Hasina was elected President of AL on the advice of 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi"^Weekly Roabbar wrote, "Since Hasina is accepted as the symbol of 
unity of the party probably the AL workers have felt relief. Probably the old guard leaders felt 
relief from anxiety. But.. . many persons believe it is happened because the AL leaders are 
directed by emotions instead of logic, by heart instead of intelligence. But can only emotion 
be the guiding force of a party like AL . In another edition weekly Roabbar commented, 
"The nomination of Sheikh Hasina as the party leader has proved the leadership crisis in AL. 
Actually the leadership conflict before the last council has converted the party into two 
conflicting armory/ munitions store.... In this situation by observing that the party leadership 
is going out of control, one of the conflicting groups proposed the name of Sheikh Hasina as 
the party leader; by observing no alternative means the other group also has bowed down (to 
it)" . The former AL and that time prominent politician Ataur Rahman Khan said, "From 
this time council session it becomes clear that the condition of AL is miserable. AL has to 
elect the daughter of Sheikh Mujib the party leader - who does not have any political 
background. The party reached to the final stage of bankruptcy""^. The editorial of one 
Kolkata daily wrote that in those days BAL was so much divided on the question of 
leadership that its workers were not at all ready to accept any one as the imdisputed leader. It 
was because of this by the initiative of a section of AL leaders led by D. Kamal, Shiekh 
Hasina was elected the AL President. It further said that the election of Hasina as AL 
President was a dangerous mistake. That was a suicidal step because after her father's death 
till the date of her election, she did not visit her own country. Then it commented, "The ruling 
BNP, the principal rival of AL will take full advantage of this situation and will get a unique 
opportunity for going in political campaign to portray Hasina as a bird sheltered under the 
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wings of Mrs. Gandhi if not a spy""^ Through Hasina elected as the party President 
hereditary leadership was initiated in AL politics. The former AL leader M.M. Montu 
commented, "If the supporters of A. Razzaq bhai and Tofael bhai could not engage in 
factional feud among themselves in those days then the AL and country politics of present 
would be different" . By the entrance of Sheikh Hasina as AL leader in Bangladesh Politics 
the dynastic politics was started. About it Hasina commented, "If you are unable to provide 
leader-ship and I have to accept it then why shall I answer for it? By creating leadership you 
get back the leadership responsibility. I did not come to take over the leadership - not to take 
over power. I have come to serve the masses"^^^ It is true by electing the inexperienced 
Mujib-daughter like India National Congress in India, and Pakistan Peoples Party in Pakistan 
AL had started a hereditary politics in Bangladesh - but when already a large number of AL 
workers and supporters by leaving the party either became neutral or joined the government 
party and the party was engaged in intence infighting - in this situation to retain AL into one 
piece and to save the party from ftirther loss of support base, this change was needed. Many 
comented that by leaving democratic process to elect the party leader AL party elites imposed 
a dynastic leadership in its top which only opened the bankruptcy of the AL leadership. But in 
a third world country like Bangladesh where in 1980s still more than 85% of the voters were 
living in rural areas - most of whom were totally ignorant about democratic practice and were 
habituated of following the dynastic leader-ship, even when the city dwellers (who were 
comparatively more educated) still could not forget their obedience to dynastic leader-ship 
and the village politics was any how controlled by the modified feudal leaders - in that 
society desiring full democratic practice in a mass based political party's internal activities 
only would be the exaggeration of expectation. During 1976-80 in the absence of any 
authoritarian leader, the practicing of democracy to elect the party leader proved futile and 
only created chaos and conflict in its party fold from top to bottom. Not only AL, the other 
opposition political parties divided and sub-divided in the absence of such type of all 
powerful universally popular authoritarian leader and his personalistic appeal. The main 
reasons behind the conflicts and splits in AL were: (a) Still institutionally democratic practice 
could not take place in Bangladesh society; (b) Due to their lacking of personal faith on 
democratic principles, the highly aspirant AL leaders by ignoring majority opinion inside the 
party forum were engaged in factional conflict - though they were propagating democracy for 
the masses; (c) Though they were propagating that they wanted to establish the government of 
the people but by ignoring public opinion the majority AL leaders were suggesting a 
authoritarian one party rule - to which majority masses already had shown their strong 
abhorrence; (d) the absence of an popular leader with strong personal appeal; (e) The 
governing regime was engaged in conspiracy to divide the opposition political parties into 
pieces etc. However in the absence of any strong political group the progress of democracy 
could be halted for an uncertain period. The military rule in the country could last long. Even 
in the absence of any strong pressure group - such as civil society, business group, lawyers 
group, or other professional groups - public right in the country could jeopardize severely. 
There was possibility in Bangladesh that military rule might be a permanent phenomenon like 
that of Pakistan after the death of Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan. So for the survival of 
remaining democratic practice of Bangladesh there was a desperate need of some mass based 
political parties. For the survival of AL with its strong entity, to save the party from further 
destruction and to regain its old mass support base there was a need to create an appeal in the 
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party workers and masses. Mujib-daughter, Hasina's acceptance of the AL leader-ship created 
that enormous appeal among tliem^ '^'. 
The council session aJso elected a party Presidium and Secrctui iut. The electcd 
members of the Presidium were A. Maiek Ukil, Zohra Tajuddin, Korban AH, Abdul Mannan, 
Abdus Samad Azad, Phani Bhushan Majumdar, Mohiuddin Ahmed, Zillur Rahman, A. 
Momen Talukdar and Dr. Kamal Hossain. The GS of the party was clccted as the ex-officio 
member of the 12-member Presidium. Sheikh Hasina was elected the permanent chairman of 
the Presidium and it was decided till Hasina come back to Bangladesh, Ukil would be the 
Acting-President. Tofael was re-elected party's Organizing Secretary. Dr. Kamal and Sajeda 
Chowdhuiy were rewarded heavily for their deeds. Kamal was elected Presidium member and 
Sajeda the first Joint Secretary of the party"'. Subsequently other 27 members of the WC 
were nominated by the Presidium and Secretariat"^ According to the newly amended 
constitution the Presidium and Secretariat was responsible to the WC^^ .^ The councilors 
empowered the party WC to elect the Parliamentary Board"®. 
To save the party from further division many were telling that the highest power to 
steer the organization, which was centralized in the hand of President, should be transferred to 
the collective leadership. To prevent A. Razzaq's bid to establish his authoritarian grip on the 
party Tofael group also demanded to switch over a Presidium where the President and 
Secretary would become figurehead"'. So by amending the constitution this Presidium was 
formed accommodating the senior-dominant leaders of the party and the all-powerful 
President's power were transferred to the Presidium's hand and that all of the members 
together might share that. Outgoing party President Ukil said, "After the death of Mujib we all 
are workers. The workers will lead the party"'^^. But about the effectiveness of the Presidium 
weekly Roabbar commented, "According to the definition of political science AL is a petty-
bourgeois political party. That means the masses from all stratimi of the country can be its 
members. As AL is not a cadre-based disciplined political party like that of CPB or Jammat e 
Islami, the collective leadership system instead of providing goods can be harmful for the 
party""^ Weekly Bichitra also expressed its doubtfulness about the success of the collective 
leadership of AL. It wrote, "There is lot of suspicion whether collective leadership is suitable 
to AL. Because AL was flourished under the individual leadership. AL is a mass based 
political party not disciplined party like that of CPB or Jammat e Islami. So if the disunity and 
conflict continues, collective leadership can turn to harmfiil instead of providing goods. And 
that conflict will be remaining in AL". Then the weekly wrote - in present, the origins of all 
the factionalism are ideological, personality and international lobbies conflicts^^"*. 
The biennial council meeting of AL endorsed a seven point program for future course 
of action. The program included the demand for the trial of those responsible for the killing of 
Mujib and other leaders. The program reiterated the party's firm stand to establish 
'democracy of the exploited people' through a drastic overhaul of the colonial administrative 
system on the lines chartered out by Bangabandhu. The program stated that AL would fight 
for the introduction of democratic legal system through a drastic change in the existing legal 
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system. The establishment of tribunals in each thana (upo-jila) would be the party's objective. 
It stated that the party would make relentless efforts to re-establish the values of the liberation 
war and the 'four state principles of nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism'. The 
party promised for a socialist economy. It called for a compulsory multi-purpose rural 
cooperatives and steady efforts for faster industrialization . 
All the political observers said that Hasina's election was an outcome of a compromise 
formula to maintain party unity. Hasina also stressed in an interview that one of her most 
important job would be to unify the party"^. But it was seen the election of Sheikh Hasina as 
party president and other Presidium members through the collective leadership formula 
brought euphoria for the rightist nationalist force. Reasons of their happiness were discussed 
in different journals. Daily Azad remarked, "Although the two rival factions in the AL 
appeared to be happy at the proposal to make Sheikh Hasina the party Chairman, one of the 
factions was seen to have been psychologically affected.... The election of S. Hasina will 
ultimately benefit the long-existing anti-Soviet group in AL"^^ .^ We should mention here that 
the main aid of S. Hasina was Dr. Kamal, a rightist politician and those other worked for 
Hasina such as Sajeda, Zillur, Korban, the young yurks like: Amu, Montu and Selim etc - all 
were believers of liberal democracy. Weekly Holiday remarked, "Kamal Hossain can 
reasonably hope that in the beginning Hasina will act like his political protege. He will play 
the role of a mentor and the uncle of the new AL chief^^^. No doubt there were other uncles of 
Hasina standing in the sideline to greed their beloved nice but Hasina at the beginning saw 
Kamal-Tofael group as his ally. At least for the time being either she would be controlled by 
them or she would hear them. Moreover according to New Nation when the new members of 
the Presidium and Secretariat elected during the council session it showed that the pro-
nationalist and democratic lobby emerged with a clear edge in the Presidium and while on the 
Secretariat too they almost went up to half and half^ ^®. It should be mentioned here that 
though A. Razzaq tried hard but the pro-Moscow Matia group, infiltrated in the organization 
in 1979 were deprived from getting any position in the AL leadership structure '^'®. The daily 
'Sangram' wrote, "From the result of the elections in AL, it speared that the nationalist 
forces have been able to reassert their influence in the party"^^\ So in this council session the 
nationalist force regained their control over party leader-ship by regaining the loosing ground 
of pro-BAKSAL group. The new development also reconfirmed the masses that the AL was 
still a party of the nationalist democrats, not a party of those who dedicated themselves to 
establish socialist rule in the country, though a large number of democrats already left the 
party due to the ideological conflict on "whether the party will follow the program of socialist 
- one party BAKSAL system or multi-party democracy". The development also manifested 
that though Hasina was elected as a compromise candidate the difference between the groups 
was not wiped out rather they tried to consolidate their factional strength and though they 
ceased their open conflict temporarily but they were waiting for the return of Mujib-daughter. 
Both groups were expecting favor from her. Whether the irmer difference would be remained 
in the party or there would be a unity among the conflicting groups - it was largely depending 
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on her leadership capability and how she was going to handle the conflicting issues of the 
groups for which factionalism was prevailing in the party. 
Sheikh Hasina was a new conimer in AL politics. Before her election as the party 
leader she was not even a member of the AL. More over for eight years she was living far 
from Bangladesh politics, in abroad as a house wife of a nuclear scientist, was having two 
children. Though she was the daughter of a great political leader even her father never thought 
to make her a politician. Her past political career was hardly coimtable. She had only one 
quality that she was the daughter of Sheikh Mujib, besides she had no other eligibility to be 
the leader of AL. Animekh wrote, "When did Hasina Sheikh envolved with AL politics, no 
one knows. She is not known as a political personality. She is known as a housewife having 
no relation with politics. Except she was known as the daughter of Mujib she did not have any 
other identity. In Mujib's absence his daughter will do politics - Mujib never dreamed it. 
Facing the internal conflict AL made Mrs. Hasina Sheikh the party President by following a 
patch-up formula and prevented the split for the time being but no body knows for how many 
days it will be effective"^^^? As Hasina was totally inexperienced and was living far from 
politics many were doubtful about her leadership capability. Even one newspaper wrote that 
the election of Hasina as party leader was a suicidal step done by AL '^'^ . When many were 
doubtful about her leadership capability Hasina needed to prove the fiitility of others 
misjudgment on her by establishing her real control over her party and secondly AL also 
needed to create a positive image of S. Hasina by building many pro-people mass movement 
under her leadership^'^. 
Because of its irmer conflict when AL was showing its inability to accept any pro-
people party program and could not initiate any popular mass movement - in spite of having a 
huge dedicated workers force; moreover due to the anti-AL propaganda of the government, 
right wing and pro-China leftist parties when the popularity was reducing day by day - in that 
situation, to turn up the popularity in its favor and to survive in political arena, AL party 
needed a leader who would have lot of appeal among the masses. In this situation in 1981 
council session of AL Hasina was elected party President. Her acceptance of party leadership 
created an enormous emotional appeal. On 17 May Sheikh Hasina returned Bangladesh, 
received a tumultuous welcome. In that day to welcome Mujib-daughter 15 lakh people 
gathered in Dhaka airport ignoring heavy rain fall and stormy weather^''^. Kazi Jawad wrote, 
"The huge public gathering in the airport gave her a dignified position in the political arena 
(of Bangladesh)"^ He further wrote that after taking over the responsibility of AL her main 
task was to reduce the factional infighting of the party. At the begiiming he was getting some 
success in her work. Some auspicious sign became visible in building unity among the leaders 
of AL. Moudud Ahmed wrote, "With the return from exile of Hasina, the daughter of the 
founding father of the nation, the party gained a new incentive and momentum"^'*'. But 
meanwhile a big political change took place in the coimtry by the assassination of President 
Zia. 
The governing Zia regime was composed of basically two components: (i) The ruling 
BNP party which was established in 1978 and (ii) the military elites. The ruling party BNP 
was the assembling centre of mainly opportunist politicians who joined the party by leaving 
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their old one. These political elites of BNP had only one similarity tliat they were loyal to 
BNP Chairman and ex-military general President Zia as he was the centre of all political 
power. Otherwise they were divided into many factions on various issues since the inception 
of the party. The inner conflict of the party reached its climax on 1981 '^'®. On the other hand 
since independence, Bangladesh Army, another power sharer in the regime, was too much 
politicized and factionally divided institution. To retain his position undisturbed Zia already 
distributed different kind of incentives to the military leaders. Even many military leaders 
were merged in his ministry but he could not satisfy the army. Meanwhile Zia realized that 
militaiy rule would not be acceptable to the Bangladesh people and to share power with army 
meant a continuation of military rule '^'^ . Sensing the public demand Zia decided to keep the 
army away from politics and concentrated to develop his political party BNP. The more Zia 
was moving towards the people for support, the more unhappy the army became^^®. Zia was 
pressed to ban the BNP and other political parties, to dissolve the parliament and declare 
Martial Law in the country. But he was not ready to agree with army demand^^'. Meanwhile 
Zia went to Chittagone (second largest city of Bangladesh) to resolve a factional dispute. In 
there, two senior member of his government were feuding for leadership. Some of the 
resented army officer took the advantage of Zia's coming to Chittagong and Zia was brutally 
killed there on 30 May 1981^". 
At the death of President Zia the total political situation of the country was changed. A 
new presidential election was held. Dr. Kamal Hossain, another new spirit of AL, was the 
presidential candidate of AL. During the election campaign AL asked for a referendum in 
favor of a parliamentary system of government^". Thousands of people gathered at the AL 
meeting to hear the speech of Mujib-daughter. This election campaign strengthened the 
leadership of Hasina over her party. Since then it became clear that Hasina is one of the 
permanent names among the few dominant political personalities of Bangladesh^ '^*. 
During 1949 to71 the politics of AL was the politics for the masses of the country. 
Their politics and movements of that time were towards the masses. The Bengali nationalist 
party AL engaged in movements to achieve the demand of the survival of the masses. The 
skilled leaders, emerged through the Pakistan movement (during the British rule), provided 
the leadership of the movements. Especially after 1963 there was no mentionable infighting 
within the party. Probably because of these reasons, they had wide public relation. By an 
effective use of every thing the party made the impossible task to a possible: in 1969 by a 
successftil mass upheaval the party ousted the autocratic Ayub regime, in the 1970 election 
AL achieved a total victory, in 1971 successfully led Bengali's liberation movement to 
achieve separate independent state. But like that of the tremendous success of 1949-71 again 
as the opposition party during 1976-81 the same AL could not show any mentionable success. 
By giving leadership to that workers force in the liberation struggle AL snatched 
independence for the Bengali masses through a bloody armed revolution though the party was 
having the same worker force during 1976-81 and when an authoritarian military regime was 
in power -made the situation enough fertile to build up a mass movement to achieve peoples 
democratic right - even in that situation the party remained inactive. Mainly two reasons were 
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working behind it: (a) During 19776-81 still AL was propagating the publicly denounced one 
party BAKSAL system as its party program. According to daily Sangbad in these days the 
talking and politics of AL was somewhat anti-people, which do not represent public 
feeling^^^. Without having public support no movement can get momentum or success; and 
(b) To make the movement successfol there was a need of appropriate leadership. After the 
assignation of the first ranking AL leaders in 1975 though the second ranking leaders were 
successfiil in reviving the AL but they were engaged in factional feud because of their 
ideological difference, excessive leadership aspiration and other selfish and parochial 
thinking. So daily Sangbad further wrote - those who engage themselves busy in internal 
infighting, those who try to maintain the party unity through many patch-up, those who seek 
public support to materialize their anti-people (BAKSAL) programs they will not be able to 
develop their public connection.^^^. For going back to the masses and to regain extensive 
public connection in its favor AL needed: (a) a clear-cut pro-people party program and (b) to 
build up an eligible party leadership by removing their internal differences. Since 1980 the 
party workers started realizing these factors. They also started pressurizing the feuding party 
leadership - for the survival of the party, to give dynamism to the party like that of its old 
days. To get back party unity by eliminating the leadership struggle and to get back its 
dynamism when the name of the daughter of the Father of the Nation - Sheikh Hasina - was 
proposed as the party chief forgetting their old grouping all the party councilors and workers 
declared their firm support in favor of Mujib-daughter and united themselves under the 
leadership of Hasina. Hasina's arrival at the party's central position gradually removed some 
of the inner contradictions of AL. Gradually, Mujib-daughter became the source of AL 
workers' political inspiration. Many thought that the party would finally be able to remove its 
leadership vacuum. Naturally, it started gaining a 'new incentive and momentum'. But still a 
lot of reformative programs remained to be completed. The party still could not totally 
liberate itself fi-om factional infighting, and the publicly denounced one party BAKSAL 
system was also remained as its program. Moreover, as yet Hasina could not establish herself 
as the only unparallel leader of the party, every thing would not be changed according to her 
wishes. Time was needed to remove the doubtfulness about her political maturity that was 
raised by different political observers. 
Daily Sangbad, 20 June 1978. 
Daily Sangbad, 20 June 1978. 
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Part 4 
Hasina's effort to Establish Individual leadership over AL 
The Fall of Ideology based Politics 
The background of Mujib-daughter's taking over of AL leadership: Since 1975 Bangladesh 
was in the grip of Military rule. The people were factually far from democratic rights. The 
country was facing crisis in the political and socio-economic front. In this situation, as the 
leaders bf a dominant political party of the country, the party stalwarts needed to maintain 
unity in their own forum for the betterment of the party as well as of the nation. In fact, it was 
a very good opportunity for AL like the period of 1966-71, in the sense that the party could 
again guide the nation to overcome the dictatorial rule of military regimes and to restore 
democratic right of the people in Bangladesh. Instead of doing that since 1975 the party 
leadership engaged in factional squabble and defection. Day by day AL was losing its tested 
cadres because: (i) The party suspended many of them because of their alleged involvement 
' with the losing faction; (ii) By defecting the main body already many losing factions floated 
new parties or joined government party; (iii) Due to the internal squabble many experienced 
party cadres were frustrated gave up politics and became neutral and; (iv) In the political 
game losing faction leaders and workers are always sidelined or deprived from competent 
post in the party though previously they proved their efficiency. Due to the infighting AL lost 
many of its front line workers, the country was also deprived from getting the services of 
some of its most honest, dedicated, experienced and tested sons who - in their early life 
engaged in politics with an holy intension to sacrifice themselves for their beloved country 
and were brought up through many stages of revolutionary movement to liberate Bangladesh 
- a process which was started since the British Period. Though some of the party men and 
well wishers tried to patch-up the differences between the conflicting groups and had some 
temporary successes in bringing back unity in the party rank but those unities did not last 
long. Finally to solve the leadership crisis and to eradicate the factionalism from the party 
through an initiative of Tofael group in the 1981 council session AL made Mujib-daughter 
Sheikh Hasina the party President by a compromise formula as the symbol of unity among the 
conflicting groups. 
Hasina's acceptance of the leadership ushered a good hope in many party workers, 
after a long lasting factional fighting now as the party was saved from further destruction, but 
they were in dark from reality. Actually in this council session the Indo-US group by playing 
a tricky game brought Mujib-daughter in the AL politics. Their intention was not to bring 
back harmony in the party but to establish the Indo-US group's supremacy over it. Their 
intension was to convert their incoming defeat into a imique victory. After the formation of all 
the national committees of the party it was observed that Kamal-Tofael-A. Mannan group, the 
believers of capitalist economy and western democracy, again were in upper hand over the 
Indo-Soviet group as they had clear edge in the newly formed party presidium, the most 
powerful body of the party as well as the President-who had sensitive emotional attachment 
with the lower level leaders and workers - was favoring them. But, the previously dominating 
A. Razzaq group was not ready to yield the defeat; rather defying the supremacy of Kamal-
Tafael group started consolidating their position just after the 1981 council session as they 
calculated that still then they had supremacy in the lower level AL. According to one of the A. 
Razzaq group cadre, "In present the reactionaries are trying to defend the progressives by 
using Mujib-daughter as their shield. But they will not be able to defend us as we have 
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qualitative difference with them. Now we shall train the workers in such a way that they may 
defend these reactionaries"'. 
Although the party was temporarily saved from further destruction by installing 
Hasina as the party leadership, it failed to overcome the inner crisis; which only took a new 
shape. After the assassination of General Zia and emergence of another General (Ershad) in 
power, many observers thought, in this critical condition of the nation, AL could put up 
pragmatic programs and call for national movement for the revival of democracy. But AL 
failed to utilize the situation. When the party leaders were busy in internal skirmish and 
engaged all their efforts, energies and times to save/ uphold their respective factional 
interests; for them, it was not possible to declare any pro-people programs. Rather, according 
to weekly Roabbar, as the days were passing the more AL was engaged in factionalism; the 
more ideological confusion and differences engrossed the party. The workers were hopelessly 
misguided by different groups^. To establish leadership domination the infighting within the 
party was initiated again in 1979, although at that time there was no major difference on 
BAKSAL issue. To establish the leadership supremacy when a new difference took place then 
it was seen that this newly developed leadership conflict turned to an ideological polarization. 
Weekly Roabbar wrote after the 1981 council session when the Indo-US faction became 
dominant then not only on the issue of party leadership but also a simultaneous cold war 
started in the party on the question of ideology and leadership supremacy. After taking over 
the party leadership by Haisna, the old conflict of the party returned to the forefront in a new 
shape: politically which program the AL will accept? Whether the BAKSAL system or 
multiparty democratic system^. 
Hasina, in quest for political ally in AL Organization; Sheikh Hasina was a stranger in AL 
Politics. Before her election as the party leader, she was not even a member of it. Though 
during her student life once she was elected Vice President of Eden Girls College as the 
nominee of AL's student front, but it was a minor part of her life'*. Moreover, since eight 
years she was living abroad, far from Bangladesh politics, as a housewife of a nuclear 
scientist. She was the daughter of a great political leader but even her father never 
contemplated that she would become a politician. Her political career was hardly countable^. 
One of the prominent politician and ex-Prime Minister of Bangladesh said. "From this (1981) 
council session it has become clear that the condition of AL leadership is very miserable. The 
AL leaders had to make-Mujib daughter Sheikh Hasina the president of the party, who does 
not have any political background" . Bangladesh Times Commented, "The objective of 
electing She i^ Hasina as the chief of BAL is not to put her in effective leadership but to 
exploit her name and connection politically"'. Hasina was totally inexperienced and was 
living far from politics. Many AL leaders were expecting that Hasina would be only a 
nominal leader and the main power to run the party would be handled by the party presidium. 
Probably understanding the poor leadership quality of Hasina the ex-president of AL, A. 
Malek Ukil said, "After the death of Sheikh Mujib, we all are the workers in the party. 
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Workers will lead the party"^. It means the pro BAKSAL group of the party was expecting 
that as Hasina was not qualified enough to run the party and to fulfill the leadership vacuum, 
so all the influential leaders would share the executive power of AL. But Kamal-Tofael 
group's tendency was different from that of Ukil-Razzaq group. They were not ready to share 
power wdth B AKSALites. When most of them were doubtful about the leadership quality of 
Hasina, whether she would be able to lead the party or not, most of the newspapers already 
indicated that behind Hasina, the real power of the party would be in the hands of Kamal-
Tofael group. By the initiative of Kamal-Tofael group Hasina was elected President, weekly 
Holiday remarked, "Kamal Hossain can reasonably hope that in the beginning Hasina will act 
like his political protege. He will play the role of a mentor and the uncle to the new AL 
chief ' . Weekly Ittehad added, "It is rumored that Kamal is the main mouthpiece of the Indian 
lobby and the political guardian of Hasina"'". At that time main figures of pro Indian lobby 
were Kamal, Sajeda, Korban and Zillur. Weekly Bichitra wrote, when the Indo-westem lobby 
was cornered by the pro-Moscow lobby Kamal and Sajeda secretly came to Delhi to make a 
plan to install Hasina in AL leadership. Only few pro-Indians in AL rank knew this fact." 
Golam Aqbar Chowdhury, the husband of Sajeda wrote, before her coming back to Dhaka 
from Delhi, Hasina was hesitant about who would take care of her. Aqbar also mentioned that 
as she was leaving in a safe political shelter provided by Indian government, so it was not 
unnatural to think of her security in Bangladesh when she was returning after many years. 
Understanding Hasina's mental anxiety, Sajeda and her husband assured, "Allah is the better 
protector and we shall be there. We shall stand besides you. Nothing is to be worried"'^. After 
Mujib's death, no one had any contact with Mujib-daughter for a long period. Now when their 
political interest was related with Hasina's taking over the party president-ship, this group 
became the close ally and guardian of Hasina. In the 1981 council session in an abrupt and 
tricky move by defeating A. Razzaq-Ukil group Dj. Kamal brought Hasina and Tofael in the 
fore front of AL politics. By this he achieved two objectives'^. In one way by satisfying 
Tofael and Sheikh Hasina he was controlling the executive power of the party in his own hand 
and in the other way by pushing-back the pro-communist lobby he opened the path for Indo-
westem lobby to control the AL leadership. The collective leadership formula was introduced 
through the 1981 council session. If Kamal wanted to establish himself the dominant leader in 
the newly formed Presidium there he had very less possibility to supersede A. Ra2zaq-TofaeI-
Zohra-Ukil-A. Samad Azad- A. Mannan etc in the competition of popularity. But after the 
1981 council session for the time being Kamal emerged as the real controlling figure of the 
party. On the other hand, vvdth the help of Kamal, the Indo-Western group leader Tofael 
extended his area of influence in a greater extent. Though he was the Organizing Secretary of 
the party but was sharing the power of the party GS with A. Razzaq'''. 
By keeping Hasina on the top position of the party both the groups were engaged in a 
new game, to embarrass each other as well as to oust each other but at the same time they 
wanted to avoid a sorrowful end of their political career like that of Mizan Chowdhury by 
leaving mainstream AL. Most of the prominent leaders were not mentally ready to accept 
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Hasina as the party chief, but both group had to respect the huge emotional support of Muji-
followers she was enjoying as the successor of Bangabandhu. If the party was finally divided 
due to the infighting then it was certain that the group which would be represented by Hansia, 
would be the main stream AL'^ Thus both groups desired that Hasian should join their 
respective group after coming back to the country. In this crucial time would Hasina be able 
to bring the party under the single leadership like her father as the symbol of unity of the party 
if she could return to the country - that was depending on her organizational capability. 
Holiday wrote, "Sheikh Hasina's ability to lead the AL has yet to be tested'^. Prior to Hasina's 
returning to the countiy the reasons were working behind the internal conflict of the party are 
listed below: (i) Even though BAKSALite group, in the 1981 council session, faced big 
setback but A. Razzaq kept continue his effort to make BAKSAL system as AL's only 
political program. So still there was infighting in the party on the issue which type of political 
linage the party would follow: pro-BAKSALite or pro-democratic programs; (ii) As A. 
Razzaq was still popular in the lower units of the party and he was having control of those 
units, just after the council session the pro-Moscow group started rebuilding their strength by 
increasing their faction's organizational activities; (iii) After the power-loss of pro-Moscow 
group in 1981, in this opportune moment, Tofael group was trying to control whole party 
leadership by ousting A. Razzaq group from the party (iv) The involvement of NAP and 
CPB in the infighting to control AL for the realization of their own socialist programs. By 
supporting A. Razzaq in the infighting at his bid to strengthen socialist group in the party they 
were trying to convert the nationalist party into a socialist organization. In 1981 AL council as 
a guest speakerCPB leader Moni Singh told, "The struggle of the future will be the struggle of 
socialism. This struggle vvdll be very difficult and intense. The farmers, laborer and working 
people have to be prepared for it. It is not enough for AL to show its existence only as a huge 
banyan tree. It has to produce fruits"*®. According to Tofael group "Moni Singh is tiying to 
produce jackfiiiit in mango tree - it is impossible". After the return of Hasina in the country 
some more reasons were added behind the conflict in the party. Such as: (v) Besides Kamal-
Tofael group, Hasina was searching for her own ally in AL party. So, there was cold war 
between Hasina and Kamal-Tofael group; (vi) Hasina-Zillur-Amu-Helal were tiying to 
establish family leadership in the party. Weekly Roabbar wrote, "There is a sub-group 
working within the Hasina-Kamal group. Their target is to establish family leadership in the 
party.... During the days of Bangabandhu in the party and administration the family 
leadership established its influence to some extent. It is heard that the party chief has a silent 
support to establish the family oriented politics.... this sub-group somehow manage to 
establish its influence in the decision making process"'®. In this reporting weekly Roabbar 
mentioned the names of some prominent leaders who were having family relation with 
Hasina. Among the prominent of them were Zillur Rahman, Ivey Rahman, Sajeda 
Chowdhury, Amir Hossain Amu, and Sheikh Selim etc. Besides them, the name of Sheikh 
Helal and Abul Hasnat Abdullah were also mentionable - in the following days who occupied 
important positions of the party, (vii) As Hasina preferred to divert AL from its BAKSAL 
program there was ideological conflict initiated between A. Razzaq versus Hasina. A. Razzaq 
also mentioned it an ideological conflict^®. But BAKSAL program was the last program of 
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Mujib, the AL workers and supporters had deep attraction for it. Keeping this in mind cleverly 
Hasina said, "This is the conflict of leadership". But in an interview given to weekly 
'Roabbar' she also told it, "Those who want to establish ideology by breaking the party they 
live in the heaven of the foolish". Weekly Roabbar further wrote that by avoiding the real 
BAKSAL program, Hasina and Kamal wanted to say that the BAKSAL system included the 
social and economic programs. These social, economic, educational and cultural programs 
also could be implemented through the democratic way^'. (viii) After taking over the party 
leadership Hasina sensed that if she did not overthrow A. Razzaq, her position in the party 
would be that of a nominal chief, real clout being wielded by the G.S^ . (ix) Hasina's direct 
support for the anti-BAKSAL faction of BCL led A. Razzaq against Hasina. Hasina remarked 
about the pro-BAKSAL Chatra League, "One particular quarter is engaged in creating 
confusion among the soft-hearted students by telling the cheap speeches of socialism.... We 
don't want that the BCL should suffer from confusion.... Those who are confused they should 
come back to the BCL by realizing their mistakes"^^. (x) When Kamal-Tofael group engaged 
themselves to build personal image of Hasina in an intention to reduce A. Razzaq's popularity 
from the party A. Razzaq took it as a conspiracy against him to curb his support base, (xi) 
Indian involvement accelerated the infighting between the parties. It was a plan of India, first 
to replace the powerful pro-Soviet leadership of AL by replacing the pro Indo-US leadership. 
And then they wanted to oust the pro-US faction by increasing the influence of pro-Indian 
group for the interest of maintaining Indian influence in Bangladesh politics. A top business 
circle that had business with India were playing active role in favor of Indo-US lobby^^(xii) 
To survive in power politics the Zia and Ershad regimes also adroitly used their state 
machineries to bring about factional feud and split inside AL.^ ^ In this factional conflict, 
Hasina-Kamal-Tofael group was enjoying the support of the old guard democrats. On the 
other side, the young Turks of the party who were favoring a socialist change in Bangladesh 
were the ardent followers of A. Razzaq. He was also enjoying the support of pro-Moscow 
politicians in the party who previously joined AL by defecting NAP (M) and CPB. 
National Council is the highest decision making body of the party. It was an 
expectation that there would be a meeting of mind of the councilors/ AL workers in the 
council session. There was an expectation that the successes and failures of the party in the 
former years, the probable future planning and programs of party and the choosing of suitable 
strategy for a successful implementation of the party programs etc all would be discussed and 
analyzed in council session. But nothing was discussed in the 1981 council session. 
According to weekly Holiday, during the national council of AL, a little effort was made to 
resolve the differences between the two feuding groups of the party^^. Weekly Bichitra v^ote 
that technically the party leadership diverted the councilors and delegates from the core 
problem of factionalism of the party - the leadership failed to provide any acceptable solution 
of such problems. As a result, though many competent leaders were present in the party but 
party leader was not selected from the party forum. To maintain the party unity, Mujib-
daughter was elected its president. But the infighting remained intact/ continued^^. Hasina was 
elected AL president on February 1981 but till May 1981, she was in Delhi. It was decided in 
Weekly Roabbar, 31 July 1983; pp. 13 & 19. 
Weekly Holiday 8 March 1981. 
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party-council that till Hasina come back, the out-going AL president Ukil would be the acting 
president of the party. But later the Kamal-Tofael group, who were in majority in the 
Presidium, over looked the decision taken in the AL council session. The presidium meeting 
held on 23 February and extended meeting held on 5 May 1981, were presided over by 
Korban Ali though A. Malek Ukil was present^^. More over due to internal rivalry AL's 
student wing Chatra League could not provide single panel in Chittagong University Students 
Union election. Two faction of SL nominated rival panels of candidates and as a result, both 
groups were defeated in their strong hold. Disappointed Chatra League President wrote -
today AL and BCL is heavily injured because of internal factionalism; they are not showing 
interest in movement. The huge organization, drowned in the disunity and disorder, is unable 
to defend the opponent's advancement/ progress. This is the reason why there is a terrible 
fioistration among the workers^^. These incidents revealed that though the party avoided a sure 
split through a last minute patchwork which brought Sheikh Hasina to the top, the deep 
differences, rivalry and distrust between the two warring factions still persisted. 
Sheikh Hasina, President of Bangladesh AL, came to her country on 17th May, 1981. 
A huge gathering of 15 lakh workers and supporters welcomed her at the airport. Sangbad 
wrote, Dhaka turned out to be a city of procession with endless streams of people converging 
at the airport amidst torrential rains to have a glimpse of Sheikh Hasina.^" This huge 
gathering on the first day in Bangladesh placed her in a dignified status in the political circle 
of Bangladesh. Hasina told the mass reception, arranged to make her home coming after a six-
year asylum in India that she had dedicated her body and soul to the cause of implementation 
of Bangabandhu's second revolution. She also said, "I want the people to avenge the killing of 
their leaders.... The only way one can avenge the killings is through building up a society free 
from exploitations and implementing Bangabandhu's programs for the second revolution.^' 
People raised slogans "Go ahead Sheikh Hasina- We are with you", 
Hasina's election was the outcome of a compromise formula to maintain party unity. 
Hasina also stressed in an interview that one of the most important job for her would be to 
unify the party^^. So there was an expectation that she would have a neutral reasonable role in 
the faction-ridden AL party. She would be the symbol of unity. Like her father she would be 
above all grouping and equal to all. But it was not easy task for her as a new comer to bring 
harmony in a factionally tomed party like AL where leaders were divided on several reasons 
such as ideology, leadership aspiration, personal enmity, personality clash or ego crisis etc. At 
the beginning of her President-ship some good sign became manifested in the party. For some 
days, the skirmish and conflict was calmed down. But as the days were passing the infighting 
again rose up. On the ideological issue, both g^pup again engaged in internal conflict. 
Initially, both the groups demanded that S. Hasina was with them^^. It was known to both the 
groups about the strong emotional attachment of S. Hasina with the lower level units of AL as 
the Mujib-daughter. It was almost certain that if the party is going to be split then that faction 
which will be represented by S. Hasina vwll be the main stream AL. All the groups were eager 
to have Hasina with them to utilize her huge popularity in their favor^ "*. 
Bangladesh Observer 24 February 1981. Also see weekly Bichitra, 13 March 1981, p. 24. And daily Ittefq, 6 
May 1981. 
Weekly Roabbar, 19 April 1981; p. 8. 
Daily Sangbad, 18 May 1981. 
The Bangladesh Times, 18 May 1981. 
Bangladesh Observer, 19 February 1981. 
Weekly Roabbar, 31 January 1982; p. 9. 
Weekly Roabbar, 5 July 1981; p. 16 & 31January 1982; p. 9. 
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Usually people from different ideology and stream assemble together in the nationalist 
parties. And it is also natural that the political leaders do have high ambitions - that is not 
sinful in politics. Ambitious and genius leaders engage themselves in demonstrating their 
ability to strengthen respective positions in the party; enrich their organizations by providing 
new programs and ideas. And hence, the parties get dynamism. Though they, are ambitious 
but do respect the internal party democracy - which is natural phenomenon. Because of the 
presence of the people from various ideologies and streams the presence of different groups in 
the nationalist political parties are always acceptable. In their struggle to materialize their 
ideology or ambition, all the leaders used to include themselves with one of the many groups 
in a party or engage in the formation of a separate/ new lobby. Any leader does not want to 
separate himself from the existing group, he is attached with, until he build up his personal 
support base in the party; because without having his ovra group if he wants to separate 
himself from all the existing groups, there is a fear for him to be isolated in the party. So, to 
establish in the politics the leaders use to attach themselves with different factions. Though 
expectation was very high from Hasina, she was not treated as a leader rather the conflicting 
leaders wanted to use the Mujib -daughter card to maintain unity or to strengthen their base. 
As Kamal-Tofael group worked for her to be the AL leader from the beginning she had 
showed her interest with Indo-US group though she was being convinced that her father was 
toppled by American imperialism. After becoming AL leader in February-March 1981 she 
gave many interviews in different dailys and weeklys. In all those interviews she praised India 
highly for its role in the 1971 liberation war and stressed that Indo-Bangladesh relations 
should be very fnendly. Though Soviet Russia also had exceptional role in 1971 and also in 
the rebuilding of war ravaged Bangladesh Hasina remained silent on USSR.^^ Atthe 
beginning, she was showing her eagerness to make BAKSAL program as AL's party 
program. In her speeches in different places she frequently said that she would sacrifice her 
life for the implementation of the program of BAKSAL and the second revolution as 
Bangbandhu wanted an exploitation free society in the country through the implementation of 
the program of BAKSAL^ . In other words, after coming back to the coimtry in the whole 
month of May, she stressed on propagating BAKSAL program in her speeches in different 
meetings. She also asked for all kinds of help and sincere assistance from the masses to 
implement BAKSAL programs in the country^^. Daily Observer wrote, "Hasina was also 
emotionally attached to the idea of BAKSAL, introduced by her father"^^. But most of the 
time she was not able to propagate the BAKSAL program publicly. Because of the internal 
pressure from her own group in the party, Hasina had to modify her speeches a little and 
along with it, she had to include some additional items there. According to weekly Roabbar, 
since long Kamal-Tofael group was espousing parliamentary democracy. Due to the pressure 
of this faction of the party from 7 June 1981, she was compelled to talk in favor of 
parliamentary democracy. In her 7 June, speech she expressed her firm determination that 
only the parliamentary system can bring back stability in the country^^. To appease both the 
rival groups after 7 June Hasina was, simultaneously, espousing both BAKSAL program and 
parliamentary democracy together in her speeches. In this condition, Kamal-Tofael group 
increased its pressure that in this moment parliamentaiy democracy should be only party 
For some interviews of Hasina in different journals in those days see Bangladesh Observer 19 and 25 
February and 20 April 1981 BSS, 24 February 1981, weekly Khobar 1 March 1981; pp 27-28, 
See the speeches of Hasina in different newspapers on May 1981. 
For a similar observation see weekly Roabbar, 5 July 1981, p. 14. 
Bangladesh Observer, 11 December 1981. 
Weekly Robbar, 5 July 1981, pp. 15-16. 
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program of AL. By this, the AL leaders and workers, who already had distanced themselves 
from the parly, will return to it'*^ '. Moreover, if the BAKSAL program, which is followed by 
A. Razzaq group, is accepted as the party program then there is a suspicion that AL may loose 
a large number of the workers and leaders of the party'". 
The leadership conflict in the AL already re-started again just immediate after S. 
Hasina's taking over of the party's president-ship. On 30 May 1981, President Zia was 
assassinated by an abortive military coup. As a result, the total political scenario was changed 
abruptly. After the death of President Zia, the BNP government declared the presidential 
election to be held on November 1981. Acting President Abdus Sattar was the governing 
party candidate. Though there was a ten party alliance of major opposition parties under the 
leadership of AL to realize people's demands through popular movement. But due to internal 
difference and mistrust in the alliance, pathetically, it failed to put up Osmani as a single 
opposition candidate against the governing party candidate A. Sattar. In 1978 presidential 
election, Osmani was the major opposition parties' candidate against General Zia. Moudud 
Ahmed wrote that Osmani could have been a real threat to A. Sattar if he had been made 
candidate by the major opposition'*^. The alliance also broke up as they could not provide 
common candidate . When the alliance broke up the long lasting love between AL, CPB and 
NAP(M) also broke up temporarily. NAP (M) and CPB jointly nominated NAP (M) Chief 
Mujaffar Ahmed as their candidate. In this situation, according to Ittefaq, the pro-Moscow 
lobby in the AL has suffered the most''"'. JSD chief Major (ret) M.A. Jalil was the candidate of 
newly formed three party alliance of JSD, Bangladesh workers party and Sramik Krishak 
Samajbadi party. General Osmani, the presidential candidate of AL in 1978, was now 
supported by a group which called itself National citizens Forum comprising of his own party 
JJP, BSD, AL (Mizan), some prominent business circle and some leftwing intellectuals . 
According to that time prominent BNP leader Moudud Ahmed, actually the National citizens 
Forum was formed by the initiative of one circle of business people and intellectuals with an 
aim to destroy major opposition parties any joint effort to put a common candidate which 
could bring about the defeat of A. Sattar'* .^ At the beginning of election, the pro-Moscow 
group of AL was strongly opposing to participate the presidential election and was in favor of 
an agitation as they believed that the ruling party; could not be dislodged without a 
movement. But Kamal-Tofael group held that the boycott of the election at this critical 
jimcture of the country would be harmftil and the democratic process would also be 
interrupted'*'. Later, both the groups agreed to take part in the poll but Hasina-Kamal wanted 
to contest the election with no candidate of their ovm, while A. Razzaq group wanted to file a 
party candidate'*^. As AL was now well organized compared to that of 1978 poll, now the 
party workers were also not enthusiastic to campaign for any outsider like that of 1978 rather 
Weekly Roabbar, 5 July 1981. 
Weekly Roabbar 31 July 1983, p. 17. 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and The Challen ge, P. 201. 
A ten party alliance was formed in 3 February 1980. The alliance included the AL(Hasina), AL(Mi2an), JSD, 
NAP(M), cpb, JJP, Bangladesh Samjtatrik Dal (BJD), Jatia Ekta Party, Bangladesh People part. See Golam 
Hossain, Generalk Zia and BNP, pp. 89 and 94. 
Daily Ittefaq, 17 October 1981. Also see Daily Azad 30 October 1981. 
Golam Hossain, General Zia and BNP, P. 89, Also Daily Azad 30 October, 1891. 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and The Challenge, p. 201. 
Dainik Bangla, 16 & 18 September 1981. Bangladesh Times, 18 September 1981. 
Weekly Ittehad, 11 September, 1981. 
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they favored to have their own candidate'*^. The internal difference in the rank of the 
leadership also appeared on the issue of the selection of the parly candidate. The Indo-US 
lobby was supporting Dr. Kanial while pro-Moscow lobby favored A. Samad Azad and if the 
two groups failed to come to an understanding then Ukil had a greater possibility to be the 
presidential candidate of AL as a compromise candidate^®. Sheikh Hasina nominated Dr. 
Kamal Hassain as AL candidate for presidential election. This resented the BAKSALites in 
the party. To them Kamal is an imperialist agent, pro-US thug. They could not forget that 
because of his subtle design they lost the control over AL leadership and still now he was 
cleverly diverting Hasina from AL's BAKSAL program. They believed that if Kamal was 
going to be elected President of Bangladesh there would not be any benefit for the exploited 
poor class^'. Moreover Kamal made Barrister Amirul Islam, his old friend and ardent rival to 
BAKSALhe A. Razzaq group, his chief election agent. Amirul was supposed to be totally 
unacceptable to the A. Razzaq group^^. It made the BAKSALites more frustrated. Meanwhile 
during the election campaign by diverting from its BAKSAL agenda AL was propagating the 
multi-party democracy. AL asked the people for referendum in favor of a parliamentary 
system of government. But the failure of AL to select a common candidate and common 
election manifesto^"* openly divided the party workers even in the lower level and affected its 
election campaign". The group rivalry had assumed so wide proportions that the supporters 
of A. Razzaq and Sheikh Hasina were openly slandering each other. Though the AL had been 
attracting large crowd in its meetings mostly because of Hasina Wajed's presence but the 
factionalism inside the party had also been taking ugly colors. Rival groups of AL workers 
clashed violently with each other in many places including Narayanganj, Brahmanbaria, 
Jamalpur, Sirajganj, Comilla, Gaumadi, Faridpur, Bhola, Barisal, Patuakhali, Khulna and 
other places. The clashes took place both during and after the public meetings addressed by 
the central leaders. Even Hasina Wajeds intervention could not lead to any settlement between 
the rival factions^^. Some newspapers wrote that A. Razzaq faction was sabotaging the party's 
election campaign^'. Tofael group accused that workers loyal to A. Razzaq did not 
participated in the electioneering whole heartedly^^. Montu, a prominent AL leader said that 
due to the rivalry in the party, AL was defeated in the election. He further alleged that during 
the election campaign in most of the cases the A. Razzaq group workers did not co-operate 
the party candidate. Even it was seen that plenty of AL's propaganda materials such as leaflets 
Moudud Ahmed, Democracy and the Challenge, P. 201, Also Daily Ittefaq, 15 June 1981 and Bangladesh 
Times 18 September 1981. 
13 July 1981,?. 1155. 
A interview of Yahya Pinto. In that time he was the CWC member of BAL and also was the leadmg member 
of A. Razzaq group. 
During 1979 when AL was dominated by A. Razzaq group Amirul Islam was not given a party ticket for 
contesting the 1979 parliamentary election. He then participated in the election as an independent candidate, 
ignormg party decision and was ousted from party. He was defeated in the election. See Holiday 25 October 
1981. 
Daily Ittefaq, 5 June 1981. 
As AL's 1981 election manifesto was espousmg parliamentary democracy by avoiding the original BAKSAL 
program - which had been accepted as party program, Hasuia could not get it approved from ALWC 
(Observer 11 December 1981). 
For the same view see Weekly Sachitra Sandhani, 10 Januaiy 1981, p. 12. 
Weekly Holiday, 25 October and 22 Nov ember 1981. Also Bangladesh Times 22 October 1981, Bangladesh 
Observer, 24 October 1981 and Ittefaq 7 October 1981. 
Weekly Holiday 25 October 1981. 
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and posters were thrown in the Buriganga river, floating besides Dhaka City^^. Dainik Desh 
wrote tiiat owing to internal squabbles in the Sylhel district AL Ihc l^azzuq-Saniad iaction did 
not vote for party candidate Dr. Kamal^". During the election campaign, it was also appeared 
that the AL was coming under fierce attack also from the parties which were formed by the 
defection of different AL factions in different times^'. During the election period AL was 
attracting large crowds in its meetings mostly because of Hasinas presence. She was the main 
attraction everywhere. To see Mujib daughter and to listen her large number of people were 
coming in every AL meetings*^ .^ By observing such huge gathering in different election 
meeting of Sheikh Hasina, the top ranking BNP leaders were surprised and became anxious 
about their election victory^^. It was also seen that the party General Secretary A. Razzaq had 
a good control over the party organization. Tofael was also not to be left far behind^''. Though 
Sheikh Hasina earned widespread popularity, and AL was promising the popular issue of the 
time i.e. parliamentary democratic system against present regimes presidential form of 
government, but it was imable to win the peoples verdict. Acting president A. Sattar won a 
landslide victory over his nearest rival Kamal Hossain^^. About the election victory of ruling 
BNP regime, Golam Hossain commented, "The AL could not conduct its campaign as a 
united party. It was divided between two feuding factions... Their infighting came into open 
during the election campaign. The division within the AL helped the BNP to victory as much 
as its own unity did^^. After the election "Holiday" wrote, the struggle among the various 
groups had affected the party election seriously^. According to M. Franda, "During the 
election campaign there were several instances of physical clashes between the supporters of 
two AL factions. Kamal's followers have since blamed for the party defeat on A. Razzaq's 
obstinacy; pro-A. Razzaq people see the disastrous election results as legitimation of their 
advocacy of an electoral boycott"^^ Then Franda commented, as both groups were divided on 
two extreme political line, the factionalism within the party was expected to sharpen, Dainik 
Bangla vwote that the AL participated in the election with seeds of dissensions embedded in 
its organization. Quoting various AL sources it also added, "The AL leaders are accusing each 
other for the defeat in the election. Along with it, the process of forming new groups and 
regrouping has started in the party"^^. The daily ftorther pointed out that the acute dissensions 
between two groups in the AL which had already been noticed before and during the election 
campaign when they clashed at different places. This difference had led to the intensification 
of factional squabble in the AL. Instead of chalking out a post-election program of activity, 
the attention of the feuding leaders was then turned mainly to strengthening their respective 
positions. That had also led to some reactions among the party workers. The Jatia League 
Interview of Mostafa Mohsin Montu. 
Danik Desh, 27 November 1981. 
During election campaign side by side with the ruling party and other rightist parties, the former-Awami 
Leaguers also criticized AL heavily. See different newspapers during September-November 1981. 
Political Column: "The contest of two dead body in the next election", Daily Sangram, 31 October 1981. Also 
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President Ataur Rahman Khan also indicated that on the issue of nominating own group 
candidate for their respective parties in the presidential election the AL and BNP leaders had 
been heavily engaged in factional squabble and after the clcction the proccss of permanent 
division in those parties were already been started'". As unfortunately factionalism engrossed 
whole of the AL leadership, the feuding leaders only gave privileges on their own factional 
interest above party interest. Because of their parochial thinking they were not ready to accept 
any rival factions success even if those successes benefit the party enormously. Just after the 
presidential election one parliamentary by election took place in a constituency of Faridpur 
district at the death of AL MP Phani Majumder. It is the home district of Mujib. Since 1954 
election that seat was known as the stronghold of AL^'. Though AL declares not to participate 
in any election under BNP regime, as it had won the presidential election by vote rigging but 
both the feuding faction unofficially put up their respective candidates. As they could not 
agree on a common candidate both of the AL candidates were defeated by BNP candidate. 
Pathetically, AL lost one of its veiy traditional seats though, according to weekly Roabbar, it 
was very easy for AL to gain victory over there. Only they (AL) needed a common candidate, 
hi any constituency of Faridpur the public opinion was always in favor of AL^ .^ 
The Fall of Ideology based Politics 
The reasons working behind the factionalism in BCL: One of the prime reasons for the 
reappearance of the infighting between the old two rival factions in AL was the issue of 
nominating the pro-US leader, Dr. Kamal Hossain by Hasina in 1981 presidential election. 
The other burning reason was the ideological conflict in BCL - the student wing of BAL -
which also affected the main-body AL. Specially, the second issue behind the factional 
squabble was so grave that it led the party into split in 1983. 
Students are the vital force in opposition politics in third world countries. In the 
absence of organized pressure groups or civil society like that of first world coimtries, in 
Bangladesh since 1946-47 Paksitan movement, students are playing vital role to accumulate 
public opinion and realizing the peoples demand. They are always in the fi-ont of popular 
movements. Even after independence, the student wings of eveiy political parties worked as a 
front organizations in all the anti-regime movements. They always came to the forefront of 
the movement, took the real leadership of the street, showed their courage against different 
regimes suppressing policies to quell the movements, even sacrificed their life to compel the 
government bowing down the popular demands. In the contemporary history of Bangladesh, it 
was always seen whenever students came to the street and sacrificed for their nation, either 
the ruling regime fell down or had to bow dovm in front of popular movement. Still now, 
every political parties of Bangladesh heavily depended on their student fronts as they are the 
main force who dedicate maximum to make all the meetings, processions, picketing, strikes 
and political movements successftil. Universities of Bangladesh are called the germinating 
centers of all opposition movements and also well known as the cantonment of opposition 
politics. So, in 1971, when the Pakistani army struck on unarmed Bengali people to quell their 
autonomous aspiration they struck first on the students of Dhaka University. It is said that the 
party which is having the support of Dhaka University students, it will have the power to 
govern the country. To get recognition as the renowned politician, every leaders needs to be 
popular in the students. 
Weekly Bichitra, 29 January 1982, p. 25 
Bangladesh Times, 1 December 1981. 
' I Weekly Roabbar, 31 Januaiy 1982, pp. 11-12. 
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The pro-AL BCL, which was the major student body of East Pakistan, played the 
spearheading role during the language movement of 1951 and Bengali nationalist movement 
of 1966-70. They were the main force of liberation war of 1971. The AL had emerged as the 
major political party of the country during Pakistan period due to the success of the BCL in 
mobilizing the support of the large segment of the students of Dhaka University and all other 
educational institutions. But its influence began to ebb with the first split on the organization 
immediately after independence of the country. After that, since 1976, whenever, the AL 
party leadership engaged in infighting, this front organization also got affected heavily. It was 
always seen that student leaders of BCL were the followers of some top AL leaders who, 
since AL's power lost in 1975, were divided into many factions. Because of strong mentor-
disciple relations of the student leaders with the factionally divided top AL leaders, it was also 
seen that student leaders were always sided with their mentors in the factional conflict. So the 
BCL was also affected and divided whenever the main organization, AL, was affected in 
infighting and broke down. As a result, BCL already lost its previous undisputed supremacy 
over other student organizations. 
Since the Bangali nationalist movement started in 1966 all the workers and leaders of 
BCL had affection for one leader: their Bangabandhu, Mujib. But still tlien, there was some 
dynamic student and youth leaders to whom students were following due to personal and 
ideological relations. Among the prominent of them were Sirajul Alam Khan, Sheikh Fazlul 
Huq Moni, A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed. In 1972 the radical-socialist Sirajul Alam Khan 
defected from AL family with his followers and formed JSD. In the sorrowiflil 1975 coup. 
Sheikh Moni was brutally killed along with S. Mujib. Since then like the youth workers of 
AL, the leaders and workers of its student and youth wdng were mainly following the 
remaining two leaders of the party: A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed. A. Razzaq was already 
known for his organizational excellence. In I960's he was the GS of BCL for two terms. 
Observing his organizing capability after independence, Mujib made him the Organizing 
Secretary of the main body AL at the presence of many senior efficient leaders. Mujib also 
gave him the charge of Awami Volunteers League. Since 1978, he was working as the 
efficient GS of AL. On the other hand, Tofael Ahmed is a demagogic leader having sharp 
political acumen. Whenever he delivers speeches in the meetings or in the parliament, he 
speaks excellently. During 1969 mass upheaval as the Vice President of the Dhaka University 
Central Students Union, he led the students against the Ayub regime efficiently. Mujib, when 
he was the PM of Bangladesh, made Tofael his personal secretary. Though A. Razzaq was a 
socialist believer but Tofael was well-knovm for his pro-US connection. But during the 
heydays of socialist ideology in AL till 1975, he adjusted himself with the socialist programs 
of AL to confirm his position in its mainstream political leadership. Since 1979 when AL was 
suffering for its identity crisis: whether it would follow socialist BAKSAL program or it 
would propagate only multi-party parliamentary system, Tofael in that opened his veil as he 
felt that now, there is no more danger remaining for him to advance with his personal belief. 
In 1979, Bangladesh people did not have any special affection for socialism and he also found 
good number old guard nationalists in his side along with his own followers. Especially, when 
Dr. Kamal and Hasina sided with him against A. Razzaq, this group captured the central AL 
leadership. But A. Razzaq remained in the control of party machinery^ as the working 
committee and the lower level AL units were supporting him. 
Marcus Franda, Bangladesh the First Decade, p. 327. 
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The 1981 council session of BCL and widening crack in AL politics: Since 1979, the BCL 
was also divided into major two factions: pro-BAKSALites had the blessings of A. Razzaq 
and anti-BAKSALite group was supported by Tofael Ahmed. Though, in the 1981 council, 
session the feuding factions of AL for the time being reconciled their differences but the 
difference inside BCL remained intact. In the 1980 council session of BCL, when the rival 
student leaders showed their inability to find out an unanimous panel of President and GS to 
save the student wing from a probable split temporarily, the AL leaders tried to keep the 
internal quarrel under a lid. By a patchwork formula, BCL kept its old President, Obaidul 
Kader and GS, Bahlul Maznun Chunnu in their old respective positions for another term. 
Though, S. Hasina tried to resolve the differences between the rival groups but her all the 
efforts proved unsuccessful, as the conflicting groups remained divided for the year. In this 
ideological conflict of BCL, its President, Obaidul Kader was leading the anti-BAKSALite 
group; on the other hand, GS, Chunnu was the leader of the socialist believers. In the 
September BCL council session, just before the presidential election, due to the intense rivalry 
between the groups they failed to elect the future leadership of the organization. After 
bickering for four days over the leadership, both the rival factions announced two separate 
committees in their separate meetings at the end of their conference'"*. The outgoing President 
of BCL declared the names of 59-member office bearers with Dr. Mostafa Jalal Mohiuddin, 
K.M. Jahangir and Hemayat Hossain Auranga as President, GS and Organizing Secretary 
respectively. On the other hand, the pro-BAKSAL group had also elected 59-member central 
committee with Fazlur Rahman, Bahlul Maznun Chunnu and Jahangir Kabir Nanak as 
President, GS and Organizing Secretary respectively. Criticizing the rival-committee, the pro-
BAKSAL group said that they are opposing the terror unleashed by the anti-BAKSAL group 
who elected a fugitive, wanted in at least a dozen murder cases including that of a member of 
the intelligence service, as Organizing Secretary'^. Bangladesh Times reported that AL chief, 
S. Hasina, gave her blessings for the anti-BAKSAL committee'^. 
Despite repeated efforts of AL leaders to cement the crack in the BCL leadership'^, the 
supporters of Hasina and A. Razzaq showed their unwillingness for coming to compromise by 
little bit deviating from their current positions. Both groups accused that their rival committee 
was illegal and unconstitutional. The Fazlu-Chunnu faction of BCL, blessed by A. Razzaq, 
told that the Jalal-Jahangir panel was presented illegally in order to divide the organization 
and foil the BAKSAL philosophy laid down by Bangabandhu. They also told that it was a 
conspiracy to undo the BAKSAL philosophy and split the organization'^. On the other hand, 
Jalal-Jahangir group blessed by Hasina and Tofael, in a meeting, expelled the pro-
BAKSALites from BCL and alleged that the 'Fazlu-Chunnu clique' was engaged in anti-
organizational activities and had been making 'pretentious claims' of its loyalty to the 
programs of the second revolution of Bangabandhu''. The group rivalry on this issue assumed 
so wide proportions that the supporters of S. Hasina and A. Razzaq also engaged in slandering 
one another. The pro- A. Razzaq elements were accusing Haisna of actfg as a CIA agent with 
Dr. Kamal Hossain her guide. Moreover, it was freely talked about in the AL office that the 
Indian PM Mrs. Indira Gandhi had adviced Shiekh Hasina to come out of the Moscow lobby. 
Hasina's supporters were identifying A. Razzaq as a KGB agent because, it was alleged, he 
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did not have any decision without consulting the CPB®°. The mother organization AL also 
involved in the skirmish of its student organization in such an extent that it even affected the 
lower bodies of AL. The battle of words reached in such an extreme position that Hasina's 
leadership was criticized for the first time in a extended meeting of AL by its district 
leaders^'. They in the meeting complained that because of this conflict the party's image had 
considerably suffered. The meeting called upon Hasina to end the disunity in the BCL through 
a compromise solution. Instead of trying to find out a rapproachment between the rival 
factions, in the meeting, Hasina openly sided with anti-BAKSAL group. Even she gave one 
flat of AL's central office building to anti-BAKSAL group to open a new office. By 
observing all these development, A1 Beruni commented, "It has not been possible for S. 
Hasina to remain a symbol of unity as was expected of her. It is difficult to say whether the 
youthfial party leader, A. Razzaq, will have sympathy for that faction of the BCL which was 
occupied the new office with the blessing of S. Hasina"^^. When all these occurrence were 
happeining in those days, A. Razzaq was in Bombay (India) for his daughters treatment. 
The effect of BCL faction in the 1981: Presidential election: As the difference of BCL was 
not removed and as the presidential candidate of AL, Dr. Kamal Hossain was representing the 
rival Indo-US faction, the Fazlu-Chunnu faction of the BCL did not participate in the election 
wholeheartedly. The difference inside BCL jeopardized AL's election campaign®^. Students 
are still now recognized as the militant workers in the grassroots level of the party. They 
devote maximum of their time and energy for the party win in any elections. But from the 
beginning of AL's election campaign, the principd front organization, the BCL, was virtually 
a divided house. During the election period instead of working as a collective force both the 
factions of BCL engaged in violent hand-to-hand clash to get control of the venues of public 
meetings in different districts of Bangladesh^''. Though, at the beginning, these clashes took 
place between the two rival factions of BCL, it soon transmitted among the factionally 
divided workers and supporters of AL. However,, this embarrassing infighting damaged the 
image of AL enormously. In an extended meeting of AL's central committee, the district 
leaders of the party also observed that the division of the BCL had badly hampered the 
election campaign and was weakening the strength of the party. They strongly pledged to 
patch up the difference between the two factions of the party's student wing^^. By observing 
all these, M. Franda wrote, "During the election campaign there were several instances of 
physical clashes between the supporters of the two factions.... Independent observers fear that 
the inclination of both factions will now be toward greater militancy with each group trying to 
provide bonafides in the crucible extremist political struggles"^^. 
At the end of the election campaign, it was understood that the division in BCL was 
total and was not likely to be diminished when the main faction leaders came out openly in 
support of the rival student groups - with whom they were already sided since long. 
Particularly after the split of BCL when by leading of her full support to Jalal-Jahangir faction 
the party chief herself had become controversial for the A. Razzaq faction, which supported 
Weekly Ittehad, 11 September 1981. 
Dainik Bangla, 10 September 1981. 
' I See the Political Column written by A! Beruni in daily Azad, 18 September 1981. 
Weekly Holiday, 25 October and 22 November 1981. 
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the Fazlu-Chunnu faction. As a result,, two groups of AL openly clashed at various places. 
AL Joint Secretary Amir Hossain Amu was manhandled by rival party workers at Barisal^^. 
The reasons of the rival top AL leaders involvement in the infighting of BCL was written in 
weekly Roabbar. According to the weekly the ideological conflict which already affected the 
BCL, at the beginning developed in the mother organization AL on the issue of controlling 
the party leadership and divided it into two main factions. This competition of the AL 
leadership later affected all of the front organizations as well as lower units of the party when 
both groups also engaged themselves in the competition to establish their respective in whole 
of the AL family. As the BCL was strategically most important front organization, it was 
affected heavily^^ 
A. Razzaq also considers the same. The beginning of this conflict was started by 
initiating a competition to capture important posts of the party®®. In the competition the leftist 
and rightist camps, ideologically rival to each other, assembled surrounding A. Razzaq and 
Tofael. Then the leadership struggle converted into ideological conflict. Since then, inside 
AL, the main reason of the conflict in the party was whether the party would accept BAKSAL 
as its party program or leave it. And which faction would lead the party: the pro-BAKSAL 
group or the anti-BAKSALite liberal democratic group. After the joining of Hasina in the 
party, the factional polarization between the groups again strengthened. At the begirming of 
this conflict, Tofael was spearheading anti BAKSAL group. After the joining of Hasina and 
Dr.Kamal, though, he remained one of the key figures of the faction but lost his previous 
position and became the number-three member. He was then maintaining low profile in the 
intra party rivalry. Hasina then emerged as the main leader, real sprit of anti-BAKSAL group 
and Kamal was recognized as the master planner of this group. In the battle of the attrition, 
Hasina -Kmal group succeeded in enlisting the old ground AL leaders who had seen the rise 
and fall of the party. Many of them believed that by replacing the democratic form of 
government with one party system power had slipped out of their hands. Even a section of 
them felt that the BAKSL program should be thrown away in it's entirely as the people 
rejected it. This very little number of extreme democrats, followers of Kamal, was associated 
with Hasina for the time being and was waiting for an opportune moment to assert their 
opinion. The key figure of Hasina-Kamal led group included two joint secretaries of the party-
Sajeda Chowdhury and Amia Hossain Amu, Presidium member - Korban ali, Abdul Mannan, 
Zohra Tajuddin and Zillur Rahman, organizing secretary Tofael Ahmad. And the other 
prominent members of this group were Seikh Selim, MP, Serajul islm MP, Sudhangshu 
Sekhar Hlder MP, Abul Hasnat Adullah and others®*^ . 
Since the election campaign, some other sub-groups inside the broad Hasina-Kamal 
group emerged. The most important of these was popularly known in the party circle as the 
'family group'. This sub-group was most powerftil in the party®'. This group was included 
Sheikh Hasina herself, Sheikh Selim MP and Abul Hasnat Abdullah - two cousins of Hasina, 
Sajeda Chowdhury, Zillur Rahmn - the distant father in law of Hasina's younger sister Sheikh 
Rehana, Amair Hossain Amu - husband of one of hasina's aunty etc. The position of the 
Kamal-Tofael group was weakened to some extent because of the emergence of this sub 
faction (family group) inside them. Still then Kamal-Tofael was enjoying blessings of party 
" Weekly Holiday, 22 November 1981. Also see Bangladesh Times, 23 October 1981. 
Weekly Roabbar, 31 January 1982. 
Interview with A. Razzaq. 
Weekly New Nation, 14 December 1981. 
Weekly Holiday, 22 November 1981. 
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chief Sheikh Hsina'^. Apart from it Korban-Sajeda-Amu were maintaining a separate faction 
of their own but they failed to show their organizational base anywhere^^. 
At the juncture of crisis in the party leadership Kamal established himself as the most 
influential leader in the party caucus. But, still then, he had no public connection. After 
becoming party candidate for presidential election for the first time, he left his drawing room 
to come into the open and thus earned widespread popularity. However,, he was not 
successful in captivating the audience into his election meetings '^*. Though, during the 
election campaign, he could not convert his audience into his support base but the AL 
nomination for presidential election gave him widespread reputation as an intellectual and 
political leader. He was also well knovm as a skilled strategist. All these made him ambitious 
in the post-election political scenario. Though Dr. Kamal was one of the main target of A. 
Razzaq group and they were still propagating that Dr. Kamal maintains a direct link with US 
imperialism, but in spite of their propaganda since election campaign, in open, he was 
maintaining a distinct masterly quite posture in the battle between the president and General 
Secretary^^. Even he took initiative to remove the difference between the rival groups of the 
party^^. As Kamal never thought to be the GS of the party according to 'Dainik Bangla', 
"Now in the party the main rival of Kamal Hossain is neither A. Razzaq nor Tofael but the 
party chief herself.. The Dainik Bangla further wrote, "A reliable party source said that 
she (Hasina) has already rejected a proposal to handover the party president-ship to Dr. Kamal 
at an AL council meeting going to be held in March or April 1982". However,, according to 
New Nation, "Dr. Kamal's existence in the party has raised hopes in the minds of those who 
want the organization to be democratic in letter and spirit"^^. The New Nation also wrote that 
these rightist members of the party are watching the developments of infighting in the party. 
Meanwhile, to bolster her strength, Hasina was trying hard to induct in the party the 
old Awami Leaguers who had deserted the party along with Mizan Chowdhury, leading 
another faction, but A. Razzaq faction put up strong objection to this^^. However,, by getting 
assurance from Hasina-Kamal group for their re-entry in main stream-AL, a large number of 
leaders led by Farid Gazi and Mohiuddin (Barisal) left Mizan and formed separate AL. As the 
first step towards their merger with main stream AL, they already supported AL President 
nominee in 1981 election* . Now Hasina was waiting for a opportune moment to merge this 
group in AL. 
A. Razzaq was known in the party circle as a genuine organizer. He was spearheading 
the pro-BAKSAL group. The other leaders who allied themselves with A. Razzaq were 
Presidium member A. Malek Ukil, Mohiuddin Ahmed, A. Samad Azad, Office Secretary 
Syed Ahmed, WC members Sardar Amzad Hossain, Yahya Pintu, Mohammad Hanif, Abdul 
Momin Talukdar, S.M. Yusuf, SafiquI Aziz Mukul and many other yoimg leaders*®'. It should 
be mentionable that A. Razzaq fortified his position among the young firebrands of the party. 
Their political awareness seemed to be higher than their opponents as they were imparted 
' I Weekly Holiday, 22 November 1981. 
' I Weekly Holiday, 22 November 1981. And Dainik Bangla, 20 November 1981. 
Dainik Bangla, 20 November 1981. 
Weekly New Nation, 14 December 1981; for more anti-Kamal allegations of A.Razzaq group see weekly 
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political education by their seniors. They were being molded through literature on socialist 
revolution in Russia supplied to them'°^. Though maximum of A. Razzaq group members 
were politically against the Hasina-Kamal led faction but A. Malek Ukil had personal reasons 
to identify himself with this group. In 981, when Hasina had been elected party chief through 
the help of anti-BAKSAL faction in that time Ukil had no alternative except respecting the 
party decision. But he could not forget the pain of his losing the number one position of the 
party. Though he was known as the moderate democrat leader but still he was with the 
BAKSALites, about it weekly Roabbar remarked, "In the next council session A. Razzaq 
camp will nominate Ukil as their presidential candidate. As such a final decision is already 
taken overnight Ukil converted into a revolutionary leader"'®^. Like Ukil because of personal 
reason A. Mannan, Korban Ali and Zohra Tajuddin joined Hasina-Kamal faction. Though, 
Hasina was not an excellent orator or organizer like that of A. Razzaq but as the daughter of 
Mujib she still continued her popularity among the party workers and supporters. But, 
meanwhile, the election defeat and internal quarrel had caused a diminution in the glitter of 
Hasina'""^. Even A. Razzaq faction claimed that Hasina would have to side with them if she 
was to survive within the party'°^. So, the post election politics threw a challenge to her 
leadership. She was no more only a daughter of Bangabandhu, she had now to pass the test as 
a astute political personality. It was depending much on how Hasina was going to handle the 
party's inner conflict. Meanwhile Bichitra wrote, "After nominating Dr. Kamal Hossain as the 
presidential candidate through engaged in election campaign, she (Hasina) established her 
permanent base in politics. It became a reality that now S. Hasina is a prominent name in the 
list of dominating political leaders of the country"'"^. 
During the election, it was found that due to the affection for Mujib, majority segment 
of the people used to come to the meeting only to see Hasina'®^. But A. Razzaq was still 
popular among the party workers, and he was having well-organized personal base even in the 
grassroots level. From 1981 to 83, two tendencies were working in Hasina-Kamal group: (i) 
Hasina was eager to build her own image as a competent political leader. She was desperate to 
have control over the organization - there A. Razzaq's image was a real threat for her. 
Holiday wrote, as soon as she took charge of the party in 1981, she sensed that if she did not 
overthrow A. Razzaq, her position in the party would be of a nominal chief, real clout being 
wielded by the (ii) By building up and projecting the image of Hasina, Kamal-Tofael-
A. Mannan were trying to capture the party leadership and get the party programs back to its 
1970 stand'®', extricate the party from pro-Moscow groups possession, who were opposing 
parliamentary democracy. About the planning of this anti- A. Razzaq group, A. Razzaq 
mentioned, "Some of the liberal leaders created a conflict with us - who were the extreme 
supporters of the Mujib-ideology. It was a conspiracy to divide the party. Because the liberals 
observed that if Hasina and A. Razzaq work together to uphold the ideology of Bangabandhu 
then the contemplation of the liberals would not be materialized - so this conflict was created 
in the p a r t y " ' T o which A. Razzaq mentioned conspiracy, about it weekly Bichitra wrote, 
"With a very cool brain the plan was prepared. S. Hasina was gradually advancing forward by 
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knocking down the strength of A. Razzaq. The calculation was very clear - whatever take 
place it is not possible for any one to hinder S. Hasina personally. And if any one criticizes 
her, reaction of the party will go against the criticizer. Moreover, how much hard the criticism 
is, in the language of Hasina there is no ideological difference among us"' " . I t was true, both 
the groups, were telling that they were working to fulfill Mujib's dream, to establish exploited 
peoples democracy. But, ideologically, differences were discemable in their speeches too. 
Hasina stressed on implementing the economic and administrative aspects of BAKSAL 
through parliamentary democracy. But A. Razzaq and his promoters strictly adhered to the 
concept of BAKSAL in to to"^ 
The post election extended meeting of AL to evaluate the election results: After the 1981 
presidential election, AL called a four-day long extended meeting of the party's working 
committee to evaluate its performance m presidential election. All the district unit Presidents 
and GSs were also invited. In the officially accepted evaluation, it was pointed out that the 
organizational weakness and lack of mass support were the main factors responsible for the 
election debacle"^. Kamal-Tofael group also held the view that: The undue emphasis on 
BAKSAL by the party leaders annoyed the voters. They suggested emphasised on BAKSAL 
to be minimized and programs of AL to re-establish parliamentary democracy to be 
highlighted. But, by vehemently opposing the idea, the leftist, A. Razzaq group said that the 
BAKSAL should be the only program for the party even if it took long time to go to the 
power. They said that people did not cast vote for the failure of the party leaders to explain the 
ideals of BAKSAL. They also pinpointed US imperialism as the enemy of the people and 
severely criticized party nominee Dr. Kamal for up braiding all type of imperialism' The 
Tofael-Kamal group complained the workers, loyal to the party, that GS did not participate in 
the election wholeheartedly. They had been more active in considering their own positions 
than electioneering activities in favor of party nominee Kamal. But the BAKSALites narrated 
their respective activities in the election in order to reftite the charges of their opponents"^. 
Then the dispute between the rival factions of BCL came to the forefront of the meeting. As 
the leftists had majority in the WC and most of the district leaders also with A. Razzaq 
Hasina faced severe pressure to patch up the difference between the factions of BCL. But she 
had already given her approval to the Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL. In his speech the GS 
said, "A conspiracy is there against me. An attempt was made to throw me out of the party 
when I was abroad". He then for the first time inside WC meeting blamed the party chief for 
carrying on divisive activities in the party. She was also understood to be responsible for the 
cleavage in the student wing of the organization. A. Razzaq was supported heavily in the 
meeting though Hasina also asserted that the Jalal-Jahangir committee of BCL was legally 
constituted and the formation of other Fazlu-Chunnu committee was an outcome of the 
divisive activities of some leaders"^. The meeting had failed to narrow down the differences 
in the party; rather it had widened the conflict further which was likely to siuface soon. 
Including A. Razzaq and S. Hasina no one of AL had courage to oppose the BAKSAL, which one was well 
known as Mujib's ideology, in public. Even if Hasina could disrespect BAKSAL in open it would be treated as 
she was rejecting her own father. See weekly Bichitra, 24 August 983; p. 24. 
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By this meeting the Hasina-Kamal group understood that though the touchy BCL issue 
should be discussed first in the Hasina group dominated Presidium to arrive at a favorable 
decision. This group already observed that Hasina had an emotional appeal in the majority 
supporters and workers, which was not to be diminished. If Hasina, Kamal and other leaders 
of the of the faction met the leaders at district and thana (sub-district) level, the left leaning 
faction would loose its grip on party workers"®. 
The signal of the end of coexistence of the rival factions: On 4 January 1982 when both BCL 
group arranged separate functions for the celebration of BCL foundation day, bomb blast and 
heavy gun shot took place in the BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) group program even in the presence of 
some top leaders recognized with Hasina-Kamal faction of AL and disrupted the functions' 
This incident further widened the misunderstanding between the factions. By condemning the 
use of arms on BCL (Jalal-Jahangir) meeting, the Hasina-Kamal faction called upon the 
progressive forces to build up strong resistance against such terrorism (of Fazlu-Chunnu 
faction of BCL)'^°, Whereas A. Razzaq, who was waiting for an opportune moment to accuse 
his opponents of creating a situation in the party leading to its division, took advantage of the 
presence of some senior rival faction party leaders at the meeting of the Jalal-Jahangir faction 
of BCL. He regretted on the presence of some AL leaders at the founding day celebration of 
the particular faction of its student wing in violation of the party decision. He said that their 
participation would create misunderstanding and confusion. He further said that when he 
requested all leaders and members of the party not to attend any of the meetings in the 
absence of the party chief, the most of the party leaders responded to his call and he himself 
did not attend any meeting'^'. Previously, all the controversies of AL were taken place inside 
the party forum but A. Razzaq's statement brought their war of words into the open, signaling 
the end of co-existence. On the next day, A. Mannan, one of the pro-Hasina Presidium 
member, countered that the statement issued by the party GS was a travesty of truth. He 
further said, it was not correct that the GS had requested the leaders not to attain any of the 
BCL functions. On the contrary, he further said their presence at the Jalal-Jahangir faction of 
BCL meeting was not divisive act because it was a legally constituted committee. He also 
questioned A. Razzaq's competence to issue that statement accusing the senior leaders of the 
party'^^. Moreover, Hasina's group leaders criticized the party leaders for his failure to 
condemn the explosion of bombs and firing at the meeting of Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL'^^ 
In reply to A. Mannan's allegation A. Razzaq said that according to the party constitution, the 
GS was empowered to issue statements on organizational and other matters and his statement 
on the unresolved problems of the BCL was not a 'travesty of truth'^^i Other AL leaders of 
both the rival groups also engaged in accusation and counter a c c u s a t i o n B o t h g ro^s were 
insisting on holding of an WC meeting to take disciplinary action against each other^ But as 
Bangladesh Observer, 12 December 1981. 
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party leader Hasina was in Europe, the WC meeting could not take place. According to 
weekly 'Holiday', Hasina left the country at the crucial moment of the party in order to avoid 
the responsibility of a final division of the party, if it really took place ^  . This open war of 
words inside AL made the party extremely instable and deteriorated the relations between the 
leaders of two warring factions. Political observers said that amid accusations and counter 
accusations, ideological and personal differences between the conflicting factions of AL 
widen so glaringly that any attempt to keep them united was likely to be counterproductive. 
Weekly 'Sachitra Sahdhani' noted, "This crisis not only sharply deteriorated the relation 
between the groups on the question of political and economic principles also on personal 
level"'2«. 
As Hasina-Kamal group was in majority in the Presidium, they were more interested 
to call a party Presidium meeting than to call a WC meeting to take strong disciplinary action 
against A. Razzaq. Finally, the Presidium meeting held in early of February. The question of 
ousting the party GS on disciplinary ground was also raised. Since A. Razzaq was having 
direct command over the majority of district committees of the party and in the absence of 
party chief he was also enjoying 50% support of party Presidium, the Tofael-Kamal group had 
to restrain itself till Hasina come back. Then the agenda was kept for discussion in the next 
Presidiimi meeting'^'. But according to the party constitution, the ouster of any central 
committee member required the majority approval of the national committee that also 
includes the district leaders'^°. So to manage the vote of majority Presidium members was not 
enough in a bid to oust the GS from the party when after such a decision of Presidium the 
ousted member could appeal for a review of the decision to the national committee. So, as the 
pro- A. Razzaq group was dommating in WC and also was enjoying dominant majority in the 
district committees, they seemed to be confident with their position in the party. An 
influential leader of this group maintained that they had the support of the majority of the 
district committees and of the workers, so the Presidiimi would never be able to throw out the 
GS constitutionally. He further said that if the situation demanded, then A. Razzaq would go 
out of the party and would form a separate AL^^^ But this euphoria of A. Razzaq group did 
not last long. 
The failure of AL WC and Presidium to find out a solution to the division of BCL 
fiirther widen the gap between the feuding groups of AL as a reaction of it, another fi-ont 
organization of AL, the Awami Jubo(Youth) League (AJL), was also in the verge of 
disintegration'^^. To save the AJL from the same bleak disaster of BCL the party leaders 
shifted the third AJL congress (national council) from 27 February to 24 April 1982'^^. But 
the 'Bangladesh Observer' mentioned, "If the present situation continues the AJL is likely to 
split"'^^ 
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The distinct feature of Dhaka University Central Students Union (DUCSU) election 
was that due to the wide rift inside AL's student wing BCL, which was one of the few major 
student organizations in Bangladesh, could not put up a single panel in the election for the 
first time. Rather, both the feuding factions had separate panels in the election. As a result,, 
BCL faced election debacle there. It only won two hall students union elections out of eleven. 
Though the JSD backed student wing won main body of DUCSU but the student wing of the 
BNP emerged victorious when its candidates won majority of the hall unions'^^. The disarray 
in BCL and other student bodies backed by opposition parties provided an opportunity to the 
BNP supported National Students Front (JCD) to build up an organizational base at the Dhaka 
University campus and other educational institutions reiving on negative support of those who 
were disillusioned with the other student organization'^ . However,, the Hasina backed Jalal-
Jahangir faction of BCL performed better than its rival Fazlu-Chunnu faction in DUCSU 
election. By observing the election performance of both groups 'New Nation' commented, 
"The better performance of Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL will have certain impact on the 
organizational strength of Fazlu-Chunnu faction in the country side'^^. Since the DUCSU 
election results definitely the Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL was showing better performance 
comparing to that of pro-BAKSAL faction of BCL in different educational institutions of 
Bangladesh '^^ 
After a long 67 days Europe visit, AL chief Hasina returned Bangladesh in a tense 
situation when the total AL family was busy in a bitter internal quarrel among themselves. 
Even in her presence, the AL showed no sign of coming out of this political wilderness/ 
disarray into which it lost its way and purpose. The crisis of leadership was showing at every 
turn. And as the largest opposition party, the absence of leadership and firm decision making 
contributed to the weak and disorganized state of the opposition of it both inside and outside 
the parliament. As its reaction, the party was partially alienated from the people. Since 1978, 
the party could not gain any big success in any national level election, even as the major 
opposition party could not led any popular movement to realize people's economic and 
democratic aspirations. However,, within one month after Hasina's coming back to 
Bangladesh, by a sudden bloodless military coup General Ershad captured the state power, 
declared Martial Law all over the country, dissolved national parliament and suspended the 
constitution and political activities'^^. As AL was factionally weak by observing the power-
hijacking and demolition of peoples democratic right, it could not even protest this wicked act 
at the beginning days of military rule. 
As during his life time, President Zia did not admitted any second man in his party, 
following his assassination to fijifill the leadership vacuum a grave factional competition 
overtaken the ruling party BNP. The Vice-President A. Sattar,who succeeded President Zia, 
had neither the skill nor the charisma of late leader''"^. Understanding his vulnerable position 
the army became his main source of strength. With no personal base and with so many 
factional differences within his party, A. Sattar could not survive without the support of army. 
Throughout his presidential election campaigns the stood by A. Sattar. They played a key role 
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in molding of public opinion in favor of ENP'"". Even during the election campaign the army 
chief General Ershad extended his open support by declaring that there was no other party 
which could replace BNP"'^. But A. Sattar and his party did not understand why the army was 
so keen to see him elected. In an exclusive interview just before the election, Ershad told the 
Gurdian (London) that in order to avoid further coup in Bangladesh, the army should be 
directly associate with the governance of the country"*^. A. Sattar, after elected President, 
could not afford to ignore these demands. Bowing down to the army-pressure, National 
Security Council was constituted with the president as its head and the three chiefs of armed 
forces were made members of the council along with the Vice President and PM. Moudud 
Ahmed, that time prominent leader of BNP, mentioned that the council was to become in 
effect a super Cabinet''*'*. Golam Hossain noted, "This was the first step in the chain of 
developments, which led the army to final takeover power"''*^. The power sharing with civil 
government could not satisfy the army. Since 1958 the army tested power, it was highly 
politicized force. They engaged themselves in discrediting the politics. 
Soon after the 27 November 1981 election, A. Sattar formed a large 42-members'''^ 
cabinet, tried to appease every faction of the party. As he had no control over the party, soon 
conflict between the factions of the ruling party became bitter, lobbying and counter lobbying 
was a regular phenomenon. Even some ministers were under severe attack by their ovra party 
men for their incompetence and corruption. What was interesting the opposition, a section of 
the ruling party leaders and a section of military officers - all wanted these divisions and 
differences inside the ruling party to continue. The military officers and their intelligence 
agencies had kept in touch with both factions of BNP and played them off against each other. 
One of the techniques both the feuding groups of BNP used was to give wide publicity to the 
corruption of their opponents and in this nefarious activity they were supported bv the army 
intelligence agencies. But A. Sattar failed to do any thing about this propaganda' The 
Generals increased their pressure on the president to get rid on those they considered as 
corrupt politicians. A. Sattar had to yield once again. He dissolved the cabinet and constituted 
a new one. However,, A. Sattar's attempt to bring some new faces did not help smoothen the 
state of affairs. The political situation was indeed running out of control. The law and order 
situation had worsened and food supply became scare. Rot had set in the BNP it began to 
crumble under the weight of internal cleavages and internecine conflicts. President A. Sattar 
could not cope with the situation, nor did the other leaders display any sense of moderation''*®. 
When the army felt ground was fully prepared to take over the power for which it had been 
longing, then in an opportune moment, on 24 March 1982, General Ershad in a bloodless 
coup forced President A. Sattar to hand over the power to him. He declared Martial Law all 
over the country, dissolved the National Parliament through a proclamation, suspended the 
constitution and all type of political activities''*^. 
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The first blow in A. Razzaq camp: The military regime declared Martial Law on 24 March 
1982 and banned all kinds of political activities till April 1983. But in these days informal 
meetings and discussion were continued in the drawing rooms of different central and district 
level leaders of AL, like that of all other parties. In these informal meetings, both the rival 
factions of the party tried to strengthen their respective positions by owing support from 'non-
committed' and neutral leaders. To persuade these 'non-committed' leaders in their favor, A. 
Razzaq faction stressed on a imity on Bangabandhu's ideology and principles. On the other 
hand, advancing one step more by projecting Hasina's image as the daughter of dead charisma 
Mujib, on whose name still the party was surviving and by using a shrewd 'compromise and 
accommodation' formula Hasina-Kamal group finally managed to create rift in the fortified 
castle of A. Razzaq. among the most tremendous success of them were Matia Chowdhury (the 
pro-communist leader of former NAP and M.A. Jalia (one of the finest lieutenant and the 
strongest pillar of A.Razzaq in north Bengal) - by changing their strong allegiance now they 
sided with Hasina group. In strategically important Chittagong district, Aktaruzzaman and A. 
Mannan, once who were the strong supporter of A. Razzaq, also crossed over Sheikh Hasina's 
side'^". More shocks were waiting for A. Razzaq, when General Ershad gave approval on 
political activities the Fazlu-Chunnu faction of BCL backed by A. Razzaq arranged its 
national coimcil session'^^ In that session in the competition for GS post for BCL (Fazlu-
Chunnu) the prominent leaders of A. Razzaq faction A. Samad Azad supported his regional 
(Sylhet) candidate Lutfur Rahman against Mukul Bush. When Lutflir RaWan was not elected 
GS of the A. Razzaq supported student faction, a bitter disagreement was developed between 
Azad and A. Razzaq on this issue and it caused previous ones defection firom A. Razzaq 
group'^^. Though, since 1975, Azad was with A. Razzaq when he left him told, "A. Razzaq is 
not sincere in his work for why it is not possible to do politics with him together.... In 
different issues I was with A. Razzaq. It does not mean that I am his man" Weekly 
Roabbar noted, "If the party becomes A. Razzaq oriented, there A. Samad Azad and A. Malek 
Ukil will be wandering simply as tools. By understanding this truth A. Samad Azad left the 
companion of A. Razzaq" It further wrote that it was already finalized that in the next 
council session Ukil was going to be the presidential candidate of AL from A. Razzaq faction 
- mainly for this reason A. Samad Azad departed fi-om A. Razzaq faction. Roabbar also 
wrote, "If we see the past of JSD (formed in 1972 by the defected elements of AL), its brain 
was Sirajul Alam Khan (Dada). Those who were learned politics from Dada were ready to 
sacrifice every thing on Dada's command. Now one faction of them by leaving Dada formed 
JSD. To keep the militant workers in his side, A. Razzaq is following the tactics Dada and 
tried to become a revolutionary leader. May be, for a short period of time, he vwill be able to 
create a surprise by his activities. But, finally, it will be difficult for him to survive in AL 
politics.... It is not necessary to say that during the formation of JSD majority of the BCL 
Bangladesh Times, 15 January 1983. Matia Chowdhury and his group sided with S. Hasina because since 
their joining in AL Kamal-Tofael group branded them 'the outsider pro-Moscow communists' infiltration'. 
Hasina group vowed to oust them from the party by any means (weekly Roabbar, 31 January 1982, p. 10). 
Probably to save themselves from becoming political orphan they joined Hasina group. A. Jalil and others also 
joined the Hasina group only to save their political career when A. Razzaq was slowly losing his previous 
support base - interview with Khondoker Harunur Rashid MP. It should be mentionable here that A. Jalil was 
among the very trusted persons of Mujib - informal talking with Mohd. Noor Uz Zaman, the Senior Vice 
President of the Dhaka District unit of BAL. 
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radical workers went with Dada to malce him the Fidel Castraw of Bangladesh. But after long 
days Sirajul Alam Khan is going to accept the pitiful consequences of a defected leader. 
Comparing to that if A. Razzaq is going to defect from the party those who will be sided with 
him they are less radical than the old (1972) days JSD workers. So, finally, what will be 
happening to A. Razzaq - it makes A. Razzaq's followers anxious.... By realizing the fate of 
Sirajul Alam Khan, Mafizul Huq Kamal (Manik Gonj), Burhanuddin Gagan (Dhaka), A. Jalil 
(Nawgaon) etc deserted the accompany of A. Razzaq. Dhaka City AL President Mohammad 
Hanif is also in confusion""^. 
The joining of some of the key leaders (the prominent of them were A. Samad Azad, 
Matia Chowdhury and M.A. Jalil) in Hasina camp by breaking their very old tight relation 
with A. Razzaq was a moral victory of S. Hasina. It strengthened the allegation of Hasina 
group that A. Razzaq's involvement in conflict with Hasina was not due to the ideological 
reason rather it was a leadership tussle of A. Razzaq to maintain his status quo over the party. 
Even those previously who were fighting side by side with A. Razzaq to make socialist 
BAKSAL system as AL's only program by leaving him now they also propagated that this 
was a leadership conflict. One of them was Matia Chowdhury, to survive in politics by 
changing her previous ideology who joined in Hasina camp, now told, "AL, for its own 
interest, to siirvive in politics made Bangabandhu-daughter S. Hasina its President. But when 
Hasina took the charge of President-ship, from his egoistic contemplation A. Razzaq felt that 
- Sheikh Hasina is a beginner in AL politics. What will she do for AL. I am the all in all of 
the party. Every thing the allegiance of AL, the workers of AL, all is mine. So, S. Hasina has 
to follow my terms and conditions. But he forgot that S. Hasina is the daughter of 
Bangabandhu"^^®. However, observing the increasing strength of Hasina group, vice versa the 
decrease of the support base of A. Razzaq many of the 'non-committed-neutral' and A. 
Razzaq group supporters by changing their previous stand/ allegiance also sided with Hasina. 
Within June 1983, Hasina was able to create rift in maximum district committees where 
previously A. Razzaq's position was very strong. Among of these district units were Khulan, 
Barishal, Noakhali, Faridpur, Chittagong, Mymenshingh, Rajshai etc. A. Razzaq was was also 
cornered in the central WC'". It should be mentioned here that all the new-joiner in Hasina-
camp were maintained absolute allegiance for Hasina, but not for Hasina-Kamal-Tofael 
group. On the other hand, to defend his support base, to continue or extend his previous 
influence A. Razzaq needed extra ordinary organizing capability - charisma and suitable 
timing like that of Mujib - but he was not Mujib rather only a lieutenant of Mujib. As the 
demander of the savor of Mujib-ideology he also failed to create counter appeal among the 
workers. Time also did not support A. Razzaq. What was bad for A. Razzaq that was good for 
S. Hasina, what was making A. Razzaq cripple by that Hasina was gaining new ground in the 
political game. All these favorable developments increased the confidence of Hasina-Kamal 
group for going ahead. Till the political activities restarted in April 1983 A. Razzaq failed to 
realize how much Mujib-daughter Hasina's influenced already surfaced over the party. 
The Propaganda issues and stvles of the two conflicting groups: During 1981 to 1983 both 
factions of AL, to strengthen their old support base, primarily depended on negative 
propaganda. Both groups could not present any concrete program to realize peoples' political 
and economic aspirations. Rather, in their speeches, both factions were vowing to establish 
BAKSAL program of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib which was already rejected by the people. 
. Weekly Roabbar, 24 July 1983; p. 16. 155 
Interview with Matia Chowdhury. 
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The difference was that in their propaganda of the Hasina-Kamal group Mujib, the man, and 
Mujib. the idealist - both were equally important. But to A. Razzaq group only Mujib, the 
idealist, was adorable, not Mujib in the picture'^^ On the BAKSAL issue, difference between 
the groups were that when A. Razzaq group was propagating for full implementation of 
BAKSAL program including its social, political, economic and administrative aspects there 
Hasina-Kamal group was only propagating to implement its economic and administrative 
part. Though Hasina-Kamal group did not believe that by adopting BAKSAL system the 
country's development was possible but did not show their dare-ness to tell anything in open 
against it. Because: (a) AL supporters and workers had lot of affection for this last program of 
Mujib; (b) the Hasina-Kamal group did not have enough dynamism to prove in front of the 
AL supporters that by this BAKSAL program better change for the country was not possible 
and (c) though they were against BAKSAL's political p r o g r a m t h e y also could not produce 
any better alternative program except that of parliamentary system of democracy - with 
implementing that they also failed to show good governance during AL's ruling period (1972-
75). On the other hand, when people had lot of grievances and fear against Mujib's one party 
BAKSAL system and due to its short tenure (it was partially implemented only for last few 
months of AL regime) even the AL workers had not clear and adequate knowledge about it 
but since 1975 the BAKSAL group also did not take any mass aware programs to make it 
familiar in the masses. Moreover, due to the Mujib-regime's failure to run the country 
effectively and the following ruling parties' strong anti-BAKSAL propaganda except the 
AL's support base, the masses had lot of hate against it; unfortunately BAKSALites could not 
take any opinion building measure to popularize the program or to counter the opposition 
propaganda. So, by propagating BAKSAL ideology, A. Razzaq group only achieved 
confidence of the socialist faction of AL leaders and workers, he could not convince the mass 
people to support the BAKSAL issue. 
During 1981-83, the factional struggle within the AL continued to gain momentum. 
Both the groups, hostile to each other, engaged in campaign to vilify each other. Actually, by 
their speeches and counter-speeches, they demolished their personal image as well as party 
image. Many of their speeches and counter speeches are already presented to justify their 
positions. Some more negative speeches of both groups are presented here: Accusing the 
Hasina-Kamal group for internally dividing the BCL the one of the BAKSALite key leaders 
Mohiuddin Ahmed said, "Whenever some people need to get special advantage and to 
materialize special interest they form groups in the Chatra League. Mizan Chowdhury also 
formed this type of group.... In that time all the supporters of Mizan Chowdhury did not leave 
AL. Those miscreants formed a separate Chatra League by assembling in the house of 
Bangabandhu and depending on the (popularity) of party President"' . He further said, "The 
land lords and industrialists are trying to make AL, a capitalist organization, by capturing the 
power of it". A. Malek Ukil claimed that the AL, in fact, was the old BAKSAL. He said since 
under the Political Parties Regulation of late President Zia, BAKSAL could not be re-floated, 
AL was activated. He now was all in favor of retaining original color of BAKSAL with its 
economic, political and social program intact'^'. Party GS, A. Razzaq, had called his obedient 
militant faction of AL for a 'drastic purge' in the organization to make it free of all possible 
dangers'^^. One of the pro-BAKSAL presidium member of AL (name was not mentioned by 
Daily Ittefaq, 5 February 1982. 
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the daily) said that if AL was to function as a powerful and coherent party the major 
difference facing it must be resolved. This was not possible unless the agents of the 
imperialist forces were eliminated from the party'® .^ Leaders of the pro- A. Razzaq faction of 
the party and the student wing spearheaded indirect attack on the party chief Sheildi Hasina 
alleging her attempt to establish a family caucus in the party'^'*. Sheikh Shahid, the cousin of 
Hasina - who had fallen from the grace of Hasina due to internal family rivalry now joined 
with A. Razzaq and asked the pro-BAKSAL faction of BCL workers to resist the move of 
establishing dynastic domination in the party and not to help building up individual image 
Abdul Momin Talukder said that Bangabandhu would lead the party from Tongmara (his 
etemal lying place). The party would not be led by his relatives or other people The pro-
BAKSAL Chatra League raised different slogans such as: 'we do not believe on successor of 
blood - we believe on the successor of ideology', 'Not Mujib - the man, but Mujib - the 
idealist, is our father of nation' etc'®'. The A. Razzaq faction also termed Hasina as an agent 
of US imperialism. She was painted as an enemy of socialism. They alleged that Sheikh 
Hasina was proved a protective shield to those who were involved in anti-socialist 
activities'®^. The A. Razzaq group attacked on Organizing Secretary Tofael Ahmed alleging 
his responsibility for the inaction of now defunct 'Rakkhi Bahini' (paramilitary force) during 
the changeover of 15 August in 1975; on some leaders charging them with secret hobnobbing 
with President Zia and Ershad; on Presidium member A. Mannan saying that he was involved 
in a series of conspiracies after the event of 15 August 1975 and the presidium member Dr. 
Kamal for his sojourn in England after the downfall of Mujib regime'®^. Kamal was also 
marked as the number one enemy of socialism who diverted Hasina from BAKSAL 
program"". However, the core items that the A. Razzaq group propagating was, "A 
conspiracy is going on against the BAKSAL ideology and second revolution of Bangabandhu. 
By any means we have to block this conspiracy'^'. 
On the other hand, leaders of Hasina-Kamal group and its student factions also 
attacked the BAKSALite faction by follovwng the same negative style. S. Hasina criticized the 
Fazlu-Chunnu faction of BCL and said that the rival central committee formed under the 
leadership of Fazlu-Churmu was an outcome of the divisive activities of some leaders"^. AL 
Joint Secretary and AJL chief Amir Hossain Amu said that another BCL was put up by some 
leaders out to weaken the mainstream BCL. He further said, "A new organization led by 
Bhasani was formed at Kagmari by splitting the AL, but people did not respond its 
overtures"''^, Korban Ali, the Presidium member of AL said those who claimed that they 
were the followers of the ideals of Mujib but did not recognize Mujib the man, were not at all 
followers of Mujib's philosophy. Rather, there should be an enquiry if they themselves were 
not the murderers of Mujib. He then said that no conspiracy against S. Hasina would be 
tolerated'^'*. According to the supporters of S. Hasina, "General Secretary, A. Razzaq a strong 
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votary of the one party BAKSAL system, is opposed to parliamentary democracy'^^ They 
also identified A. Razzaq as the KGB agent because, it was alleged - he does not take any 
decision without consulting the CPB'^ ®. A senior Presidium leader (name was not mentioned 
in the daily) told, "A. Razzaq's contemplating towards the party is not healthy. He is working 
closely with the Communist Party and Pro-Moscow NAP. These elements do not want any 
good of the AL until such time they are able to grab it'^^. Some of the pro-Hasina leaders of 
AL were propagatmg that there was no basic-difference of the pro-democrat leaders with the 
pro-Moscow leaders. A. Razzaq and Ukil, to fulfill their selfish political ambition, were 
1 Tff 
engaged in telling contradictory speeches . Another pro-Hasina leader told that actually A. 
Razzaq was not a believer of 'BAKSAL ideology'. By propagating BAKSAL ideology, he 
was cheating the workers of the party. He made it possible because workers were having an 
emotional attachment with BAKSAL programHowever , the main theme of Hasina groups 
propaganda was: "due to the lust of power, A. Razzaq and Ukil are engaged in leadership 
conflict. By their engagement in anti-constitutional activities, they are spreading the factional 
conflict in the party. To strengthen their group, they set up their supporters in important 
positions of different committees of the party - though those are unfit for the posts''*^". 
All the government own and pro-regime dailies and weeklies were cleverly giving 
heavy coverage to the infighting of AL. To create misunderstanding and more rifts, they were 
taking informal interviews of different leaders of both groups; were circulating the angry and 
emotional comments of the leaders against each others. But when they were publishing the 
comments of different leaders, were not mentioning their names. The other intension of the 
newspapers behind the heavy propaganda was to demoralize the supporters of AL. Since 
1981, they frequently wrote down: soon the party is going to be divided or a split is eminent 
within a short time etc. Pro-AL daily 'Banglar Bani', in its report, was favoring Hasina-Kamal 
group as Hasina's cousin Sheikh Selim was the owner and editor of that daily. On the other 
hand, pro-communist daily 'Sangbad' was favoring A. Razzaq but restrained itself from 
criticizing Hasina group like that of Banglar Bani. Among the weekly 'Sachitra Sandhani' 
was bluntly supporting A. Razzaq but including weekly 'Roabbar' maximum of the weeklies 
were supporting Hasina-Kamal group as the owners of these weeklies did not have believe on 
socialism. 
Till the Martial Law was declared, the major opposition party AL was politically 
inactive due to its leader-ships engagement in internal infighting. Weekly 'Sachitra Sandhani' 
gave a detail picture of AL just before the military regimes withdrawal of ban from political 
activities. The summary of the article is here: "In reality, in the aftermath of 1975 sorrowful 
events, AL has not been able to show its competence to take constructive role for the 
advancement/development of the country. In the last seven years experience, it is understood, 
AL could not present any solution of different fundamental problems of the country. The root 
cause behind all these inabilities of AL are that the absence of competent leadership and the 
continued infighting within the party rank. Though Mujib-daughter S. Hasina has accepted the 
leadership but the problems of the party are not eliminated rather increased in some extend 
when she herself also has emerged as one of the faction leader in the infighting. It has made 
her political career uncertain. After the Martial Law has been imposed, she has left for' 
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London for a long period, When will she come back, it is uncertain, Now a day, maximum of 
the senior party leaders eitlier remain inactive or engaged in leadership conflict. Thus, in this 
way, day by day the most popular party of one time is going towards an uncertain destiny, 
becoming an inactive organization. Even the declaration of Martial Law is not able to make 
the party alert. It is expected by many that when the country is fallen in crisis the party 
leadership will overcome their differences and will inspire the people in the movement to 
establish democracy. But, it is observed in reality that rather they still are being engaged in 
leadership skirmish even in the deep crisis and have taken the role of spectators. Observing 
the internal position of the party, it can be perceived that the internal party situation is not 
improved. The old infighting of the party is still continuing on. In near future when the open 
politics is going to be started whether the internal situation of the party will be improved or 
not - nobody knows' 
The vertical spreading of factionalism in the front organizations and lower units of the party: 
In reality after the 1981 council session AL, the largest political party, was running in an 
aimless and bewildered manner. During 1981 to 1983 day by day the infighting was gaining 
momentum. The party leaders were also failed to resist the division of its student wing. The 
council of its youth wing was also postponed on the fear of division. The peasant and labor 
wing of the party already were divided. In other words, the difference of the main body 
surfaced quickly in its front organizations like that of contagious disease'®^. The hard reality, 
the party was facing: which lineage it would follow and which group would lead it - the 
BAKSALites or the liberal democrats. Different political observers view was that if the 
infighting of the party i.e. the leadership conflict and ideological difference was not possible 
to remove, another division in the party was irresistible'^^. AL workers and supporters were 
feeling frustration and expressing their unhappiness by observing this miserable condition of 
the party. The failure to prevent the 1974 famine, the introduction of one-party BAKSAL 
system in 1975 and the continued infighting etc not only damaged the dignity and political 
base of AL as the result of all of these the party was also deprived of building new support 
base. The talk of the town during 1981-83 was that anyhow it was not justifiable to protect the 
continuing difference any more. The masses were also afraid of that if the major opposition 
party AL's entity was threatened due to the infighting the governing military regime would 
get more opportimity to impose autocratic rule over Bangladesh. That condition was not 
expectable for the nation and the country'^'^. The AL workers were also regretting that at the 
death of President Zia, when the BNP regime was plunged with intense factional conflict, AL 
failed to utilize the opportunity'^\ According to them, behind all the failure of AL, two root 
causes were responsible'^^: (i) the ideological and leadership conflict of AL and (ii) one 
section of AL had secret hobnobbing with the government regime. In this situation, AL might 
temporarily survive by patch up the differences but with the differences inside party, it was 
not possible for it to play any positive role in Bangladesh politics. 
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The permanent crack in AL on the issue of the infighting in BCL: Hasina returned from 
London in the middle of 1982. Though till April political activities were not allowed by the 
military regime, informal meetings of the AL leaders were continued in different leaders' 
house. When Hasina came back Bangladesh, this time she had strong determination in her 
mind. Previously, she was treating Kama), Tofael, Korban, Zohra etc as her group partners in 
AL family. Unlike that of the past, now, by her boss-like posture conveyed the message to all 
that she was the real boss, above all in the party and this new attitude of Hasina already 
irritated many of the key-partners of her faction'*^. But they did not express it in open as all of 
their target was to oust A. Razzaq and his followers from the party; without Hasina, it was not 
only impossible even Hasina's neutral role in the infighting could endanger the anti-BAKSAL 
leaders' political career, many of them would have to accept the fate of political orphan in 
Bangladesh politics'^^. Before the restoration of legal political activities meanwhile Hasina 
established her supreme position in the party. Now she felt no hesitation of slandering A. 
Razzaq in her speeches as the pro-BAKSAL student wings slandering speeches on her also 
made the conflict into a prestigious issue for Hasina. In an informal meeting of CWC Hasina 
accused A. Razzaq of keeping alive the difference within BCL and challenging the leadership 
of Hasina. Even during the heated exchange of words Hasina expressed her doubts about the 
involvement of A. Razzaq and his association with the conspiracy to kill Mujib. A. Razzaq 
left the meeting and threatened to resign'®^. Not only that the AL President issued show-cause 
notice on Fazlu-Chunnu BCL and asked it to express regret for the defiance of party 
instructions'^". Defying the show-cause notice of Hasina to strengthen their own base just 
after the approval of the political activities the BAKSALites Chatra League convened its 
council session and formed a new committee'^'. 
In this heated situation Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL declared that they were going to 
shift their office in the AL's central office premises but A. Razzaq protested it. On 3 June 
statement he told all AL activists to maintain peace in the central office premises. He 
requested all associate organizations of the party except that of Women's League for not to 
use AL's central office. A. Razzaq had no option but to protest the bid of BCL (Jalal-
Jahangir). Meanwhile, in the same day of A. Razzaq's statement, the pro-BAKSAL Chatra 
League also declared the shifting of their office in the AL's central office premises'^^. 
Since then A. Razzaq was falling back and in this opportune moment of Hasina, the 
CWC meeting was called on 12 and 13 June 1983. This was the first ever CWC meeting 
called after the political activities were restarted. A. Razzaq already realized that a big rift 
took place in his fortified camp. He needed some time to mend the rift. But due to Hasina's 
firm determination his effort had gone to the vein'^^. Hasina group had previous preparation 
for this WC meeting. Here, again, Dr. Kamal masterminded the ensuing development. He 
neutralized the difference between S. Hasina and newly developed third faction of AL led by 
Zohra, A. Mannan and Korban Ali. With their support ensured, he and Tofael persuaded the 
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Februaiy 1983. Also see weekly Holiday, 16 September 1982. Weekly Bichitra, 12 August 1983. 
Dainik Desh, 19 January 1983; New Nation, 18 January 983; POT Bangladesh Series, 25 January 1983, p. 
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Weekly Holiday, 21 January 1983. Also see POT Bangladesh Series, 25 January 1983, p. 140. 
Daily Ittefaq, 3 May 1983. 
" I Weekly Bichitra, 12 August 1983; p. 24. 
Weekly Bichitra, 12 August 1983; p. 24. 
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reluctant Hasina to go for a decisive action against her de t r ac to r sAlong with the 53 CWC 
members, all the 70 district presidents and secretaries were also requested to attain the two-
day long extended meeting. The thorny issue of divided student wing of BCL was the main 
discussion matter of the meeting. The surprise for A. Razzaq was that unlike the previous 
meetings, now, most of the district leaders supported the stand of Hasina, threw their weight 
behind the Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL. Maximum of the members showed their 
displeasures on Fazlu-Mukul faction of BCL's speeches like that of 'we do not believe on the 
successor of blood', 'we do not know Mujib - the man', 'we are the followers of Mujib - the 
idealist' etc. According to them, those who do not know, Mujib - the man, they also don't 
know, Mmib - the idealist''^. Even some of them demanded the expulsion of A.Razzaq from 
the party' After the two-day long meeting decision was given by the national committee in 
favor of recognizing the Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL as AL's student wing by 40 - 34 
v o t e s B u t , for the greater interest of the organization, it was also decided that the student 
workers of Fazlu-Mukul faction would be accommodated in the recognized associate student lOfi 
organization of the AL . 
Though many of the B AKS ALites by changing their previous allegiance already sided 
with Hasina the other reasons of the painful defeat of A. Razzaq was that the people on whom 
he was depending in the conflict, many of them were either remained silent or absent. One of 
A. Razzaq's dependable lieutenants, AL's Cultural Secretary Safiqul Aziz Mukul was absent 
due to his illness. Another diehard supporter of A. Razzaq, Colonel (ret.) Saukat Ali was in 
jail. Moreover, before the resolution was adopted, Ukil, Azad, Md. Yusuf Ali, Mohammad 
Hainf and some other pro-A. Razzaq group leaders left the meeting for Tarabee prayer'^ ®. 
After the acceptance of the resolution though AL President claimed that the decision taken in 
the meeting was unanimous but A. Razzaq and ten of his associates recorded their notes of 
dissent on the decision of the national committee^®®. 
Rival student group led by Fazlu and Mukul rejected AL decision of recognizing the 
Jalal-Jahangir faction. The central AL leadership had come under sever criticism from them. 
They said, such decision as taken by AL National Committee would totally disappoint the 
followers of Bangabandhu's ideals and would also obstruct the path of social change^®'. 
They ftorther said, "We want to declare it in clear terms that the BCL's relation with 
the AL is based completely on ideology and not on constitution. Criticizing Hasina-Kamal 
group they said that, these were the people who pledged loyalty to Khondoker Mustaq and 
joined him as ministers in 1975^° .^ They ftirther said the decision was made by 'reactionaries 
influenced by those who took over as ministers in 1975 over the body of Bangabandhu^"^. In 
another place pro- A. Razzaq BCL faction leader Fazlur Rahman said that the particular 
Hasina-Kamal group leaders were the 'agents of imperialists'. Although they talked about 
Bangladesh Times, 15 June 1983. 
Daily Ittefaq, 11 June 1983. 
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New Nation, 14 June 1983. 
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Bangabandhu's ideolo^, they did not believe in it and BCL was divided because of 
ideological differences Criticizing Hasina, they said that who had no quality to be a leader 
was made President of AL as the symbol of unity and as the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman to avoid split in the party. We tried to establish her as the leader of the masses but 
she became the leader of those who had violated the ideology of her father^'^^ In a statement 
the BCL (F-M) alleged that the powerful section of the AL had forsaken the ideals of 
Bangabandhu. They felt that strict adherence to the ideals of Bangabandhu and certainly not 
inheritance of leadership by blood connection would inspire the dedicated workers of the 
party and its affiliated front organizations to correct the course of action^^^. On different 
occasions, they raised the slogans, "We do not understand any thing except BAKSAL; we do 
not accept any imposed decision"^"^. 
The resolution of the national committee was a big blow to A. Razzaq, cornered him 
in the organization. In this situation, he was urged by the BCL (Fazlu-Mukul), other front 
organizations and different district imits to adopt a clear-cut stand^® .^ According to them, now, 
they had to advance themselves wdth socialist BAKSAL program by severing tie with the 
reactionary force in the party. According to Bichitra, "Since then it was difficult for A. 
Razzaq to survive vvdthout counter attacking the opposition faction"^°^. On 11 June night, 
when the anti-BAKSAL Chatra League was recognized by the National Committee violently 
excited, A. Razzaq came out from the meeting opposing the party decision in the slogan of his 
supporters 'A. Razzaq bhai go ahead, we are with you' On the other hand, after the 
tremendous success in the CWC meeting, Hasina-Kamal group already engaged themselves to 
transform it into a permanent victory over the party. The hard liners supporting Hasina, now, 
wanted to remove the 'leftist elements' of the party as soon as possible \ Both the feuding 
factions had reached in a point of no return. Since then it became clear that the party was 
going to be divided, just the formalities were remained to be completed. 
Since the setback of A. Razzaq group in 11 June the leaders of both factions engaged 
in 'cold war', 'war of words' and were engaged in competition for control of the district units. 
For the final showdown in the coming council session both factions had already started 
undertaking separate organizational tours in different districts to strengthen their respective 
supports, were taking attempts to bring the leaders - who were still uncommitted over to one 
or another factions in the AL^'^. Attempts were also being made to bring the imcommitted 
central leaders in their own fold by both rival factions of AL^'^. To facilitate own factions, 
working A. Razzaq group of the party hired a specious office near the residence of A. Razzaq. 
Since then except for attaining the party meetings they were not visiting the AL office 
regularly as in the past^'''. Despite the internal struggle the central and district committee 
leaders with opposition political views had been working together since 1975. When the two 
Bangladesh Times, 18 June 1983. 
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feuding factions in centre reached in a point of no return immediately, the district units were 
informally broken into two counter units in maximum dislricts^'\ 
When schism in AL deepened day by day, both fuctions were organizing their 
functions separately. Ukil, one of the key members of A. Razzaq group, was hesitant to take 
active part in favor of A. Razzaq. According to weekly 'Roabbar', he was not coming in open 
conflict rather was helping A. Razzaq group from a distance. Even in the decisive extended 
meeting of AL he was silent. But at the set back of A. Razzaq by removing the veil came 
forward with open support for A. Razzaq. Addressing an Ifter Party at the residence of party 
GS, he, hinting the hereditary leadership of Hasina, said, "It is not possible to provide 
leadership going against the mainstream of party politics and ignoring the workers' 
sentiments. Had the leadership been hereditary Begum Akhtar Solaiman, daughter of 
Suhrawardy, would have been the leader after her father's death"^'^. Referring to recent 
recognition to Jalal-Jahangir faction of BCL by the AL WC the former AL President further 
said that majority decision was imposed on BCL denying the justice. Unjust action was taken 
against the Fazlu-Mukul faction of BCL. But they were following the path. Those who joined 
the party yesterday, today they stroke on Fazlu-Mukul faction of BCL. By this speech, Ukil 
clearly defied the party leader-sip. In another Eid-reunion function in Chittagong, A. Malek 
Ukil challenged the dynastic leadership of S. Hasina. He further said - the party is a divided 
house now. This situation has arisen because of imposition of decisions on party's rank and 
file. "Those who are imposing decisions will be responsible and answerable for this", he 
added. He further added, "Those who are opposing the BAKSAL program are virtually 
opposing the ideology and politics of BangaWdhu.. In the same meeting, another AL 
Presidium member, Abdul Momin Talukdar, by challenging Hasina's leadership said, "We do 
not accept the leadership except of anyone except the B.angabandhu who is lying in eternal 
peace at Tongipara.... We shall not accept the leadership of any relations of the 
Bangabandhu' . In the meeting, A. Razzaq alleged that the AL was now in the state of 
stagnation because of the 'shy leadership'. He said when Ukil was its President; the party 
gave calls for country wide strikes for five occasions. He said why the present leadership had 
failed to give such cdls or take a decisive step towards establishing democracy^All these 
provocative speeches of rival group leaders resented the Hasina-Kamal group. Especially, 
party chief Hasina, whose leadership came imder criticism, had taken serious view of the 
statements^^®. Tofael Ahmed in an interview to ENA said if anyone worked in violation of the 
party decision he would have to quit the party.... In the past those who contravened party 
decisions had to finally leave the party^^. Counting Tofael (Organizing Secretary of the 
party) for the observation he made Syed Ahmed, the Office Secretary, said that Tofael Ahmed 
had no constitutional right to issue such a statement. He said that the party constitution 
empowered party President, GS and any other member of the Presidium to make any 
statement and such statement should be distributed under the signature of the Office 
Secretary^^^. After Dhaka and Chittagong, subsequently, in Jessor and Khulna, A. Razzaq 
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group in their meeting castigated the rival faction for its inaction in national politics. They 
said the days of dynasty based politics must go"^ The Presidium^^'' of AL met on 18 July, 
only 24 hours after the party's leadership was challenged by some Presidium members 
belonged to A. Razzaq group. Naturally, hot talk took place in the Presidium meeting. All the 
leaders of A. Razzaq group left the meeting before its conclusion. Later on 19 July in the 
absence of A. Razzaq group the Presidium accepted a resolution that condemned A. Razzaq 
group for their 'misleading utterances' and urged them to refrain from making such remarks. 
The Presidium also decided to refer the matter to an extended meeting of the WC to be held 
on 31 July and 1 August 1983 for the final decision^^^. 
The war of words in the AL took another turn when Hasina group by their brut 
majority in Presidium, snubbed the minority group. Responding the AL Presidium resolution 
which condemned A. Razzaq group, A. Razzaq said that the decision taken by the party 
Presidium in his absence was unconstitutional and conspiracial. He claimed that no such 
resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Presidium on 18 July meeting. But a decision 
was announced in Ae following day without his knowledge.^ ^®. He alleged that for over a year 
lots of agenda were not disposed of in the WC meetings. He further alleged that a section of 
the party leaders were issuing news to media without the knowledge of the party in an attempt 
to hasten the split in the party and mislead the workers. He now favored holding of a council 
session of the party to settle differences of opinion in the organization^^^. Pro-BAKSAL 
Presidium members Ukil, Mohiuddin, Talukdar and AL GS A. Razzaq in a joint statement 
also claimed that no such resolution was adopted at the Presidium meeting held on July 18. 
They said that the Presidium had no right to adopt such resolution and it was a violation of the 
party constitution. The AL leaders said that a few members of the party Presidium held a 
meeting in absence of the GS at the residence of one of the Presidium members (Korban Ali's 
house) on the following day and drafted the misleading Press release in question. "It is not 
only violation of the party constitution but also detrimental to party unity", they said in the 
statement^ ^®. This statement came as an open challenge to the AL Presidium resolution which 
was accepted by the Hasina group in the last Presidium meeting. In another counter - joint 
statement, the Hasina group Presidium members, including of them were Hasina, Korban Ali, 
Zohra, A. Mannan, Kamal. Azad and Zilluir Rahman snubbed four of their colleagues who 
castigated them on 22 July. In the statement, they said that those four members had been 
continuing with their 'objectionable statements defying and undermining the WC decision'. 
They urged the four rival Presidium members to refrain from making statements and speeches 
contrary to unity of the party and to adhere with the resolution and decision taken at the 
meeting of the Presidium on 18 July. Presenting the detail of the 18 July meeting, the pro-
Hasina Presidium members demanded that all the Presidium members except Ukil attended 
the meeting and the meeting discussed in depth the problems created by GS and some other 
New Nation, 23 and 24 July 1983. 
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chief. The other four members were led by A. Razzaq and Ukil. The 12 member Presidium was reduced to 11 
when Phani Majumder died and vacancy caused was not filled in (New Nation, 20 July 19983). 
Criticizing Ae remarks made by a section of party leaders the resolution said that some of the leading 
members of the party were active in creating confusion in the party through utterances and statements. They did 
not even hesitate to make some motivated remarks on the decision of the party working meeting held on 12 June. 
The resolution flulher said that these acts and utterances by those quarters were nothing but attempts to create 
chaos and disorder in the party and was against the party decision. See Bangladesh Observer, 20 July 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 22 July 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 2o July 1983. Also see Ittefaq, 20 July 1983. 
Daily Ittefaq and New Nation, 23 July 1983. 
336 
leaders of the party. They said tliat the meeting noted the GS and other leaders had made 
speeches in Ifter parties and Eid reunions that increased the danger of disruption in the party 
and anarchy in the organization^^'^. 
The breakup of the party: In this tense situation Hasina, in a letter on 24 July, requested A. 
Razzaq to convene an extended meeting of the WC on 31 July and 1 August with an intension 
of final showdown. A. Razzaq did not follow the request of Hasina rather in another request 
letter he informed her in writing that a large number of central and district leaders were of the 
view that in the critical situation, the party was facing and in view of death anniversary of late 
party leader Mujib on 15 August, the meeting should be differed after 15 August 1983^^°. A. 
Razzaq actually was trying to delay the meeting. He desperately needed some days to 
reorganize his vulnerable fortress after the 12 June setback. But Hasina-Kamal group, now 
with fiill strength, was determined to utilize the vulnerable situation of A. Razzaq group. A. 
Razzaq group also had the intension for a final showdown - not now but in coming council 
session - and they had faith on A. Razzaq's organizational capability, Hasina-Kamal knew it. 
They were not ready to give A. Razzaq enough time and opportunity that he might strengthen 
his position again. So ignoring A. Razzaq's request the party President herself convened the 
extended meeting of the CWC on 31 July and 1 August. Some party insiders supporting 
Hasina also indicated that show-cause notice would be served on A. Razzaq and three other 
Presidium members in the next meeting for violating party discipline^^^ The workers of 
Hasina-faction were alerted against any possible attempt by its rival faction to disrupt the 
extended meeting as well as WC meeting^^^. When Hasina was adamant that she would not 
postpone the meeting, A. Razzaq observed that this step would lead the party to disaster. He 
said, "I would again request the party President to postpone the meeting in the interest of 
unity and save the party fi-om disaster"^^^ However,, the faction led by A. Razzaq decided to 
boycott the meeting. A. Razzaq was firm in his decision, said, "We stick to our decision not to 
attend the extended meeting as well as WC meeting convened by Hasina"^^" .^ Actually, A. 
Razzaq group knew that with their present minority strength, they would not be able to 
harvest anything good rather they would have to face another humiliating defeat in the 
extended meeting if they participate there and by not participating in the meeting they would 
be able to save their maximum support base as well as would have better and open 
opportunity to take against the rival group to increase their own acceptability. 
Meanwhile, some initiatives were taken to reconcile the difference between the two 
factions. Li an effort some district leaders, who already arrived in Dhaka, on 30 July met both 
group for a compromise. But they were late in their initiatives; both sides were already firm in 
their respective stand^^^. In another last minute hectic maneouvering for a compromise 
formula, Matia Chowdhury and A. Jalil, the two former A. Razzaq group members and 
Monaem Sarkar of A. Razzaq group, persuaded the President and GS of the party to sit 
together on 30 July evening at a party member's house in a bid to patch up the difference 
Daily Ittefaq and Bangladesh Times, 24 July 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 27 July 1983. 
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between them. They had the three-hour long meeting. Then A. Razzaq again met an emissaiy 
of the party leader at the house of A. Malek Ukil at night of the same day. Through these two 
meetings the President and GS agreed to postpone the extended meeting of WC on the 
condition that A. Razzaq would accept the demand of Hasina that the WC meeting had 
convened by a decision taken at the meeting of party Presidium on 18 July. According to the 
agreement, a document was drafted to postpone the meeting of party Presidium of 31 July 
until 15 August. A. Razzaq signed in it^ ^ .^ But the three negotiators could not contact the 
party chief to get sign in the document despite their best efforts. Monaem Sarker, one of the 
three negotiators, said that they searched for her in every possible place but she was not 
available throughout the night. In the next day (on 31 July) morning when they contacted the 
party chief at her residence she refused to sign the document and said that there was no time 
to postpone the meeting^^'. 
Thus, what was presumed to be happened that really took place. Dhaka City unit AL 
was known as one of the stronghold of A. Razzaq faction. At the first day of the WC meeting 
A. Razzaq group displayed their might. The first day WC meeting began at the AL central 
office under police protection amid explosions of hand made bombs, brick batting and clashes 
between the lathi (stick)-wielding supporters of Hasina and A. Razzaq while the group led by 
A. Razzaq boycotted the meeting. Police had to use tear-gas sells and resort to lathi (stick)-
charge on A. Razzaq group supporters to bring the situation under control around the AL 
office^^^ On the second day of the extended meeting, the central office of the AL was under 
the full control of the supporters of A. Razzaq faction. Hasina had to transfer her extended 
WC meeting venue at the residence of late leader Mujib^^^. On 2 August for the last time, A. 
Malek Ukil took an initiative to patch up the difference. He met Hasina and requested the 
party chief to adjourn the WC meeting till a date after 15 August. This attempt was also failed 
like those of previous initiatives when Hasina could not take any firm action to adjourn the 
meeting^'"'. 
The central WC of Hasina faction of AL, after two days of deliberation, issued 'show-
cause notice' on six leaders of the party and relieved them of their responsibilities as office 
bearers on charges of activities against the party interest and the decision of WC and issuing 
statements against party interest^ It was reported that the party chief was favoring 
postponement of the meeting and to take a lenient action but some of the key members of 
Hasina group were stick to take the hard measures against their opponents (to break the 
backbone of A. Razzaq group in this favorable moment). Out of 53 WC members, Tofael 
claimed that 33 members attended in their meeting and out of total 251 National Committee 
members, according to Hasina, 135 persons attended^^^. Though the extended meeting of the 
national committee by avoiding Ukil recommended taking punitive action against Mohiuddin, 
A. Momin Talukdar, A. Razzaq, Syed Ahmed and S.M. Yusuf but A. Mannan and Zohra 
Tajuddin was adamant to take action against Ukil. Because of their pressure the old-
competitor of Zohra Tajuddin was also relieved from his responsibility by Hasina faction of 
Bangladesh Times, 1 August 1983. Also see weekly Bichitra, 12 August 1983; p. 27 and Bangladesh 
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AL. Bichitra mentioned here that in last February when anti-military regime student 
movement reached in a crucial stage and the both factions of BCL, along with all progressive 
student organizations, were involved in that movement during that time on 23 February Zohra 
Tajuddin, the Presidium member of AL, gave one statement in the newspaper in favor of the 
military regime and by disfavoring the 'student movement for the aspiration of democracy'. 
Though in that time, A. Razzaq faction brought a charge against Zohra for conspiracy wiA the 
government regime but to strengthen her camp against rival A. Razzaq faction Hasina ignored 
that allegation Modasser Ali mentioned that in that time another key member of Hasiana 
group Korban Ali (also a Presidium member) also was involved in a intrigue with General 
Ershad regime to divide the party '^*'^ . It should be mentioned here that in that time A. Razzaq 
also alleged that some foreign embassy officials had been engaged in different districts of 
Bangladesh for encouraging the district AL leaders to go against him '^*^ Obviously A. Razzaq 
was indirectly referring the involvement of India in this conflict. However, Hasina group 
decided that Sajeda Chowdhuiy, senior Joint Secretary of the AL, would act as party's GS in 
the place of A. Razzaq '^* .^ 
On the other hand, within 24 hours of the suspension of the key leaders of A. Razzaq 
group, they hurriedly called a WC meeting which was presided over by Ukil. In a retaliatory 
action they suspended six Presidium members, two Joint Secretaries and Organizing Secretary 
Tofael Ahmed on the ground of their involvement in activities against party discipline, 
ideology and unity^''^. The A. Razzaq group also issued show-cause notice against them for 
their involvement in anti-disciplinary activities. Party President S. Hasina was spared from 
any action and requested to come out of the grip of imperialist force for the implementation of 
BAKSALprogram^''^ Still now S. Hasina was enjoying the image of her late father Mujib; a 
large number of AL workers and supporters had deep sympathy for her. So, by suspending 
Hasina, A. Razzaq group did not want to deprive themselves from the sympathy of these 
groups in this moment, though, for the last two months, they heavily criticized her. A. Razzaq 
demanded that they had the requisite members in the meeting to have a quonmi but different 
newspapers demanded that out of total 53 the number of WC members who attended the 
meeting was 
Following the suspension and counter-suspension, the leaders of the rival factions of 
the AL, in a bid to strengthen their respective camps, engaged heavily in convincing the AL 
workers and supporters that they are the real followers of Mujib, only they are upholding the 
Mujib's ideology, their only aim is to fulfill the Mujib's dream that is an exploitation free 
society and opposite faction was engaged in divisive activities as a part of conspiracy to ruin 
AL and the dream of Mujib. As for example: After suspending the key A. Razzaq group 
leaders Korban Ali, the Hasina group leader said the party cleared the organizational mess by 
taking action against refractory, undisciplined and over-ambitious elements trying to stab the 
party in the back^^°. On the other hand, in a meeting, A. Razzaq group condemned those 'who 
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acted inside the party on behalf of the government and against mid February (1983) students' 
movement^'^'. A. Razzaq group observed that the pai ty had become inoperative due to the 
conspiracy of anti-progressive and anti-movement leaders within the party. They also called 
upon the party rank and file to resist reactionaiy and imperialist forces for the implementation 
of BAKSAL program through unity of peasants, workers, students and peoples^ . Mohiuddin 
Ahmed in a meeting said some people killed Bangabandhu by bullet but now Hasina is killing 
his ideology silently^^^. 
The somersaulting of Ukil and others from A. Razzaq group: Attempts were also made by 
both the groups to bring the uncommitted leaders over to one or another faction. Following 
the persuasive policies, like that of previous occasion, at this time Hasina faction again 
achieved some remarkable success by including some more key leaders of A. Razzaq group in 
their fold. One of the tremendous successes was the ex-AL president A. Malek Ukil, the 
senior most and subtle politician and a believer of moderate democracy. He was sided with A. 
Razzaq group only in an expectation of regaining his old party leadership. As the key figure 
of A. Razzaq group, he already criticized Hasina by saying that there is no room of leadership 
of the blood in AL. If that could be possible, Suhraward's daughter would be the leader of 
AL^ '^'. But by observing the poor representation of WC members in the rebel A. Razzaq 
group's meetings, probably, he thought that this platform would not be able to serve him, 
rather he would have to face a pre-mature death in politics. Since the beginning, clever Ukil 
was always sided with the winning camps. When Mizan Chowdhury left AL, he expected 
Ukil in his camp due to long time political friendship and ideological affinity but Ukil did not 
leave mainstream AL, though, he had to abide by himself with BAKSAL program. Again 
during 1979 till last working committee meeting, Kamal-Tofael group was eager to get Ukil 
in their camp due to their some ideological leaning, his important position in the party and his 
political prudence but Ukil's calculation was different and denied them. Now in this crucial 
time by remaining with A. Razzaq and publicly denounced BAKSAL program, he was not 
ready to jeopardize his career rather he saw some hope for himself in the Hasina faction of 
AL. Though, there he would not have any chance to be the AL leader but by sided with 
Hasina, at least, he would be remained one of the key figure of the main stream AL, which 
was the largest opposition party of the country. Though Ukil was suspended by the initiative 
of Zohra and A. Mannan, still the main figures like Hasina, Kamal and Tofael were eager to 
get him in their fold. They believed that if the understanding between Ukil and A. Razzaq^ can 
be vmdermined, there would be a non-descriptive party under the leadership of A. Razzaq ^^ 
So, even after his temporary suspension was declared by the WC meeting of Hasina group, he 
was requested by some of the very influential figures of the group and also by his district 
leaders to break the tie with A. Razzaq. They also tried to obtain a statement from him 
regretting the utterances he made earlier^^^. Hasina group correctly fed Him. They needed him 
to make permanent rift in A. Razzaq group. They continued their persuasive policy and finally 
got success. He gave statement regretting the utterances he made. In one occasion he said, 
"There was misunderstanding on the BCL incident and I was, at that time, in the hospital. 
After being discharged from hospital, I was working for party unity when the show-cause was 
Bangladesh Times, 11 August 1983. 
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New Nation, 10 October 1983. 
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served on me causing mental strain. What I said, in a state of mental agony, should not be 
taken seriously by the party president. I believe in Bangabandhu's politics of national unity 
and towards that objective I will work with S. Hasina^ . To legalize his turn a somersault 
towards Hasina group from A. Razzaq group, he, in a statement, said, "It is beyond 
controversy that she (Hasina) is the party President". He further clarified that leaders and 
workers of seven organizational districts had requested him and to the leaders of Hasina 
faction to forget the past and work together. "I can not disoblige them" - he categorically 
said^^^ On October 1983 when the CWC of the Hasina faction of AL finally expelled A. 
Razzaq and four others, Ukil was being spared for his statement that "I shall be back to the 
party if the door remains open"^^^. The charges against Ukil were withdrawn after a meeting 
between Hasina and Ukil on 11 September 1983. On the next day Ukil said, "I cannot stay 
away from the mainstream of the party with which I had been associated since its 
inception"^^®. Though many had lot of respect for A. Razzaq, but were hesitant to leave AL. 
Hasina group also remained its door open for other A. Razzaq group leaders, including 
members of AL Secretariat, Amjad Hossain and Shafiqul Aziz Mukul etc^^'. Hasina's 
invitation to all dissidents to return to the party fold was a clever tactics to weakening the 
foothold of A. Razzaq, among the leaders and workers of the party. Meanwhile, some more 
members of A. Razzaq faction by changing their previous allegiance joined Hasina faction. 
Among the prominent of them were Dhaka City AL President Mohammad Hanif^^^ and lessor 
district AL President Rausan Ali^ ® .^ From 1 September, the Hasina group of AL launched its 
membership drive and it was also decided that the biennial council session of the AL would 
be held from 19 to 21 January 1984. The lower level (union, thana and district) council 
meetings would be completed within 13 December 1983^ '^*. The Hasina faction of the par^, 
in the meantime launched a 12-point program to make public their current political stand^ 
After expelling the key leaders of A.Razzaq group, Sajeda Chowdhiuy, the acting General 
Secretary of Hasina faction of A1 said, "under the changing situation, we favor multi-party 
democracy and due to tactical reason, we cannot stick to the political program based on 
BAKSAL concept"^^^ The defection of the BAKSALites from AL made it possible for Farid 
Gazi, Mohinuddin (Barisal), Muzzaffar Hossin Paltu and many others to return in their old 
political platform. Previously, they had to leave the party by the leadership of Mizan 
Chowdury in 1979 because of their disagreement with that time leadership who were firm to 
continue BKSAL system as the party program .The merger of this group was formally 
announced on 11 November 1983^^ . Although, since 1981 presidential election, Hasina 
group was keen to accommodate Farid Gazi-Monhiuddin group of AL (Mijan) in mainstream 
AL, there was pressure from A.Razzaq to stop the entry of anti-BAKSAL group in the 
organization. 
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When Hasina faction of A1 engaged in maneuvering to acquire an advantageous 
position, the A.Razzaq faction was not sitting idle. It lunched an organizational drive to 
strengthen its position in the rank and file of the party^^^ it also launched a seven point 
program to make public their political stand and by finalizing its preparation for floating a 
nev^ political party under the leadership of Ukil and A.Razzaq declared a special council 
meeting on 21 and 22 October 1983^^ .^ A. Razzaq faction now permanently suspended those 
nine Hasina led AL leaders, who had been temporarily suspended previously. They also 
decide to sever their connection with party chief, Hasina and her faction as Hasina continued 
her activities in support of imperialist and coteries working against the party ideology. 
A.Razzaq faction said, "It is not possible to work with S. Hasina but we are not thinking of 
taking any formal organizational action against her". She will be dropped in natural course", 
said one of the A.Razzaq group leaders^^ . When Ukil was slipped into the Hasina faction of 
AL by performing a somersaulting, another key figure and AL presidiusm member, 
Mohiuddin Ahamad, was picked up as presidential candidate of the proposed new party^^'. In 
the two-day council session, it was decide that the party would be renamed as BAKSAL^l 
But the special council meeting of the A.Razaq faction departed from the original concept of 
BAKSAL, i.e. one party governing system, amending the original BAKSAL constitution in as 
much as the program could be implemented through a multiparty system^^^. After the new 
BAKSAL party formed, it seemed more dissimilar with the original one i.e. the original one 
floated by Mujib in 1975. Though, there was little difference on ideology and objectives 
between 1975 and 1983 BAKSAL, but, unlike that of 1975 BAKSAL, the new one wanted to 
establish socialism through following multiparty parliamentary system. In the council session, 
A.Razzaq said that the ultimate objective of his party 'BAKSAL' was to establish socialism 
through following multiparty democracy. He further said that democracy was needed only to 
reach to the masses and to organize the people as a means to achieve socialism^^''. In a pre-
council meeting to clarify his stand on BAKSAL, he said that there was no reason to return 
from the ideology and program of BAKSAL but in the absence of a towering personality like 
Bangabandhu and in the changed socio-economic and political circumstances there was no 
other way but to adjust BAKSAL's organizational and procedural aspect-in the context of the 
multi-party politics . The session also approved a seven-point program and charter of 
demands of the party, which were earlier announced by the A. Razzaq faction of AL^^ .^ The 
main theme of the seven-point programs were: the demand of the trial for the killers of S. 
Mujib and other four leaders, withdrawal of Martial Law, restoration of fundamental rights 
and holding of parliamentary elections on the basis of the constitution of 1972 before 
Weekly Holiday, 16 September 1983. 
New Nation, Bangladesh Observer and Ittefaq, 9 September 1983. 
New Nation, 16 October 1983. 
New Nation, 16 October 1983. 
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eveiything else to transfer power to the elected representatives. The program also included the 
demand of lifting restrictions on open political activities. It included in its objective to 
continue the policy of nationalizing all invest making organizations, land ceiling up to 50 
bighas, compensation on agriculture sector^^^. 
Besides the 25-member all powerful executive committee a 11-member Presidium, 12-
member Secretariat and 115-member central (national) committee was also set up to run the 
Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants and Workers Awami 
League - BAKSAL). The 115 member central committee would be comprised with 25 
executive committee members, 70 representatives from 70 organizational district units, 8-
members would be accepted from 4 associate organizations. These four organizations were 
Krishak (Peasants) League, National Labor League, National Womens' League and National 
Youth League. Another 12 member would be co-opted^^^. The 'BAKSAL' party source 
claimed that 969 councilors out of total 1238 from 70 organizational districts attended the 
two-day council session^^®. Soon after the formation of the BAKSAL, the party initiated a 
membership drive to strengthen its grassroots support base^^". 
Meanwhile, like that of lower level units of the party before the special council session 
of A. Razzaq group took place, the division of all the associate organizations were also 
completed. On 17 October 1983, the pro-BAKSAL group of Youth League expelled the anti-
BAKSAL faction from the organization^^'. Prior to that, Hasina faction of AJL expelled 8 of 
the rival pro-BAKSAL central leaders including the AJL GS Fakir Abdur Razzaq . In 
another occasion, the Krishak League - the peasant wing of AL was formally divided on 24 
September when a meeting of the Hasina faction of central executive committee expelled 
Mohiuddin Ahmed, Rashed Musharaf and Prof Abu Syed - President, Vice-President and 
Joint Secretary respectively of the organization. The decision was taken as a counteraction 
against the Mohiuddin faction of Krishak League. Earlier, in another meeting of the executive 
committee of pro-BAKSAL group held on 23 September had expelled Rahmat Ali, the GS of 
Krishak League, on charge of anti-organizational activities^^^. When BAKSAL was finally 
floated on 23 October 1983, the pro-BAKSAL factions of all the previous AL's front 
organizations, such as the Peasant League, the Student League, the Labor League and the 
Women League were also recognized as the front organizations of the newly formed 
BAKSAL^®\ 
Reasons behind the split: Through a completion of top to bottom vertical division in the 
former AL and all of its front organizations and the formation of a new party on a new name 
'BAKSAL' the ideological conflict in AL, which had been started since 1976, was finally 
ended. Different political analysts gave different view on the reasons of the split. A. Razzaq 
said, "The split in the party is due to political and ideological differences and not because of 
any personal reason". He further said that in their (A. Razzaq group) seven-point program, 
their anti-imperialist stand was clear but the 12-point program of Hasina faction did not say 
For seven-point programs of A. Razzaq group of AL or BAKSAL party see daily Ittefaq and New Nation, 9 
September 19983. Also Bangladesh Times, 23 September 1983. 
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any thing against US imperialism^®^. On another occasion, A. Razzaq signaled out Dr. Kamal 
Hossain as one of the principal villains in the AL's vertical split and accused him squarely of 
cleverly negating the concept of BAKSAL by prescribing parliamentary democracy as the 
panacea for all problems in Bangladesh^^^. Bringing charges against Hasina for the split in the 
party, A. Razzaq said that she had done so at the behest of the imperialist force^® .^ According 
to S. Hasina, there was no ideological dispute in the party rather some of the AL leaders were 
engaged in leadership conflict to fiilfill their personal aspirations^^®. Prior to the defection of 
A. Razzaq group from AL, the prominent leader of pro-BAKSAL group Ukil said, "Because 
of political and ideological difference, the party can be divided. In this case division in the 
party is veiy natural.... Prior to this time due to ideological difference the party was 
divided"^^®. Dr Mohammad Selim, the AL Presidium member, said, "In 1983 due to 
ideological difference through a defection BAKSAL was formed"^^°. Matia Chowdhury, the 
Agriculture Secretary of the party said that because of A. Razzaq's arrogancy and the 
involvement of external hand, the party was divided^^'. On the present split in AL, JSD 
President Major (ret.) M. A. Jalil said, "At a time when every one looks for strong national 
unity to face a national crisis, such a split in a party is really unfortunate of all political 
activities.,,. This is the final outcome of the struggle between the Russia-India and the Indo-
US factions in order to capture party leadership^ . He was of the view that generally parties 
divided in Bangladesh on personal issue, not on ideological issue. He further said that it 
would be ridiculous to speak of large unity of opposition parties for democratic movement, if 
the opposition leaders themselves show their inability to safeguard their respective party 
unity. In an interview, Mizan Chowdhury said that the split that took place in AL in 1983 due 
to ideological reason^® .^ In an interview to daily 'Desh', Mizan Chowdhury said that a split in 
any opposition party was unfortunate, but if this split in any opposition party had taken place 
due to ideological difference over BAKSAL versus parliamentary democracy, it would be 
beneficiaP^'^. Prof. Mozaffar Ahmed, President of NAP (Mozaffar) welcomed the split in AL 
and said that it would identify the oppressed and oppressors to help emancipation of the 
people. He further said that all unity do not favor the people. "We must understand whether 
the unity between the chicken and jackal could help the people. The AL splitted in 1960's on 
the question of six-point program. If there was no split, the country would not have been 
independent", he added^ . To describe the reasons behind the split of the party Ukil said that 
both Hasina and A. Razzaq factions were guided more by emotion and sentiment than 
reasoning^^^. A. Razzaq also agreed with this point that at the last moment of the conflict both 
the group were largely guided by emotion and broke the party^^^. Actually, in final stage, this 
conflict was converted into a conflict of prestige and dignity between the two main leaders -
Hasina and A. Razzaq - one was the successor of blood and another was demanding the 
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successor of Mujib's ideology. A. Razzaq also said that during that time, a conspiracy was 
continuing on nationally and internationally to break the unity of AL that S. Hasina and A. 
Razzaq were not be able to run the organization together. He further told that those 
conspirators were working in both side - some were with him, participated in progressive 
politics and some were against him concentrated surrounding Dr. Kamal Hossain . In an 
informal talk, he also said that except him, there was no one in AL and BNP who did not have 
secret relation with the military regime of Ershad. According to Modasser Ali, to oust A. 
Razzaq and Mohiuddin Ahmed from the party, Dr. Kamal group played the decisive role^^ .^ 
A. Razzaq said that Dr. Kamal and others were engaged in conspiracy because they felt if 
Hasina and A. Razzaq work together to establish the ideology of Bangabandhu then the 
political aspiration of the liberal democratic leaders would not be fulfilled^®''. According to 
weekly Bichitra, though, it was not widely discussed but the role of military regime was also 
responsible for the split^®'. In conclusion it is found that the reasons of the split were many. 
The major reasons are given below: (a) there was deep ideological difference between the 
groups. A. Razzaq group believed on socialist BAKSAL concept whereas Kamal-Tofael 
group was the believer of democracy and capitalist economy, (b) Kamal-Tofael-Zohra-
Mannan-Korban group's intension was to establish their own leadership and ideology by 
ousting the pro-Moscow group from the party. They were using Hasina as a means to fiilfill 
their aspiration, (c) S, Hasina after having the party leader-ship was trying to establish her 
grip over the p ^ to fulfill her political aspiration and Kamal-Tofael and others were helping 
her to build personal image in opposition to A. Razzaq. (d) A. Razzaq was not ready to 
sacrifice his status quo, his dignity as the single influential leader of the party even after 
Hasina's taking over the party president-ship. His group leaders and student faction frequently 
propagated that they made a great mistake by making a politically inexperienced person like 
S. Hasina the party chief^°^. (e) If Hasina was the successor of blood of Mujib, A. Razzaq also 
was loudlv appreciated by the AL workers and supporters as the successor of Mujib-
ideology^ . In the war of words the leaders and workers of both the group used ugly speeches 
against each other's leaders. The government controlled as well as the other newspapers, rival 
to AL, circulated it successfiilly and enlarged the rift between the rival groups and build up an 
extreme hate campaign against each other . At the last stage, the conflict of ideology and 
successor turned into the conflict of personal prestige and dignity. Usually, when the 
difference arises on dignity issue then there is no solution of it till division takes place. 
Kamal-Tofael were anti-BAKSALites but Hasina was not. But no one between Hasina and A. 
Razzaq was ready to sacrifice her/ his ego or prestige for the sake of party unity. So division 
was inevitable, (f) Due to deep ideological difference between A. Razzaq group and Kamal-
Tofael-A. Mannan, group the division was also imminent as since the beginning, one of the 
main two protagonists of the party Hasina was largely controlled by Kamal-Tofael-Zohra-
Mannan-Korban clique, (g) A section of AL leaders of both groups was engaged in 
conspiracy in collaboration with that time military regime to split the main opposition AL in 
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order to trampling down the peoples aspiration for democrac/°^ (h) The Indian lobby, 
engaged in AL, had an intension to clean up the pro-Moscow and pro-US elements from AL. 
As in this first step, they removed the comparatively stronger pro-Moscow faction from AL 
with the help of pro-US elements in the party. 
The victory of hereditary leadership in Bangladesh politics: When the split was completed 
both the groups were engaged in their organizational tour with the intension to establish their 
respective control in the district and other lower level units of former united AL. In their tour, 
both the groups' propaganda strategy was totally different to each other. A. Razzaq and his 
BAKSAL party was demanding that it was the real successor of Mujib's ideology and the 
BAKSAL party leaders were pledging to work for the establishment of a exploitation free 
socialist Bangladesh on the basis of BAKSAL program. Whereas to acquire the district and 
lower level leaders sympathy Hasina-Kamal group was projecting Sheil^ Hasina the daughter 
of Mujib, who had luckily survived from the killers hand in 1975. They appealed that after 
many defection in the party, Mujib-daughter was the only hope who could get back the old 
fame of the party, who could re-unite the party workers and supporters for the second time. 
Though this group was supporting and propagating parliamentary democracy as the only 
means, which could bring back the stability in the country but to get the pro-BAKSAL 
sympathizers in their fold they also propagated that they would follow BAKSAL's economic 
and adminisfrative programs except its political one^ ®*^ . Weekly Roabbar wrote that as the 
daughter of Mujib, naturally, Hasina would have maximum support in the masses - from this 
assumption the majority section of party leaders and a large number of workers and 
supporters preferred to remain with Hasina. Probably for this reason some of the central 
leaders of A. Razzaq group by changing their old allegiance also gathered in the platform of 
S. Hasina^®'. The weekly further wrote from all the post split calculation, it was seen, Hasina 
faction of AL was benefited from this split of AL. Hasina was able to keep majority cenfral 
leaders and a large section of district leaders of AL in her side. She was also showed her 
ability by bringing back the Farid Gazi faction in the mainstream AL, which had left the party 
platform with Mizan Chowdhury in 1979^ °®. Even at the time when split was just completed, 
it became clear that Hasina was going to be the leader of main-stream AL. Prior to the final 
split of AL, weekly Bichitra wrote that even a well reputed organizer like A. Razzaq was 
defeated in the politics of image. All his wishes would be remaining only a good dream in his 
life. Though he was upholding the ideology of Mujib but at last, the majority associates of 
Mujib did not show their allegiance to him. But Mujib-daughter Hasina did not to prove her 
leadership competence in this feudalistic society^"®. 
The youth section of the party in the post-independent Bangladesh, always fell in error 
to define the AL, to evaluate its leadership background and base of support. AL is the party of 
lower middle class, middle class and petty bourgeois people, not the party of have-nots. AL is 
a party believing on constitutional politics and to realize peoples' demands through following 
constitutional movements. It wants to come to power through an election process not by any 
A. Razzaq alleged that there was a conspiracy against the AL from within the council of ministers and old-
ministers (see POT Bangladesh Series, 9 March 1982, p. 377). A. Razzaq, Matia, Tofael told the research scholar 
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revolutionary movement. Because of its typical political structure, leadership background and 
base of support, it can not be a revolutionary organization, for the same reason any one should 
not expect something revolutionary from it especially after the independence of Bangladesh. 
The independence of Bangladesh was achieved through a fierce armed revolution by the 
leadership of AL, even after that AL was not recognized itself as a revolutionary organization. 
Just after independence at the beginning of AL rule though that time PM, Tajuddin, declared 
his interim government as a revolutionary government but only a few days after the 
declaration when the AL leader and father of nation Mujib took the charge of the goverrmient, 
he immediately reminded the revolutionarists that 'AL is the offspring of democracy'^"*. By 
making a democratic constitution on time, certainly, AL controlled the zeal of 
revolutionarists. AL is a mass based party believer on constitutional politics. As AL was not 
converted into revolutionary party by leading the nation in an armed revolution like that by 
accepting socialism as one of its state principles or by forming one party socialist BAKSAL in 
1975, neither it converted into a leftist political party nor its leader ships' background was 
changed. From the beginning to end, AL remained a nationalist party and the assemble centre 
of the people believing on every school of political thought. Not a national organization like 
that of Pakistan Muslim League - by losing power who lost had lost its entity, rather AL is 
such an organization, even after losing power during the period of survival (1975-86) which 
still was representing the whole nation - irrespective of all cast, creed and sects; irrespective 
of all ideological differences. AL leader Matia Chowdhury compared AL with a floating 
river^'' to survive in political arena and to deliver the goods to the masses, it follows zigzag 
course - adjusts itself with the demands of the time and as a mass organization, it is open to 
all irrespective of all cast, creed, class and ideology. In 1975, Mujib was deprived ft-om 
enough western economic help which was needed for the country's survival, to build up the 
infra-structure of a war-ravaged country. When Mujib felt by an open democracy, it was also 
not possible to subside the underground leftists - who were engaged in an armed conflict with 
the regime to bring about a china-type revolution - then to bring back law and order situation 
under control and for the peoples' economic emancipation, he took an U-tum from liberal 
parliamentary democracy to one party parliamentary system and in February 1975, he formed 
one party socialist BAKSAL, banned all other political parties including AL. Through the 
formation of BAKSAL, Mujib personally planted the seeds of ideological conflict inside the 
moderate nationalist party AL. When the ideological difference re-emerged inside AL rank, 
the conspirators made relation with the unhappy pro-US section of the party and assassinated 
Mujib. In 1976, when the AL was revived, the difference which one already surfaced in the 
party rank also continued. The old-guard AL leaders, believers of liberal democracy, showed 
their disagreement to accept one party BAKSAL system but the young-Turks - the believers 
of socialism, since the liberation war who were dominating the party, wanted to accept 
BAKSAL program as the last wish of Mujb. Since then, the party was divided again and 
again, many prominent leaders left it defying, accepting BAKSAL concept. Many also, by 
defecting AL, joined the government party when they saw a gloomy ftjture of it as still 
infighting was going on^ , but difference inside the party was not removed. In 1981, weekly 
Roabbar commented, "Keeping the ideological difference continued any party cannot be 
survived. This infighting not only obstructs the growth of the party. It also hastens the split of 
it. Pro-left political parties are the burning examples of it". Then the weekly gave a brief 
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description of the leftist parties of Bangladesh who had been divided and sub-divided because 
of ideological conflict since 1966 and till 1981 maximum of them either had to accept the 
pathetic end in Bangladesh politics or many were still surviving but without mass 
following^'^ During 1976 and 1980, there was enough time for AL leadership to show their 
leadership excellence, but as they could not remove the difference of their ovra it was not 
possible for them to give dynamism in the party - no matter how much excellent organizing 
capability they had. Due to continued hopeless infighting and splits, the workers and 
supporters were already demoralized. The party was in the verge of destruction. Many 
predicted that AL was going to accept the pathetic fate of Pakistan Muslim League. In that 
difficult time, Hasina was elected chief of the party as the symbol of unity and as the daughter 
of Mujib to avoid split in the AL. Though by making her party president, AL saved itself from 
a confirm split but since then, when Hasina instead of remaining the symbol of unity, because 
of his aspiration to be the real determining factor of AL sided with anti-BAKSAL group, the 
schism in the AL deepened with every passing day and finally on October 1983, the party 
faced another split. Though in 1979 because of unity, dedication and superior organizational 
capability of the socialist BAKSALites when Mizan group had defected AL, he had few 
followers with him and A. Razzaq became the leader of mainstream AL, but the picture of 
1983 was different. The defection of Tofael Ahmed, the second popular leader of A. Razzaq 
group was a big blow for A. Razzaq. Tofael provided platform for Hasina, Kamal and others 
to work against the BAKSALites. Because of Hasina's image as Mujib-daughter, because of 
people's irmumerable sympathy for her as the successor of Mujib and Dr. Kamal's shrewd 
handling of the matter, the Hasina-Kamal group was able to create rift in the fortress of A. 
Razzaq group. Even though, the pro-Moscow CPB and NAP supported the A. Razzaq group 
from outside but that help could not strengthen his position. Rather the pro-Moscow leftists -
who previously joined in AL as the ally of A. Razzaq by a sudden performance of somersault 
joined Hasina camp to save their political career. A. Malek Ukil also defected from A. Razzak 
group for the same reason. He was with Mizan Chowdhury since long. By using Mizan 
Chowdhury's platform as a compromise candidate, he became the party President but when 
Mizan group defected from AL before of that, he performed somersaulting and joined A. 
Razzaq group. He enjoyed the group support to enlighten himself Again in October when he 
saw A. Razzaq became minority by performing another somersaulting Ukil became the part of 
Hasina group and till his death remained in the mainstream AL. 
Observing the infighting of AL during 1979 to 83, we may come to the conclusion that 
in politics of a mass based political party, there is no last word, there is no permanent 
allegiance to any ideology or person, there is no permanent friend or permanent foe. On the 
demand of time every thing is changeable. Here, always the friendship is of individual 
interest. Even ideology is also changeable to suit the political situation. One ideology (for 
which leaders use to inspire the workers to sacrifice their lives) is worth enough till it ftilfills 
ones political ambition, otherwise, to many leaders, it becomes a secondary importance. To 
survive in politics and to confirm their ftzture ambitions, if needed, many leaders don't 
hesitate to join in such camp - that was previously treated by themselves as the enemy camp -
rival to their ideology, rival to their personal choice and supporters wish. They feel nothing 
wrong of their taking stand against their old friend - from whom they were previously 
benefited a lot and for whom previously they had lot of esteem; and old ideology - to 
establish which they frequently taken solemn oath in public meetings. When the leaders 
suddenly discard their old propagated ideals and principles for the sake of self leadership or 
" I Weekly Roabbar, 5 July 1981; p. 11. 
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ministerial aspiration they become Hippocrates. The only thing remains in their life - that is 
lust for power, post and prestige. The leaders who left pro-BAKSAL group and joined Hasina 
group, they did it for these three 'P'. I am not arguing that Hasina group did hot have 
principles; but I want to tell it clearly that who left A. Razzaq group, they also left their 
ideology and principles behind them as one of the main reasons of the split in the AL, was the 
deep difference of ideology between the two faction. When A. Samad Azad, Matia 
Chowdhuiy and many other pro-Moscow leaders left A. Razzaq at the same time, they had to 
leave ideology also at least at this time. Previously, it had been seen that by defecting the 
leftist parties who had joined the nationalist party AL, in different time, had not left their 
ideology rather they had just joined the already prevailing left of the centre faction of AL. By 
this, they had been able to maintain their separate ideological identity in the party till the last 
split of AL in 1983. But latest split also confirmed that when one wanted to change his faction 
or party it was needed for him to change his previous ideology. 
Previously, whenever any faction or leaders had left the party, they always had been 
treated by the party workers as villain, but in the case of A. Razzaq, even the AL leaders 
directly could not define him a villain after his leaving of AL. Rather, the AL workers were 
conftised about him, as they still had lot of respect and love for him '^" .^ To the district level 
AL leaders, he was both hero and villain, to many AL leaders, he was the victim of time and 
situation. He had conflict with traditional political faith of the people. Where still people had 
hero-worshiping mentality, there, he was lost to the conservative feudal society. Though, the 
AL workers thinking was traditional but maximum of them were educated and already they 
had enough consciousness. That's why there was lot of confiision in their mind about A. 
Razzaq. From then, though, all the district and lower unit leaders accepted Hasina as their 
leader but to many of them Kamal, A. Mannan and Zohra became permanent villain. Still 
then, though, Kamal was known as an excellent intellectual but his intellectually could not 
convert him to a perfect leader fi-om a villain in many district level AL leaders contemplation. 
In 1972, there had been a powerftil flow in favor of socialism among the youth 
freedom fighters and student leaders. In that time, when JSD was formed, A. Razzaq was in 
illusion. Though, he was a believer of socialism but Mujib's charisma attracted him more. For 
that he reftised the call of JSD leaders to join it. According to him, Sirajul Alam Khan had 
taken the initiative to form socialist party JSD before the time was prepared^Later, since 
1978, he had devoted all his energy to establish BAKSAL in the country but with less 
dynamic and less qualitative workers group. Time to initiate a socialist party also did not 
sweet his initiative as in those days the erosion on socialist world was already started. 
Naturally he did not get success. The formation of BAKSAL was a biggest contradiction in 
his life. 
In a bid to imite the fioistrated and conftised party leaders, workers and supporters, by 
removing the widening schism the AL adapted a collective leadership formula by amending 
the constitution of the party in its 1981 council session. But it was seen, instead of running the 
party affairs by collective leadership, the Hasina group was busy to build up the personal 
leadership of S. Hasina. On the other hand, A. Razzaq group was busy in materializing its 
own intension by a clever use of party's WC avoiding the Presidium. As a result, Presidium 
could not play any effective role. Day by day, the leadership schism and internal crisis in the 
party continued to increase. According to weekly Roabbar, if the split in the party take place 
due to ideological reason, then this division would be positive for both the factions. Because, 
Interview with Harunir Rahsid and Yahya Chowdhury Pintu. Also see Syed Modasser Ali, The Uncle Story 
of AL, P. 84. 
Altaf Parvez,, Unfinished Liberation War, Col. Taher and JSD Politics, p. 104. 
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in future, the pro-democratic speech of S. Hasina and A. Razzaq's pro-BAKSALite speech 
will not create confusion among the workers and supporters of the party^"'. 
The emergence of BAKSAL party: Previously, it has been discussed that through the 
amendment to the constitution, one party governing system was introduced in Bangladesh. 
According to the amended constitution in February 1975, that time President of the country, 
Sheikh Mujib, formed the single national party named, Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami 
League (Bangladesh Peasnats and Workers Awami League -BAKSAL) and banned all other 
political parties. AL, NAP (M) and CPB were merged in BAKSAL. The president was the ex 
officio President of BAKSAL and all the executive power was concentrated in the hand of the 
party President. The major objectives of the BAKSAL were^": (a) to wed out corruption, (b) 
to increase production in agriculture and industry, (c) to control population growth, (d) to 
foster national imity, and (e) to establish the democracy of the exploited i.e. to establish 
socialism. To fulfill these objectives, the BAKSAL took some steps. Among those the total 
renovation of the district administration and the formation of compulsory village cooperative 
system were mentionable. Before the implementation of these plans through a bloody military 
coup on 15 August 1975, the BAKSAL government was overthrovra from power. The first 
military regime of Khondoker Mustaq, for the time being, banned all the political parties 
including the BAKSAL and subsequently on 8 November 1975, repealed the one party 
system '^®. In 1976, under the Political Parties Regulation Act AL, NAP (M) and CPB were 
revived as the separate organizations. 
In October 1983, finally, AL was divided into two parts, the pro-Moscow faction of 
the party laimched new political party named BAKSAL. In a two-day council session, 
Moliiuddin Ahmed and A. Razzaq were elected President and General Secretaiy respectively 
of the BAKSAL respectively^'®. BAKSAL was also the believer of the four principles, AL 
was following. Those were - Bengali nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism. But 
it was differing with AL on the question of the definition of democracy and on the way to 
achieve socialism. According to the BAKSAL leaders^ they believe on the democracy of the 
exploiters. They did not believe that the people's problem could be made only through 
parliamentary democracy. And the ultimate objective of BAKSAL was the establishment of 
socialism through parliamentary democracy. A. Razzaq said the democracy was needed only 
to reach and organize the people as the means to achieve sociaIism^^°. The BAKSAL believed 
that AL was not a cadre based well-organized party. That was a political platform of different 
classes. During 1972 to 75, AL could not properly implement the progressive steps of 
Bangabandhu because of its internal weakness. So, to establish the 'democracy of the 
exploited' in 1975, Bangabandhu introduced the second revolution, formed the BAKSAL 
party and abolished the disorganized and vulnerable AL. But, a section of the Bangladesh 
army killed Bangabandhu through a military coup, according to the planning of US 
imperialism, with the help of one section of reactionaries in AL and established military rule 
in the country. The post-1975 governments of the capitalist class, which were backed by the 
bureaucrats, demolished the four fundamental state principles - included in the constitution in 
972, and also perished the spirit of liberation war and were working for the expansion of 
Weekly Roabbar, 11 December 1983; p. 29. 
The Bangladesh Observer, 26 March 1975. 
Abul Fazal Huq, Government and Politics of Bangladesh; p. 347. 
Bangladesh Times, 23 October 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 22 October 1983. 
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capitalism in the countiy. So, the aim of the BAKSAL is to bring about a 'national democratic 
revolution' to free the country from the grip of imperialism and capitalist exploitation^^'. 
BAKSAL opined that for the establishment of socialism, there is a need to develop 
class consciousness, imity and leadership in the workers, peasant and common masses. It 
believed that it is not possible to bring about a revolution through any particular class of the 
country. To ensure such revolution, there is a need of unity and assemblage of the anti-
imperialist democratic force including the peasants, workers, middle-class, intellectuals and 
all other people of different occupation. The BAKSAL proclaimed that its target is to build up 
a 'revolutionary democratic party' to bring about a 'national democratic revolution' and to 
establish a socialist social-structure through establishing the democracy of the exploited 
people. In an aim to bring about the 'national democratic revolution', BAKSAL declared 
some pressing party programs. Among the many, some of the important party objectives are 
given below^ (i) TTie re-establishment of the constitution of 1972. (ii) Administrative 
decentralization; and in village to district level, the formation of a democratic administration 
by coordinating the elected public representatives, trained government servants, and the 
representation from different occupation and class, (iii) The formation of multi-purpose 
compulsory cooperative society in every village, (iv) To obstruct the influx of the imperialist 
capital investment, (v) To develop the state owned investment sector as the main investment 
sector, (vi) To nationalize all the invest making organizations including banks, insurance 
companies, basic and heavy industries, and foreign trading, (vii) To fix up the highest 
limitation of income, (viii) To limit the land ceiling up to 50 bighas, a total renovation of land 
system and the distribution of the government-own lands to the land-less farmers, (ix) 
Separation of judiciary from the administrative division and to decentralize the judiciary 
division, (x) To build up the armed force as the patriotic peoples army. 
At the beginning of the 1983, to initiate the anti-Ershad regime movement, 15-party 
alliance was formed under the leadership of AL. Though by defecting from AL, A. Razzaq 
group formed BAKSAL, it joined the AL led 15-party alliance and continued its anti-
autocratic movement. In 1986, on the issue of participating in the parliamentary election, the 
15-party alliance was divided and by opposing the pro-elections policy of AL, pro-China 
leftist parties formed a separate 5-party alliance. BAKSAL preferred to remain in the 8-party 
alliance led by AL^^ .^ On the issue, the party was also divided as the main-stream BAKSAL 
led by Mohiuddin and A. Razzaq boycotted the election and Sardar Amzad Hossain and Shah 
Mohammad Abu Jafar led small faction of the party joined the AL-led 8-party election 
alliance. However, Amzad Hossain and Abu Jafar led BAKSAL won three seats in the 
election. Later on, this faction of BAKSAL joined the Jatia Party of President Ershad^ '^*. 
With lot of hope BAKSAL was floated. The workers and leaders of the party had lot 
of confidence on A. Razzaq, the moving spirit of this group and that time best organizer in 
Bangladesh politics, that he would show his wonderfiil magic to give dynamism to the new 
organization, to make it the real successor of Mujib's AL. But all the good dreams of the 
followers of A. Razzaq proved futile. The party failed to build up a well organized 
organizational structure. It soon engrossed in multiple factionalism. Though, as the 
Organizing Secretary (during 1972-75) and General Secretary of AL, A. Razzaq had proved 
his organizational exigency, had shovm his excellence as the real organizer but because of his 
political colleagues' tendency of defecting the party, he failed to strengthen the political base 
Abul Fazal Huq, Government and Politics of Bangladesh; p. 348. 
" I See the Proclamation paper of BAKSAL published in 1983. 
Amzad Hossain, Politics and Political Parties of Bangladesh, p. 198. 
Weekly Roabbar, 15 July 1990; p. 14. Also Abul Fazal Huq, Government and Politics; op. cit., p. 349. 
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of BAKSAL. Since the formation of BAKSAL party, in 1983, many of the party leaders and 
workers, by leaving the BAKSAL platform, returned to the mainstream AL. Among the 
prominent of them Colonel (ret.) Sawkat Ali, S.M. Yusuf, Shafiqul Aziz Mukul etc leaders 
names were mentionable. Since 1990, among the remaining, Monaem Sarkar, Laisuzzaman 
and many others were also contemplating to join main stream AL^^^ Weekly Roabber wrote -
the workers of AL are also considering that by losing skilled and hard working organizer A. 
Razzaq, the organizational activities of the party is hampered. To give dynamism to the party, 
those who were instrumental to oust A. Razzaq, now one section of them wants to get back 
him in the party^^^. Since the last of 1988, the Indian friends of Hasina also felt the necessity 
of A. Razzaq in A^. So, they put pressure on Hasina and A. Razzaq to merge the later with 
the former^^ . On the other hand, even after the defection of A. Razzaq group from AL, the 
infighting in the party did not reduced. After the 1991 election defeat of AL, the old guards of 
the party led by Dr. Kamal challenged the leadership of S. Hasina. In this time to comer the 
old-guard leaders, Hasina became active to get back A. Razzaq in the party^^®. Daily Star 
wrote, "The merger process was initiated after the defeat of AL in the 27 February 
parliamentary election. The working committee of the AL and the BAKSAL in the post-
election evaluation resolved that the debacle of the AL in the election was due to the split 
among the soldiers of Bangabandhu.... A meeting between AL chief S. Hasina and the 
BAKSAL leader A. Razzaq was held in New Delhi with Congress leader Pronob Mukheijee 
when both of them went to India to attend the cremation of Indian leader Rajiv Gandhi.... At 
that meeting, the two leaders decided to work united"^^^. In the 1991 parliamentary election, 
the BAKSAL won five seats out of 300. However,, in August 1991 the BAKSAL of A. 
Razzaq was merged with AL^^". 
Because of various reasons, the BAKSAL could not survive with its own entity. The 
reasons are: (a) The BAKSAL pledged to establish the democracy of the exploited i.e. to 
establish socialism in the country. But according to Marxist theory, without the leadership of 
proletariats and a cadre based organization, communist revolution is not possible. Those, who 
were with BAKSAL, were the former members of nationalist AL party and none of them 
were from the proletariats. Rather, the leadership of BAKSAL came from the higher class, 
middle class and business section of the society. It is not possible to convert a mass based 
political party into a cadre based political party overnight, (b) On the context of Bangladesh 
as an ideology, BAKSAL was not suitable. Though, in 1920, the Communist Party of India 
was formed but in the Muslim society of Bangladesh, it could never build up its base. The 
Bengali Muslims treated socialism as an anti-religious ideology. Due to the 1974 famine and 
subsequent governing regimes strong anti-BAKSAL propaganda, even towards the name 
Weekly Roabbar, 15 July 1990; p. 14. 
Weekly Roabbar, 15 July 1990; pp. 14-15. 
Weekly Holiday, 18 November 1988. The weekly further wrote that the process of merging BAKAL with 
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Weekly Roabbar, 4 August 1991; p. 34. 
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'BAKSAL', the masses of the country had lot of discontent. Moreover, according to A. 
Razzaq, after the downfall of the communism in East Europe in the 80s, socialism lost its 
appeal in tlie masses"'. In 1990, the BAKSAL General Secretary admitted, "People did not 
accept one party system and we have also rejected". The socio-economic programs of 
BAKSAL, however,, should be implemented for the welfare of the people^^^. (c) We may tell 
the AL leaders, who later formed BAKSAL, the Fabian Socialist. To organize the support 
base of a socialist party, the level of sacrifice needed - probably no one of the BAKSAL 
leaders were ready for that. They felt comfortable as the big leaders of a big party. Because of 
the uncertain future of BAKSAL no one of them was ready to remain with it - all were eager 
to return to the main stream AL. (d) From the beginning AL was busy to create splits in the 
BAKSAL. The propaganda of the AL leaders, their secret communication with the central and 
lower level leaders of BAKSAL encouraged the bigger segment of BAKSAL leaders-workers 
to come back to the mainstream AL. A big section of the BAKSAL leaders and workers were 
not ready to leave AL. They defected from AL due to their involvement with A. Razzaq 
group. But their love for the old party AL and the organizational weakness of BAKSAL easily 
encouraged them for coming back to the main stream AL. (e) After the formation of 
BAKSAL, since 1983, it was facing internal conflicts. So, for the survival of the AL, the 
position of Hasina as the successor of Bangabandhu became acceptable to many of the 
BAKSALites. (f) In 1983, Ershad regime floated its own party accumulating the defected 
leaders firom different political parties. Like General Zia, General Ershad was also 
encouraging factionalism and splits in opposition parties. To get the test of power, a good 
number of BAKSALites joined Generl Ershad's Jatia Party^^^. To save the remaining 
strength, probably, A. Razzaq and Mohiuddin needed to merge themselves with AL. (g) The 
huge amount of money needed to run the party - A. Razzaq-Mohiuddin group did not have 
that amount. As a result, the organizational activity of the BAKSAL was slowed down^ '^*. 
Mainly, the high-eagemess of the BAKSALites to join AL was the main reason of dissolving 
the party. Many of the political parties are surviving in the political arena of Bangladesh 
without having a single seat in the parliament. Rather, the performance of BAKSAL was 
much better than any of the other small political parties of the country in the 1986 and 1991 
parliamentary elections. But a careful study of those days' newspapers shows that the 
BAKSALites used to give more importance in their contemplation for their merger with AL, 
rather, to strengthen the BAKSAL platform. However,, it was proved for another time that 
whoever left AL he/ they only ruined their career. By leaving the party, A. Razzaq, Mizan 
Chowdhury etc could not flourish themselves politically. 
Interviw with A. Razzaq. 
New Nation, 6 February 1990. 
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Factionalism in AL during 1983 to 93 
The beginning of the anti-Military regime movement: Since 1982 the country was in the grip 
of the Martial Law. It was facing crisis on socio-economic front. The people had no political 
right. To solve these gigantic problems, to compel the military regime to restore the people's 
democratic and economic right, it was needed to launce a strong opposition movement. For 
that there was urgent need of national unity in the leadership of major opposition parties of 
the country. To start an anti-regime movement for the realization of democracy, on December 
1982 under the leadership of AL, 15 leftist and democratic parties formed a united platform 
(Alliance)'. Just after that at tlie middle of 1983 another 7-party Alliancc emerged in the 
political scene of the country under the leadership of BNP^. But at that time, AL, BNP and all 
the opposition parties were plunged into infighting and were broken because of (a) all of the 
party leaderships failure to put up an end to the basic controversies inside their respective 
parties and (b) because of some of the opposition leaders' personal opportunistic tendency to 
manage the ministerial and other posts through joining the governing regime. These 
factionalism and splits only served the interest of the military regime of the country; both the 
alliance failed to discharge the responsibilities for the nation and could not initiate any 
pragmatic pro-people movement till the last of 1983. However, weekly Roabbar wrote down 
some points for why AL was unable to create effective anti-regime movements^: (a) 
leadership conflict inside the party prevented it from taking any pro-people activities. AL was 
much more busy in solving leadership conflict than thinking for future movement; (b) the 
front organizations such as student, youth, labor and peasant wings of the party used to 
provide militant workers- who were the vital force in any anti-regime movement, were also in 
a bad shape due to internal conflict; (c) AL was indecisive in taking any concrete decision 
because of its self-contradiction in itself, in its party program. On the one hand it was 
promising parliamentary democracy if it will come to power; on the other hand,, it was not 
ready to leave its one party BAAKSAL system from its political program. Both BAKSAL and 
parliamentary democracy cannot go together; (d) the activities of the party failed to build up 
public confidence over it. So AL's call for movement could not create any kind of enthusiasm 
in the people. 
Though the political parties were lagging behind to satisfy the democratic aspiration of 
the people, the students came to the lead of all other section of the people in ventilating 
grievances of the Bangladesh society. A Chatra Sangram Parisad (Students Action 
Committee) composed by the component parties of the 15-party alliance and defying the 
military regimes ban on political activities started movement to achieve their limited 
demands. In February 1983, the student movement reached a crucial stage- it was the first 
violent challenge to the military regimes authority. The success it had achieved so far already 
attracted the notice of all concerned to the student movement as a part of the political struggle 
Weekly Holiday, 25 December 1982. The other components of the 15-Party Alliance were JSD, Gono Azadi 
League, Bangladesh Samajtantrik Dal, Workers Party, NAP (Harun), NAP (Muzaffar), CPB, Sammobadi Dal, 
Jatia Ekota Party, Sramik Krishak Samajtantrik Dal, BSD (Mahabubul Huq), and Majdur Party. On December 
1982, the Mizan group of AL also joined the alliance but on 1983 when the government sponsored Janadal was 
floated Mijanur Rahmans faction of AL mergered with the governing party. On the other hand, on October 1983, 
after the formation of BAKSHAL by the defected group of AL, it joined the 15-Party alliance. 
I Weekly Bichitra, 28 November 1983. 
^ Weekly Roabbar, 31 January 1982. 
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for democracy'*. There was a hidden support of the 15-party alliance in the movement^ Now 
the situation obviously demanded direct intervention from the political leadership in the tussle 
with the government. It was clearly a political obligation of AL and other opposition parties to 
take up the cause of the movement for democracy. But because of the continuous infighting in 
AL and other components of the alliance and because of some of the top AL leaders' secret 
intrigue with the regime to frustrate the student movement^, the 15 party alliances failed to 
coordinate the student movement properly in the general framework of its movement. As a 
result, the movement certainly suffered an avoidable jolt. By killing some and injuring great 
many students, finally,, the regime suppressed it. But still then Ershad wished to come into a 
conciliatory agreement. A. Rahman mentioned that the distressing incident of mid-February 
produced noticeable change in the policy decisions of the regime which thus allowed indoor 
politics of the political parties from April 1,1983 and General Ershad invited the opposition 
party leaders to have a dialogue on the country's socio-political and constitutional issues'. 
The split of A. Razzaq group from AL in October 1983 ended the ideological conflict 
inside AL; the party was thought to be freed from any grave factional conflict. After the mass 
defection of the opportunist leaders from the party under the Khaleda Zia's leadership, the 
BNP was slowly reorganizing itself Meanwhile, both the opposition alliance led by AL and 
BNP came forward in articulating anti-regime movement but the mutual difference between 
the two alliances prevented them from building up a common platform. With regard to the 
fundamental constitutional question of government system, the 15-Party alliance demanded 
parliamentary democracy while the 7-Party alliance presidential multi-party democracy. 
Keeping their mutual opposition stands, the two political alliance came to an understanding 
by August 1983 to work together for projecting a resemblance of unity. Accordingly, they 
decided to launch an anti- regime movement together and formulate a common Five-point 
demand^. Since then, the demands of the oppositions grew louder and louder. In favor of their 
demands, they called several strikes, arranged meetings and rallies. Sheikh Hasina and 
Khalida Zia emerged as the leaders of national stature through this anti-regime agitation 
politics of 5-point even though they were yet to organize their own party^. In 1983, Ershad 
regime floated its own party Janadal and since then was trying to hold national election to 
legitimize his government. He preferred a presidential election before the parliamentary polls 
to get a confirm victory over the opposition. But both the two major opposition alliances were 
not agreeable to participate in any elections offered by the regime unless their conditions were 
duly met. To demonstrate their views, the opposition involved in continuous movement. But 
these anti-government movements failed to generate a popular response due to the prevailing 
difference between the alliances & because of still persisting jealousy and distrust between the 
\ Weekly Holiday, 12 February 1982. 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 106. 
Zohra, Imtiaz and Baber Aliwere involved in the intregue with the governing regime to frustrated the students 
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Md. Ataur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1983 A Turning Point for the Military", Asian Survey, Vol.24 No.2, 
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two main leaders (Sheikh Hasina and Khakeda Zia) of the two alliances.Sirajul Islam 
commented, " in fact, the AL and BNP sought each others destructions during the movement 
phase as much as they desired the downfall of the Ershad regime"'". Ziring wrote, "The open 
rivalry and bitterness exhibited between the ladies leading the chief opposition movements 
were a boon to the Ershad forces"". Though both the alliances were involved in movement to 
realize five-point demand but till 1986 parliamentary election, they could not come to one 
platform. Ershad regime used its repressive forces to quell the movements. As a result, a 
number of the opposition workers died and many more were injured; normal political 
activities were suspended time to time to suppress the movement. However, the movement 
was partially successful as by using his maximum effort, Ershad could not held any 
presidential or parliamentary election till 1986 in the presence of the opposition parties' 
resistance. 
The formation of Jatia Party and the 1986 parliamentary election: Though Ershad could not 
arrange any national election till 1986 but to consolidate his position and to raise his support 
base without any significant resistance from the opposition. In March 1985 he arranged a 
countrywide referendum and in May held Upojella (local government) polls. The parties, 
which had been leading the movement for restoration of democracy and civil rule, could do 
nothing to prevent the regime from conducting election'^. When the regime felt the Janadal 
was not organized enough to fulfill its political purpose abandoning it on January, 1986, it 
floated another Jatia (National) Party, a much more broad platform, merging some more 
political parties and individuals with his old party Janadal . 
TTie principal opposition were already on record that they would oppose any election 
conducted under the strictures of martial law. With the lifting of a ten-month ban on political 
activities on l " January 1986, the two mainstream opposition alliances announced a 
coordinated program of 'direct action' to overthrow the military regime unless there was an 
announcement of a definite polling date for parliamentary elections on the alliances own term-
that is, under a caretaker nonmilitary government''*. The other demands of the opposition 
included the withdrawal of martial law, restoration of fundamental rights etc. In order to 
organize greater united movement against the regime, the two alliance fortified themselves by 
coming closer and unitedly declared that those would be identified as national betrayer who 
would contest the election under the blueprint of the military government ignoring the five-
point demands. The two alliances also expressed determination to resist them socially and 
politically'^. In Marchl986, the General announced the date for the third parliamentary 
election. With this declaration, the date of national parliamentary polls was changed for the 
sixth time since 1983. In order to convince the major opposition parties the regime accepted 
See Syed Serajul Islam, "Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase"; Asian Survey, Vol. 27 No.2, February 
1987, p. 165. 
Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad, p. 181. 
S.R. Chakrabarti, Bangladesh Under Mujib, Zia and Ershad: Dilemma of a new nation, p. 165. 
Keeping an eye on the future national elections, the regime organized in the middle of August, 1985 a 
political alliance named Jatia Front. The front was a conglomeration of opportunist politicians coming from 
different political parties and parties and party factions including Janadal, ML (Siddique Group), Shah Aziz 
faction of BNP, Kazi Zafars United People's Party. The Jatia Party was a conglomeration of all these parties 
excluding the Shah Aziz faction of the BNP. See A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh 
Politics, p. 115. Also see Ittefaq, Sangbad, 2 January 1986. 
Syed Serajul Islam, "Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase", Asian Survey, Vol.27 No. 2, February 
1987. 
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some of the demands of the opposition including that of holding of presidential polls after the 
completion of the parliamentary election. 
Since long some of the component parties of the 15-Party alliance were interested to 
participate the parliamentary elections. They had an observation that if all the opposition 
challenge the ruling regime in a body they would get a definite win over it. According to their 
plan, the CPB proposed both the alliance leaders (Hasina and Khalida) to contest in 150 seats 
each to defeat the regime in the election'^. When the two leading ladies of the alliance decidcd 
to contest in 150 seats each under one symbol as a tactics to quash the government bid to 
legalize its illegal power, the government going against its commitment, amended the sacred 
constitution'^ After the failure of this bid, some of the component of 15-party alliance, 
including CPB, recently unified NAP, NAP (Mujaffar), Workers Party (Nazrul) etc still 
believed that boycotting the coming election would be a big blunder. From their past 
experience they noted that even though opposition boycott the election together, in this time 
the regime would be able to conduct the election. So it would be a better step for the 22 
parties (15-party alliance and 7-party alliance together) in opposition to participate the 
election jointly in a alliance and nominate only one common candidate in each 300 
constituencies to get the peoples verdict against the military regime. On the other hand,, some 
of the parties of this alliance opposed this proposal. Among them were Sramik Krishak 
Samajbadi Dal, BSD (Mahbub), BSD (Khalei, Workers Party (Menon), JSD (Siraj -Inu) and 
Sammabadi Dal'®. 
Like that of the 15-Party alliance, there was pro-election and anti-election lobby in the 
AL itself. The youth leaders of the AL, who were also known as militant followers of Sheikh 
Hasina, were against in the participation of the coming election. But still then they were weak 
in the new organizational set-up of the party after the defection of A. Razzaq group from AL, 
whereas the old-guard leadership led by Dr. Kamal Hossain was in favor of it. This pro-
election lobby of the AL central leaders also intensified its activities to influence a section of 
the rank and file in favor of participation in election. AL presidium members A. Mannan, 
Zohra Tajuddin, AL's acting G.S Sajeda Chwdhury etc senior leaders, were supporting him. It 
is mentionable here, in an extended meeting of AL held on S"' February, 1985 when Hasina 
was giving an anti-election speech, the pro-election group made hue and cry in there and 
embarrassed the AL president'^. Moreover, after the election declaration by the President, 
even a group of senior leaders led by presidium member Dr. Kamal had met President Ershad 
and reached an understanding on taking part in election. Sajeda and A. Mannan accompanied 
Kamal in the meeting with the General 
Following the election announcement, 15-Party alliance leaders assembled in a 
meeting. The meeting witnessed exchange of hot words between protagonists and antagonists 
of election. They were reviewing pros and cons of the issue^'. The anti- election lobby of the 
alliance argued that taking a decision to participate in the election bypassing the five- point 
demands would not be acceptable to the people. They also said that the people made it clear 
repeatedly in the past by observing many successftil hartals (strikes). They favored joining the 
polls along with Ae 7-party Alliance, which was in favor of boycotting the election. On the 
other hand, the senior AL leaders argument was that in 1985, it had been seen though all the 
Dainik Bangia, 16 March 1986. 
Dainik Bangia, 16 March 1986. Also POT- Bangladesh Series, 2 April 1986, p. 786. 
Dainik Bangia, 16 March 1986. 
Weekly Roabbar, 27 April 1986; p. 17. 
Dainil Bangia and The New Nation, 22 March 1986. 
The New Nation, 22 March 1986. 
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opposition boycotted the elections, they could not resist the regime from holding up Upojilla 
elections and referendum. By holding the elections, the regime availed opportunity to raise up 
a political base for itself in the country. So overthrowing the regime would be virtually 
impossible through strike, processions and rallies and therefore, the party should take part in 
the election. Considering the past failure, the AL and 15-party alliance should participate the 
coming election. The youth leaders of AL and other four pro-left alliance component leaders 
tried to resist the decision but their voice was drowned when the powerful senior AL leaders 
threatened Sheikh Hasina to quit the party in a body/ united if the decision in favor of election 
was not taken^^. India had mentionable influence of AL and S. Hasina had personal weakness 
to India. India also created pressure on AL to participate the election^^. Finally, in response to 
the declaration of the third parliament election schedule by Ershad, AL led 15-Party alliance 
and JI decided to participate in the polls. Defending the party decision, Dr. Kamal said, it was 
consistent with the spirit of the 5-point demands for the realization of which it had been 
struggling for the past four years. He further said that alternative to election would have 
caused violence and blood shed of unprecedented magnitude. That would have jeopardized 
people's aspiration for peaceful transition fi:om martial law to democracy and might have 
endangered the very existence of the country "^*. AL president said, " We have taken the 
election as the part of the ongoing movement"^^. She further said that the 15-party alliance 
including her party considered the participation in the ensuing election as a challenge to put 
an end to martial law with the pledge to carry forward the movement for the restoration of lost 
rights of the people^^. Defending her pro-election decision she also told, "... Ershad wanted to 
keep us away and score like his "guru" Ziaul Huq (the Pakistani President) in the empty field. 
But we did not allow him as he did away with Upojilla polls and referendum. We take it as a 
challenge to bring an end to maritial law We have taken it up as a new style of movement 
as we have failed in our traditional movement to end martial law during the last four years^^. 
However, Sheikh Hasina's announcement to participate in the polls sparked a crisis 
inside the alliance and inside her own militant followers. The raging debate over the 
participation in the May 7,1986 parliamentary polls cracked the fragile unity inside JSD 
(Shahjahan Siraj- Inu), one of the component of the 15-Party alliance, when party President 
Shajahan Siraj and G.S Hasanul Huq Inu took sides respectively with pro and anti election 
stand and both of them announced their decision in the newspaper. For the third time, JSD 
was divided again and two new JSD was formed under the leadership of Shajahan Siran and 
Hasanul Huq Inu^ ®. Some of the parties, since long who were opposing to participate in any 
election, diverting from the alliance's five-point demands, in a meeting informed Sheikh 
Hasina that they were not agreed in principle with her decision in favor of election. Any 
election avoiding the five-point demands would not be acceptable to the people^^. They also 
said that avoiding a unanimous decision of 15-party alliance those who imposed their party 
^^ The New Nation, 23March 1986. 
Weekly Roabbar wrote, AL agreed to participate in the election by the suggestion of India and Jammat 
participated due to the advice of Saudi Arabia. Weekly Roabbar, 27 April 1986; pp 20 and 18. 
The New Nation, 24 March 1986. 
Daily Ittefaq, 15 June 1986. 
^^ The New Nation, 23 March 1986 
The New Nation, 5 April 1986. 
Ittefaq and New Nation, 3 February 1986. According to New Nation in this split Inu was benefited. Only 10 
Executive Committee members out of 27 followed Shajahan while Inu was enjoying the backing of 17 members 
and almost totally commanded the militant shidents wing BCL (Shireen-Mustaq) of the party. 
Daily Ittefaq, 23 March 1986. 
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decision over the alliance it was not possible to maintain political unity with them^°. Later, on 
this issue, these five anti-election components of the 15-party alliance broke away from the 
group and formed another five- Party alliance^'. They strongly criticized the AL and its 8-Paty 
alliance and said that we will not participate the election to legalize an illegal government^^. 
In another occasion they said, by taking decision in favor of election, AL and 8-Party alliance 
uhimately betrayed the people's movement for the realization of the five-point demands. They 
further said, on the name of 15 party alliance, some of the leaders imposed their decision upon 
the people and had broken the unity of opposition parties. They also mentioned it a deceptive 
decision^^. 
AL and other 8-parties of the 15-party alliance decided to form an electoral alliance to 
compete the incoming election '^*. The difference over the sharing of seats among the 9-parties 
of the 15-party alliance also led to another split in 15- party alliance. The BAKSAL, another 
dominant component of the 15-Party alliance, was insisting for 30 seats to nominate its own 
candidates but AL, the mother party of BAKSAL, was not in any way ready to give it more 
than 22 seats. As it failed to reach in any understanding with the dominant partner in the pro-
election 9-party alliance, the party decided to keep out itself from election race. In an oblique 
reference the BAKSAL said that certain parties showing a 'big-brotherly attitude' jeopardized 
the unity of the 15-party alliance to set up agreed candidates^ . Accusing AL president, 
BAKSAL president said that by not nominating the able candidates, she nominated as many 
as 16 of her own family members and relatives on the name of 15-party alliance candidates^^. 
The party also added, all the election procedure had been done in line with the government 
scheme. The participation of 15-Party alliance encouraged government efforts to legitimize its 
rule; the dominant section of the 15-Party alliance had become nothing but its helping hand in 
the perpetuation of its power. Under this circumstances, BAKSAL foresaw no alternative but 
to wage a struggle for the realization of five-point demand of the people^^. BAKSAL leaders 
decided to pull themselves out of elections but not from the alliance. However, differing with 
the central executive committee decision, a small faction of BAKSAL party leaders led by 
Sardar Amjad Hossain and Prof. Abu Sayeed opted for fighting the polls under the 15-Party 
alliance. A. Razzaq said, that list of nominees of 8-Party alliance including some from 
BAKSAL was a conspiratorial and motivated^®. Later, the dissident BAKSAL leaders were 
also suspended fi-om the party for participating in the May election ignoring the party 
decision^'. Finally, the AL formed an electoral alliance with the 8-parties and a faction of 
BAKSAL belonging to 15-party alliace''® 
The AL and its 15-party alliance's decision to participate the election also broke the 
larger unity of 22 party alliances i.e. the unity of 15-party alliance and 7-party alliance. BNP 
'".Weekly Roabbar, 27 April 1986; p. 19. 
Bangladesh Observer, 26 March 1986.The five-Party alliance led by Rased Khan Menon included included 
Workers Party (Menon), Sramik Krishok Sammayabadi Dal, JSD (Inu), BSD (Khaleq), and BSD (Mahbub). 
Daily Ittefaq, 25 March 1986. 
Dainik Bangla, 26 March 1986. 
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led alliance was stuck to its poll boycott decision and condemned the AL for forming an 
"unholy alliance" with the military regime and for betraying the unity of the opposition'". In 
an oblique reference to AL the BNP leader, Khaleda said, this party was going to legalize the 
illegal government through a farcical election keeping BNP and other nationalist parties out of 
the election race"*^ . The BNP led alliance set pre-conditions for their participation in the polls 
- restoration of fundamental rights, release of all political prisoners, and the annulment of the 
judgment against politicians convicted under martial law'* . But General Ershad flatly refused 
to concede any of these demands. His main objective was perhaps to confirm AL's 
participation in the election to show the donor countries that the major opposition parties also 
contested in it. However, the 7-party alliance did not face any major setback within its fold on 
the polls issue'*'*. Only the Democratic Party (A. Rouf) did not agreed with the stand of the 
alliance. The general trend of the public opinion was apparently sympathetic to the 7-party 
alliance for its consistency and principled stand on participation of elections on the basis of 
five-point demands'*^. In fact, the AL's departure for its commitment to the movement caused 
much more damage to the opposition than the Ershad regime had been able to accomplish in 
four years. 
However, the AL did not get any concession from the government. It was seen that on 
the Election Day, congenial environment was hampered because of the prevalence of 
violence, involvement of hoodlums, ballot box hijacking and the like. Obviously, AL raised 
allegations against the regime for committeeing vote robbery, rigging and conducting a media 
coup'* .^ It also demanded recounting of votes and re-elections in those constituencies where 
unfair means had been adopted by ruling regime'* .^ The election result was not satisfactory to 
the AL. The election resuh saw the JP victorious with 153 seats out of 300. the AL came up as 
the major parliamentary opposition with 76 seats followed by Jammat- e- Islami with 10 seats. 
Among the other parties, NAP (unified) won 5, CPB 5, ML 4, JSD (Rob) 4, BAKSAL 
(Amjad-Sayeed) 3, JSD (Siraj) 3, Workers Party 3, NAP (Mujaffar) 2 and independents 32. 
After the election, the IP's strength in the parliament rose to 208 when 23 of the 32 
independents joined the JP and it obtained 30 'reserved' women's seats and two additional 
seats in the by-election'*^ 
See Syed Serajul Islam, "Bangladesh in 1986: Entering a New Phase"; Asian Survey, Vol. 27 No.2, February 
1987, p. 166. It was remarkable that as many as 167 ex-BNP ministers, leaders and MP's were nominated by JP 
to contest the election. Among the mentionable of them were Dr. Matin, Lt. Co. Jafar Imam, A.K.M. Mydul 
Islam, Ruhul Amin Howlader, Samsul Huda Chowdhury etc. For more detail see Weekly Roabbar, 13 April 
1986, p . l l . 
Daily New Nation, 13 April 1986. 
Bangladesh Observer, 6 April 1986. The last condition was vital for the BNP nine of its national leaders, who 
were ministers in the government ousted by Ershad regime in 1982, were convicted on various charges, 
including corruption, and were prohibited from contesting elections for five years. For this see Syed Serajul 
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The post-election polarization inside AL: Who was benefited from the election? General 
Ershad needed to civilianize his government. By this election, he succeeded in his design. He 
also needed recognition of his government by the opposition parties. The participation of the 
major opposition parties except BNP in the election under the military rule ultimately 
recognize not only Ershad's military regime but also opened the path for it to legalize its all 
previous undemocratic deeds by the parliament- in which the JP had a overwhelming 
majority. General Ershad needed to create rift in the growing opposition movement and the 
AL's departure for its commitment to the movement caused much more damage to the 
opposition than the Ershad regime had been able to accomplish in four years. Since the 
beginning of the anti-regime movement, the two ladies of the two alliances were engaged in 
personal image building competition. The 1986 election boycott of Khaleda was appreciated 
by the people on principle and she was able to build up an image of "uncompromising leader" 
in masses. After the election, she was able to say that BNP's stand on election proved correct 
and without a neutral caretaker government, any free and fair election could not be possible"* .^ 
AL's participation in the election and the subsequent election defeat tarnished the image of 
Sheikh Hasina a lot. A senior leader said that Sheikh Hasina,s leadership was questionable 
and it would come under fire in the coming council meeting. He further said, her change of 
mind in favor of participation in the parliamentary election within five hours after President 
Ershad's announcement of the date had taken the party workers and leaders aback. This not 
only isolated the workers from the people but the leadership also lost the credibility^®. There 
was some positive side for AL in the election. It gave the AL an opportunity to show that even 
eleven years after Mujib's death, it was still capable of attracting voters. The AL had gained 
its popularity through its anti-government agitations during the previous four and half years. 
This is clear evidence from the fact that the AL won only 39 seats in the 1979 parliamentaiy 
election compared with 76 seats in 1986. 
In the national level AL and S. Hasinas image was tarnished because of AL's pro-
election decision vis-a-vis other dominant opposition party, BNP and its leader, Khalida's 
popularity enhanced remarkably because of party leader Khaleda's election boycott policy, 
even though, it did not have enough strong grass root organization like that of AL. However, 
in the party's internal politics, the picture was totally different. Centering the parliamentary 
election issue, a clear polarization took place in the party between the youth and old guard 
leadership. Hasina and his faithfiil youth militant group were seen gaining ground over the old 
guard leaders fragile position in the party forum in the post- election scenario. In the election, 
maximum of the senior AL leaders, who played major role in favor of participating the 
election, were defeated badly while the anti-election youth leaders success list was large. The 
prominent AL leaders who lost the polls were party presidium members Dr Kamal, A. 
Mannan, A. Momen, A. Samad Azad, Matiur Rahman, party acting secretary Sajeda 
Chowdhury, joint secretary Amir Hossain Amu and Sheikh Abdul Aziz etc. Zohra Tajuddin 
did not contest from any seat because of the resistance from the workers probably for her 
alleged relation with the military regime. Among the senior leaders, only Zillur Rahman and 
A. Malek Ukil succeeded in the election but inside the party forum, both were known as the 
pro-Hasina elements. Among the other mentionable pro-Hasina youth leaders, Mohammed 
Nasim, Mostafa Mohammad Montu, Joinal Hazary won the election. Moreover, S. Hasina 
showed her best performance by winning all the three parliamentary seats she contested^'. 
Bangladesh Observer, 12 May 1986. in 1991 parliamentary election her image as the 'uncompromising 
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There was another reason for her happiness that under her leadership, the AL won 76 seats 
compare with 39 seats in 1979 parliamentary election. Weekly Roabbar wrote, in a press 
conference, S. Hasina was seen proud and happy for her individual election performance. But 
Dr. Kamal, who was sitting besides Hasina, was looking depressed (because of his election 
defeat in both the constituencies he contested from)". In the election, some youth cadres of 
Hasina group were also defeated; among the mentionable of them were Amir Hossain Amu, 
Abul Hasnat Abdullah, Ilyas Ahmad Chowdhury etc. the defeat of these trusted persons of 
Hasina was definitely a setback for her but she did not worry for that. That's why Weekly 
Roabbar wrote, her main wish was fulfilled through the election defeat of the "uncle group" 
of the party^^. Rather the election success of Tofael worried Sheikh Hasina and the youth 
leaders, as they believed that Tofael was the source of obstruction in building of personal 
image of Sheikh Hasina and it was also truth that in this worse situation of the elders the 
"uncle group" of the party was depending on him heavily to sur\'ive in the internal politics of 
the party^^ 
In the post election, politics AL was busy to reduce the fi^stration and rage of the 
party's defeated leaders, workers and the supporters. They were unhappy both on party 
decision to participate in the election and in its defeat in the election^ . At the same time, both 
the main groups of the party, emerged as the result of the post-1983 days internal grouping 
and regrouping, were also busy to strengthen their respective position. Weekly Roabbar 
wrote, "In 1981 when Hasina was elected the AL president, she had no command over the 
party, in that time she was a puppet in the hand of some of the senior leaders. Meanwhile, in 
these years she build up a group of workers for her. She definitely realized one thing that it is 
very difficult for her to lead those senior leaders who accompanied her father. Many believe, 
Hasina will follow the path of Rajiv Gandhi. Such as Rajiv Gajdhi did not like to move with 
his mother's associates and removed them from party leadership, like that if Hasina comes to 
a decision to leave the old guard leaders, there is nothing to be surprised. This process is 
already seen in AL's internal politics"^^. To get total control over the organization, to 
consolidate her position in the party, Hasina did not feel any hesitation to create an 
environment to remove the influence of the "uncle groups" in 1981 who had been instrumental 
to elect her as party president. So, the post election situation seemed to be running into not 
less controversial phase than the pre-parliamentary election itself. 
The senior group led by Dr. Kamal was silent for few days after their bad performance 
in the election. Then they started lobbying in favor of anti regime movement by boycotting 
the parliament, actually to serve their own ends. They were of the view that the party should 
refrain from attending the parliamentary sessions until re-election was held in at least fifty 
constituencies where violence and rigging had taken place on large scale. Amir Hossain Amu 
and Nasir Ali Khan, who were known for their pro-Hasina leaning, also were favoring the 
parliamentary boycott. They had been defeated in the election and now wanted reelection in 
all the 300 constituencies". Among the influential leaders of the party, who won the electins, 
Weekly Roabbar, 25 May 1986. p. 9. 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 June 1986. P.I 1. The Weekly also wrote that among the youth leaders Nasim, Montu, 
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the Hasina lobby. 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 June 1986. P.l 1. It should be mentionable here that against A. Raz2aq Tofael and senior 
AL leaders had been involved in building personal image of S. Hasina now they were opposing it for the same 
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Tofael Ahmed and Major General (retd.) Khalilur Rahman were favoring the old guard 
leaders' views^®. In a press conference Dr. Kamal told, the parliament which was formed by 
the May election, would not be able to contribute any thing good for the nation^^. 
Subsequently, in another AL workers' meeting in Chittagong, in a strong emotional voice he 
told, "If any one want to sit in the parliament they have to go to there trampling our blood"®°. 
Kamal in a meeting also called upon the elected parliamentary members of his party to think 
over attending the parliamentary sessions with those who managed the parliamentary 
membership by passing the verdict of the people. Referring to the JP MP's, he fijrther said, 
"Those who got elected through ballot robbery would not be allowed to sit in the parliament 
even at the cost of our blood" . However, Kamal suggested that the party should not sit in the 
parliament as a measure of protest against the tailored result. He also called for a continuing 
anti-regime movement to bring an end of martial law and demanded immediate resignation of 
President Ershad". The defeated senior leaders of the party also believed that if the AL 
accepted the role of puppets by participating the parliament, it would be a suicidal decision 
for the party and as a result, of such wrong decision, many of the party workers would depart 
from the party^^. But the same Kamal and the senior leaders had told before the election that 
the party's participation was in consistence with the spirit of 5-point demands^. In a meeting 
of 15-party alliance held on 21 March (before the election) to decide whether the parties 
would go to the polls or not. Dr. Kamal and the senior leaders had even threatened to leave 
the party in case of non-participation in the elections. There was no consistency in Dr. Kamal 
and the senior leaders post-election and pre-election talking. Now they were favoring a 
permanent parliament boycott and a direct action movement to oust the Ershad regime to 
rescue them from a self-made trap. 
In the senior leaders speeches, AL chief and the majority youth leaders, who won the 
parliamentary election, were disturbed. Those, who were elected, were in favor of attending 
the parliamentary sessions. According to the youth leaders, if they were to boycott the 
Parliament then why did the party decided to contest the election? Was not it a sheer wastage 
of money and energy? Out of 76 AL MP's, 70 had this opinion and pressurized S. Hasina to 
take decision in favor of attending the parliamentary sessions Kamal was insulted in the 
Chittagong meeting. It was heard from some of the party workers that they would participate 
in the parliament trampling down the blood of the senior leaders. According to them, Kamal 
pressurized AL for going to the election and now after loosing in the election reversed his 
speech^^. Sheikh Hasina also ignored the demand of boycotting the parliament. She said, "Our 
movement will continue till we can remove martial law from the country. People, who have 
been under martial law for eleven years, needed emancipation. Whatever success we have 
achieved (in this parliamentary election) has to be utilized in fixture for the restoration of 
peoples right"^'. She fiulher said, "We are keen to sit in the parliament. The movement will 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 June 1986, p. 12. 
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continue within and ojutside the Sangsad (Parliament)"^^ She also made it clear that it was 
imperative to join in parliament to achieve the goal for which they had been waging the 
struggle^'. However, Sheikh Hasina also proposed to nominate Dr. Kamal for one of the three 
seats had won by her in the by election to bring him into the parliament. Dr. Kamal, however, 
dismissed it by saying that he would not stand in any by election^". 
However, to decide its stand on the question of par ticipation in the parliament, AL 
called an extended meeting of its Central W.C and also invited the district representatives to 
join it. The five days long meeting witnessed a heated debate enjoining the parliament when 
the old guards of the party, who suffered defeat in the election, emphasize on their views 
against sitting in parliament in view of alleged massive rigging of elections and manipulation 
of results^'. However, the opinion of the district leaders was mixed. Over 150 leaders of 
different organizational districts and the party nominees in the last elections narrated their 
experience of the polls and gave their arguments both in favor and against sitting in the 
parliament. Some had called for going to the parliament on the basis of certain conditions, 
some other observed that in view of the party's gain in terms of the seats it had captured they 
should attend the parliament. A few others also suggested that the party should stay out of the 
parliament as a measure of protest against tailored results^^. However, most of the leaders 
from the grass root level had so far stressed the need for continuing the movement, both inside 
and outside the parliament. The defeated 'soldiers' in the election battle echoed pre-
conditions, which included assurance from the government that martial law would be lifted in 
the first session of the parliament. They also emphasized for fresh polls in constituencies 
where "voting was marred by violence and fraud" as was demanded by party chief Sheikh 
Hasina earlier. However, most of the speaker preferred that Sheik Hasina was likely to be 
empowered to take the final decision on the issue^^. On the concluding day, Hasina said that 
AL had participated the election to end martial law and "we will have to use the crops we've 
harvested in the polls in the face of manifold hurdles" to that end. She further declared, "we 
are in the midst of a movement which will continue. The people of Bangladesh have given 
their verdict to carry forward our struggle to its conclusion"' . In the same day, Kamal in his 
speech demanded the restoration of the snatched away victory. He also called for continuing 
the movement to bring an end of martial law and demanded resignation of President Ershad. 
However, the party W.C could not come to any concrete decision by this extended meeting. 
It is true in the lower level leaders and workers on the issue of pro-election decision 
and due to the election defeat there was disappointment and fhistration and they were angry 
on Ershad regime for vote-piracy, but in the post election political scenario the party was not 
in a position to join only the anti-regime movement to oust General Ershad by staying out of 
the parliament. Because, meanwhile, the BNP, the main competitor of AL for governing 
power among the opposition parties, already declared that its stand on polls proved correct'^. 
People also had the same feeling. If in this moment, AL was going to join BNP to realize a 
Dainik Janata, 21 May 1986. 
Weekly Holiday, 23 May 1986. 
Dainik Janata, 21 May 1986. 
Bangladesh Observer, 25 May 1986. 
New Nation, 26 and 29 May 1986. 
New Nation, 26,27 and 29 May 1986. 
^ New Nation, 29 May 1986. 
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with them. They did not participate the farce election at all. She further stated that those who won the election 
and those who had lost the same were ail demanding fresh election reflecting amply well what kind of elections 
were held on May. See Bangladesh Observer, 12 May 1986. 
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single issue that is to remove Ershad from power tlien it had to accept a moral defeat in the 
eyes of the masses. Immediately, the question would be raised, if AL believed that there was 
no use of participating the parliament, then why did not it oppose the election by joining the 
decision of BNP? Why had they broken the greater unity of the opposition, which was formed 
to realize 5-point demands? For why they joined an election, if they stay out of the 
parliament? There was anodier personal reason of Hasina tliat she was grateful to hidia and 
Gandhi family and as her 'Indian friends' advised her that AL should participate in the 
parliament sessions'^; she was favoring to participate in the parliament. Weekly Roabbar 
wrote, without going to the parliament, there was no alternative for AL. Since, AL had taken 
the election as a challenge against the military rule of General Ershad, in the same way now, it 
had to go to the parliament to challenge the military regime as a part of movement. Because 
of these reasons for AL now it would not be easy to build up a street movement as the BNP 
already had made that difficult for it^ .^ 
Even after the extended meeting, Hasina was still facing resistance from the party's 
old guards for not to join the parliament, rather, they were trying to take the party along the 
course of anti-regime movement to oust Ershad^^. The public opinion was also favoring the 
senior group. The senior group still was strong enough in the central committee and in the 
presidium. All these placed Sheikh Hasina in a, somewhat, disadvantageous position. She was 
inclined to go-slow so as to allow the crisis to blow over. However, the young MP's once 
attended the parliament and taken oath only to register their names and then again continued 
their parliament boycott^ ®. As a compromise formula for going to Parliament, AL imposed 
seven pre-conditions to fulfill by the government. The major issues of the 7-point conditions 
were: (1) immediate withdrawal of martial law, (2) those whose election wins were turned 
into defeat by terrorism and election rigging etc, they have to be declared elected and (3) 
formation of enquiry committees on the killing of Sheikh Mujib as well as four leaders in the 
jail. After the presidential election, which was held in the same year (1986) in the boycott of 
all the major opposition parties, president Ershad only withdrawn martial law and did not pay 
attention to any other demands of AL^". However, the pre and post-election difference, inside 
AL, polarized the party stalwarts into two visible factions. In the next council session 
definitely a bitter reflection of this bitter difference would be reflected. 
The difference in AL led 8-partv alliance: A major difference was also apparent in the 8-party 
alliance led by AL. Confronting the alliance decision meanwhile, JSD (Siraj) and defected 
section of BAKSAL led by Sardar Amjad Hossain joined the parliament and voted in favor of 
7 amendment bill which validated all martial law proclamations and orders since 1982^'. Not 
only that these defected BAKSAL MPs, subsequently, joined the government party^^. Among 
the other components of the 8-party alliance CPB, NAP (Mujaffar) and NAP (Unified) were 
favoring to attend the parliamentary session with a view to ftirther consolidate their victory in 
Daily Janata, 20 June 1986. 
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the May polls, to take the movement ahead and squarely face the reactionary elements"^. In 
the post election politics, though, JSD (Siraj) did not leave the alliance but was criticizing AL 
because of Siraj's personal reason®''. The speeches of another pai tner of 8-Parly alliance 
BAKSAL also annoyed the AL. According to the BAKSAL leadership, those parties which 
contested the parliamentary polls, betraying the 5-poingt demands would not be pardoned by 
the peopIe^"\ In an oblique reference to AL, the BAKSAL leaders also told that tliose who 
wanted to share power with the military regime, they are the enemies of the nation. BAKSAL 
demanded the reelection in all 300 parliamentary seats and for the demand of fair election 
under a caretaker government tlie party declared strike on 14"' May 1986*'''. In the election, 
Sammabadi Dal could not secure any seats it contested. On 12 May, in a meeting, 8-party 
alliance leaders discussed the post-election political situation of the country. The JSD (Siraj) 
and Sammabadi Dal led by Mohammad Toalia did not participate there® .^ Weekly Roabbar 
noted, in the speeches of Mohammad Toaha, it was clear that he did not have confidence on 
post election 8-party alliance programs^^ Now AL, Workers Party, CPB, NAP (Mujaffar), 
NAP (Unified), Gono Azadi League were still imited on the 8-Party alliance programs^^. 
However, these dissident components did not leave the 8-party alliance. Actually, the 
contradictory pro-election decision of some of the components of the previous 15-party 
alliance was responsible for all the pre- and post-election infighting in the alliance. It hindered 
the ongoing anti-military regime movement to realize democracy. Till AL and its alliance 
returned to the street movement in the absence of 8-party alliance BNP led 7-party alliance 
could not give dynamism in it'''. Even in this time the anti-AL weekly^remarked that the 
success of the movement largely depends on AL led 8-party allianceNevertheless, in the 
last of 1987, AL led alliance minimized the difference of them, took the leadership of the 
street movement and gave life to it. 
AL Council Session (1987): According to the AL constitution in every two years, the party 
had to organize its council session, but since 1981, no such council session was held. 
According to weekly Bichitra, the leadership conflict inside the party was the main reason 
behind the delay of the AL conventional Finally, on l", 2"'' and January 1987, the overdue 
council session was gong to be held. In 1981 council session the party was about to split; by 
electing Mujib-daughter S. Hasina, the party president, the stalwarts, however, save the 
organization from a sure division. But, later, the step was proved temporary because, after a 
short period of time, AL was broken and under the leadership of AL GS A. Razzaq, another 
Bangladesh Observer, 27 May 1986. It should be mentionable for the first time 5 CPB cadres were elected 
Parliament Member. Except this time in every election they loosed their security money for the election. 
In the constituency, from where Siraj was nominated, AL workers did not work for Siraj rather they worked 
for Laila Siddiquy, the wife of jailed prominent AL leader Latif Siddiquy, as a result, Siraj was defeated though 
4 of his party candidates were elected as MPs. He was accusing that because of the blue print of AL he was 
defeated and by supporting Laila Siddiquy AL broke the unity of the 8-party alliance. See Weekly Roabbar, 18 
May and 31 August 1986. 
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new party BAKSAL was formed. Since then, till 1986, the old guard leadership had 
undisputed dominance in the party. In their hand, Hasina was more or less like a puppet of 
their drawing room. Meanwhile, she engaged herself to build up her own followers group in 
the party. However, though, Dr. Kamal led the old guards group, but it was a conglomeration 
of different senior leaders and small groups led by the senior leaders. 
Despite the expulsion of hard liner A. Razzaq group in 1983, every thing was not 
going well inside AL. In February 1983, at the pick of anti-regime student movement, AL 
presidium member Zohra Tajuddin issued a statement, which was gone against the student's 
interest. Despite a ban on political statement by any political personal, the government news 
agency BSS ordered for its immediate use in media. It is also alleged that AL WC member 
Imtiajuddin Ahmed and Khulna district AL G.S and ex-MP Babar Ali had gone to meet 
Hasina in her Baily Road prison house^^ to get her signature on the statement drafted on the 
same line as that of Zohra. Imtiajuddin told the party chief that Zohra Tajuddin, Major 
General (Ret.) Khalilur Rahman and two other leaders knew about the move. But Hasina 
strongly denied them'''. Although the issue was shelved for some time in the face of sharp 
infighting between Hasina and A. Razaaq, it was once again raised on September 11 by one 
time A. Razzaq camp follower and international affairs secretary M.A. Jalil in the W.C 
meetng. The W.C expelled Imtiajuddin from the party on the charges of anti-party activities, 
without serving any show cause notice, on the basis of the evidence given in the meeting by 
the party chief Sheikh Hasina'^. The meeting did not consider the request of Zohra Tajuddin 
to t ^ e a lenient view of the expulsion of Imtiajuddin. Rather it led Hasina to a brief skirmish 
with Zohra defending Imtiajuddin. Even Tofael tried to defend Imtiajuddin but without any 
result^^. This internal squabble produced a few resignations from the party including that of 
Imtiajuddins associate, Babar Ali. When the issue of Babar Ali came up in another W.C 
meeting held on October 9 and 10, Zohra and her associates like K ^ i Zahirul Quy\aun, Major 
General (Ret.) Khalilur Rahman and Abdul Momen were absent from the meeting Though, 
like that of Imtiazuddin and Babar Ali for the same grave crime, Zohra was not punished 
because of her exclusive political position but it, thus, introduced another line of conflict in 
the party. A new faction led by Zohra Tajuddin also had taken shape within AL. The other 
influential leaders of the group were Kazi Zahirul Quyyum, Major General (Retd.) Khalilur 
Rahman and Abdul Momen'^. Since then, Hasina was facing trouble from her 'aunty' Zohra 
Tajuddin and her supporters. 
Dr. Kamal, since long, had been known for his intellectuality for his calculative and 
subtle brain. Mujib evaluated him, included him in his nucleus. During his bargaining with 
President Yeahya of Pakistan during 1970-March 1971 on 6-point demands, Mujib kept 
Kamal with him in his every meeting with President and took legal advice from Kamal. In the 
post-independent Bangladesh till Mujib was alive, Kamal was a Cabinet Minister of Mujib 
regime. Though, from the beginning, Kamal was a pro-US element and believer of capitalist 
economy but even when Mujib formed socialist BAKSAL, Kamal was appointed the foreign 
minister of BAKSAL government. In 1981, by making Hasina the AL President and in 1983 
by ousting A. Razzaq and socialist hardliner elements from the party, he was rightly 
Hasina and some more AL leaders were in detention at a government bungalow at Baily Road, Dhaka on 
Febraary28 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 13 September 1983. Also Weekly Holiday, 16 September 1983. 
Bangladesh Observer, 13 September 1983. 
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recognized as the master planner of political games in Bangladesh. The 1981 presidential 
election, in which he was the presidential candidate of AL, gave him dignity and recognition 
of a leader. But, still now, he was not popular among the masses though he was an 
indispensable element in the central body of AL. It was widely known that to recapture the 
dominant position of the nationalist/ democrat elements of the party, he played an 
instrumental role and made Hasina the party leader, but Kamals goal was much more deep. It 
first reflected after the 1981 presidential election, when some of his associates proposed 
Hasina to get retirement and transfer the party leadership in Kamal's hand. Though, Hasina 
was beginner in politics, but she did not agreed with the demand. Meanwhile, she adjusted 
herself in politics. Moreover, Hasina's advisors and friends in India, probably, had not seen 
Dr. Kamal as a permanent ally for her. Rather, the Indian lobby had temporarily used Kamal 
to establish Hasina inside AL against the hard-line socialist elements led by A. Razzaq. It 
was seen, till 1986, Kamal played the role of "Uncle and adviser" of Hasina but maintained 
his separate entity and lobby inside AL. He first engaged in conflict with Hasina on 1986 
parliamentary election issue. His personal defeat in the polls and the differences with Hasina 
in finding out the party's line of action in the post-election politics extended the dtiration of 
the conflict between them also aggravated their relations. In the difference he was 
representing the old guard leadership and Hasina was getting support of the militant youth 
leaders of the party. Like that of her past conflict with A. Razzaq Sheikh Hasina's main asset 
was still the confidence of the workers of the party, because of whose sacrifice, the party was 
still surviving. Everyone was expecting a showdown between the old guard leadership and S. 
Hasina in the coming council session^. 
Sheikh Hasina was inheriting the image of Sheikh Mujib image as the only survived 
successor of the family. So, naturally, she was enjoying the public support in this semi-
feudalistic social system- on this assumption majority of the leaders showed their allegiance 
to her. For the same reason the workers and supporters of the party remained with her 
Probably for this reason though A. Razzaq had every organizational qualities but the major 
stream of the AL followed S. Hasina. Observing the reality, meanwhile, many of the 
BAKSAL leaders left A. Razzaq and came back under the shadow of S. Hasina. Among them 
Safiqul Aziz Mukul, Col. Satikat Ali Saflql Aziz Mukul etc were prominent^®'. Most of the 
lower level leaders, workers and supporters of BAKSAL already had changed their allegiance 
from A. Razzaq to Hasina and joined Sheikh Hasina was also in favor of inftasing these 
comparatively young bloods in the party as by rejoining in the party, they were showing their 
total allegiance only to Hasina not to their old rival group. Even, at the end of 1986, it was in 
the air that party would have a structural change, it was going to revive its deftmct BAKSAL 
ideology as its program'"^. The old leaders of the AL resented this move but they were seen 
unable to counter it'®'^ . Hasina was encouraging family politics since long and she was 
enjoying fiill confidence of them. Though previously, there was competition among the 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 June 1986; p. 12. 
Weekly Roabbar, 11 December 1983; p.29. 
Weekly Roabbar, 15 July 1990; p. 14. 
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Daily Naba Abhijan, 29 July 1985. 
368 
leaders to enjoy the support of BCLand JL (studentts and youth wing of the party), the most 
mililaiil front organizations of the party, but now Hasina was enjoying the conimitmenl of 
both of the front organizations. Future leaders of tlie party use to grow from these two 
organizations. Naturally, the new youth leaders were showing their allegiance to Hasina. 
Besides this in order to further strengthen her position, since the end of 1984, Hasina was 
trying to get back Kader Siddiqui, an AL leader who took asylum in India after the Killing of 
Mujib in 1975, in Bangladesh In December 1986 Hasina had been to New Delhi to seek 
the help of Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi for the return of Kader Siddiqui to get her hands 
s t r eng thenedIn a meeting, AL WC also demanded that the government should ensure the 
return of Kader Siddiqui. It also called for withdrawal of all cases and convictions against 
him'°^. Weekly Roabbar wrote that if Kader Siddiqui could come back to Bangladesh, he 
would be one of the strong candidates for the post of AL General Secretary and Hasina also 
would favor him. All the MP's of Tangail, the home district of Siddiqui, also were engaged in 
lobbying in his favor. The Weekly further wrote, the return of Siddiqui would be a vital factor 
in the factionally polarized AL and it became headache to many of the old guard AL 
leaders'®^ Hasina rightly thought that addition of Kader Siddiqui's magnified image would 
help her tackle the growing party conflicts as well as her opponents. According to Weekly 
Bichitra, actually, as a bargaining trick, Hasina was using ihe name of Siddique but "it is an 
interesting matter that even Hasina don't wish the return and establishment of Siddiqui in AL 
as a political leader"'®^. That means, by playing a shrewd tactical game, she brought down the 
name of Siddiqui and on the one hand, she compelled the senior leaders to accept her 
conditions and reduced their enmity against her and on the other hand, she satisfied the 
followers of Kader Siddique. In the cold war, however, Hasina won as she was entrusted with 
the responsibility of framing a compromise formula to accommodate the old guards and the 
young Turks in the same boat"®. However, due to government's opposition, Siddiqui's 
homecoming program was cancelled. So, prior to the 1987 council session, Hasina was able to 
organize her own followers group. It was already confirmed that the party presidentship was 
already confirmed for her. Even before the council session, Tofael Ahmed, the leader of Dr. 
Kamal group, stated, "Sheikh Hasinas leadership is above question. She is certain to be 
reelected as the party president for the next term"'''. 
Just prior to the AL council session, Weekly Holiday wrote, the AL had split into 
several factions due to the conflict between old and the young, the democrats and the 
BAKSALites i.e. AL had lost its dynamism and growth after the death of Sheikh Mujib. All 
its front organizations, including the labor, youth and student also split into many groups. As 
a result, the party organization became increasingly weak. So, whether the AL would regain 
its lost dynamism depended to a great extent on Hasina's choice of a new party General 
In a meeting she termed the one time freedom fighter Kader Siddiqui as a patriotic follower of Mujib and 
justify his exile as an act of showing allegiance to the ideals of Bangabandhu. The AL leader said that 
arrangement should be made sd that Kader Siddique could come back home safely. See Daily News, 21 
November 1984. 
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Secretary' ' I It further wrote, "The choice of a new G.S. for the party will really be a difficult 
task for Hasina who will have to pick-up one of the aspirants like Zillur Rahman, Tofacl 
Ahmed, and Amir Hossain Amu, keeping in view the sentiment and support of the AL leaders 
and workers". Since the defection of A. Razzaq from AL in 1983, the rumor on "who is going 
to be the next party general secretary" had been continued. As the acting Secretaiy, Sajeda 
Chowdhuty was working in the post because of her standing seniority in joint secretary 
post"^. For the post of General Secretary Presidium Member A. Mannan, Zillur Rahman, 
Sajeda Chowdhury, Amir Hossain Amu and Tofael Ahmed were too much interested"'*. But 
the defeat of A. Mannan and Amu in the election reduced their probability to be the party 
secretary. Sajeda Chowdhury was also defeated in the election. Moreover, she was a lady and 
in a male dominated society two lady controlling both the highest position- it would not be 
acceptable to any one. Sajeda also was not good organizer too. The most probable candidate 
for this post was Tofael Ahmed. After the defection of A. Razzaq, he was the only person 
except Hasina who had countrywide followers in AL - though, that was also to a limited 
extent. Meanwhile, he consolidated his position in the party. His election win enhanced his 
probability. The other prominent candidate was Amir Hossain Amu. Though, they were 
united to oust their common enemy A. Razzaq, but since their student life, they were rival to 
each other. In 1983, Weekly Roabbar commented that, "by anyhow Amu will not allow 
Tofael for coming to the limelight""^. Amu was enjoying the support of party chief Hasina. 
On the other hand, Tofael was backed by Dr. Kamal, A. Maiman and all other old guard 
leadership. Majority central and district level leaders preferred Tofael as the G.S. of the party. 
Tofael was comparatively more skilled than Amu in organizational activities. According to 
Roabbar, the only weak point of Tofael was that Hasina did not wish Tofael as the party G.S., 
Amu was more acceptable to Hasina as he was obedient to her. In this case there is a 
probability that Amu, Zillur or Sajeda would be the party G.S in the coming council session"^ 
The old guard leaders, had been defeated in the election, kept Hasina under pressure 
and successfully compelled her for not to join the parliament till the Council Session. To 
remove this pressure from the old guards Hasina wanted to utilize the coming council session. 
According to the political observers in this council session, she would establish her full 
authority by ousting some of the senior party leaders from their influential position"'. It was 
in the air that many of the incumbent presidium members would loose their respective 
positions except A. Malek Ukil. Weekly Roabber wrote, if Dr. Kamal, A. Samad Azad, A. 
Mannan were degraded from Presidium member to simply W.C. member it would not be a big 
surprise"®. It also would not be a big occurrence from the side of Hasina if Zohra Tajuddin 
were ousted from the presidium. The relationship between Zohra and Hasina was very cool"'. 
The old guard leadership believed that Hasina would try to amend the constitution in the 
coming council session to establish youth leadership in the party. By keeping one or two 
senior leaders in the secretariate, all other posts of the secretaries might be given to 
comparatively young leaders.'^" Among the senior leaders, Abdul Aziz had a good possibility 
to be the Presidium member. But another senior influential leader, Salauddin Yusuf would try 
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to foil it. Everybody knew the bitter relationship between the two. The workers and middle 
rank leaders of the parly also knew that though the senior leaders had a iragile unity among 
themselves against the youth group and Hasina but die internal relationship among the old 
guard leaders were not sweet enough'^'. On the other hand, by preventing Hasina from 
joining the parliament sessions, the senior party leaders had shown that they could still 
influence the party according to their own wish. Weekly Roabbar wrote, meanwhile, Hasina 
lost her maximum credibility inside the party due to her unpopular activities'^^. Bichitra 
wrote, Hasina became the minority leader because of her acceptance of the fake election 
decision and her aspiration for joining parliament. It further wrote, the old guard leadership 
had a intension to settle this issue permanently as well as they took initiative to establish 
collective leadership in the party in reality by reducing the sole authority of the party 
president. They were also suggesting for a secretariate of 3 to 5 members in place of one 
General Secretary of the party However, the dream of the old guard leaders was shuttered 
in the Council Meeting held in January 1987. 
The three-day council session of BAL inaugurated on January 1987. In connection 
with this context, it may be remembered that in the absence of Hasina in the S"' Council 
Session, the councilors elected her the party President. In fact, it is the first council session 
under her leadership. Approximately 2500 councilors participated in the national council 
session of AL* '^'. Targeting the council session meanwhile, except few, all the lower level 
council sessions, including that of district, sub district, union and ward level council sessions, 
were completed. Since 1976, after the death of towering leader Mujib, it is the first time every 
thing was going smoothly. 
Though it is the conventional way to elect the party leadership on the basis of majority 
councilors verdict either by conducting election or by taking their direct opinion in mass, but 
in this council session, the nomination of the new leaders for different posts was mainly 
depended upon party presidents own liking. Except a few, the followers of Sheikh Hasina 
controlled maximum executive posts of the party. Even Hasina nominated some such youth 
leaders for the party secretariate posts, just before the council session, who had been the 
general workers of the party. Within a very short time, they were promoted to such high posts 
because of the blessings of Sheikh Hasina'^^. Those, who returned to mainstream AL from 
BAKSAL, maximum of them were also accommodated in significant position. To 
accommodate the youth leaders in the central executive body and lower level units of the 
party, Hasina had to bring some amendment of the constitution. In the amendment of 
constitution, Hasina proposed to enlarge the party's W.C. from its strength of 54 to 59, 
Presidium members from previous 10 to 12 and district committees from 40 to 49. The 
councilors endorsed the amendment'^^. In the absence of A. Razzaq, there was no second 
popular leader in AL to whom the middle rank and district leaders and councilors could heed. 
Though Tofael had some followers but that was also limited. The Old Guards, due to the 
lacking of a leader having popularity and following among the workers and masses, failed to 
Weekly Roabbar, 4 January 1987; p. 9. In reality since the power loss of AL in 1975 the old guard leaders 
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counter the move of Hasina, failed to resist the amendment of the constitution in spite of their 
efforts. In the council session, majority of the councilors preferred Tofael to be the party GS. 
If the matter could be settled through election, it was certain that councilors would elect 
Tofael not Amu or any other else as party GS. But Hasina's candidate was Amu as he was 
obedient to her vis-a-vis Tofael, who was against the building of personality cult of Hasina. 
So, to avoid any conflict (with the councilors), at last Hasina preferred Sajeda Chowdhury for 
the GS post'^^. The announcement of Sajeda's name was a surprise to all. As before the 
declaration of Hasina's name in 1981 council session no one knew that she was going to be 
the party chief, in the same way before the declaration of Sajeda's name, it was unanticipated 
that she was going to be the second person of the party. To the councilors, Sajeda was not an 
acceptable figure. When Sheikh Hasina, who was earlier selected as the President of the party, 
announced the name of Sajeda Chowdhury, the audience received the announcement without 
any enthus iasmRather , when Tofael's name was announced, as retaining his position as 
Organizing Secretary of the party, he received more cheer than Sajeda'^^. Among the youth 
leaders, Amu and A. Jalil were elected the party Joint Secretaries. Fazlul Huq, Safiquel Aziz 
Mukul, Mofijul Islam Kamal, Matia Chowdhury, Shamsur Rahman Khan, Mormujan Sufian, 
Mohammad Nasim etc were elected for secretariate'^^. Every thing in the council was going 
against the old guard leadership. In this situation, after a bitter wrangling frustrated, presidium 
members Dr. Kamal and A. Mannan left the venue of the coimcil session just before, Hasinas 
armouncement of the newly formed presidium and secretariate members name. However, all 
the old Presidium members were able to retain their membership- that was the only 
satisfaction for the old-guard leadership. With the dissociation of Mohiuddin Ahmed, Abdul 
Momin Talukder, Korban Ali and the death of Phoni Bhusan Mojumdar, post of four 
members of the Presidium, of AL remained vacant for long. To fill the vacancy and newly 
created posts of the Presiditmi five new faces were included. They were Prof Pulin Dey of 
Chittagong, a comrade of Master Da Suija Sen, former party Joint Secretary Salahuddin 
Yusuf, School Teachers, Union leader and Parliament Member Kamruzzaman, former 
Commerce Minister Matiur Rahman, Supreme Court Lawyer Sirajul Huq and Dr. Alauddin of 
Chapai Nawabgonj'^^ 
The national convention, in which some decisions were taken, avoiding coimcilors 
opinion, could not please many of the delegates and party leaders. Side by side the senior 
leaders Amu and Tofael showed their resentment over the party decision on nominating the 
G.S'^^. On 4 January, immediately after the declaration of the new secretariate of the party, 
Iqbal Hussain issued a press statement saying that a faction of AL headed by him would form 
a separate AL and a council session of his faction would be held on 13 February. Moreover, at 
a press conference on 6 January, he claimed that the AL leadership had been grasped by a 
handftil of leaders who did not care to carry out the opinion of the councilors. He further 
alleged that some leaders of the party had established unofficial connections with the pro-
government forces and were diverting the party's aims and objectives toward helping the pro-
government program. He claimed that he was associated with the party since 1962, had been a 
central leader of the student wing and later Organizing Secretaiy of the labor wing of the 
party. But the official spokesman of the AL did not recognize Iqbal Hossain even as their 
Weekly Roabbar, 11 January 1987. 
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councilor. Sheikh Hasina told that she had nothing to say about the press conference of any 
'unidentified person'. However, whether Iqbal was a prty man or not, but his comments on 
AL council session was carrying some evidential truth. Some senior leaders of AL told 
'Weekly Holiday' that Iqbal Hossain's move was not totally unexpected 
However, by this council session, Sheikh Hasina established her full grip over the 
party. Not only that, on the name of giving privilege to the youth group over seniors, she 
accumulated a flatters group beside her to make her leadership secured. According to Weekly 
Roabbar, The politics of flattery was established in AL. Madam (Hasina) was seen victorious 
in this coimcil and democracy was trampled down. Centering the issue of selecting party 
leadership, if another split took place in the party, there was nothing to be surprised by this'^'*. 
Most of the councilors endorsed the party decision to fight the 7-May polls. But they 
avoided any remarks about whether to continue the boycott of parliament as the party MP's 
had done during the last two sessions of the house. Hasina also failed to mention anything 
about the future program of the party, particularly, about attending the winter session of the 
Parliament'^^. However, in the political resolution of the party's council session, AL declared 
a 7-point demands and programs of the party. The AL called for the removal of the present 
government and restoration of the sovereignty of parliament by establishing Parliamentary 
system of government instead of Presidential system. The party also called for a unity of the 
pro-liberation force. The resolution, in its 7-point demands and programs of the party, 
demanded the establishment of rule of law, repeal of all black laws, release of political 
prisoners and lifting of restriction on homecoming of Kader Siddiqui. It also demanded trial 
of the killing of Bangabandhu and four other national leaders'^^. In another resolution, AL 
vowed to establish socialist economy as outlined by Bangabandhu Sheikh Mi^ib and 
contained a 12-point economic demands in keeping with a goal of the p a r t y . 
AL's reentry in full-fledged anti-government movement: The 1987 council session was a big 
jolt for the senior groups of AL. Their influence was curved and Sheikh Hasina's position was 
consolidated evidently but still then they were active, still propagating that the AL MP's 
should relinquish their seats and come out to the street in order to build up opposition 
movements to overthrow General Ershad regime. However, as they became minority group, 
their activities could not create enough pressure in the party, which would force Hasina to 
follow their way. Rather, in this council session, the newly constituted central W.C. was 
totally dominated by the loyal elements of party chief and also in the Presidium, her group 
became majority in number. On the other hand, the BAKSAL Workers Party (Na2xul) and 
Samyabadi Dal of the 8-party alliance led by AL were favoring same line of action told by the 
old guards of the AL, but like the seniors of AL, they were also minority in the alliance'^ . 
After 1986 election defeat, senior leaders successfully pressurized Hasina to boycott first two 
parliamentary session. But afterwards, ignoring the minorities in AL and the alliance, the 
dominant section of 8-party alliance led by Hasina, participated in the opening session of 
1987. Facing weak opposition from AL in the parliament, the government planned to pass its 
budget for fiscal year 1987-88 with enhanced taxes, and put through a bill on the participation 
of the armed forces in the zila parisads (district councils). At this point, the AL realized that 
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the ruling JP had majority in the parliament and the presence of AL in the parliament could do 
nothing to stop passing of the bill in the parliament, rather, the presence of AL was an 
advantage for the regime. Like all other opposition parties, the AL felt, if the bill passed, 
President Ershad's position would be solidified so intensely that no agitation would be 
possible since the army would have control at the lower tires of the administrative units. The 
AL and 8-party alliance, therefore, walked out from the parliament and expressed its desire to 
start an opposition movement inside and outside the parliament to stop passing the zila 
parisad bill'^^ 
The first major differences arose between AL and BNP in 1986-87 when the AL 
decided to contest the parliamentary elections, but the BNP remained true to its commitment 
not to participate in the elections held by General Ershad. In the presidential elections which 
followed in October 1986, even the AL boycotted it vsdth all other major political parties, 
though, its MP's did not resign from the parliament. Serious difference developed when the 
BNP asked the AL and others to resign from parliament and the later did not agreed to it. As a 
result, till June 1987, the BNP and AL continued exchanging bitter words, with the BNP 
blaming the AL for betraying the cause of democracy. The difference between the two major 
opposition parties provided the regime with the advantage of ruling the country without any 
meaningful opposition. Though after the deviation of AL, since the 1986 parliamentary 
election, from the sfreet movement, BNP led 7-party alliance and pro-left 5-party alliance 
tried together to invigorate the movement but failed to give momentum in it. Then it became 
clear that AL led 8-party alliance was a necessary component for the success of any 
movement. But AL was not happy with the demand for dissolution of the Parliament as it was 
already in it. The 7-party and 5-party alliances at this stage realized that they would not be 
effective unless they drop their demand for the dissolution of Parliament. And the issue that 
inspired the alliances to unite was not the budget but the Zila parishad bill. All the opposition 
alliances, therefore, decided to observe a countrywide half-day general strike on 21 June in 
protest of proposed budget and the Local Government (zilla parisad) Amendment Bill. This 
was the first time since 21 March 1986 that the opposition had manifested its wrath against 
the regime through a joint action program. The success of the program encouraged the three 
alliances to go ahead imited. Finally, on 18 July 1987, the 8-party, 7-party and 5-party 
alliances met together to find out a way to start a unified movement. In the meeting all the 
parties agreed to concenfrate on one point movement - i.e. the downfall of Ershad regime''*". 
Targeting the end of autocratic rule of Ershad regime and in protest of proposed Local 
Government (zila parishad) Amendment Bill during 22-24 July, all the opposition parties 
observed a 54-hour strike successfiilly. During the strike, at least seven people were died and 
more than hundred were injured. As a consequence, in August, the president sent back the zila 
parishad bill to the parliament for reconsideration, but it never discussed again in the 
Parliament''*'. The movement of the opposition continued with greater vigor and as the field 
was already fertile, it converted into a hard-line movement. On lO"^  November, they called a 
'Dhaka Seize' program. Since then, it succeeded in enforcing strikes almost in every day until 
1®' December 1987 and paralyzed the administration through a series of protests, 
demonstrations, strikes and rallies. Meanwhile, when the movement was at the peak on 11 
and 12 November, Hasina and Khaleda were arrested by the police and interned at their 
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residence. When the government repression failed to quell the movement, then it found no 
other option but to declare a state of emergency. To intensify the movement, all the 10 JI 
MP's and three independent MP's relinquish their seats in the parliament and the AL was also 
seriously considering resignation from the body. At this time, the regime aJso dissolved the 
parliament on 6 December to avoid further crisis and fixed the date for the fourth legislative 
election on 3 March 1988. However, by using its repressive forces, the regime finally, crushed 
the opposition movement. The main weakness of the three party alliances in the movement 
was that though, they had the same agenda that is to oust Ershad regime from power, but they 
could not come to a common platform because of the deep distrust between the major two 
opposition parties leading the 8-party and 7-party alliances. While analyzing the failure of the 
1987 movement of the opposition, Hasanuzzaman opined "lack of building a common 
platform by the rival AL and BNP produced a serious impediment to make their struggle 
effective. Spontaneous participation of the general mass in this movement could not t ^ e 
place as mutually distrustful AL and BNP leadership failed to chalk out a coordinated 
approach to unite the people against the autocratic regime"''*^. Frustrated Syed Serajul Islam 
commented, "The journey to a stable democratic polity is still a remote vision to which the 
nation eagerly looks forward"''*^. 
The fourth parliamentary election was held on March 1988 without the participation of 
the main sfream opposition parties including the three alliances and JI. The absence of the 
politically significant opposition from the polls thwarted his bid to use the election as a means 
of legitimizing authoritarianism''*'^. Two prominent ministers of the government Anwar Zahid 
(Information) and Salahudin Kader Chowdhury (Health) resigned from the government 
because they disagreed with Ershad on the credibility of an election without the participation 
of the major opposition parties''*^. 
The difference in AL over the resignation issue of AL MP's and AL's dilemma in united 
opposition movement: At the peak of the 1987 movement in a presidium meeting, the 
presidium members accepted the resolution that AL MP's would resign from the parliament 
en-masse in order to intensify the opposition movement. But the presidium took the decision 
at the absence of Hasina as the regime already interned AL leader Hasina and BNP leader 
Khaleda to suppress the movement at this time. Presidium member A. Mannan, Dr. Kamal, A. 
Samad Azad took the leading role in it. In an interview to BBC news service from the side of 
the AL Presidium, it was told that the party had decided to resign from the parliament. But 
according to constitution, the decision taken by the Presidium needed the approval of the 
party chief Without taking the consent of Hasina, the old guards sent the news to the news 
media also. AL whip in the parliament and the pro-Hasina leader M.A. Jalil differed with the 
Presidium decision and said that the Presidium did not have the right to take any decision 
regarding the MP's of the parliament. The Weekly Roabbar mentioned that A. Jalil gave the 
speech by the wish of S. Hasina''*^. The weekly further wrote, the decision of the Presidium 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 126. 
Syed Serajul Islam, "Bangladesh in 1987: A Spectrum of Uncertainity", Asian Survey, Vol. 28 No. 2, 
February 1988; p. 171. 
Dr. Muhammad A. Hakim, "Parliamentary Elections in Bangladesh: A Comparative Analysis" , Regional 
Studies Islamabad; Vol. 11 No. 2, Spring 1993; p. 90. 
Syedur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1988: Precarious Institution Building Amid Crisis Management"; Asian 
Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, Februaiy 1989; p. 217. 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 May 1988, pp. 21. After the Presidium decision AL parliamentarians in an emergency 
meeting empowered party chief Hasina to take fmal decision on regarding the resignation of the MP's from 
parliament. For this see New Nation, 6 December 2987. 
375 
without the consent of Hasina embarrassed her. Though President Ershad already dissolved 
the parliament but the relation between the old guards and the party chief was deteriorated 
further. Since then, Hasina planned to comer the senior elements in the party. She was not 
agreed with the party Presidium decision regarding the resignation from parliament. She 
ridiculed the stance that the dissolution of the parliament would lead a political upheaval in 
the country. She said, her stand had proved right and there had been no alternation on the 
political scenario in the country. According to her, the dissolution of the parliament was not a 
victory of the people but it was the victory of the undemocratic regime of President Ershad'''^ 
Hasina successfully utilize a three days extended meeting, held on May 1988 against the old 
guards of the party. In the extended meeting the seniors defended their role regarding 
withdrawal of party MP's from third parliament at the peak of the opposition movement for 
the best interest of the organization considering the political situation but according to the 
wish of Hasina, a resolution was passed by the majority that the AL presidium's decision to 
go for resigning from parliament helped the government dissolved the parliament and this 
ultimately defused the anti-autocracy movement*'^ .^ 
During the 1987 council session, Hasina successfully installed her men not only in the 
central committee of AL, the new district and sub-district committees were also formed by the 
elements- loyal to her. Still then a good number of the lower level leaders felt difference with 
her and attended this extended meeting but did not dare to differ with Hasina in their speech. 
Because according to 'Roabber', to remain even in these lower level posts of the party 
leadership, the AL leaders had to depend on the satisfaction of Hasina'"^^. The 'Weekly' 
further wrote, to give speeches in support of the stand and speech of Hasina, the pro-Hasina 
group already had briefed/ instructed their own peoples. According to New Nation, by 
anticipating resistance from the old guards in the extending meeting Hasina had sent 
emissaries to influence the district leaders to her camp'^°. In the meeting, the loyal group's 
speech was so strong that except few old guard top leaders, no one showed difference with 
Hasina. Maximum of the district and sub-district leaders condemned the seniors of the 
presidium for taking decision without the approval of party chief They also opposed the 
senior party presidium members who favored to the building up of a united movement at all 
cost only to remove Ershad regime and supported Hasina's approach that the future alliance 
would be formed only with the pro-liberation forces and who believe the parliamentary form 
of government was the only solution to solve the crisis of the country. 
In the meeting. Dr. Kamal and the senior leaders were in favor of a imited movement at 
all cost and these leaders aired their views at the extended meeting but by the dominant 
majority Hasina passed a resolution, hi the resolution, AL said, mere change of an individual 
from the citadel of power would not bring the desired objective. President Ershad was the 
embodiment of all the military power in Bangladesh since 1975. So he might come or go, it 
would matter little, the need of the time was the change of the system of government. Then it 
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prescribed a 7-point program'^' and said pre-1975 parliamentaiy system as the only recourse. 
So the restoration of the 1972 constitution prior to the fourth amendment, revival of the four 
state principles and trial of killers of Mujib would be the basis for future alliance. It further 
said, "The AL virtually saying 'no' to the movement under the present perspective called for 
realignment of all pro-liberation forces under AL and said that it is the only v^ay to solve the 
present c r i s i sAc tua l ly , the resolution was the true copy of the 7-point demands and 
programs accepted in the party resolution of the AL during the 1987 council session'^^. The 
difference between the two was that the 1987 council session's political resolution was 
comparatively unclear and current resolution clearly expressed the conditions of AL to other 
opposition parties in forging a greater unity against the government. It also emphasized for 
greater xmity against the present goverrunent but made it clear that such unity must be based 
on the direction of Hasina. 
Weekly Roabbar raised a question, why did Hasina called the extended meeting? Then 
the Weekly wrote. Sheikh Hasina wanted to show that the party leadership and the 
organization were under her control and her leadership was not under question. The extended 
meeting gave consent of building up a single party leadership instead of a joint leadership of 
the alliance to lead future opposition movement. It also conveyed total responsibility to build 
any unity with other alliances on Hasina. In fact Hasina also desired it. She called the 
extended meeting to make it clear that the senior leaders i.e. the presidium members were the 
puppet of her drawing room'^'^. Roabbar further wrote, "may be Hasina has to recompense for 
it in fbture". Hasina knew the probability of a split in the party as the seniors were 
enormously cornered in the extended meeting. Observing it, daily New Nation wrote'^^, "She 
(Hasina) did not fail to deliver the chilling note for dissidents. She reminded every one the 
fate of earlier party non-conformists in the person of A. Razzaq and the like or the deserters. 
They all vanished into wilderness; she told the concluding session of the extended meeting". 
Roabbar v^rote again, one senior leader said that a tendency was prevailing in the party to 
reduce the influence of the old guards; it was not a good sign. He also lamented that they have 
to survive in politics so they were still in the party. Then the weekly commented, "The seniors 
In its political resolution AL passed a 7-point program including some socio-economic program in the 
extended meeting. According to AL the one point 'oust Ershad' campaign had failed to involve all classes of the 
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don't want to be the political orphan at their late age"'^^ so they did not think to split the 
party. But the confusing decision of AL regarding unity, particularly, about the coordinated 
one-point movement left the other alliances and other components of its own alliance 
pondering over the situation. The deviation of AL from one-point movement was unfavorable 
to the components of AL led 8-party alliance. The BAKSAL and CPB leaders were critical to 
Hasina and named her for destroying the opposition unity'". In a meeting of 8 and 5-party 
alliance the AL wanted to issue a joint statement by the 8 and 5 parly alliancc against the 
Jammat. CPB opposed it on the plea that it would distract from the one point movement' 
The other components of 8-party alliance agreed on principle to declare identical programs to 
resist flindamentalists but they were not ready to withdraw themselves from one point 
movement. However, though the components of 8-party alliances were critical to AL, finally, 
they had to abide by the 7-point programs of AL as to strengthen their organizational position 
they needed the moral and active support of AL'^^. Moreover, to get success in their 
movements, they needed the huge organizational set-up of AL'®". The BNP led 7-party 
alliance had reservation against the following four conditions of AL's 7-point programs'^': (i) 
Introduction of a system of government as per the Constitution of 1972; (ii) Trial of Sheikh 
Mujibs Killers; (iii) restoration of fundamental state principles; and (iv) Banning of political 
parties founded on religion. Criticizing the AL's extended meeting decision, BNP GS Obaidur 
Rahman said, at the pick of extensive 5-point movement when the nation expected an end of 
the Ershad regime in that time AL and 8-party alliance betrayed the movement and participate 
the 1986 parliamentary election; saved the autocratic regime from a confirm downfall. The 
speech of Sheikh Hasina (in the extended meeting) was not favorable for greater unity of the 
opposition parties. Rather, it would confuse the people. It was a deceptive act firom the side of 
AL to secure the autocratic regime in power. In fact, on the name of party's extended meeting, 
Hasina stabbed in the back of one point movement 'Weekly Roabbar wrote, opposition 
unity was possible only on the basis of minimum programs; but not by sacrificing party 
ideology and principles. BNP believed on presidential form of multiparty goverrunent. 
Accepting the conditions of AL meaned the crucifixion of the parties own e n t i t y ' A f t e r this 
extended meeting, the opposition collectively called only one strike on 13 June 1988. From 
then till 1990, the AL and BNP could not sit together to chalk out any movement against the 
present regime. 
AL's endeavor to build an pro-liberation unity against BNP and Jammat: During the last six 
years the Jammat-i-Islami (JI) had been very active in the political movement for democracy. 
The 7-party alliance had maintained good relation with JI. They had formal relation with 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 May 1988; p. 22. 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 May 1988; p. 22. 
IJ8 . Weekly Holiday, 16 December. 
The 5-party alliance was united with AL to resist the fundamentalist but was adamant to advance them to 
achieve the one point demand. See POT Bangladesh Series; Vol. 14 No. 19,28 January 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 16 December. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. 
Daily Ittefaq, 25 May 1988. On the other hand, AL Organising Secretary in another statement said that the 
statement of Obaidur RiJiman against S. Hasina was motivated and contrary to unity. He fiirther said, Obaidur 
Rahman who was associate with Mujib politically, had joined hand with Mustaq and later President Zia. We 
won't be surprise if he joins hand with the present government in near future by betraymg his present political 
party (Foe this see Daily News, 26 May 1988). 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 May 1988; pp. 20-21. 
378 
Jamniat. Khaleda Zia was always showed her positive attitude towards the Jl"'"'. Though AL 
led 8-party alliance and leftist 5-party alliance had no direct relation with Jammat but in these 
years they were not very critical against it. But Jammat's role as an allay oi'either the 8-party 
or 7-party alliance had been ambiguous. Sometimes it had coincided its programs and 
activities with the AL and sometimes it wanted to remain with the BNP. In the 1986 election 
Jammat had followed the AL and had not wait for the decision of the BNP. But in 1987, 
Jammat had resigned from the parliament in support of the call given by JChaleda Zia'^^.The 
8"' amendment to the constitution, passed in June 1988, which declared Islam as the state 
religion of Bangladesh, put the Jammat in a direct opposition to the pro-liberation forces i.e. 8 
and 5-party alliances. Sydur Rahman noted that for the first time, the JI failed to join the 
leading opposition parties in resisting such government initiative involving r e l i g i o n B N P 
also was not eager to involve itself in an opposition movement against the amendment of 
the constitution though it had a token participation in the 13 June 1988 strike opposing the S''' 
amendment bill. According to Dainik Janata, recent classes with BNP's student wing and JI's 
student wing exposed the organizational weakness of the student organizations affiliated with 
AL and other friendly parties. JI's growing organizational strength and violent activities in 
different part of the country particularly in Chittagong, Rajshahi, Sylhet and Rangpur districts 
posed serious problems for the AL. In this context the AL considered building up effective 
resistance against BNP and JI as its main political objective to keep the unity and existence of 
the party intact'®^. During 1988-1990 side by side the anti Ershad movement, Sheikh Hasina 
called for a united movement of the pro-liberation forces to eliminate the anti-liberation forces 
(i.e. JI and the other pro-Islamic parties)'^^. In her 7-point condition to form alliance with any 
groups or party also included that there would not be any alliance with the anti-liberation 
forces and the AL demanded of banning of political parties foimded on religion. In this 
trickery move of Hasina, regarding launching a movement, she tried to comer the Jammat and 
other rightist parties as anti-liberation forces. According to Holiday, since 1988 by giving 
importance on the pro-liberation forces in forming any new alliance in the post independent 
Bangladesh, the AL negatively polarized the nation into "pro-liberation and anti-liberation 
e l e m e n t s " A s a result, all the secular and leftist parties of Bangladesh including the 8 and 5 
party alliances, though they did not show much unity against the Islamic bill excepting a one-
day strike, became active and united against the rise of fiindamentalists (i.e. JI), under the 
leadership of AL. During 1988-1989, AL led 8-party alliance and leftist 5-party alliance 
together declared different programs against the anti-liberation forces, though, till October 
1990 they could not come close to initiate a united movement against Ershad regime. DUCSU 
(Dhaka University Central Students Union) is considered the vanguard of major political 
events in the country. To root out Jammat and its abettor BNP's influence from Bangladesh in 
1989 DUCSU polls, some of the student groups of AL led 8 and pro-left 5-party alliances 
together submitted a single panel dividing the post among themselves and eradicated the pro-
right force from the university'^''. But the understanding of AL with 5-party alliance and other 
Though Khaleda was favoring Jammat but the BNP GS Badrudduza condemned the activities of Jammat 
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leftist organizations forged through united resistance to fundamentalism was weakening due 
to their difference on the issue of anti-government movement. At the end of 1989, when 5-
party leftist alliance and some other pro-left were trying to build a one point action program, 
nine components of the pro-AL student wing led 22member Students Action Alliance broke it 
and formed a new alliance announcing the goal of building a movement against the 
government'^'. Till the middle of 1990 tlie AL and pro-left parties failed to show the facadc of 
unity; even the student wings of other components of AL-led alliance did not form an alliance 
with the student wing of AL. The pro-AL student wing had to contest the DUCSU election 
individually, held in June 1990 and as a result, faced an election debacle at the hand of pro-
BNP student wing'^^. Though a difference was developed between AL and 5-party alliance 
but the 5-party alliance was not supporting the BNP either because of Khaleda Zia's soft 
comer for parties like the Jammat and the different factions of ML. Begum Zias criticism of 
those "who speak of pro-independence forces" also angered the 5-party components. One 5-
party alliance leader said, "We have no objection to combine forces with Begum Zia for a 
renewed anti-government movement. But it'll be a big mistake if she thinks that we will join 
hands with those who offend the very independence of the nation"''^. He further said, 
"Begum Zia will have to come out 'clean' if she wants us with her". Till October 1990, BNP 
led 7-party alliance could not convince the leftist alliance to form an anti-regime united 
movement, though contrary to AL's 7-point movement, both of the groups were favoring a 
one point movement to oust Ershad. 
The differences between AL and BNP: The joint movement of 8, 7 and 5-party alliance also 
continued till the first few months of 1988 but without having any formidable/ effective zeal 
from the masses. President Ershad showed his disdain for the opposition's ability to oust 
him'^ "*. The failure of the short lived united movement as a way to forcing President Ershad 
out of power again triggered the difference between AL and BNP. The half- day strike jointly 
called by AL led 8-party alliance, BNP-led 7-party alliance and leftist 5-party alliance was the 
last united program of the three opposition alliances. After that program during July 1988-
October 1990, AL and BNP could not participate in any united anti-regime movement 
because of continuing cleavage between the two major parties. AL and BNP had some basic 
political differences' : AL propagated secular Bengali nationalism whereas BNP espoused 
territory based Bangladeshi nationalism: a blend of Bengali culture and religion; AL 
advocated a parliamentary system of government while the BNP was likely to want an 
election based on the presidential system; AL leader Sheikh Hasina demanded the revival of 
1972 constitution with the four basic principles of the state unchangedand abrogation of all 
the anti-people amendments, from fourth (by which presidential one party government had 
been introduced) to eighth amendments to the constitution passed in the parliament whereas 
New Nation, 25 October 1989. 
" I For the DUCSU election result held in 7 June 1990 see Bangladesh Observer, 8 June 1990. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 4-10 May 1990. 
Syedur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1988: Precarious Institution Building Amid Crisis Management"; Asian 
Survey, Vol. 29, No. 2, February 1989; pp. 216-17. 
For similar discussion see Syedur Rahman, "Bangladesh in 1989: "Internalization of Political and Economic 
Issues"; Asian Survey, Vol.30 No.2, February 1990; pp.151-52. Also M.A. Wajed Mjuah, Some Memorable 
Incidents relating to Bangabandhu Mujib and Bangladesh; p. 339. 
The four principles included in the constitution of 1972 were nationalism, democracy, socialism and 
secularism. By an amendment Zia regime brought some changes in the basic principles of the constitution. In the 
changes 'socialism' was redefmed as 'socialism means economic and social justice' and the word 'secularism' 
was substituted by the words 'the principle of absolute trust .and faith in Almighty Allah'. 
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BNP leader Khaleda Zia wanted no such things, especially she was maintaining silence about 
fifth amendment by which General Zia had legalized his military regime; AL program 
included a socialist economy for the wellbeing of the country and favored the nationalization 
of all the heavy industries of the country^ whereas BNP believed on some type of semi-
capitalist mixed economy and during its rule had denationalized maximum of the state owned 
business enterprises, banks and industrial sectors etc; AL maintained a pro-Indian leaning and 
secularism was its one of the fundamental principles; on the other hand, in public, BNP 
established for an anti-Indian and pro-Islamic image for itself to utilize the anti-Indian public 
feeling in its favor. The pro-Islamic parties banned during the AL regime had been permitted 
to involve in political activities by General Zia. The anti-liberation force JI was reorganized 
under the shade and shelter of BNP and still BNP had very cordial relation with JI whereas 
during 1988-90 side by side the anti Ershad movement, Sheikh Hasina called for a united 
movement of the pro-liberation forces to eliminate the anti-liberation forces (i.e. JI and the 
other pro-Islamic parties)'^^. The BNP and JI jointly observed general strike on 28 November 
1988. In a emergency meeting of its WC, the AL held the view that the 28 November Hartal 
(strike) program of BNP and JI had divided the opposition''^. Notably Amendment had 
passed by the BNP regime in 1980 had prepared ground for making Islam the state religion 
and by the passing the 8th amendment Ershad regime made Islam the state religion of the 
country. Though on 13 June 1988, all the opposition parties except JI observed general strike 
against the amendment to the constitution. But the BNP led 7-party alliance did not mentioned 
anything against the 8"* amendment in their demands. Khaleda Zia and BNP wanted that 
Ershad should go but all his programs and policies should be left intact while Hasina and her 
party AL wanted the removal of Ershad and simultaneously revival of tjie spirit of the war of 
liberation (i.e. the revival of parliamentary type of government, socialist economic program, 
secularism as state principles etc)'' '. Without these the prevailing mutual distrust and 
suspicion between Hasina and Khalida, the difference between them on choosing the 
strategies and ways to capture the state power were also the reasons of the conflict between 
them. They also thought each other only rival in a bid for power. In-between 1988 to October 
1990, both party leaders, Hasina and Khaleda, locked in a lengthy bitter war of words. By 
leaving Ershad, they made each other their main target of criticism. Staying in totally opposite 
pole both of them even mentioned each other the abettor and protector of autocratic Ershad 
regime. Whatever times the two leaders spent in the anti-regime movement, more than that 
they spent to criticize and complain against each other. Occasionally, they also spoke for 
opposition unity but for a ftiture unity both of them included preconditions. On one hand, 
Hasina said, unity was possible on the basis of 7-point demands; on the other hand, according 
to Khaleda, unity was possible on the basis of one point demand- the ouster of present 
government and polls under a neutral government. By cunningly, using the difference 
between the two opposition leaders, Ershad regime spread bloody skirmish between the 
student wings of AL and BNP and closed down more than hundred educational institutions -
called germinating centers of opposition movement. Naturally, extreme rivalry developed 
between AL and BNP'^°. Though AL led 8-party alliance, leftist 5-party alliance and BNP led 
7-party alliance continued their movements but without any kind of coordination between 
them. A. Wajed wrote, in 1989, Hasina conveyed around 350 public speeches and Khaleda 
Bangladesh Times, 17 June 1988. 
New Nation,4 December 1988. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 8 July 1988. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Memorable incidents relating to Bangabandhu sheikh Mujib and Bangladesh; pp. 
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conveyed around 400. In almost every speeches of them, they bitterly criticized each other. As 
a result, they could not build up any effective and united opposition against General Ershad's 
autocratic regime. Their vilifying public speech and statements, they were using against each 
other, not only frustrated the masses but also misguided them verily. Undoubtedly, Ershad 
was benefited by this development. To remain in power for long period, President Ershad not 
only successfully utilized the differences between them but by a clever use of the government 
machineries (such as civil and military intelligence agencies) also enlarged the riflt between 
the two main opposition leaders and parties. The difference between the two leaders provided 
the regime with the advantage of ruling the country for a long period without any meaningful 
opposition'^'. 
The AL had always been prone to splits and factions, and it was well known that its 
leader, S. Hasina did not have trust on Dr. Kamal, a formar foreign minister and presidential 
candidate, and the old guards led by him. Part of her distrust may result from the decision of 
Dr. Kamal and the seniors to force party leadership to participate the election and when the 
same group failed to come to the parliament became vocal in favor of AL MP's permanent 
boycott from the parliament. And probably Hasina's distrust became permanent when in her 
absence in December 1987, by the initiative of Kamal in a meeting, the party Presidium 
accepted a resolution in favor of the party MP's withdrawal from third parliament and forced 
them to resign en-masse at the absence of Hasina, though, they knew Hasina would not give 
her approval in it. Since Hasina and Dr. Kamal were staying in opposite poles, the AL was 
apparently divided over the question of joining in another election in future under President 
Ershad's regime'^^. Kamal wanted to follow a one point program of united opposition parties 
and build up an strong movement to remove Ershad regime from power but by the influence 
of Hasina, the party declared a 7-point program diverting itself from its previous one point 
program. The old guards i.e. Dr. Kamal, A. Mannan, Barrister Amirul Islam and Salahuddin 
Yusuf etc. were in favor of united movement; on the other hand, the the youth leaders group 
led by Hasina including Amu, Nasim and A. Jalil wanted AL to go ahead with the movement 
of its own'^^. This difference of opinion in the party surfaced in open after the 1986 
parliamentary election. The polarization had reached a final stage in the 1987 council session. 
The old guards had been bitterly criticized in 1987 council session and in the 1988 extended 
meeting of the party. Still then, till the 1990 upheaval, they were firm to their one point 
movement and strongly opposed any polls under Ershad regime'^''. Another reason described 
by one of the prominent AL leader which also created unavoidable distance between Hasina 
and old guard leaders. According to him, "S. Hasina is prejudiced against all those leaders in 
the party whom she has to address as 'uncle' or 'elder brother'. She has been persistently 
trying all these years to install a leadership in the party which would be heart-and-soul loyal 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Politics and Government of Bangladesh; p. 30. To know the criticism they did against 
each other see M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Memorable mcidents relating to Bangabandhu sheikh Mujib and 
Bangladesh; p. 340. 
The same was true of the BNP as well. After seven years of one-point movement when the party failed to 
reap anything good there was tremendous pressure on Khaleda Zia, by the party stalwarts, to join a fresh general 
elections. This dilemma was shared by the other political entities like the Jammat, CPB and 5-party. Alliance. 
All these years, these opposition parties had been holding on to the two ladies grudgingly. From time to time 
they changed sides, to suit the occasion, but now they had a formidable challenge ahead to face the issue of fresh 
election. The decisions taken by the two ladies would of course affect their actions ultimately. See Weekly 
Holiday, 3 March 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 21-27 April 1989. 
For the old guards anti-election stand see New Nation, 7 December 1988; Bangladesh Times, 11 March 
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to her. This policy has angered the veteran Awami Leaguers whom even Mujib used to take 
into confidence on important national and international matters"'^^ He further said, "She 
(Hasina) strongly feels that the AL leaders failed to react properly and adequately on August 
15, 1975. In her eyes they are guilty of collaboration with Sheikh Mujibs assassination". In 
this connection, NAP leader Pankaj Bhattacharya said, "Perhaps Hasina is not very pleased 
with those who became ministers after Bangabandhu's death and are still in the party"'^^. The 
rift between the young and old leadership within AL was gradually widening. Sheikh Hasina 
was encoxiraging the young and promoting them to the leadership of the p a r t y ' O n this 
point, pro-Hasina leader Amu said, "No one stays in the leadership forever in any party. New 
leadership is bound to emerge"'^^ Even in the districts and sub-districts, traditional AL 
leaders were bypassed to pave the way for the emergence of ex-student leaders and some 
yoimg people personally loyal to Sheikh Hasina as a parallel leadership in the regions'^®. The 
old guards in the party were displeased and disgruntled. There was an allegation that since 
1987, all decisions of AL were taken by-passing the old guards. On no national and 
international issues did she consult the one time stalwarts and no one in the party challenged 
her about it. She installed a caucus in the party comprising some relatively young central 
leaders and some youth and student leaders as the defacto high command of the party'^". 
Hasina used to take all the important decisions after discussion with these trusted deputies'^'. 
The seniors resented this type of activities of her but they were helpless. In 1989, during her 
organizational tour in different districts, none of the senior leaders accompanied her. When 
asked to comment on this, A. Mannan said, "We were not asked to join her. This is entirely 
the chairperson's affair"''^. An AL leader said, "The bossy attitudes of the old guard 
leadership and their desire to make Hasina work according to their wishes have created a 
hostile reaction in her. That's why she keeps them at distance"'^^. During June 1988-
September 1990, Hasina led faction was contemplating to participate in a parliamentary 
election on the basis of the party's 7-point demand depending on the political development of 
the c o u n t r y I n this regard Hasina asked the party men to prepare themselves for the next 
parliamentary election which might be participated by the AL if it was held on the basis of its 
7-point''^. Whereas Dr. Kamal said, "There is no question of participating in any election 
under the present government which has destroyed all the democratic institution of the 
country". He further added, "At least I cannot take part in any election, under the 
The AL leader did not disclose his name. See Weekly Holiday, 14 April 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 21-27 April 1989. 
In her initiative to promoter the youth leaders Hasina was going to loose nothing nor was there the least bit of 
risk involved for her. 
During these days observers viewed that new leadership in AL including Amu, Nasim and A. Jalil would 
climb high up in the AL leadership in the coming days. Weekly Dhaka Courier, 21-27 April 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 14 April 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 14 April 1989. In many times it was seen Hasina used to give more importance to the loyal 
student and youth leaders comments than the senior party leaders in tiie country's contemporary political affairs. 
It is written from the research scholar's personal observation. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 21-27 April 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 21-27 April 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 25 November 1988. 
In the same meeting Hasina told the party men that though the forthcoming upozila poll would not be held on 
party basis the AL would put up candidates in each upozill unofficially to test its strength in the interior and 
make a solid base of the party in the upozillas to ensure its victory in upcoming parliamentary polls. See 
Bangladesh Observer, 26 December 1989. In this regard also see Bangladesh Observer, 28 December 1989. 
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government" By facing stiff resistance, Dr. Kamal and the old guards comprising with the 
intellectuals of Bangladesh formed a non political organization Nagoric (Citizen's) 
Committee to propagate their own views. It was working for uniting the democratic forces of 
the country. Its leaders exchanged views with BNP leader Khaleda Zia. On September 1989 
held an anti-terrorist rally and was active in its attempt to build up a united movement'®^. 
Hasina personally was against such type of activities. There was a belief among the political 
observers that there was a strong possibility of the 8-party alliance components joining hands 
with the old guard of AL leaders to float a programs of a united movement in the absence of 
S. Hasina like that of 1987 if Hasina did go abroad for any purpose'^^ Hasina and her close 
associates were aware about this move of other components of AL led alliance and the old 
guards. Meanwhile, Hasina had been busy consolidating her position in different tires of the 
party. There was a probability of holding of the biennial council session of AL in the first 
quarter of 1 9 9 0 P r i o r to the central committee conference when the lower unit (district, 
sub-district xmion and word committee) conferences were taking place in all over Bangladesh, 
her emissaries (the youth central leaders loyal to her) were moving around to influence 
reorganizing of the lower committees of the party with those whose who had allegiance to 
her^ . In September 1989, she sent controversial letters to the district and sub-district leaders 
pouring out wrath against those (old guards) whom she described as a hidden group of 
intriguers. In the letter, she strongly criticized the old guards for their taking decision in 1987 
that all AL MP's should resign from the parliament. Dhaka Courier wrote that she probably 
took this step in order to evaluate and also to claim the support of the leaders at the grass-root 
level. The issue of the letters had been timed to precede the forthcoming council session. It 
further wrote, "This letter will help Hasina to pick up leaders who will remain at her side. At 
the same time, she will be able to comer the seniors and their supporters"^"'. Despite 
dissension due to personal belief or on the question of the movement and suppressed 
discontentment till the dispatch of this letter none of the old guards was considering the 
prospects of a separate entity nor were they willing to express their dissatisfaction with 
Hasina openly. But Hasina's letter to the lower tires of the party brought out the internal 
squabble in the party to open. Many of the leaders held that by issuing such a letter, the 
president undermined the party spirit; the issuing of the letter was possibly unwise; her action 
mocked the claim of total imity within the AL. All the senior leaders deplored it saying that 
the letter tarnished the image of the party as a whole^°^ The seniors demanded that they were 
not inclined to further complicate the issue. However, the difference of Hasina with the old 
guards reached a critical stage 1990. Quoting from the party source Dhaka Courier wrote that, 
"The relationship turned to so sour that she started avoiding meeting the senior group of the 
New Nation, 7 December 1988. For Dr. Kamal's anti-election stand also see Bangladesh Times, 11 March 
1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 29 September-5 October 1989 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 29 September-5 October 1989. It may be mentioned that the old guards took such 
and initiative in 1987 on the question of resignation of AL MP's. The initiative sidetracked Hasina, however, 
could not made successful. 
New Nation, 25 October 1989. 
New Nation, 25 October 1989. Also see Weekly Dhaka Courier, 29 September-5 October 1989. In such 
conferences always the conflicting faction leaders try to strengthen their grip at the grass-root level by 
incorporating their own people in the local committees. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. 
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leaders. No meeting of the party presidium has been called in the last three months mainly 
because of the state of affairs"^°^ 
Continuous difference between Hasina and Kamal: All the opposition parties boycotted the 
first Upozilla election held in 1985 but they could not resist it. As a result, the governing 
regime monopolized the local administration and was successful to build a pro-government 
elite group in rural Bengal. On the other hand, the opposition could not successfully wage an 
anti-regime movement in the rural area during these years. Ershad was trying to build up its 
own power base in the district and sub-district level to make ineffective, the fiiture 
movements of the opposition in rural Bengal by using the Upozila and Municipality election. 
The second Upozilla election was held in March 1990, though, it was supposed to be held at 
the beginning of 1989. Though all the major opposition were so far stick to their public stand 
of non-participation in polls held under the present regime but AL, BNP, Jammat and all other 
parties were encouraged to go for it^^. They were not ready to give further opportunity to 
Ershad regime to monopolize the local administration^®^. Moreover, it was a good opportunity 
for them to judge their own strength in the constituencies for the preparation of the next 
parliamentary election. Like all other parties, AL did not officially nominate candidates in the 
election being held on non-party basis but encouraged its men to go for it. In many cases, the 
district committees of AL nominated party candidates to contest upozilla polls^"^. However, in 
the election JP won 42% of total seats followed by AL which won 31 %. BNP was far behind 
By this election, it was proved beyond doubt that AL was the largest opposition party 
in the country which boosted the confidence of AL leadership. Many were predicting that 
despite some scattered violence and rigging the upozilla election widened the opposition's 
scope to participate in the national election . Dismissing that time prevailing notion that the 
opposition might have changed its stand on the issue of taking part in national elections after 
its participation in upozilla polls Kamal said, "The deadlock related to participation in 
national polls did not break. Rather, it has deepened further after the upozilla poll As long 
as Ershad and his government remain in power, no free, fair and impartial election is 
possible"^® .^ Though Dr. Kamal and hardliners like him were still retaining their rigid attitude, 
the 'doves' in AL led by Hasina, believed that the voters in the upozilla election gave a 
verdict against the ruling party JP and had chosen the AL as the alternative. The AL chief was 
in no mood to miss the bus this time if another election was offered. The youth leaders close 
to Hasina confirmed it to 'Dhaka Courier' that "Dr. Kamal's views are not necessarily those 
of the party or of the party President"^'". They further said that, "So far the people have been 
looking for an alternative. It is evident from the results of the upozilla polls that they had 
accepted our party as an alternative to the present government". So after this election Hasina-
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. 
Bangladesh Times, 20 Febmaiy 1990. 
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Observer, 10 March 1990. 
POT Bangladesh Series; Vol. 15 No. 35, 16 February 1990. 
Opposition Leader in parliament A. Rob gave this information. Bangladesh Observer, 8 April 1990. For the 
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Kamal difference on parliamentary election was surfaced. On the other hand, according to one 
AL leader, by the election one thing was clear "we have been able to rout out our rival in the 
opposition camp, BNP, from the scene. BNP is now nowhere"^''. He further added, "If the 
next national election is free and fair, it will be difficult to stop it (AL) from staging a 
comeback to power". But the analysis was proved wrong in the 1991 parliamentary election. 
In different times, the BNP tried to reap benefits from the increasing deteriorating 
relationship between Hasina and Kamal in AL.There was a broad hint from the Ershad's Vice 
President Moudud Ahmed that though the next presidential election was scheduled for 1991, 
but the date might be advanced depending on the attitude of the opposition^'^. After the 
upozila election, the government was trying to hold presidential election in the country. In this 
time, Dr. Badruddoza Chowdhury, a Vice-President of BNP, in a meeting of BNP, 
unofficially proposed to consider the name of Dr. Kamal as a common opposition 
candidate^'^. But political observers were of the opinion that an influential quarter within 
BNP was trying to bring Dr. Kamal to the forefront because of his strained relationship with 
the AL chief, his stand on the question of movement, which was similar to that of BNP and 
considering his image in international community. Coinciding the opinion of the political 
observers a BNP leader also confided that Dr. Kamal's name came up in the meeting just to 
embarrass the AL '^^ '. However, the pro-election faction of the party wanted Khaleda Zia to be 
the presidential candidate. On the other hand, AL and the 8-party alliance were demanding 
parliamentary election first^'^. They preferred to boycott the presidential election^'^. One of 
the dominant political leader also confirmed that if, in any case, the party participate the 
presidential election, it would not nominate Dr. Kamal as presidency candidate. Probably 
some body else from the Presidium would be nominated^' . 
Since assumption of state power on 24 March 1982, General Ershad faced continuous 
and sometimes severe movements organized by opposition parties and alliances. But, because 
of disunity and mistrust in the opposition camp, he managed to stay in power and continued 
his own efforts to legitimize his regime. In the year 1989, the opposition observed nationwide 
strike for 9 days. In the district and sub-district level, the politics was very active. Including 
all district and sub-district strikes, the opposition observed total 239 strikes and blocades to 
realize different demands^'®. But ignoring opposition movement, Ershad regime successfully 
conducted upozila election. After the passing of the 9^ amendment to the constitution^ 
Ershad expressed his willingness to go for second term to the presidency with his running 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 23-29 March 1990. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 23-29 March 1990. 
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mate Moudud and was taking preparation for the probable presidential election on 
1991. Though every opposition party was internally divided into pro-election and no-election 
group, in open all the major opposition was opposing any ftiture election under Ershad 
regime. They continued their agitations and showing their adamancy to thwart any move by 
Ershad to hold presidential election. After a long gap, the three major opposition alliances (8, 
7 and 5-party alliance) unitedly called their first hartal in 28 June 1990. Then on 10 October 
1990, they arranged a sit-in strike infront of the Secretariate. This was, however, followed by 
an unexpected collision between AL and BNP, chanting different slogans and provoking each 
other^^' . Despite the difference in opposition, agitation movements were organized in October 
and November, they turned out to be had become violent and bloody. In spite of the 
conflicting relations between the major two opposition parties, 22 rival student organizations 
on their own came forward, took the leadership of the movement. Students employed their all 
out efforts: led the protest movement, engaged themselves in physical combat to oust General 
Ershad and free the nation from autocracy. Previously rival student wings of different political 
parties (especially AL and BNP led student wings) targeted one another as well as 
government installations. Sensing the futility in the latter activity, a student front organization 
was hastily assembled under the designation. All Party Student Unity (APSU) ,which 
provided a symbol of unity in the opposition front. Agreement of all the major student 
organizations proved instrumental in extending the united movement and thus, AL leader S. 
Hasina and BNP leader Begimi Zia agreed to settle their personal enmity, at least temporarily, 
and their parties joined in collective struggle against the Ershad regime^^^. When unity was 
reassured, all the major opposition alliances accepted the demand of APSU to sign a Joint 
Declaration on highlighting the process of democratic transition on 19 November. The main 
features of Joint Declaration included the following: the three political alliances would 
boycott and resist all elections sponsored by the illegitimate Ershad government; these 
alliances would participate in the elections only when conducted by a neutral, non-partisan 
government; Ershad regime would be forced to resign and an interim caretaker government 
would be formed; Election Commission would be reconstituted by the caretaker government 
to hold free and fair elections and reestablish the electorates voting rights; the media would 
have to be free; the newly elected parliament composed of people's representatives would be 
sovereign; and the fundamental rights of all citizens, rule of law and judicial impartiality 
would be ensured^^^. This Joint Declaration added an unprecedented strength to opposition's 
anti-autocracy movement. Following the 1987 style, the regime retaliated with oppressive 
measures and declared a state of emergency on 27 November 1990 but it was soon apparent 
that the conditions in 1990 were different from those in 1987. All coercive measures including 
curfews were violated by the opposition and the leaders were determined to give a final blow 
to autocracy. The people were also rallied with the opposition to oust autocracy and establish 
democracy. Ershad's order to suppress the opposition was also not obliged by the top army 
officials who perhaps considered peoples anti-military mood and negative attitude of the 
international community in the events of such interventions. At this hour what occupied the 
Moudud Ahmed, Vice President of Ershad, gave a broad hint that President Ershad might go for an early 
presidential poll after the upozila poll. "If every thing goes well, Allah willing, I will come to you again as Vice-
President candidate soon", Moudud told a public rally. The 9* amendment of the constitution made provisions 
for Vice-Presidential candidate to be a running mate of the president. See Weekly Dhaka Courier, 23-29 March 
1990. 
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political scenario were huge turmoil and uproar of people's voice and commotion. Being 
faced with an astounding outburst, Ershad resigned. On 6 December 1990, the parliament was 
dissolved and Ershad handed over power to the caretaker government to hold a free and fair 
parliamentary election^^''. It was a people's victory and at the beginning its leadership came 
from the students. This victory paved the way for the restoration of democracy and 
establishment of an accountable government in Bangladesh. 
During November-December 1990, Sheikh Hasina and her loyal supporters including 
Amu and A. Jalil were found themselves in an awkward situation. The course of opposition 
movement and students agitation had gone out of the control of the AL president and her 
supporters. To adjust the new development in these days, Hasina became more vocal about 
the anti-government movement and strong critic of 'autocratic regime'. The senior faction of 
the party- which advocated anti-election stand consolidated its position in AL and in 8-party 
alliance. Like Begum Zia and BNP, they also built up an uncompromising image. During the 
movement, they were also more acceptable to the All Party Students' Unity^^^. The pressures 
from within and outside the party made Hasina accept their firm stands for the ouster of 
Ershad regime. The student wing of AL with other 21 student organization formed APSU to 
oust Ershad regime. In an oblique reference to Hasina, AL's student Mdng leader said that any 
particular slogan or person should not be an issue to back out from the movement. He further 
said, people from all walks of life have taken to the street for ousting the present regime and 
now "I can only say I would not go home from the movement"^^^. Most components of the 8-
party alliance including CPE, NAP, and the Ganotantri Party were no more in favor of taking 
elections as a strategy for movement^^^. The changed stance inside and outside the party 
compelled Hasina to go for final showdown against Ershad regime on the basis of one point 
movement. However, for a temporary period, Hasina had to negotiate her difference with the 
senior group. One of the ex AL MP Asadul Huq Khashru said, during the election campaign 
and nominating the candidates to contest the 1991 polls AL leader Hasina temporarily became 
a pawn in the hand of two diametrically opposite groups (i.e. the senior and youth groups) 
within the party^^^ 
The date of S"' Parliamentary election was fixed on 27 February 1990 by the caretaker 
government of Justice Sahabuddin Ahmed. With the declaration of the date of parliamentary 
elections, the political parties started thinking their strategies for the participation in the 
elections. Just after the fall of Ershad regime, all the other six organizationally insignificant 
small components of BNP led 7-party alliance merged themselves in BNP to strengthen their 
position in the incoming election . During this time a proposal was mooted by the 5-party 
alliance and CPB that a national government should be formed by the major political parties 
which led the anti-autocratic movement. They also proposed to form an all party election 
alliance comprising the three alliances (5, 7 and 8-party alliances) to contest the incoming 
election in one body for the convenience of the formation of a national govemment^^®. The 
five party front, which played an important role on a number of occasions as a mediator 
between AL led 8-party and BNP led 7-party alliances during the anti-Ershad movement, 
Bangladesh Observer, 7 December 1990. 
Dhaka Courier, 16-22 November 1990. 
^^ ^ Morning Sun, 17 October 1990. 
Dhaka Courier, 16-22 November 1990. 
Asadui Huq Khashru was elected MP by AL ticket in 3"* parliamentary election in 1986. He was a central 
committee member of Krishak League, AL's peasant wing. In March 1991 he left the party due to internal 
cleavage. See Daily Star, 18 March 1991. 
Daily Star, 2 September 1991. 
^^^ Weekly Sachitral Sandhani, 4 January 1991; pp. 10-11. 
388 
made the above proposal to forge greater unity of the major parties in the post-election period 
for consolidating democracy. But such a proposal was not acceptable to either of the two 
leading parties, AL and BNP, as tliey had divergent opinion on important national issues as 
stated in their different manifestos^^'. After the failure to convince the AL and BNP, the 5-
party alliance went to seek blessings of AL president Hasina for an election alliance with the 
8-party alliance^^^, but AL showed little interest. As the 5-party alliance was rejected by AL, 
it then came to BNP^^ .^ The BNP was already under pressure from all rightist forces including 
Jammat-e-Islami to go for an alliance. But BNP chief Khaleda Zia told that the BNP was a 
very big party and would file the candidates in all the 300 seats of the Parliament by its ovm. 
She added that the BNP would negotiate with any influential candidate of any party in case of 
necessity after submission of nomination paper. AL President, S. Hasina also said that sharing 
of seats among the political parties before the election might jeopardize the democratic spirit 
of the people^However, earlier, when the 8-party alliance was formed, it had decided to go 
for election on alliance basis. The AL so far agreed to leave 6-7% of the total seats for other 
components of 8-party alliance like CPB, NAP, BAKSAL, Gonotontri Party and Gono Azadi 
League. But the proposal was not acceptable to the minor components of the 8-party alliance. 
So, they engaged in bargaining for more seats with the AL^^ .^ Even they engaged in 
criticizing AL and alleged it for betraying the conditions of the alliance^^^. The disgruntled 
group of the 8-party alliance tried to form a tacit alliance with the 5-party alliance for election 
purposes, they also failed in this attempt. Finally, by a last minute poll understanding with the 
8-party alliance partners AL, nominated its own 264 candidates and surrendered the 
remaining 36 seats to its allies as part of electoral alliance^^'. In these 36 seats the alliance 
partners contested the election with AL'S election symbol 'Boat'. Though AL sacrificed its 
36 seats for the alliance partners while most of the nominees of the alliance did not withdraw 
their nomination rather fought the candidates of AL in various constituencies with their 
separate election symboP^^ However, these partners of AL with their own party symbol could 
not wdn any parliamentary seats^^^. On the other hand, BNP built up tacit understanding with 
Jammat during the election. According to the secret negotiation, BNP agreed to sacrifice 18 
seats for Jammat and the Jammat organization supported BNP in other 282 seats '^'®. 
A. Kader Siddiqui-Bir Uttam, who led the Kaderia Bahini in the liberation war and 
built up a resistance movement after Mujib was assassinated in August 1975, fled to India 
with more than 2000 followers formed a band to carry out attacks from across the border to 
avenge the murder of S. Mujib^'^'. Since then, he was enjoying political asylum provided by 
the government of India. For a quite long period, the AL was demanding that the government 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 138. 
Bangladesh Observer, 7 January 1991. 
weekly Holiday, 21 December 1990 and Bangladesh Times, 13 January 1991. 
For Khaleda and Hasina's comments see weekly Holiday, 21 December 1990. 
^ ^ Weekly Holiday, 21 December 1990. Also see Bangladesh Observer, 7 January 1991. 
The other components of the 8-party alliance alleged that in the election the AL wanted to move alone. It 
didn't want to share any election-alliance with its old partners. See Daily Sangbad, 20 Januaiy 1991. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Memorable Incidents Relating to Bangabandh Sheikh Mujib; pp. 360-61. Also see 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 138-39. 
In a Centrla W.C meeting AL gave this account. See New Nation, 16 March 1991. 
Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, pp. 48-49. 
Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, pp. 48-49. According to Dr. Kamal, BNP built up 
an understanding with Jammat in at least 150 seats (for this see New Nation, 16 March 1991. Jammat leader 
Abdul Kader Mullah also agreed that the Majlish-i-Sura of Jammat decided to negotiate with the rightist and 
other powerful candidates during the elections (for this see Weekly Holiday, 21 December 1990). 
Dainik Khabar, 15 July 1990 and Weekly Holiday, 18 January 1991. 
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should create a conductive atmosphere for the safe return of Siddiqui to Bangladesh. After the 
fall of Ershad regime, the government took a decision to allow him to enter the country 
without any interruption . On his arrival in Bangladesh on 16 December 1990 ending his 16 
years of self-exile in India, Siddiki received a heroic welcome '^* .^ In 1974, he was first elected 
as the WC member of AL. In his absentia, he was elected the AL WC member in 1987 
council session. Siddiqui during his stay in India, meanwhile, differed with the many policies 
of AL in Bangladesh. At one stage, he congratulated the JI in a letter written to its acting amir 
Abbas Ali Khan for the decision on the resignation of members of JI from the Parliament 
in the wake of the movement of the people in Though, he was accorded a heroic 
welcome at his return to Bangladesh, but, no AL leaders was at airport to welcome him. Only 
AL Presidium member A. Mannan, who hailed from Tangail (Siddique's native district), was 
seen at the airport but he was found missing when Siddiqui arrived at the airport^''^. Siddiqui 
in his every public meeting demanded of the party leadership to expel from the party those 
persons who became ministers after the killing of Mujib. He said, "Neither Jammat-Shibir nor 
A1 Badars killed S. Mujib. Bangabandhu was killed by his partymen" '^*^. He said, party men, 
those who had joined the Mustaq government over the dead body of the Father of the Nation, 
Bangabandhu, were also killers and as such they must be tried before the trial of the killers of 
S. Mujib^"*'. His provocative speeches against the senior party men jeopardized party's image 
during the AL's 1991 election campaign. However,, on 11 January 1991, he was sent to jail as 
he was foimd guilty by Martial Law court in 1976. S. Hasina protested the arrest of Siddiqui 
and told it was unfortunate^''^ But it was a great relief for the party as well as for the old 
guard leadership- who were the member of Mustaq cabinet, especially, during the period of 
election campaign. In the 1991 parliamentary election, he contested from his own 
constituency but failed to get elected '^*®. 
The result of the poll on 27 February disproved predictions that the AL would win as a 
result, of its (wrongly) assumed organizational strength. By obtaining 140 seats out of 300 
BNP emerged as the single largest party following by AL with 88 seats. JP and Jammat 
became the third and fourth largest parties by obtaining 35 and 18 seats respectively. In the 
indirect election for women's seat Jammat offered its support to BNP in return of two of these 
seats and 28 won by the BNP boosted its nominal strength to 168, a clear majority of the 330-
seat house^^°. The election result astounded the political analysts. A. Hakim wrote, "The 
election was a difficult battle for the BNP as its organizational network was quite poor 
compared with the experienced political machine of much large and older AL"^^'. The 
During Zia regime he had been sentenced in absentia and sentenced for seven years on charge for high 
treason. At least 18 case were pending against him. Weekly Holiday, 18 January 199. Also Morning Sun, 16 
December 1990. 
Morning Sun, 18 December 1990 
Morning Sun 16 December 1996. 
Morning Sun, 18 December 1990. In an interview, Siddiqui also told me his grief that on 16 December 1990 
no AL leader was present in the airport to welcome him. Interview with A. Kader Siddiqui. 
Bangladesh Observer, 3 January 1991. 
Bangaldesh Observer, 3 January 1991; Dainik Janata, 6 January 1991. 
Daily Khabar, 18 January 1991. 
Morning Sun, 1 March 1991. 
Craig Baxter, "Bangladesh in 1991: A Parliamentary System"; Asian Survey, Vol. 32 No. 2; Februaiy 1992; 
p. 164. For detail election result also see A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, p. 
141-42. 
Mohammad A. Hakim, The Shahabuddin Interregnum, p. 61. 
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reasons behind the election win of BNP were^^ :^ (i) The fighting image of Begum Zia built 
up during the past nine years of struggle keeping away from the elections was reflected in a 
large measure in the election and (ii) While BNP activists had carried on the election 
campaign to every household all over the country, including Dhaka, this was not seen in case 
of AL activists. Besides, the BNP's young activists outnumbered those of the 8-party alliance. 
This young group had influenced the election campaign in securing votes; (iii) General Zia's 
clean image as far as corruption was concerned, gave BNP political credibility needed to win 
the election; (iv) The popularity of BNP's student wing Jatiotabadi Chatra Dal, the student 
wing of the BNP, among the students and its control over most of the college and university 
student's union, including DUCSU, helped the BNP to take its message to the remote 
villages^", (v) The BNP was highly successful in exploiting the anti-Indian and pro-Islamic 
sentiment of electorate. Khaleda Zia succeeded in making the people convince that the words 
"Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim" (In the name of Allah, the beneficent, the merciful) in the 
constitution were safe with her party in power and that it would be wiped off if the AL were 
voted to power. An apparently pro-Indian bent of the AL helped the BNP to receive a large 
number of negative votes; (vi) The BNP attempted to make its electoral campaign unflawed, 
well planned, cohesive and consistent. It paid the party off. Whereas the main factors of AL's 
election debacle was^ '^^ : (i) The party was over-confident of its victory in the election 
"without ever taking into reckoning the obtaining objective situation". The leaders and 
followers of AL were so complacent that they thought the BNP could at best win 30 seats. 
Complacency made the election campaign of the AL unplaimed, unorganized and in-cohesive. 
In the camouflage of underestimation, the BNP prepared itself for an assault on its rivals; (ii) 
The internal feud in the AL contributed substantial to the defeat of the party in the elections. 
Dr. Kamal attributed the defeat of the party, among other factors to intra-party conflicts and 
tensions. According to him, in a number of constituencies some local AL leaders openly 
worked against the candidates contesting with the AL tickets^^^. Many party candidates who 
lost the election submitted a number of allegations to the party chief. They alleged that party 
men who had failed to get nomination also contested the poll as Independent candidates, 
destroying their prospect^ ^®; (iii) AL failed to feel the pulse of the people. The party mainly 
attacked BNP which created a fissure in the democratic process and the party did not criticize 
the JP the way it should have, to demonstrate its anti-autocratic image; (iv) The party failed to 
gauge the depth of strength of black money in the electioneering, specially by the JP; (v) The 
party did not take into consideration the new generation voters imder 30, for many of whom 
the trauma of Bangladesh's liberation two decades ago was a faint memory. Because of this, 
the party's student front lost control over most of the college and university student unions. In 
the absence of a common youth force, the AL had serious problems taking its ideology and 
election promises to the remote villages; (vi) Sheikh Hasina's campaign strategy was 
defective. Her criticism of General Zia was looked upon as arrogant and aggressive by the 
general voters. Moreover,, she concentrated more on the past than on the future programs of 
her party. But unpleasant memories of AL's misrule (1972-75) were very much alive in the 
" I See Dainik Janata, 1 March 1991, Dhaka Courier, 8-14 March 1991 and Mohammad A. Hakim, The 
Shahabuddin Interregnum, pp. 60-61. 
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minds of the voters; (vii) The AL failed to refute the rival's allegation of the party's pro-
Indian bent. Many voters, therefore, internalized the conviction that if voted to power, AL led 
government would gladly accept a "relationship of subordination" with India. Sheikh 
Hasina's repeated commitment to reintroduce secularism as one of the fundamental state 
principales reduced her party's ability to mobilize massive electoral support; (viii) Another 
factor that had damaged insidiously the AL's image among the voters was the party's 
participation in the 1986 parliamentary election by forming, what the critics of AL called, an 
"unholy alliance" with the Ershad regime. Many voters viewed it as stabbing an anti-
autocratic movement from behind and they found the party's explanation justifying its 
decision in 1986 unacceptable; (ix) There was confusion between AL and parties of its 8-
party alliance on seat-sharing. AL had suffered due to this. According to some AL supporters, 
leaving those 36 seats to the 8-parties of the alliance was suicidal. AL leaders said that 
although AL spared 36 seats to its alliance partners, they did not withdraw their candidature in 
favor of AL candidates in many constituencies. As a result, AL candidates lost the race. Only 
because of "sickle" (the election symbol of BAKSAL), AL lost 31 seats, the AL leaders 
alleged^". BAKSAL Secretary A. Razzaq told to Daily Star that half-hearted unity among the 
leaders of 8-party alliance and the radio and television speech of S. Hasina were the main 
reason of the defeat of AL and its alliance^^^; (x) In many areas the supporters of JI and other 
anti-AL parties also cast their votes fro BNP to resist AL; (xi) One of the 87 years old AL 
councilor during 1992 council session said that the previous AL leaders had the ability to 
attract the workers in the party fold but the current leadership lack this ability. So, the party 
was defeated in the 1991 parliamentary election^^'. 
However, after the election, BNP formed the government and Khaleda Zia became the 
PM of the country. AL leader Hasina became the opposition leader of the parliament. Just 
after the election, the AL leaders reminded all the 19 November 1990 Joint Declaration issue 
by the 8, 7 and 5-party alliances and called upon each member of S''' National Parliament, 
irrespective of party affiliation, to arrive at a consensus to bring a necessary amendment to the 
Constitution for the establishment for a sovereign parliament^^ . In order to prevent future 
autocratic rule to ensure democracy for the masses, the AL, in the first session of the S'*' 
parliament, came up with the demand for the establishing parliamentary system of 
government. All the opposition supported the issue. The ruling party was under pressure not 
only from the major opposition to go back to parliamentary system but also faced similar 
demands from its own rank and file and numerous BNP supporters. Yielding to demands of 
the opposition and government back benchers, Begum Zia ultimately decided for a 
parliamentary form of government^®'. However, 11'*' and 12^ amendment bill of the 
constitution was passed in the parliament on 7 August 1991. With these constitutional 
amendments, Bangladesh returned to parliamentary democracy. 
The parliamentary election result astounded the political analysts. Most of them 
predict that the 8-party alliance led by AL would be victorious. A pre-election survery 
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conducted by some of the professors of Political Science Department of Dhaka University 
showed that the AL might win as many as 178 seats and the BNP would finish as a distant 
second with 67 seats^^^. Only three weeks before the election-day, the AL chief in a press 
conference in Dhaka hoped that her party would get a two-third majority seats in 27 Februaiy 
elections^^^. Although the number of votes received by the BNP and the AL was equal 
(31%^^), the number of seats won by the BNP was much larger. Also, the vote average per 
candidate of AL was higher than that of BNP. It simply meant that the AL could not translate 
the number of its votes into parliamentary seats^^^ It was indeed psychologically difficult for 
AL to accept defeat. Not only did it fail to achieve majority seats but some well known AL 
leaders like Dr. Kamal Hossain, Amir Hossain Amu, A. Mannan, A. Kader Siddiqui and 
Zillur Rahman were defeated^^®. AL chief S. Hasina also could not win in two constituencies 
in Dhaka. While on election results, Hasina maintained that "It is inconceivable that the 
people have not voted for AL and the result surprised and stunned the people". She further 
added that "The voters have voted in her party's favor but some identified undemocratic 
forces conspired with an invisible force to deny the people the benefit of the verdict"; she 
therefore forcefully added that "some secret hand had manipulated" the election results^^'. 
Although Hasina refused to accept the results, disagreeing with her, the Presidium member of 
AL, Dr. Kamal accepted his party's defeat. Kamal also admitted that the election was fi-ee and 
fair^^^. The statement of Dr. Kamal created adverse reaction in the party. As a reaction of his 
statement, S. Hasina resigned fi:om the party president-ship, assimiing responsibility of the 
election debacle of her party. In her resignation letter she maintained that she wanted to step 
down from the party leadership showing her respect to the democratic values^^'. However, 
because of thousands of party workers and supporters emotional appeal to Hasina for the 
withdrawal of resignation letter^^", finally she withdrawn her resignation^^'. A section of party 
workers alleged that Dr. Kamal's statement was detrimental to the party discipline and 
^^^.Under the leadership of Professor Mustafa Chowdhury the survey was conducted. See Banglar Bani, 26 
February 1991. 
Banglar Bani, 7 Februaiy 1991. 
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amounted to challenging the authorities of party chief. They also chanted slogan against him 
and demanded his resignation^^^. A section of the parly workers brought out procession, 
chanted slogans against Dr. Kamal depicting him the agent of USA and CIA. They also did 
wall writing and postering, demanding his resignation. Even a group of party workers did not 
hesitate to assault him in front of the party's central office^". From the side of senior leaders 
Zohra Tajuddin described the attack on Kamal a terrorist act done by some miscreants and she 
also warned that this type of practice would jeopardize the democracy inside AL^ "^*. Quoting 
one AL leader, Dainik Bagla wrote, after the submission of resignation letter, AL leader 
Hasina's image was glorified to a large extent vice-versa Dr. Kamal became the target of AL 
workers criticism^^l Dainik Bangla also suspected that in this situation, the unity of the party 
might be jeopardized. 
The hostility between the two leaders came to the peak when in another central 
Working Committee meeting of AL, called to evaluate party's pre and post election situation, 
party's election performance and to decide its future programs; Kamal issued a 12 -page 
statement narrating his evaluation of the party activities during the polls and criticized the 
party chief for her failure to provide leadership to the party and said that the party would face 
the fate of ML if the extant situation was allowed to continue. Referring to the recently held 
parliamentary election, he said raising questions about the fairness and neutrality of the poll at 
this jimcture because of some minor irregularities would amount to implicitly dishonoring the 
nation's democratic consciousness and verdict of the people at large. However, though, he 
sent the evaluation letter in the WC meeting but did not attend the meeting^'^. 
Dr. Kamal described a combination of factors which led to the debacle of AL^''. (i) He 
alleged that AL leader's arrogant speeches in radio and television and the party workers 
negligence in the organizational activities were the main reason of the AL debacle in the 
election. "In our over-confidence about victory, we had taken the election as routin and only a 
matter of time," he said adding "party leaders and workers became elated over victory in 
advance"; (ii) Dr. Kamal attributed the defeats of party candidates in a number of safe 
constituencies to factional squabbles inside the party. In this connection, he mentioned the 
names of a large number of constituencies, where from same party cadres contested as 
"Independent candidate". According to him, large number of party candidates all over the 
country became victim of inner party factionalism; (ii) He said, "AL's glorious tradition is a 
historical fact. In our campaign we talked mostly about this past history doing comparatively 
very little to expose hard realities of the present and to project our plans for building up a 
bright future. What we harped on history to the voters aged between 18 and 30 years who are 
not witnesses to the realities of the past; (iii) Kamal said that the party had criticized Zia and 
Ershad's autocratic regime but it failed to admit the mistakes of AL, committed willfully or 
otherwise, during its ruling period; (iv) Describing Hasina's role after the 1986 election as 
"mysterious", he said at a time when the people were bursting out with anger and hatred 
against Ershad's rule, the party president gave the call to consolidate achieved victory while at 
the same time raising the charges of vote dacoity (robbery) and media coup. "Had a call been 
given against vote dacoity and media coup, the Ershad regime would have fallen in 1986 and 
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the AL could have claimed the full credit for overthrowing the autocratic rule," he said and 
added that the opportunity that was created for the party was missed because of weakness of 
the leadership and its failure to take the correct decision at the proper time. Rather the party 
leadership's wrong decision reduced the image of AL; (v) Dr. Kamal said even though 36 
seats were given to the alliance candidates unilaterally (these candidates contested the 
election with the same symbol of AL i.e. Boat), a large number of candidates belonging to 
allied parties contested against the AL nominees with separate election symbols which caused 
resentments among party workers and contused the voters; (vi) He also said that the failure of 
AL leadership to coimter the propaganda of the post-Mujib governments and rightwing anti-
liberation forces branding AL as subservient to India and anti-religion force also was the 
reason of AL's election defeat. Dr, Kamal criticized S. Hasina for silence during her election 
campaign over Indo-Bangladesh friendship treaty and the Special Power Act of 1974, these 
were the subject to criticism by the party's political opponents; (vi) According to him the 
BNP built up an understanding with Jammat in at least 150 seats. This had accelerated the 
defeat of AL. 
In his paper Dr. Kamal strongly criticized Hasina's style of functioning since she 
became the president of the party. He alleged that only a few days after the president took 
over the leadership of the party as symbol of unity, factionalism started to rear its head inside 
the party leadership first to open split in Chattra League and then to the emergence of a 
separate party under the leadership of A. Razzaq and Mohiuddin. He also alleged that the 
party had been converted into a forum of speech-making at all levels. "Absence of a chain of 
command and lack of democracy inside the organization have created a dangerous situation," 
he said adding: "leadership is being distributed instead of being built up." He urged to give an 
institutional shape of the party. Referring to the failure to build up a new leadership, he said 
the organization would lose its vitality if the generation gap was allowed to continue and as a 
result, the party would have to accept the fate of the ML. He called for establishment of 
collective leadership by dispelling mutual distrusts inside the party. He urged that the 
leadership of the party and that of its parliamentary wing should not be vested in one person. 
Stressing the need for separating the leadership of the party from that of its parliamentary 
wing, he said Bangabandhu had given up party president-ship after he became PM and urged 
the leadership to follow his example^^^. Dr. Kamal also threatened to quit his present party 
post if evaluation of reasons for party's failure was not done immediately^'®. However, the 
meeting set up a three member committee to evaluate why the party had faced debacle in the 
polls.^^ In a Dhaka City AL meeting referring to the controversy over the party leadership, S. 
Hasina said, "We have become leaders as we have been working with AL, which has glorious 
past of 42 years and led the nation in the war of independence. If any of us is isolated in the 
party, it will lose all its importance"^®'. In another meeting of the youth wing of AL Hasina 
said, "It should be considered that as we are in AL, some of us are leaders, some are workers 
and some are well wishers. We don't carry any wait, if we are not in AL. As for example till 
stars are in the sky, they glitter, spread light but when they fall down from the sky, they loose 
their existence"^® . 
Dainik Desh, 15 March 1991. 
Dainik Desh 14 March 1991 and Weekly Roabbar, 17 March 1991; p. 13. 
The members of the committee were Sajeda Chowdhury, Tofael Ahmed and Amir Hossain Amu. See Daily 
New Nation, 22 March 1991. 
Daily Star, 16 Maarch 1991. 
Daily Ittefaq, 16 March 1991. 
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By his latest attack on Hasina, he jeopardized his own position in the party as the pro-
Hasina group was extremely dominant in it and party workers and supporters were with 
Hasina. However, the election debacle brought down an organizational turmoil in AL 
organization. After the contradictory statement of Hasina and Kamal, their relation became 
extremely bitter and it became clear that the hostility was not going to end soon. The 5 days 
long WC meeting, called for early convening of the council session, postponed a number of 
times in the past, with a view to reorganize the party at the grass-root level^^^. Actually, by the 
incoming council session, S. Hasina intended to finish the remaining influence of Kamal in 
the party. On the other hand, when Kamal was isolated in AL for some days, he was silent. 
But, meanwhile, Dr. Kamal and his followers with some prominent intellectuals and 
politicians were working to form a Gonotantrik (Democratic) Forum - a non-political 
organization to remain active in Bangladesh politics. It was already decided that the forum 
would be floated on March 1 
Day by day, the rift between Hasina and Kamal was increasing. In this situation, some 
of the old guards, including A. Samad Azad etc also left Dr.Kamal by observing a grim fiiture 
of this group and attached themselves with Hasina group to avoid conflicting stands and gain 
importance in the party. The other reason of the defection of these elements from Dr. Kamal 
group was the carrot and stick policy of Hasina. Since the 1987 Council Session, Hasina was 
depriving old guards from the important positions in the party, even in some opportime 
moment, she did not hesitate to oust the close ally's of Kamal^ ®^ but those, who came close to 
her by leaving Kamal, were rewarded heavily. By this tactics, Hasina successfully created 
defection in the old-guard leadersip. As a resuh. Dr. Kamal was isolated inside the party. In 
1990, A. Samad Azad joined Hasina by defecting Kamal. For this, Hasina rewarded him 
heavily. There was a practice in AL that the senior members of the Presidium by rotation 
acted as Acting President in the absence of the party chief. Accordingly, this responsibility 
had already been undertaken by A. Marman and Zohra Tajuddin. In May 1990, when AL chief 
was visiting Bnmei, A. Samad Azad was carrying on as the party's acting president. 
However, many, inside the party, expected that in this case, according to the practice of 
Presidium, Dr. Kamal would act as acting President in the absence of party president^^^. After 
becoming the opposition leader of the parliament, Hasina also made A. Samad Azad the 
deputy opposition leader in the parliament and AL's deputy parliamentary party leader^^'. 
Since long, Hasina was also thinking to have A. Razzaq in the party to comer the rival 
old guards as they were showing challenge against her leadership^® .^ AL could not fill up the 
absence of A. Razzaq at his departure from the organization. At the end of 1988, the Indian 
friends of Hasina (Priya Das Mukherjee and Pranab Mukheijee of Congress party) felt the 
necessity of A. Razzaq in AL party. They put pressure on Hasina and A. Razzaq to reconcile 
their difference and merger of the later (A. Razzaq) with the former^ ® .^ AL workers and lower 
New Nation, 22 March 1991. 
Mohammad Hamian, Bangladesh 1992, p. 68. 
On October 1990 AL WC member Amirul Islam (Morning Sun, 8 October 1991) and on April AL Presidium 
member Sirajul Huq (Dainik Bangla and Ittefaq, 6 April 1991) was expelled from the party due to infighting in 
the party. Both of them were close ally of Dr. Kamal Hossain. By expelling the pro-Kama! elements Hasina and 
her staunch supporters curved the influence of Kamal and senior group in the party. In 1990 New Nation wrote 
that the expulsion of Amirul Islam was a warning against those who were bent on opposing the party chiefs 
role. See New Nation, 8 October 1991. 
Dainik Nabo Abhijan, 6 May 1990. 
Daily Star, 5 April 1991. 
Weekly Roabbarr, 4 August 1988. 
Weekly Holiday, 18 November 1988. 
396 
level leaders were feeling the lacking of A.Razzaq and wanted to get him back in the 
organization, as in his absence, the party lost previous dynamism, was facing difficulties in 
organizational activities^^®. But the merging of BAKSAL in the main body AL was not easy, 
since: (i) Hasina needed to accommodate A. Razzaq in the hierarchy of the party and (ii) some 
of the aspirants of the GS post in pro-Hasina group of AL (Amu and Nasim) were afraid of 
the return of A. Razzaq, Side by side the old guards were also trying to resist the rejoining of 
A. Razzaq in the party^^'. After the 1991 election debacle, the WC of the AL, in its post 
election evaluation, resolved that the debacle of AL in the election was due to the split among 
the soldiers of Bangabandhu^'^. In the post-election scenario, the AL desperately needed to 
strengthen party organization. Moreover, to give new life to the party, to revitalize the 
supporters and workers mental strength, the party needed to make a showdown. Now the old 
guards including A. Mannan, A. Samad Azad and Tofael Ahmed also supported taking back 
BAKSAL into AL fold. They would not even grudge A. Razzaq being made AL GS . On 
the other hand, maximum of the BAKSAL workers already returned to their old party AL by 
observing the grim future of the party. However, in 1991, the BAKSAL still had mentionable 
number of followers. In the 1991 parliamentary election, it won five parliamentary seats^ ®'*. 
Because of the fall of commvmist block in the 90s, the appeal of the socialism was already 
disappeared from the masses. The CPB also was about to break up. In this situation BAKSAL 
leadership felt it difficult to strengthen its own base with socialist ideology. So, majority 
faction of the party was favoring to merge the BAKSAL in Meanwhile, a meeting 
between AL chief S. Hasina and BAKSAL leader A. Razzaq was held in New Delhi wdth the 
Congress leader Pranab Mukherjee. In that meeting, the two leaders decided to work 
unitedly^®^ On 15 August 1991, the BAKSAL under the leadership of Mohiuddin and A. 
Razzaq merged itself with AL^'^. The return of pro-BAKSAL elements was a victory of S. 
Hasina. It was easy for her to come to an agreement with this group, especially, against Dr. 
Kamal, as because of Dr. Kamal, they had to leave the party. 
Infightings in the student front of AL: However, during 1986-90, there was intense rivalry 
between AL's student wing BCL and BNP's student wing JCD to get control of the Dhaka 
University. Gun battle between the two student organizations in Dhaka University campus 
was a regular phenomenon during 1989-92, except November-December of 1990. Political 
rivalry between the BNP and AL was carried to such absurd extent that the top leaders of the 
parties turned a blind eye to these gun battle and middle class leaders of both parties were 
giving all type of shelters to the gunmen of these student groups to ensure their future 
domination in the party. However, following a day long bloody gun battle on the campus 
between pro-AL student wing BCL and pro-BNP student wing JCD, to prevent the violence in 
university campus, Hasina had annoimced the postponement of BCL activities of Dhaka 
University (DU) on 30 October. Four persons including three students were killed in that day-
Weekly Roabbar, 15 July 1990; pp. 14-15. 
Amir Hossain Amu, the aspirant of the GS post of AL was resisting the Joining of A. Razzaq in AL. See 
Weekly Holiday, 25 November 1988. 
Daily Star, 2 August 1991. 
Still in 1991 Amu and Nasim was against the merger of BAKSAL in AL. See Morning Sun, 11 July 1991. 
Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, p. 49. 
There was one small anti-merger faction in the BAKSAL. They strongly believed that there was scope for 
raising a strong third political force besides BNP and AL. See Morning Sun, 11 July 1991. 
Daily Star, 2 August 1991. 
M.A. Wajed Miah, Some Memorable incidents relating to Bangabandhu sheikh Mujib; p. 380. 
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long gun-fight between JCD and BCL on 27 October 1991^'^ In the absence of BCL 
activities JCD was trying to capture the remaining ground of BCL in DU and moreover, the 
recruitment work of new workers in the DU was also postponed. By realizing the necessity of 
BCL activities in the university the BCL resumed its activhies in the university campus from 
9 January 1991^^'. On the other hand, since long the pro-AL student organization BCL was 
divided into three factions: Barisal, Faritpur (or Gupalgonj) and Montu group^"". The Montu 
group was known in the campus as the "third world group^®'". These group leaders were 
enjoying regional allegiance of the workers of BCL. Factional strife and rivalry among these 
three groups was regular phenomenon and all the three groups were engaged on extending 
their influence in Dhaka University and all other educational institutes. The Barisal and 
Faritpur group was dominating the campus while the third world group was weak. In the 
central and other national committees of the BCL greater Barisal and greater Faridpur region 
had good number of representation but the other districts were deprived. Usually in every 
council session the BCL Presidents and Secretaries were nominated from these two regions. 
So the third world group, comprised with the BCL workers of other districts, had grievances 
against the AL leadership as it used to impose their selected leadership on the student 
organization. The third world group was reportedly controlled by Jubo (Youth) league leader 
Moatfa Mohsin Montu.. On 9 January 1991 BCL arranged a discussion meeting in Dahaka 
University Campus to celebrate 44'*' aimiversary of its foundation. AL chief Sheikh Hasina 
was the chief guest in the meeting. During the meeting two groups of BCL engaged in hand to 
hand skirmish. They also used gims in the conflict. In the gun battle BCL Organizing 
Secretary Manuruzzaman Badal succumbed to death by gunfire of the opposition (third 
world) group^°^. 
Hasina and the BAKSAL group of AL were looking for opportunity to curve the 
influence of Dr. Kamal and his people. Montu was known as the close allay of Dr. Kamal and 
the 'third world group' backed by Montu was blamed for the killing of Badal. So Sheikh 
Hasina decided to take tuff action against killers of Badal and ex-BAKSAL group of AL was 
with her. But Montu was popular in the youth section of AL workers and he was also getting 
backing of the senior groups of the AL. At the merger of BAKSAL group in AL and after the 
brutal killing of Badal, the party again was engaged in intense factional conflict. 
The faction, which was clearly anti-Hasina, was opposing the action of Hasina. They 
strongly felt that the action of Hasina was not appropriate. There had been steady decline in 
party's popularity with the common people due to negative attitude of Hasina. This faction 
also alleged that the party chief ran the AL by her arbitrary decisions and completely ignored 
the senior leaders of the party. They said AL was being painted as an arrogant and obdurate 
party. AL's policy to meet the BNP challenge by aggressive postulations rather than by 
political means was not acceptable to them. They also alleged that any party decision was 
contingent upon the final vetting by S. Hasina. On the other hand, the faction supporting 
Hasina, endorsed her way of leading the party. They said no one came forward to share the 
responsibility but was only eager to enjoy the fruit. They said there had been several instances 
Morning Sun, 23 December 1991. 
Morning Sun, 8 January 1992. 
300 . Daily Star, 11 January 1992. 
The third world group was comprised by the BCL workers of greater Dhaka and Comilla region. 
Daily Ittefaq, 10 and 12 January 1992. Some years before in a similar way in the presence of BNP leader 
Khaleda Zia at a meeting of BNP's student wing tow rival group students of JCD engaged in armed conflict and 
Pagia Sahid, one of the JCD activists, was brutally killed in that incident (see Weekly Jai Jai Din, 5 January 
1993; p. 9. 
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when discussion had failed to produce any result and in such circumstances the party chief 
had to take a decision on her own. According to pro-Hasina group, in day-to-day party work, 
the young activists rather than the senior leaders were easily available. If the party were to 
depend upon the seniors, there would be complete stalemate in the party, and every thing 
would come to a standstill. They said BNP had not come to politics under normal 
circumstances. Therefore, to meet its challenge, AL would have to adopt an aggressive 
posture. They said BNP was the principal political opponent of AL. Yet many AL leaders 
were hobnobbing with the ruling party^''^ 
The extended meeting of ALiAfter the killing of Badal, a working committee meeting held on 
10 January 1992 witnessed a heated discussion and criticism for fostering the 'armed cadre 
politics' allegedly by some party central leaders that led to a bloody clash between the feuding 
group of BCL resulting in the killing ofBadal^'^. After the meeting, AL mounted a cleansing 
operation imder the instruction of S. Hasina. On 12 January, six third world group activists 
were expelled from the BCL^"^. Later another BCL activist of the same group was expelled. 
But it created a sharp resentment among some leaders of the party. Montu, the central leader 
of AL and the President of AL's youth wing, was leading this agitated group. This group 
reportedly was having the blessings of Dr. Kamal, Major General (Ret,) Khalilur Rahman, 
Syed Zohra Tajuddin and Barrister Amirul Islam felt that decision of expulsion of seven BCL 
activists in connection with Badal murder was not impartiaP"^. Another three daylong 
extending meeting of AL began on 4 March 1992. Many already contemplated that in the 
March extended meeting, Hasina group would expel Dr. Kamal and Montu from the party^® .^ 
In the meeting, stormy debate took place between Dr. Kamal and Hasina when Dr. Kamal in 
his speech called for joint leadership in the party. He said, according to constitution, AL 
President and GS cannot avail any government official facilities. After the formation of new 
government, Hasina was occupying the posts of leader of the opposition and party president at 
a time °^®. But Bangabandhu Mujib left the party president-ship when he took the 
responsibility of govenmient during his regime to give dynamism to the party. S. Hasina was 
already upset at Kamal's suggestion that a collective leadership guided the party and she had 
also not taken lightly Kamal's initiative about the so-called democratic forum. In her answer, 
S. Hasina quoted from party constitution to state that President and GS of the party cannot 
simultaneously occupy the office of the PM, ministers, high commissioners, ambassadors, 
chief whip of ruling party and any government service. But the constitution was not clear in 
case of the Leader of the Opposition. Hasina also said her resignation letter was still with the 
GS of the party and it could be accepted. Pointing to Kamal Hossain, she said she was ready 
to relinquish the office of the President of the party. She further said this issue was being 
raised at regular intervals and demanded a clarification from Kamal. Hasina also questioned 
Kamal on the issue of floating Democratic Forum and specifically asked whether it was going 
to be a political forum. Dr. Kamal was empathetic in saying that the forum, he intended to 
Morning Sun, 20 January 1992. 
Morning Sun, 28 January 1992. 
. Morning Sun, 13 Januaiy, 1992. Meanwhile, Jasimuddin Jessi, one of the arrested student in the connection 
of Badal killing, told the police that the killing was the outcome of factional conflict in BCL and a senior AL 
leader (Montu) supplied ftem arms to kill their rivals. See Morning Sun and Daily Ittefaq, 13 January 1992. 
Morning Sun, 28 Januaiy 1992. 
Daily Bhorer Kagoj wrote, AL might take disciplinary action against its three leaders. See 23 February 1992. 
Though the daily did not mention the name of the three leaders but it was easy to understand in that time that 
these three leaders were Kamal, Zohra and Montu. 
Damik Janata, 4 March 1992. 
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float, was a purely non-political organization, mainly to attract the talents from different 
professional groups. He further said, "I am still with AL and I shall never quit the party"^°'. In 
the meeting, maximum speaker criticized Kamal, Zohra and Montu for their engagement in 
anti-organizational activities. They told those, who were engaged in conspiracy against party 
chief, should be ousted from the party. They also demanded to take tuff action against those 
persons involved in the killing of Badal. They also demanded to complete the council session 
of Jubo (Youth) League. Countering these criticisms of pro-Hasina group, one pro-Kamal 
leader said, it became a regular practice to criticize Dr. KamaP'°. Among the central leaders, 
Tofael Ahmed criticized Hasina and said Mostaq (the alleged killer of Mujib) also used to 
show excessive regards to Bangabandhu. Countrymen knew what Mustaq did later. He also 
said that the party should accept that the mistakes were made in selection of candidates for the 
last election. That's why the party was defeated^". An intense debate also took place in the 
working committee meeting on the issue of taking punitive action against Kamal, Zohra and 
Montu. According to one group, then the punitive action have to be taken against many of the 
party leaders for various reason^However, following the extended meeting in the WC 
meeting, AL leadership advised Dr. Kamal not to proceed further with his proposed quasi-
political Democratic Forum which, it felt, would create confusion among party workers and 
the people and damage the party's interest in the long run^'^. In the fight, finally, the triumph 
was with S. Hasina since the WC of the party already torpedoed the collective leadership idea, 
through the determined efforts of Hasina loyalists like Mohammad Nasim^ '^*. The WC also 
stispended Montu from the party central committee and Dhaka District AL GS post for 
'undermining the image of Ae party and anti-party activities'. The committee also decided to 
serve a show-cause notice on him^ Montu, who was also chairman of the Jubo (Youth) 
League, was basically suspended for his alleged involvement in the killing of BCL leader 
Badal. However, the reaction to the suspension decision on Montu was sharp. Dr. Kamal and 
the senior leaders of the party were apparently unhappy not only on the attitudes of the party 
on the proposed forum of Dr. Kamal Hossain but also on the question of Montu's 
suspension^'^. 
Previously, it was decided that within March 1992, all the district and sub-district level 
council session would be completed and the AL council session would be held soon. But now, 
before the extended meeting, only about fifty sub-district committees completed their council 
session. The main difficulties of the completion of the council sessions of the lower units 
were the internal difference and frustration in the party. The factional conflict of the centre 
has already percolated in the lower units, as many of the AL leaders gave more attention to 
build their own cadre groups in lower level than building the party's organizational base^'^. 
Since the death of Badal, the council sessions of lower unit organizations were halted. The 
central leaders were avoiding attending the meetings to form new committees in the lower 
units. The AL WC instructed the district and sub-district organizations to complete council 
sessions till 30 April and declared that the central council session would be held on 30 May 
1992. But because of the newly developed crisis inside the party centering the suspension 
Morning Sun, 4 Mm-ch 1992. 
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Dainik Janata, 4 March 1992. 
Ajker Kagoj, 5 March 1992. 
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notice on Montu, the council session of the party became uncertain. In the WC meeting, AL 
also changed its economic program to adjust the new world order at the fall of world 
socialism. At the WC meeting, following the extended meeting of the party, market economy 
was added in place of nationalized economy and the work 'socialism' was being dropped 
from the four main organizational principles^'®. 
Dr. Kamal and DF: Despite objections from party's bigger section of policy making circles. 
Dr. Kamal decided to go ahead with his proposed Democratic Forum. He said it was not 
written in the constitution of AL that any one would not be permitted to involve with any 
nonpolitical forum side by side his association with AL^'^. Finally, the non-political forum 
was floated on March 1992 with an intension to contribute to the building of democratic 
institutions in the country. AL leader Barrister Amirul Islam and Kaji Jahirul Kaiyum joined 
the front^^°. It will not be exaggeration if a previous short-history of the Democratic Forum is 
given here. Since 1988, Dr. Kamal and the old group were isolated inside the party. To 
overcome their isolation and to gain control over the political activities, this group was 
thinking to form an alternative platform, which would at least give them opportunity to 
express their democratic ideas and thoughts^^'. During March 1982- October1990 when the 
opposition parties could not bring any positive change by their anti-regime movement rather, 
they were engaged in infighting among themselves and as a result, became inactive; by 
observing all these, people became frustrated and were desperately expected a pro-people 
positive change in the political scenario of the country. The anti-Hasina group in the AL, who 
were cornered in the party platform, tried to capitalize the frustration of the masses to form a 
new platform. The Nagorik (Citizens) Committee, a non political forum, was formed in 1989 
comprising the lawyers, intellectuals and politicians to unite the democratic forces of the 
society by the initiative of the old guards of AL and it remained in their controP^^. These 
committee leaders exchanged their views with Khaleda Zia on September 1989 and took 
different attempts to build up a united anti-regime movement. Using this new platform, 
avoiding Hasina and youth group of AL leadership, the seniors in the party tried to float 
separate stream in Bangladesh politics. But the close associates of Hasina were aware of the 
move of Nagorik Committee and elder leaders of the party. S. Hasina personally was against 
of such activities of old guard^^^. She advised her men not to associate with this move. Since 
the formation of Nagorik Committee, the old guards started criticizing the inactiveness of the 
opposition political parties in realizing the democratic right of the people. They also told that 
neither the traditional right nor the traditional left could meet the needs of the hour. Then they 
Dainik Millat, 5 March 1992. 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 5 March 1992. Also Mohammad Harman, Bangladesh 1992; p. 68. 
Daily Ittefaq, 20 March 1992. 
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proposed that now the liberal democrats and the progressive forces should jointly float a new 
platform on the basis of a national consensus, which was emerged from the seven years of 
democratic movement. With this end in view, the anti-Hasina group in AL masterminded a 
two-point program. One is to form a unity with educationalists, intelligentsia, political 
personalities, technocrats, patriotic bureaucrats, and different professional groups, and the 
second is to make a public project of their plan regarding the ^ture course of action of the 
opposition, form of government, etc^^". The difference between Dr. Kamal and Hasian 
reached in peak. When differing with party evaluation Kamal declared that the 1991 
parliamentaiy election was free and fair and the AL should accept the election defeat^^^. Since 
then, Kamal became inactive in AL; even he was not attending the meetings of AL central 
committees regularly^^^. Instead of using AL platform, he concentrated more to organize 
Nagorik Committee. In these days, he was telling some liberal views, such as he was stressing 
for the practice of inner democracy in the political parties as the pre-condition to 
institutionalize democracy in Bangladesh and these preaching were more acceptable to the 
masses. As for example, talking to Morning Sun on 13 September, he stressed the need for 
effective cooperation between the democratically elected government and opposition to build 
the democratic institutions destroyed by the autocratic rule in the past. He further said that all 
sections of the people should work united to give institutional shape to democracy so that they 
could face the enormous challenge across the path of improvement of their lot in an 
atmosphere of democracy and unfettered freedom^^^. However,, on 19 June 1992 when 
Gonotantrik (Democratic) Forum (DF) was formed and Dr. Kamal was elected the president 
of it^ ^ .^ All the Nagorik committee members became the members of it^ ^®. Moreover, some 
more left wing leaders from CPB, NAP (Mozaffar), Gono Azadi League, Samyabadi Party 
and Gonotontri Party already joined the The memorandum of the DF was very critical 
about political forces both in and out of power for their 'failure to come up with a 
comprehensive political direction to overcome some fundamental national problems'. The 
burning problems of the nation, according to the paper included a shattered economy, all-
engulfmg violence and anarchy, deteriorating law and order situation. The memorandum also 
accused the party leaderships of being autocratic saying, 'although the political leaders of the 
country always talk democracy, they in practice have developed a tendency of ignoring 
democratic values and norms at all levels'. The paper further added, "All we need is a 
political leadership equipped with firm determination, patriotism, and psychological make-up 
^^^ Weekly Holiday, 19 January 1990. 
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free from parochialism to direct a united nation towards tJie goai"- '^^ '. Meanwhile, the forum 
succeeded in attracting a large number of liberal intellectuals and politicians. Just before the 
floating of the DF different english dailies propagated that Dr. Kamal was going to float new 
party. Dr. Kamal denied tlie report about his starting new political party^^^. He also told the 
importance of effective cooperation between the government and the opposition to build the 
democratic institutions. He said that the relationship between the government and the 
opposition should be based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms and values 
with a view to leading the nation towards the common goal of progress^^^. During 1992, the 
DF also was advocating in favor of an all-party national govemment^^''. Moreover, Dr. Kamal 
openly told in different meeting of DF that the political parties of Bangladesh were used to 
tell for democracy for the country but they did not practice democracy inside their parties. 
They did not elect the party leadership democratically. As Dr. Kamal was the presidiimi 
member of AL, and the journalists were always were writing the infighting between Hasina 
and Kamal in the newspapers. Naturally people were thinking that Kamal was indirectly 
criticizing his own party. Observing all these contradictory activities of Kamal, Modasser Ali 
wrote, by discussing the weakness of his organization (AL) individually one could be 
benefited but the organization had to loss its popularity; an adverse reaction against the party 
developed among the massed by this type of propaganda^^^. Defying the objection of party's 
policy-making circle when Kamal was advancing with his DF just before the 1992 council 
session the party leaders mounted pressure for issuing show-cause notice to him^^^. 
Factionalism after Motin's suspension: After the suspension of Montu, the AL faced a serious 
organizational crisis. The conflict in the central body of AL soon spread in its lower level and 
other front organizations of the party. It put S. Hasina somewhat in an awkward situation. 
During 1986-90 when the BNP's student wing the JCD was controlling Dhaka University and 
other educational institutions in Bangladesh because of its superior armed cadre-group and the 
AL led student wing was not getting hold because of lacking of arms in those days on 
necessity the party leadership welcomed the armed cadres and Montu to defend the BNP 
backed student wing. On 1986 as the loyal cadre of Hasina Montu was elected the president 
of Awami Youth League. In those days during 1983-90 when, at the defection of BAKSAL 
group, AL was very weak in Dhaka city Montu and his people made AL's different programs, 
especially strikes and big gathering, successftil. The party leaders and workers were aware of 
the dedicated role of Montu in those days. So many of them were not ready expel Montu only 
because of internal conflict between Hasina and old guard leadership of AL. They knew 
Montu was targeted by Hasina because of his influence over Dhaka city and a big section of 
youth workers in the party and as because of his defection from Hasina group and joining 
with Kamal-Tofael axis. In this connection after the three months of suspension of Montu 
Dainik Bangla wrote, "Widespread resentment is brewing in AL over suspension of eminent 
party leader Mostofa Mohsin Montu"^^^. 
See the draft of memorandum in Daily Star, 8 February 1992. 
Morning Sun, 11 February and 4 March 1992. 
Morning Sun, 11 February 1992. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 17-23 April 1992. 
Syed Modesser All, Subject: Politics, p. 98. 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 5 July 1992. 
Dainik Bangla, 5 May 1992. 
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In a Presidium meeting held following the WC meeting seven out of nine presidium 
members opposed the decision of serving show-cause notice on Montu^^^. Though Montu was 
suspended from AL, he was still the President of Awami Jubo (Youth) League. The youth 
wing of the party protested the suspension of Montu and demanded to withdraw it 
immediately^^^. They also engaged in meeting, procession and wall writing to materialize 
their demands. Tension mounted in the Dhaka University campus at the suspension news of 
Montu became public. On 6 March night, pro-Hasina and Montu group of BCL fought a gun-
battle^ "*". Since then time to time both groups engaged in gun-battle. The pro- Montu faction 
and the senior group, close to him in AL, was creating pressure on AL leadership for the 
withdrawal of his suspension. On the other hand, the pro-Hasina group published news in 
newspaper that those who were engaged in meeting and procession to pressurize the AL 
leadership would be punished for demolishing the image of the party. The names of those top-
level Jubo League leaders and Dhaka District AL leaders supporting Montu were also 
collected. AL Joint Secretary M.A. Jalil, Dhaka district AL President and some more 
important party leaders visited all of the sub-districts of the Dhaka, did meeting with them and 
tried to unite the local AL leaders against Montu^''^ In this situation, the seniors in AL 
extended their total help for Montu and were observing the development of the infighting in 
AL. Though since 27 February election debacle Zohra and Kamal was criticizing Hasina 
openly but still then Hasina's men could not convinced the extended meeting to expelled them 
or sent show cause notice against them. It revealed that the party was not totally under her 
control. The seniors knew that the masses had craze for Hasina as she is the daughter of Mujib 
but AL workers and supporters were unhappy with her because of her contradictory political 
decisions- she was taking one after another. In this situation their contemplation was that if 
Montu could create dent in Hasina's support base then they together would challenge the 
leadership of Hasina. 
On 13 May 1992 in the annual council session of BCL, Hasina formed a new 
committee '^*^. Many of BCL leaders expressed their dissatisfaction with the new committee. 
Within few days Montu backed BCL workers also organized a council session and announced 
the formation of a parallel committee '^*^. As a result, the factional feud between the groups 
turned to the peak^'^. On 28 May 1991, the Montu faction of BCL took possession of Johorul 
Huq Hall of Dhaka University by ousting the Hasina backed BCL group . It was known as 
the traditional fort of BCL. On 31 May 'Daily Azker Kagoj' wrote that at the taking control of 
Johorul Huq Hall by the pro-Montu BCL faction a particular situation for face-to-face gun-
battle was being prepared '^^ ^. However, the Hasina backed faction of BCL still had supremacy 
at S.M Hall and Jagannath Hall^ '* .^ Since then for about two year because of the fear of armed 
cadres of Montu group the activities of Hasina backed BCL was jeopardized. In these years, 
frequently gun-battle was taking place between pro-Montu faction and pro-Hasina faction of 
Morning Sun, 9 March 1992. 
Daily Ittefaq, 7 March 1992 and Bhorer Kagoj, 10 March 1992. 
Morning Sun and Daily Ittefaq, 7 March 1992. 
Bhorer Kagoj, 11 March 1992. 
Moinuddin Hasan Chowdhury and Iqbalur Rahim were elected the president and secretary of the BCL. 
Mizanur Rahman and Wahiduzzaman Lony were elected president and secretaiy of this faction of BCL. 
Mohanunad Hannan, Bangladesh 1992; p. 81. 
^^ ^ Daily Ittefaq and Ajker Kagoj, 28 May 1992. 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 31 May 1992. 
Morning Sun, 8 September 1992. 
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BCL^ '*®. In these gun battle the government backed student wing was helping the Montu group 
in the Dhaka University campus for two reasons '^^ ^: (i) To weaken the organizational base of 
AL backed student wing BCL and (ii) By encouraging the armed conflict between the two 
rival faction of BCL government created an opportunity for itself to criticize AL in masses for 
its student wings terrorist activities. 
Though Montu was suspended from the GS post of Dhaka District AL but still he was 
enjoying the support of maximum number of the members of the district unit. Relieving the 
pro-Hasina president of Dhaka District AL, Samsuddoha Khan Majlish, made Senior Vice 
President Mimshi Abdul Aziz acting president. Several times defying the suspension notice he 
arranged the district AL meetings with the help of his followers. Prior to the 1992 AL council 
session when all district AL conventions were taking place a close aid of Montu already said, 
"We will prove with holding of the armual council session of (Dhaka District AL) that the 
executive committee members and peoples of Dhaka city are with Monstafa Mohsin 
Montu"^^°. According to him, the Dhaka district unit would put pressure on the party's central 
leaders to withdraw the suspension notice against Montu before the 1992 council of the 
central committee of AL. To show its strength Montu group of Dhaka district AL also 
arranged district AL convention side by side the legal convention of Dhaka district AL in the 
same day in two different places (Montu group at Engineers' Institute of Dhaka and pro-
Hasina group at Savar upozila of Dhaka district)^^'. The gathering of AL workers and 
supporters in the council meeting of Montu group was larger than that of Hasina supported 
convention^^^. Montu group claimed that out of 49 previous district committee members 30 
participated in his meeting . AL presidium member Zohra Tajuddin inaugurated the Montu 
backed council session of Dhaka District AL and bluntly said the suspension of Mostafa 
Mohsin Montu was undemocratic and unconstitutional Zohra further said, "Hasty 
expulsion can never solve any problem of a party and Mantu's contribution to the party must 
be recognized"^^^. AL working committee member Major General (Ret.) Khalilur Rahman 
was also present there. On the other hand, though it was previously decided that A. Samad 
Azad would be the chief guest of the pro-Hasina group's Council Session of Dhaka District 
AL bur he was not present there. Zillur Rahman (Presidium member), M.A. Jalil (joint 
secretary) and Mohammad Nasim (publicity secretary), the loyal cadres of Hasina, were 
present at Savar convention. In their respective council sessions each group formed its 49-
member committee for the next two years^^ .^ However, Zillur Rahman, AL Presidium 
member, who attended the Savar meeting, said his party did not recognize the conference held 
by Montu-led group and actions would be taken against those central leaders who attended the 
'illegal' conference^^^. 
Finally, after the AL's victory in the Dhaka City Corporation election the Montu group of BCL became 
disheartened and left Johurul Huq Hall of Dhaka University. The pro-Hasina group took the control over the hall. 
The research scholar witnessed of many of those gun-battles between the two groups. 
From Personal observation. Also see Morning Sun, 8 September 1992. 
Morning Sun, 16 May 1992. 
Ajker Kagoj, 23 May 1992. 
" I Daily Star, 23 May 1992. 
Daily Ajker Kagoj and Daily Star, 23 May 1992. 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 23 May 1992. 
Daily Star, 23 May 1992. 
Montu and Jamal Uddin Ahmed was respectively elected the President and GS of the new committee of pro-
Montu faction of the Dhaka District AL. On the other hand, Shamsuddoha Khan Majlish and Benojir Ahmed 
were respectively elected the president and GS of Hasina backed new committee of Dhaka District AL. For the 
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The Expulsion of Montu: A controversy was raised over the presence of some central AL 
leaders in the council session of the Montu-faction of Dhaka district unit of the party and their 
remarks in that meeting. Zohra Tajuddin's remarks that suspension of Montu's party 
membership was both unconstitutional and undemocratic made the party chief and her 
loyalists in the party extremely annoyed. So the younger section of the party's WC was 
preparing to propose disciplinary action against Zohra and Khalil at the coming emergency 
meeting of the WC for their joining the council session of Montu faction of AL^^ .^ The 
younger section of the party also believed that letting Zohra's remark go unchallenged would 
encourage others to make further undesirable comments on the party high command. But it is 
no doubt that Zohra and Khalil had fully weighted the pros and cons before participating in 
the Dhaka District AL council meet organized by Montu. They were of course, aware that 
show-cause notices could be issued against them on charge of violation of party discipline. 
They could even be expelled from the party. They were also aware that; (i) widespread inner-
party anger against Hasina's autocratic leadership. A section of the young and veteran AL 
leaders thought that Hasina had been able to occupy the party's highest post merely as an 
inheritance. She was conducting the affairs of the party according to her whims by taking 
advantage of the sentiments and respects for her as the daughter of late Mujib; (ii) because of 
Hasina's favoritism for greater Faridpur and greater Barishal regional group there was already 
frustration in other regional leaders in the party; (iii) the remaining pro-socialist faction was 
angry on Hasina's support to market economy; (iv) Hasina neglected the socio-economic 
aspiration of the people and in party's program gave too much stress only on the demand of 
trial of killers of Mujib as the main agenda of AL; (v) even while talking about democracy 
Hasina was not following democratic methods and process inside the party; (vi) the lower 
level party leaders knew that Hasin used to avoid the senior party leaders and take party 
decisions by consulting with only few of her close followers in a undemocratic way. 
However, it was confirm that the elderiy leaders of the party, sharing the same views of Zohra 
and Khalil would defend in the coming WC meeting. According to one AL leader, having 
sympathy for Zohra, said that despite the fact that Zohra Tajuddin was right in criticizing the 
^ high command for its undemocratic attitude, she made the remarks in a 'wrong place'^^^. 
However,, according to another quarter of the party insiders Hasina might become flexible on 
Montu following pressure from some influential central leaders and some of her relatives. 
They requested Hasina to go slow about Montu in the interest of the unity of the party. They 
said action against Montu could cause serious trouble for the party as he had wide support 
among the party workers^^®. It should be mentionable here Montu was the follower of Sheikh 
Moni, the cousin of Hasina and the foimder president of Awami Youth League who was 
assassinated in a military coup in 1975 along with Sheikh Mujib. Still Montu was maintaining 
cordial relationship with Moni's younger brother Sheikh Selim MP, one of the WC members 
of AL and editor of AL's mouthpiece 'Banglar Bani'. During the conflict of Hasina with 
Montu 'Banglar Bani' never wrote against Montu though it was very critical against the old 
guards of the party. There could be some positive solution of this crisis as Montu had many 
friends who were close to Hasina. But Montu was not ready for any mutual compromise 
because of his overconfidence and arrogancy. In those days, it was regular discussion in the 
AL family that without Montu in AL, it would be difficult for the party chief Hasina to 
conduct the activities of the Chhatra League, Jubo League, Dhaka City Committee and the 
Dhaka District Committee. Montu was over confident of his political strength. So he was 
Daily Star and Morning Sun, 26 May 1992. 
" ' .Daily Star, 26 May 1992. 
Morning Sun, 26 May 1992. 
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challenging Hasina directly. Even his language was like that'The party will face bitter 
consequences if any action is taken against any one for attending the council session at the 
Engineers' Instituti" and "If Zohra Tajuddin is served with any show-cause notice, there will 
be no party called AL"^^'. During the crisis period one AL leader met him to find out a 
compromising way to settle the matter with Hasina. He told the party leader that he would not 
go for any compromise. Rather Hasina had to withdraw the suspension letter first. If Hasina 
was not agreeing to it there would not be any party named AL imder Hasina's leadership^^^. 
This leader told the researcher in an interview that Montu was doing every thing encouraged 
by the senior leaders of the party and by using Montu the senior leaders were testing the 
fertility of the internal situation of the party whether it was possible to challenge Hasina's 
leadership. Montu was being used by some old Guards, who wanted to comer Hasina and 
challenge her hold over the party. Montu forgot that during the near about 45 years of its 
political history, AL had to face many types of attack but the party had marched ahead 
overcoming all the obstacles. The youth section of the WC was demanding his expulsion from 
the party. However,, the infighting temporarily reduced the image of AL so much, so that 
weekly Tide already wrote, "Internal troubles have almost finished the Chhatra League. Now 
it is possibly the turn of the AL itself BNP and Jammat won't have to do any thing. They 
know AL is committing harikiri"^^^ 
In the three-day long WC meeting, of AL a stormy debate took place when the Montu 
issue came up for discussion. Majority members of the WC strongly condemned the activities 
of Montu in the last few months following his suspension by the central committee. Some 
leaders said the show-cause notice, which was served upon Montu, should have specifically 
mentioned the allegation of his involvement in the killing of BCL leader Badal. They noted 
that suppression of this single fact resulted in more wrong doings by Montu in last three 
months, including the holding of a conference in the name of Dhaka District AL undermined 
the image of the party. They also discussed the armed attak by Montu group on pro-Hasina 
student workers. The leaders also voiced strong criticism against Zohra Tajuddin for attending 
Montus conference in utter violation of the central committee decision and the party 
constitution. Some leaders put up a strong plea that those who were directly or indirectly 
involved in anti-organizational activities should be expelled to make the organization more 
disciplined. On the other hand, Zohra Tajuddin was absent in the meeting. Dr. Kamal, A. 
Mannan, A. Momin Tofael Ahmed and Advocate Sirajul Islam etc remind the AL WC 
members of the past dedication of Montu for AL^ ® .^ Tofael Ahmed even said, "I don't believe 
that Montu can do any sabotaging activities against AL"^ ® .^ Though Zohra Tajuddin came 
under fire from the members close to the party high command. Sheikh Hasina disagreed to 
take any disciplinary action against her because of her husband's dedication for the party. She 
said that the widow of late Tajuddin would understand her wrongdoing and would be regretftil 
for it^ ^ .^ Probably, it was a trick of Hasina not to take punitive action against all at a time to 
avoid any big revolt from inside the party. However, the central WC of AL chaired by party 
chief to expel Mostafa Mohsin Montu amid note of dissent from five top leaders of the party 
including of them were Dr. Kamal, A. Mannan, A. Momen, Tofael, Sirajul Islam. Party GS 
Sajeda Chowdhury, A. Kader Siddiqui, Mafizul Islam Kamal, A. Rob Chowdhury and some 
Morning Sun, 26 May 1992. 
Still now this person is very close to Montu. Mentioning his name would not be wise for me. 
Weeicly Tide, 16 March 1992. 
Daily Ittefaq, 30-31 May and 1 June 1992. Also New Nation, 31 May 1992. 
Daily Ittefaq, 1 June 1992. 
Daily Azker Kagoj and New Nation, 1 July 1992. 
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more leaders also opposed the decision seeking more time to settle the issue tough they 
abstained from giving the note of dissent at the meeting^^^. In this stage Dr Kamal became 
emotional and said, "I love Bangabandhu, I love AL, I can not think myself without AL. But I 
don't know whether I can be active with AL politics fiirther"^®^. After the expulsion one pro-
Hasina leader said, "We want to make the party clean and free from terrorists". On the other 
hand, a senior leader said, "The whole thing was organized by S. Hasina herself and further 
asserted that the decision could not been passed but for the Young Turks who were inducted 
into the WC by the party chief^^^. Party stalwart Advocate Sirajul Islam strongly opposed the 
move to expel Montu describing it as unconstitutional and anti-party. Referring to the 
constitutional provisions, he categorically said that Mantu's suspension order was totally 
illegal as there was no provision in the constitution to take punitive measures like suspension 
or expulsion from the party without serving show-cause notice. But surprisingly, Montu was 
suspended first, and then was sent sow-cause notice. He said the coterie inside the party 
plotted Montu's suspension only to cut size those who voiced the need for protecting 
democratic norms within the party.^^° Montu's expulsion triggered high tension in Dhaka 
University campus. Bangladesh Times wrote the campus passed another sleepless night as the 
two factions of Chattra League fought each other on the night of May The leaders and 
activists of the rebel Dhaka District AL staged demonstration in June in front of the central 
office of AL and later held a rally at national press club to protest the expulsion of Montu 
from AL^^^ 
After the expulsion of Montu,the old guards repeatedly tried but failed to bring S. 
Hasina's notice that her autocratic behavior was not beneficial to the party now became 
somewhat desperate. This attitude was discemable more or less in every level of AL"^. The 
dissidents of AL were contemplating to form a new political party. The senior leaders, who 
gave their blessing for the dissident group, held a meeting at the residence of AL Presidium 
member A. Mannan^^"*. The meeting agreed to mount pressure on AL high command to 
withdraw the expulsion order against Mantu and try to elect Tofael Ahmed as general 
secretary of AL in the forthcoming council session. If these two objectives were not achieved 
at council session the dissident leaders would form a new political party. Even they decided 
that the name of the party would be 'Gonotantrik (Democratic) AL . In these days, though, 
it was appeared that the AL leadership clearly divided into two factions over the issue of the 
expulsion of Montu but the Montu issue was only a pretext. The long standing political, 
organizational and leadership tussle inside the party reached its climax centering round this 
issue. The two factions of the leadership were trying to consolidate their strength and position 
in view of the next council meeting. However, the floating of the party was depending on 
'negative outcome' at the AL council session scheduled for 27 and 28 June^ ^®. It had been 
seen in the past that when BAKSAL was formed by defecting AL it could not survive due to 
New Nation, 1 June 1992. 
Daily Ittefaq, 1 June 1992. 
New Nation, 1 June 1992. 
New Nation, lJune 1992. 
Bangladesh Times, 1 June '992. 
" I Daily Inqilab, 2 June 1992. 
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as Hasina was possessing the charisma of her father Mujib. The old guards were conscious 
about it. 
With the control of Youth League remaining in the hands of the expelled Montu the 
crisis in AL was not yet over. Montu was the President of this youth front of AL and it was 
reportedly still with him. Attempt to throw Montu out of the Youth League was not 
successful. Under the party constitution the JL does not come imder the direct control of the 
AL^^ .^ After the expulsion of Montu from AL the pro-Hasina faction was contemplating to 
disown the present committee of Jubo League^^^. Montu's base was very strong especially in 
Dhaka city and Dhaka district region and strategically these were very vital area for the 
political parties to make success any of their political programs. It is a belief that who has the 
control of Dhaka he will have the control of the government power of Bangladesh. When the 
Hasina group was facing tuff resistance from Youth League (JL) leaders to oust him from this 
front organization of AL at one stage they offered proposal that the AL working committee 
would withdraw the expulsion order against Montu and restore his party membership if 
Montu wrote to the party high command regretting his past activities^^^. But Montu was very 
arrogant and was not ready to bow a little to Hasina. So the pro-Hasina group arranged many 
separate sitting with different JL, Dhaka City AL and Dhaka district AL leaders and was able 
to convince them by distributing different incentives (important posts and positions in the 
party and other incentives). Mostafa Mohsin Montu was removed from the chairmanship of 
Awami Youth League at an emergency meeting of its presidium held on 8 July at the 
residence of S. Hasina. JL Presidium member and former MP Nurul Majid Humayim was 
made acting president in his place^^°. 
Montu's expulsion triggered high tensions inside the party in the backdrop of the 
forthcoming national council of AL. After the coimtrywide publicity to the expulsion news, 
adverse reactions were received from the districts. Some of the district leaders and activists 
protested and demanded a reconsideration of the decision. Targetting the expulsion issue of 
Montu the central and district leaders were temporarily divided into two distinct factions. 
Ajker Kagoj wrote, "The expulsion of Montu is simply an excuse. By using this issue the 
sustained political, organizational and leadership rivalry in the party reached to the climax"^^'. 
Using the mounted grievance of one section of AL activists, the senior group led by Dr. 
Kamal was trying for a show down in the council session supposed to be held on June. 
Targeting the next council session, both the group intensified their group activities to 
consolidate their strength and position in the party. The main issues of rivalry between the 
groups were the proposed amendments to the constitution and the practice of democracy 
inside the organization^^^. A section of the party was also afraid that an irmer conflict of the 
party might surface following the council session at this time^^^. In view of these reactions. 
"lDai lyMil la t ,2June 1992. 
" ' .NewNation, ] June 1992. 
Morning Sun, 4 July 1992.' 
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those close to the party chief Hasina favored fiirther postponement of the council meeting^^''. 
They felt that if council session was going to be held now the 'Montu' issue would influence 
the council meeting and hasten the breakup of the party. So due to the inner conflict in AL 
council session was differed further to settle the hue and ciy after the expulsion of Montu 
from AL and JL. During these days, AL had taken the lead to build up an agitation against the 
government to divert the attention of its rank and file from party feud^^^. The New Nation also 
v^ote, "The AL is trying to launch an anti-regime movement to materialize some of its 
demands. But the political commentators said that AL has virtually taken the lead to build up 
an agitation against the government to divert the attention of its rank and file from 
organizational lapses and party feuds. AL has no option but to go for a movement to tackle 
the schism surfacing within the party"^^^. In the mean time by arranging many sittings with 
the central and district level leaders Hasina group succeeded to manipulate or neutralize many 
of the elements known as sympathizer to Montu. On the other hand, though many AL workers 
and middle class leaders had sympathy for the old guards demand that there should be more 
intemal democratic practice in the party and Montu should not be ousted but they failed to 
appreciate the violent way Montu was following to overturn Hasina. The AL leaders and 
workers had emotional attachment with S. Hasina. So slowly old guards lost their ground to 
challenge Hasina in the coming council session. Montu also understood that demonstrating 
any type of strength it would not be possible to compel Hasina to withdraw the expulsion 
notice. So he surrendered to the expulsion order and became silent during council session of 
Preparation for the 1992 Council Session: Hasina was now eager to consolidate her leadership 
in the party. Hasina and her followers decided to bring many amendments to the constitution 
to curve the anti-Hasina group's influence permanently and to avoid future crisis in AL 
leadership. The constitutional sub-committee, formed to bring necessary amendment of the 
constitution, proposed further increase of the power of the party chief including a provision to 
give punishment to any member of the Executive Committee for alleged involvement in anti-
party activities and failure in organizational work^^l The committee also suggested increase 
in the number of members of the executive committee and Presidium, formation of advisory 
committee for the party chief by including the senior members of the party^^^ and the 
intellectuals of the society and holding of triennial council session instead of current biennial 
According to the proposals, the party chief would select members of the central advisory 
council^^'. In this regard a source close to the party leader hinted that the stalwarts identified 
as anti-Hasina camp might be dropped from the working committee to be formed in the 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 2 June 1992. 
New Nation, 30 August 1992 and Morning Sun, 5 September 1992. According to some of the party leaders, 
in these days AL had no options but to go for anti-government movement to tackle schism surfacing within the 
party (ee New Nation, 30 August 1992). A section of the party leadership was in favor of buildmg up a strong 
movement instead of holding the council session at this time by the fear that an inner conflict of the party might 
surface following the council session (see Morning News, 5 September 1992). 
New Nation, 30 August 1992. To know the demands of AL see the same edition of the daily. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 29 September, 1992; p.6. 
According to the that time party constitution, the party chief did not hold absolute power to punish any 
executive member or issue any show-cause notice against a members mvolvement in anti-party activities. See 
Morning Sun, 5 September 1992. 
With this step Hasina group intended to neutralize the senior members of the party by including them in the 
advisory committee of party chief 
Morning Sun, 5 September 1992. 
Daily Star, 17 September 1992. 
410 
forthcoming national council session of the party^® .^ Maximum of the posts of the party would 
be filled by the youth activists of the party loyal to Hasina^^^. It was also known that many of 
the post of secretariate and WC would be filled by the ex-student leaders loyal to Hasina. 
Though all the amendments to the constitution were calculated only to centralize more power 
in the hands of Hasina by crushing inner party democratic and give her scope for removing 
the rival elements from the important positions of the party without expelling them, but pro-
Hasina AL tried to justify the move by saying that to give dynamism to the party and 
strengthen its organizational structure the constitutional amendment was necessary and it 
would be accepted in the next council meeting^ '^*. The elder members of the constitution 
amendment sub-committee, however,, opposed the idea of giving special power to the party 
chief on the ground that it would hamper the present balance of power between the presidium 
and secretariate of the party. They were also reluctant to accept the idea of constituting of an 
advisoiy council on the ground that the council parallel to the Presidium would affect the 
dignity of the later^^^. Dr. Kamal severly criticized the idea of increased of the power of the 
party chief, the proposed amendment to the constitution that the secretaries of the party would 
be individually and collectively responsible to party chief and the proposal of the sub-
committee of forming the advisory council. According to him, it would ultimately develop a 
dictatorial leadership. The establishment of dictatorial leadership by consolidating of 
unlimited power in one person's hand would certainly turned itself into autocracy in the party 
and it would finally, fhistrated the party; by establishing an individual leadership, AL would 
not be able to continue its historical role in Bangladesh politics. So by making active the 
presidium collective leadership had to be established^®^. On this regard the Morning Sun 
wrote, "The AL with its historical record, will not be doing any good to itself if it believes 
that every thing it stands for will henceforth be all that its chief decides it will be. Dr Kamal 
has opposed the idea of increased authority for the part chief.... The guiding principle for a 
modem political party ought not to be a concentration of powers in the hands of its leader. 
And then, too, one must not forget that when one politician is transformed into an all-
powerful, if not an all-knowing, being, there is little opportunity for other people to offer 
themselves as potential leaders. A rising luminary will forever have the misfortime of seeing 
his independence mistaken for indiscipline"^®^. 
During! 976-83, the student front of AL was controlled by A. Razzaq and Tofael 
Ahmed. After the defection of A. Razzaq, it was an expectation that Tofael would get the 
responsibility to take care of BCL. But to spread own control, Hasina was also interested to 
control the BCL, So she assigned her loyal Amir Hossain Amu to look after the affairs of 
Chhatra League. But Tofael was also still active in it. As a result, Hasina, Tofael and Amu 
had followers in it. In the 1989 council session of BCL, both Tofael and Amu was trying to 
see their nominees in the leadership of the student front of AL^ ® .^ After the conference, the 
subject committee assigned to elect the new leaders had failed to form new committee 
following the pressures from the followers of the two AL stalwarts. Later, party chief Hasina 
had to intervene to resolve the crisis and formed a committee headed by Habibur Rahman and 
Asim Kumar Ukil as President and GS. The newly elected BCL leaders were the followers of 
^'iNewNation, l June l992 . 
Daily Ajker Kagoj, 19 September 1992. 
Ajker KagoJ, 14 September 1992 and Weekly Jai Jai Din, 2 June 1992; p. 10. 
Daily Star, 17 September 1992. 
Ajker Kagoj, 9 June 1992. 
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AL Joint Secretary Amu. This created a strong resentment among the followers of Sagir 
Anwar, candidate for President-ship who was backed by Tofael. The rebel faction formed a 
new committee headed by Sagir Anwar and Sarwar Jahan Badsha as President and GS^®'. The 
persistence of two committees' of BCL seriously threatened the very image of the student 
wing. No doubt the Sagir-Badsha faction was getting the blessings of Kamal-Tofael group of 
main body AL. The main stream AL finally, suspended the pro-Tofael BCL leaders on 
charges of activities against the organization'""'. This step of BCL resented Tofael but he was 
helpless to take any step against it in public. The seniors maintained a good contact with the 
rivd committee'"". It was thought by others that the old guards of the AL would strongly 
criticize her in public as the leaders of the BCL were not elected democratically by election 
rather a committee of leadership was imposed on the student wing. But the old guards 
remained silent. Later Hasina nominated the committees of different district units of the BCL 
in the same way. Her selections were not often accepted by the district AL and BCL leaders. 
In fact in many places including Kustia, Khulna, Sylhet, and Chittagong, the present AL 
organization was divided over the committee of its student fi-ont''®^. By the formation of these 
new committees Hasina was successful to curve Tofaels influence in the party's student wing. 
The BCL was now totally controlled by the party chief. She became more confident and 
strong in the party. Tofael, the experienced politician, saw the frustrated consequences of 
those AL leaders who defected the party and either formed another party or joined the 
governing regime. He also could imagine the final consequences of those who would take 
extreme stand against S. Hasina. So before the 1992 council session he decided not to take 
any separate stand along vdth Dr. Kamal against S. Hasina. Rather from inside the party, he 
would agitate to establish internal democracy in the party''°l When Dr. Kamal formally 
floated the Democratic Forum on 19 June he did not join it rather he made it very clear, "I feel 
very proud to recognize my self Tofael of AL. I will fight to establish the ideas of 
Bangabandhu throughout of my life"'^ ''^ . 
Zohra Tajuddin was highly ambitious lady. Though she understood that in the 
presence of Hasina, there was no possibility for her to be the AL leader, immediately, she did 
not agreed to accept Hasina's leadership. Rather she joined the camp of Dr. Kamal in an effort 
to increase the power of the AL Presidium as she was also the member of this highest body 
and to earn more respect as the prominent leader of the party. During 1990-92, Zohra 
Tajuddm and the senior leaders became the advocates of 'collective leadership' in the party 
and favored 'democratic practices' within the party'^ ''^ . In an endeavor to establish her family 
politics in Bangladesh like that of Hasina and Khaleda she started propagating the role of 
Tajuddin in the liberation war of 1971. One section of AL leaders and intellectuals were 
helping her in her activities. According to this section, it was Tajuddin Ahmed who really 
gave a shape to the independence of Bangladesh. When Mujib was arrested by Pakistani 
rulers, Tajuddin Ahmed had actually organized the liberation war. Yet, Mujib subsequently 
removed Tajuddin from the cabinet due to jealousy because of his historic role in the 
liberation war. This type of contradictory propaganda of this section only created confusion in 
. Bangladesh Observer, 10 June 1989. 399 
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the AL supporters and workers. Hasina was annoyed by these activities as she understood it 
was also an indirect demand from the side of Zohra Tajuddin that AL was surviving because 
of its glorious role in 1971 and Tajuddin was the PM of the revolutionary AL-led Bangladesh 
government in exile, so the leadership of AL had to be shared with Zohra Tajuddin. But 
Hasina was unable to take any hard action against her as still many of the Tajuddins friends 
were in the party and AL workers had respect for the dead leader. Meanwhile, the followers 
of Hasina already curved the influence of Zohra Tajuddin in her (Zohra's) own constitutional 
area by installing Dewan Afsar Uddin, brother of Tajuddin, in the local politics in Gazipur. 
Dr. Kamal was world wide known for his intellectuality and profession as a renowned 
lawyer. In May 1989, Kamal received the highest votes at the election and was elected one of 
the 14 members of the prestigious Supreme Court Bar Council of Bangladesh"*"®. In March 
1990, he was elected the President of Supreme Court Bar Association for 1990-1991''°^. In 
1991, he was also elected Vice-Chairman of the National Bar Council of Bangladesh''°^ On 
different occasions, he was also appointed on various prestigious posts in UN. On September 
1989, he was included in a panel constituted by UN Secretary General to hold public hearing 
of the activities of trans national corporations in South Africa and Namibia'*"^. On July 1991, 
he was appointed as special adviser to the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Cooperation in New York"*'". Dr. Kamal and old guards were using his personal image in their 
fight against S. Hasina. 
From the begirming, Dr. Kamal's target was to be the President of the party. Basically, 
for that reason, he made Hasina the party president; helped Mujib's daughter Hasina to build 
her personal image as the inheritor of dead charisma, who could bring back the former glory 
of the party. In the fight against popular organizer A. Razzaq, he sided with Hasina and forced 
A. Razzaq quit the party. At the beginning, he expected that new comer in politics, 
inexperienced and imskilled in politics Hasina would relinquish the party president post in 
favor of him. When his first strategy failed, the old guards started criticizing her'*''; raised 
questions regarding her eligibility to be the leader of such a huge party AL; tried to humiliate 
her by their propaganda tactics; sidetracking Hasina tried to impose their will on the party; 
formed non-political organization DF to enlarge his support base. 
Hasina took retaliatory action when she regarded him as her arch rival. Dr. Kamal's 
unwavering stand in the united movement, his image as an international figure, his winning of 
the prestigious President post of Supreme Court Bar Council and the victory at the case of 8"^  
amendment of the constitution contributed in enhancing his popularity among the party 
workers and masses. But instead of accepting Dr. Kamal's victory as the boost to the party 
image Hasina and her people were active to curve Kamal's influence and popularity, to 
' ^NewNat ion ,31May 1989. 
Bangladesh Times, 30 March 1990. 
Morning Sun 14 September 1991. 
New Nation, September 1989. 
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isolate him inside and outside the party'"* and (ii) drive out Kamal liom decision making 
process. In the Supreme Court Bar Association election, held on March 1990, Dr. Kamal did 
not receive party support. Rather to hinder Kamal's win, S. Hasina put up Gaziul Huq to 
contest for the presidential post against Kamal. Even after Dr. Kamal's win in the presidential 
post, Hasina did not congratulate him. Obviously, she was not pleased at the outcome. Her 
role was strongly resented by the senior leaders of AL'^ '^ . Dr. Kamal was again deprived of 
party support in his crusade against the government over the Haripur oilfield concession issue. 
This enabled the government to isolate him'*''*. In October 1990, Hasina and his young 
supporters launched attack against their opposition camp in the party, expelled party executive 
committee member Amirul Islam, a close confidant of Dr. Kamal Hossain'^'^. The New 
Nation wrote that the expulsion of Amirul was a warning against those who were bent on 
opposing the party chiefs role'"^. But it foreshadowed a battle between two factions of the 
party. However, as the anti-regime movement was strengthening day by day, the issue was 
dropped for a short period. Again, on April 1991, AL Presidium member Sirajul Huq was 
expelled from the party due to infighting in the party""^. Both of them were close ally of Dr. 
Kamal Hossain. By expelling the pro-Kamal elements, Hasina and her staunch supporters 
curved the influence of Kamal and senior group in the party. Now, in the decision making 
process, the seniors of the party continued to kept in dark. The seniors alleged that the 
decision of the AL naming the former Chief Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury as the 
candidate for presidency in the 1991 presidential election was not duly discussed at the party 
level. The policy-making organ of the party kept in dark in this regard. "We are simply 
ignored on this vital issue," an old guard leader told adding that Hasina did not exchange 
ideas even with most of the prominent figures of the party including Kamal to select Justice 
Chowdhury's candidature for the presidency. Except a few like A. Samad Azad, Amir 
Hossain Amu the senior leaders had no information about the dramatic move of the party'''^ 
Since then Kamal was not included in any policy making of the party. After the expulsion of 
Montu the old guards including Dr. Kamal had to dependant on the mercy of their archrival 
Hasina for their survival in AL. Now Hasina's intension to reduce the influence of Dr. Kamal 
was ftilfilled. But she was not still out of anxiety as Dr. Kamal was an excellent architect of 
political game and at any time his presence in the party could be a challenge to her leadership. 
In the last council session held in January 1987, AL President S. Hasina had 
armounced that the next biennial council session would be held in due time. The main cause 
for this delay was the difference among the leaders of the party, regarding the political 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 13-19 October 1989. In this context the weekly gave two examples, those deserves 
mentioned, (i) Soon after the victory of 8''' amendment, the Central Students Action Committee (comprised by 
the student wings of 8-party alliance) decided to accord a reception to the victorious lawyers. But it could not be 
arranged due to opposition from Sultan Mohammad Monsur Ahmad, the President of BCL and Hasina's man on 
the campus, (ii) In 1989 Dr. Kamal went to Sylhet (district town) at the invitation of Jubo (youth) Union to join 
their anti-Scimitar march. It was learned that Hasina contacted other local AL leaders over telephone informing 
them that Kamal's Sylhet tour was his own decision and it had no connection with the party. In this context also 
see Damik Nabo Abhijan, 6 May 1990. 
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process. In September 1989, the central committee instructed all the district, sub-district and 
union council branches to hold their conferences by December. But till December only a few 
sub-district conferences could be organized. No district level conference was so far been 
held'"®. To complete the council sessions in the lower units of the AL it took more than two 
years. The main reasons of the delay were: (i) Hasina was cautious in selecting local level 
leaders; and in most cases, she tried to impose her trusted people even in the lower level units 
to run the party affairs as had been done in the cases of selecting the president and secretary 
of the students wing of the As a result, factionalism erupted in the lower level. To clear 
up the differences and install Hasina's men, it took long time; (ii) The Upozilla election of 
1990, the mass upheaval of 1990 and the power change in Bangladesh, the 1991 
parliamentary election and its aftermath etc. made AL very busy in these years; (iii) 
According to 'Holiday' in last council session Hasina wanted to bring another change -
curbing the power of the Presidium. But her proposal was not accepted in the council session. 
Presently the Presidium was responsible for nominate the members for the central committee. 
But she again made proposal to give absolute power to the president to nominate members in 
the executive committee'^^'. For easy passage of the constitutional change she would like to 
see a majority of delegates in favor of her decisions which could only be assured by the 
district leaders. Unless the district committees remained in her favor, the chances of changing 
the constitution would be marred. So she needed time to nominate the favorable district 
committee presidents and secretaries. Moreover, to draft the proposal for the constitutional 
change in constitution, it took time; (iv) The mounting difference of Hasina with Dr. Kamal 
and Montu and the occurrences after the expulsion of Montu delayed the council meeting. 
Though in the WC meeting held on March 1991, it was decided that to strengthen the party 
organization the Council Session would be held soon''^ ^ but intra-party feuds forced the party 
high command to differ the date of the Council Session for four times since 1991. 
After assuming the leadership of the AL in 1981, S. Hasian initiated moves to 
establish her sole control over the party. From the begirming all these years she had been 
persistently trying to install a leadership in the party which would be heart-and-soul loyal to 
her. In the initial phase, she faced widespread obstacles. There was even a breakup in the 
party in 1983 headed by the then GS A. Razzaq and the AL led by S. Hasina faced with a 
serious crisis. But she was able to overcome it within a year. However, in August 1991, the 
BAKSAL was unified with main body AL. Though the dispute between S. Hasian and A. 
Razzaq was settled but another dispute between Hasina and old guard leadership led by 
Kamal emerged over the question of controlling the party since the defection of socialist 
group fi-om AL. She was facing challenge on her leadership from the old guards. In the 1987 
council session by changing the constitution and appointing Sajeda Chowdhuiy she tightened 
her grip over the party. Old guards were no more direct threat to her leadership; their failure 
to impose their ideas in defining the party's line of action in different occasions already makes 
it clear. But still then Hasina was facing criticism from the old guards. 
After many rise and fall in the camp of old guards, it became clear in the forthcoming 
council session that there would not be any fight for AL leadership. Rather, now, it was a pain 
for the senior leadership whether they would survive in the party hierarchy or they had to 
accept retirement from politics. Understanding their deteriorated position prior to the council 
Weekly Holiday, 25 December 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 25 December 1989. Dr. Kamal also accused it that Hasina was imposing leadership over 
the party instead of following democratic process. See Dainik Desh, 15 March 1991. 
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session, the seniors became silent from any more criticism. When many were expecting that 
Zohra Tajuddin and Dr. Kamal might be expelled from the party for their anti-party activities, 
both of them left for Europe after the date of council session was confirmed. The old guards 
were depending on S. Hasina's clemency to survive in the party. 
Though Hasia's position in the party was unchallengeable but for the post of GS party 
stalwarts were contesting hard. Since A. Razzaq left the party in 1983, the party workers were 
feeling the lack of him. Sajeda Chowdhury could not give dynamism in the party, could not 
fill up the absence of A. Razzaq. The aspirants for coveted position of general secretary of the 
party were in a quite race since 1989 to win favor of the apparently mighty party chief S. 
Hasina, on the one hand, and earning support of the district level leaders on the other"'^ ;^ while 
the elderly leaders were trying to gauge how far she may go in dealing with them at the 
council meeting'^ '^*. The dispute over the post of GS of AL reached its climax at the 
declaration of the party council session. For this vital post of GS, six possible choices were 
speculated: A.Razzaq MP, Amir Hossain Amu (Joint Secretary), Tofael Ahmed MP 
(Organizing Secretary), A. Kader Siddiqui (WC member), A. Jalil (number two Joint 
Secretary) and Mohammad Nasim MP (Publicity Secretary)''^^. The newcomer in AL politics 
Dr. Md. Selim,s name was also discussed in the party forum for the post of GS. Besides those 
Matia Chowdhury MP (Agriculture Secretary) and present GS Sajeda Chowdhury MP were 
also reportedly aspiring for the post''^^. Too many aspirants for the post of GS led the party 
leaders to think over a 'new formula' whereby a senior leader would be made Secretary 
General while four posts of general secretary would be created. The general secretaries would 
have equal status but different responsibilities''^^ To form the new secretariate including 
several secretaries an amendment to the constitution was also needed. But as the council 
meeting came nearer the possibilities of the formation of a secretariate of many secretaries' 
became uncertain. S. Hasina did not want to appoint four GS's at a time. According to her by 
this some confizsion and complexity would be increased in the party. She was also afraid that 
by this her control over the party would be slackened/ relaxed'^ . So when party chief did not 
wish there would not be many secretaries in AL. 
Amir Hossain Amu and Tofael Ahmed were aspirants to the post during the last 
coimcil session held in 1987 and both were backed by strong lobbies in the party. During the 
1987 council session Hasina wanted that Amir Hossain Amu should emerge as the second-in-
command in the party. But this was strongly opposed by Tofael Ahmed and others and her 
move to install Amu was defeated in the last council session. Old guard leaders viewed that 
"Amu is not only not fit to become a front ranking leader of a big party like the AL, he does 
not even have potential or acumen to lead a party of a few hundred people. He has only one 
quality in the eyes of S. Hasina- unquestioned and unqualified loyalty to her leadership"'*^'. 
However,, Amu was not only loyal to Hasina he was also her close relative. In different crisis 
period, Hasina faced inside AL, Amu was always sided with Hasina and never left her. If he 
were elected the GS of the party he would never go against Hasina'*^". Although Sajeda 
Chowdhury was officially holding the post of GS, in practice it was Amu who had been acting 
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the role'^^'. Meanwhile, Amu strengthened his position a lot in the party forum. His organizing 
capability also developed as in the absence of Sajeda Chowdhury he was in the charge of GS. 
Besides Hasina, he was enjoying support of A. Samad Azad, Zillur Rahman, Md. 
Kamruzzaman, and Sheikh A. Aziz. Previously Sajeda Chowdhury was with him but now 
their relationship became bitter. Rather, since 1990, Sajeda became strong supporter of Tofacl 
Ahmed'*^ .^ In addition to these central leaders just before the council session, Amu was also 
enjoying a significant number of district leaders' support of all over the count^y'^ ^^ At the eve 
of the 1992 council session currently, Hasina was making efforts to appoint Amu to the post 
of GS for the next term. But Amu was not popular in the lower units of the party. In 1979, 
1986 and 1991 parliamentary election he failed to get elected as an MP. Morning News 
commented, "Amu, who was defeated in two constituencies in the last parliamentary election 
had no acceptability among the activists of the party"'* '^*. Moreover, one of the close aids of S. 
Hasina told daily Star, "The AL high command's possible apprehension of a major 
dissatisfaction among a significant number of party workers with Amu becoming the second 
man of the party can only stop him from being the GS of the AL"''^^ 
In the last coimcil session, party chief did not respect the opinion of the councilors 
rather she imposed Sajeda Chowdhury as GS of the party for comprehensible reason. In that 
time Tofael and Amu were the major two competitors for the post. It was open secret that if 
election could take place obviously Tofael would be elected the party GS"^ ^ . In the forth-
coming coimcil session Tofael was one of the competitors for the post though like all other 
aspirants he did not openly declared it. He was one of the recognized national leaders. Both in 
the 1986 and 1991 parliamentary election he showed his eligibility by wiiming the 
parliamentary election. His organizational capability was already proved. He was enjoying 
support of the old guard leadership including Dr. Kamal, A. Mannan, Sajeda Chowdhiuy etc. 
Most of the young AL MP's also wanted Tofael to be the party GS'*^ .^ Though previously 
Tofael was popular in the students' wing of Satra League but the BCL was now controlled by 
party chief To whom Hasina would convey support he would get support of the students. It 
was open secret that it was not possible to be the AL GS by ones popularity or public image; 
to be the party GS it was necessary for one to get confidence of Hasina. So before the council 
session Tofael tried to win the favor of Hasina. But Tofael was very close to Dr. Kamal and 
since long Dr. Kamal was engaged in cold war with Hasina. So there was little chance for 
Tofael to be the party's GS. 'Morning News' wrote, "In case of Tofael Ahmed, a section of 
the party's central leaders, known as Amu-Nasim group, have reservations. This group has 
observed that Tofael represents Dr. Kamal group who was vocal for establishing a joint party 
leadership in the last extended meeting (held on March 1992) of the party"'*^®. However, 
source close to Tofael said he might surrender his candidacy in favor of A. Razzaq as he felt 
his own chances to be bleak'*^ .^ 
The unification of BAKSAL with AL in 1991 and the return of A. Kader Siddiqui in 
Bangladesh in December 1990 amplified the multifarious conflict within the AL family over 
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the choice of next GS. A. Razzaq and Siddiqui's reemergence in the AL's political scenario 
again raised questions about their suitable position in the future power structure in the party. 
In 1981 as soon as she took chajgo of tlic pm ty, she sensed (hut if she did not 
overthrow A. Razzaq, her position in the party would be that of a nominal chief, real clout 
being wielded by the GS'*'' . However, there was far difference between the AL GS A. Razzaq 
of 1983 and frustrated A. Razzaq of 1991. Once those, who had been crazy for "A. Razzaq 
Bhai" (brother) now they left him and strengthen the hand of Hasina. There was no more 
remaining for him among AL workers'''^'. By leaving the party, he already broken his old 
connection with the middle rank leaders of AL and instead of him, these leaders changed their 
allegiance for Hasina. They also believe in the absence of Hasina's leadership their beloved 
party may divide again. There was no possibility to join A. Razzaq camp by leaving Hasina. 
He was no more threat to Hasina. When A. Razzaq, along with BAKSAL, joined AL, it was 
believed that he would be elected the GS on the basis of an understanding between the two 
main lobbies within AL'^ '^ .^ The majority workers and supporters of the party, including those 
who were with erstwhile BAKSAL, wanted to see A. Razzaq as party GS again. According to 
them he is the most experienced and hard working organizer. Many believed A. Razzaq also 
won the blessings of the party chief Hasina. Tofael Ahmed also would not oppose A. 
Razzaq's candidature if he was not allowed to be the GS of the party. In the last parliamentaiy 
election by winning two seats, he also had shown his acceptability to the masses. But 
reservations were also there about electing A. Razzaq, since he was away from the AL for 
eight years'*''^ . The AL constitution did not allow anybody to be the office bearer of the party 
unless he or she had served the party as a worker for at least two years. A. Razzaq was yet to 
fulfill this requirement since he rejoined the party 15 August 1991. To accommodate A. 
Razzaq in the party GS post, constitution would have to be amended'^ '^ '^ . The supporters of A. 
Razzaq believed that with the blessing of S. Hasina and with the earning of support of a few 
more district level leaders, the constitutional complication could be easily overcome'*''^. Amu 
and Nasim, the two other aspirants for the post, were said to have objection to make A. 
Razzaq the GS of the party. They felt that A. Razzaq, like Matia Chowdhury, should wait for 
two years to be eligible for a party position'*'* .^ This main faction in the party were opposed to 
BAKSALites and was of the view that if A. Razzaq was made the party GS he would tiy to 
consolidate the positions of BAKSALites in various committees starting from the district 
level'*^'. A. Kader Siddiqui's released from Jail also altered the situation inside the party. The 
presence of Siddiqui made the situation uncertain for A. Razzaq vdthin AL. For support he 
had to depend on the two lobbies at the party was presently divided. They had their own 
candidates for the post: Amu and Tofael. Dhaka Courier wrote, "If these two opts out of the 
race, only then can these groups consider the case of A. Razzaq" '^^ ®. Both groups had 
reservations about Siddiqui. 
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A. Kader Siddiqui, Bir Uttam, the veteran freedom fighter and WC member of AL was 
freed firom the jail on August 1991. Soon after his release he said, "If I demand trial of the 
killers of Bangabandhu, I also demand trial of those who miserably failed to protest the killing 
of Bangabandhu at that time". Referring to the indemnity bill''''^ (which was a bar to bring the 
killers of Mujib under judicial trial) he said that the bill could have been moved in 1979 or in 
1986 as well there was parliaments'^ ^®.At his release 'Dhaka Courier' remarked, "If the fiery 
remarks of Siddiqui demanding the trial not only of the killers of Bangabandhu, but also of 
those AL leaders who joined the Mustaq cabinet are any indications then the AL had little to 
be pleased about his release from the jail after eight months of detention. Even S. Hasina is 
not being spared fi-om his tirade since it was she who led AL in the 1986 parliament"^^'. But 
he was commanding a great deal of respect from the younger members of the AL for his 
virtually one-man protest against Mujib's killing. There was a feeling in AL family that he 
must be awarded of his worth in the party. Siddiqui's credential as a genuine and fearless 
Mujib follower was his greatest asset, which the AL leadership could not dare to ignore. 
There was expectation that Hasina would certainly utilize him in her own as well as party's 
interest''^^. But Siddiqui lost the confidence of party chief and other central leaders as he had 
met PM Begum Zia at the beginning of April without permission of AL high command''^^ 
M.A. Jalil was the second choice of Hasina after Amu. Like Amu, he was also loyal to 
Hasina. He was advancing with the strength of north Bengal group. But Nasim from Nort 
Bengal was opposing him as he was also the candidate from that region and their age 
difference was not far'* '^'. The possibility of Mohammad Nasim becoming the party GS was 
thin as he did not perform his duty well as publicity secretary. According to Morning Sun, he 
would be made organizing secretary while Matia Chowdhury publicity secreta^y''^^ Matia 
Chowdhury was enjoying the confidence of party chief but still the AL workers and leaders 
recognized her as an outsider in AL. Some insiders of the AL also said that Nasim was too 
yoimg to be the GS of AL while Sajeda Chowdhury would be retained in the post only in case 
the council session faced major technical difficulties in selecting a new GS^^Mnthe previous 
council sessions the party leaders in selecting the main leaders of the party always gave 
surprise to the AL councilors. Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote that if Hasina could not come to any 
settlement with the aspirant leaders for the post of GS to find out new GS then she might 
present such a person as the party GS who would be accept to all as the symbol of unity. The 
weekly further wrote that Hasina might present Dr. Mohammad Selim, the son of late AL 
leader Monsur Ali and brother of the publicity secretary Mohammad Nasim, for the post of 
GS as the symbol of unity'^ ^ .^ As he was in UK for a long period there was no contradiction 
about him in the party. But according to the weekly by appointing Selim as party GS Hasina's 
Since long AL was saying that the Indemnity ordinance of 1975 was a black law and it must be removed 
from the statutes. But in the parliament they did not discuss it before 1991. When the AL brought the repeal bill 
in the parliament one Independent MP Nurul Islam Moni called an AL stunt saying: "I don't think they are really 
serious about the bill. Had they been serious enough, they would have brought it in the parliaments of 1979 and 
1986". See Weekly Sunday Express, 25-31 August 1991. 
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intension would be fiilfilled but the party would not be benefited. However, the main 
competitor for the GS post were A. Razzq, Tofael Ahmec, Amir Hossain Amu and A. Kader 
Siddiqui. 
Since she became the party leader, the AL organization was then passing through a 
great crisis as she utterly lacked the tact and skill to run a huge mass political party like the 
AL. After the defection of A. Razzaq, she did not choose any dynamic leadership as the 
second person of the party, who could give dynamism in the party. She also destroyed the 
chain of command of the party for her own interest. From centre to sub-district level every 
one had to follow her command directly. To remain in the party leadership even the district 
leaders depend on her mercy. Sheikh Hasina may be short sighted but she was methodical in 
tightening her grip over the party and cornered or removed those who could challenge her 
authority in the party. She successfully used the old AL leaders, such as Kamal, Tofael and A. 
Razzaq, one against another in asserting her leadership. Every thing became possible by her 
because according to Ziring, "politics in Bangladesh revolves around persons, not ideas or 
institutions"'*^®. Still in 1987 AL was running on the name of its great leader Mujib and 
Hasina, as the daughter of Mujib, was enjoying the charisma of this dead leader. Hasina's 
dictatorial control over the party was reflected when the councilors from different districts 
came to Dhaka to participate the council session. After coming to Dhaka the coimcilors first 
of all devoted their time to collect the information that: (i) what is the intension of Sheikh 
Hasina in this council session'*^^; (ii) Whom did she wanted to elect the party GS and (iii) 
Which type of leadership she was preferring for other posts. They expressed to Ajker Kagoj 
that according to the wish of Hasina they would express their opinion in the party coimcil. 
Tough to elect the GS and other office bearers of the party, A. Razzaq, Tofael and some 
others were demanding for election but the councilors told that they would not go against of 
the Subject Committee if it wanted to give sole responsibility to Hasina to select all the party 
office bearers''^°. Actually these district leaders did not want to jeopardize their leadership by 
criticizing any of Hasina's wish- 'whether that is right or wrong does not matter'. 
The 1992 Council Session of AL: The AL Council Meeting: The two-day council session of 
BAL inaugurated on 19 '^' September 1992 after a long delay. Targeting the council session 
meanwhile,, except few, all the lower level council sessions, including that of district, sub 
district, union and word level council sessions, were completed. Three thousand councilors 
and ten thousand delegates participated the council session''^^ The atmosphere during the 
council session was peaceful because of retreat of the old guards from their old position to 
challenge Hasina. Just before the council session Dr. Kamal and Zohra Tajuddin, the two 
vocal figures of old guards against Hasina's dictatorial leadership and in favor of collective 
leadership, had left Dhaka for France and USA. Probably they left Dhaka to avoid 
humiliating/ disgraceful criticism from the district leaders for their anti-party activities. The 
remaining two influential leaders of senior groups, A. Mannan and Tofael Ahmed, already left 
the group by understanding the harsh consequences of going against Hasina. 
The chief herself presided over the general discussion session of the 1992 National 
Council. The national council is the highest authority and all-powerful body of AL. But in the 
session, the councilors were not allowed to discuss all the agendas scheduled to discuss. In a 
pre-planned way the party high cormnand allowed only the councilors loyal to her, to present 
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their speech in evaluating the last six years party activities. Though few more councilors 
conveyed their speech in the council, by taking permission from party chief, but maximum of 
them could not complete their speeches as party chief personally prevented them to complete 
their speech. Many more tried to convey their speech but were not allowed''^^. 
In the council session, S. Hasina was reelected party President unopposed for a 
third consequence term in the council session. The election of Hasina did not create any 
enthusiasm in the party forum, as she did not face any competitor for this pose. But all the 
eyes were eager to know who was going to be the second person of the party as they believed 
that the progress of the party was greatly depending on the election of a competent party GS. 
In the council session, most of the subject-committee members proposed the election of 
candidates for the post of GS through secret ballot'*® .^ Some of the councilors were also 
demanded that the GS should be elected by direct vote of the councilors. There was also a 
general consensus of the councilors for electing either A. Razzaq or Tofael Ahmed in the 
coveted post of GS of the party'* '^^ . However, instead of giving importance to the councilor's 
desire, AL leader Hasina used her discretion in choosing the GS and she belied virtually all 
speculations by choosing Zillur Rahman for the coveted post. It was a surprise to all the 
coimcilors and political analysts. Since 1989, in different times, the newspapers published 
different names for the post of AL GS but Zillur Rahman's name was never discussed there. 
The 63 years old AL leader was elected to the post for the third time in 20 years. Previously, 
he was elected GS in 1972 and 1974consecutively. According to New Nation, there were 
three reasons, which led S. Hasina in favor of Zillur Rahman : (i) Zillur would not be 
opposed by most of the general councilors, considering his contribution to the party if he was 
imposed as a consensus candidate for the post of GS; (ii) In selecting Zillur Rahman, Hasina 
was prompted by thinking that she would have as much confidence in him as she could have 
in Amu and A. Jalil; (iii) Hasina also weighted between the positive and negative aspects 
involving the aspirants who were expected not to oppose Zillur Rahman's candidature. There 
were some more reasons behind the selection of Zillur as the second man of the party: (iv) 
Since the beginning, Zillur was not physically healthy enough to run a huge party like AL. So 
Hasina always knew that he would be dependent on Hasina to continue the activities of the 
party. To survive in the party, he would be always loyal to Hasina. Moreover, unhealthy Zillur 
would never be the threat to Hasina's leadership; (v) Zillur was one of the close relatives of 
Hasina in the party'^ ^ .^ By selecting Zillur Rahman Hasina showed that she had enough clout 
to prevent those she did not want in getting the coveted post. The selection of Zillur Rahman 
was not acceptable to many. It made A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed and Amir Hossain Amu 
unhappy. After the council sessions for two-three days, they did not join any of the AL 
programs. It created confusion in the party workers in those days about the unity of the 
party"*®'. However, finally, they accepted Zillur Rahman for the GS post. At the election of 
Zillur Rahman, weekly Jai Jai Din remarked, the election of Zillur Rahman as the party GS 
put an end to the probability to make AL a dynamic party. Because of his elderly age and 
weak health a question raised in the political circle including AL whether he would be eligible 
to take the responsibility of a huge party like AL"*®®. It further wrote, after the political change 
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of 1975 he could not come to the forefront of AL leadership. He was almost absent during the 
burning days of long lasing anti-autocratic movement. In the last parliamentary election, he 
was defeated. Because of his weak health just before few days of the council meeting even he 
wanted to get release from the membership of AL Presidium. In this circumstances, the 
question raised in the AL workers circle that it was apt making him the party GS. Jai Jai Din 
also wrote, though in the general secretary's report it was written that for the progress of the 
party as a precondition AL had to overcome the generation gap but in reality it followed the 
opposite decision"^ ® .^ An old and inactive person was installed in the vital post of GS. In his 
comment, Tofael Ahmed told, the leadership of a democratic political party like AL should be 
elected in a democratic way'*^ ®. He further said that if there was any election for the post of 
party secretary he could contest for the post. 
The National Council of the party also authorized the party chief to elect the National 
Committee, Central Working Committee, Presidium members and all other Secretarial 
members'^^'. Hasina declared the names of her own people for the posts of Presidium, 
Secretariate, CWC, Treasurer, National Committee etc . Tofael Ahmed, A. Razzaq and 
Amir Hossain Amu- three most talked about aspirants for the post of GS- were included in the 
13-member Presidium. Sajeda Chowdhury, the outgoing party secretary, was also included in 
the presidium. The other new member in the presidium was ex-BAKSAL president 
Mohiuddin Ahmed, who rejoined the party by dissolving the BAKSAL party. From the anti-
Hasina lobby, though, Zohra Tajuddin and A. Mannan retained their membership in presidium 
but Dr. Kamal, Sheikh Abdul Azia, Salahuddin Yusuf and Matiur Rahman were not included 
in the presidium. AL chief replaced them in the newly constituted advisory committee. Wajed 
Ali wrote, many were surprised when these senior four leaders were included in the advisory 
committee; many of the newspapers wrote especially the expulsion of a wise and experienced 
man like Dr. Kamal from the party's Presidium and central WC was not a prudent decision of 
Hasina'*'^. Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote that the disgracefiil position of Dr. Kamal in AL would 
compel him to leave the party'^ '^*. Abdul Kader Siddiqui, Advocate Sirajul Islam and Mofizul 
Islam Kamal were not given any important posts. These leaders, in the AL circle, were known 
to be from anti-Hasina group. About the newly formed committee one district leader of AL 
commented that Mujib used to include/ allow people of different opinion in AL but S. Hasina 
formed the committee only by including the group loyal to her. this method would not give 
dynamism to the party'*^ .^ Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote while S. Hasina kept the dynamic and 
skilled leaders inactive and preferred to go forward with the leaders loyal to her, those 
previously proved unproductive/ ineffective in running the organization, then to make 
successful the written pledge in the GS's report "ftiture is ours and we will be the fiiture" AL 
had to wait for long'*^ .^ Jalil, another aspirants for the GS post retained his post- Joint 
Secretary. The other Joint Secretary, elected for this post, was Shamsur Rahman Khan 
Shajahan. The ex-Publicity Secretary Mohammand Nasim was elected as the Organizing 
Secretary of the party'*''. It was for the first time that the AL leader gave importance on 
family relationship, money power and faithfulness of her master's voice to select the members 
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for different central committees of the party''^^ As a result, Hasina had established her control 
over the party but at an enormous cost. The middle class, mainstream of the politically 
conscious people of the country, was dropped from the central body of the party. 
The AL Council approved the party's amended manifesto, constitution and economic 
policy. Under the amended constitution, strength of the CWC- party's highest policymaking 
body- was increased to 65 from 59. Two new posts of secretary, two of assistant secretary, 
one member of the presidium and one member of the CWC were also created by the 
amendment of the constitution. The number of Natinal Committee members was increased to 
21 from 11. There would be sub-committee under each departmental secretary. Each sub-
committee would be headed by a member of the presidium while the concerned secretary 
would act as member secretary. New Advisory Council was constituted by the amendment. 
The Council would be set up with pro-AL intellectuals, bureaucrats and technocrats to advise 
the party chief on different national and international issues. The party President would 
nominate the members of the Advisory Council whose strength would not exceed 15. A 
seven-member Advisory Committee would also be formed at the district level to advise the 
party's district committees. The strength of the district committee was increased to 55 from 
49. A nine-member committee of the party would be constituted at the village level. The 
party's central council session would now be held after every three years instead of every two 
years gap'*^^ . 
Previously the presidium had some responsibility. To take any disciplinary action 
against any party member, it was necessary to discuss it first in the presidium. Now the 
Executive Committee would be responsible to the party President. The secretaries would be 
accountable to the party chief for their performance instead of presidium. She would be able 
to take any punitive action against any of the party members. She would nominate 21 
members of the 65 members WC. She would nominate the Advisory Council members. If any 
amendment to the constitution was needed she was allowed to amend it by her individual 
decision and later that would be ratified in the next WC meeting. The councilors also 
empowered the CWC for further amendments to the party constitution. Under the amended 
constitution, Hasina was empowered more to handle the organizational matter, party's 
policies without referring the matters to the WC or Presidium of AL. The amendments curved 
maximum of the power of party Presidium and transferred those to the hand of party chief. 
The presidium, by loosing its all power, became an inactive committee. If the party president 
did not give any responsibility it would have no work to Now in the place of joint 
leadership dictatorial leadership was established in the party by the amendment to the 
constitution. The party leaders obedient to Hasina ousted democracy from democratic AL. Dr. 
Kamal said that the amendment to the constitution of the party was wrong as it centralized the 
power into one hand. "This kind of amendment made to the constitution will never help 
democratization of the party, which is essential for strengthening the organization"^^ ^  In an 
interview to daily 'Sangbad' Dr. Kamal further said that the amendments accepted at the 
council session had taken the party from teamwork and collective leadership into a framework 
of authoritarianism. 
The party councilors were not allowed to discuss on the approved amendment to the 
manifesto, constitution and economic policy. Many of them told their grievance against the 
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amendments to tlie constitutions to different news mcdia'"'^. When some of tlic councilors 
tried to oppose the proposal of transferring the Presidium's all power into the hand of party 
president they were prevented by some of the central party leaders rebuke"® .^ However, for 
Hasina, indeed, this council session was a total success. Now she was at the apex of the party 
cadres who would be totally loyal to her leadership. With the amendments to the party's 
constitution, according to her desire, selection of Zillur Rahman as GS, expulsion of Dr. 
Kamal and other old guards from important posts of party's central body and formation of 
party's new WC, it could be said that her long cherished plan ended in what she aspired for. 
The amended manifesto retained the party's four principles but with explanation on 
nationalism, secularism and socialism. In the explanations, it was stated that nationalism 
means Bengali Nationalism, secularism as guarantee of the rights of all religious groups and 
socialism was replaced with free market economy for achieving exploitation free society'* '^*. 
The new economic policy abandoned the socialist economy and opted for competitive free 
market economy to encourage private investments side by side with the protection of the state 
sectors. The policy committed that there is no more nationalism'*^^. Now both the BNP and the 
AL adopted market economy as their economic model. It was good for the country. If AL 
came to rule the country by a change of governing power then there was nothing to be afraid, 
as there would not be any big change in economic policies of Bangladesh. The economic 
progress would not face any big jolt. 
Elite displacement: Montus base was very strong, especially, in Dhaka city and Dhaka district 
region and strategically these were veiy vital area for the political parties to make any of their 
programs success. After the expulsion of Mostafa Mohsin Montu the Dhaka City unit of AL 
became very weak. S. Hasina was eager to strengthen the Dhaka City unit to confirm AL's 
political might in Bangladesh. Though Dhaka City unit AL council session was supposed to 
complete prior to the council meeting of the central body AL but it could not be completed 
due to high competition among the competitors for the main two posts. At least three 
candidates were in the race for the post of President while half a dozen were lobbying for the 
post of GS of the Dhaka City unit of AL. The aspirants for the post of city unit chief were the 
sitting President Mujaffar Hossain Paltu, Mofazzal Hossain Maya and Reazuddin Ahmed. The 
probable candidates for GS were M.A. Aziz, Aktarul Alam, Advocate Kamrul Islam, 
Hasimuddin Haider Pahari and Advocate Sahara Khatim''® .^ Hanif was the best candidate for 
the post of city unit presidentship. He was the aboriginal resident of Dhaka, from very 
influential political family and moneyed person. He was also the private secretary of Mujib. 
In the 1978 and 1981 council session of Dhaka city AL, he was elected the party president. 
During his presidentship, Dhaka City AL organization was very strong. When A. Razzaq 
formed BAKSAL by defecting AL, Hanif also left the party in 1983. Though soon he came 
back to AL but Hasina did not prefer him as the chief of Dhaka city unit. Hasina made loyal 
Mujaffar Hossain Poltu the city unit president. Still in 1992, Hasina was backing Poltu''® . But 
PoItu was not popular. Since 1979 in any parliamentary election, he could not show his 
eligibility. Whereas Hainf still was very popular in Dhaka. After the expulsion of Montu 
when Hasina was thinking to rebuild Dhaka city AL Hanif s name for President-ship again 
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came up for discussion. But incumbent President Poltu was loyal to Hasina. So in the 1992 
council meeting of main body AL, Hasina made Poltu the party's Publicity Secretary''®®. After 
the completion of the central AL council session, immediately, Dhaka city AL council 
meeting was arranged. S. Hasina announced the names of the office-bearers of new committee 
of city AL. Mohammad Hanif and Mofazzal Hossain Maya were made President and GS 
respectively of the committee''®^. The nomination of Hanif multiplied AL's strength in many 
fold. 
Formation of Gono Forum: Dr. Kamal, Sheikh Abdul Azia, Salahuddin Yusuf and Matiur 
Rahman were dropped from the presidium. AL chief replaced them in the newly constituted 
advisory committee. Abdul Kader Siddiqui, Advocate Sirajul Islam and Mofizul Islam Kamal 
also were not given any important posts. These leaders, in the AL circle were known to be in 
anti-Hasina group and demanding internal democracy in the party. They were dropped from 
their previous prestigious position because they demanding inner party democracy. Wajed Ali 
wrote, many were surprised when these four senior leaders were included in the advisory 
committee; many of the newspapers v^ote especially, the expulsion of a wise and experienced 
man like Dr. Kamal from the party's Presidium and central WC was not a prudent decision of 
Hasina'''®. Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote that the disgraceful position of Dr. Kamal in AL would 
compel him to leave the party''''. However, the elders were not ready to accept a face saving 
advisory post in the party. During the council session, Dr. Kamal was in France and USA. 
From USA, Dr. Kamal declined to accept his nomination as a member of the newly created 
AL Advisory Coimcil and said, "The concept of Advisory Coimcil is not acceptable to me at 
all. So, question of my taking part in it does not arise". He fiirther added, "If the power in the 
party remained concentrated in one hand, what would the advisers do? ... This is not fair; this 
goes against the democratic norms.... We were supposed to work in one team"""^. According 
to Kamal, Advisory Council was an old concept, a concept of 19"^  century, which was now 
obsolete, particularly in the political party. As regards to the new WC, Kamal expressed 
dissatisfaction and said, "I am not happy, the committee was not formed in a democratic 
manner, it was supposed to be formed through election in the council. Even the constitutional 
amendments were not done in a democratic way". He further confirmed, "I am still in AL, 
now is not the stage to talk about a new political party" and included that he would 
continue to serve the nation as an ordinary member of AL'"'*. Sheikh Abdul Aziz, who also 
lost his Presidium membership, did not accept the membership in newly formed Advisory 
Council. He said that he was founding member of AL, was imprisoned for the cause of the 
party for several years, he was made the Presidium member of the outgoing committee by the 
councilors mandate and after that he lost his position in this council session because he was 
demanding the practice of inner-democracy in AL. Then he asked the journalists, "Is 
demanding democratic practice in the intemal party-organization an offence for me"?^'^ By 
ousting from their dignified positions, Hasina offended all the seniors, who lost their positions 
in the party. 
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After the council session was over, the public perception was that now S. Hasina and 
Kamal had little to share about politics as the difference between the two grew to such a point 
from where they could not be able to return. It was talk of the town that a new party led by Dr. 
Kamal was likely to be floated after his return from abroad"*^ .^ The AL leaders, who were not 
given due positions in the party at the 1992 council session, were reportedly holding meetings 
every day to work out the modalities of the new party. Mostafa Mohsin Montu, the 
controversial AL leader said, "Since we are the dedicated long time members of the party, we 
may think seriously of forming another platform if we don't get due positions under the 
leadership of S. Hasina". He further said that the discussion was continuing to form new party 
and the names considered were Democratic Awami League and "Jatia Gonotantrik 
League"''^'. Meanwhile, the leaders and activists in the Democratic Forum (DF) who were 
from AL, NAP, CPB, Janata Mukti Party, Ganatantrik Party etc were in favor of expressing 
solidarity politically, even though belated However, they were waiting for the return of 
Kamal from abroad. Dr. Kamal returned home on 20 October after his USA and Europe visit 
and said that he would decide his future course of political activities after discussion with the 
like minded political colleagues in the party'^ ^ .^ Kamal attended in a Montu-led dissident 
Youth League rally on November as the chief guest^ ®°. All the dissident AL leaders' including 
Sheikh A. Azia, Matiur Rahman, Advocate Sirajul Islam, Amirul Islam, Jamaluddin Ahmed, 
Advocate Mofizul Islam etc and a number of Members of Parliament, who were dropped from 
different positions of the party, were also attended the rally. At the rally the dissident AL and 
Yough League leaders urged Kamal to work for emergence of a 'third force' in the country's 
political arena: "People are eagerly waiting for you to give a new call to ensure democratic 
rights of the people and introduce true democracy within the party and in the country". In the 
rally S.A. Aziz, the Agriculture Minister of Mujib government and who also fell from 
Presidium in the council meeting, stressed the need for an honest and clean man like Kamal 
for leadership at this critical time of this country. Montu, expelled JL leader in his presidential 
speech called for all to unite imder the leadership of Dr. Kamal. "We want guide line, we 
want to change traditional politics... country's youth community will stand by you... please 
lead us", Montu urged Dr. Kamal^®'. Since then he was criticizing AL for not practicing 
internal democracy in its own platform. In a press conference criticizing AL Dr Kamal said, 
"Frequent boycott of Parliament by opposition virtually weakens the process of 
institutionalizing democracy"^"^. He further said that AL's reported understanding with the JP 
(because of its autocratic role during Ershad regime) for a joint movement against the 
incumbent government "is not acceptable in principle". 
Since 1979, Dr. Kamal was the moving spirit of the senior group of AL. Though he 
said that he had no immediate plan to quit the AL and float a new political party but he said 
that he would continue the activities of Bangladesh Democratic Forum of which he was the 
convener^® .^ Though Kamal was repeatedly telling that he did not decide yet whether he 
would float a new political party '^''* and yet there was no decision to transform the DF into an 
alternative political platform but the AL leadership knew his inner aspiration. They knew 
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what was the final goal of Dr. Kamal behid the formation of his DF. Allegations were already 
raised in AL forum against Dr. Kamal and his followers for their involvement in a process to 
float a new political party, participation in the meeting of expelled leader Montu and 
launching mass campaign program under platform of DF violating the instruction of party 
high command^''^. AL WC, though was extremely annoyed at Kamal's violation of party 
discipline was unlikely to take extreme measures against him. The top ranking leaders said a 
decision at this time could give 'additional political mileage to Dr. Kamal' and also would 
force the dissident elements of the party to rally round him^"^. Hasina was of the opinion that 
before expelling Kamal from the party, his sympathizers at home and abroad should be 
convinced that it was Kamal himself who wanted to leave the party^°^. Most of the top 
ranking leaders of the party would like to watch how the later proceed with his front. It was 
like a challenge from the AL when the party GS said, "We are watching the activities of Dr. 
Kamal. How far he can go, we want to Meanwhile, the AL high command started 
lobbying at different levels in order to resist the process of launching an alternative political 
platform by Dr. Kamal. In April 1993 launched an action program to divert workers attention 
from Dr. Kamal's Its central leaders visited the districts and contacted with the district 
leaders, they tried to contain the growing frustration among the party activists and to stop 
leaders and activists from joining Kamal's proposed political party^^°. It already approached 
many dissident leaders including party's expelled leader Montu to settle the difference^''. It 
also categorically approached other like-minded parties and leaders including CPB and NAP 
not to associate with Kamal's DF^'^. However,, though Kamal was not explicit about any new 
political party but at the end of 1992 told that soon he would convene a grand conference of 
all pro-independence and pro-democracy forces and that assembly would decide whether his 
DF was to be turned into a political party^'^. On February 1993 in a working committee 
meeting of DF, it was also decided that a national convention to launch a new political party 
would be held some time in May in Dhaka. Besides the prominent members of the DF, the 
meeting was also attended by some leaders of CPB, NAP(M), JSD (Siraj), Ganatantri Party 
and other parties. All the leaders of these parties also came to a consensus with DF to 
introduce a 'third force' in the political arena^'''. Matiur Rahman, former Minister and 
member of AL advisory council told Weekly Holiday, "The country needs an alternative 
political party since both the ruling party and we the opposition have failed". He ftirther said: 
"The DF cannot implement any political program; a political party is needed to implement 
it^'^ After the declaration of the possible time of its grand convention, the DF leaders formed 
a 62-member preparatory committee for the plarmed national grand conference^started 
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public relation programs: visited all the district towns, arranged meetings and processions, 
made its district committees in tiiese districts^Among the senior AL leaders Dr. Kamal, 
Sheikh A. Aziz, Matiut Rahman, Barrister Amirul Islam, Advocate Sirajul Islam, Mofizul 
Islam Kamal etc were attending the district programs of DF. In his campaign to assemble the 
active political workers of whole Bangladesh he stressed in anti AL propaganda. He openly 
criticized AL. In different meetings and seminars he raised the allegation that AL abandoned 
the collective leadership formula and established an individual leadership in the party. There 
was no practice of democracy in the party^'^. As the DF could not complete its district 
meetings on time and Dr. Kamal also was busy with his different works in abroad, the DF 
rescheduled its grand convention date on 27-29 August 1993. Meanwhile, Kamal's endeavor 
also faced some hurdles: (i) In a extended meeting of AL, the district leaders drew the 
attention of party chief to tlie need of the appropriate steps immediately against Kamal as he 
had embarked on political activities contrary to the party's interest^'^. When the district 
leaders saw AL central body was not taking any disciplinary steps against Kamal, they 
followed their own course. In different district towns, the local AL and its front organization 
workers put resistance against the DF leaders and workers activities. Even on some occasions, 
they foiled the DF's meeting arrangements in some of the district tovms^^°; (ii) Some of the 
prominent intellectuals of the society who were involved, such as ex-Vice Chancellors of 
Dhaka and Jahangir Nagar Universities, Fazlul Halim Chowdhury and Zillur Rahman 
Siddiqui respectively, expressed their opinion that they would quit the DF if it was turned into 
a political party^^'. On the other hand, some of the political stalwarts, who earlier had 
associated with Kamal's proposed new political platform, were now in the opinion that 
"Kamal is an intemation^Iy reputed lawyer no doubt, but he is not a dedicated politician". 
The same leaders felt that during crisis period, he was always away from the country"^. "This 
attitude vidll have to be changed if he sincerely want to float a new political platform in the 
countiy", they said^^^. However, Kamal's initiative to form a new party was able to attract a 
large number of political parties (particularly left-leaning parties), different type of 
professional groups and individuals. At the beginning, Kamal's DF was able to draw 
tremendous response from various quarters. New Nation wrote, Even a sizeable number 
dissidents of AL from the capital city to sub-district level might joined the Kamal, called 
conference with a objective of floating a party under the leadership of Dr.Kamal^^''. Despite 
AL's assertion that Kamal's move would not create any impact in the political arena just 
before the formation of Kamal's proposed party, AL leaders became anxious at the progress 
of Kamals activities. Even now AL leaders feared that a good number of AL workers might 
join Kamal by deserting the party. They felt Kamal's new move might really poise a threat to 
the very existence of AL. So they took an initiative to bring back Kamal into the party fold 
with a position in the Central Committee of AL. It was also assured that other expelled AL 
leaders would also be co-opted with the phase by phase. AL GS Zillur Rahman also told that a 
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move was afoot for an understanding with Dr. Kamal''''"\ But the Kamal and the old guards ol" 
the party like Matiur Rahman, S.A. Aziz were not ready to back track from their present 
stand. Though AL could not convince its own party men (dissidents) not to defect the party 
but was able to create rift in DF. When the preparation for the new party became near final 
difference developed in some of the component parties of DF. NAP President Mozaffar 
Ahmed and few of his followers now opposed the merger of the organization with proposed 
party of Kamal. He observed that floating of any new party would help only process of 
power-sharing and economic exploitation^^^. He fiirther pointed out that the people had been 
loosing confidence in politicians due to divisions in political parties. However, his stands 
failed to convince the majority leaders and workers of the party. The Ganatantri party was 
also divided over the issue. Suranjit Sengupta and some leaders of the party opposed to 
formation of any party with the dissident AL leaders led by Kamal^^^. On the other hand, the 
CPB (reformist group) led by Manik^^^, majority faction of NAP led by its GS Pankaz 
Bhattacharya and majority faction of Ganatantri Party led by A^al Hossain declared to joined 
hand with Kamal in their respective meetings, held in August, to enhance the process of 
floating a broad based political party^^ .^ The open declaration of these old allies of AL 
puzzled party chief Hasina. In an oblique reference to the current move by Kamal and several 
like minded political parties like the CPB (reformist), NAP and the Ganatantri Party to float a 
new party- which they hoped would emerge as a third forum in the coimtry's politics- she said 
this was all a party of conspiracy to divide the pro-independence force. She warned that this 
so-called third force would only strengthen the hands of the forces opposed to independence 
and democracy^^°. AL GS Zillur Rahman also accused DF Convener and dissident AL leader 
Kamal of conspiring against the party. He said, "Dr. Kamal is now traveling across the 
country and spreading falsehood against the AL only to foil the party's agitation programs". 
He further said, "Who is Dr. Kamal? Who knew him? He became known to the people only 
because of Mujib who made him his foreign minister". He also challenged Kamal to prove his 
popularity in the AL by contesting any executive post including presidency^^'. The speech of 
Zilltir generated war of words between AL leaders and the dissidents. Referring to Zillur 
Rahman's suggestion to Dr. Kamal to contest for the post of AL president at the special 
council session, the expelled AL leader Montu, in a statement, wanted to know if there was 
any scope for contesting for any post or casting vote as a councilor in the AL. "If that 
opportunity was there, not Zillur Rahman but leaders like Tofael Ahmed or A. Razzaq would 
have been the GS of AL" Montu said^^ .^ He further said Kamal did not want to be the 
President of AL. What he wanted was the restoration of democratic practice within the party. 
S. Hasina again blamed Dr. Kamal for keeping his mouth shut after the killing of Mujib^^^. 
She pointed out that Dr. Kamal, who was the foreign minister and was abroad, had refrained 
from making any statement against the killing of Mujib. Dr. Kamal even did not attend the 
function organized to commemorate the first death anniversary on his leader in London. At 
the last momerit another initiative was taken by some AL leaders and intellectuals to patch up 
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the difference between Kamal and Hasina but Dr. Kamai withdrawn himself because of the 
recent comments made by Hasina and her GS Zillur Rahman"'*. 
The news of formation of a new party by Dr. Kamal delighted the government party 
BNP^^^ because, by the formation of DF, already, AL camp was going to divide into two 
broad factions. To the BNP, it was as something of a political bonus as it produced disarray in 
the AL. The DF leader Dr. Kamal also met PM Begum Zia in a secret meeting probably to get 
cooperation in the formation of his new party against AL^^ .^ When the Gono Forum was 
formed, those who were included in its 111-member organizational committee were either the 
AL leaders and supporters or like-minded party leaders and workers. The power loss of AL, 
the main competitor of BNP and its close allies was always good news for its archrival BNP. 
The government-controlled newspapers gave big coverage to the activities of Dr. Kamal and 
the proposed new party^^'. 
The three-day national grand convention of Kamal and his allies began in Dhaka on 27 
August 1993 with a call for national unity on the basis of a program of a dynamic economy 
and a new political approach. Over 6500 delegates and observers from all over the country 
attended the meeting. In his speech, he pointed out that the independence of Bangladesh was 
the culmination of mainstream politics, which was built around certain basic goals and values-
democracy, non-communal politics, Bengali nationalism and commitment to establish social 
and economic rights of the common. Expressing his grave concern that the national goals 
were still far away, he added, society was facing mounting crisis, which were manifest in 
increasing incidents of violence and terrorism and by the continued stagnation in the 
economy. He further said, "Our industries are sick, our administration is sick and our society 
is seriously afflicted with terrorism and violence""^ According to Kamal political parties, 
instead of delivering goods for the masses, were preoccupied in attacking each other. So, in 
this grave situation, a broad base organization was the crying need of this hour. He also added 
that the new political party would build a national consensus to uproot terrorism, corruption 
and communalism from the society^^'. 
At the concluding session of the three-day grand convention, finally, a new political 
party Gono (People's) Forum, a brainchild of Dr. Kamal Hossain, was formally floated. The 
main components, those finally, merged in the GF, were: a dissident faction of AL, the 
Shajahan Siraj led JSD (Siraj), a faction of CPB led by Saifuddin Ahmed Manik, a faction of 
NAB led by Pankaj Bhattacharia^^". Kamal himself became the President of the party and 
none was made General Secretary. However, 111 member Organizatinal Committee was 
being announced. A seven-member 'Organizing Executive Council' (Steering Committee) 
was also formed. AL leader, Sheikh A. Aziz, who was deeply involved in the process of 
floating the new party and addressed a number of meetings, was not included in the 
organizing committee. Dr. Kamal said that his party would have no student and Jabor front 
like other political parties of Bangladesh. It should be mentioned here that Dr. Kamal and all 
other dissident leaders submitted their resignation letter before the one day of their floating of 
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the new party Gono Forum (GF)^"". At the resignation of Dr. Kamal from AL, one of the 
parly Presidium members, Sudiiangshu Shekhar Malder MP said that someones resignation 
would not affect the party when hundreds of people would be joining from time to time^''^. 
In the party programs, the GF said the objective of this party was to build a dynamic, 
happy, affluent, well-balanced and gentle society in the countiy by reviving the pro-
independence, pro-democratic and pro-development force of the society^''^. However, the GF 
declared a course of action to realize in its party programs. The aims and objectives of the 
party are described in its constitution. The theme of the aims and objectives are as follows '^*'': 
(a) To consolidate the independence and sovereignty of the country and to give proper dignity 
to liberation struggle and the war of independence, (b) The real author of all the power of the 
People's Republic are the people. To materialize this unambiguous proclamation of the 
constitution, the party would work to ensure peoples sovereignty on governing the state to 
insure a permanent democratic stream and democratic way of life in the country and to give 
an institutional shape to the parliamentary type of government, (c) To establish the 
constitutional sovereignty in governing the country and to ensure the effective participation of 
the masses by establishing elected public representatives in all parts of the administration, (d) 
To establish the secular Bengali nationalism and to ensure the overall progress of the hilly 
aboriginal and other backward class of the country, (e) To establish the religious right of 
every citizens; To take strong stand against all type of racial and religious repression, (f) To 
ensure respect over basic human rights and liberty, dignity of humanity and ethics of the 
society, (g) To establish rule of law in the country. For this it is needed to make sure the 
separation of judiciary from the executive and establish independent judiciaiy system; To 
guarantee equal right of getting protection under rules of laws of the country, (h) To make 
sure of the enhancement of the growth of production power by ensuring the economic 
development and growth of the country and to develop the living and cultural standard of the 
masses, (i) To make the independence and democracy meaningful in the masses by ensuring 
all the basic demands including food, clothing, education, medical care, shelter and all other 
flmdamental rights, (j) To ensure the right of employments and job facilities for all. (k) To 
provide all kinds of possible help to the self-employed citizens and to remove all obstacles 
they are facing in their initiatives. (1) To remove the poverty and unemployment problems and 
to gibe maximum importance in human development, (m) To emancipate the poor from all 
type of exploitation and deprivation and to involve them in the development activities of the 
country, (n) To take different initiatives to reduce the difference of living standard of the 
village and urban peoples, To give priority in the development of the backward areas of the 
country, (o) To ensure the participation of women in all level of national activities, to 
establish the equal rights and dignity of women folk of the society. To guarantee effective and 
strong action against women-repression; the conventional lows have to be replaced by new 
laws, (p) To develop social resistance against racism and fundamentalism; To discourage the 
racism and fundamentalism from the state level by taking all necessaiy actions, (q) To 
introduce people oriented and universal education system of same syllabus for all and up to 
the secondary school level to introduce free and compulsory education system; To take an all 
out initiative to make the country free from illiteracy. ( r ) To make all the educational 
institutions including the Universities terrorism free, peacefiil for the students, (s) To preserve 
the cultural heritage of Bengali society and to take necessary step to develop the language. 
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literature and fine arts, (t) To play necessary role in spreading and practicing democracy in the 
political parties. To take proper initiative to establish politics and government on the basis of 
consensus with the patriotic, democratic, secular, progressive parties for the betterment of the 
country and nation by giving proper respect to them, (u) To make politics free from black 
money and arms; to convert politics ideological, program based and pro-people, (v) To make 
the political parties responsible to the people for their activities, (w) To work for the 
enhancement of mutual cooperation and fHendship with other nation by upholding the 
national interest above all. (x) To uphold the national interest side by side maintaining 
friendship with all countries and enhancing cooperation and establishing Bangladesh in a 
dignified position in the world arena in the field of development. To complete the incomplete 
task of the heroic and blood-stained struggle of the people and create a national awareness to 
build a civil society to make Bangladesh a modem and progressive state. 
GF was the first party in Bangladesh, though it did not participate in any election but 
was having representatives in the parliament. Because all the MP's of former CPB and JSD 
(Siraj) joined the GF. The total strength of the GF in the parliament was six^''^. Shamsuddoha 
was elected the Parliamentary Party leader of GF. 
Kamal could not create any big dent in AL platform. Though at the beginning of the 
process to form the GF it was heard some of the top ranking leaders of Bangladesh like that of 
A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed and Zohra Tajuddin of AL and Bodrudduzza of BNP would join 
the party^ . But it did not happen. It is true that all these leaders had adverse feeling against 
Hasina but they were not ready to jeopardize their political career by joining the GF unless 
they were sure of the fact that the GF was going to be one of the mainstream parties. In those 
days there was rumor in the air that if Dr. Kamal could show primary success of his endeavor 
then a good number of influential political leaders would join the GF.Only the AL leaders and 
workers, already ousted from the main stream politics, who were already became inactive 
because of various reasons included themselves with Kamal. From the AL the prominent, 
those who joined the party, were^''^: Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Matiur Rahman, General (ret.) 
Khalilur Rahman, Barrister Amirul Islam, Advocate Zahirul Islam, Mostafa Mohsin Montu, 
Mofizul Islam Kamal, Advocate Serajul Islam ect. The biggest worry of all was that whether 
he could convince the country that his differences with the present AL leadership went 
beyond the personal and moved deep into ideological. After the formation of GF Minister for 
Public Work and BNP Joint Secretary Rafiqul Islam Miah said that there was no fundamental 
difference between the GF and AL. He said quarrels within the AL had led to the birth of the 
new party '^* .^ According to GF Joint Secretary, since the death of Mujib AL politics was being 
influenced by the congress party of india. He then said that in the return of A. Razzaq in AL 
and ouster of some of the AL leaders from party platform India played a role^''^. Though he 
did not directly mentioned that because of the wish of hidia Kamal was technically ousted 
from the party but in his conversation he cleared that India played a big role in ousting Kamal 
from party platform. 
Different persons gave different views in regard to the formation of the new party. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote that many were encouraged by hearing the news of the declaration 
of a new political party by Dr. Kamal besides the developing hereditary leadership in the 
political parties of Bangladesh. As many did not relaying on the politics of AL and BNP they 
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showed their eagerness in the formation of GF by Dr. Kamal Hossain^^®. AL CWC member 
Yahya Pintu said Dr. Kmal believed that he was very wise and high in respect. He could not 
respect the majority decision of a democratic party. He was a renowned lawyer but did not 
have political maturity. By this move, he pushed his political career towards an unfortunate 
end^^ . According to Dr. Mohammad Selim, there was no ideological reason behind the 
formation of GF. The GF was formed because of the personality clash between AL leader S. 
Hasina and Dr. Kamal Hossain^". Ganatantri Party Prisidum member Suranjit Sengupta said: 
"It seems to me that the party is a platform setup to rescue from obscurity some lost 
politicians and some confused and despondent personalities^". About the joining of the leftist 
leaders in GF, the JSD (Inu) GS Hasanul Huq Inu questioned whether people who sacrificed 
their socialist ideologies or changed parties could be considered true friends of democracy^ '^*. 
CPB (hardliner) Presidium member Morshed Ali pointed out that the formation of GF only 
increased the number of political parties and said, "This new party is merely a part of pre-
arranged drama being enacted by donor countries, aid agencies and business community"^^^. 
Sheikh Abdul Aziz, the prominent AL leader and a former prominent member of Dr. Kamal's 
DF, said it was good that Dr. Kamal left AL and formed GF. In his presence party was facing 
leadership conflict. Long time leadership conflict was not good for any party. "It makes party 
inactive, party workers become frustrated and party loose dynamism" ^ . 
The pathetic condition of GF: Before the formation of GF the party was able to attract all the 
eyes of the country and many expected that by this initiative of Kamal, there was a hope of 
third force in Bangladesh Politics, which would break the traditional political impasse of the 
country. Dailies were also propagated that it would be the alternative to the AL and BNP^^'. 
Dr. Kamal told that it would be the main stream of politics^^®. With this high ambition that it 
would be the main stream of the national politics, the GF was floated but soon after the 
formation of the party doubt was being raised whether Kamal's much-talked about political 
party would be able to survive in the political arena of Bangladesh. Soon after the formation 
of GF, it became clear that Dr. Kamal's endeavor turned to a fancy organization of some 
pleasure-seeking aristocrats, inactive politicians and the politicians who were rejected by 
masses. Those who joined the GF except Dr. Kamal, no one were enough popular in the 
masses. 
From the beginning of the formation of the GF different groups already engaged in 
competition to control the party leadership. Kamal was world wide renowned as a successful 
lawyer; naturally, he was able to attract a large number of lawyers in his party. In his 
campaign in different district towns to mobilize political workers for his new^arty Kamal 
gave privilege to them. Majority lawyers were included in the preparatory committee of grand 
convention. Since then, they were trying to establish their domination over the party. 
According to them, the politician, those came to the party, though, they were honest but did 
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not have acceptability in the masses. In tlie last election, it had been already proved. Those 
CPB and NAP MP's joined in the formation of new party were not elected by their own 
eligibility rather they were elected because of'boat', the election symbol of AL- which 
influenced the voters to enfranchise in tlieir favor. These leaders would not be acceptable in 
masses as the GF leaders. So it would not be wise to give them important positions in the 
party. The second section of leaders of the GF, those came from AL, were engaged to control 
the party leadership by their own. The dissident AL leaders were mainly trying to engage their 
ovm old party people in the party activities. And the different leftist party leaders who joined 
the party were trying to direct the party according to their own wish . Former CPB leader 
already had proposed good number of names for the post of party central committee before 
the formation of the party. In the bargaining with others, he tried to capitalize the five CPB 
MP's who joined the Even before the formation, the leaders of the proposed party were 
engaged themselves lobbing for the post of proposed party's GS. CPB leader Saifuddin 
Ahmed Manik, NAP leader Pankaj Bhattacharya and expelled AL leader Mostafa Mohsin 
Montu were the main aspirants for the post^^'. Due to the difference in the new platform when 
GF was formed, the party could not made its GS immediately after the formation of the party. 
However, aftefr some months of the formation of the party, Saiftiddin Ahmed Manik was 
made its first GS. Form the beginning of its formation, the GF faced defections and splits. The 
first person left the GF was Sheikh Abdul Aziz and returned to his old platform AL. A crisis 
also overtook the GF over the choice of either a former communist or a JSD leader to head its 
parliamentary party. According to the former reformist communist party members, the leader 
of the GF's parliamentary party should be chosen from among them and also mentioned the 
name of Shamsuddoha for the post. An argument in support of this claim was that they had 
five members in the Parliament and that they joined the GF with these MP's along with a 
large number of ordinary members. On the otiier hand, JSD leader Shajahan Siraj opposed 
this argument saying that the parliamentary party's leader should be chosen on the basis of 
experience and the former communist party MPs had come to the Parliament only for the first 
time. Under the circumstances, the parliamentary party's leader should be Shajahan Siraj^^^. 
However, Shamsuddoha was made the PP leader of GF. There was internal difference in the 
lower unit GF organization. As for example, the district unit office of Comilla was controlled 
by the ex-AL leaders of GF. The district leaders of CPB, who joined the GF, were not allowed 
by the pro-AL group to enter the party office. The central leaders called them in Dhaka and 
settled the difference. But when they returned to Comilla both group again engaged in 
conflict^^^. The division of the GF among its various trends and sub-trends at its very initial 
stage disappointed a large section of its activists. Meanwhile, many of the top ranking leaders 
of GF left the GF in the first year and joined AL. Among of them were ex-AL leader S.A. 
Aziz, Matiur Rahman, Barrister Amirul Islam, Hasimuddin Pahari and Nurul Islam Nahid by 
1995 except Samsuddoha all the GF MP's left the party. Shajahan Siraj^^ and other three ex-
CPB MP's joined the ruling party BNP and one joined AL. Many of the central leaders also 
left GF due to their difference on organizational and political policies with Kamal^^^. In the 12 
June 1996 parliamentary election for the first time the GF put up 104 candidates in different 
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constituencies. In the election all the candidates of the party forfeited their election deposit. 
The GF received only ^^^0.12% of the total votes casted in the parliamentary election. 
After the devastating election defeat it became clear that the future of the newly bom GF was 
grim. Dr. Kamals dream to make the GF the mainstream party of Bangladesh was dashed by 
this election result. 
The DF, non-political organization of Dr. Kamal, was able to demonstrate its 
credibility, its effectiveness as an organization, especially in reaching the grassroots level and 
showed some success in carrying out the program offered to country. But after the formation 
of GF, it became clear that the party could not reached the expected target, it could not create 
any appeal in masses. There were many reasons why it could not build itself as one of the 
political mainstream party of the country. These are described below: 
(i) When Dr. Kamal formed the GF, he said that he would form the main stream of politics 
but in his call, the politicians responded all were the pro-left party-politicians except few 
dissident AL leaders and pleasure-seeking intellectuals. In the past it was seen the masses had 
rejected the ideology and principles of these leftist political parties and as a result, these 
parties could not developed their base among them. Those dissident political leaders were 
also ousted from mainstream politics. Dr. Kamal was not able to include any well-known 
political organizer, who had mass support base, in the party. He also showed his inability to 
include the popular sub-elites (district and sub-district leaders of the country) in GF. So the 
new party of Dr. kamal was confined in a limited circle; (ii) At the beginning it was expected 
that a large number of different party workers, intellectuals and other professional groups 
would join the party but finally, they were not convince by the activities of Dr. Kamal; (iii) 
The GF was not emerged with principles that could outline its difference fi-om the AL; (iv) 
AL's anti-GF propaganda was very strong and when AL accused Kamal for breaking the 
party discipline he did answered but those were not satisfactory to the political circle. 
Moreover, in face of AL workers resistance, Kamal group could not arrange meetings in 
many of the areas of Bangladesh; (v) GF was such an organization where the extreme leftist 
elements like Saiftiddin Manik, Shajahan Siraj and Pankaj Bhattacharia wanted to make 
friendship with extreme-rightist Kamal and Matiur Rahman (if we remember the origins of all 
these men). Any one could not wish an inspiring prospect from a platform where the 
personalities of totally conflicting ideology were gathered; (vi) in its aims and objectives GF 
said it would make all the educational institutions including the Universities terrorism free, 
peaceful for the students. But some politicians said there were some politicians in GF with 
terrorist background because of whom they did not join the AL. When they saw these anti-
people politicians in GF they left that platform and joined AL^^'; (vii) To run a political 
organization and its activities, to spread its party programs up to the grassroots level one 
political needs huge amoimt of money. The GF general secretary Manik mentioned that 
because of economic crisis the party was facing difficulties to run the organization. As a 
result,, since the beginning of its formation there was lacking of encouragement among the 
GF workers^^®; (viii) According to the political tradition of Bangladesh the future leaders and 
workers of a party grow from its student wing. In Bangladesh students are the most dedicated 
force- who even don't hesitate to sacrifice their life to make success the opposition parties 
agitation programs. To make success any political programs every popular political parties 
depends on the student front. But the GF doesn't have any student front; (ix) Ziring wrote, "It 
has been demonsfrated that politics in Bangladesh revolves around persons, not ideas or 
Dr. Mohammad Hamian, Political Histoiy of Bangladesh; pp. 517-18. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 23 August 1994; p. 5. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 23 August 1994; p. 5. 
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institutions"'^''^. In AL Dr. Kamal is known for iiis wisdom and political planning. In the AL 
platform, he was like a technocrat leader"", he is not renowned in political arena as a good 
organizer. People know him because he was an AL leader and they respected him because of 
his wisdom and his international reputation. But he don't have big personal political base in 
the masses. He is also lacking of charisma- which is very important to give popularity to a 
political party. So in the absence of a popular political leader the party could not get 
momentum; (x) The major ways, in the third world countries, to attract the masses in favor of 
a political party are election and movement. Till now the GF could not build up any anti-
regime or issue-based movement. In the 1996 and 2001 parliamentary election all the 
candidates of the GF, including the party President and GS, forfeited their deposit money. It 
reveals that the party could not create any appeal among the masses by their activities; (xi) 
From the beginning of the formation of GF one by one, the initiators of the party left it 
because of various reasons. Among the prominent of them were Sheikh Abdul Aziz, Matiur 
Rahma, Nurul Islam Nahid etc. When the main leaders defected from the party it created 
frustration in the party platform; (xii) Though Dr. Kamal is the President of the party and he is 
the main spirit of it. But he remains in outside Bangladesh in the maximum times of the year 
because of his international activities. He did not give time to the party properly. According to 
the Organizing Secretary of GF, Dr. Kamal is very busy with his international commitments. 
If he can give enough time to the party then it will spread very fast."'; (xiii) In different times 
different popular leaders, by leaving the two main stream political parties AL and BNP, tried 
to form new political parties but their endeavors were failed to get success. So the political 
leaders and workers were afraid to join the GF of Kamal as they did not want to put their 
political career in danger and (xiv) Zillur Rahman wrote, "Instead of striving for consensus on 
national goals political leaders over the years have routinely resorted to the cult of 
personality- Sheikh Mujiur Rahman and his daughter Sheikh Hasina; Ziaur Rahman and his 
widow, Khaleda Zia.... Even an intellectual politico liked Kamal Hossain seemed to fall into 
this trap"^^^. Now GF became a weak and fancy organization of some inactive politicians to 
nurture an elitism of sorts. 
Hasina in the commanding position of AL: Mujib daughter Hasina's political life was build 
up through many zigzag ways. A private house wife thrust into the cesspool of Bangladesh 
politics luckily at the death of her father and whole family members. When the AL was going 
to be divided probably into many parties, in 1981 council session she was unanimously 
elected party chief as a symbol of imity. Her clean image generated hope that here was a 
leader who would save the party from further destruction. But after assuming the party 
leadership when Hasina initiated moves to establish her sole control over the party soon she 
involved in conflict with A. Razzaq and his powerful socialist group and with the help of old 
guards compelled him to leave the party in 1983. At the defection of socialist group the old 
guards thought it was their victory over the youth hardliners. Due to this defection of 
powerful and dynamic group from AL for a temporary period, the party was jolted even in 
every districts and sub-districts of Bangladesh. But Mujib daughter was able to overcome it 
within a year. As Hasina was enjoying the image of her father, Majority of the followers of 
Mujib rejoined Hasina by leaving A. Razzaq. Many thought that at the defection of the 
Lawrence Ziring, Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad, p. 216. 
Weekly Sachitra Sandhani, 22 April 1984; p. 13. 
Interview with Mostaf Mohsin Montu, the Organzing Secretaty of Gono Forum. 
Zillur R. Khan, "Bangladesh in 1993: Values, Identity and Development"; Asian Survey, Vol. 34 No. 2; 
Februaiy 1994; p. 162. 
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socialist group the ideological and leadership conflict was over. But soon it was revealed 
many political ups and down remained to be seen when Hasina engaged in conflict witii her 
old friends, the old guards of tlie party, who were instrumental to make her the party chief and 
to oust A. Razzaq from the party. In the conflict during 1986-93 friends turned to foes. The 
reasons of her conflict with her political uncles and aunty were many: (i) After the defection 
of A.Razzaq the old guards, in general, tried to control Hansin. They wanted to run the party 
by making Hasina the puppet leader of it; (ii) Highly ambitious Zohra Tajuddin, the widow of 
Tajuddin Ahmed and one time President of the party was turned to a plaintiff of the party 
leadership because of Tajuddin's historical role in the 1971 liberation war and Zohra's 
leadership role in the adverse days of the party after the assassination of Mujib; and (iii) Dr. 
Kamal Hossain, the most intellectual figure of the party, was not happy with his position in 
the party. He dreamed himself to be the party President. He and old guards ousted A. Razzaq 
from AL not to make safe the party leadership for Hasina rather he thought at one time Hasina 
would leave the party and ultimately he would be the leader of it. But Hasina's taking over the 
party leadership was not for a transition period. Rather her Indian friends were planning 
different game; (iv) Hasina's Indian friends intension was very clear, they wanted to convert 
the AL into a pro-Indian party not pro-USSR or pro-USA. So conflict of Kamal with Hasina 
was unavoidable and (v) In the conflict of Hasina with Kamal and other elders at one stage 
Hasina totally excluded Kamal and elders from policy making process, not only that in the 
extended meetings frequently it was seen the followers of Hasina intentionally were using 
insulting words against the old guards particularly against Kamal. All the seniors particularly 
Kamal was definitely insulted by these activities of Hasina and her group members. So at one 
stage the conflict of Hasina with her uncles and aunty turned in a shape of personality clash. 
In the conflict of Hasina with the old guards the youths, her relatives and except few all the 
lower level unit leaders were with Hasina. As the old-guards were very tactful in political 
game, by the advice of her Indian friends Hasina welcomed her old enemies including A. 
Razzaq, rehabilitated them in the party platform in a bid to crush the opposition of her one 
time guide and guardian Kamal, aunty Zohra Tajuddin and others. Here it is revealed that 
there is no a permanent fnend or foes in politics. Friendship always changes on the demands 
of interest. In this conflict Hasina did not need to be afraid of facing any revolt in the lower 
units of the party as that happened during her fight with A. Razzaq. Even she did not need to 
follow any image-building measures to strengthen her positions against the old guards like 
that of previous occasion (1981-83). Rather in the fight against A. Razzaq the old guards 
already did that for her. Since then Hasina was the only popular leader in the party whom the 
lower unit leaders followed. As she was the daughter of Mujib she was more acceptable to the 
AL workers and leaders than any other politicians. On the other hand, like that of A. Razzaq 
of 1981-83, now there was no popular leader with organizing capability within AL. To curve 
the remnant support of the old guards Hasina directly wrote letters in different times alleging 
them for conspiracy against the party interest, before 1987 and 1992 council sessions, Hasina 
sent her loyal leaders in the lower units to form new committees with the loyal elements but to 
defend their positions, the old guards could do nothing. By using her direct influence she was 
also successfiil to curve Tofael Ahmed's influence from the student wing of AL. When 
majority portion of the central committee of the youth wing of AL went against her, ignoring 
that committee she formed a new committee with the loyal group. As she was enjoying the 
image of Mujib the lower imits of youth the youth wing conveyed their allegiance to it. 
Among the student leaders and youth leaders who went against Hasina they only destroyed 
their political career. To get total control over the party Hasina made her loyal figures the GS 
of the party, no matter whether they were acceptable to the organization or had they 
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organizational competence. In tlieir fight with Hasina the seniors tried to control party GS 
post by making Tofael as its candidate. Tofael was really fit for the post. Me had all qualities 
to be the GS of the party and was enjoying support of majority AL leaders and councilors. But 
he was lacking of the vital support of Hasina. Probably Hasina was not ready to jeopardize her 
leadership by makking another strong competitor like that of A. Razzaq. So by depriving the 
party from a skilled GS, by ignoring maximum councilors feeling she made such the persons 
the party GS who would never raise their heads against the wish of Hasina. In the fight with 
Hasina Kamal knew his weakness very well. He also knew that if he proceeded against 
Hasina in a traditional way there was no possibility of his victory. He advanced in a very 
clever way, at the first stage formed a non-political forum to show his political acumen and to 
create a support-base for him and his future party. The respond was enough positive. He was 
able to form the district committees of DF in allover Bangladesh. A section of the political 
analysts also were predicting of a third fi-ont side by side with AL and BNP"^ But when he 
converted the non-political DF into political GF party maximum members of the previous 
organization disagreed with him to join the political party. After the formation of the GF 
slowly all the important leaders also left him. Here the major hurdle for him was the charisma 
of two dead leaders Mujib and Zia, what still their inheritors were enjoying incessantly. 
Another reasons- Kamal was not a good organizer rather we may tell him a political 
technocrat and he was seen more committed to his international commitments than national 
one. He did not give enough time to his party. As a result, he and his friends failed to arouse 
political support behind his political forum. Still the party is prevailing but without much 
following and any fiiture hope. 
The defection of Dr. Kamal confirmed one thing that for some years the leadership of 
Hasina is safe from fiirther leadership conflict, till any extraordinary dynamic organizer is 
produced in AL platform who will have charisma or strong organizing background. Now the 
old-guards who remained in AL, knew that to survive in AL with prestige, not to accept a 
premature political death they should not involve in conflict with Hasina. Moreover, it is also 
proved that with their weak political base and lack of organizational capability they are unable 
to change the party leadership and conversed if party expel them they have to accept a 
pathetic consequences like that of A. Salam, Mizan Chowdhury and Dr. Kamal. 
A. Razzaq returned in AL but as a cripple tiger, already lost his following except few. 
Now to become the party leader he needed the blessing of Hasina. It was in the air that Hasina 
promised A. Razzaq at the time of his rejoining to make him the party GS. When in an 
interview I asked A. Razzaq about the truthfulness of the promise he remained silent^ '^^ . 
Hasina did not fulfill the promise. He and many other dynamic leaders like Tofael are still in 
the party but without proper position and assignment. Hasina made them inactive. She is 
probably afraid of them. She doesn't want to give them opportunity to build new support base. 
Now she is enough matured in politics. She knew here in Bangladesh when "politics in 
Bangladesh revolves around persons, not ideas or institutions" she is not ready to give 
opportunity to any one to become the contester of her. She already faced enough resistance 
from her colleagues in her bid to consolidate her leadership in the party; she did not want to 
face more. 
All these show that factional leaders may emerge successful if the sanitation is 
handled in an astute and clever manner. In this process of elimination Hasina played her role 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 31 Auust 1993. 
Interview with A. Razzaq. 
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very tactfully to not only eliminate her opponents but also making her grip over the party 
more and more secured and tight. 
AL led 8-Party Alliance 
During the last six years the components of the 8-party alliance were united against the 
government. But following the collapse of 1987 anti-government movement a difference 
appeared in 8-party alliance led by AL. The BAKSAL, CPB and its close allay NAP had been 
in a fight with AL on different occasions over different alliance policies and programs. As a 
result, it became difficult to achieve even a fa9ade of unity for intensification of the anti-
government movement. 
AL president Sheikh Hasina was mainly blamed by other component leaders for the 
malaise developed in the alliance and opposition movement. It is mentioned earlier that 
avoiding the previous one point movement AL initiated a 7-point movement and included 
some conditions to form any unity with other opposition parties and alliances against the 
regime. In this time some oif the newspapers propagated that Sheikh Hasina was trying to 
increase her party's distance from the other components of the 8-party alliance"^ The 
deviation of AL fi:om one-point movement was unfavorable to the other components of AL 
led 8-party alliance. All the parties of the alliance were in favor of a united movement based 
on a minimum program^'®. The BAKSAL, NAP and CPB leaders were critical to Hasina and 
accused her of destroying the opposition unity"'. In a meeting of 8 and 5-party alliance the 
AL wanted to issue a joint statement by the 8 and 5 party alliance against the Jammat. CPB 
opposed it on the plea that it would distract from the one point movement^'®. Observing the 
hurdle from the other components of 8-party alliance Amir Hossain Amu, one of the confidant 
of Sheikh Hasina, fiercely lashed out at them in a public meeting and said that some of the 
parties within the 8-party alliance were trying to resist the progress of the AL '^®. However, 
though, the components-of 8-party alliances were critical to AL but finally, they had to abide 
by the 7-point programs of AL so as to strengthen their organizational position they needed 
the moral and active support of AL. Moreover, to get success in their movements, they needed 
the huge organizational set-up of 
Since 1988 some more controversies developed in 8-party alliance. There was 
allegation from CPB, one of the components of 8-party alliance that the AL wanted to use the 
8-party alliance as a conduit for pursuing its own politics without the concurrence of the other 
components^®'.Under the leadership of CPB GS Mohammad Farhad, till 1987 the party turned 
into a virtually appendage of the AL. Farhad never dreamt of doing any thing independent of 
AL. But after his death the present GS of CPB Saifuddin Manik believed in assertion of the 
independence of the party. In an interview with weekly Holiday, Manik said, "Previously the 
Weekly Holiday, 18 November 1988. Also see Dainik Janata and Banglar Bani, 5 May 1989. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 26 May -1 June 1989. 
Weekly Roabbar, 29 May 1988; p. 22. 
Weekly Holiday, 16 December 1988. However, later the CPB gave a proposal to AL for an identical program 
by the 8 and 5-party alliance for resisting the expansion of the fundamentalist Jammat-Sibir forces. See 4 
December 1988. 
In a meeting o f 8-party alliance held on 19 November the question of derogatory remarks by Amu against 
the other components of the alliance came up and this was learnt to have created some tension in the meeting. 
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differences with the AL were hidden from the public glare, but now every thing has been 
made open"^®^ 'Holiday further wrote, on more than one occasion in reference to AL, Manik 
used the phrase "big brotherly behavior". 
Even "party GS Manik led faction of CPB felt that the party should withdraw itself 
from the 8-party alliance and favored either to start an independent movement or to give 
leadership to a broader left unity which would ultimately give better result in future. The other 
group however,, holds strong sentiments about remaining with the AL. They felt that in the 
prevailing complicated national crisis the CPB should think whether it should come out of the 
alliance only to face isolation from mainsfream politics which was dominated by the 
nationalist forces^ ®'*. They also viewed that if CPB withdraw it from 8-party alliance there 
would be a great problem for itself to strengthen its positions in some of the forums such as in 
the agricultural workers, transport workers and trade union centers etc^ ®^ However, according 
to Workers Party leader Rashed Khan Menon, greater left unity in Bangladesh was near 
impossible because of mistrust, difference of ideologies and in some cases un-penetrable ego 
of the left parties^^^. Moreover, the pro-Moscow NAP and CPB never recognized the 
existence of any alternative left parties outside the pro-Moscow left components in the 8-party 
alliance and they also were not ready to accept the leadership of already existed pro-China 
leftists dominated 5-party alliance. Moreover, within a night it was not possible for the left 
parties to minimize their long lasting differences. Actually it was also not possible for CPB to 
come out of the 8-party alliance due to its multiple connections with AL. Rather the AL 
workers accused in different time that the CPB used to reap political benefits out of their 
relation with AL. In the extended meeting of AL held on May 1988 maximum of the AL 
workers criticized CPB because of the CPB GS Manik's tendency to mention AL as a 
bourgeoisie political party in different public meetings. The 'Roabbar' v«-ote, the AL leaders' 
criticism to CPB embarrassed the CPB and NAP leaders. But they were not going to leave the 
8-party alliance as they depended on this nationalist power AL to build up their socialist 
The frustration in the alliance further increased on Sheikh Hasina's go alone policy 
and it poised a threatening factor of the existence of 8-party alliance when AL decided to shift 
its allegiance from Indo-Moscow to Washington to pursue the Indo-American political line by 
ignoring the opinion of its long term pro-Moscow allies. The Bangladesh visit of US 
congressman Stephen Solarz helped AL to develop close relation with USA but it was not 
acceptable to maximum components of 8-party alliance. In her meeting with Solarz the AL 
leader wanted CPB and NAP leaders to be present with her but they refused it^ ^ .^ In the 
changing circumstances of the world AL decided to shift its allegiance to Washington-Delhi, 
instead of relaying on USSR-India axis in order to smoothen its way to power sharing. But 
such a change of policy direction went against the position of the other components of the 
alliance and that became the main point of growing conflict between AL and its other pro-
Moscow partners (i.e. CPB, NAP and BAKSAL etc) in the alliance^^^ In view of the recent 
change in AL politics, the above three alliance partners hold that the 8-party alliance was 
formed in the background of a political principle involving national and international politics. 
Weekly Holiday, 5 May 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 19 January 1990. 
Weekly Holiday 16 December 1988. 
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Any change even in one of these policies should be brought about only through talks and 
discussions. Those can not be changed by the unilateral decision of one party. According to 
CPB, NAP and BAKSAL the changed foreign policy of AL towards USA did not carry the 
approval of the 8-party alliance. These three parties decided to work together so that Hasina 
would not be able to parade her own views as these of the 8-party alliance. These parties also 
decided to maintain close contact with the other anti-US parties in the alliance. Not only that 
they decided to talk about this issue with those parties those were dissatisfied with Hasina^^®. 
S. Hasina personally and several other AL leaders were unhappy at the criticism, other anti-
AL activities and lobbying of these three parties. Hasina claimed that her party had never 
criticized against any of the parties in the 8-party alliance, and wished the others would also 
exercise necessary restraint^ . She further said, "... the unforgettable contribution of the 
Soviet Union and India in our liberation war is undeniable- for which we are eternally 
grateful- so in today's context the economic aid without strings and technological cooperation 
of the USA and Europe are necessary for the reorganization of our economy". Other AL 
leaders described these as an attempt to weaken the 8-party alliance. Their reaction was that 
"If the CPB has not discerned any matter of concerning in the Reagan-Gorbachev and 
Gorbachev-Bush talks, why should it feel perturbed at Hasina-Solarz talks"^® .^ Though other 
party leaders were highly critical on AL's newly accepted foreign policy and Hasina's 6-week 
long USA and Europe tour, in 17 June 1989 meeting of the alliance AL chairperson did not 
have to face any challenge. Among the leaders of the 8-party alliance those who maintained 
that the present leadership of AL was responsible for the failure in building up a united 
movement and that democracy would not be establish in Bangladesh by seeking external (US) 
help, did not raise the voice of dissent^^^. It revealed that AL chief achieved political victory 
over the other components on the issue of its revised foreign policy in this meeting. After 
more than six months the alliance also agreed to call a general strike on 28 June in protest of 
the budget for 1989-90 and other anti-peoples bills so far passed in the parliament. After this 
meeting though the relationship of AL with the alliance partners were not so pleasant but till 
October they unitedly observed some face saving programs (such as calling of strike on 10 
August 1989, anti-terrorist rally on 20 September 1989 and some meeting and procession on 
different issues). 
The difference among the alliance members was again intensified and took a 
permanent shape in November 1989 when at the death of BCL leader Chunnu in a arms 
conflict with pro-BNP student wing Satra Dal AL called a strike on 29 November 1989 and 
tried to persuade the other components of the 8-party alliance to join it but they did not agree 
to support the strike call^ "^*. CPB's refusal to support the AL called strike in November 
angered the AL and almost simultaneously AL also refused to participate CPB's programs of 
In its bid to form a coalition of the anti-USA parties CPB met the pro-left five party alliance and discussed 
about: (1) increasing US influence in Bangladesh (ii) the rising trend of fundamentalist force which might 
organize a counter-revolution in Bangladesh. CPB and NAP also contacted the BNP for the progress of one point 
movement. In a bid to dismantle the 8-party alliance the BNP was also very eager to maintain close relation with 
the CPB and NAP. (See Weekly Holiday, 14 April and 5 May 1989. Also POT Bangladesh Series, Vol. 14 No. 
87; pp.1360-6 L). But they could not leave the AL led alliance till the 1991 parliamentary polls. 
Weekly Bichitra, 7 July 1989. 
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See Weekly Holiday 24 November and 15 December 1989. Hasina said, "It is true that some of the alliances 
did not extended support to our hartal (strike) program following Chunnu's murder. They should not have done 
that. It was their moral obligation to support us in our hour of trial. But in spite of that we believe in sustaining 
the unity". For this see Weekly Dhaka Courier, 16-22 March 1990. 
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"padayatra" (march) to Dhaka from all comers of the country with the objectives of ending 
autocracy totally broke the relation between the two^^ .^ As a result, the alliance remained 
inactive till October 1990, except performing some face saving programs. 
There was allegation from the other 8-party alliance members that AL would take part 
in the midterm parliamentary election if the present regime agreed to fulfill its 7-point 
demand. In this regard mistrust developed among other components of the alliance that they 
believed Hasina now wanted to make her party power-oriented and so she did not want to 
share any alliance with any party '^®. The CPB was also keen to participate in a parliamentaiy 
election, if that really took place, and wanted to conclude a deal with the AL on the election 
issue. But the AL was not in huny to discuss the election arrangements with CPB; it had 
many cards to play^'^. The second Upozilla election was held in March 1990 though it was 
supposed to be held at the beginning of 1989. The CPB and BAKSAL jointly proposed the 
AL and decided to put up common candidates of 8-party alliance in the forthcoming upozilla 
(sub-district) election with a view to defeating the government and anti-liberation forces in the 
election and so that they can not acquire power in the local administration. NAP, BAKSAL 
and all other components of the alliance also showed their interest with the proposal. Even 
though during the last years the 8-party constituents unitedly participated in the elections as 
well as movenients but in a meeting of the alliance held on 29 December 1989 the AL leaders, 
annoyed by the recent anti-AL CPB activities, rejected the proposal fro common candidates in 
the upozilla election^^^. As a result, of the failure to come to an understanding, the AL, 
BAKSAL, CPB and the other components of the 8-party alliance put up their respective 
candidates in the upozilla polls. Holiday wrote all this had annoyed the CPB leaders who were 
trying to cleverly whip up anti-AL sentiments^^'. All the opposition party encouraged their 
candidates to take part in the election, though any of the parties did not officially fielding 
candidates in the election being held on non-party basis^ During the election in many 
constituencies the candidates of same alliance engaged in direct contest against each othe^^°^ 
However, the election result was devastating for the other partners of AL in the 8-party 
alliance. This election taught a proper lesson to the other components of AL led alliance that 
beyond doubt that the AL was Ae largest opposition party in the country and without the 
presence of AL in the alliance the strength of it was near zero^°^. Following the upozilla 
election at a meeting Hasina told CPB GS Manik that the AL was not interested in an alliance 
just for sharing seats in elections. She further said that the upozilla election had demonstrated 
the strength and weakness of the parties^°\ She, however, requested the CPB leader to extend 
support to the cause of "Bengali nationalism". However, the other components of 8-party 
alliance took a sweet revenge in the June 1990 DUCSU election. Their student wings did not 
make election alliance with AL's student wing like that of 1989 DUCSU election. As a result, 
the BCL had to face election debacle^®'^ . In the division level conference of AL the councilors 
Dainik Desh, 19 January 1990. 
Weekly Holiday, 25 November 1988. 
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showed their dissatisfaction with the 8-party alliance and demanded for its dissolution^"^ The 
CPB leaders also openly proclaimed Iheir dissatisl'action over AL's negative allilude towards 
the anti-government agitation and their 'individualistic' policy. A CPB leader also said, "We 
want to organize an anti-government movement. If that means eventually going ahead without 
AL, we will consider joint programs with BNP and the 5-party alliance"®". Some more 
components of the 8-party alliance including NAP (Mujaffar) and BAKSAL, which were 
supportive of the present CPB stand, were also thinking on similar line®"^ 
The relation between AL and its alliance members deteriorated so much that during 
November 1989- September 1990 other components of 8-party alliance opposed to participate 
the strikes and other programs called by AL® . On January 1990 one of the AL leaders told 
that during the last one year the 8-party alliance failed to draw up any action plan®"®. As a 
result, of internal difference in the alliance the possibilities of a united movement had been 
shattered and the leaders were not contemplating any long-term program to initiate a future 
movement®'". The 8-party alliance was formed by the split of 15-party alliance prior to the 
1986 parliamentary election but the leaders of the alliance did not hold even ten meetings in 
these years till 1990. Though the difference between AL and other components of the 8-party 
alliance could not create any big harm to AL's organizational activities; but the publicity by 
different news media of the difference prevailing in the alliance reduced the image of AL 
during this period. However, the leaders of 8-party alliance mend their difference in October 
1990 joined the anti-regime movement and finally, ousted the Ershad regime. In 1991 they 
also jointly nominated their candidates to contest the parliamentary polls. For that AL had to 
sacrifice 36 seats for its partner®". After the election debacle AL and its partners in the 
alliance accused each other for the election defeat®'^ . The other component's relation of the 
alliance became so bitter that they decided that they would quit the AL led alliance and strive 
to forge a separate platform. Moreover, the MPs' belonging to the non-AL components of the 
alliance would sit in the parliament as a separate block although they won the election v\dth 
the symbol of 'boat'®'^. As a result, the alliance was disbanded and the other components 
endeavor to form a new alliance did also not materialize. 
After the 1991 election a difference developed between AL and its alliance partners 
when the AL and the components of the 8-party alliances accused each other for the election 
defeat. As a result, the alliance was dissolved. When the 8-party alliance ceased to function 
some of the components of it including CPB, NAP (Mujaffar), Gono Azadi League and 
Samyabadi Dal formed another alliance named Political Democratic Front (PDF). The 
In particular, the speakers in the councils expressed extreme adverse views against the alliance partners at the 
failure to present a single panel by the student wings of the alliance partners in the recently concluded DUCSU 
election. See weekly Ekota, 15 June 1990. 
Even in this time CPB was contemplating participation in the presidential poll if there was no active 
movement. Besides CPB was also preparing for parliamentary poll. See weekly Dhaka Courier, 12-19 July 
1990. 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 12-19 July 1990. 
As for example, on 29 November 1989 AL called Strike and tried to persuade the other components of 8-
party alliance to join it but they were not agreed. See Weekly Holiday 24 November and 15 December 1989. 
Weekly Holiday, 19 January 1990. 
Fro the detail reasons of the differences see Weekly Dhaka Courier, 4-10 August 1989 and 29 September-5 
October 1989. 
Daily Ittefaq, 23 January 1991. 
To know the accusation of AL against other components of the alliance see New Nation, 13 March 1991 and 
Dainik Desh, 15 March 1991. To see the anti-AL criticism of other parties see Daily Star, 4 March 1991; Weekly 
Dhaka Courier, 15-21 March 1991 and New Nation, 23 March 1991. 
New Nation, 23 March 1991. 
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initiators of the PDF then held AL's big brotherly attitude responsible Iro breakdown ol'tlie 
alliance®"*. But the PDF also remained inactive. In September 1992 AL planned to launch a 
countrywide agitation apinst the government with the help of other opposition parties to 
realize certain demands In tliis aim AL chief convened a meeting of the like-minded 
political parties to discuss the issue. The 8 and 5-party alliance members attended the meeting 
but. But the meeting ended inconclusively®'®. Meanwhile many of the old Alliance partners of 
AL already joined the Democratic Forum (DF) of Dr. Kamal®'^ . When in 1993 Dr. Kamal 
floated his new party Gono Forum all the components, those joined the DF except NAP, 
merged themselves in the Gono Forum. 
^"..New Nation, 30 August 1992. 
The demands included repeal of the Indemnity Ordinance, appropriate steps to check terrorism and 
deteriorating law and order situation, halt to repression of the opposition parties by BNP, trial of Jammat amir 
Golam Azam as war criminal, an early ban on the activities of Jammat-Sibir-Jubo Command and exemplary 
punishment to the assailants of Rashed Khan Menon MP. See New Nation, 30 August 1992. 
New Nation, 30 August 1992. 
Saifiiddin Manik faction of CPB, Gono Azadi League, NAP (Mozaffar), Gonotontri Party and Samyabadi 
Dal all these ex-partners of 8-party alliance already decided to join in Democratic Front before of its formation 
(see Daily Star, 8 February 1992). However, the DF was floated on March 1992. 
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Part 6 
Awami League Under the Individual Leadership of Mujib-Daughter 
The future Strategies of AL: Hasina, since her joining as the AL chief in 1981, was advancing 
in a planned way to establish her control over the party. Though not like that of BNP and JP 
but after some more amendments to the constitution of AL that was passed in the party's 1993 
council session, Hasina started enjoying unlimited power in the party. Like BNP and JP leader 
she established herself inside the party above any type of criticism. The defection of Kamal 
confirmed a total control of Hasina over the AL. It also became clear in the party that if any 
one wanted to criticize the party chief, even on genuine ground, the door of the party would 
be close for him. Now Hasina concentrated on mainly four things: (i) Reducing the infighting 
in district and sub-district levels. In 1991 election in about 40 constituencies, AL had its 
dissident candidates'. AL leader Mannah wrote the party could win more 30 to 50 seats if it 
could control the difference of the party in these constituencies^. It was also one of the reasons 
of its defeat; (ii) In many constituencies AL had not competent candidates. So AL gave 
attention to include the influential and moneyed local elites in the party. In this process many 
industrialist, military officers and bureaucrats joined AL. During 1991 election a number of 
JP leaders joined BNP but AL did not allow such type of inclusion in the party. Now on 
necessity AL decided to include other party members irrespective any previous ideology^. As 
a result a number of ex-left party leaders, JP and BNP leaders joined the AL party fold; (iii) 
During 1993-96 in general AL remained a centrist party and advocator to uphold the 
consciousness of liberation war of 1971. It maintained its Bengali secular nationalist 
ideologies and Bengali liberation war as the main inspirational forces for the party workers 
and supporters in general. But in anti-government movement it gave priorities to two things: 
(a) by cWging its pro-Indian stand in public started criticizing BNP for selling Bangladeshi 
economic interest to India and instead of following its secular old lineup accepted a pro-
Islamic garb in its political activities; and (b) gave priorities on interaction with other 
parliamentary opposition parties irrespective of ideological and all other differences. By this 
the AL had achieved three targets: (a) It tried to gain confidence of the moderate Muslims of 
the country; (a) It created a general environment of anti-govemment politics in which all 
opposition parties and forces felt free to operate; and (b) More importantly, to create a 
condition in which the three major opposition parties in parliament - the AL, JP and JI- found 
a common purpose in forcing the ruling BNP to call a mid-term election on opposition's 
terms. 
The Anti-Government Movement of the Opposition during 1994-96: Since 1992 the 
good relation between BNP and Jammat deteriorated. The rightist forces were divided among 
the BNP, JP and Jammat. "Resist AL" quarter inside the BNP became weak since the 1991 
election victory. Mainly due to the division in the rightist camp the AL once again emerged as 
the single largest party. The enormous intellectual input to build-up the image of AL against 
rightist politics among middle classes, succeeded in spreading its influence in the general 
masses . The AL was growing strong organizationally and politically, winning victory in the 
In his evaluation of the reasons of the election defeat of AL Dr. Kamal gave some detail about it. See Weekly 
Roabbar, 17 March 1991; p. 13. 
\ Mahmudur Rahman Mannah, The Present and Future of Awami League, p. 89. 
Interview with Matia Chowdhuiy. 
^ Weekly Ekota, 23-29 October 1992. 
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by-elections one by one^ Before the 1994 City Corporation elections, AL won all the four by-
elections for parliamentary seats, which were vacated with the death of its MP's. The city-
corporation polls in major four cities held on 30 January 1994. Prior to the election the local 
BNP leaders engaged in infighting to get the nomination and could not reduce the difference 
between the conflicting leaders of the party whereas before the city corporation election 
Hasina successfully assembled different internally divided conflicting groups in a body 
especially in Dhaka and Chittagong. The AL victory in Dhaka and Chittagong City 
Corporations boasted the image of the party heavily vis-a-vis BNP which lost its credibility 
heavily^. At the loss of by elections and city corporation elections BNP was desperate to 
regain its winning trend in election politics. Meanwhile at the death of one AL MP in Magura 
constituency, another by-election was held in February 1994. Magura was the stronghold of 
AL. By the misuse of government machineries, terrorism and rigging BNP managed to win 
that by-election^. The AL refused to accept the election verdict. Soon thereafter, the other 
opposition parties including JP and Jammat also joined AL in condemning the BNP for its 
alleged fraudulent acts. This turned into a joint movement of protest against the BNP's in-
competency rampant corruption and demand of the resignation of the government^. 
In 1994 after the Magura election by changing its old alliance AL turned itself for a 
new polarization in the street movement of opposition politics. AL observed that one of the 
reasons of AL defeat in the 1991 election was the unity of the rightist forces of Bangladesh. 
Moreover the mentionable strength of the rightist JP and Jammat in parliament was also 
countable. If AL denied making alliance with them they would be inclined towerds BNP^. AL 
was known as a pro-liberation, pro-democratic and secular political party. Pro-left political 
parties were its traditional ally. Now the AL accepted so called 'autocratic Ershad's' JP and 
anti-liberation plus fundamentalist force Jammat as its ally in street movement'®. The unity 
seemed incongruous because of the different viewpoints the parties held. But at that stage they 
were pursuing certain limited objectives. The AL wanted to capture power; the JP wanted to 
release General Ershad in return for his party making allegiance with the former; the Jammat 
wanted to rehabilitate Golam Azam (its leader) and be allowed to carry its activities". The 
political somersault invited criticism for Hasina as she abandoned the party's old principles'^. 
The hobnobbing of AL with JP and Jammat was not acceptable to many of the AL stalwarts. 
They strongly criticized the role of some former bureaucrats and now members of the AL 
advisory council for pushing the party towards an alliance with the Jammat and JP'^. The 
CPB, one of the old allies of AL, remarked such an 'unholy alliance' would destroy the spirit 
AL won back the Rajbari seat in the by-election held on 12 October 1992 (see Morning Sun, 13 October 1992) 
and retained Gouripur seat of parliament in another by election held on 15 October 1992 (Bangladesh Observer, 
16 October 1992); also won the Bhola-4 seat held on 2 December 1992 (see Daily Star, 3 December 1992). AL 
m 1992 regained all the parliamentary seats it had lost with the death of its MP's. 
The big difference of votes in Dhaka and Chittagong revealed the loss of credibility of BNP in Bangladesh 
politics. For the different City Corporation election results see Nizam U. Ahmed, Party Politics in Bangladesh's 
Local Government; Asian Survey, Vol. 35 No. 11; November 1995; pp. 1025-27. Also see M.A. Wajed Miah, 
Politics and Government in Bangladesh; pp. 222- 23. 
\ Jai Jai Din, 29 March 1994. 
Jai Jai Din, 3 Januaiy 1995; p. 5. 
Interview with AL leader Tofael Ahmed. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 3 January 1995; p. 6. 
". Amera Saeed, Awami League (Hasina): Rise to Power; Regional Studies Islamaad, Vol. 15 No. 1; Winter 
1996-97; p. 93. 
' I Morning Sun, Editorial: "Hasina's dilemmas"; 8 July 1994. 
Morning Sun, 9 September 1994. 
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of Liberation War'"*. The CPB central committee observed, "The AL, which claims to be the 
leading force of the War of Liberation and secular Democratic Party has chosen a suicidal 
course through its alliance with Jammat and JP". The party also called upon the left-leaning 
and pro-liberation forces to remain alert against any destructive move by the AL. AL turned 
down the mouth of criticism against it. AL leader A. Samad Azad told that the AL had 
cooperated with the Jammat in the past and would continue to do so in the future'^. 
The major opposition party AL's difference with the ruling BNP arose almost 
inmiediately as they entered the new parliament. Since December 199 lone section of AL, 
those who suffered debacle in the parliamentary election, including Amu, Zillur Rahman, 
Kader Siddiqui Mozaffar Hossain Paltu were making all out effort to force the AL leadership 
to launch a vigorous anti-govenmient movement. While according to A. Samad Azad, Dr. 
Kamal, A. Marman, Tofael Ahmed, Salahuddin Yusuf and Sajeda Chowdhury, it would be 
suicidal for parliamentary politics in Bangladesh. The majority number of MP's also 
cautioned against the matter of whipping up the anti-government movement'^. However, till 
the council session of 1992, AL leadership was not contemplating for going to any anti-
regime movement". Difference of opinion among the stalwarts of AL was also prevailing 
over the issue of mid-term polls'I The Magura by-election was a turning point of Bangladesh 
politics. From 1994 AL waged an anti-government struggle for creating a system which 
would ensure free and fare poll. It demanded resignation of the BNP government and 
constitution of the nonparty caretaker government to conduct all the future general polls by 
bringing necessary amendment to the constitution to ensure all the future elections free and 
fare According to it under this government free and fare election could not be possible. The 
rightist JP and Jammat provided critical support to AL by pressing the common demand for 
caretaker government purportedly in the interest of holding free and fare elections. BNP 
become isolated in and outside the parliament^". All the major opposition parties declared that 
till the demand was fulfilled the movement would be continued^'. In order to pursue the 
government to agree to their demands the opposition held several strikes, organized public 
meetings and boycotted the parliamentary sessions since March 1994^^. It should be 
mentioned here that AL decision to go for anti-government movement was not unanimous. 
One small section of AL leaders and MP's favored to participate in the parliamentary 
sessions^^. But in front of the strong will of Hasina and majority section of the party 
leadership in favor of strong street movement they became silent. Side by side of the 
'caretaker government' movement the AL also launched a nationwide campaign to help 
farmers '^* and workers, build a strong movement in the rural areas demanding supply of 
fertilizer at fair price^^, supported the cause of industrial workers for reinstatement in their 
Bangladesh Times, 9 July 1994. 
Bangladesh Times, 2 August 1994. 
New Nation, 12 December 1991. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 5 May 1992. 
Morning Sun, 4 November 1992. 
Jai Jai Din, 3 January 1995; p. 5. 
Daily Star, 7 July 1994. 
Daily Ittefaq, 11 September 1994. 
^^ Jai Jai Din, 6 December 1994 and 3 January 1995. 
New Nation, 8 April 1994; Dainik Bangla, 17 April 1994 and Weekly Bichitra, 13 Januaiy 1995, p. 11. 
Since the beginning of 1993 a massive fertilizer crisis took place in Bangladesh. See Ajkr Kagoj, 17April 
1993. 
See Golam Hossain, "Bangladesh in 1995: Politics of Intransigence"; Asian Survey, Vol.36 No. 2; February 
1996; p. 201. 
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jobs^^, burst into protest against the rape and killing of teen-aged Yasmin and subsequent 
killing of several others by police in Dinaspur district town^^. By including different popular 
issue with the 'caretaker government' movement, the opposition successfully won the popular 
support in their favor. But the BNP ignored the oppositions 'caretaker government' demand 
described it an unconstitutional^®; BNP chairman told it an illegal demand of opposition^® and 
responded the movement by taking tough line. It only helped the opposition to strengthen 
their unity further against the government. When the negotiation settlement on the issue with 
the BNP government failed, to strengthen the anti-government movement on 28 December 
1994 all the opposition MP's (147 out of 154 MP's) resigned en masse from the Parliament 
and also demanded the resignation of government^". But PM Khaleda denied relinquishing 
from power. Rather her party encouraged defection in opposition parties to make her political 
stand acceptable to the masses and managed some primary success- some MP's defected from 
JP, GF, JI and AL^'. The weekly 'Jai Jai Din' wrote the trend BNP started by hijacking the 
MP's from different opposition parties if it continued and strengthen then in fiiture instead of 
institutionalization of democracy a new "hijacking practice" would be established in 
Bangladesh politics^^. In another edition the 'Weekly' said this trend of changing of the party 
would jeopardize the democracy of Bangladesh^^. The only member of AL joined the BNP 
was Najibul Bashar Maizvandari. He was a religious leader, first join in AL just before the 
1991 parliamentary election and elected the parliamentary membership by AL ticket. But 
because of manpower business and other family reasons, meanwhile, he lost his previous 
popularity. For this reason AL decided to nominate another candidate, A. Rafiq, from that 
constituency. So to ensure backing from another major party BNP in a by polar political 
system in Bangladesh, he joined BNP. Not only that after joining BNP he declared Islam 
would not be secure in the hand of AL^^ He said, "AL in the name of secularism has 
abandoned religion and shaken hands with the anti-liberation Jammat Islami, despite its claim 
of upholding the spirit of liberation war"^^. At his defection to BNP several hundred 
supporters of AL demonstrated a protest meeting in front of his house^^. However the joining 
of some of opposition MP's could not enhanced the image of BNP. 
The sfreet movement of opposition continued in 1994 and 1995. This set the tone of 
confrontation for the rest of 995. Different public opinion survey was held in and around 
Dhaka in 994,1995 and 1996^^ All the opinion polls showed the same picture that majority 
^^ In 1993 BNP government closed down many government own industries, sold many to the private owners and 
sacked millions of industrial workers from different government industries. For these see Banglar Hani, 17 and 
29 May and 8 June 1993; Ajker Kagoj, 29 May 1993. Demanding the reinstallment of the workers AL called 
different nationwide programs. See M.A. Wajed Miah,, Politics and Government in Bangladesh; p. 264. 
Jai Jai Din, 19 September 1995; p. 8. When the reports came to the people that the Yasmin was 'raped and 
dumped' by police, the masse the Dinajpur town burst into protest. Several protesters were killed when police 
opened fu-e on angry mobs that attacked different police outposts (see Daily Star, 30 August 1995). 
Bangladesh Tunes, 28 October 194. 
Daily Star, 19 December 1994. 
^^ Daily Ittefaq, 29 December 1994. Also see Morning Sun, 2 January I995.However the resignation decision of 
AL was not unanimous. A section of the AL MP's was strongly against it (New Nation 12 November 1994). 
Jai Jai Din, 2 January 1996; pp. 4-5. 
' I Jai Jai Din, 2 January 1996; p. 5. 
Jai Jai Din, 22 August 1995; p. 5. 
Jai Jai Din, 22 August 1995; pp. 4-5. 
Daily Star, 18 August 1995. 
Daily Star, 18 August 1995. Daily Star, 18 August 1995. 
The Human and Civil Right Commission (HCRC) conducted an opinion survey on the caretaker government 
issue in October in Dhaka City and its adjoining areas which revealed that 57.15% of the people supported the 
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was in favor of holding election under a caretaker government. Amidst increasing violence 
which seemed to augment with the holding continuous general strike the government did not 
bow to the opposition demands^®. The BNP responded the opposition by dissolving the 
parliament in November 1995 and by holding of the national parliamentary election on 15 
February 1996. The opposition boycott of the election for not being held under a neutral 
caretaker govermnent resulted in a sweeping victory for the BNP, which won 289 of the 300 
seats in a near vote-less election. Voter turnout was less than 10% of the eligible electorate, 
the BNP engaged in massive vote rigging, and independent monitors denoimced the process 
as flawed^'. The February 1996 election confirmed opposition allegations of mass rigging and 
the absurdity of having a fare election imder the then normal government procedure. The 
elections therefore not only failed to end political impasse but called into question the 
legitimacy of the BNP government, adding fuel to the opposition movement for the creation 
of a neutral caretaker government. The opposition responded the 6"* parliamentary election by 
calling a three-day general strike. The movement gained momentum after the election. It 
reached the peak after the party called a non-cooperation movement on 9 March 1996. Not 
only a huge number of people and professionals, but a number of government officers and 
employees also came out from their places of work and expressed solidarity with the 
movement'*". Faced by an open revolt of the civil bureaucracy the government passed the 13''' 
amendment to the constitution providing for the creation of an interim goveniment to conduct 
all fiiture elections in the country, the PM asked the President to form a Neutral Caretaker 
Government and conduct new election. Finally, PM, Khaleda Zia, resigned and a non-party 
caretaker government was formed on 30 March 1996 to conduct the 7 parliamentary 
election'*'. However, after a two years street agitation, the opposition gained the victory. The 
new non-party neutral government declared the election date on 12 June 996. 
Election Strategies of the Parties: Targeting the Parliamentary elections all the 
major parties were getting preparation since long. They already decided their election 
strategies. Day by day they were advancing with their own planning. AL also had its own 
planning. The party succeeded to break any probable alliance of the pro-religious and rightist 
parties including that of JP and Jammat and BNP camp through involving the former two in 
anti-government movement. As a result the rightist vote bank was divided into many. 
Majority of the GF leaders and workers already joined AL, who could have put threat in AL's 
vote-bank and the leftist parties already did not have significant followers. 
It can be said by Ae defection of Kamal that the power conflict in the central 
leadership was over but still difference was prevailing in the district and sub-district level of 
the party which was one of the reasons of the defeat in the 1991 parliamentary elections. Even 
during 1996 different news of infighting in different districts were coming to party chief. 
concept to hold future parliament election in the country (Bangladesh Observer, 30 October 1994). In another 
survey, conducted by Jai Jai Din, showed only 25.7% people believed that in the absence of caretaker 
government the opposition should participate in the next elections (Weekly Jai Jai Din, 19 December 1995; p. 
80). One survey conducted by NDF in January 1996 shoed that a total 87% of the respondents supported the 
opposition demand for caretaker government to resolve the current political impasse (Weekly Dhaka Courier, 5 
January 1996). 
Amera Saeed, Awami League (Hasina): Rise to Power; Regional Studies Islamaad, Vol. 15 No. 1; Winter 
1996-97; pp. 100-01. 
" Stanley A. Kochanek, Bangladesh in 1996: The 25"^  Year of Independence"; Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 2, 
February 997; p. 137. 
Daily Star, 29 March 1996. 
Stanley A. Kochanek, Bangladesh in 1996: The 25"^  Year of Independence"; Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 2, 
February 997; p. 138. 
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Even in some areas the infighting turned to hand to hand skirmish. Such as New Nation wrote 
in Jamalpur and Comilla district rival factons of AL were locked in clash and several persons 
were injured in these clashes''^. At a time when AL was bussy in making the strategies to win 
the forthcoming election Hasina was not happy with receiving all these present infightings. 
She asked the party GS Zillur Rahman to take proper steps in steps in this respect'^^. 
The new polarization in politics, which began after the February 1991 polls, was well 
on the way. On the 27 February 1991 elections the leftist parties suffered the most serious 
debacle. An assortment of several leftwing parties together captured only 13 seats'^ '*. It proved 
that in the pre-dominantly Muslim society of Bangladesh radical leftist ideologies would not 
be acceptable. The recent downfall of the socialist block in Europe has further added to the 
vulnerability of leftist parties and radical ideologies. The process of the dissolution of leftist 
and pro-left parties started with BAKSAL's joining the AL. In addition to it JSD (Inu) leader 
Shajan Khan and A.H. Alam joined the AL in 1991''^ In the same year some other leaders of 
JSD and Janamukti Party had reportedly showed interest in joining AL. On 1992 Mahamudur 
Rahman Manna and Miqa Sultan Raja of Janamukti Party with their followers joined AL''®. 
At the dissolution of the 8-party alliance the former pro-Soviet left parties that including the 
CPB, NAP and Ganatantri Party tried (GP) to forge a front on the basis of the theory of social 
democracy'*^. But mainly due to the collapse of the socialist block in Europe all these 
frustrated political parties including the CPB were heavily engaged in factional infighting. 
Insiders of all these parties in 1991 had hinted that quite a good number in these parties 
intended to merge with AL''^ On 28 April 1994 a good number of GF leaders and a big 
number of their followers, previously who were the member of CPB, finally shifted their 
allegiance to the AL by deserting Dr. Kamal and GF''^. Among the prominent leaders joined 
AL were GF central leader and former CPB secretary Nurul Islam Nahid, Mohammad Yusuf 
MP, Dabirul Islam MP and some more district presidents and secretaries of GF. At the 
formation of Dr. Kamals GF a small faction of Ganatantri Party merged with it. The larger 
part of Ganatantri Party also could not survive at the crisis of leftist politics in Bangladesh. 
Finally on October 1994 Suranjit Sengupta faction of Ganatantri Party merged with its old 
ally AL at a special council session of GP^". GP leader Suranjit Sengupta MP was included in 
AL's advisoiy council. The joining list of the leftists in these years was very big. However 
there were mixed reactions within AL regarding these influxes. Some of the party stalwarts 
said that the joining of these leaders in AL should be counted as its big success^^ But they 
were conscious that the incoming aspirants could unsettle the balance of the party and so at 
present the leadership was not too eager to reward them with party posts. Besides, a section of 
AL leaders had reservations about accommodating the leftists and left-of-the-centrists. They 
pointed out that the ideological and political gap between the AL members and the new 
Because of the infighting in Jamalpur at least 14 persons were injured and in Comilla at least 25 persons were 
injured. See New Nation, 16 March 996. 
New Nation, 16 March 1996. 
Among the left wing and pro-left parties CPB captured 5, BAKSAL 4, NAP (Mozaffar) 1, JSD Siraj 1, 
Ganatantri Party' 1, and Workers Party won 1 seat. See Daily Star, 1 March 1991. 
Dhaka Courier, 12 September, 1991. 
Jai Jai Din, 5 May 1992; p. 8. Also see Mahamudur Rahman Mannah, The Present and Future of Awami 
League; pp.74-75. 
Daily Star, 2 September 1991. 
Daily Star, 2 September 1991. 
Dainik Bangla, 29 April 1994. 
^^ Daily Ittefaq, Sangbad and Daily Star, 21 October 1994. 
Mahmudur Rahman Mannah, The Present and FuUire of Awami League, P. 90. 
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comers were wide. According to these AL leaders, "the party suffered enough damage 
through forming a single party (BAKSAL) in January 1975. The party has still to pay for that 
near-fatal mistake"^^. A believer in multi-party democracy AL was then partially influenced 
by the pro-Moscow left parties and proceeded to establish one-party rule. It was the left 
parties that gave this advice to AL while the ultra lefts, through their terrorist activities, forced 
the government to take these damaging steps^^. However because of defection of good 
number of good organizer AL needed some skilled and devoted workers. By realizing it, 
Hasina kept the door of party remain open for the leftist. AL also was encouraging defection 
in different parties including GF. 
The election win of AL in different by-elections and City Corporation elections 
boosted its image too much that many started predicting AL was coming to power in the next 
parliamentary election^'*. So a trend was developed in the power seeking politicians to join AL 
to have the share of power. After the 1991 election defeat AL was also desperate for coming 
to power. To make its path smooth to win the next elections it was accepting necessary 
changes, whether all the changes were adjusting with the heritage and past principles of AL or 
not the party leadership did not bother that. Since 1993 large number of leaders and workers 
of BNP and JP started joining AL because of deteriorating popularity of BNP. In August 1993 
several BNP and JP leaders and workers from Narshinghdi, IGiulna and Mymensing district 
joined the AL^ .^ In February 1994 about 500 JP leaders and workers joined AL by the 
leadership of former JP Mayor of Khulna City Aminul Huq Amin^^. The most important 
realignment to the AL from the JP was the joining of Humayun Rashid Chowdhury, the 
former Forcing Minister of JP^ .^ In the last of 1994 Barrister Aminul Islam and his followers 
deserted GF and joined AL^ .^ It is the second biggest split in GF. Previously the largest 
faction of former CPB leaders and workers by leaving GF already joined AL. On 18 
December 1994 about 500 freedom fighters and prominent citizens of the country led by 
A.K.M. Jainal Abedin Khan, Bir Pratik, joined the AL^ ®. Matiur Rahman, a former senior 
leader of AL, joined GF when it was formed. But when he saw the grim future of it in April 
1995, he deserted the GF and joined BNP^". Since then, for few months, he was in BNP but 
could not adjust there and finally, with his followers joined AL in August 1995^\ 
Before the 1996 election the AL, with the help of BCL (the student wing of AL), 
completed a survey. The party made a least of best every three probable candidates from each 
of the 300 constituencies of the country. In those constituencies AL did not have competent 
candidates for those areas the party decided to recruit some outsiders who could be the most 
competent persons to contest the election by AL ticket. In maximum case local moneyed and 
Dhaka Courier, 12 September 1991. 
Dhaka Courier, 12 September 1991. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din, 6 December 1994; pp. 4-5. 
From Narshindi district more than 10000 activists of BNP and JP (Daily Star, 6 August 1993); from 
BakergonJ sub-district of Khulna district a group of some SOOOactivists of BNP and JP joined AL (Daily Star, 8 
August 1993) and from Gafargaon sub-district of Khulnl district a group of BNP and CPB leaders and workers 
joined AL on 17 August 1993(Moming Sun, 18 August 1993).. 
Ajker Kagoj, 12 Febmary 1994. 
The Bangladesh Observer, 8 May 1995. Also Dhaka Courier, 21 July 1995. 
Morning Sun, .18 December 1994. 
Bangladesh Observer, 19 December 1994. 
Bangladesh Observer, 27 April 1995. 
Morning Sun, 12 August 1995. 
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influential persons were preferred for AL nomination". In the survey it was also revealed that 
in 1991 election some of the top AL leaders sold AL ticket by money. Because of nominating 
wrong persons AL was defeated in the 20% of total seats in the 1991 elections. In the survey 
it was also seen that people prefer anti-Indian and pro-Islamic positions from the political 
parties^^ According to Dainik Bangia the survey committee also advised Hasina to make 
good relations with the Bangladesh Military and give anti-Indian and pro-religious speech in 
the public meetings^. 
According to the advice of the survey committee, the AL took initiative to 
accommodate the possible new-comers in those seats in the upcoming polls where the party 
candidates were seemingly weak and their chances to win from those constituencies were 
slim^^. It opened the party for a significant number of 'political strangers' to contest the 
forthcoming general election on party ticket. The party also encouraged defection in BNP, JP 
and other small parties. During April and May 1996 surprising all a large number of people 
from different strata of life joined AL. The new faces included politicians, businessmen, 
industrialists, retired army officers and retired civil buteaucrats. The former Information 
Minister and Speaker of Ershad regime Shamsul Huda Chowdhury joined AL on 22 April; on 
21 April JP leader of Dhaka City Rahmatullah defected to AL; on 2 May the former Vice-
President of Ershad government Justice (Ret.) Nurul Islam, Jessor district unit BNP President 
and Jessor Municipality Chairman Ali Reza Raju, former Land Minister of BNP government 
Mohd. Ismail, former sub-district Chairman of Ujirpur Syed Mynul Huq, Prof L.R. Mallik, 
former student leader Nure Alam Siddique joined AL; On 3 May CPB leader and Trade Union 
Centre (TUC) President Mohd. Nurul Islam and GS Abul Kalam Azad along with other TUC 
leaders joined AL. including of them were Aedin, Mezbah Uddin Chowdhury and Prodip Das. 
On the same day Barrister Altaur Rahman and JSD leader and Savar Municipality Chairman 
Ashrafuddin Khan Imu also defected to AL. On 4 May prominent social worker of 
Mymensing district Amir Ahmed Chowdhury Ratan joined the party. On 9'*' May the central 
committee member and Jessor district President of JSD (Inu) Ali Hossain Moni, on 11 May 
BNP leader Hazi Selim defected to AL. On the same day Wing Commander (Ret.) 
Hamidullah Khan defected to AL from BNP. Former President of Bangladesh during Mujib 
regime Mohammadullah joined AL on 12 May. It should be mentioned here that after the 
assassination of Mujib he collaborated with the Mujibs killers. In 1976 he joined the DL of 
Mustaq, then defected to General Zia's BNP regime, then deserted to Ershad's JP and now 
returned to AL^ .^ Hasina did not hesitate to get back her one time arch-enemy Advocate 
Sirajul Islam in the party. From GF he defected to AL and was nominated from Panchagar-2 
seat to contest the coming election^^. Though it was the talk of the town that two BNP rebels 
Major (Ret.) Akhtaruzzaman and Nurul Islam Moni might contest on AL ticket in their own 
constituencies at Kishoreganj and Barguna respectively ® but, finally, they did not join AL. 
Akhtaruzzaman contested on BNP ticket and Moni contested as an independent candidate. 
Since the fall of Mujib, all the government of Bangladesh maintained good relation 
with the armed force. It is saying that how much the civil government will be firm it depended 
Informal interview with Bahadur Bepari, the BCL chief, who was responsible for the survey works. For those 
areas, where AL was week, the party decided to recruit former bureaucrats, retired army officers, and even 
leaders from rival parties who appeared better than its own candidates to face the challenges of oppositions. 
Also see Dainik Bangia, 10 May 1995. 
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on their relation with military force^'. During AL rule the party did not give importance to the 
military. Military believed that AL government did not have any intension to make the 
military strong. AL lost its power in 1975 by a military coup. Till 1991 parliamentary election 
military was against the party^°. On the other hand, the BNP and JP were considered the 
abode of retired army officers and were enjoying military support in the power game of 
Bangladesh, which was very necessary in third world countries. A section of AL suggested 
party chief to build up relation with the Bangladesh Military to smoothen the way to 
governing power''. After the 1991 election defeat the AL took necessary steps to remove the 
false impression surrounding it and tried to gain militaty confidence in favor of it. As a result, 
on 4 December 1993 by the leadership of former chief of Army Major General K.M. 
Shafiullah, more than one hundred ex- soldiers and army officers joined the party'^. A good 
number of former defense officers joined AL during May 1996 to get the party nomination'^. 
Side by side the Bangladesh Army and the AL also concentrated to gain confidence of 
the bureaucracy of Bangladesh. During 1993 to 94 many former bureaucrats joined AL. To 
ensure their support for the party, Hasina appointed Shah A.M.S. Kibria, a former bureaucrat, 
her political adviser''*. As a result, later on some more bureaucrats not only joined but also 
found place in the AL central bodies, including the advisory council'^. To contest by AL 
ticket just before the election, mentionable number of prominent civil bureaucrats joined 
AL'^. 
The stalwarts flocked into the AL camp not all of them were loyal followers or 
believers in the political principals of AL. The joining was seen to the mutual interest of both, 
the person and the party. There were even a few faces whose entry into AL camp surprised 
many of the loyalists in the party. It may be mentioned that just before the 1991 elections, 
many aspirants in politics had expressed their intension to join AL. But they did not get the 
entry due to the party's weakness for the tested workers as well as some kind of adverse 
attitude to the political and professional background of the aspirants". Justifying the current 
Jai Jai Din, 14 December 1993; p. 8. 
Matiur Rahman Chowdury, Inside Politics, p. 84. 
Dainik Bangla, 0 May 1995. 
Jai Jai Din, 14 December 1993; p. 8. 
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General of Ansar and VDP Major General (Ret.) Syed Badruzzaman, former Bangladesh Military chief Major 
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Brigadier (Ret.) Abu Baker, Col. (Ret.) Mujibur Rahman, Col. (Ret.) Abdul Latif, Group Captain (Ret.) Mohd. 
Aqqas, Lieutenant Col. (Ret) Kamrul Hossain Murad, Major (Ret.) Rafiqul Islam (Bir Uttam), Major Gen. (Ret.) 
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Daily Star, 10 October 1994. 
".Dhaka Courier 21 July 1995. 
Among the prominents of them were former Secretary of Law Nurul Islam Khan, former Secretary Aminul 
Islam, fonner Additional Secretary of Foreign Ministry Mohiuddin Ahmed, former Chairman of Bangladesh 
Handloom Board Myzuddin Ahmed etc. see Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, pp. 503. 
However rejected by AL some of them knocked at BNP door and got admission. Most of them were elected 
as BNP parliamentarians, some even were appointed ministers. BNP had the advantages of being a party of 
heterogeneous elements, therefore, it was not hesitant to take anyone in it. But AL being a party with political 
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decisions to nominate the political strangers, one AL leader said, "You see, the AL has been 
out of power for the last two decades. The next poll is the life and death question for our 
party. It is therefore imperative for us to ensure victory, not to entertain mere aspiration of any 
local level leaders, however, decided he may be"^^. Another leader added to the same 
journalist, "What is the use giving nomination to a dedicated worker if you see a new face 
more prospective". Being away from the seat of power for last 21 years the party lost a lot 
including allegiance of many party workers who had become frustrated. It was therefore quite 
befitting in power politics.Hasina also asked her partymen during the recent extended meeting 
of the party whether they wanted 'nomination' or 'power at any cost'. The reply was quiet 
natural from the party men. It was that AL must bag as many seats possible in the next general 
elections^^. 
In 1991 election in about 40 parliamentary constituencies AL had its dissident 
candidates^''. It was also one of the reasons of its defeat. Apprehensive of revolt of by a 
number of local level leaders of the parties at the decisions of nominating 'outsiders' the 
policy makers of AL plarmed to offer 'rewards' for the original leaders and activists of the 
party who had worked day and night for the party. An AL leader said that if voted to power, 
the local level leaders failing to get nominations in the poll 'would be rewarded with various 
positions in the government funded autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies vdthin the 
purview of law'. "They could also be accommodated in various local government bodies," the 
leader added^'. Meanwhile, since long Hasina was propagating that if voted to power, she 
would reintroduce a local government system to be run by the elected representatives for the 
welfare of the common people^^. In another occation, Hasina again said if voted to power, her 
party would decentralize the administration and have elected local bodies at union, sub-
district and district level in which many dedicated leaders could get leadership positions^^. In 
the 1991 election many veteran local-level leaders of AL were enraged by the party 
leadership's decision but in this year party chiefs assurance of honoring the dedicated leaders 
in the local body elections worked magically. Though, 26 'dedicated' local-level leaders of 
the party had initially thrown challenge to the party nominees in some constituencies through 
its appeasing policy AL managed to restrain most of these 'dissidents' from contesting the 12 
June parliamentary elections^. 
The vote bank of the ruling party, the JP and the Jammat was basically the same. The 
ruling party's policy maker and Standing Committee member of BNP, Deputy Leader of the 
Parliament Badruddoza Chowdhury remarked, "AL is the political opponents of the BNP. But 
JP and JI are our opponents in polls."^^ One of the main reasons of BNP's victory in 1991 
parliamentary polls was that JP and Jammat could not disturb BNP's vote bank. Rather to 
crack an AL victory, they had organized other Islamic parties who instead of voting for party 
candidates secured vote for BNP. Where supporters were not contested supporters of JP 
extended full support to BNP because of ideological leaning. BNP was strengthened by 
innumerable workers and leaders of JP who joined the JP after the fall of Ershad, which 
' I Daily Star, 22 April 1996. 
See the editorial of Weekly Dhaka Courier, 10 May 1996. 
In his evaluation of the reasons of the election defeat of AL Dr. Kamal gave some detail about it. See Weekly 
Roabbar, 17Marchl991;p. 13. 
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helped BNP, win in a majority seats^^. To ensure BNP's return to the power for the second 
term by winning the next parliamentary election the party adopted a new strategy either to get 
JP and Jammat support in the election or to see they could not disturb the voters. According to 
the first step of the new strategy, efforts were being made to build close relation with JP and 
Jammat, to ensure support of the JP and Jammat for BNP in the forthcoming parliamentary 
elections. They also contemplated to obtain support of factions of them by splitting the parties 
so that JP and Jammat won't be able to shutter the BNP's vote bank. To execute the strategy, 
the BNP leaders took initiatives either to build close relations by sending, now imprisoned, JP 
Chairman, H.M. Ershad to any foreign country for treatment and not taking any steps to 
harass the JP supporters, or to obtain support of a faction by splitting it, if necessaiy^^. But the 
first step of the BNP strategy to woo JP and Jammat into election alliance in the 1996 election 
was not succeeded. But the party was able to create defection in JP and a large section of 
lower level JP leaders joined BNP during 1995 and 1996^^ 
The BNP adopted some more strategies against the AL to ensure to return to power 
thorough victory in the forthcoming election. It decided to make concrete efforts to bring to 
the BNP the disgruntled AL aspirants who failed to secure nominations from their party in the 
coming elections. According to BNP, this would be one of the major threat to the AL with the 
sole objective to block an AL victory, the ruling party also would make all-out efforts to 
convince the GF to field candidates in all the 300 seats. The BNP felt that in this way the 
Forum could tear into the AL vote bank. The GF, on its won, was seriously considering the 
same step. BNP leaders were also maintaining links with Left Democratic Front, National 
Democratic Alliance and Sammilita Sangram Parishad as part of its anti-AL strategy®'. BNP 
had some success in bringing some AL workers in its platform. In the course of this process, a 
large number of former AL, JP and Jammat workers from Tangail, Brahmanbaria, Rajbari, 
Rajshahi etc. districts joined BNP'®. The merger of former Secretary General of BNP Obaidur 
Rahman and his party Janata Dal on 22 May 1996 boasted the moral strength of the party. 
Obaidur Rahman a former Secretary General of BNP had been expelled firom the party in 
1988 because of leadership conflict and formed a new political party named Janata Dal". 
Just before the election, side by side the AL, the BNP also nominated several 
newcomers in different constituencies following its 1991 election strategy. On 3 May 1996 a 
number of Jatia Party leaders and professional group leaders joined BNP. Among the 
prominent of them were the former Minister of JP Mahbubur Rahman and Miah Monsur Ali, 
former Step Minister of JP, Nazimuddin A1 Azad, Bangladesh Teachers Association President 
Asadtil Huq, Secretary General of Prokrichi Abu Hena, former East Pakistan Provincial 
Assembly Member Altaf Hossain etc. Former Industrial Secretary A.K.M. Musharraf joined 
BNP on 4 May 1996. Prior to joining BNP, he tried to get nomination for the parliamentary 
election from AL and JP but when he was not assured then joined the BNP. On the same day, 
prominent JP leader of Dhaka city Abul Hasnat defected to BNP. On 10 May Salahuddin 
Kader Chowdhury and his brother Gyas Kader Chowdhury joined BNP. It should be 
mentionale here that before this Salahuddin Kader Chowdhury defected to JP from ML and 
was appointed the minister of Ershad regime. Then by leaving JP formed NDA and now 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 9 June 1995 
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joined the BNP^^. When some of the prominent members of AL including the adviser of S. 
Hasina Arsaduzzaman^^, AL presidium member Dr. Alauddin Ahmed®"^  became confirm that 
they were not getting nomination from AL, they defected to BNP. Especially, the joining of 
AL Presidium member Dr. Alauddin Ahmed in BNP on 7 May 1996 astonished the people. It 
embarrassed the party leadership. He was elected MP by AL ticket in 1973 but could not win 
in 1986 and 1991 election and in 1996 AL was not ready to nominate him. Some few political 
aspirants also joined JP but their number is few'^. 
On the other hand in its election strategy, Jammat adopted the tactics of defeating in 
any way certain anti-Jammat Ministers and leaders of the ruling BNP in the next national 
polls. Among of these BNP leaders were Prof Badruddoza Chowdhury, Col. (Ret.) Oli 
Ahmed, Col. (Ret.) Akbar Hossain, Major (Ret.) Akhtaruzzaman and some others. Besides 
them, some AL and GF leaders also figure in the Jammat list of 'must be defeated' in the next 
election. According to its leaders and activists, this would make them understand that it was 
not possible to go far in politics by opposing the Jammat'®. 
Maximum political aspirants tried to join AL; BNP was their second choice then JP. In 
all the mass based political parties the newcomers dominated in getting nominations. Among 
Al's 300 candidates to contest election, 158 were new who did not get nomination in 1991 
election. Among the candidates won in the 1991 elections, 16 did not get nomination in 1996. 
All the 8 AL candidates nominated in different constituencies of Dhaka City were new. All 
the five AL candidates to contest in different constituencies of Narayangonj district were also 
new. The candidates of AL in maximum districts of Bangladesh including Chittagong were 
new. Side by side the BNP also gave preference to the new comers. Among the 300 
candidates of BNP to contest in different constituencies, 157 were new. Among the MP's 
elected in 1991 election's, 31 persons were excluded to from the party candidature in 1996. 
Among the prominent who were excluded from BNP nomination were former Minister Mirza 
Golam Hafiz, former Step Minister for Finance Mujibur Rahman, former Deputy Speaker 
Humayun Khan Ponni, former BNP Whip Mahabub Alam Tara, the defected NAP MP Prof 
Abdul Hafiz, former AL MP Najiul Bashar Maijbandhari etc^'. According to a survey of the 
Power and Participation Research Centre, it was found that 70% of the AL candidates came 
from socially better-ofif groups, while the percentage of BNP candidates was 79 and for JP 
68%'®. On the other hand, the percentage of farmers and small traders among the nominees 
were very poor, for these parties that was 3-4%. The survey also revealed that most of the 
candidates were from business background and were living in urban areas. 35% of the 
nominees had residence in Dhaka. The CPB, Jammat etc cadre based political parties did not 
nominated new comers in the election. 
In this year ideology, party activist's personal honesty, sacrifice and allegiance for the 
party did not play any role in getting nomination of the party ticket. This put AL on almost 
same footing as BNP and JP. Jai Jai Din wrote that all the parties sacrificed ideologies and 
principles in nominating the party candidates. The joining of some anti-liberation' elements 
like Nurul Islam Chowdhury and Shamsul Huda discontented the AL supporters. In the party 
Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, pp. 475-76. 
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change and joining of new parties, money power and local influence was seen as the standard 
of eligibility'®". But weekly "Dhaka Courier" wrote that in the present political situation there 
was no way to be dogmatic about principals and ideals as simultaneously bid for power'"'. 
When the political leaders themselves do not practice democracy, morality, honesty, ideology 
or principles etc in their own life, they are unable to show themselves as the example of such 
qualities like that of Gandhi of India, Mandela of South Africa, Martin Luther King of USA 
etc how would the masses follow them; moreover, they are unable to mobilize support behind 
certain exemplary ideologies, principles, or issues like that of Lenin and Mauseton for 
Communist ideology, Gandhi for Non-Violence principles and Mujib for Bengali nationalism; 
when the political parties are really empty of putting up any good theme in the people then 
they have to follow some immoral, unprincipled way to capture power'®^. AL was benefited 
most by the party change before the election before the 1996 election. Due to the party change 
just before the election by the defection JP suffered maximum damage then BNP and CPB' . 
The defection of the political leaders could not distress the AL and Jammat badly. However, 
people can expect minimum ideology and principles form political parties'of the day. 
Especially, there is an expectation from the voters that they will vote the party candidates by 
comparing ideologies, principles and development programs of the parties. Peoples can expect 
from the parties having faith on principles and ideologies that they will fulfill their election 
pledges; they will execute their party programs. But when the parties already lost their 
integrity and honesty by nominating some moneyed but dishonest and immoral candidates 
only for going to power then how would they fulfill their election pledges. 
The tone of the 1996 election campaign was somewhat different from 1991. Rather 
than defending its record, the BNP resorted to a largely negative campaign, attacking the AL 
as anti-democratic, politically incompetent and pro-Indian stooge'®'*. 
In the 1991 election, BNP successfully used religious feeling, anti-Indian feeling, and debate 
on nationalism etc in its anti-AL campaign'®^. As AL could not understood the peoples 
feeling, it had to loose the election. All these factors once again came to up in the 1996 
election campaigns. But, in this time, AL was well prepared. It already declared that it would 
not renew the 25-years Indo-Bangladesh friendship treaty which would expire in 1996'® .^ 
Hasina also took a temporary anti-Indian stance as election strategy. Since Hasina's arrogance 
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had been a primary factor in her defeat in 1991; the AL campaign was much more humble and 
positive. Hasina diffused the BNP attack by apologizing for any mistakes made by her 
father's 1972-75 AL government'"^. Considering majority people's religious sentiments, AL 
greatly projected Islam during electioneering'"^. Besides its traditional pro-left, centrist and 
secular vote-bank by showing respect to religious feeling of the 90% Muslim masses, AL was 
able to regain part of its old pro-right vote-bank. 
The Election Results: Although no party was able to win the majority, the AL ended 
up with the 147 seats out of 300 and emerged as the single largest party while BNP trailed AL 
by bagging 116 seats, the JP 32, the Jammat 3; other parties won 2 seats'"^. The BNP defeat 
was attributed primarily to the party's isolation, arrogance and complacency. Its success in 
1991 had been due to steadfast image of Khaleda Zia during the anti-Ershad movement and 
the isolation of AL; in 1996, however, it was the BNP that was isolated as the AL, JP and JI 
mobilized against it during the two-year long anti-regime movement. Though AL won 
majority seats at the same time a number of influential stalwarts of AL were defeated due to 
the electorate's dissatisfaction with their performance. Among of them were Zohra Tajuddin, 
Amir Hossain Amu, Mohiuddin Ahmed and Suranjit Sengupta and Sudhangshu Shekhar 
Haider"". Among the prominent leaders won more than one seats in the elections were S. 
Hasina, A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed and A. Sam.ad Azad. Among the prominent leaders who 
had lost in the 1991 poll but won in the 12 June 1996 fray were"': AL GS Zillur Rahman, 
Presidiimi member A. Mannan, A. Noman, Prof. Abu Sayed, Bangabir A. Kader Siddiqui, 
Nurul Islam Nahid, Dewan Farid Gazi, Obaidul Kader, Mafazzal Hussain Maya. 
For the first time, the GF came to contest a general election and nominate 104 
candidates in different constituencies of Bangladesh. But, unfortunately, all the contesters of 
GF including its President Dr. Kamal and Secretary Saifiiddin Maink lost their security 
money. It was a most ridiculous matter that among the all 104 GF candidates only 6 had votes 
more than one thousand. The party President Dr. Kamal received highest votes among all the 
candidates of the GF. From Dhaka-9 constituency, he received 5175 votes i.e. 2.7% of total 
votes polled and managed 6^ position among the contesters. Comparing to it, the winner AL 
candidate received 189930 votes''^. The bad performance of GF in the election revealed that 
the party was rejected by the masses though its leader once declared that it would be the main 
stream party of the politics of the countiy. 
Seven leftist formed an alliance named Bam (Leftist) Front to contest the election. The 
parities were CPB, JSD (Inu), Workers Party, BSD (Khaleq), BSD (Mahbub), Sramik 
Krishok Samajbadi Dal and Oikka Prokria. In the election, they nominated 140 candidates. 
All were defeated in the contest, not only that except three of them all also lost their security 
money. The front received less than 0.5% of the total votes in whole of Bangladesh"^. It 
revealed that they were already alienated from the masses. 
The election result was of tremendous significance to the AL. Having been forced out 
of power through a murderous putsch in August '75, the AL had to operate under tremendous 
odds for the last 21 years. It took long time to reorganize itself for coming to power. AL had 
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three seats less to have a single majority in the parliament. The JP leader Ershad extended 
their unconditional support to AL in the formation of its government' During this crucial 
hour JSD (A. Rob's) support to AL was also available. On 23 June a twenty member ministry 
headed by S. Hasina was sworn in by the president. The government's majority was further 
strengthen when the AL and JP combined to elect 30 women representatives to seats reserved 
for women in the 330 member parliament, 27 from the AL and 3 from the JP' 
AL in Power 
Formation of the AL led Government: In the first meeting of the AL Parliamentary Party 
(ALPP), S. Hasina was unanimously elected the leader of it. The ALPP also unanimously 
empowered Hasina to select deputy leader, Chief Whip and Whip's"^. After the election win, 
discussion was going on about the probable candidates for different post of AL Cabinet. The 
central leaders also sat in several meetings to select the members of future cabinet members. 
For last 21 years, the party was out of power. So, there was few in the party with having 
ministerial experience. The party leadership was hesitant to nominate the candidates for some 
of the important ministries such as home, finance and information ministries. Though the 
prominent party leaders were showing their interest for different ministry but none of them 
were ready to take the responsibility of Home Ministry as it is always a very sensitive 
ministry and from here it is very difficult to satisfy everyone. In the central body of AL 
leadership, there was no prominent economist. So the party contemplated to nominate 
ministers for finance and home affairs from outside the party politicians"^. For the post of the 
President of the country, Speaker and Deputy-Speaker of the national parliament, the party 
was also looking for suitable candidates. A. Samad Azad's name was discussed for the post of 
the President of the coimtry. But as it was only a ceremonial post without having any 
mentionable executive power he requested Hasina that he did not want to go in that 
ceremonial position. The party was also contemplating to make a person the country President 
who would be accepted by all section of the people. For the posts of Speaker the names of A. 
Mannan, A. Momen and Salahuddin Yusuf was discussed. Though Amir Hossain Amu, A. 
Jalil and Suranjit Sengupta were not elected in the election but they were expecting that they 
would be included in the cabinet"^. However party president Hasina was final decider in the 
formation of her cabinet and to nominate the party stalwarts in important positions. 
S. Hasina, leader of the ALPP, was swom-in as PM on 23 June 1996. She also formed 
her first 20-member cabinet in the same day. Zillur Rahman was appointed the deputy leader 
of the party and Hasina's cousin Abul Hasnat Abdullah was made the Chief Whip of the 
ALPP . It should be mentioned that after the 5''' parliamentary election A.S. Azad had been 
made the Deputy Leader of the Opposition. Moreover, though, many times Zillur Rahman 
was elected MP but he was never a good parliamentarian. Though many of the experienced 
and skilled senior AL MP's were available but inexperienced young Abdullah was preferred 
for the post of important chief whip. Among the prominent leaders of the party A. Samad 
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Stanley A. Kochanek, Bangladesh in 1996: The 25*^  Year of Independence"; Asian Survey, Vol. 37 No. 2, 
February 997; p. 139. 
Bangladesh Times, 22 June 1996. 
Vorer Kagoj, 19 June 1996. 
VorerKagoj, 19 June 1996. 
'".Jai Jai Din, 10 September 1996, pp. 14-15. Also see Daily Star, 14 July 1996. The other Whips of the ALPP 
were Principal Rafiqul Islam, Md. Abdus Sahid, S.M. Mostafa Rashid Suja and Mohammad Mijanur Rahman 
Manu. See Daily Star, 14 July 1996. 
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Azad, Zillur Rahman, A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed, Mohd. Nasim and Matia Chowdhury were 
included in the ministry. It should be mentioned that S.A.M.S Kibria and Major (Ret.) Rafiql 
Islam (Bir Uttam) were appointed for finance and home ministry. Both of them joined the 
party very recently. One was former civil bureaucrat and another was from military 
background. In the 20 members cabinet 4 members were included from civil and military 
bureaucracy and Anwar Hossain Manju was taken from It should be noted here that 
after the assassination of Mujib on 15 August by some disgruntled soldiers, the 'Ittefaq', 
owned and edited by Manju, expressed their delight in the next day'^'. The PM accepted 
Manju in the cabinet in spite of whatever he might have said in favor of the coup-makers of 
August 1975 shortly after the events. The absence of some top leaders from the AL cabinet 
resulted in resentment among the party stalwarts. Many senior leaders were aggrieved because 
of dropping the names of former ministers such as A. Mannan, A. Momin, S.A. Aziz and 
Salahuddin Yusuf from the list of the ministers. Even some of the top leaders were absent 
from the oath taking ceremony at Bangabhaban (the Presidential palace). The deprived leaders 
of the party also met in groups to discuss the issue'^^. The reports of the resentment in AL 
rank and file were also prominently flashed in party newspapers. The Daily ' Alamin' was 
owned by AL MP Moqbul Hossain, who won the election from Mohammadpur-Dhanmondi 
constituency. The newspaper corroborated the report that serious resentment was brewing in 
various areas, specially in three divisional towns of Dhaka, Chittagong and Khulna. It said 
that many AL leaders were unhappy when new PM Hasina ignored the cases of Dhaka City 
where the party bagged seven out of seven seats. According to the daily reports of 
resentments and fhistrations had reached from outside Dhaka also over the formation of the 
council ministers'^^. S. Hasina had been to Tongipara to visit the graveyard of Sheikh Mujib, 
the charismatic leader of the party and the father of the nation, but a number of AL leaders 
were not accompanied with the party leader'^"'. The appointment of AL GS as LGRD (Local 
Government and Rural Development) Minister caught sight of everyone. It was seen during 
JP and BNP rule that the LGRD ministry had been always in the hand of the governing party 
GS'^^. As all the local development works are under the responsibility of this ministry, to 
control the district and lower level party unit activities and to distribute different economic 
incentives (including the distribution of contractorship and supply business etc.) to the lower 
level party workers, the ministry in the hand of party GS use to play important role. The 
appointment of Syed Abul Hossain, one of the prominent entrepreneurs of Bangladesh - who 
joined the party just before the election and was elected MP, as the State Minister for the 
LGRD Ministry was not acceptable to the party activists. Abul Hossain was not an organizer 
and it was not possible for him to organize the party as he was basically a businessman and 
previously never been a politician and was never been involved with organizational 
activities 
AL leader A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed, two top leaders of the party, were visibly 
unhappy when their names were placed under Finance Minister Kibria and Home Minister 
Raiql Islam in protocol list despite their seniority in the party. On the other hand, many AL 
The two included from civil ureaucracy were S.A.M.S Kibria and A.S.H.K. Sadek. The two included from 
military background were General Nuruddin Khan and Major Rafiql Islam. For the names of AL cabinet 
members see Daily Sangbad, 24 June 1996. 
Daily Ittefaq, 16 August 1975. 
New Nation, 26 June 1996. 
Daily Alamin, 25 June 1996. 
Jai Jai Din, 2 July 1996; p. 12. 
Jai Jai Din, 2 July 1996; p. 5. 
Jai Jai Din, 2 July 1996; p. 5. 
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leaders were found resentful due to introduction of JP Secretary General Anwar Hossain 
Monju in the AL cabinet. One of the AL leader said, "We could easily accommodate one of 
our leaders in the place of Monju who is not going to serve AL interest in any way"'^^. The 
lone JSD MP A. Rob also lent his unconditional support to AL in the formation of 
government and when it became confirm that he was also getting a place in the cabinet many 
AL leaders also resented'^®. AL workers used to detest A. Rob, the lone member of the JSD, 
due to his role in 1988 parliament during Ershad regime. When election was boycotted by all 
major parties of the country A. Rob was the leader of the opposition in that predominantly JP 
parliament and played a role of 'loyal opposition'. To reduce the resentment of the AL rank 
within one week of the formation of AL government, the PM included 6 more members in the 
cabinet. Among the prominent of them were the AL Presidium member Salahuddin Yusuf and 
JSD leader A. Rob was included as Cabinet Ministers and other four were included as Step 
Ministers'^'. Side by side of the appointment of JP and JSD leaders Monju and A. Rob, the 
appointment of Faijul Huq as the Step-Minister for Jute also resented the rank and file of the 
party as Huq was ousted from AL in 1972 due to his alleged involvement in anti-liberation 
activities during the 1971 liberation Again for the third time in the begining of 
month PM Hasina expanded her cabinet by appointing two ministers, three state ministers and 
two deputy ministers . The inclusion of Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir as the Step Minister for 
Planning was the talk of the town at that time. As a bureaucrat, he started his career and 
during Zia and Ershad regime because of his flattering activities was close to the military 
rulers. Always, he was in the winning side. After the parliamentary election when anti-
government agitation reached to the top by his leadership, maximum of the secretaries 
declared their harmony with the opposition movement for the formation of 'caretaker 
gove rnmen t 'S ince then he was very close to PM Hasina. After getting his retirement from 
the Cabinet Secretary post he was immediately included in the cabinet as a technocrat 
minister by Hasina. He was rewarded the ministerial berth by Hasina for his role in anti-
government agitation inside the bureaucratic circle for why BNP regime fell down very soon. 
Since the AL government was formed, Alamgir was seen very close to S. Hasina. It became 
confirm that in future he would be a full minister because of his flattery character'^^. In 
Bangladesh, regionalism always plays important role in politics. The Rajshahi district AL 
leaders were demanding a minister from their region, so Jinnatunnesa Talukder was included 
in the c a b i n e t T h o u g h the cabinet was expanded the grievances of AL leaders were not 
reduced to ta l lyMoreover , discontent was seen in AL over the inclusion of some new faces 
in the cabinet. Many of the party leaders had objection over the inclusion of Alamgir'^^. The 
New Nation, 26 June 1996. 
New Nation, 26 June 1996. 
Daily Sangbad, 30 June 1996. Also see Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, p. 523. 
Jai Jai Din, 2 July 1996; p. 5. 
The new Cabinet Ministers were: Syed Sajeda Chowdhury and A. Matin Khasru. Dr. M Amanullah, 
Talukder Abdul Khaleq and Dr. Mohiuddin ^ a n Alamgir were made Ministers of State, while Dhirendra 
Debnath Shambhu and Prof. Zinnatunnesa Talukdar Deputy Minister. Widi the including of 6 new faces the 
number of ministers rose to 16, state ministers to 14, deputy ministers to 2. Daily Star, 15 January 997. 
Jai Jai Din, 21 January 1997; pp. 4-5. 
Jai Jai Din, 21 January 1997; p. 8. One of the prominent intellectual of Bangladesh and a professor of Dhaka 
University, Rajiv Humayun, was also telling the same view in an informal talking. 
Jai Jai Din, 21 Januaiy 1997; p. 4. 
In tiiese days the research scholar visited some of those AL leaders's house, who had the probability to be the 
ministers and saw their unhappiness as they were not still included in the cabinet of AL government. 
All the party stalwarts knew Alamgir had warm relation with former army rulers Zia and Ershad. His brother 
Burhanuddin Khan Jahangir, the professor of Political Science Department of Dhaka University, had written 
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former Foreign Minister of Ershad regime Humayun Rashid Chowdhury, who joined the AL 
recently before the election and was elected MP by AL ticket, was elected Speaker of the 
parliament and Advocate A. Hamid was elected Deputy Speaker'^^ Since 1973 he was never 
defeated in any parliamentary election from his constituency in Kishoreganj district. The 
nomination of Himiayun Rashid Chowdhury, a new comer in AL, in the post of Speaker was 
acceptable to all of the parties because of his intellectual capability and diplomatic experience 
though there was unhappiness among the seniors at his nomination. Hamid was a district level 
leader and was elevated to this post because of his dedication and honesty to the party. Some 
senior leaders' opinions were that persons who were in the cabinet of late President 
Khondoker Mustaq Ahmed would not be included in S. Hasina's cabinet. Among the AL 
leaders A. Marman, A. Momen and Dewan Farid Gazi were in Khondoker Mustaq's cabinet 
followed immediately after the assassination of Sheikh Mujib. It was for this reason that the 
name of Major Gen. (Ret.) K.M. Safmllah, the Chief Army Staff in August 1975, was not 
being considered as a minister of Hasina's cabinet'^^. The top AL leaders, who could not win 
the election- including Hasina's two close aids Amu and A. Jalil, were also not included in the 
cabinet. Because of their seniority in the party and important role for the party their supporters 
expected that they should be included in the cabinet. Instead of their inclusion in the cabinet 
when some non-MP bureaucrats were included in the cabinet, it frustrated the AL workers'^ ®. 
Though Suranjit Sengupta was not added in the ministry but he was ^pointed adviser to PM 
on Parliamentary affairs''*® and was enjoying the status of a minister' '. Observing the 
grievances among the AL leaders close to her, PM Hasina included more six faces in the 
cabinet on 31 December 1997. Two of them, Kalparanjan Chakma and Engineer Mushraf 
Hossain, were included as Cabinet Ministers and others were appointed as State Ministers in 
different ministries. Among the mentionable of the new State Ministers were Mofazzal 
Hossain Maya (the GS of the Dhaka City AL), A.K.M Jahangir (central WC member of AL) 
and Saber Hossain ChowdhurySabe r was elected MP from one of eight seats of Dhaka 
city. The MPs of Dhaka city had grievance that among of them no one was included in the 
cabinet. Maya was known for his sacrifice for the party since 1971 liberation war and 
Jahangir was one of the veiy trusted lieutenants of Hasina. Their inclusion was the demand of 
the party workers'''^. Kalparanjan was included to fulfill the demands of the Tribal people of 
Bangladesh. It was a commitment of PM Hasina to the tribal people''*'*. In the cabinet 
reshuffle some of the former Cabinet members were elevated from their previous position 
because of their better performance. Labor and Manpower State Minister M.A. Manna of 
against AL in different newspapers. As an active activist of AL's student wing BCL the researcher came to know 
these information. 
Daily Star, 15 July 1996. 
New Nation, 26 June 1996. 
In his informal talking with even many middle level AL leaders the research scholar saw that they demanded 
when some non-MP bureaucrats could be appointed ministers then why not the dedicated leaders like Amu and 
A. Jalil would not be included in the ministry. 
Daily Star, 12 July 1996. Probably Haisni appointed him in this post to satisfy the Hindu Community as well 
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ofAL. 
New Nation, 12 September 1997. 
Daily Independent, I January 1998. 
Before their appointment in the informal gathering in different AL leaders drawing room the AL leaders and 
workers used to expressed their fioistration as they could not be the ministers after lot of sacrifice for the party. 
Maya and Jahangir were among of them. As their grievances were genuine the party workers showed sympathy 
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Daily Independent, 1 January 1998. 
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Chittagong was elevated to cabinet rank; Deputy Minister for Primary and Mass Education, 
Prof. Zinnatunnesa Talukder was elevated as State Minister; while parliamentary Whip, Prof 
Rafiql Islam, was inducted as State Minister'^^. It should be mentioned here that during Mujib 
regime he did not allow any civil or military bureaucrat as cabinet minister'"'^. On the other 
hand, PM Hasina surrendered a large extent to the civil and military bureaucracy by including 
many of them in the cabinet. Some of the very important ministry (including finance, 
plaiming, education and home ministry) were given to their responsibility. Moreover, Mujib 
never encouraged technocrat ministers but Hasina already included two technocrat ministers 
and both are from bureaucrats (Kibria and Alamgir). AL is a large party, having a big number 
of party leaders and it was not possible for Hasina to satisfy every one. 
AL nominated Justice (Ret.) Shahabuddin Ahmed as its candidate for the presidency 
of the country''*^. Shahabuddin Ahmed was nominated Acting President of the country 
following the fall of the Ershad regime in December 1990 in the face of mass-upsurge led by 
AL and BNP ^ d other parties. He was chosen unanimously by the parties as the head of that 
time caretaker govenmient to conduct the general election to elect the country's fifth 
parliament and by discharging the responsibility efficiently he earned high esteem from 
Bangladesh society. In those days when the governing party BNP was not ready to introduce 
parliamentary democracy in the covmtry because of the adamancy and pressure of Acting 
President Shahabuddin the party had to bow to the peoples demand'''^. All the parties of 
Bangladesh welcomed this nomination of AL''* .^ JP Secretary Anwar Hossain Monzu said, 
"Nomination of Justice Shahbuddin Ahmed by ruling AL for the presidency goes very much 
in line with the PM's commitment to form a government of national c o n s e n s u s " I n its 
editorial Daily Star wrote, "No other decision of this government could have so unified the 
nation as this"'^'. Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote, "Without any hesitation it can be said...the 
institution (Presidency) is very high, even after this in this case individual made the institution 
g r e a t " H o w e v e r , before taking the decision to make Shahabuddin the president of 
Bangladesh, AL chief did not discuss it with any one of the party. She did not need to seek the 
permission of the party working committee'^^. If it could be the party decision, if the party 
CWC would take the decision democratically then every one could tell that AL was practicing 
democracy in taking its decision inside its party forum. It would be recognized that party's 
decision making body is more important than any individual's wish and nation is above the 
party. It could be recognized that sensible politics still got loudest applause in a third world 
country like Bangladesh. Though even the bitterest critic of AL could not but nod in support 
of the nomination of Shahabuddin for presidency but all the nomination including it made it 
clear that AL was being controlled by an authoritarian leader. Where there was no practice of 
internal democracy in a party then one could not expect that the party would work for 
democracy in a country. 
After a long 21 years gap AL formed its second government, inducted in its cabinet 
Anwar Hossain Monju and A.S.M. Abdur Rob, the GS of Jatia Party and JSD (A. Rob) 
Daily Independent, 1 Januaiy 1998. 
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respectively'^'* and termed it as a 'government of national consensus'. Such government was 
described as consistent with AL's election pledge of running the state business through 
agreement and consultation with all concerned. The PM Hasina also offered the BNP to join 
her 'government of national consensus 'bu t the BNP leader refused the offer and charged 
Hasina with attempting to create a new version of notorious B AKS AL, the one party 
dictatorship erected by her father in 1975'^^. On the other hand, though, the AL jointly did 
opposition movement to remove the BNP from power but when it formed the 'government of 
national consensus' did not invite the Jammat to take participation in the government by 
honoring the public sentiment. Not only that AL took help of JP and JSD (A. Rob) in the 
formation of government and shared the women's reserved seats by a convenient agreement 
with JP but after the election win it did not maintain any type of relation with the Jammat to 
sustain its image as the leading force of pro-liberation force. The immoral and shrewd politics 
of AL helped it to come to power and to sustain its support base but Jammat's tactics to have 
reorganization of AL in Bangladesh politics for itself was seen disastrous. By following this 
policy, the party lost its previous political ground. The Jammat needed to rethink over its 
political strategy. In the evaluation of election defeat, the Jammat GS Maulana Nizami wrote 
that Jammat was not benefited by its anti-BNP regime movement rather by this it lost its 
support base'^'. Just after the formation of the government Jammat decided to take anti-
regime role'^^ also joined its old allay BNP to start opposition agitation'^'. 
It should be mentioned here that in the anti-regime movement of 1994-96 the anti-
liberation force Jammat and anti-democratic authoritarian force JP joined hand with AL, 
though, frequently AL criticized these two parties as fundamentalist and fascist force. Not 
only did that AL also did not hesitate to share power with JP 'the well known party previously 
the leader (Ershad) of which controlled power in undemocratic way'. Once in 1990, the 
masses ousted the autocratic regime of JP by the leadership of AL through a vigorous popular 
upheaval. But, now, it was observed, for coming to power, AL destroyed its long day's 
cherished principles and honesty in politics'^®. The workers and leaders of the party could not 
raise voice against such unholy alliance of AL with JP and Jammat. It also showed that the 
mentality of the lower level leaders and workers of the party also changed. Side by side, the 
authoritarian leadership of party chief Hasina, they also accepted her dishonest intension to 
make fiiendship with anti-liberation and autocratic force for the sake of coming to power. 
Now there was no difference of principles between the natural ally of Jammat and 
undemocratic force BNP and AL. For the interest of the party everything was acceptable to 
the workers and leaders of the party. Now it is proved that in Bangladesh politics power is 
more desirable than principle and authoritarian party leadership vis-a-vis democracy in the 
country. 
Both JP as well as BNP held almost identical views in their respective manifestoes of 
national issues. Both of them were believer of Bangladeshi nationalism, practitioners of 
religion in politics and incite anti-Indian (also pro-Islamic) feelings of the people to confirm 
A1 Masud Hasanuzzaman, Role of Opposition in Bangladesh Politics, pp. 214-15. 
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their vote bank in predominant Muslim society of Bangladesli. As, both of their vote bank 
were same during her tenure (1991-96), that time PM KJialeda Zia tried lo demolish the JP 
organization and till she was in power Ershad was not able to come out from jail. Ershad was 
so angry on BNP after the election he declared that in his whole life he would not compromise 
with BNP'^'. When he was freed from imprisonment in January 1997 in his native town 
mfuriated Ershad blasted the BNP for, what he alleged, inflicting inhuman torture on him 
while in custody'^^. AL successfully utilized this conflict between the two in its opposition 
movement and in the 1996 election. After the election when AL was in need of support of JP 
to form the government, Ershad's JP provided that support 'unconditionally'. The AL also did 
not fail to express its gratitude when it included JP Secretary as a Cabinet Minister and 
sacrificed three reserved seats for women. And, in long run Ershad could come out of the jail 
where he was detained for over six years. Although the policymakers of AL were certain that 
by doing good to Ershad they would be able to utilize him against the main opposition and by 
their strategy the BNP and the rightist force of the country would still be divided but many 
people did not support the contention. Many inside the party were not ready to accept JP in 
the government. When Ershad was released from jail the youth and student leaders of the AL 
were unhappy by observing that one military officer, who grabbed the political power through 
a military coup in unconstitutional way and to oust whom (autocratic Ershad regime) from 
power many of their friends sacrificed lives was released without being punished. But they 
had to shut dovra their mouth to survive in AL p o l i t i c s L a t e r the calculation of the AL 
stalwarts was proved wrong. While in jail, Ershad had persuaded a soft line towards the AL 
and harvested maximum benefits from it. But after releasing from jail step by step he went 
against the AL government. When AL leaders confident on him was not lost yet in that time 
prior to his release he made it clear that he would not be a obedient opposition leader of AL. 
When jailed Ershad was released on parole in July 1996 to attend the National Parliament 
session he cleared the stand of JP in Bangladesh politics by saying that the JP was not party of 
the AL government and certainly it would sit in the Opposition bench. Ershad also expressed 
his optimism that in the next general elections his party would be able to muster sufficient 
strength to form government . It means he was tiying to be the competitor of power. To 
ensure power in this case JP needed to go against governing party AL to muster maximum 
support in his favor. After being released from 6-year long imprisonment Ershad started to 
criticize both the BNP and He clearly told his party men that political alliance with the 
ruling AL was not a 'permanent settlement' and he would differ with the AL if its decision 
went against the greatest interest of the people and the country. He also denied that he had 
been released from jail by AL'^^. TO prepare his followers for future anti-AL fimctioning 
Ershad further said that the JP and the AL had wide ideological difference; AL believed in 
democracy, socialism, nationalism and secularism while JP was committed to democracy, 
nationalism, social justice and Islamic values. To show JP's closeness with BNP, he added 
that the difference between JP and BNP was very thin. On 18 March 1997 in his first public 
speech, Ershad cleared it that his JP was not the 'B team' of any political party. His party 
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believed on Bangladeshi nationalism'®'. Advancing one step more one JP leader said that 
despite the hostile attitude of the JP towards the BNP, the two ultimately must come closer for 
the sake of their own interest'®^. He further said, "Our party is pledge-bound to fight Indian 
hegemonism and work for the Muslim Ummah. It will not take much time when we will find 
the activists of JP and AL are engaged in clashes at different parts of the country for 
supremacy". Hardly 14 days after his release on bail when Ershad, in parliament, was cleverly 
showing his party's separate political identity instead of a partner of government of national 
consensus the AL parliamentarians did not hesitate to brand him as an ex-autocrat leader, the 
blame which they used to put on him during his rule. On the other hand, the BNP MPs 
showed their sympathy to Ershad after his release to rope/ sided him in a ftiture opposition 
alliance'®'. Since then the crack in the AL-JP fiiendship ftirther widened due to their 
contradictory political philosophy and IP's changing over the track from previous pro- AL 
role to an anti-govemment role in national politics. Till June the journalist wrote that the JP 
was in dilemma in determining its line and setting out its own plan of action. The JP was still 
maintained a soft line towards the government'However, in September 1997, Ershad's JP, 
by changing its previous political strategy, converted into a regular opposition party and 
engaged in anti-govemment movement to remove the AL from power Here it should be 
mentioned that though till the 1996 parliamentary election it was truth that BNP and JP's vote 
bank was same but after this election the political scenario was changed a lot. AL itself 
created that passage for both JP and BNP to curve its traditional vote-bank in favor of them. 
Because, in the last election, AL nominated business people and bureaucrats in maximum 
number to ensure its victoiy but previously these people had been created by Ershad. By this, 
according to a prominent weekly, AL sold its existence to these opportimist people who could 
sell their loyalty to any party at any time. As they were the product of Ershad so if he could 
manage money probably they would be belonged to him'^^. The weekly further wrote that 
contrary to previous elections in 1996 election, AL workers worked for money not for 
ideology in many of the constituencies. So, in future, if some of them changed their allegiance 
for money, no one would be surprised, 
Ershad's active anti-govemment role was not tolerated by AL for long. Since 1998, it 
put pressure on Ershad. To neutralize him, they pointed at the several cormption cases still 
hanging over his head. Ershad was freed from jail but the cases against him were kept only in 
abeyance as weapons to be used the moment he stepped out of line. The threat of being taken 
to the court and convicted stmck at Ershad's initiative to play active part in opposition 
movement. So, since 1988, he seemed to be sitting on the fence that divided the government 
and the opposition. At times he seemed to be leaning over to the side of the government, at 
others, he seemed to be close to the opposition. Actually, from the middle of 1998, Ershad 
was following his own private agenda - an agenda which had nothing to do with AL or BNP, 
and every thing to do with his own political survival and personal fi-eedom'^^. 
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In upper class society power and party is more important than principle and 
democracy. Just before the 1996 election, it was seen that to get share of power rich business 
people, civil and military bureaucrats (the representative of upper class society) en masse 
joined either AL or BNP. Following the BNP, the AL also, by throwing its old principles to 
winds, did not hesitate to nominate these opportunist upper class people in different 
constituency to contest the election by depriving its middle class party workers and leaders of 
the local level party organization. These people were not grown up through any political 
process, they did not have any previous political background i.e. in past, they never engaged 
in any public work or political activities. In all the seven constituencies of Dhaka, AL 
nominated rich business people to make certain its election victory. As a result, the 1996 
election turned into a battleground of some power seeking upper level elements where money, 
muscle and family influence played decisive role instead of ideology, principles and political/ 
public work experience. In the last 25 years, AL did not give privilege to these forces in 
politics. As a result, though, these opportunist forces were active in power politics since the 
military regime of General Zia but were not appreciated by the civil society of Bangladesh. 
AL gave them recognition by including one new batch of them in its party fold, side by side, 
with BNP and JP. Now, they came to the forefront of politics. Bangladesh was liberated by 
united movement of all class of masses and AL gave the leadership to that movement. 
Through that movement a dedicated and dynamic leadership was developed from the masses. 
Because of infighting in AL mainly due to the absence of practicing internal democracy and 
because of the role of money power in election politics this leadership in AL was slowly 
replaced by the moneyed power seeking people who don't have contact with the masses. As a 
result, governing power came to the hand of those traditional local elites, business people and 
bureaucrats who only think for themselves not for the nation. They are elected by the people 
but do not represent the people; also do not care for the people. They were living in the city 
area but were the elected members of the rural people. It became the paradox of the 
Bangladesh politics. It is true still there are a mentionable number of leaders working in AL 
who were patriot and dedicated to the masses but they had to surrender their own principles to 
survive in politics. 
Infighting in AL administration: It is seen there is difference of appearances of habits, 
characters, temperaments among the sons of same parents in a house- actually, it is the 
peculiarity of creation. So it is not unnatural but usual phenomenon that sometimes difference 
can be developed between the ministers of two ministries or between the two ministries, 
though, both the ministers are from the same party and believer of same party ideology. But 
the difference should be limited within prevailing convention, party discipline, social justice 
and mutual politeness. 
AL leader Mohammad Hanif, the Mayor of Dhaka, played a very important role in the 
1996 opposition movement. By his initiative in March 1996 AL set up people's stage called 
the ' Janatar Mancha' in front of the secretariat in Dhaka and encouraged the intellectuals, 
bureaucrats, businessmen and other people of different occupation to join the opposition 
movement. The Janatar Mancha soon became the centre of the centre of opposition 
movement. As a result, overall situation of the country went out of the ruling party's control; 
the fall of Khaleda regime became inevitable^ '^^ . In the 1996 parliamentaiy election to confirm 
AL victoiy in the 7 constituencies out of 8 of Dhaka, Hanif s role was tremendous. After the 
withdraw soldiers from insurgency affected Hilly Chittagong district, not to buy electricity from India, not to 
,?ive transit facilities to the Indian government etc. 
Daily Vorer Kagoj, 31 March 1996. 
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election victory, it was talk of the town that Hanif was going to be the LORD Minister of 
Bangladesh. But PM did not includc Hanifin her cabinet'". During his mayoral clcction, AL 
leader Hanif promised not to increase tax in the next five years, to end corruption and 
politicization in city administration, suppress terrorist activities and to ensure law and order 
and promote development. He also pledged to undertake a number of specific projects such as 
modernizing garbage systems, reducing the traffic rush, eliminating mosquitoes from Dhaka 
city, and upgrading the quality of other mimicipal s e r v i c e s A f t e r 6 months of the election 
win Hanif said that the BNP government was not helping him to fulfill his election promises 
rather reduced the budget of Dhaka City Corporation. At one stage during BNP rule, he 
proposed the government to form a local goverrmient structure of City Corporation but was 
denied. After that he gave another proposal to form a committee by including the water 
supply, sewerage, electricity and telephone board and Dhaka City Corporation and to make 
him the chairman of that committee to distribute better facilities to the inhabitants of Dhaka 
City but he was again reftised. After AL's coming to power when Hanif could not include 
himself in the ministry, he again demanded to form a mini government of Dhaka City 
Corporation and engaged in conflict with the LORD Minister Zillur Rahman. He also asked 
for the interference of PM. PM did not accept his first demand to form a mini government 
rather she agreed with the second demand and formed a committee by including relevant 
service boards including water, electricity, telephone etc but made Zillur Rahman committee 
chairman. It finstrated the mayor and engaged him in conflict with the PM. Since then Hainf 
maintained his personal distance from party activities'^'. 
A water sharing treaty was signed with India on 12 December 1996. The treaty was 
highly acclaimed by the Bangladesh society. However, after signing the treaty, a cold war 
started in the cabinet over the question as to who should be honored with the credit behind the 
signing of the 30-year water treaty with India. Two members of the cabinet who were 
demanding for the credit were Foreign Minister Abdus Samad Azad and Water Resources 
Minister A. Razzaq and none of them wanted to share the credit for the 'stupendous task' 
performed by them. The cold war was not confined to individual demands and emotions only. 
The two were quarreled even in the cabinet meeting held on December 1996 with PM in the 
chair. The Foreign Minister claimed that he had prepared the backgroimd for the treaty 
through his shuttle diplomacy and, as such, the credit should go to him. On the other hand, A. 
Razzaq said that since the issue exclusively belonged to his ministry and, as such, he could 
not be ignored in any way. The PM, however, did not want the credit but reportedly enjoyed 
the drama 'Center ing the issue relations between the two ministers deteriorated to such an 
extent that it affected their followers. However they could not reconcile their difference 
during the AL rule 1996-001Normally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepares 
backgroimd for the signing of an international treaty but as soon as the treaty is signed, the 
responsibility to honor the treaty lies with the concerned ministry. 
Abdus Samad Azad and Suranjit Sengupta were from greater Sylhet division. Both of 
them were renowned senior leaders from that region. After Suranjit Sengupta's joining in AL, 
Azad engaged in infighting with Sengupta in the establishment of their respective influence in 
Informal interview with an AL MP. He does not want to disclose his name. 
Nizam U. Ahmed, "Party Politics in Bangladesh's Local Government"; Asian Survey, Vol. 35 No. 11, 
November 1995; p. 1022 and Weekly Roabbar, 20 October 1996; p. 14. 
Weekly Roabbar, 20 October 1996. 
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that area. That also affected their personal relations. In the recent parliamentary session of 
1997 the rift between PM's Parliamentary Affairs Adviser Sengupta and Foreign Minister 
Azad came out in open and the PM herself was witness to this . 
Since 1977, the government was observing November as the Sepoy (soldiers) 
Revolution and Solidarity day, marking the crushing of counter-coup led by General Khaled 
Musharaf. The JSD gave the leadership in that so called Sepoy Revolution in November 1975, 
although, its intension was not fulfilled. When the present government which Icept the holiday 
undisturbed for 1996, decided to scrap it for 1997, in the cabinet meeting A. Rob, leader of 
the JSD and Shipping Minister of Sheikh Hasina's cabinet recorded his note of dissent against 
the government decision. The JP's nominee in the cabinet, Anwar Hossain Manju, being a 
minister, also opposed the government decision'^'. 
Finance Minister Shah A.M.S Kibria and Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir both were non-
MP technocrat ministers. They were also not from regular political background, rather, they 
joined AL from civil bureaucracy background. The party leaders and workers frequently 
criticized them whenever they got the opportunities. Even then sometimes, it was seen that 
there was not good understanding between these bureaucrat ministers in the party. One tried 
to embarrass others whenever they get opportunity. One tried to interfere in others ministerial 
matters. It also happened in the past in different cabinets under different regime. On one 
occasion. State Minister for Planning, Alamgir tried to embarrass Finance Minister, Kibria. 
Publicly opposing the Ministry's position that 50% equity was necessary for the industrialists 
to get fresh loans, Alamgir reportedly said that 20% equity should have been considered 
adequate. This embarrassing news came to the public and tarnished the image of the party. 
The PM also found Alamgirs statement 'acrimonious' against Finance Minister Kibria and to 
prevent the infighting in the cabinet said not to consider themselves indispensable for any 
position in the party or the government. She then warned Alamgir to keep in mind that she 
had 'thrown away many gems' while leading the AL to the power' 
Loss of Ministersip of Afsaruddin due to internal rivalry in AL: Zohra Tajuddin, because of 
her high ambition, could not accept Hasina since the beginning of Hasina's taking over of AL-
President-ship and was engaged in conflict with Hasina till Dr. Kamal was in the party. She 
did not leave AL because she did not want to accept a pathetic end of her political career. 
Because of her anti-Hasina campaign the party chief had a feeling of hatred for Zohra. But 
Hasina tolerate her presence in the party due to party workers feeling for their former leader 
Tajuddin and Zohras contribution to the party during the hard day's of AL (1977-78). Hasina 
was not ready to give Zohra any opportimity for coming to the limelight of Bangladesh 
politics. So in the 1996 parliamentary election Zohra was given nomination from Meherpur-1 
constituency, an area with which she did not have previous organizational connection and was 
defeated'®^. To crush Zohra popularity permanently in her husband Tajuddin Ahmed's 
constituency Hasina nominated Tajuddin's younger brother Afsar Uddin from Tajuddin's area 
to contest the 1996 election. Afsar Uddin Khan was elected MP and subsequently was 
included in Hasma's cabinet as the Step Minister for Housing and Public Works for a 
convincible reason. But after eight months of his appointment as the minister, Afsaruddin was 
removed from the ministry. Different newspaper wrote that he was sacked for evicting the 
Daily Muktak^tha, 25 September 1997. 
New Nation, 25 Januaiy 1997. 
182 . Daily Star, 10 August 1997. 
Aminur Rashid (Edit.), Pramnnaya Sangsad; pp. 227 and 263. 
469 
inhabitants of the Bhasantek Slum without giving them enough time'^ "*. But the main reason 
was different. Afsar Uddin was an honest and bold politician. But he was not ready to show 
personality-less/ enough loyalty to PM and her family members. It affected Hasina. Moreover, 
Afsaruddin's rival faction in Gazipur district politics was being led by Rahmant Ali MP and 
Akhtaruzzaman MP. Rahmat Ali was with President Mustaq Ahmed after the AL's loss of 
power in the 1975 military coup. Not only had that, when in 1976 Mustaq formed Democratic 
League he also joined that party. On the other hand, Aktihruzzaman by defecting from JSD 
formed BSD with his fellow members and later defected to AL to survive in politics. So, to 
survive in AL politics, they converted themselves into the subservient of Hasina. In the 
conflict of Gazipur district politics, they were more acceptable against Tajuddin family. 
Meanwhile, Afsaruddin engaged in a personal conflict with Hasina's very close cousin and 
whip of the ALPP Abul Hasnat Abdullah. As a result, Afsaruddin was removed from 
• 185 
ministiy and the Bhasantek Slum incident provided Hasina only a convincible ground to 
execute her plan. It is interesting that the people in the party including Abdullah MP, 
Rahmatullah MP and Akhtaruzaman MP visited the slum on PM's instruction and assured 
proper rehabilitation of the slum dwellers'^^. The pro-BNP daily 'Dinkal' wrote that the 
reason of evicting a slum which was highlighted in the media was eyewash. Prior to this 
incident, Afsaruddin evicted some more slums from different areas of Dhaka. If it could be a 
cause of his loss of ministry Afsar would be ousted from cabinet prior to this incident*^'. The 
Dinkal further said that Afsar was removed from ministry to warn other ministers of the 
cabinet of the consequences, if they do not follow the line of PM Hasina. According to pro-
AL daily Janakantha, to preserve one influential section's political interest, Afsaruddin was 
sacked from min i s t ry 'Many of the dailies reported that because of the removal of 
Afsaruddin from ministry many of the ministers became imhappy'^^. According to one AL 
leader, Afsar Uddin lost his ministerial position due to his enmity wdth an influential leader of 
Barisal (Abul Hasnat Abdullah)'^°. The Daily Muktakantha wrote that in September 1997 the 
Home Minister was under pressure from some aggrieved ministers and leaders since his 
recent visit to Barisal 
The removal of Hossain from Ministry: Leading businessman Syed Abul Hossain joined AL 
in 1991 and was elected MP in 1991 and 1996 parliamentary elections. After AL's taking 
over the power he was appointed State Minister for Local Government and Rural 
Development (LGRD) Ministry. As this key ministry was directly connected to the rural 
masses, many of the top AL leaders were disappointed. Abul Hossain was not an organizer 
and it was not possible for him to organize the party as he was basically a businessman and 
previously never been a politician and was never been involved with organizational 
activities They preferred this post for a professional organizer, who was well connected to 
the local units of the party and also a good social worker, who could be able to utilize the 
ministry as it should be: (i) provide some goveniment incentives to the local party workers by 
giving different work permits and contract of local development works; and (ii) to enhance 
Bangladesh Times, 18 February 1997. 
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the support base and vote-bajik of AL tlirough providing the benefits of AL rule at the door oi" 
the rural masses. Some of the middle ranking AL leaders were also unhappy with Abul 
Hossain's appointment because, though, they were working for the party for several years but 
could not be ministers. On the other hand, by joining in AL within short time by exceeding 
them, he became minister because of his money power 'However , after one year of his 
appointment, the LORD State Minister was on tangled into a controversy following press 
reports on his secret business trip (by using illegal green passport instead of his red one'^ '*) to 
Singapore as a private citizen without prior permission of the PM and possession of two 
passports. The red passport was issued to him after he became MP. But he did not surrender 
his green passport earlier issued to him as a leading businessman. For some days, the incident 
was the talk of the town and threatened the party image. The rivals of Abul Hossain also 
engaged them to remove Hossain from the ministry. Three of the 'dailies' whose owner cum 
editors were AL MPs played important role to curve the good image of Hossain'^^ When PM 
came to know about the irregularities by the State Minister which was also threatening to the 
party unage, she expressed dissatisfaction and disapproval, asked the minister to resign. On 
10 August 1997 Abul Hossain resigned from the ministry'®^. 
The Nuruddin episode: The third minister was removed fi-om Hasina cabinet was Major 
General (Ret.) Nuruddin Khan. Khan was representing the Bangladesh Army in Hasina 
cabinet. Just before the 1996 election he joined the party and was elected from his own 
constituency and subsequently was made the Electricity, Fuel and Mineral Resource Minister. 
Since AL's taking over power, the country was suffering from electricity shortage. Because of 
his failure to handle the ministry successMly from Electricity, Fuel and Mineral resource 
Ministry, he was removed form the ministry and was given the responsibility of 
comparatively less important Housing Ministry. T & T Minister Mohammad Nasim was 
given extra responsibility of this ministry''^. 
The difference of bureaucrat ministers with the AL leaders in the government: During the 
Khaleda Zia regime, it was seen the former civil and military bureaucrat ministers were the 
main reason for reducing the popularity. Col (ret.) Mustafizur Rahman and Major General 
(ret.) Majedul Huq were more responsible in curving the image of the party. There were 
differences of BNP district leaders with these non-political figures in the party. After the 
election defeat the district leaders as well as some of the BNP standing committee leaders 
demanded the removal of these unpopular persons from the party Standing Committee''^. The 
finance, home, planning, education and energy ministry of AL government were in the hands 
of some civil and military bureaucrats. The non-political background ministers of Hasina 
Ministry also lost their popularity very soon and party workers showed their dissatisfaction 
over them on different occasions. Most of the AL and its front organization leaders became 
critical to these ministers of S. Hasina's cabinet. Among them were Home Minister Major 
(Ret.) Rafiqul Islam, Finance Minister S.A.M.S. Kiria and Education Minister A.S.H.K. 
Sadeq. They alleged that these ministers did not give due importance to the party workers 
Daily Sangram, 9 August 1997. 
New Nation, 12 September 1997. 
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who tried to meet them on various occasions. They held the Home Minister responsible for 
the country's deteriorating law and order situation and Finance Minister for the catastrophe in 
the country's share market, shortage of reserve fund in the central bank etc. They alleged that 
these Ministers did not want to listen to party workers although the workers had to be 
answerable to the masses*®'. The party workers also alleged that like the non-political 
ministers of BNP regime these bureaucrat ministers of AL were accelerating the fall of this 
government. These ministers were putting the AL government in trouble^"". But because of 
convincible reasons, they were still in the ministry. Financ Minister Shah A.M.S. Kibria was 
the technocrat minister from civil-bureaucrat background. In the concluding day of two-day 
orientation workshop for the ruling party MPs the Finance Minister was severely criticized for 
his 1997-98 Budget. The ruling party MP's demanded for withdrawal of duty on some items. 
They also expressed the opinion that the elected representatives should involve in the budget-
making process^"'. Some of them told the Finance Minister that had they not been elected in a 
majority in the last general election, their party would not be in the government and he would 
not be a minister. He should rather not forget this fact and them in future. They further added 
that they could not be treated as redundant for the ruling party^°^. In September 1997, some of 
the AL MP's, at the ALPP meeting, expressed concern over the reported liquidity crisis in 
different nationalized banks and recession in the economic sector and blamed the finance 
minister for In another parliamentary party meeting held in September 1997, the Energy 
Minister General Nuruddin Khan came under fierce criticism by the ruling AL MP's for the 
sudden increase in fuel prices and frequent power disruption in the country. Khan explained at 
length the reasons behind the rise in petroleum price as well as the government's efforts to 
meet the power shortage by setting up new power plants. But the minister's explanation was 
not well received by the MPs. K.M. Jahangir and Mohammad Selim urged the minister to 
specify the time when the shortage could be overcome. The ruling party MPs were of opinion 
that the prices of petroleum products could have been increased in phases or after holding 
discussions or seminars on the matters so that the people could realize the necessity of the 
price hike. In the face of criticism by the party MPs PM Hasina was stated to have come to 
the rescue of the Energy Minister^"'*. The party MPs also criticized Education Minister 
A.S.H.K. Sadeq for not cooperating the AL parliamentaiy representatives when they used to 
meet the minister for their local problems. These ministers always tried to avoid the party 
workers^°^. On many occasions, the Education Minister did not hesitate to insult the student 
and youth leaders of the party who met him to solve their regional educational problems. On 
one occasion, the Organizing Secretary of BCL (the student wing of AL) met Sadeq to have 
some grant for his local area Madrasa (religious school) for necessary renovation. Sadeq 
behaved very badly to him and finally the issue reached to the PM. Sadeq was criticized and 
warned by the PM for not to behave like this in future with the party workers. Many of the 
party stalwarts resented by observing the audacity of a bureaucrat minister. Party depends on 
its workers for coming to power and if the workers are treated badly by their own ministers it 
is very sorrowful matter. As these non-political ministers did not know how to behave with 
the masses and party workers at many times party felt in awkward situation. They knew well 
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how to deal the files, how to move the files but they did not know how to take decisions, as a 
result, always, the party suffered terrible jolt when the party was in power. All the non-
political ministers were either highly criticized for their failure or removed from their 
respective posts - during AL rule. At the last of 1997, it was written in the newspapers that 
some of the ministers became targets of criticism by the AL lawmakers due to their 
performance during the last 15 months; some of the ministers form Hasina cabinet were likely 
to be dropped because of their failure to manage their respective ministries inefficiently. They 
were Finance Minister Kibriaa, Energy Minister Nuruddin Khan, Home Minister Major (ret.) 
Rafiqul Islam, Planning and Tourism State Minister Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir and State 
Minister for Jute Faizul 
Anti-Terrorist Jehad of Hasina: PM Hasina declared Jehad (holy war) against political 
terrorism in Bangladesh. Administering a note of warning to the terrorists, she said, nobody 
irrespective of party affiliation, would be spared. We are determined to stop terrorism^® .^ To 
set some examples from different parts of Bangladesh many pro-AL student and youth leaders 
were being arrested after Hasina's coming to power^"^. Moreover, the PM's office also 
circulated a declaration through newspaper by declaring prohibition of some student and 
youth leaders' presence in the functions attended by the PM. Their entrance in the ministry/ 
secretariat was also restricted. Since long these leaders were already condemned in the society 
for their controversial activities^® .^ Among them were JL leader Hemayatullah Auranga, 
Liaqat Hossain, Hannan, Matiur Rahman etc^'°. PM's initiative was applaud from all section 
of the people. But it was seen in those days student and youth wing leaders of AL maintained 
their relations with these people by dishonoring the PM's notice. As a result, these 
condemned peoples influence over the party was not reduced totally^' 
Personality Clash of A. Kader Siddiqui with Hasina: A. Kader Siddiqui, Bir Uttam, the hero 
of 1971 liberation war fled to India after the fall of AL government in 1975.Since then he was 
enjoying political asylum provided by the government of India. On his arrival in Bangladesh 
on 16 December 1990 ending his 16 years of self-exile in India Siddiqui received a heroic 
welcome^'^. In 1974 he was first elected as the WC member of AL. In his absentia he was 
elected the AL WC member in 1987 council session for another time. Siddiqui during his stay 
in India, meanwhile, differed with the politics of AL in Bangladesh in many times. At one 
stage, he congratulated the JI in a letter written to its acting amir Abbas Ali Khan for the 
decision on the resignation of members of JI from the parliament in the wake of the 
movement of the people in 1987^'^ Though he was accorded a heroic welcome at his return to 
Bangladesh but no AL leaders was at airport to welcome him. Only AL Presidium member A. 
Mannan, who hailed from Tangail (Siddique's native district), was seen at the airport^ *'*. 
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Siddiqui in his every public meeting demanded of the party leadership to expel from the party 
those persons who became ministers after the killing of Mujib. He said, "Neither Jammat-
Shibir nor A1 Badars killed S. Mujib. Bangabandhu was killed by his partymen"^'^ He said, 
party men, those who had joined the Mustaq government over the dead body of the Father of 
the Nation, Bangabandhu, were also killers and as such they must be tried before the trial of 
the killers of S. Mujib^'®. His provocative speeches against the senior party men jeopardized 
party's image during the AL's election campaign in 1991. He was a sympathyser of Dr. 
Kamal in the intra party factionalism. When Montu was expelled form the party in 1992, A. 
Kader Siddiqui and some more leaders opposed the decision seeking more time to settle the 
issue tough they abstained from giving the note of dissent at the meeting^'^ Abdul Kader 
Siddiqui along with Advocate Sirajul Islam and Mofizul Islam Kamal were not given any 
important posts in the 1992 council session^'^. When the Gono Forum, Dr. Kamal's party, 
was formed in September 1993 except A. Kader Siddiqui, no AL leaders were present in that 
convention^Since 1994 when AL decided to go for vigorous anti-BNP regime movement, 
A. Kader Siddiqui differed with the AL decision. Even he walked out of a AL WC meeting 
held on 6 April 1994 when a anti-government agitation program was approved there. He 
opposed the anti-government agitation on the plea that this would be damaging the economy 
and help JP more than the AL^ . After AL's taking over the power in 1996, because of his 
difference with PM, A. Kader Siddiqui was not included in AL cabinet though he was a 
central committee member and an elected popular MP. He was insulted by it. A. Kader 
Siddiqui was engaged in internal conflict with party's Joint Secretay ShamasiH- Rahman Khan 
since long. During AL rule administration was helping Khan to reduce the influence of 
Siddiqui^ ' definitely by the indirect approval of Hasina. The police raided the house of 
Siddiqui on December 1996, arrested one of his younger brothers Azad Siddiqui, the local 
leader of the student wing of AL, and 4 more Chatra League leader^^^. Eru-aged Siddiqui, in a 
press conference, alleged that harassment of the pro-liberation forces under the present 
government had surpassed all previous records. He also retired his demand for the dismissal 
of the Home Minister Major (Ret.) Rafiql Islam, for his failure to maintain law and order^^^. 
He and his brother A. Latif Siddiqui called a non-stop transport strike in Tangail to press the 
government for Azad Siddiqui's release. As a result, no vehicle ran through Tangail district 
for a fiill day^ '^'. On the other hand, Hasina's cousin and Awami Youth League President 
(AJL) SheilA Selim MP and his organization lend their weight in favor of A.K. Siddiqui in 
his struggle against his political enemies in Tangail. The reason behind it was that A.K. 
Siddiqui was a close associate of late S. Moni, the founding chairman of AJL and elder 
brother of S. Selim. In a meeting presided over by AJL President S. Selim most of the AJL 
leader questioned the partial attitude of the administration. They were of the opinion that 
when there were allegations of terrorism against both A. Kader's men as well as his rivals, 
why then houses of A. Kaders rival's (Khan and A. Mannan) were not searched^^^. 
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Cold relation of Hasina with S. Selim: Because of his brother S. Moni, the former founding 
President of AJL and AL WC member, S. Selim MP had a big friend circle inside AL 
organization. Before Hasina's election as tlie party chief in 1981 this group had been engaged 
in propaganda to make field for fertile her. They did wall writing, postering; distributed 
handbills and arranged public meeting in favor of her^^ .^ This group was very instrumental in 
favor of Hasina during her conflict with A. Razzaq. Mostafa Mohsin and his followers were 
also in this group. When Montu engaged in conflict with Hasina though other pro-AL papers 
backed Hasina but the 'Daily Banglar Bani' played a neutral role. S. Selim was the owner 
cum editor of this daily. Since A. Kader Siddiqui returned in Bangladesh, he engaged in a 
personality conflict with Hasina. But S. Selim still maintained good relation with him. After 
the Magur by-election defeat as a protest to election rigging when Hasina, in a party WC 
meeting, decided to declare a blockade program A. Kader Siddiqui and Sheikh Selim MP, two 
of the CWC members were walked out of the AL WC meeting held on 6 April^^^. Even 
during 1996-97 against Hasina's wish Selim and his AJL was working for A.K. Siddiqui. As 
Selim was going against the wish of Hasina, she was resented on him. Including this term S. 
Selim was continuously elected MP for four times^^^. His family had lot of dedication for the 
party. Still then he was not included in the Hasina's cabinet. As a result cold relation 
developed between Hasina and Selim^^ .^ So, most of the AJL leaders became critical of some 
ministers of S. Hasina's cabinet. Among them were Home Minister Major (Ret.) Rafiqul 
Islam, Finance Minister S.A.M.S. Kibria, Education Minister A.S.H.K. Sadeq and State 
Minister for Youth and Sports Obaidul Kader. They alleged that these ministers did not give 
due importance to the youth leaders who tried to meet them on various occasions. They held 
the Home Minister responsible for the country's deteriorating law and order situation and 
Finance Minister for the catastrophe in the country's share market. They alleged that the 
Youth Minister did not want to listen to them although they represented the country's youths 
to a great extent^ ^®. When Selim was not included in the ministry he also alleged that some of 
the killers of S. Mujib were included in the cabinet of S. Hasina . The relation of Selim with 
S. Hasina was so bad that till AL was in power, he was not included in any dignified position 
of the government. 
Workers-Leaders relation during 1996-97: AL was one of the very few parties in the sub-
continent which in spite of remaining outside the power for more than two decades was 
organizationally most strong party in a country. AL remained organizationally strong because 
of its grassroots level leader's and workers' sacrifice for the party. During 1971 freedom 
movement, AL chief, Mujib was in Pakistani prison and other leaders took shelter in the 
neighboring coimtry, India. During the crisis time, local AL leaders and workers organized 
the party activities and freedom movement. They sacrificed their lives. In 1975, including 
Mujib, all the senior leaders were brutally assassinated and other leaders were sent to jail or in 
hiding. Party became leaderless. In those days the foremost thinking was that how the party 
would survive? The grassroots leaders and workers not only saved the party from dissolution 
Interview with Mostafa Mohsin Montu. 
They opposed the gherao program on the plea that this would be damaging the economy and would help JP 
more than the AL (New Nation, 8 April 1994). 
Dainik Sangram, 24 May 1997. 
New Nation, 12 September 1997. 
Daily Star, 4 Januaiy 1997. 
See the speech of Col. Oli Ahad in Daily Sangbad, 3 December 1996. Ahad in a meeting coated S. Selim's 
speech. Also see Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, p. 557. 
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by their love and dedication for the party but also did anti-regime movement to realize 
people's demands. At different times central leaders engaged in factional conflict to fulfill 
their high ambitions, defected from the party and either formed new party or joined the 
governing party. Sometimes, though, few workers were confused by the rebel leader's 
campaign but soon they returned to the main stream. It was said, "AL is the party of workers 
not the party of leaders and workers lead the party not the leaders". Grassroot workers and 
leaders were the main strength of the party. But after the party came into power, a difference 
was developed between the workers and leaders. Reasons are many: (i) Since the formation of 
AL government the AL leaders were saying that upozila system (local government system in 
sub-district level) would be introduced soon for rural development^^^. But due to the 
opposition of opposition parties on it, AL could not reintroduce the system^^^. AL wanted to 
rehabilitate the deprived local leaders, who were not nominated in parliamentary election, by 
this election. Though AL chief Hasina promised but even after more than one year when the 
local leaders were not satisfied they became frustrated^^'*; (ii) Previously workers had direct 
contact with the top party leaders. Since the party leaders became the ministers, as they were 
busy with government activities, they were not able to give enough time to the workers. 
Because of the hindrance of the Personal Secretaries of some ministers the workers could not 
meet the ministers to discusses about the problems of local organizations; (iii) In the 1996 
who were elected MP's by AL ticket, many of them joined the party just before the election. 
After becoming the MPs to insure their influence in the area and to make sure AL nomination 
for the ftiture elections they tried to control the local party organization by their money power 
and personal influence. As a result local old leaders engaged in conflict with the newcomers. 
The central party leaders were in dilemma to solve this recent internal party crisis. From their 
fhastration in the newly developed hostile situation many of the dedicated old local party 
leaders withdraw themselves from active politics. Many of them were not cooperating with 
the local elected MPs, who were the newcomers in the party. Rather the local leaders and 
workers engaged in infighting with their local MP's to ensure their control over the local party 
organization. As a result, the aggrieved local leaders formed their own factional groups in 
district and sub-district level. It was like that many small parties inside the main party^^^. 
Weekly Jai Jai Din wrote, just after six months of AL's coming to power, it was seen that 
many small groups emerged in AL. They engaged in a self-destroying armed infighting to 
perish their opponents inside the party. This fight of some AL leaders, who were not included 
in the ministry, was against the ministers; MPs are fighting against the top leaders; and the 
local deprived leaders are fighting against their MPs. It was difficult for the party stalwarts to 
identify in which place among the conflicting local CToups to whom they would deter. AL 
needed long time to settle sensitive local disputes^^ . By observing several armed conflict in 
the AL party the pro-AL newspapers were also surprised. To maintain their maximum 
circulation of their daily's they also reported several of the internal armed conflict of AL^^ .^ 
The opposition parties could not make any harm to AL during it was in power but the 
mfighting of AL confused the masses about the party. After the formation of the government 
the party organization became weak. Many predicted that if the party could not come to the 
^ ^ Bangladesh Times, 6 September 1996. 
President Ershad introduced the upozila system in 1985. But BNP government annulled the system. Before 
coming to power AL promised that it would reestablish the system. 
Daily Sangram, 24 May 1997. 
Jai Jai Din, 30 September 1997; p. 16. 
Jai Jai Din, 7 Januaiy 1997; p. 12. 
Jai Jai Din, 7 Januaiy 1997; p. 12. 
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power by winning the next election a crisis might arise when it would go for anti-regime 
movement because the dedicated local leaders and workers were already dishearten that why 
would they devote their energy for the party if they were not getting nomination from it. On 
the other hand, there was no assurance of the opportunist newcomers that at the time of crisis 
of the party they would be remaining with the party or like the JP leaders they would join the 
government party^^^. 
Towards the end of 1997, it was seen rift, conflict and jealousy were on the rise in the 
AL leadership due to number of factors including grievances over being deprived despite the 
party being in power and consolidation of respective positions in the organization. Though 
there was no infighting for the President-ship in AL but still Sheikh Hasina involved in 
personality conflict with valiant freedom fighter and AL WC member A. Kader Siddiqui. 
Especially, the conflict between the ministers and also between the ministers and the leaders 
aided factional squabbles and groupings among the middle-level leaders and grassroot 
workers. In 1997, the consistent factionalism in the student wing (BCL) and youth wings (JL) 
of AL assumed dangerous proportions, as a result, of rift in the central leadership^^'. The 
situation inside the BCL was very serious over the issue of expanding the influence of some 
top AL leaders. As a result, till the last of 1997 in many universities and localities, the BCL 
cadres engaged in bloody armed conflict^ "*®. Many of the lower level party units also were 
engrossed in factionalism^'". Party leadership showed its inability to prevent it. Because of 
infighting in AL and the other major opposition parties they not only suffered integrity crisis 
but when the followers of the two or many faction leaders engaged in armed conflict to ensure 
their local dominance, as a result, the law and order situation of the country was temporarily 
deteriorated. That used to demolish the image of the party. 
The difference of AL with pro-AL Media group: From 1992 maximum dailies and weeklies 
including Ittefaq, Daily Star, Independent, Jana Kantha, Banglar Bani, Azker Kagoj, Vorer 
Kagoj, Sangbad, Jai Jai Din, Bichinta, Khoborer Kagoj etc started publishing the AL cause 
and helped the party to regain strong popularity in the masses. The AL had proved its high 
public support by winning the 1996 parliamentary election. Still after the election the most 
renovmed editors of different newspapers including others Abed Khan, Mahfuz Anam and 
Matiur Rahman were supporting the AL cause^ "^ .^ Their loyalty to AL ideology was out of 
question and their closeness to the AL president is well known '^* .^ Their supporter for the 
party was voluntary not compulsory. To maintain and increase party popularity the role of 
media is inevitable. 
After coming to power the ruling AL not only infested by almost insurmountable 
internal conflict but also faced another unpalatable situation due to a sharp division among the 
pro-AL media over former President Ershad issue. The AL included Ershad's JP in its 
'government of national consensus'- it was not acceptable to many of the newspaper 
journalists. Moreover, when AL government was influencing the judiciary for the freedom of 
Ershad from imprisonment, they could not praise this unprincipled act. Apparently most of the 
Researcher talked to many AL workers and collected this view from them. 
Muktakantha, 25 September 1997. 
For example see Daily New Nation, 3 & 15 May 997; Daily Financial Express, 8 June 1997; Daily Star, 9 
June, 11 September, 13 andl7 November 1997; Bangladesh Observer, 30 October 1997; Daily Independence, 25 
December 1997 etc. In 1997 different factions of the student wing of BNP JCD was also engaged in armed 
conflict (see Bangladesh Times, 28 February 1997). 
As for example see Daily Star, 28 and 29 September 1997. 
Jai Jai Din, 31 December 1996, p. 11. 
^^ ^ Dhaka Courier26 June 1997. 
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newspapers which had launched a strong hatred-campaign against the former military ruler 
only recently were not in a position to swallow the bitter pill by changing their policies 
overnight. "We support the present government but that does not mean we will have to ditto 
all its decisions. After all we must maintain our credibility," said an editor of an influential 
pro-AL daily who preferred anonymity^"". A close review of the national dailies during 1996-
97 after AL's coming to power showed that except the 'Banglar Bani', owned and edited by 
S. Selim, a cousin of PM, all the pro-AL dailies and periodicals continued their hostile 
attitude towards Ershad. Although some of them stopped direct criticism of JP and its 
Chairman, reports and editorials were indications that these dailies were not happy over the 
mamier the former military ruler was set free. The editor of a pro-AL daily said that although 
both the ruling party as well as the Jatia Party had been campaigning that 'law has taken its 
ovra course' it has already been difficult to convince the common men that law had already 
taken its own course. He said that people were no more fools and they understood the 
manipulations in all these cases^''^ It was the beginning of the difference of AL with the 
media groups who were propagating the cause of the party. 
The Preparation for the 1997 Council Session of AL: Like the past after the 1992 council 
session, AL could not hold its council session on time because of its engagement in anti-
goverrunent movement. However, after coming to power, the party decided to hold its council 
session on December 1996 '^'^ . Accordingly, in July 1996, the AL central leadership asked all 
the lower units to hold their respective council sessions on time. But it had to shift its date in 
April 1997 due to the sharp infighting which was surfaced over the leadership issue in the 
lower level units of the party including that of district and sub-district level and delayed the 
formation of full-fledged new committees of party leadership in the lower level units. Due to 
the factional rivalry among the leadership aspirants of the district leaders till 5 Februry 1997 
out of 69 organizational district units' conference to form new committees could not be held 
in at least 41 districts and fiill-fledged committees were formed only in 21 district units^''^. 
However, till 24 April 1997, the party completed council of its 65 districts. 
The defection of Kamal put an end to the leadership conflict in the central body of AL. 
But the grouping and competition among the AL leaders for the second (GS) position of the 
party and other posts of central continued on. Everyone knew the main eligibility to occupy a 
good position in the party is to acquire confidence of Hasina. To remain in the AL any leader 
should not go against her. Since 1993, there was competition among the stalwarts of the party 
to prove their loyalty to S. Hasina. Usually, when the party is in power, the party leaders use 
to engage in government activities, they posses ministerial and other dignified posts of the 
government. So, they cannot manage enough time to engage themselves in organizational 
activities like at the time when the party was in opposition. In this case, it is necessary to 
make the party General Secretary from among the efficient and skilled organizers of the party. 
Just before the council session, eminent columnist Zwarder wrote that many were telling that 
within ten months of AL's taking over of power, as if, it started loosing its traditional 
dynamism in its organizational activities. They did not have their previous enthusiasm and 
activeness in their activities. As if, from the central office to the lower units, the party office 
lost its previous active activities. Rater factionalism was gradually increasing in all the units 
of the party organization. It seemed that including the party GS all other leaders could not 
New Nation, 15 Januaiy 1997. 
New Nation, 15 January 1997. 
^^^ Daily Ittefaq, 27 July 1996. 
New Nation, 6 Febniary 1997. 
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give attention in this matter. So to elect tiie new GS he suggested that^''^ (i) the future GS 
should be a non-minister leader, who would be able to give ftill time in politics. Who would 
be able to prepare the workers group properly to fight the incoming election, to defend the 
opposition parties in gaining ground in all level of the organizational units; (ii) who would be 
able to play a effective role to eliminate the infighting of the party; (iii) who would be with 
full of political wisdom, honest, hard-working, popular and having acceptability among the 
workers i.e. who is not controversial to the AL family etc. 
Many expected that in the 1997 council session there would be a change in the post of 
GS of the party as incumbent GS Zillur Rahman failed to show his efficiency and moreover, 
he was an aged person. Some newspaper also wrote that Zillur Rahman would not be 
remaining in the post of party GS^'' . Some of them wrote that the present GS Zillur Rahman 
was not reportedly veiling to retain his post again in view of his old age. He might get entry in 
the next presidium of the party after the council session^^°. Naturally, about a dozen 
prominent party leaders' names were being discussed at close door informal meetings in many 
of the top AL leaders' drawing room. Among them A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed, Amir Hossain 
Amu, Dr. Mohammad Selim, A. Jalil and Mohammad Nasim were prominent^^'. 
Immediately, they started lobbying to convince AL chief Hasina. Everyone knew without the 
approval of Hasina it would not be possible for anyone to capture the second post of the party. 
So, all the candidates were engaged in lobbying to get her confidence. Tofael, one of the 
dominant leaders knew that Hasina would not make him the party leader. So, since the 1992 
council session instead of involving his full time in organizational activities, he concentrated 
himself in business. Among the aspirants for the GS post A. Razzaq was very popular in the 
masses. Among the youth leaders Nasim was popular. Both A. Razzaq and Nasim elected 
MP's from their respective constitutions. Comparatively young Mohammad Nasim also 
proved his organizational skill by his activity as an Organizing Secretary of the party. Many 
of the district leaders already supported Nasim for the GS post^". But as he was junior in the 
party, he had less possibility to be the party leader. A. Razzaq was well reputed for his 
organizational capability. But it was also widely whispered in the party circle that Tofael and 
A. Razzaq failed to persuade PM Hasina. A strong lobby led by Tofael and A. Razzaq was 
working against Amir Hossain Amu as he was the political enemy of both of them and he 
appeared to be a fi-ont-runner for the post. Many were also backing Nasim to block Amu's 
prospect although Amu was known as one of the trusted partymen of S. Hasina^^^. Though 
Amu and A. Jalil were very near to Hasina but could not win in the parliamentary election. As 
A. Razzaq and Tofael Ahmed did not have possibility maximum of the district leaders 
supported Amu^ '^^ . As Amu was not processing any ministerial posts and would be able to 
give full time in politics, which was the demand of the workers, there was more possibility for 
him to be the party Secretary. 
Some top rankers of the party told that AL's council working committee was likely to 
be expanded to 65 members with non-minister GS. "Party GS will be elected in the council 
while amendments of the party constitution and manifesto will be brought in the light of the 
recommendations of the sub-committee formed in this regard" AL Joint Secretary A. Jalil 
Daily Banglabazar Patrika, 6 May 1997. Also Momen Uddin Zwarder, Rajnitir Chalchitra; pp. 40-41. 
Weekly Khoborer Kagoj, 29 October 1996; p. 27. 
New Nation, 6 February 1997. 
Weekly Khoborer Kagoj, 29 October 1996; p. 27 and New Nation, 6 Februaiy 1997. 
Weekly Khoborer Kagoj, 29 October 1996; p. 27. 
New Nation, 6 February 1997. 
^^^ Jai Jai Din, 13 March 1997; p. 4. 
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said^^^ The sub-committee on amendment to the constitution and manifesto recommended 
some minor amendments to the party constitution for inclusion of a leader from each district 
committee. One of the daily wrote that if this forthcoming council session endorsed this 
amendment the number of the members of the CWC would increase to more than one 
hundred^^®. 
AL Council Session 1997: The two-day triennial council session of BAL inaugurated on 6"' 
May 1997 after a long delay. It is the first council session of AL after its coming to power. 
Targeting the 8''' (since the formation of AL it is the 15'^ ' council session) council session 
meanwhile, except few, all the lower level council sessions, including that of district, sub 
district, imion and ward level council sessions, were completed. About six thousand 
councilors and twenty thousand delegates from all parts of the country attended the council 
session. The noticeable thing of this council session was that the atmosphere during the 
council session was tension free, very peacefril, disciplined and organized^^'. Since 1976 AL 
councilors and delegates had been participating council sessions with lot of anxiety as the 
central leaders were divided into many conflicting groups but in this council session there was 
no one to challenge any wish of arbitrary leadership of S. Hasina. Moreover, under the 
leadership of Hasina after a 21 years gap the party returned to power. So, all the leaders and 
workers were in happy mood. Since 1981, in Hasina's presence, it was the third council 
session. 
On the 21^' century, the Bengali nation would bom with fresh lease of life. On the first 
day of the council session, AL President S. Hasina pledged to form a well-timed and strong 
AL organization to face the challenge of 21"' century and said within 2020 we shall build a 
happy and prosperous Bangladesh which would be freed from the curse of hunger, poverty 
and illiteracy. The Bengali nation would bom in with new identity. We are working to 
materialize the dream of Bangabandhu S. Mujib in the coming century. She said to the 
gathering of thousands of leaders and workers of the party that we had to cross a long way 
and it is not a way of bed of roses. In the work for the exploited and deprived people 
definitely the self-seeking people would create trouble. So we had to be alert and had to work 
through our strong organization. Not to demolish the country on the name of governing it, 
rather we wanted to run the country with having pure intension of votary^^^. 
Before the formation of the new committee for next three years, Hasina announced the 
dissolution of the old Central Working Committee including Presidium and got down from 
the rostrum to have her seat among the councilors. Hasina also requested the councilors to 
elect altemative party leader. It was very difficult for her to lead the party as she was very 
much occupied with state affairs as PM. The councilors and party leaders turned down her 
request and declared their fiill confidence on her leadership. Accepting the decision of the 
councilors to elect her as party chief^^', Hasina assured her party men of her commitment to 
lead the party to uphold the spirit of the liberation war, ensure the welfare of the people and 
Bangladesh Observer, 25 April 1997. 
Bangladesh Observer, 25 April 1997. 
Momen Uddin Zwarder, Rajnitir Chalchitra; p. 43. 
Daily Janakantha, 7 May 1997. 
Probably she made this drama to enhance her dignity in the country. If she could have any real intension to 
do so at least she would choose one non-ministerial or dynamic and skilled politician for the GS post of the 
party. Rather she preferred the previous old leader Zillur, who was already proved inefficient in his work, for the 
post who would never go against her. She was firm to control the party in her grip but in a gentle shape. So she 
did all these acts as she was confuro now there was no competitor to challenge her position and councilors would 
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achieve economic emancipation of the toiling masses^^°. In this council session, PM 
Hasina was being reelected unopposed President of the ruling party for a fourth consecutive 
term since 1981. The entire house rose to its feet and gave a standing ovation to their beloved 
party Chief S. Hasina who led AL to power after 21 years winning the June 1996 general 
elections. 
Still all the eyes were eager to know who was going to be the second person of the 
party as they believed that the progress of the party was greatly depending on the election of a 
competent party GS. In all the previous council sessions, Hasina did not respect the opinion of 
the councilors rather she imposed her own men as the GS of the party for comprehensible 
reason. As newspapers were publishing news through different coating some influential party 
leaders that there would be a positive change in the GS post of the party and as all felt the 
need of a skilled organizer in the GS post to strengthen the party organization the party 
workers and supporters were enthusiastic to know that who was going to be the next GS of the 
party. S. Hasina was empowered by councilors and delegates to announce the names of 
Presidium members, GS and other key office-bearers. Belying all speculations Local 
Government Minister Zillur Rahman retained his position as the party GS^^'. With his re-
election this time, Zillur Rahman was made the chief of the party for the fourth time since 
1972. During Mujib regime (1972-74) he was elected GS for two times and since it was his 
second tenure in GS post since 1992. The declaration of Zillur Rahman's name in the post 
could not satisfy anyone of the councilors. Weekly Jai Jai Din vwote that the declaration of 
Zillur Rahmans name broken the heart of the party councilors and delegates. Except few of 
the party workers of Kishoregonj (Zillur's home district) no one was seen pleased with 
Hasina's decision^^^. The AL was going to enter the twenty first century with an eighty years 
old weak politician. By re-electing Zillur only Hasina was benefited; party was deprived from 
a dynamic and skilled GS. Nurul Islam Bhuyan wrote that during the lifetime of Mujib the 
person who had been the GS of the party, the same Zillur Rahman still was holding the GS 
position of the party. In the absence of transparency, democracy and accountability for their 
acts to the masses how the AL would lead the country by facing the challenge of 21'' 
century^^^? Hasina did not elect Amu because in these years Amu has changed a lot. Amu was 
still loyal to Hasina but not like that of Zillur an exact subservient of Hasina^ '^^ . But the daily 
'Sangram' wrote that the family relation with S. Hasina demolished the possibility of Amu to 
become the GS of the party. According to it, because of the district AL leaders demand for a 
new GS, Hasina was thinking to make Amu the party secretary. Realizing the feeling of 
Hasina the rival faction of Amu engaged in campaign that Hasina, after installing in some of 
her close relatives in different important positions of the government, now was going to make 
the AL a family party of her. To execute her intension Amu was going to be made the party 
GS. The campaign embarrassed Hasina and she dropped the contemplation to make Amu the 
party GS and re-elects Zillur Rahman in his old post . However, Zillur was also her distant 
relative. Jai Jai Din further wrote that Hasina might feel that she had been with the party but 
could not come to the power; in this time she captured the power with the help of bureaucrats, 
businessmen and generals. Though, at present, Hasina did not realize the need to strengthen 
Bangladesh Observer, 8 May 1997. 
Bangladesh Observer, 8 May 1997. Also see Bangladesh Times, 8 May 1997. 
Jai Jai Din, 13 May 1997; pp. 4-5. 
Jai Jai Din, 13 May 1997; p. 10. 
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the party organization but in one day she would understand that her interest is connected with 
the interest of her party AL. Without her party she is nothing. 
Party President S. Hasina announced a 15-member Presidium including two new 
faces. None of the Presidium members of the outgoing committee was dropped. A. Jalil, who 
was Joint Secretary and Suranjit Sengupta, who was in the advisory council of party 
President, got a lift when they were made a new members of the Presidium filling up the 
vacancy caused by the death of senior Presidium member Mohiuddin Ahmed and by the 
defection of Dr. Alauddin to BNP. Telecommunications and Public Works Minister 
Mohammad Nasim was reelected Organizing Secretary of the party^ ®®. S. Hasina discussed 
close door with senior leaders and district level leaders before announcing the names of the 
Presidium members, GS, Organizing Secretary. When the party chief announced the names 
the councilors and delegates raised their hands extending their full support. The council 
approved amendments of the party constitution raising the strength of the CWC from 65 to 
67, adding one more post of Joint Secretary and reducing the number of the post for Assistant 
Secretary to two from five^^^. 
Party chief decided to announce the names of other office bearers and members of the 
CWC later on^^ .^ All knew from the beginning that Hasina would make all the central and 
national committees with the help of her close aid's and would not discuss with the councilors 
though the councilors were the real authority to elect the office bearers, central and other 
committee members. Who would be in the office and who would not be it was totally 
depending on the aspirant candidates demonstration of loyalty to Hasina. So, except the 
aspirants for those posts and their few followers, other councilors did not have any kind of 
headache over the new central committee. However the selection of other office bearers by 
Hasina could not satisfy the political analysts. By this council, it became clear that there was 
no real practice of democracy in AL, rather, it converted into an organization to fulfill 
Hasina's personal wish. For the lacking of practicing internal democracy in AL, not only 
Hasina rather all other prominent leaders of the party were responsible. For their personal 
interest, they helped Hasina to concentrate all powers in her hands^^^. 
After 21 years, AL captured power by including many of the outsiders in the party. 
Among them were bureaucrats, generals and large number of businessmen. Definitely, they 
did not join the party with the intension of a votary. They did not join the AL because of the 
ideology or principles of the party. Rather they joined the party to fulfill their personal 
aspirations. As these people themselves were seekers of power (greedy) or other government 
incentives, than the nation or the party, could not expect any thing good from these people. 
So, with these people, it was not possible for AL to remain in power for long. The party 
needed to take initiative to make AL's own cadres who would contest to win the next election 
instead of taking help of the hired outside people. For that the party needed a good team of 
office bearers in its central body. But the party could not show its sagacity in the formation of 
its central committees. For this reason, not only Hasina was responsible rather all the party 
leaders, since Hasina's taking over of party leadership, who followed a persuasion policy to 
fulfill their own interest were responsible. Among them already many had to leave the party, 
many (like Amu, Selim, S.A. Aziz etc) could not achieve their targets. Rather many outsiders 
entered the party just before the election and when party came to power they became the 
ministers and the old party leaders were deprived from the ministry. 
Bangladesh Times and Bangladesh Observer, 8 May 1997. 
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By arranging the council session, no doubt the party was successfully demonstrated its 
huge organizational strength and discipline but it could not set up any examples to be 
followed by electing the party leadership in a democratic way or by taking other party 
decisions and programs through an open discussion of the party councilors. If these incidents 
could take place in the case of BNP or JP, then there was nothing to say because the party 
constitutions of JP and BNP did not give any power to their respective party coimcilors. 
Rather all the power of these two parties concentrated in the hands of party chiefs. Both the 
party chiefs were given power to form all the central committees including nominating their 
respective party secretary. They had right to oust any person of the party without seeking 
permission of the central committees. Moreover, the presidents of these two parties also had 
the constitutional powers to nominate the leaders and members of their respective front 
organizations. The constitutions of these two parties allowed their councilors only to elect 
their respective party chiefs^^°. So, both the party leaderships were internally authoritarian. 
But the AL was far different from these two - still the party councilors were enjoying some 
democratic rights to elect all the party central committees and other office bearers including 
the party secretary. Moreover, still the CWC was constitutionally enjoying the rights to decide 
the policies of the party. But when there was no practice of these remaining democratic 
powers of the councilors to elect the party leaders, when the CWC became the puppet in the 
hand of party chief- she by herself decided the party policies and in the CWC meetings only 
got the approval of her doings, then in practice there was no difference among AL, BNP and 
JP. This shows that mental tendencies of the AL councilors and delegates who in spite of 
opportunity failed to elect office bearers in a democratic way and contended in authorizing 
Hasina to have her way. Meanwhile, after taking many amendments to the constitutions, the 
AL leadership also constitutionally transformed into a semi-authoritarian leadership. So, the 
phenomenon of 'absence of democracy' is the dependent variable for which hero-worshiping 
mentality of the party workers is also responsible. When any of the big parties do not practice 
internal democracy in their own party forums then how does one person can expect that these 
parties would practice democracy in Bangladesh politics? When the party leaders felt comfort 
with authoritarian power in their internal party matters then how one can expect that they 
would behave democratically in national politics? 
Any political analyst can raise question: Hasina had established her control on the 
party and the countiy but at what enormous cost. The party lost its old ideological and 
traditional heritage. The dedicated, dynamic and tested leaders and workers group of the party 
who were grown up through a long anti-regime struggle since its formation in 1949, who had 
good contact with the masses were deprived. Many of the moneyed opportunists, still untested 
of their allegiance to the party and the country, were included in the party and subsequently 
elected as the MP's and ministers for coming to power and to survive there. Though this 
section became the party MP's and ministers because of their money power but they did not 
have any connection with the masses. What would these opportunist ministers of the party do 
for the countiy when they involved in election politics only to increase their money, power 
and prestige. Would they remain with AL if the party lost its power like that of 1975? Would 
they be ready to sacrifice their everything for the party like the traditional AL workers 
sacrificed in 1971 and after 1975? The old leadership of the party, the middle class of the 
society who sacrificed their whole life, money and energy became the deprived section of the 
party. What would they do in future? Would they leave politics or would they also follow the 
opportunist politics like their leader, like the BNP and JP activists and sell their allegiance for 
See the constitutions of BNP and JP. 
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money and power? One strange fact was that in the 1991 election where AL by giving 
nomination to its own party workers received total 33.73% of the total votes whereas in 1996 
election by nominating some hired elements won 37.42% of total votes^". There was no big 
difference on the percentage of total votes received by AL in the two elections but the seat 
difference was big. In 1991 election AL could not convert its votes into election win 
comparing to 1996 election. It was not impossible for AL to win the election by its own 
people through increasing grassroot activities like it did before the 1994 Mayoral election but 
instead of following that strenuous process preferred short cut path and invited the non-
political people in politics. The party central committee and lower level committees were 
comprised with the people loyal to Hasina, who were moneyed and known as good flatterer 
but lacking of skills in organizational activities; these new people were included in the 
organization leadership because of money power and flattery not because of their 
organizational skills. Because of infighting in AL mainly due to the absence of practicing 
internal democracy and because of the role of money power also in internal politics of AL 
expert and experienced organizers, who were outspoken and honest old worker of the party, 
either were ousted from the party or kept aside. As a result, leadership in AL was slowly 
installed by the moneyed power seeking people who don't have contact with the masses. As a 
result, governing power came to the hand of those traditional upper class local elites, business 
people and bureaucrats who only think for themselves not for the nation. Would the party be 
able to survive in politics with this weak self seeking party leadership if suddenly one 
dynamic third force (new party with strong principle and leadership) emerge in Bangladesh 
politics. Even since the last election as Hasina started to give Islamic color to AL to win the 
majority Muslim section's vote the minority commimities were no more that sure about the 
party's secular credentials. One of the pro-AL intellectual told with grief that now in politics 
there was no place of ideology and principles. It was not the politics of masses it was the 
politics to plunder the public proper^^^. Another prominent Historian told that now anarchy 
is prevailing in Bangladesh politics^ The party had alienated the intellectuals who could 
have given it additional strength. One might tell the Bangladesh and the AL ride on a strange 
camel to travel uncertain future. 
The Introduction of Opposition Movement by the leadership of BNP: The victory of AL left a 
deep residue of resentment among supporters of the defeated BNP. Khaleda Zia was so 
offended by the election result and had too much antipathy against Hasina that she did not 
attend the oath taking ceremony of S. Hasina as the PM of Bangladesh held on 23 June 
1996^ '^*. Not only that the BNP, which had earlier drawn up a host of criminal charges seeking 
to put him into prison and even demanding that he be hanged, approach General Ershad 
wooing him with the proposal to come out on parole and become the PM of the coimtry on the 
strength of the BNP support. Ershad declined the offer and preferred to give unconditional 
support to AL^'^. Like S. Hasina of AL Begum Zia never accepted her defeat at the polls and 
was searching for issue that could be used to launch a sustained anti-govemment movement. 
From the very beginning AL was facing difficulties in governing the country as at the same 
Dr. Mohammad Hannan, Political History of Bangladesh, p. 510. 
Informal talking with Dalim Chandra Barman, the Professor of Political Science Department, Dhaka 
University. 
Professor Sharif Uddin Ahmed, Director, Bangladesh National Library and Achieves and former Professor 
History Department, Dhaka University. 
Daily Star, 24 June 1996. 
Bhorer Kagoj, 18 June 1996 and Morning Sun editorial: "Ershad's release", 24 June 1996. 
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time of its taking office the main opposition BNP also initiated agitation politics. During 996-
97 main opposition BNP of former PM Begum Khalda Zia and other opposition groups tried 
to build up a movement capitalizing some of the political and economic issues. These were: 
unequal Ganga water-sharing treaty, proposed transit facilities to India, the four-nation sub-
regional grouping with Bangladesh, Nepal Bhutan and the Seven north-eastern States of India 
and pull out of army from the insurgency affected tribal areas of Chittagong Hill Tracts^'*'. 
Begum Zia even declared that she would bring down the AL government by Marc 1998, In 
her attempt to develop a strategy to topple the government, Beum Zia followed the example 
set by the AL during the period of BNP rule. This strategy included demonstrations, general 
strikes and movement politics in the streets accompanied by walkouts and boycotts of 
parliament that would ultimately lead to a resignation of party MP's and a call for new 
elections. Since September 1997, an anti-government polarization of the major opposition and 
small parties started to shape^^^. Opposition further strengthened when, by changing its 
previous political stand, General Ershad's JP withdrew its support from the government and 
decided itself to be a genuine opposition party. General Ershad's joining the opposition camp 
provided them an opportunity in the formation of four party alliances^^^ to realize their 
demand for immediate midterm election to oust AL led government from power^'^. Khaleda, 
though by imitating Hasina, declared one point movement to oust the government but the two 
situations were not quite alike. During her opposition movement, Hasina knew she would 
never get to the corridor of power by an election held under normal procedures. She smelt the 
rat after Magura by-election and included a brilliant idea of caretaker government issue in her 
anti-goverrmient movement and was crowned with success. To succeed, however, the 
opposition needed a potent issue similar to a Magura Parliamentary by-election and the call 
for neutral caretaker government to conduct new elections, which was used so successfiilly by 
the AL. None of the issue at hand, however, the major opposition parties failed to build up 
any effective pressure on the government till 1997. Khaleda Zia's charge that the AL was 
selling the sovereignty of the country to India so far failed to resonate with the public^^''. 
Barring March and April of 997, the rest of the year was comparatively calm although the 
opposition camp tried its utmost to keep the opposition politics alive by issuing regular press 
statements, holding public meetings and processions across the country, and by enforcing 
general strikes from time to time. The other reasons for the opposition failure to build up any 
effective pressure on the government in the last one and half years were the lacking of unity in 
the opposition camp because of intra party leadership crisis in JP, ideological squabble in the 
BNP and the absence of overall effective strategy^^'. The opposition needed more time before 
starting any serious agitation using the political and economic issues. 
On the other hand, PM Hasina had a party with strong affiliations at the grassroots. So, 
the ruling party AL, however, rejected opposition plea for dissolution of parliament. It 
responded the opposition's series of anti-government movement by its better organizational 
strength. To contain and disarray the opposition, the AL employed a number of shrewd 
moves. Such as: AL took lesson from past history. In the past history of Bangladesh since 
Weekly Dhaka Courier, 20 June 1997. 
Stanley A. Kochanek, "Bangladesh in 1997: The Honeymoon Is Over"; Asian Survey, Vol. 38 No. 2; 
February 1998; pp. 135-37. 
The components of the four party alliance were BNP, JP, Jammat-e-Islami and Islami Oikko Jote (lOJ) 
Elora Sehabuddin, "Bangladesh in 1998: Democracy on the Ground"; Asian Survey, Vol. 39 No. 1, January 
1999; p. 148. Also see the Hindu, 31 January 2001. 
Stanley A. Kochanek, "Bangladesh ui 1997: The Honeymoon Is Over"; Asian Survey, Vol. 38 No. 2; 
February 1998; pp. 135-36. 
Dhaka Courier, 20 June 1997. 
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1990 as both Ershad and Khaleda governments were removed by street movement the party 
understood now the opposition would try to play the same trick with the AL. So to counter the 
opposition move, it occupied the major streets by the AL workers during general strike and 
blockade programs^^^, engaged its student wing 'Chattra League' to capture the student halls 
in different universities (from where the opposition movements use to germinate)^^^, 
organized counter public meetings and rallies like AL's peace march program against the 
opposition's long march towards Hilly Chittagong district, encouraged intra-party and inter-
party factionalism and split in opposition parties etc. It also took some more steps to disarray 
opposition such as: arranged anti-BNP programs in the state controlled radio and televisions, 
resorting conspiracy theory and shifting responsibiliW on the opposition, adopted repressive 
measures, sent many opposition workers to jail etc^^ . When BNP and other three parties 
made anti-regime alliance to oust the AL from governing power, AL also made good contact 
with some opposition political parties by distributing different government incentives. 
Including of them JSD (Inu), JSD (Rob), BSD (Mahbub), CPB, Communist Kendra etc were 
mentionable^®^ But these parties, with weak organizational base, were not effective enough to 
counter the opposition movement^^^. So, the AL was resisting the opposition by its own. The 
long awaited water sharing treaty with India (1996)^^^, the peace accord of Chittagong Hill 
Tracts with the tribal aborigine people^^^, the Senior Citizens pension scheme, PM Hasina's 
successful visit to USA, Japan, Italy, Turkey China to increase foreign investment and to 
ensure more foreign assistance and investment in Bangladesh^^® etc proved the credibility of 
AL government. On the other hand, because of the absence of overall effective strategy to 
create strong popular movement; because of the opposition parties, including BNP and JP, 
engagement in intra-party and inter-party conflict; because of the lacking of strong unity 
among the alliance partners and AL regimes programs to give benefit to its rule to the people 
the AL easily suppress the oppositions endeavor to build anti-government agitation to 
overthrow it from power. 
After the t ^ n g over of governing power by AL, the JSD (A. Rob), JSD (Inu), BSD 
(Mahbub), remaining fragments of former CPB etc decided to extend their support towards 
AL to establish the spirit of the liberation war in Bangladeh society^^* .^ In another initiative on 
31 October 1997 after long years gap the multiply divided JSD factions merged in one body. 
The different factions which were united in one JSD platform were JSD (Rob), JSD (Inu) and 
BSD (Mahbub). A.S.M. Abdur Rob and Hasanul Huq Inu were elected the President and GS 
of the united JSD. The other members of the central committee of the JSD were Nure Alam 
Daily Ittefaq and Janakantha 26 September 1997. 
Ittefaq and Daily Star, 23 August 1996; Daily Star, 25 July 997; Jai Jai Din; 31 December 1996, p. 48 and 24 
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PM's effort to invite foreign donors and investors brought lot of success. Already several foreign countries, 
including those from USA, Japan and UK, made sizeable investments in the country's gas and power sectors. In 
the one and half years of AL rule many foreign dignitaries visited Bangladesh and renewed promised to 
strengthen economic cooperation between Bangladesh and their respective countries (Weekly Dhaka Courier, 20 
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Ziku, Kazi Aref Ahmed, Sharif Nurul Ambia, Syed Zafar Sazzad and Moinuddin Khan Badal. 
In a press conference the united JSD leaders declared this new committee. They also pledged 
that the JSD would continue its movement to establish scientific socialism through social 
revolution. They also said they would materialize the spirit of liberation war by establishing 
an exploitation free, secular and democratic society through bringing about a total changing to 
the current socio-economic-political system. The united JSD also declared an 18-point 
program to be executed^". Probably AL played a vital role in the merger of different factions 
in one body. The intension of AL was very clear. When the major opposition parties including 
BNP, Jammat, JP and Khelapat Andolon made one united platform to remove AL from power 
in this time AL needed strong friends in the opposition. So by the economic and logistical 
backing of AL different factions of JSD merged into one body to emerge as a strong 
opposition party that would be cooperative to AL. 
Success and failure of a government was not possible to judged by its performance 
only for one and half years. But its political will and honesty in resolving many problems now 
facing the country would be definitely appreciated by the people with sympathy. PM Hasina 
already earned praise in electing a neutral personality like Justice (ret.) Shahabuddin Ahmed 
to the country's top office of President, alftough the post was mostly ceremonial. She also 
took a bold step by scrapping the black "Indemnity Ordinance" in parliament to clear the way 
for the trial of the killers of slain President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. She was successftil in 
encouraging foreign aid and investment in different sectors of Bangladesh. Alongside the 
economic diplomacy, Bangladesh under Hasina's leadership joined several economic blocks 
for expansion of frade and economic cooperation, ignoring bitter criticism from opposition. 
Hasia mooted the idea of sub-regional economic grouping comprising Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Bhutan and seven north-eastern States of India. The grouping finally emerged as a growth 
quadrangle. Bangladesh also became member of two other economic blocks- BISTEC and D-
8. the other members of the BISTEC were: India, Srilanka and Thailand, while Myanmar was 
being given the observer status. D-8 comprised eight developing countries of the OIC 
Bangladesh, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, hidonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Egypt^^^. But a host of 
pre-election pledge made by the AL like eliminating corruption, scrapping black law like 
special Power Act, ensuring independence of judiciaiy, and granting autonomy to the state-
ovwied radio and television were yet to be fulfilled. 
The prospect of democracy's taking roots in this country depended to a large extent on 
the cautious nurturing of nascent parliamentary system by the two major rival parties i.e. AL 
and BNP. Unfortunately, their role in the political process since the parliamentary democracy 
had been reintroduced in 1991 was quite fostrating. From the begirming, both the protagonists 
indulged themselves in negative politics and disregarded the national representative body for 
legislative compromise or solution of national problems. Any analyst in Bangladesh politics 
would find that the constraints which obstructed the functioning of the fifth National 
Parliament were mostly present to make current Parliament as unsuccessful one. Negative 
politics took place in national politics because the main leaders of both the parties also were 
habituated in practicing negative politics in their own internal political forum. They never 
practiced internal democracy, never showed respect to the opposition views in their internal 
party forum. Rather instead of solving internal difference of the party democratically by 
showing patience and following a process of discussion in the internal party forum they 
always showed intolerance to the rival views and compelled the leadership competitors to 
For the detail of the 8 point programs of united JSD see Daily Sangbad, 1 November 1997. 
Dhaka Courier, 20 June 1997. 
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leave the party; became undeclared authoritarian leader. In state level they tried to practice the 
same, always showed intolerance to the rival party and by any how tried to remove the 
democratically elected party from power. The chiefs had ample time to rectify their past 
mistake. But as they were not ready to practice democratic principles, negative politics such 
as from opposition side agitation politics and boycott of the parliament continued till the next 
election and from the government side to suppress the opposition repressive action continued 
and for the convenience of their repression also passed more strict law in the parliament. 
People still supported either one of the two parties because of the absence of any third 
dynamic political party whose honest democratic leadership and pro-people programs can set 
examples in the right direction to the nation. 
Some case study of party factionalism in different regional areas of Bangladesh 
It can be said by the defection of Kamal that the power conflict in the central 
leadership was over but still difference was prevailing in the district and sub-district level of 
the party. However, since 1993, the trend of factional conflict of the lower level units is 
totally different. Still now the local leaders have allegiance to the central leaders for various 
reasons (such as regional grouping, mentor disciple relation, the cooperative relation between 
the two leaders during the student life etc) but they always show their unconditional loyalty is 
first for Hasina. It is seen in the conflict between two or many regional leaders (such as in the 
conflict of Tofael Vs Amu in Barishal or Mohiuddin Vs Aktaruzzaman in Chittagong or A. 
Samad Azad Vs Huda Vs Surangit Sengupta or Matiur Rahman Talukdar Vs Mirza Azam 
group in Jamalpur and Farid Gazi in Sylhet) the local leaders are divided into two or many 
factions but if any regional leader challenge Hasina; he will be no more important even to the 
sub-district level AL leaders. Even if Hasina shows her open resentment against any of the 
central leaders or withdraw her blessings from anyone, he will also loose his credibility in 
maximum cases. The example of Montu and A. Kader Siddiqui can be cited here. During 
1987-91, Montu was the imchallengeable leader in Dhaka district. But, when he lost the 
blessings of Hasina, he had to leave the party without any significant mass following. Only 
some of the local leaders, who were politically dead, followed him as an endeavor to establish 
themselves in the political field for the second time. The case of A. Kader Siddiqui was more 
pathetic. When he formed new party even his brother A. Latif Siddiqui did not joined it. Only 
some of the youths of his local area, who yet did not have enough political maturity, joined 
him. It can be said soon they will be leave him also if he does not return to AL or join the only 
alternative party in Bangladesh i.e. BNP. Meanwhile when A. Kader and his followers tried to 
organize meetings in different districts excepting hiss home district Tangail they faced hard 
resistance from AL workers, even in some cases the stages made for the meeting and the cars 
of Siddiqui was destroyed. 
However, in many district, city and sub-district level imits of the party, the AL leaders 
had been engaged in conflict since long. The reasons were: (i) personality clash; (ii) the 
tendency of spreading their personal support base; (iii) economic conflict or competition; (iv) 
the competition of the present leaders to get future nomination of the party for parliamentary, 
city corporation, municipal and other local level elections; (v) family clash; (vi) regional 
competition; (vii) competition among the central leaders to maintain their influence in local 
level to confirm their positions in centre; (viii) power and prestige conflict and (ix) leadership 
conflict etc. All the factional conflict in the lower level was on personality base. Though there 
was ideological difference among the leaders but after the defection of BAKSALites from AL 
in 1983 in the internal conflict of the party ideology did not play any role. Some case study of 
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the infightings in the district level units of AL is gven below to give an idea behind the 
reasons of infighting in the district level. 
Infighting among the two Top AL Leaders To Ensure Their Control Over Greater Barishal 
division: Greater Barishal division is known as one of the stronghold for AL. AL's two 
Presidium members Tofael Ahmed and Amir Hossain Amu are from this division. Since their 
student life, they were competing with each other. Though Amu was senior in age but because 
of DUCSU Vice President Tofael's unprecedented role in the 1969 upheaval and 1971 war 
Tofael became senior in politics. He was appointed the personal secretary of PM Mujib and 
Mujib was thinking to make him the future PM of Bangladesh. On the other hand, during 
Mujib era, Amu was one of the Vice President of JL. In the leadership conflict in the youth 
group Amu was with JL leader S. Moni against A. Razzaq and Tofael. After the assassination 
of Mujib and Moni in the 1975 army coup till Hasina took the leadership of the party though 
Amu was a central leader but was not in the lime light. On the other hand, Tofael emerged as 
the one of top two popular leaders of the party. Tofael had mass following in the country but 
Amu did not have. In the Hasina versus A. Razzaq, conflict Amu and Tofael jointly worked 
for Hasina to oust A. Razzaq. When A. Razzaq was ousted from the party Tofael fell from the 
grace of Hasina. At the defection of A. Razzaq it was expected that dynamic and popular 
leader Tofael would take the party's GS post. But Hasina preferred Amu for the post not 
Tofael. Amu won over Hasina mainly due to two factors: (i) he was the relative (husband of 
Hasina's aunty) and (ii) obedient to Hasina. By the protection of Hasina, Amu was gaining 
ground in the party. Though Hasina tried to make Amu the party GS but because of Tofael 
and others opposition it could not be achieved. There was competition between Amu and 
Tofael to control the Barishal belt. The leaders and workers of Barishal division are still 
divided mainly between the two. The student politics of Barishal was also divided into two 
groups. However, after the 1992 council session when Tofael understood, Hasina would never 
make him the party leader he diverted his maximum attention in business instead of regional 
politics. But still the AL politics of Barishal division is divided into three factions: Tofael, 
Amu and Abul Hasnat Abdullah group and still Tofael is the popular among the three leaders. 
Abdullah the rising leader of AL in Barisal belt is the cousin of Hasina and son of ex-AL 
minister A. Rob Semiabad. He was appointed the whip of AL PP of the national 
parliament of Bangladesh. 
Factionalism in the Chittagong City Unit of AL: The second biggest city Chittagong is called 
the port city of Bangladesh. The largest see port is situated there. Many of the industries, 
producing exportable goods, are situated there. The only known heavy steel industry is also 
situated in Chittagong. The city is known as the business town of Bangladesh. Chittagong city 
is divided into four parliamentary constituencies. Since the independence, it is the stronghold 
of AL politics. For Ae convenience of organizational activities, AL divided Chittagong city 
into two organizational districts. One Chittagong North and the other is Chittagong South. 
Since long the two organizational district leadership of Chittagong was controlled by two 
conflicting groups, opposed to each other. S.M. Yusuf was the leader of Chittagong North 
group and Mohiuddin Chowdhury was leading the South group. After the independence till 
1983, both of the groups were active and working hard to strengthen their own influence in 
the city. But S.M. Yusuf led group was dominant in this period. He was getting the blessing 
of A. Razzaq group from the centre. When in 1983 A. Razzaq left AL and formed BAKSAL, 
Yusuf and majority part of his faction deserted AL and joined the BAKSAL. As Yusuf was a 
vital factor for Chittagong politics, he was given a place in the central committee of 
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BAKSAL. Yusuf came to Dhaka to work for the BAKSAL party and under his leadership 
BAKSAL became a strong organization in Chittagong. Though Yusuf joined BAKSAL but 
all the leaders and workers of his faction did not leave AL. A mentionable number of activists 
temained in AL but they were not ready to join rival leader Mohiuddin, who was blessed by 
Hasina against Yusuf. Rather they assembled under Akhtaruzzaman Babu. It should be 
mentioned here that Akhtar was one of the prominent leader of former Yusuf group of AL. 
Under the leadership of Akhtar, slowly, the group was growing stronger. Soon factional 
conflict spread between the groups. Meanwhile, when both group engaged in showdown of 
their strength through their engagement in armed conflict and some of the activists of both 
group died. But still the rivalry was continued. The dominant leaders of Mohiuddin group 
were Mamun and Ayub. The other leaders of this group were Gyasuddin Hiru, Mofizur 
Rahman, Iftekher Hussain. Chittagong City College was in their control. On the other hand, 
the other leaders of Akhtaruzzaman group were Azam Nasir, Raihan Yusuf, Hasan Mahmud 
Hasan. They were controlling many of the colleges of Chittagong City. Among them were 
Chittagong Medical College, Islamia College, Fatehabad College. The local leader of 
Akhtaruzzaman faction was Azam Nasir. hi the 1991 parliamentary election, Akhtar won one 
of the two constituencies of Chittagong City area. Since 1991 the presence of another third 
group was prevailed the Chittagong politics under the leadership of S.M. Yusuf. Yusuf 
rejoined AL by leaving BAKSAL in 1986 and got the nomination in the 1986 parliamentary 
election. But he had to come alone; no one of his followers followed him when he rejoined 
AL. After his defeat in the 1986 parliamentary election for a temporary period he kept him out 
from active politics. He was also defeated in the 1991 parliamentary election. After the 
continuous defeat in two elections, to survive in politics, he was again engaged in forming the 
third faction in Chittagong politics. Meanwhile, in August 1991, BAKSAL was merged in 
AL. The pro-BAKSAL elements of Chittagong also joined AL. But neither of the main two 
group of Chittagong were not ready to tolerate their (BAKSAL) presence, did not 
accommodate them in their fold. The former BAKSALites felt helpless. Yusuf took the 
advantage of it and strengthen his third group by assembling his old comrades under his 
leadership in Chittagong politics. Since then among the other leaders of Yusuf group in 
Chittagong politics were Khurshed Alam Sujan, Jamsedul Alam, Sydur Rahman, Moshiur 
Rahman etc. Since then this group was very active in increasing its influence in Chitagong 
City AL. To strengthen its position in the Chittagong North Organizational district of AL, 
Yusuf group built up cooperation with its old enemy Mohiuddin group. Both of the faction 
felt Akhtar their primary enemy to demolish^® .^ In the 994 City Corporation elections 
Mohiuddin Ahmed was nominated AL's candidate for the mayoral post. During the election 
AL leader Hasina personally mediated among the groups to reduce their difference at least for 
the time being^ "^*. Moreover, Akhtar, the main rival of Mohiuddin, was an accused person on 
Humayan Zahir Murder case and to save himself from imprisormient he was out of the 
countiy^^. As a resuU, Mohiuddin won the mayoral election^^^. After the AL's taking over of 
governing power, Akhtaruzzaman came back to Bangladesh, surrendered to the High Court 
For a short political history of the infighting of Chittagong City AL see Weekly Roabbar, 4 April 1993; p. 16. 
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and got bail. Again, he became active in local politics. In the long absence of Akhter in local 
politics his number one lieutenant Azam Nasir tried to establish him as the head of the Akhtar 
group. In the return of Akhtar Nasir left Akhtar group and formed his own faction. On 21 
December 1996, the council session of Chittagong North district unit of AL held. There 
Akhtar declared himself the President and made his close associate the Secretary of the new 
committee. The rival leaders protested the formation of the new committee and complained 
against Akhtar but the AL central committee did not take any action against him. The high 
command, however, did not approve the committee against the backdrop of serious protest 
from the rival group^^^. Since then Akhtaruzzaman was running the committee for a long time 
without the approval of the party high command. On the other hand, in April 1997 in another 
council session of Chittagong South unit State Minister for Labor and Manpower M.A. 
Mannan and Mohiuddin were reelected President and Secretary respectively in their previous 
posts^^^. Meanwhile, as Akhtar's main competitor, Mohiuddin, the Mayor of Chittagong, 
became active to eradicate terrorist groups from Chittagong and was discouraging armed 
hooligans from politics. The armed cadres, previously who were with Mohiuddin also joined 
Akhtar group and strengthened his muscle power. As a result, he was getting success in 
different educational mstitutions in Chittagong. The presence of Akhtar in the active politics 
of Chittagong again deteriorated the law and order situation there. The government was 
loosing its popularity in Chittagong. So, when in January 1997 Akhtar's bail was cancelled, 
one of the Mohiuddin group faction leader said that this decision of the goverrmient would 
help to return peoples faith on govemment^® .^ When it became clear that Akhtar lost the 
blessing of party chief immediately Akhtar's number one lieutenant Azam Nasir left him and 
formed a new group. Since then Akhtar was discouraged by the AL central leadership not to 
engage armed hooligans in internal party politics. As he did not respect the party advice, he 
was removed from the Industrial and Commerce Secretary of the AL party. The party press 
release said the action was taken "as he has taken part in activities contrary to the party's 
ideals programs, constitution, rules and interests"^Since 1992 council session 
Akhtaruzzaman was the Industrial and Commerce Secretary of the AL central committee. 
Factionalism in Khulna district AL: Khulna is the second largest port city of Bangladesh. 
Khulna district is also known for some jute and paper industry. In Khulna, AL is still strong. 
Since long the AL and its student wing BCL was engaged in intense rivalry. S. Helal, one of 
the nephew of S.Hasina, was the rising leader of Khulna. But he was not certain about the 
loyalty of the old guard leaders of the district. To strengthen his position he included the 
former JP Mayor of Khulna and many other local JP leaders in the party^"' against the wish of 
the local leaders of AL. The inclusion of the JP leaders in AL was possible because of the 
blessing of party chief in favor of Helal. He also was backing the BCL members of Khulna in 
the rivalry against the district leadership. Those who were representing the central committees 
of the student and youth front of AL had reached to those positions because of the blessing of 
Helal. He already controlled the local student and youth wing. During 1995 infighting was 
still going on between Helal and district leaders on the issue to get control over the local labor 
wing of the party. A small section of local BCL leaders were with the district AL leadership. 
In 1995 on the issue of getting control over a college's student union the two group of 
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students engaged in armed conflict; as a result, 6/7 persons were injured. After the conflict the 
pro-Helal student group stormed the house of Khulna district AL President and ransacked it. 
They insulted the district AL president and secretary. Protesting this terrorist activity of the 
pro-Helal student group, the district AL committee of Khulna and the central labor secretary 
resigned from their post. However, because of the request of party chief, they later withdraw 
their resignation later. But nothing was done to the student leaders, who stormed the AL 
president's house. It became certain that if the old guard AL leaders of Khulna wanted to 
remain in the party fold they had to accept the leadership of Helal. Moreover, within 1995, it 
was also clear that the old guards were not getting nomination in the next parliamentary 
election and in their place some new face, loyal to Helal would be nominated^"^. However 
maximum of the old guards were nominated as party candidates to contest the 1996 election 
and won from their respective seats^ ® .^ Here in the infighting in Khulna S. Helals family 
relation with S. Hasina played a decisive role. Just before the election because of the initiative 
of Helal Khulna district GS of BNP joined AL and as a AL candidate won the 1996 
parliamentary election^"'*. S. Helal for the first time contested in the 1996 parliamentary 
election and was elected from his local constituency Bagerhat-1 through a by-election as PM 
Hasina vacated that seat for him^''^ Though, not form the first row of AL leadership, Hasina's 
cousin Helal Uddin now not only controlling the Khulna and Bagerhat district AL activities 
also playing important roles in national and parliamentary matters^"®. 
Factionalism in Naravangani District AL: Narayanganj is one of the largest industrial areas in 
Bangladesh. Majority of jute industries of Bangladesh are in this district. Largest numbers of 
industrial labors live in this industrial town. As Narayanganj is situated nearby Dhaka and 
labor class is one of the vital forces in opposition movement, and also moneyed industrialists 
are living in this town, the town is strategically very important to all the political parties. 
From the beginning, AL organization is very strong in Narayanganj district. However, during 
1972 council session for the first time, the district committee was divided into two factions to 
capture party leadership. One faction was leading by A.K.M. Samsu22;uha and Mostafa 
Sarwar was the leader of other faction. In the district council Samsuzzoha was elected the 
district organization President. In the 1993 parliamentary election Samsuzoha was also 
elected the MP from town constituency of Narayangonj. In the municipality election, held in 
the same year, Samsuzzoha supported Mohiuddin Ahmed. But opposite group leader Ali 
Ahmed Chunka won the election. Since then the local AL organization was permanently 
divided into two camps. Both Samsuzzoha and Chunka were enjoying the blessings of some 
rival central leaders of the party. During the 1981 presidential election campaign, in a 
meeting, in presence of party leader Hasina, both leaders engaged in hand to hand fighting. 
Now both of them are dead. Samsuzzoha could not manage to get the nomination to contest 
the 1986 parliamentary election. In the election AL candidate was Professor Nazma Rahman 
and governing party JP candidate was Nasim Usman, the eldest son of Samsuzzoha. In that 
election instead of doing election campaign for the party Sumsuzzoha and his people secretly 
helped Nasim. As a result, comparatively strong AL was defeated in the hand of weak JP. In 
the 1991 election, again. Prof. Nazma and Nasim Usman contested from the AL and JP 
respectively from the Narayangong Town constituency. In this election Narayangonj town 
For a brief histoiy of the infighting of Khulna district see Weekly Roabbar, 16 July 1995; p. 15. 
Aminur Rashid (edits.), Pramanya Sangsad, pp. 110-11 and 265. 
Aminur Rashid (edits.), Pramanya Sangsad, p. 111. 
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unit GS of AL supported his eldest brother instead supporting his pai'ty candidate. Because of' 
the internal conflict AL was again defeated in the hand of weak BNP candidate Abul Kamal 
Azad. After the election for a short period Shamim and Nazma came close together during the 
1992 council session to defeat their rivals in the leadership competition. In the party council 
session of the town unit Nazma and Shamim was reelected in the post of President and GS by 
defeating their opponents Mofizul Islam and Anwar Hossain respectively through direct votes 
of councilors. From tlien Shamim and Na2uiia engaged in heavy rivalry to spread their 
personal influence in Narayanganj. Both of them wanted to be the sole leader of the area. In 
Narayangonj, in the factional conflict, Shamim was enjoying the supports of some top local 
leaders and the major section of student and youth wing members of AL. On the other hand, 
district AL and one section of tovra AL memrs were supporting Nazma Rahman. Till prior to 
the 1991 election maximum of the district leaders including the president and secretary were 
with Nazma Rahman. But, in 1991, when Shamim and district AL President Mofizul Islam 
were deprived from parliamentary nomination from their respective (Narayangonj 4 and 5) 
constituencies, they came close together and formed a new faction. Because of the formation 
of new faction, Nazma lost many of her old allies. To have total control over AL's local fi-ont 
organizations such as Youth League, Student League and Labor league they involved in 
intense rivalry^®'. On April 1994 the two groups of Narayanonj town unit of AL involved in 
firce armed conflict in presence of two central leaders on the issue of formation of district and 
tovm unit conamittee of Youth League . As both the group were enjoying some of the top 
party leaders backing g in the conflict the centre could not take necessary action of this 
incident. As a result, for the same reason, the two group again in August involved in armed 
conflict in which two persons died^ '^ ®. The image of AL was tarnished significantly by this 
continuous armed conflict. In this grave situation CWC of AL banned the party activities in 
Narayangonj for an indefinite period^"' also expelled three district level leaders^". 
Factionalism in Pabna district AL: Pabna is one of the district towns in Bangladesh known for 
its Small and Cottage industries. Majority sections of this district people are involved in cloth 
business. It is one of the strongholds of AL. Since long Pabna district AL was divided into 
two factions. One was leading by former AL MP and district AL GS RafiquI Islam Bakul^'^ 
and other faction was leading by former Pabna Sadar (proper) Sub-District Chairman and 
district AL Organizing Secretary Sheikh Sahidullah Bachchu. District AL President 
Wajiuddin Khan was also with Bachchu. However the Bakul group was organizationally 
strong in the district but Bachchu group was having influence in the town area. Both the 
groups were trying to establish their sole influence over the area and time to time they also 
involved in hand to hand clash. In one of such clash between these rival factions, took place in 
1992, at least 11 persons were injured and six of them seriously^^^. In the 1993 Pabna 
Municipality election Bachchu wanted to be the AL candidate for the post of Pabna 
Municipality Chairman. But the Bakul group, by their majority in the committee nominated 
their own group member as the party candidate. Bachchu then contested the election as an 
For a detail description of the factional conflict in Narayangonj see Weekly Roabbar, 21 August 1994; p. 12-
13. Also see Weekly Roabbar, 10 April 1994. 
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independent candidate and Pabna district AL President supported him. The municipality 
election brought the rivalry into climax. To establish the party discipline the Bakul group first 
informed the matter to the AL central committee then to party chief Hasina. But they did not 
get justice there. Rather Hasina told that among the two whoever would win the election, he 
would be accepted as party candidate. In the election Bakul group candidate was defeated at 
the hand of Bachchu. It raged the Bakul group of Pana district unit against the party central 
committee and party chief They accused that Hasina followed an opportunist policy in regard 
to Pabna Municipality election. The Bakul group was so disheartened that except few all the 
members of Pabna district AL including its maximum of its front organization members 
defected to BNP. The number of the resigned members of AL was about two thousand^"'*. 
This mass defection of AL workers and leaders in Pabna embarrassed the party leadership. At 
the defection of Bakul, AL became weak in Pabna Sadar. In the 1996 Parliamentary election, 
Bakul contested from Pabna Sadar (Pabna-5) and defeated the AL candidate by a big margin 
of vote. Pubna is divided into five parliamentary constituencies. AL candidates won all the 
four seats in Pubna except the seat of Bakul^'^ However Bakul died on April 2000^'^. After 
his death, maximum of the district AL leaders, who had previously joined the BNP came back 
to AL. 
Intra Party Factionalism in Tangail District: For last three decades the AL politics of Tangail 
was suffering from intra party conflict. The main reason behind it was to establish personal 
control of some central leaders over the Tangail district AL. Local people of Tangail alleged 
that the conflict in AL was over gaining political control and dominance in business and trade 
in the distr ict^Three different forces were working to control Tangail district AL: (i) AL 
leader and presidium member A. Mannan, (ii) A. Kader Siddiqui and his brother A. Latif 
Siddiqui and (iii) Shamsur Rahman Khan. Sincer 1970 Tangail District AL was controlling by 
the family of Shamsur Rahman Khan with the blessing of central AL leader A. Mannan. 
Though A. Mannan was also belonged to Tangail but he was not involved with local grouping 
rather he tried to remain above all as a unanimous leader of Tangail. A. Kader Siddiqui's 
eldest brother A. Latif Siddiqui was Vice President of the student union of local Saddat 
University College in 1970'''. At the end of 1970, A. Kader was elected the GS of Tangail 
District Chattra League and was controlling the student politics of Tangail. During the 1971 
liberation war, A. Kader Siddiqui formed local guerilla force "Kaderia Bahini" to fight the 
Pakistani army and overnight at the age of 23, he achieve the image of a great freedom 
fighter. His rising image faded the image of A. Mannan and Shamsur Rahman Khan^'^. 
During 1972-73, he was the youth front leader of AL but did not agreed to show his loyalty to 
local AL leader. During liberation war A. Mannan helped Kaderia Bahini to get international 
coverage in different medias. But, immediately after independence, A. Kader challenged the 
leadership of A. Mannan. Not only that when A. Mannan was included in the ministry of 
Mujib in 1972 as the Home Minister A. Kader and his followers burned the effigy of A. 
Mannan. Side by side with A. Mannan and Khan A. Latif Siddiqui was also elected AL MP in 
1973 parliamentary election from different constituencies of Tangail. In 1975, after the 
Dainik Bangla, 14 Februaiy 1993. 
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assassination of Mujib, when Khondaker Mustaq came to the power A. Mannan joined the 
Mustaq government. On the other hand, A. Kader Siddiqui fled to India, took political asylum 
there and started armed struggle against Mustaq government to take revenge of the killing of 
his leader Mujib^'®. However the main stream leaders of AL preferred to resist the killers 
politically. In the opposition of a very hostile environment they advanced politically and 
reorganized the party. In 1983 when A. Razzaq and his dissident followers formed new party 
BAKSAL by leaving AL, A. Latif Siddiqui also joined BAKSAL. In 1990 A. Kader Siddiqui 
returned to Bangladesh. Since then he was the central working committee member of AL. A. 
Latif Siddiqui also came back to AL in 1991. But, meanwhile, both AL and Chatra League 
politics of Tangail was in the control of Khan Family. In 1993 Miron was elected district 
Chattral League President. But as he was close to A. Kader Siddiqui by changing him Khan 
group made Saukat Jang the President of district Chattra League. As a result, to take control 
of Tangail town by the leadership of A. Kader Siddiqui's other two brothers an armed cadre 
group was formed. In exchange of it Rana and Bappi, the two nephew of Shamsur Rahman 
Khan, also formed a counter cadre group^^". About the rivalry between the followers of 
Siddiqui and Khan A. Mannan MP, the Presidium member of AL, said, "One group emerged 
in the process of protesting the other group's terrorist activities''^^'.Due to the skirmish 
between the two groups during 1995-97 six Chatra League workers and leadrs were killed^^^ 
and about 20 student leaders and workers were heavily injured. Due to the infighting of the 
two groups in the 1995 Sadat University College student's union election Chattra League was 
defeated. However, in the 1996 election, Sohel Hazari of Khan group was elected VP and 
Kamruzzaman Ripon of Siddiqui group was elected GS. As VP and GS were from two group 
the student's imion of the college was divided into two faction. In the 1996 parliamentary 
elections, A. Mannan was elected MP from Tangail-5. It is included the Tangail tovra area. A. 
Kader Siddiqui and his brother A. Latif Siddiqui was elected from Tangail 8 and 5 
constituencies respectively. Though Shamsur Rahman Khan, one of the three Joint Secretaries 
of AL central working committee, could not win election but as he belonged to this town his 
family had influence over it. Moreover, A. Mannan was patronizing the Khan group in 
Tangail. So, the town committee was under the control of Khan family. The district 
committee was also in the control of same group. As Siddiqui brothers could not get control 
over the district imit of AL and its student organization during 1996-97 they tried to highlight 
'Kaderia Bahini' in their activities. In December1996 by leaving local AL workers and 
leaders, A. Kader Siddiqui celebrated the victory day under the baimer of 'Kaderia Bahini'^^^. 
Avoiding AL platform, A. Kader Siddiqui was highlighting the freedom fighters issue in his 
local politics^ . In the infighting of Kader siddiqui vs Shamsur Rahman Khan during 1996-
97, PM Hasina was with Khan to eliminate Kader Siddiq's influence. So, administration was 
helping Khan to reduce the influence of Siddiqui^^^ definitely by the indirect approval of 
Hasina. The police raided the house of Siddiqui on December 1996, arrested one of his 
younger brothers Azad Siddiqui, the local leader of the student wing of AL, and 4 more 
Chatra League leader'^^. On the other hand, Hasina's cousin and Awami Youth League 
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President (AJL) Sheikh Selim MP and his organization extended their weight in favor of A.K. 
Siddiqui in his struggle against his political enemies in Tangail. The reason behind it was that 
A.K. Siddiqui was a close associate of late S. Moni, the founding chairman of AJL and elder 
brother of S. Selim^^^. In an interview to Daily Star, A. Mannan did not hesitate to tell his 
party men terrorist. In an oblique reference to A.K. Siddiqui group, he said, "Terrorism under 
political cover was on for long in Tangail. From early 80s no development work could be 
undertaken in Tangail without the consent of a political group"^^®. On the other hand, in a 
meeting presided over by AJL President S. Selim, most of the AJL leader questioned the 
partial attitude of the administration. They were of the opinion that when there were 
allegations of terrorism against both's A. Kaders men as well as his rivals. Why then houses 
of A. Kaders rival's (Khan and A. Mannan) were not searched^^^. 
Infighting in Dhaka District: For the administrative convenience, Dhaka is divided into two 
parts. One is Dhaka City and another is Dhaka District. Dhaka district is strategically veiy 
important for all political party because of its location. In the 1986 elections, AL candidates 
won in three out of five constituencies of Dhaka districts. But, in the 1991 election, in all the 
constituencies the AL candidates were defeated^^®. The main reason of AL defeat was the 
influence of Dhaka city in the district voters. The district AL was divided into two group. One 
was led by district AL secretary Mostafa Mohsin Montu and the main leaders of another 
group wre district AL president Samsuddha Khan Majlish, Benojir Ahmed, Hazi Manir etc. 
Montu was enjoying maximum support of district AL because of his leadership quality. 
During 1991-92 Montu involved in personality conflict with AL chief Hasina and as a result, 
he had to leave the party. Benazir Ahmed was replaced as district AL secretary in the place of 
Montu, but was not enough eligible to organize the party unit. Except Montu, there was no 
good organizer in Dhaka district unit of AL. District AL president was old and did not have 
organizing quality. At the defection of Montu there was no proper coordination among the 
sub-district units of the party. All the aspirant leaders of the district engaged to form their own 
group. But, when there was absence of organizing quality in themselves, they became self 
declared faction leader having negligible followers. Party was divided into many factions. As 
the local party leaders did not have mentionable popularity, the AL leadership nominated 
some outsiders in all the five seats of Dhaka district to contest the 1996 parliament elections. 
But the local leaders and their followers were not cooperating them by thinking that if the 
outsider MP candidates succeeded in the elections then the local leaders had to loose their 
respective incumbent positions and slowly outsiders would be replaced in their place. As a 
result in the 1996 parliamentary election the party also could not win a single seat from this 
district^^^ Still now the Dhaka district unit of the party was divided into many parts^^^. 
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Chapters 
CONCLUSION 
Conclusion 
A political party is an organization of a group of like-minded men to capture political power 
in constitutional way and to provide justice and well-being/ happiness to the society through 
using its organizational machineries. To govern a country the importance of political parties 
are admirable. Political parties, however, have some common functioning in whatever system 
prevailing in the country. Parties articulate a set of political goals & principles. They organize 
public opinion behind their programs/ principles in an attempt to develop a broad base of 
popular support, recruit workers, train people in the art of leadership, put candidates in the 
elections, campaign to win elections, negotiate to meet the claims of diverse interest groups, 
communicate the leaders to the centers of government power and decision-making through 
elections, and coordinate the fimction of government. The parties are the means through 
which the leaders can communicate with the masses. In third world countries, many political 
parties led the independent movement of the nations to emancipate them from colonial rule. 
Factionalism - by nature factionalism is an intra-group phenomenon. Faction denotes 
a group with an articulated set of goals operation within a larger organization but not created 
by or with approval of parent body. In the context of political parties it aims at party 
organization and power apparatus. 
Factions are different from the political parties in several important ways: Factions are 
composed of shifting alignments, deal with immediate issues and the personal advancement of 
their leaders, but these lack a formal leadership and former hierarchy structure, and also lack 
any declared programs to articulate. By contrast parties have a stable structure and leadership, 
perform regular political functions and tend to formulate consistent programs to articulate. 
> Whereas factions consisted of shifting alignments and personal fellowships, parties 
have a more durable structure consisting of a stable relationship between national 
leaders, sub-leaders, active party workers at the local level and the mass at large. 
> Parties develop procedures for performing key political fimctions such as to capture 
governing power. These procedures include nominating candidates, campaigning in 
elections, and establishing coalitions among disparate groups - the factions do not 
perform these ftmctions. 
> In order to mobilize group interests and appeal to voters, parties develop a broad 
program or statement of principles that lends coherence, focus and continuity to the 
party's activities. By contrast, factions concern themselves only with the immediate 
issues and the advancement of personal careers. 
> Unlike factions, parties in a pluralistic society appeal to a wide range of groups, enjoy 
the support of a relatively large segment of electorate, and have a relatively stable 
following. Party success partly depends, therefore, on bringing together a large 
number of people from all walks of life that identify with the party, not just in a given 
election or on a single issue but over a period of years. A party heavily depends on 
brokerage function and on compromise to bring desperate interests and individuals in 
a working coalition. By the contrast, factions possess a narrower range of group 
support and greater fluidity of aligrmients in the electorate. 
> Parties articulate a set of perspective that develops into an ideology. The perspective 
includes emotional or moral influence of a society; beliefs that develop into faiths and 
identifications emerge as loyalties, ideas of right and wrong become moral 
commitments. Sometimes, the revered charismatic leader's followers accept his ideas, 
preferred customs and way of ruling the country as party ideology. Factions, by 
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contrast, neither develop full-fledged ideologies nor attach emotional symbolism to 
leaders or issues. 
> A head of a party is always a head of one of the factions. 
> It is imperative that though factions are not formally recognized as a party or a group 
inside the party but the dominant faction, not all of the groups together, in a party use 
to operate the party machinery and controls the decision making body. 
Political process can be visualized in two ways: (i) the struggle between the parties for 
governing power, (ii) the conflict between the informal groups for organizational power (i.e. 
the conflict between the factions within the parties). While political scientists are found to 
have by and large concerned themselves with inter-party conflict, very little concern has been 
shown towards conflicts between temporary groups within parties. This has been neglected 
largely due to the fact that political competition has concerned itself with conventional 
political conflict among the parties to acquire power, and political observers use to 
concentrate more on the happening of a nation and its administration or among the nations. 
Informal factional conflicts use to acquire prime importance in the news medias only in such 
situations when the top party leaders of any of the major political parties engage in conflict to 
have the top position of it. When the top party leaders engage in conflict for party leadership, 
the other politicians within the party usually utilize this issue to further their interests and 
position within the party. At the begirming the conflict begins on the issue of personal 
differences, power sharing, and to confirm the leaders top position in the party or government. 
But, when the crisis deepens the top party leaders use to display elements of ideological and 
generational differences etc to manipulate the lower level party leaders and workers' support 
and to hide their selfish motives. The general workers and supporters use to side themselves 
with any of the conflicting factions due to the ideology or personal image of the faction 
leaders or their (workers' or supporters') personal relation with the faction leaders or sub-
leaders. In the final stage of the conflict, the crisis also gradually draws the reluctant local-
level leaders and workers (who are majority in number) into the controversy. Usually the 
reluctant side themselves in the winning faction in the conflict. It is notable that ideological 
and other rationales follow rather than precede the first sign of conflict over power and 
prestige among the senior party leaders. Sometimes conflicts among the groups resolve 
through compromise formula but in many cases due to the intense skirmish between the 
groups the party splits. There may be several factions and sub-factions in the infighting of a 
party but when the crisis reaches to the pinnacle it is always visible that the small factions use 
to merge themselves in one of the major two factions. 
Factionalism, especially in Bangladesh, is not a new phenomenon. It came into being 
since the party politics resumed in this subcontinent. The Congress party and ML in British 
India from the beginning of their formation were factionally divided. In the politics of this 
subcontinent there are unlimited examples of the political leaders' tendency to involve in 
factional infighting, changing of ideology and formation of new parties. Among the pioneer 
leaders Mohammad Ali Jinnah was one. Jinnah began his political career by joining in Indian 
National Congress party. Literally, he was a secular leader and was a stunt supporter of 
Hindu-Muslim unity. He was in favor of separation of politics fi^om religion. In 1921 he 
defected from the congress party protesting its pro-Khelafat movement policies. According to 
him Khilafat movement was an obscurantist communal fundamentalism. But the same man 
Jinnah, when he understood his gloomy future in Indian National Congress Party like that of 
all other careerist leaders to buildup their ovm political fortune, he changed his previous 
allegiance and joined the All Indian Muslim League. Under the clever leadership of Jirmah 
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finally Indian Muslims engaged in Muslim homeland movement and thus Jinnah became the 
Kaid-e-Azam of Pakistan. Jinnah himself was a pro-westem progressive politician. In the 
politics of West Pakistan he did not prefer the Nawabs as his political mate. Rather he 
preferred the limited western educated class and the bureaucrats with him in power. But in the 
case of East Pakistan for the convenience of his personal politics he preferred the publicly 
denounced conservative Nawabs and Zamindars, and deprived the progressive EPML 
leadership from power, who were the vanguard of 'Pakistan movement'. From the feeling of 
deprivation progressive section of EPML left the ML and formed AL, and soon this newborn 
party gave the leadership to the Bengali nationalist movement. 
The year 1971 did not mark the beginning of the infighting in the AL. Nor did 
factionalism originate in the party after Bangladesh gained independence. Since its inception, 
the AL contained within itself two opposite groups. One group led by Hussein Shadid 
Suhrawardy and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was composed of 'pro-Western' liberal democrats. 
The other group was composed of'anti-imperialist' and 'leftist' elements and their leader was 
Maulana Bhasani. Te first split was confirmed in 1957 when the leftists led by Bhasani 
severed their link with AL, in protest of the following of the pro-Western foreign policies by 
AL high command and floated a new party named as National Awami Party (NAP). Another 
serious disagreement between Suhrawardy's two trusted lieutenants Mujibur (General 
Secretary and the undeclared leader of the EPAL) and Ataur Rahman Khan (Vice President 
and Parliamentary leader of EPAL in the provincial parliament and Chief Minister during 
1956-57) on the issue of ftiture party leadership, started since AL's coming to power in 1956 
and continued till the Military's take over of the power in 1958. During 1958 and 1962 the 
party politics were banned in Pakistan. When the Ayub's military regime reintroduced 
political activities at the sudden death of Suhrawardy in December 1963 Sheikh Mujib, the 
leader of strong organizational capability, took the opportunity of the existing leadership 
vacuum and revived the AL in 1964. However many of the old party executives, including 
Ataur Rahman Khan, did not join the newly revived AL and due to his old rivalry Ataur 
Rahman also criticized the attempt of Mujib. Later Ataur Rahman Khan formed his own party 
named Jatia (National) League but it became the party of few leaders without mass following. 
Mujib's charisma soon made the AL the only popular party of this region even after the 
independence of Bangladesh. 
The necessity of partition of hidia in 1947 on the basis of religion, which created 
Pakistan and in the independent Pakistan state the Bengalis struggle against the central elites 
of Pakistan to achieve their self-rule which converted into a fears armed struggle and gave 
birth of the independent Bangladesh - it is described in the first chapter. In the British India, 
Bengali Muslims, the majority community of Bengal was lagging behind the Hindus because 
of their illiteracy and poor economy. In politics and administration their position was virtually 
nil. They needed relief from their disadvantageous position. Both the formation of ML and 
establishment of Dhaka University played a decisive role to mobilize Muslim grievances in 
Bengal. Till 1937 the University of Dhaka created an educated Muslim middle class who gave 
the leadership to the Bengali Muslim in their political struggle. The 1937 provincial election 
made the Bengali Muslims the main force to form Bengal government. After 1937, ML 
acquired tremendous strength in India. The Lahore resolution was passed at 1940 ML 
convention for a separate Muslim homeland scheme, which assured cultural, political and 
economic leadership for the Muslims. The resolution created religious zeal among the Indian 
Muslims and united them in the ML platform to achieve Pakistan. The Bengali Muslims 
joined the Pakistan movement to achieve political, economic and social freedom from 
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colonial exploitation as well as from the minority Bengali Hindu domination. In 1946 election 
ML fought for only issue, the independent Muslim homeland Pakistan, and the demand 
transformed into a rallying cry in East Bengal. The Muslims overwhelmingly voted the 
League for it. Pakistan was bom on 14 August 1946. It was the first phase of Bengalis 
liberation movement. The second phase of liberation struggle began when the majority 
Bengali masses saw that their dream of self-rule was shattered in the newly formed P^istan 
state; they found them under another colonial and minority rule; only the former British and 
Hindu masters are replaced by the West Pakistani political elites. From the very beginning of 
independence the Bengalis started struggle for political equality and economic justice in the 
form of autonomous movement. Due to the language controversy, economic disparity 
between the two provinces and misrule of West Pakistani ruling elite dominated government, 
ML lost its popularity. In this circumstance the politically deprived faction of EPML under 
the leadership of Bhasani and Suhrawardy defected ML and formed AL in 1949. From its 
origin AL was championing for full regional autonomy of East Bengal. Its sub-nationalist 
appeal turned it into the most popular political force within few years of its inception. It 
became the largest partner of United Front (UF) and eliminated the ML from East Bengal in 
the provincial election of 1954. But through conspiracy and subtle dealing Pakistani ruling 
elites removed the Bengalis from power. In 1958 the military regime of Ayub Khan captured 
the state power. In 1962, Ayub regime allowed open politics in Pakistan. Meanwhile 
Suhrawardy died and Mujib took over the AL leadership. Since then AL showed less interest 
in Pakistan and directed all its attention towards the problems of East Bengal. To save the 
Bengalis from the dominion and subjugation of West Pakistan based ruling elites in 1966 
Mujib formulated a 6-point autonomous demand and launched a vigorous agitation to realize 
the demand, which extensively changed the nature and direction of Pakistan politics. Bengali 
sub-nationalist movement gathered momentum. In 1969 a mass upsurge toppled the Ayub 
regime. Gen. Yahya Khan took over the power from Ayub and held the first general election 
of Pakistan. In the 1970 polls the Mujib led AL won a landslide victory. But the Pakistani 
power wilders most blatantly denied the AL its legitimate claim to form the central 
government of Pakistan. Instead they began genocide in East Bengal on March 1971 and 
forced the Bengalis to engage in a liberation war. This struggle was hard long and costly. It 
eventually culminated the emergence of independent Bangladesh in December 1971. 
The first AL regime, in the newly liberated Bangladesh, introduced parliamentary 
democracy to govern the country. However the system did not last long. Rejecting the liberal 
democratic model the same party elites introduced a one party authoritarian rule in 
January1975. However the Mujib regime was overthrown by a military putsch in August 
1975. Since then for 15 years the military rulers governed Bangladesh. The parliamentary 
democracy was reinstalled in 1991 after the fall of Ershad regime. However the second 
chapter of the study totally concentrated on the analysis of the political parties and party 
system of Bangladesh. 
Most of the parties, here, are personality oriented with followers clustering around the 
political leaders, who in tern became dictatorial leaders. The mass based political parties are 
popular, not due to their ideologies or organizing capability. Rather the major parties of 
Bangladesh, AL, BNP and JP are identified with the charisma or personal image of their 
leaders Mujib, Zia and Ershad. The leadership of the major political parties come fi-om the 
family kinship of former charismatic leaders of the respective parties and still the remaining 
appeal of two dead charisma, Mujib and Zia, are the main source of strength of the major two 
parties to assemble support base in their party fold. Except AL, BNP, JP and Jammat all the 
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political parties are urban based. All the parties are more or less suffering from factional 
conflict and defection. In power, the parlies try to impose moderate dictatorial rule over the 
people and argue more authoritarian power for an effective and stable regime; but in 
opposition, the same parties demand for maximum democracy. No party practice democracy 
in their internal forum. Lacking of discipline is also visible in the internal party politics. Only 
a few left wing parties practice internal democracy but they don't have any influence in the 
election politics of the country. The ruling and opposition parities feel themselves rival to 
each other rather than partners in governing the country. The parties are more for agitation 
politics than to constitutional politics. This tendency of them is responsible for sad political 
disarray in Bangladesh. To dominate street politics both the ruling and opposition parties 
depend on their student wings, the most effective political force in Bangladesh. 
After the fall of communist block all the parties more or less adopted free economy in 
their party ideology. Now political parties depend on two type of propaganda in extending 
their support base: AL and the pro-left parties highlight secularist views. Side by side AL also 
show respect to the moderate Islamic feelings of the masses. AL always highlights its 
spearheading role in the liberation war of Bangladesh. On the other hand BNP, JP, Jammat 
and all other pro-Islamic parties propagate anti-Indian and pro-Islamic views. Whereas the 
BNP and JP want to be limited by making Islam as the state religion but the other Islam based 
parties promise to declare Bangladesh an Islamic State and establish Quranic law in the 
country. The civil-military bureaucrats, businessmen and politicians are dominant in the BNP 
and JP leadership. But AL and Jammat leadership is formed with the professional politicians. 
A number of Islamic clerics are also included in Jammat rank. To survive in power all the 
ruling parties need to share power with the civil-military elites. The influence of the middle 
class was reflected in different party leadership till 1975. Now the urban-based wealthy class 
of the society, who doesn't have any connection with the rural masses, occupies all the 
parties' top-positions. 
From its inception Bangladesh preferred multi-party system for itself. About two 
hundred political parties existence are detected in Bangladesh. Except few maximum exists 
merely in names and without having mass following. The presence of so many political 
parties in such a small country reveals the weakness of Bangladesh politics. Majority of the 
parties in Bangladesh evolved from factionalism and division and sub-division of the major 
parties such as ML, AL, CPEP, NAP and BNP etc. Among the many only AL, BNP, JP and 
Jammat are having party offices in every district towns, respectable support base allover the 
country and good representation in the parliament. Actually AL and BNP are dominating 
Bangladesh politics with the JP and Jammat (much smaller than the big two) holding the 
balance. The voters are also mainly polarized behind the two major camps. 
A stable and workable party system is synonymous with a constitutional government. 
The main reason of limits of democracy in Bangladesh is the frequent military intervention in 
state power. Till 1990 these military juntas were the real threat to the practice of democracy in 
Bangladesh. In different military regimes bid to legitimize their illegal power through 
civilianizing the military regimes they form their own political parties by merging those small 
political parties. In this process many opportunist leaders formed their personality-oriented 
parties by splitting the original one in a bid to join the ruling party. As a result the major 
parties lost thek organizational strength, their support base were divided. The other reasons of 
the split and factionalism in the political parties are: the opportunistic nature of the politicians; 
the ruling parties encouragement of infighting and splits in opposition parties to weaken the 
anti-regime agitation and to strengthen their party fold by merging the breakaway factions of 
the opposition parties; the liberal recruitment policies of the mass based parties; leadership 
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aspiration, ideological differences, egoistic and personality conflict etc of the politicians. 
These things always hindered to build a healthy party system in Bangladesh. If a political 
system is developed by the domination of few parties and the public become conscious about 
their political rights then it will be difficult for the illegitimate occupation of power by 
military juntas. There is the need to create public awareness against such mushrooming of 
splinter and small political parties for the growth of a healthy party system in Bangladesh. 
The third chapter dealt with the AL organization and its activities. AL is the oldest and 
largest mass based political party in Bangladesh, formed in 1949. Since its inception the party 
became the exponent of Bengali nationalism and won the first general election of Pakistan in 
1970. It led the successful liberation war in 1971. In the liberated Bangladesh it formed the 
first government. In the history of Bangladesh it won peoples verdict for two times in 1973 
and 1996 to rule the coimtry and for the remaining years it always was the main opposition 
party. Now it is in opposition. It is strongly organized with branches and front wings in all 
over Bangladesh. It is developed as a broad based political party including diverse elements in 
its party fold fi:om extreme left to extreme right and moderates, from poor peasants to rich 
business people and high-ranking bureaucrats, all type of professional people etc. Today it is 
an umbrella organization of all strata of people to fulfill their socio-economic and political 
goals. The party stands for four basic principals: nationalism, socialism, democracy and 
secularism. The secular progressive section of the masses, believer of secular-Bengali 
nationalism, a large section of freedom fighters and the religious minority groups are known 
as its vote-bank. 
The AL Central Working Committee (CWC) headed by party President is the topmost 
administrative organ in the party power structure and the village committees consist of 
primary members are working in its bottom. Among the permanent party members one small 
group of activists are known as careerist and they usually challenge the existing leadership, 
which leads factionalism in AL. The central AL power structure is made up of six parts: 
Bangladesh AL Council, National Committee, CWC, Presidium, Parliamentary Party and 
Parliamentary Board. The most powerful body of the party is the AL National Council (NC). 
The NC has the constitutional right to elect the central bodies of the party but party chief 
personally nominates all the executive committee members including the party GS. All the 
administrative powers of the party have been centralized in her hand and made her 
authoritarian leader of the party. Hasina has the final word on making the key decisions. All 
the party leaders have been just following her to secure their position in AL. Hasina faced no 
real challenge in her authority until now, although there is many subtle groupings prevailing 
in the top body AL. The AL leadership presents dual characteristics: it is democratic in 
appearance and authoritarian in reality. When the party does not practice internal democracy 
in its own body then how it will practice democracy in the national level- it is the dilemma 
that Bangladeshi people are facing. For the implementation and supervision of the party 
programs, and to expand its influence allover the country AL has its various branch 
committees, spread in district to village level comprised with experienced and dedicated party 
workers. As a result even though the party was out of power for long 21 years (1975 to 1996) 
it was able to sustain sound foimdations in allover Bangladesh. Contrary to the central body 
the lower level committees are elected democratically. To consolidate its position among 
different interest groups of the society AL also has its front organizations among the peasants, 
women, labors, youths, students etc. Some of these front organizations of AL like student and 
youth league play vital role to strengthen anti-government movement- when the party is in 
opposition; when the party is in power they engage in materializing the party promises to the 
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people. However these front organizations are heavily depend on AL for financial assistance 
and intellectual advice to run their respective organizations. All the lower unit and front 
organization members have natural tendency to be the big leader of AL. For that in their 
respective units they engage in leadership competition. Always these competitions turn to 
factional conflict. Because of ideological or personal relations with the top-brass party leaders 
the conflict of the centre always spread to the front and lower units of the party both 
horizontally and vertically. 
The AL leadership: From the beginning AL leadership has been drawn from various 
groups and interest of Bengali society; from left to right; moderates and radicals; surplus 
farmers from rural areas and lawyers, rich business peoples, trade union leaders, student 
leaders and professionals from urban areas. During 1949 to 1975 AL leadership were drown 
basically from the middle class people. Since 1986 this trend is changed. Now AL mobilized 
the support of various groups of the people, but the top party leaders and parliamentarians of 
the party represents the urban wealthy class of the society - who don't have real contact with 
the village people. Money plays an important role to run an organization a party, to confirm 
an election victory and on economic power the local allegiances rested. The emergence of the 
affluent class in the AL leadership fiilfilled the economic needs for its organizational activities 
and the party is now able to put solvent candidates to ensure election win. 96% of the central 
party leaders elected in the 1997 ALNC meeting are graduate and post-graduate degree 
holders and 94% are having above 40 years political experience. The 1996 election triumph 
showed the foresightness of this generation AL leadership who are much more educated, 
experienced and pragmatic in their policy-making. Although the party lost the 2001 election 
against a coalition of all major parties including BNP, JP and Jammat, its vote bank increased 
remarkably from 37.5% in the 1996 election to more than 40% in the 2 0 0 1 B u t only 24% of 
the top brass leaders have more than three times legislative experience and even 18% of the 
leaders don't have any legislative experience; it showed their collective inefficiency in the 
electoral politics, their weakness in organizing public support for AL platform. 
In the liberated Bangladesh from the beginning the party faced internal factional 
conflict due to the heterogeneous character and wide internal differences of the top brass 
leaders. But Mujibs charisma was enough to glue the different factions together. After his 
death during 1975-80 again and again the party faced intense factionalism and splits and the 
party leaders were also failed to show their previous efficiency to mobilize people under AL 
banner in the absence of any alternative charismatic leader. In this grave situation Hasina was 
made the AL president as the leader of consensus. In her years in office the party also faced 
internal conflict and split for three times. Some small groups are still present in the party but 
none has the strength to challenge the leadership of Hasina. Now she has her frill command 
over the party. 
Party Propaganda: AL has its socio-economic and political programs for national 
development. The effective party set up and its modem propaganda machineries are involved 
in popularizing the party programs, in increasing its support base and recruiting new dynamic 
workers group from all strata of Bangladesh society. However the party is still depending 
heavily on the image of its dead leader Mujib and its past leading role in the liberation war to 
maintain its support base. Still the party highlights 'Mujib and Bengali nationalist movement' 
in the public meetings and processions, postering, distribution of handbills and leaflets etc to 
sustain its image in the mass. During the election season the intensively of the party's 
propaganda activities increase mentionable. Internal factionalism and splits in the party create 
The Hindu, 29 October 2001. 
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confiision in the masses about its competence. To eradicate the confusion from the public 
mind and to save the party image from damaging opposition propaganda through the pro-AL 
newspapers and arranging public meetings the party provide own version of information to 
the masses. The party leaders also engage in intensive mass contact programs, they visit 
whole of the country, arrange workers as well as public meeting, personally meet the lower 
level leaders and workers to sustain its workers and support base alter aJiy split. 
The fourth chapter dealt with the factional politics of Bangladesh Awami League. The 
study tried to find out the causes and consequences of the factionalism and splits in AL. 
On 25 March 1971, the Pakistani military junta attacked the unarmed Bengali masses 
in the eastern province of Pakistan to demolish their autonomous aspiration. Once the 
genocide was started the Bengali involved in liberation struggle under the leadership of AL to 
bring their long cherished political and economical emancipation. From the beginning of the 
war the neighboring country India delivered all kinds of help and support needed. The 
legendary, imdisputed, charismatic leader of East Bengal Mujib was arrested on the first night 
of the freedom struggle by the Pakistani junta. He could not recognize any second leader in 
the party before his detention; thus a power competition was natural in the AL leadership in 
his absence. Once the genocide started, politically astute Tajuddin, in the absence of Mujib 
quickly moved forward to seize the opportunity of the leadership vacuum. To fulfill his 
ambition he went to Delhi before anyone could reach there, met the Indian government to ask 
help in the liberation war and announced himself as the PM of the Exiled Bangladesh 
Government without any prior discussion with any of the top party leaders. Indian 
government acknowledged his claim to be the PM as he was the GS of AL. The shrewd move 
strengthened Tajuddin's leadership position in the party but the other top leaders of AL were 
dissatisfied in him during the rest of the war. The reason is that among the six-member inner 
circle of Mujib, Tajuddin was third in the party lineup. Nazrul was second just after Mujib. 
Mansur Ali, Kamruzzaman and Khondoker Mustaq were the fourth, fifth and sixth 
respectively. Mustaq was the senior most among all. However considering the bigger issues of 
the liberation of Bangladesh the top leaders approved of Tajuddin as the PM and formed the 
cabinet of the Exiled Bangladesh Government. But Mustaq could not ever give up his dream 
to be the PM and continued demonstrating open propaganda against Tajuddin throughout the 
war. Mustaq was pro-USA and pro-Islamic leader; he was against the independence and in 
favor of maximum autonomy of East Bengal. As his anti-liberation conspiracy was revealed, 
he became cornered in the power competition. The forerunners of the power competition were 
the leaders of the student and youth wings of AL. Mujib Bahini leader and Mujib's nephew. 
Sheikh Moni, was representing them. The liberation war was both political and armed 
struggle. The student-youths of AL had become famous for their sacrifice and bravery during 
the autonomous movement (1966-70) and in the liberation war they were the front force to 
fight the enemy. Eventually they started to believe that in the absence of Mujib they should 
lead the war as his second in command. With this in their mind this group with Mustaq and 
others engaged in infighting to overthrow Tajuddin from his PM position. In the power 
conflict Nazrul maintained soft relation with the Mujib Bahini leaders by contemplating that 
in future if any sudden change occurred in the Exiled Goverrmient he might come to the 
forefront. Two regional groups were also engaged in the power competition: one North 
Bengal group led by Kamnzzzaman and another group comprised of the MPs of southern part 
of Bangladesh. Mizan Chowdhuiy, the Joint Secretary of AL, joined the anti-Tajuddin lobby 
to be the GS of the party by ousting Tajuddin from the post. The personal ambition of 
different faction leaders about to endangered the issue of independence but the timely and 
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astute interference of Indian authority helped to lead the Bengalis liberation struggle to a 
successful end. The role and interest of Indian government was as controller and long-term. 
To keep Indian control over the Bangladesh issues the Indian administration also sustained the 
inner conflicts within the AL, and helped the youths of AL to form parallel force (Mujib 
Bahini), side by side the Exiled Bangladesh government led liberation force, to fight the 
liberation war^. However, they were always with the Exiled Bangladesh Government and 
tried to confirm that the post-independent Bangladesh government should be a pro-Indian one. 
Both pro-Soviet parties NAP (M) and CPB recognized leftist Tajuddin as PM, and 
international support was needed for the independence therefore despite all the oppositions he 
survived as the PM during the war. After nine months of bloody war Bengalis achieved their 
expected victory on 16 December 1971, under the leadership of Tajuddin. Of course the first 
Bangladesh government was pro-Indian. Even though AL very efficiently conducted the war 
but in the absence of unanimous leader Mujib, conflicts and divisions cropped up within the 
wartime AL leadership, it could not avoid the impact of that even after the war. During the 
war the reasons of power conflicts inside AL were: high ambitions of the young leaders, the 
discords of the senior leaders over their positions in the wartime government and their 
prestige issues. 
Students and Youths had made immense sacrifice in the Bengali nationalist movement 
in Pakistan. Therefore after liberation the youths were having an ambitious tendency to 
influence the politics of the government and that created conflicts between them and the 
governing AL party. Bangabandhu Mujib was the heart of AL in the newly independent 
Bangladesh. The students and youth had enormous faith in him, but they had conflicted 
opinion about the rest of the political leaders and their ideology even before the liberation. In 
the pre-liberation CL there was the presence of two groups: (i) the socialist A. Rob-Siraj 
group was the follower of Sirajul Alam Khan, the unannounced philosopher and guide of the 
youths; (ii) the moderate Siddik-Makhon group opposed the socialistic notion, and the power 
behind them was Sheikh Moni. During the war the majority radical CL workers made Khan's 
leadership strong vice versa Moni was unsuccessful to strengthen his position. The conflict 
between S.A. Khan and Moni was to establish a solo leadership and Khan was clever enough 
to present this conflict as an ideological conflict. In the post-independent Bangladesh, Khan 
led dominant radical student-youth faction of AL called on Mujib to build a socialist national 
revolutionary government. But Mujib believed in parliamentary democracy and ignored the 
call. However he agreed to establish a socialist economy for the country. But the radical 
youths reftised to step down from their revolutionary demand. They tried to implement 
"scientific socialism" within CL. In this time Moni thought that it was intelligent to side with 
his uncle Mujib in the factional game. Moni came up with a new ideology called 'Mujibbad' 
(Mujibism), a democratic-socialist system to introduce in Bangladesh, in contrast to the 
scientific socialism. A. Razzak and Tofael Ahmed were the two main pillars of Moni group. 
Thus CL was divided into two major groups through the debate over the ftjture governmental 
system of the newly independent Bangladesh. 
The dilemma of CL and JL also spread in AL. From the CL the AL leaders picked up 
the slogan of Mujibbad. But Tajuddin opposed Mujibbad, helped and encouraged the 
'scientific socialists' with money and other needs. At the beginning of this ideological debate 
Mujib had neutral posture. Still he was undisputed to all. But when in July 1972, both the 
groups of CL had two different conventions and Mujib attended in the Mujibbadi group 
Moni led youth group was the second choice for the Indian authority, if by any chance the senior leaders of AL 
were unable to lead the war Moni group would be the alternative group to do the job. 
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convention, as its chief guest, CL was officially spitted. The conflict also officially divided 
the other front organizations of AL, the Bangladesh Krishak League (BKL) and Jatia Sramik 
League (JSL). Finally on 31 October 1972 the rebel sons of Mujib floated a new political 
party Jatio Samajtantric Dal (JSD) with Abdur Rob and Major M.A. Jalil as the GS and 
President respectively. However the newly formed party was revolving around Khan as their 
center. Though the ancillary wings of A1 were divided due to the formation of JSD, the main 
body AL remained intact. Some of the AL leaders at the beginning of the split had different 
opinions but at the end they stayed in AL. 
Inspired by socialist slogans instantly a good number of true patriots and the honest 
freedom fighters gathered under the JSD flag. When there was no one to utter a word of 
opposition against Mujib, the JSD emerged as strong political party vindicating people's 
grievances against the AL regime. The banned right wing party workers also attended their 
meetings to enlarge the crowds. JSD tried to use famine of 1974 and social instability to 
remove AL regime from power. Encouraged by the primary success in the protests-strikes on 
17 March 1974, JSD announced a countrywide mass movement. However because of AL 
regimes coercive actions, the whole revolution went astray. From the very begining the party 
was involved in both open politics and armed insurgency and after the failure of March 
agitation, the JSD tilted towards armed politics. It eventually isolated the JSD from general 
public and made it weak. Thus JSD entangled itself in the wrong political decisions one after 
another. Therefore due to the uprooting strategy of AL and subsequent BNP regimes most of 
the dedicated JSD workers lost their life or were imprisoned. Out of fhistration a major part of 
the JSD workers engaged in anti-social and terrorist activities and thus became even more 
isolated from the public and started conflicts within the party and eventually split into several 
small parties. Ahmed Sofa wrote, "The name of JSD still exists but there is nothing more left 
there. There are so many skeleton of it roaming around as ghosts"^. Islam commented, "The 
slogans in 1972 to overthrow Mujib in short was imprudence and in exact meaning was an act 
which was favorable to fulfill the desire of imperialism"'^. The wrong politics of JSD, (1) gave 
an easy way to kill Mujib, (2) gave the military an easy access to politics (3) gave the 
opportunity to the anti-independence rightist party to be organized and (4) divided the pro-
liberation pavilion and as a result right after the independence the people lost their spirit of the 
freedom fight, which spirit was very essential to rebuild the country. The whole nation paid 
heavily for the wrongftxl politics of JSD. However, the high ambition and conflicts between 
Khan and Moni was responsible for the split in CL. 
Though in the establishment of personal leadership Moni could not do better in the 
opposition of Khan but by sided with his uncle Mujib against Khan for the time being he was 
succeeded in establishing his supremacy over the student and youth wing of AL. But the 
appeal of Mujibism could not secure the party from further factional conflict. After the 
departure of Khan from AL, Moni founded JL in 1972. A. Razzak and Tofael were left to 
guide CL. In 1973 CL council, during the selection of the new CL central committee leaders, 
Moni engaged in conflict with A.Razzak-Tofael and provided a counter committee. As Mujib 
recognizeed the A. Razzak-Tofael supported CL committee, the Moni supported committee 
faced natural death. This event was a red signal for highly ambitious Moni; his calculation 
was that A. Razzak and Tofael left him behind in the political game. A. Razzak was the 
organizing secretary of AL at the time and in ftiture Mujib would make him the GS of AL in 
fiiture. Mujib at present made Tofael his Political Secretary probably to make him the nest 
^ Ahmed Shafa, "Rajnitir Lekha", p.48 
Nazrul Islam, "Jashoder Rajnitir Nikot Bislation (The Close Analysis of JSD politics)", p. 140 
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PM of Bangladesh after him. In this situation Moni was doubtfiil of his future leadership. 
From then though there was no ideological difference between CL and JL but as the CL and 
JL were administering by Moni and his rival A. Razzaq-Tofael. The rival youth leaders 
engagement in conflict to establish their personal position in the future power structure of AL 
spread a constant animosity between CL and JL leaders and workers. Since the conflict started 
both the groups leaders and supporters engaged in sladering each other in public savagely. 
The conflict between the two daughter organizations also spread in their parent body AL and 
its lower units. As a result the party was internally divided up to the grassroots level. The 
factionally divided AL leaders encouraged the ugly fight between those two ancillary 
organizations for their personal interests. At the extreme of conflict seven pro-Moni CL 
activists was murdered by that time pro-Tofael CL GS Shafml Alam Pradhan and his 
colleagues. From outside ultra radical 'Sarbahara Party' was using Pradhan to create conflict 
and division in AL family. Only after the seven murders AL leaders understood the gravity 
that the infighting was going to affect the whole politics of AL. Thus Mujib personally 
negotiated between the two rival groups. 
JL President Sheikh Moni also was a central committee leaser of Jatia Sramik league 
(SL). In the 1974 biennial council of SL, Moni also had conflict with A. Mannan over the 
formation of new JSL committee. Tough Abdul Marman previously joined Moni in his 
"purification campaign" but he became resentful of Moni's growing support among the 
labors. Moni was pretty much involved in the internal politics of the ancillary organizations of 
AL and eventually his conflicts with all of them were increasing. 
The attack of Moni and JL was not limited against CL, SL and Tajuddin, eventually 
they became the strong critic of AL. In 1974, they hold the leaders of AL responsible for that 
time famine, economic ills and the decline of the law and order of the country. JL chief Moni 
described the AL leaders except for Mujib as corrupts and traitors. Moni accused that the AL 
President Kamruz Zaman at the time, the Dhaka city AL president Gazi Golam Mustafa and 
some other notable AL leaders were involved in conspiracy to demolish the JL. In the middle 
of 1974 the relationship of JL with AL declined to a dangerous level over the question of 
controlling regional politics and it also spread into the grassroots level. In this time Moni 
announced that JL had no connection with nor did it owes its allegiance to any body in AL 
except for Bangabandhu Mujib. 
The conflicts between CL and JL, the two ancillary organizations of AL, and their 
trying to abuse each other damaged the reputation of Mujib and his regime extremely. It 
reduced the popularity of AL in the masses, provided issues to the opposition to criticize AL. 
Chowdhury commented that if the AL leaders could restrain their dependents from infighting 
then the unity of the nation during the freedom fight would be intact; they could make general 
public to do the impossible good for the country^. 
In 1974, following the JL the student and labor wing of the AL also engaged in 
criticizing AL leaders for the anarchy, corruption and the deteriorating law and order of the 
country. Side by side the opposition parties some CL elements also organized protests-
marched against high prices of the essential goods and government corruptions. On August 
1974, CL released a long list of corrupt leaders. Which was included many of the opposition 
and governing party leaders. Moni's name was mentioned in it. In these days like JL, all the 
ancillary organizations separately announced that only they were the real soldiers of Mujib, 
but they were in no mood to tolerate each other. They wanted Mujinb among them because 
they knew that in his absence all of their existence could be in jeopardy, and only his 
^ Zohur Hossain Chowdhury, "Darbar-e- Zohur"; Daily Songbad, 20 April 1977. 
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attachment with them could assure the fulfillment of their political ambitions. In the post 
liberation period the differences among various party factions seemed to be irreconcilable. 
These persistent internal conflicts and rift in AL family aggravated the situation, weakened its 
strength. This internal conflict rather than opposition agitation was the main challenge of the 
AL's stability. 
Factionalism in the main body AL: In the pre-liberation Bangladesh Mujib's AL was 
an umbrella organization. To achieve their autonomous aspiration, the people of different age 
group, profession and ideology- from left to right, moderate and extremist- joined in it 
without any discrimination. With these heterogeneous characteristics infighting in AL was 
natural. Moreover among the young larders, who were included in the post-independent 
ALWC and were allowed to run CL, JL and SL, political ambition was extreme. The senior 
AL leaders were not fi-ee from power conflict but the reasons were personality and prestige 
issue rather than that of political ambition. Until 1975, their concern was about their 
leadership positions in the party hierarchy after Mujib. 
During the liberation war the Bengali masses were united behind AL, but in the 
absence of Mujib AL was a divided house. After returning to the independent Bangladesh, 
PM Tajuddin enlarged his cabinet to alleviate the discontent in the party. But it failed to 
reduce the conflicts much. All knew the political rivalry between Tajuddin and Mushtaq. By 
this reshuffle Mustaq was given less important portfolio in cabinet; he was downgraded and 
was resented. However in this transitional period, the key factions within AL were: (1) the 
Indo-Soviet group led by Tajuddin (supported by pro-Moscow NAP [M] and CPB), (2) pro-
western groups led by Sayed Nazrul Islam and Khandakar Mustaq Ahmed (two separate 
groups led by the two leaders but had the same motivation), (3) the centrist group led by 
Kamruz zaman (supported by the MPs of northern Bangladesh), (4) a group of AL leaders, 
such as Mansur Ali and Zillur Rahman, who committed to Mujib instead of forming their own 
factions and (5) various other groups within AL led by youth leaders of the party. Though 
there was factional competition among the second, third, fourth and fifth factions but all the 
four groups other than PM's one, were always united against Tajuddin's PM-ship during the 
pre and post-war periods. The grip of the Tajuddinn regime was weakening. Despite the 
infighting inside AL, all the factions were inclined to work under Mujib's leadership. 
Mujib was freed from Pakistani jail on January 1972. Till his return Mujib was the 
President of Bangladesh in absentia. On 12 January 1972 Mujib steppes dovra from the 
Presidency and assumed the PM's position (rejecting a Ghandi type role in the government 
that some AL members including Tajuddin expected him to play) and made Justice Abu 
Sayed Chowdhury the president of Bangladesh. In independent Bangladesh Mujib first tried 
to confirm his absolute control over the party and the government. In his endeavor to gain 
confidence of the dynamic youths Mujib started giving privilege to them over his old 
colleagues in the important positions of the party and administration. He nominated 92 fresh-
bloods in the place of corrupt senior leaders to contest the 1973 parliamentary elections. In the 
1972 AL council, depriving the seniors Mujib made comparatively young Zillur Rahman the 
party GS. A. Razaak was designated as Organizing Secretary. Ultimately, ex CL leaders A. 
Razzaq and Tofael were employed by Mujib to oversee the organizing part of the party. 
Through the National Councils of 1972 and 1973, many youth leaders from the CL and JL got 
position in the central committee. Because of the patronage of Mujib the young leaders were 
becoming dominant in all parts of the administration very quickly. By this input of fresh 
bloods, Mujib confirmed his absolute control over the party. In the 1973 council of AL Mujib 
left the party presidency of AL and replaced Kamruz Zaman in his position. 
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After becoming the PM, Mujib included some more face in his cabinet to contain 
some of the discontents among the faction leaders. On leadership distribution issue leaders 
like Nazrul Islam wanted that the pre-war party hierarchy remains intact. Some of them even 
wanted to deny the heroic role of Tajuddin in the liberation war. Opposing it Tajuddin wanted 
the leadership distribution according to the contributions of leaders during the liberation war. 
In the new cabinet of Mujib, Nazrul Islam, the Vice President of the wartime government, 
was given the position of first senior minister and was made the deputy leader of the 
Parliament. Tajuddin held the position of the second senior minister and was made Finance 
Minister. Even though Tajuddin expected to have the position of the first senior minister i.e. 
the second position in the cabinet just after Mujib, but Mujib kept him in the same pre-war 
position of the party hierarchy. The importance of Tajuddin was greatly diminished. Some 
saw in tlie change a deliberate downgrading ol"Tajuddin. Mujib rehabilitated Muslaq with 
dignity, gave him the important ministry of electricity, irrigation, and flood control. 
In the post independent Bangladesh Tajuddin was a socialist. He was pro-Indian, pro-
USSR and rabidly anti-USA. He was against of accepting any US assistance in rebuilding the 
war-ravaged coimtry. Whereas Mustaq preferred the support of the capitalist block especially 
of USA would be accepted; he was pro-USA, anti-Indian and a religious Muslim. He was 
keen to build firm relations with the USA and the Muslim countries. Unlike Tajuddin and 
Mustaq, Mujib had no reservation about any country from where the help comes. Bengali 
needed help on a scale that perhaps only a worldwide response could meet. Nazrul was a 
centrist with regards to economic policy. He was grateftil to India and the USSR for their help 
during the war, but also was favoring to get western help in rebuilding the country. Kamruz 
Zaman, Monsur Ali, Miza, Sheikh Abdul Aziz and maximum of the AL leaders were also 
having the same attitude. S.A. Aziz and Mizan Chowdhury, though the believers of secular 
principles, were deeply interested in having good relationship with the oil rich Muslim 
countries. Under the leadership of Nazrul Isalam and Mustaq, the right v^ng lobby in AL was 
favoring of a democratic Bangladesh where private ownership would be secured. Whereas, 
Tajuddin wanted a socialist government in Bangladesh with nationalized economy - it was 
the ideological conflict among them. Tajuddin wanted a second position just after Mujib but 
Nazrul-Mustaq-Kamruzzaman-Mansur all disagreed with it - it was a conflict of prestige 
among the senior leaders of AL. Actually the AL was a heterogeneous party. Mustaq and 
Tajuddin represented two wings of it. 
It was the reality, before 1971 Tajuddin was simply a trusted and loyal follower of 
Mujib. In the absence of Mujib in 1971 as his lieutenant Tajuddin ran the war and became the 
wartime-hero. Mujib's popularity gave Tajuddin the opportunity to be in the position that he 
was at. But a big change was seen between the pre-war and post-war attitude of Tajuddin. For 
long one year Tajuddin was handling enormous political power and became habituated with 
applaud of the media and press. Now he was not ready to be satisfied by feeling him as one of 
the prominent lieutenants of Mujib. Rather he claimed the recognition of his work. Moreover 
since the wartime he wanted to move the AL politics from the middle to toward the left. Soon 
after independence, he tried to establish socialist order and an all-party revolutionary 
government in Bangladesh by comprising leftist parties with AL, tried to implement secular 
views by replacing Islamic practices and values in the state affairs, wanted to build a National 
Para Militia similar to China type of Peoples Army etc. But as Mujib turn down Tajuddin's 
planning and re-established the pre-independent party lineup. Thus Tajuddin and his 
associates felt ignored. Soon Tajuddin engaged in power conflict with Mujib. In opposite of 
the Mujibism of the pro-Mujib youth group he supported 'Scientific Socialism'. In the 
rebuilding of Bangladesh, Mujib accepted the help of the capitalist countries including USA, 
509 
Tajuddin openly criticized this initiative. In 1974 from inside the government Finance 
Minister Tajuddin criticized the AL regime; blamed Mujib and his misguided policies for the 
1974 famine. From Mujib's perspective it was a challenge to his authority and prestige but 
from Tajuddin's perspective it was a way of getting the recognition of his work that he 
deserves, at the same time it was a way to advance one more step to fulfill his high political 
ambition. But Mujib's authority was supreme in AL. Through these developments, Tajuddin 
got into a conflict with whole of the AL family in general which created disagreements and 
factions within AL. These weakened the party both internally and externally; tarnished its 
image in public. In the internal politics of AL especially Moni-Mizan-Mustaq camps were 
always united against Tajuddin. hi this situation this lobby, and the youth leaders demanded 
immediate resignation of Tajuddin. By his criticism Tajuddin helped his rivals to engage 
Mujib against him and confirmed his own exit from the government in October 1974 and 
before of that in 1972 he was already removed from the GS post of the party. After 1974 
Tajuddin did not hold any important post in AL or in cabinet. Tajuddin was close to the JSD 
leaders but they were not ready to share power with him. Tajuddin was also afraid that if he 
joined the JSD he would be only used by the radicals, would not be honored properly. For the 
fear that Mujib would demolish his political career if he joined the opposition, instead of 
forming a new party or joining any other party, he remained in AL without any dignified 
position. He was not even included in Mujib's socialist BAKSAL government in 1975. As 
wartime PM he had been very spirited, but he was now a broken man. 
After Mujib, Tajuddin was the most influential person in the post independent AL 
politics. But Moni wanted to be the heir of his uncle Mujib and he was relentlessly active to 
secure his position in the national politics of AL and here since 1971 Tajuddin was the main 
headache of him. He was always inimical to Tajuddin. Tajuddin's sudden fall dawn from 
mainstream politics was happy news to Moni. Still he was facing competition from: (i) the CL 
that was controlled by A. Razzaq and Tofael, who previously supported him in his fight 
against Tajuddin and Khan; (ii) the senior AL leaders who were close to Mujib and had strong 
base in the party and in administration. 
Like Tajuddin when Mijan Chowdhury, Mujib's cabinet minister, was asked by Mujib 
to resign, he did so without public protest. Following Mizan because of the allegation of 
corruption Shamsul Huq and M.R. Siddiqui were dropped from Mujib's cabinet. Mollah Jalal 
Uddin, Amirul Islam, Osmani, Mofiz Chwdhury and many were also dropped. But in public 
none of dare to show their discontent. All of the AL leaders depended for their political 
survival on the support of Mujib. 
In the parliamentary type of government the President is a titular head of the state. As 
the President was not assigned any administrative power Abu Sayeed Chowdhury, the then 
president, was unhappy. The other reasons of the President's discontent were that, PM Mujib 
and his cabinet members did not show proper respect to the President in different state affairs. 
An ideological difference was also developed between PM Mujib and pro-democrat President 
Sayeed in 1974 as day-by-day Mujib started showing his inclination towards socialism. That 
time contemporary Bangladesh society was also responsible in creating difference between 
the President and the PM as they were giving more protocol to Mujib instead of the President. 
It was also right as the 'Father of the Nation' Mujib's position was above the President. 
However in this awkward situation President Chowdhury resign from the president-ship. 
Afterward, Mujib preferred that time Speaker Mohammadullah as the next President of 
Bangladesh. The new President did not engage in personality clash with Mujib. From the 
beginning he accepted the reality that 'Mujib is supreme over every one'. As Mohammadullah 
did every thing according to the wish of Mujib and did not try to interfere in the decision 
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making process of the government (for the reason Sayeed resigned), any difference did not 
arise between him and Mujib. In 1975 by changing the parliamentary system, presidential one 
party BAKSAL system was introduced in Bangladesh. From the beginning to end Mujb was 
the centre of power. In the new governing system he became the President of the country. The 
two ex-Presidents of Mujib, Mohammadullah and Sayeed, were taken into his cabinet against 
their own free will. That was a terrible comedown for two distinguished ex-President. 
Soon after the liberation the leftists encouraged Tajuddin to form a socialist 
revolutionary government by including the pro-liberation parties and elements. But at the 
begirming Mujib was unwilling to form a socialist government. When Tajuddin fell from the 
grace of Mujib, CPB built a very close link vwth Moni as he had enormous influence on 
Mujib. Highly ambitious Moni found possibility to fulfill his ambition through pro-Moscow 
connection. Since 1973 Moni led youth faction of AL started opposing the parliamentary 
democracy, though previously had opposed total socialism. Moni through his public speeches 
and newspaper repeatedly called for a 'second revolution' by Mujib where the masses would 
be benefited from their leader's direct rule. In 1974 the economic and political situation of 
Bangladesh was deteriorated maximum, Mujib failed to control the armed insurgency of the 
ultra leftists. Especially the 1974 famine partly alienated the Mujib regime form the masses. 
Mujib asked US help to save Bangladesh from disastrous situation but USA was not 
cooperative toward him. He then focused his attention towards the communist world, who 
were always cooperative to him. On 25 January 1975 he announced a socialist 'second 
revolution'^, brought necessary amendments to the constitution, introduced a presidential one 
party (BAKSAL) authoritarian system by merging AL, CPB and NAP in it, against the private 
sentiment of the majority AL leaders'. Mujib was elected the President of the goverrmient 
under the new system. Two AL MPs, Gen. Osmani and Moinul Hossain resigned from the 
Parliament protesting against the one party rule^. Though some of the opposition party leaders 
joined BAKSAL, only a few of them were included in the party central committee, none of 
them were given any role in the key executive committee or in the five front organization of 
the party. All the centrist moderate and rightist factions of AL, who were opposing the 
socialist system, except for the followers of Tajuddin, eventually were given participation in 
BAKSAL. Mujib's trusted Mansur Ali was made for both of the key positions, the secretary 
general of BAKSAL and the PM and Nazrul Islam was appointed the Vice President of the 
country. The executive committee included Gazi Gulam Mustafa, who had rivalry with Moni. 
Significantly two youth leaders Moni and A. Razzaq (rival to each other) were included with 
previous GS Zillur Rahman as the secretaries of the party. In fact the new model was being 
put into the operation by the same old bourgeois leadership with the same factional cleavage. 
Under the new system all the administrative positions were controlled by the party men, 
which made bureaucrats completely subservient to the party. Mujib thus assumed absolute 
control over the party, state and government. However previous parliamentary system was 
proved ineffective not only due to the insurgency of ultra leftists, also due to inefficiency of 
AL regime and the infighting in AL was the main problem behind the inefficiency. But the 
new system accommodated all the factions of AL and added a few more. Jahan wrote, "As 
® The core objectives of the second revolution were: A) to weed out corruption, b) to increase production in 
agriculture and industry, c) to control population growth and d) to foster national unity. 
^ In a secret poll of AL MPs, conducted by Mujib a week before his death, only 117 of 315 supported the 
BAKSAL scheme (Marcus Franda, Bangladesh: The First Decade; p. 66). Apart from the pro-Soviet NAP (M) 
and the CPB, all other opposition parties were opposed to the constitutional change. 
® AL, CPB, NAP (M) and the leaders from various political parties personally and in a group merged with 
BAKSAL. Out of 7 opposition party MPs 5 Joined BAKSAL. 
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there is no channel for constitutional opposition, factional disputes within the regime can be 
expected to intensify and if that happens the government would continue to remain ineffective 
even under the new system"^. 
When unity among all the leaders and general public was much needed right after the 
war, AL leaders and the ancillary organizations engaged in factional conflicts v^dthin the party 
and caused civil unrest. This led to an irreparable damage for the country and the 
organization. The party was internally divided into numerous factions, some wanted to gain 
advantage over the others. Just immediate after the liberation from the split of AL the JSD 
was formed. Because of Mujib's towering image till 1975 AL was saved from further division 
but if any more defection could take place no one would be surprised. Even after the 
formation of BAKSAL infighting was continued in the governing party. Internal conflicts 
mate ways for the pro-US group and the traditional bureaucrats to reorganize who were never 
in favor of the independence of Bangladesh. The weaker Mujib and AL got, the stronger the 
bureaucrats became which was not beneficiary for the nation. Moreover the 'second 
revolution' to establish socialism not only alienated the regime from the masses, it threatened 
the major social groups. In this situation in August 1975, ultimately, under the patronage of 
the west the one faction of Bangladesh army Mdth the help of the pro-US faction of AL killed 
Mujib, his nephew Moni and other top ranking leaders. The participation of Mujib's own 
party men in his killing revealed that Mujib's assumption of absolute authority and the 
introduction of one party system did not diminish personal rivalry and factionalism in AL. 
The pro-US member of Mujib ministry, Khondoker Mutaq, assumed the presidents office 
through this coup. It is notable, since 1973 the ultra leftists had been active in building up 
public opinion against the Mujib regime for a popular uprising and brought anarchy in the 
country, but the rightists in AL and the bureaucrats properly used the fertile field. With the 
help of few army officers, they overthrew Mujib regime and captured the power. 
Mustaq went against Mujib not only because of Mujib's inclination towards socialist 
ideology but his high political ambition and mental dissatisfaction also was responsible 
behind it. Though Mustaq was the senior most and enough intelligent leader but in the party 
lineup he was fifth, and this kept him dissatisfied politically for long time. So the political 
leadership in the assassination Mujib came from Mushtaq. After the power change, all the 
former members of Mujib ministry, except a few, joined the cabinet of President Mustaq. 
However, the Mustaq faction wanted to purge its rivals in AL. Who opposed illegal Mustaq 
regime, did not sell out their morality like many of their associates, were taken into prison. 
The sufferings made its way from the top to the grass root level of AL. Leaders and of 
workers of all strata were killed, tortured, or jailed under the new regimes after the death of 
Mujib. Even though Mustaq had the armed force behind him to support still the few junior 
majors who planned the coup did not have the absolute support of the army. So in November 
1975, by a counter coup Mustaq regime was ousted from power. The coup ushered in an era 
of the military supremacy that haunted the nation for many years. The post 1975 history of 
Bangladesh is the history of dictators. Killing Mujib wiped out the democratic values and the 
values of dictatorship were rooted. Death of Mujib brought death to nascent democracy of the 
country, the politics of the country again moved backed to the Pakistan era - the countiy and 
its people became hostage in the hand of the military dictators, the largest party of the country 
that was having long tradition of democratic practice sustained enormous sufferance. For the 
prolong period of dictatorship, the nation has lost its long nourished dream of political 
freedom and prosperity. 
. R. Jahan, Problems and Issues, p. 124. 
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On July 1976, after nine months of his abducting the power by a counter coup, 
General Zia lifted the ban from political activities by issuing a political party regulation act 
(PPR). Once the political activities started more than hundred parties emerged and among of 
these maximum were new, headed by competing individual factional leaders. The emergence 
of so many parties showed too much factional characteristics in the political environment of 
Bangladesh, which was not helpful in ensuring political stability of the countiy. In 1976, the 
parties and party leaders, who previously merged themselves into BAKSAL, revived their old 
parties in old and new names. No one was interest to revive the BAKSAL. The revived parties 
were: the CPB, NAP (Muzaffar), Ataur Rahman led Jatia League and Gana Mukti Union of 
Hazi Mohammad Danesh. Later all of these parties were divided into many pieces. 
Since the formation of BAKSKAL in 1975, AL had been a defonct organization. In 
1976, when AL was going to be revived, some of its disgruntled right of the centrist leaders, 
instead of remaining in the old party fold, floated personality-based parties. Under the 
leadership of Khondoker Mustaq, General Usmani, and Maulana Abdur Rashid Tarka Bagish 
the Democratic League (DL), Jatia Janata Party (JJP), Bangladesh Gana Azadi League 
(BGAL) was formed respectively. Though there was some ideological difference of these 
parties with main stream AL but in the subsequent years it was seen that actually the ex-AL 
leaders left the AL not because of their difference with the party ideology; rather they left it 
due to their personality clash with dominant leaders, group conflict with dominating groups 
and leadership aspirations. They formed their small parties only to fiilfill their selfish interests 
instead of realizing any broad national goals. These party leaders were failed to include any 
other national level leaders in their party folds and also to build support base in the grassroots 
level. Since the formation these parties also faced factionalism and splits for different reasons: 
(a) the defected party leaders were lacking of organizational skills; (b) their old age were the 
hurdle in spread their party base in the grassroots level; (c) all the leaders including the main 
leaders of these parties were highly ambitious and ftill of opportunist natures. Due to 
opportimist nature time to time the peripheral leaders of these parties joined the government 
party; (d) the dictatorial mentality of these party leaders and the absence of internal 
democracy in these parties; (e) to consolidate power and for the interest of forming the BNP 
as a mass based political party, Zia regime encouraged factionalism and splits in the 
opposition camps. However after the death of the main leaders all the parties became 
obsolete. 
In 1976 the youth leaders were in jail. In the midst of adversity mainly the old guard 
AL leaders under the initiative of Mizan Chowdhury, came forward to revive the defunct AL. 
As Mujib and all the first ranking leaders were assassinated the junior most Vice President of 
deftmct AL, Mohiuddin, was made the acting party chief. As AL GS Zillur Rahman and 
Organizing Secretary A. Razzaq were imprisoned, Sajeda was made the acting party GS. The 
leadership decided to revive the party on its old name 'Bangladesh Awami League' (BAL) 
and also to project Mujib's name in the party manifesto. In this time the party leadership was 
divided into multiple camps mainly due to: (i) Mujib was the solo leader of AL till his death. 
In the absence of any recognized leader the question was raised in the party: who would be 
the next after Mujib and what is the alternative of Mujib - individual leadership or collective 
leadership. There is a proverb that which country doesn't have king, there every one is king. 
The condition of AL was same. All were trying to be the leader of the leader-less party; (ii) 
The former AL had been the believer of parliamentary democracy but the present AL leaders 
were polarized into tow major ideological streams: (a) Nationalist group: the old guards of AL 
led by Mizan Chowdhury who believed in parliamentary democracy; (b) The Mujibites: 
believers of one party BAKSAL thought. The youth leaders of the party, who had strong link 
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with the grass root level workers, were leading this faction. Aa its leading figures were still in 
the jail, for the time being Mohiuddin, Sajeda etc were leading this stream. So the parly 
leaders needed to decide, which type of governing system the pai'ty would follow: multi-party 
democracy or one party BAKSAL system. However the first open difference appeared in the 
party when the government refused it permission to function as a political party because of its 
mentioning tlie name of its great leader Mujib in party documents, submitted for the 
government approval. The promotion of any individual, alive or dead, in the party document 
was a violation of PPR. 
The party caucus was divided over the issue, how to get government approval to 
revive the AL. The old guards preferred to re-submit the party documents by forsaking 
Mujib's name. To them, that was a mere tactical move to get government approval. The 
Mujibites were, however, determined to organize AL drawing inspiration from Mujib. When 
difference was widening between them, both the factions ultimately compromised and called 
an extended meeting to take the decision. The majority in the meeting decided to submit the 
party documents excluding Mujib's name. On 4 November 1976, the BAL started functioning 
after getting government clearance. For the greater interest of reviving the party the district 
leaders supported Mizan group, but that support was issue-based and contemporary. Still dead 
Mujibs was the main inspiration of the party workers. As the Mujibites were the expounder of 
Mujibism that group soon became more powerful in AL, maximimi district and sub-district 
leaders' support turned to them. 
As the Mujibites were still in jail the old guards decided to form a full party committee 
by holding a special council session to establish their control over the party before the 
Mujibites were reorganize and form resistance. But there was extreme competition among 
them to be the future leader of AL and among all Mizan was the number one claimer for the 
post. In the absence of any competent candidate among the Mujibites they nominated Zohra 
Tajuddin, the widow of late Tajuddin, for the party leader-ship from their side. The plus point 
of nominating Zohra was that her husband Tajuddin was the successful wartime PM of Exiled 
Bangladesh Government and because of his loyalty to Mujib he was brutally killed with 
others in 1975. The Mujibites appealed to the councilors for support in favor of Zohra to 
uphold the ideology of Mujib. The campaign proved effective. In April 1977 special council 
session of AL the councilors unanimously agreed to form an interim Organizing Committee 
(OC) to run the party for one-year tenure with Zohra as its convener. It was a big defeat for 
the old guards in-group and disgraceful setback for Mizan individually. The old guards took 
initiative to revive the AL but they found no position in the new leadership. Instead, the Indo-
Soviet elements had captured the leadership by getting Zohra Tajuddin being accepted as the 
convener. The election of Zohra as the compromise leader could not bring desired imity in 
AL. Failing to reach a consensus over the election of 44 general members of the OC, the 
coimcil authorized the Convener Zohra to nominate them in consultation with the former 
Preparatory Committee (PC) of the council session. But later Zohra dropped eight names from 
the final list of the OC members made with the consultation of PC and included her won ment 
there and published it. It initiated rivalry between the Mujibites and old guards. As both 
groups were not ready to take big risk of open conflict till they were not sure that to which 
side maximum workers would swing together, in case any split takes place, a compromise 
formula was accepted by the initiative of third group i.e. through dropping four members from 
the 44-member OC the leadership included another four new members from the old guards. 
After getting the responsibilities Zohra started organizational tour all over the country. 
In her tours avoiding the old guards she included the Mujinbites as her associates. Her 
campaign theme was that Mujib's followers were needed to unite behind his last program i.e. 
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socialist BAKSAL program. Within one year by utilizing her executive power she formed, 
maximum lower level parly units comprising the pro-BAKSAL elements. Side by side, the 
old guards, especially the Mizan group, also engaged in organizing themselves targeting the 
coming 1978 Council Session. Mizan propagated liberal democracy. He did not have any faith 
on socialist BAKSAL system. The long-standing factional conflict in the party caucus finally 
surfaced in its lower level units and front organizations and day-by-day its nature became 
more complicated. There were differences between party leadership and Sramik (Labor) 
League leaders, between youth and senior members in AL caucus; the student wing of the 
party was already split into pro-BAKSAL vs. pro-nationalist factions and rival groups 
appeared within nearly all district committees. Just before the 1978 council session the release 
of A. Razzaq, the youthful dynamic Mujibite leader, from his long incarceration divided the 
pro-BAKSAL group into two sub-groups headed by A. Razzaq and Zohra. Till 1975 the 
Mujibites were following S. Moni, A. Razzaq and Tofael. At the assassination of Moni in 
1975, the majority youth-student workers of AL were following A. Razzaq and Tofael. As 
Tofael was in the jail, all the Mujibites supported A. Razzaq. Another opportunist group from 
inside the democrats also became visible. Observing the strength of Indo-Soviet lobby A. 
Maiek Ukil, Zillur etc tilted towards them. For the same reason many of the old allay of 
Mizan including A. Mannan, Korban Ali, Sohrab Hossain also left him. 
The three-day national council meeting began on 3 March 1978 amidst pandemonium 
and disorder. It became clear that if Zohra were elected President and A. Razzaq the GS, the 
AL would be split up as both of them were from socialist groups wherein the present 
leadership was divided on the ideological issue. After many debates from the old guards A. 
Malek Ukil (to the BAKSALites he was more acceptable than Mizan) was made the President 
and A. Razzaq the GS of AL through a compromise formula. The working committee of the 
party was from with the majority A. Razzaq group members. Mizan was defeated in the 
leadership competition, because: democrats were not enough dedicated & skilled comparing 
to the leftists in organizing their support base. The Indo-Soviet group captured the leadership. 
But the rivalry between the two major groups continued even after the council session as 
Mizan Chowdhury disagreed to accept this patch up formula, wherein his group interest was 
threatened. Many commented that actually Mizan was engaged in a scheme of General Zia in 
breaking the AL. As ideological difference was not reduced, the established party unity 
proved fragile in the subsequent days. 
The ideological difference again came to the forefront during the presidential election, 
held in June 1978. In the election campaign BAKSALite leader A. Razzaq told that the 
parliamentary system of democracy was tihe preliminary phase for establishing socialism. On 
the other hand Mizan extremely criticized the BAKSALite one party system. He even said, by 
forming BAKSAL government AL made mistake. In the post-election scenerio the infighting 
in the party reached its peak during the extended meeting of the ALWC held in June 1978. 
Both Ae feuding groups raised all the conflicting issues in the meeting and engaged in 
quarrel. When debates between the groups turned to an extreme point Mizan group opposed to 
accept BAKSAL; Mizan strongly criticized that the one party BAKSAL rule in Bangadesh 
had been 'tyrannical'. Then the BAKSALite group made blistering attack against Mizan 
group; called them the betrayers and included that opposition to BAKSAL amounts to 
disrespect to Mujib. The WC meeting resolution defended the introduction of one party 
BAKSAL, saying that the then step was right and correct; the ftiture course (programs) of the 
party would be based on BAKSALite principles. After heavy criticism against BAKSAL now 
it was difficult for Mizan to survive in a pro-socialist group dominated AL. In August 1978, 
Mizan group formed counter AL called AL (Mizan). The pro-democrat factions of the front 
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organizations of AL (such as the student, youth, labor and peasant wings of AL) openly came 
out in support of Mizan. But Mizn led AL could not survive in the competition with A. 
Razzaq-Ukil led AL. 
After the split in AL, Ukil, A. Mannan, Rafiquddin, Mollah Jalal and many of the old 
guards, who supported Mizan before the breakup, also slipped to majority A. Razzaq group 
just to survive their existence in politics. At the beginning of the formation of a new party 
Mizan got association of a few of his old friends. Mizan failed to give dynamism to his party. 
In the 1979 parliamentary election AL (Mizan) won only two seats out of 300 and received 
2.78% of the total votes. Whereas Ukil-A. Razzaq led AL emerged as the largest opposition in 
the country'". The AL (Mizan) could not exist for long. In the subsequent days many of its 
leaders and workers joined the Zia regime. Many returned to mainstream AL. Mizan with his 
remnant followers merged his party with the Ershad regime and strengthen the hands of 
autocracy. In 2001 the octogenarian leader Mizan returned to his original party AL. 
Searching for Party Leadership: Since the 1978 council session, Zohra was trying to 
recapture the AL leadership. As experienced and stout Ukil sided with A. Razzaq, she 
understood that now she was no more the future Presidential candidate in AL of A.Razzaq 
group; her aspiration would not be fulfilled from here. So she dissociated her from the 
BAKSALites, formed a new group with the pro-Soviet pure socialists and waged almost a 
crusade to oust Ukil- A. Razzaq from AL leadership. From outside, CPB supported her in her 
effort to establish socialism in Bangladesh. But the planning of Zohra group was proved 
futile, as they were minority in the party. After the defection of Mizan, due to A. Razzaq's 
unique organizing skill almost total AL family assembled behind him. Rapidly AL was 
getting dynamism. He emerged as the most powerfiil person in the party. As Zohra could not 
serve the purpose of CPB, it left her and reconciled relation with A. Razzaq. Since then the 
CPB connection in AL was working for him. 
Till 1978, A. Razzaq and Tofael were the strategic partners in the factional game of 
AL though Tofael was somewhat pro-US and A. Razzaq was clearly pro-Soviet. The conflict 
first surfaced between the followers of the two since 1978 council session when Tofael was 
imprisoned. The men of A. Razzaq were controlling total AL politics but Tofael's men were 
few in AL and in its front organizations' leadership. After Tofail was freed, his men took 
initiative to strengthen their positions. The discontent fiirther vwdened when some of the NAP 
(M) leaders including Matia Chowdhury joined AL and established control over some of its 
front wings. Now Tofael felt that by confirming the domination of pro-Moscow group A. 
Razzaq was building his personal leadership in AL. If A. Razzzaq's solo leadership were 
established, his aspiration would be in risk. So he went against A. Razzaq. Since then their 
conflict to confirm own leadership supremacy over the party was initiated, although they had 
no major difference on BAKSAL issue. The pro-democrat old guards, who remained in AL 
instead of joining Mizan but due to the dominance of the BAKSALites were silent, now 
joined Tofael and strengthened him''. In this new development by surprising all commimist 
Zohra was sided with Tofael, to be the future President candidate of this group in the next 
council and by observing the domination of pro-Soviet group liberal democrat Ukil remained 
with socialist A. Razzaq. After living in foreign countries for long, pro-US leader Dr. Kamal 
Hossain returned to Bangladesh in 1980 and strengthened Tofael group. As the democrats 
sided with Tofael and he now decided to advance with his personal belief slowly this newly 
developed leadership conflict turned to an ideological polarization. 
In the election AL (Ukil-A. Razzaq) won 39 seats out of 300 and 23% of the total votes casted. 
These old guard leaders knew that if the two popular leaders A. Razzaq and Tofael remained united they 
would be in nowhere of the party. So they created rift between the two, in a planned way. 
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Keeping an eye on the party's incoming national council, both groups engaged in 
strengthening their bases in the lower level units of the party. As a result the lower unit party 
leaders were vertically divided into A. Razzaq and Tofael group. In different district units the 
feud between the groups turned into open hand-to-hand skirmish. The feud also vertically and 
horizontally divided the student, youth, labor, peasant and women wings of AL. The wild 
propaganda of anti-AL press was responsible for spreading tlie infighting in its lower units in 
a violent way. At the beginning of 1981 the party was about to split. However it was saved 
from destruction due to the internal and international mediation. By using its internal crisis 
Zia regime planned to divide the AL through distribution of patronages and benefits. Many of 
the frustrated lower unit faction leaders, lost their party posts due to the infighting, joined 
BNP. Since 1976, there was enough time for AL leadership to show their leadership 
excellence, but as they could not remove the difference of their own it was not possible for 
them to give dynamism in the party, no matter how much excellent organizing capability they 
had. Due to the continuous infighting and splits all the initiatives of AL to create anti-regime 
opposition movement suffered setback, in spite of having huge & dedicated workers force. 
The factional feud already demoralized the total AL family. The party was in the verge of 
destruction. Many predicted that AL was going to accept the pathetic fate of Pakistan Muslim 
League. In that difficult time to unite the fiustrated workers and to regain its old spirit the 
party needed a leader who would have lot of appeal among the masses. Sheikh Hasina, the 
survived eldest daughter of Mujib, was considered appropriate to create that appeal. By 
observing many defections and disunity in AL, the AL's friends in India engaged themselves 
to bring unity in its faction-ridden leadership by installing Hasina on top of it. They engaged 
the indo-westem lobby inside AL (Dr. Kamal, Sajeda, Zillur etc) to execute their plan. This 
group intruded in the Tofael group and silently kept continues their activities even keeping 
Tofael in dark. 
Since 1979 the party had to change its Council Session date for four times due to the 
internal crisis in it. Finally the three-day long council session began on 14 February 1981 in 
the midst of a conflicting environment. Zohra could not remain as the only President nominee 
of Tofael group as Tofael tilted towards Kamal because of his skilled handling of factional 
games. Incumbent President Ukil was the President candidate of A, Razzaq group. In electing 
the party GS there was no such difficulty due to A. Razzzaq's unique organizing capability, 
but till 16 February the rival leaders failed to elect a unanimous President. In this tense 
situation many were afraid that the division in the party was imminent. Meanwhile Kamal 
convinced Tofael that Hasina's nomination, for the party's presidential post could be the best 
alternative for them to block the A. Razzaq group's bid to capture AL leadership. Then in the 
16 February evening meeting Kamal proposed Hasina's name for the presidential post of the 
party as the symbol of unity between the rival groups. It made A. Razzaq and Ukil's 
calculation topsy-turvy. They could not dare to oppose the proposal directly since even the 
majority councilors of A. Razzaq group favored Hasina; because: they had deep emotional tie 
wiA their late leader Mujib's name and they felt that Hasina's election as party chief would 
keep AL united by eliminating the leadership feud. Thus the earlier loosing Tofael group 
changed their incoming defeat into a unique victory over the socialst group by their sudden 
tactical change. Ukil and A. Razzaq's politics proved futile in front of workers emotion. 
Hasina, who was living in Delhi for last eight years, elected President in absentia. By this AL 
started dynastic leadership in Bangladesh. In another bid to cover their widening rift the rival 
groups, in the Council, agreed for a collective leadership formula. The constitution was 
amended and a powerful 12-member Presidium was formed accommodating the senior-
dominant leaders of the party. The highest power to steer the organization that was centralized 
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in the President's hand, transferred to the Presidium that all of its members together might 
share it. 
Hasina's accaptance of the party leadership and the formation of Presidium through a 
compromise formula roused hope in the workers that after long lasting factional feud the party 
was saved from further destruction. But problems of the party were not eliminated, as the 
council could not reduce the ideological difference between the groups on "whether AL 
would follow the program of socialist- one party BAKSAL system or multi-party 
democracy". Moreover when all the national committees were formed Kamal-Tofael group 
was seen in upper hand over the A. Razzaq group as they had clear edge in the party 
Presidium and the party President was also sided with them, became the real spirit of the anti-
BAKSALites; Kama! and Tofael were recognized as second and third leaders of this group. 
Now the democrats were not ready to share power with the BAKSALites. But, the previously 
dominating A. Razzaq group was not ready to yield the defeat as still then they had 
supremacy in the ALCWC and lower level AL units. So the old rivalry returned to the 
forefront in a new shape centering on two issues: (i) Annoying the socialists in 1981 
Presidential election Hasina nominated pro-US leader Kamal as the AL candidate. The failure 
of AL to select a common candidate openly divided the party workers even in the lower level 
and affected its election campaign. The difference within AL helped BNP to win the election, 
(ii) The other reason was the ideological feud in BCL, the most important front organization 
of AL. Since 1979, the BCL was divided into pro and anti-BAKSAL group. In the September 
1981 BCL Council Session, after intense quarrel, both the rival factions announced two 
separate committees. AL chief, Hasina's blessing was for the anti-BAKSAL committee. 
These differences led to the intensification of factional squabble in AL. 
In an extended meeting of AL held in December 1981 majority WC members and 
district leaders heavily supported A. Razzaq and criticized Hasina because of her given 
support to anti-BAKSAL faction of BCL. Hasina faced severe pressure to patch up the 
difference between the groups of BCL. But as she had already given approval to the anti-
BAKSAL faction of BCL, the conflict became a prestige issue to her. By this meeting the 
Hasina understood that A. Razzaq's image was a real threat for her leadership. If A. Razzaq 
were not overthrown, her position in the party would be of a nominal chief. Hasina-Kamal 
group leaders observed that Hasina had an emotional appeal among the majority AL workers, 
which was not to be diminished. If they met the lower level leaders, the socialist faction 
would loose its grip on party. Since then they engaged in building up and projecting the image 
of Hasina as the daughter of dead charismat Mujib, on whose name still the party was 
surviving. Hasina was gradually advancing forward by knocking dovra the strength of A. 
Razzaq. Three outside groups' involvement in the infighting intensified the feud: (i) It was a 
plan of India, first to replace the powerful pro-Soviet leadership of AL by the Indo-US group. 
And then they wanted to oust the pro-US faction by increasing the power of pro-Indians for 
the interest of maintaining Indian influence in Bangladesh politics; (ii) Since long pro-
Moscow CPB and NAP (M) was supporting A. Razzaq; and (iii) To survive in power the Zia 
and Ershad regimes also adroitly used their machineries to bring about factional feud and 
splits inside AL. In the war of words both the group members used ugly speeches against each 
other's leaders. The government controlled and other anti-AL newspapers circulated it 
successfiilly and enlarged the rift between the rival groups, built up an extreme hate campaign 
against each other. As both the groups engaged in the competition to ensure their respective 
supremacy in whole of the AL family, soon all of the front organizations as well as lower 
units of the party were unofficially divided into pro and anti-BAKSAL factions. 
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The military regime of General Ershad captured the state power in March 1982 and 
suspended political activities till April 1983. In this situation as AL was factionally divided, 
by observing the power hijacking and demolition of democracy it could not even protest this 
wicked act at the beginning days of military rule. Meanwhile by projecting Hasina's image 
and using a shrewd 'compromise and accommodate' formula Hasina-Kamal group created rift 
in the fortified castle of A. Razzaq. Among the tremendous succcss of them were Matia, A. 
Jalil, A. Samad Azad, Aktaruzzaman and A. Mannan (Chittagong). These key leaders joining 
in Hasina camp by breaking their very old tight relation with A. Razzaq encouraged more 
socialist elements to join the Hasina camp. Till June 1983 Hasina was able to create rift in 
maximum district committees where previously A. Razzaq's position was strong. It is 
remarkable that all these new-joiners maintained their absolute allegiance to Hasina, not for 
Hasina-Kamal group. 
To Kamal-Tofael and old guards, the objective of electing inexperienced Hasina as the 
party chief was not to put her in effective leadership but to exploit her name and connection 
politically to have the real power of the party in their hand. At the beginning Hasina treated 
them as her group partners. But since 1982 anti-BAKSAL camp was sub-divided because: 
Besides Kamal-Tofael, Hasina was searching for her ally in AL. Hasina-Zillur-Amu-Helal etc 
formed powerful family group inside the Hasina-Kamal group and weakened the position of 
Kamal-Tofael to some extent. Since 1982 Hasina, by her boss-like posture, conveyed the 
message that she was the real boss above all in the party. Hasina's new attitude irritated the 
key-figures of her faction. But they did not express it in open as all of their target was to oust 
BAKSALites from the party; without Hasina it was not only impossible, even Hasina's 
neutral role in the infighting could endanger the anti-BAKSAL leaders' political career'^. 
Within 1983 Hasina openly advanced to curve the influence of A. Razzaq. Instead of finding 
out a rapprochement between the rival factions of BCL, she issued show-cause notice on its 
anti-BAKSAL faction for the defiance of party instructions. Even she gave one flat of AL's 
central office building to anti-BAKSAL group of BCL to open a new office. 
When A. Razzaq was falling back, the first CWC meeting was called in June 1983 
after the political activities were restarted. The surprise for A. Razzaq was that unlike the 
previous meetings, now, most of the leaders threw their weight behind Hasina over the thorny 
BCL issue. The meeting recognized pro-Hasina faction of BCL as AL's student wing by 40-
34 votes. It was a big blow to A. Razzaq, cornered him in the organization. In this situation, 
he was urged by his followers to adopt a clear-cut stand. On the other hand, after the 
tremendous success in the CWC meeting, Hasina-Kamal group wanted to remove the 'leftist 
elements' from the party as soon as possible. Both the feuding factions had reached in a point 
of no return. The district units were informally broken into two counter units in maximum 
districts. 
Since then the leaders of both factions engaged in 'war of words' vilifying each 
other's leaders. Ukil, the key figure of A. Razzaq group criticized Hasina that there is no room 
of leadership of blood in AL. If that could be possible Suhraward's daughter would be the 
leader of AL. If Hasina was the successor of blood of Mujib, the AL workers also appreciated 
A. Razzaq as the successor of Mujib-ideology. So the conflict of ideology and successor 
turned into the conflict of prestige between the two main leaders. Neither Hasina nor A. 
Razzaq was ready to sacrifice their ego for the sake of party unity. Both of them were guided 
more by emotion & sentiment than reasoning. The provocative speeches of rival group 
Vice Versa it was also true when Zohra and some more members of Tofael group misused AL platform 
keeping Hasina in dark but Hasina had to tolerate the trouble for the time being. 
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resented the Hasina-Kamal group. On 19 July in the absence of A. Razzaq group leaders the 
Hasina group by their majority in Presidium accepted a resolution that condemned A. Razzaq 
group for their 'misleading utterances'. Responding to it A. Razzaq group said that the 
Presidium had no right to adopt such resolution and it was a violation of the party 
constitution. This statement was a challenge to the Presidium resolution. In this tense situation 
Hasina asked A. Razzaq to convene an extended meeting of the WC in August 1993 with an 
intension of a final showdown. As A. Razzaq disagreed to call the meeting Hasina, the party 
chief, called it. A. Razzaq group knew that with their present minority strength they would 
have to face another humiliating defeat in the extended meeting if they participate there. They 
decided to prevent the meeting instead of joining there. Thus, the first day meeting began at 
the AL central office amid armed clashes between the rival groups. On the second day Hasina 
had to transfer the meeting venue at a secured place. The meeting issued show-cause notice 
on six leaders of A. Razzaq group including A. Razzaq and Ukil and relieved them of their 
responsibilities on charges of anti-party activities and their issuing statements against party 
interest. Within 24 hours of the suspension of their key leaders A. Razzaq group called a 
coimter WC meeting and in a retaliatory action they suspended nine top rival group leaders on 
the ground of their involvement in activities against party discipline, ideology and unity'^ 
Party President was excluded from their suspension list as a large number of AL workers had 
deep sympathy for her. By suspending Hasina, A. Razzaq group did not want to deprive itself 
from the sympathy of this group. Through these suspension and counter suspension another 
split was completed in AL. 
After the June WC meeting A. Razzaq group hired separate office; Ixmched an 
organizational drive to strengthen its position in the rank and file of the party and to make 
public their political stand. Mean-while like that of lower level party units divisions in all the 
associate organizations were also completed. By finalizing its preparation to float a new 
political party A.Razzaq faction declared a special council meeting in October 1983. When 
Ukil slipped into the Hasina faction by performing a somersaulting, another key figure, 
Mohiuddin Ahamad, was picked up for the presidential post of the proposed party. In the 
Council Session, the new party was named as BAKSAL following the name of old BAKSAL 
party of 1975. Mohiuddin and A. Razzaq were elected President and GS respectively of the 
BAKSAL. Though, there was little difference on ideology and objectives between 1975 and 
1983 BAKSAL, but unlike that of 1975 BAKSAL, the new one wanted to establish socialism 
through practicing parliamentary democracy. By this split and the formation of BAKSAL the 
ideological conflict in AL, which had began in 1976, was finally ended. 
Though A. Razzaq was upholding the ideology of Mujib but at last the majority • 
associates of Mujib did not support him. As Hasina was enjoying the image of her father, in a 
semi-feudalistic society where still people were having hero-worshiping mentality, majority 
party leaders and workers sided with Hasina. By observing maximum strength in this side 
many A. Razzaq group members gathered in Hasina camp. So Hasina found majority central 
and lower unit leaders in her side after the split. The pro-Moscow CPB and NAP support for 
A. Razzaq fi-om outside could not strengthen his position. Rather the leftists, who formerly 
joined the AL, to save their political career, by a sudden somersault left A. Razzaq and 
strengthened Hasina camp. Observing the poor crowd with A. Razzaq, Ukil also was not 
ready to jeopardize his career by staying with minority faction. He gave statement regretting 
the utterances he made. On October 1983, Hasina faction of AL finally expelled A. Razzaq 
Among the nine six were Presidium members (Kamal, Zohra, Korban, A. Mamian, Zillur and A. S. Azad; 
two Joint Secretaries (Sajeda and Amu) and Organizing Secretary Tofael. 
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and four others, but the charge against Ukil was withdrawn. Hasina group also icept its door 
open for otlier BAKSALites. Due to the defection of A. Razzaq group from AL temporarily 
even its lowest units were jolted. But Hasina was able to recover it within a year. In 1986 A. 
Razzaq led mainstream BAKSAL boycott the parliamentary election. But Sardar Amzad 
Hossain and Shah Md. Abu Jafar led small faction of the party joined the AL led 8-party 
election alliance and split tlie BAKSAL. Amzad and Abu Jafar led BAKSAL won tliree seats 
in the election. Later on this faction joined the Jatia Party of President Ershad. 
With lot of hope BAKSAL was floated. The workers and leaders of the party had 
confidence on A. Razzaq, that time best organizer in Bangladesh politics. But A. Razzaq 
failed to build BAKSAL as an effective organization because of his follower's high eagerness 
to join AL. Since the formation of BAKSAL majority of its leaders and workers by leaving it 
returned to AL. Though the election record of BAKSAL was much better than the other small 
political parties. In the 1991 election it won 5 seats out of 300. But BAKSALites gave more 
importance of their merger with AL instead of strengthening their ovra base. On the other 
hand the AL workers were also considering that by losing skilled and hard working organizer 
A. Razzaq the organizational activities of the party was hampered. Since the last of 1988 to 
comer the Kamal led old-guard leaders Hasina and her Indian friends became active to get 
back A. Razzaq in AL. Finally in August 1991 the BAKSAL of A. Razzaq was merged with 
AL. However, for another time it was proved that whoever left AL they only ruined their 
career. By leaving the party A. Razzaq, Mizan Chowdhury etc could not flourish themselves 
politically. 
Since 1982 the country was in the grip of the Martial Law. The people had no political 
rights. To compel the military regime in restoring democracy, the recently formed two 
political alliances led by AL and BNP, by August 1983, launched anti- regime movement but 
from separate platforms. Hasina and Khalida Zia emerged as the leaders of national stature 
through this agitation politics even though they were yet to organize their own parties. As the 
major two alliance leaders could not reduce their differences the movement failed to bring 
democracy. General Ershad needed to create rift in the growing opposition movement and 
AL's pro-election decision in 1986 halted the movement for the time being. 
Despite the expulsion of hard line-socialists, every thing was not going well inside 
AL. Since then the old guards had undisputed dominance in the party. Hasina was more or 
less like a puppet in their hand. In this situation in 1986 General Ershad declared a 
parliamentary election. Because of the influence of India and huge pressure of Kamal led old 
guards, AL decided to join the election. The youth leaders, loyal to Hasina, were against 
joining the election, but still they were weak in the party. The difference over joining the polls 
broke the AL led 15- party alliance and reduced it into an 8-party electoral alliance and other 
anti-election parties formed a separate 5-party alliance and boycotted the polls. The BNP led 
7-party alliance also boycotted it. The JP became victorious in the election with 153 seats out 
of 300'^ The AL came up as the major parliamentary opposition with 76 seats followed by 
Jammat-e-Islami with 10 seats. However AL's participation in the election and the subsequent 
defeat tarnished the image of Hasina a lot. 
In the election maximum of the senior AL leaders including Dr. Kamal, who forced 
Hasina to participate the election, were defeated badly, while Hasina and her youth followers 
After the election, the JP's strength in the parliament rose to 208 when 23 of the 32 independents joined the 
JP and it obtained 30 'reserved' women's seats and two additional seats in the by-election. 
AL's popularity was rising gradually. It won 39 seats in 1979 election compared with 76 seats in 1986. 
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success list was large'". I'hey were seen gaining ground over the old guards fragile position in 
the party after the seniors' bad performance. As Kama) led old guards failed to come to the 
parliament, after the election they became vocal in favor of AL MPs' permanent parliainent 
boycott and of a direct action movement to oust the Ershad regime from power. In the past the 
same Kamal gong advocated for the participation in the election. But now to rescue them 
from a self-made trap they were telling different. They knew that their absence in the 
parliament would isolated them from mainstream politics and only an agitation movement 
outside the parliament could save their leading position. But AL chief and the youth leaders 
were in favor of joining the parliamentary sessions. Hasina's 'Indian friends' also advised her 
to participate in the parliamentary sessions. Ignoring the elders' demand Hasina said that the 
movement would continue inside and outside the Parliament simultaneously. However the 
public opinion was favoring the old guards. They still were strong in the WC and Presidium. 
All these placed Hasina in a somewhat disadvantageous position. She was inclined to go slow 
so as to allow the crisis to blow over. Meanwhile the AL MPs once attended the parliament to 
register their names and then again continued their Parliament boycott. However the pre & 
post-election difference clearly polarized the party stalwarts into two visible factions. Hasina 
realized that it was difficult for her to lead the senior leaders. She then persistently tried to 
install a leadership in the party which would be heart-and-soul loyal to her. 
To make Hasina the party leader and to recapture the dominant position of the 
democrats of the party by ousting A. Razzaq group, Kamal played an instrumental role. But 
from the beginning his target was to be the party President and he did all to advance towards 
his personal ambition. It first reflected after the 1981 presidential election when his friends 
proposed that time inexperienced Hasina to get retirement and transfer the party leadership to 
Kamal. Hasina disagreed with the plea. Meanwhile she adjusted herself in politics. Besides 
Hasina's friends in India had not seen Kamal as a permanent ally for her; rather temporarily 
they used him to establish Hasina inside AL against the BASKALites. Till 1986 Kamal 
played the role of 'uncle and adviser' of Hasina but maintained his separate lobby inside AL. 
He first engaged in conflict with Hasina in the post-1986 election scenario. When his first 
strategy to capture AL leadership was failed in 1981, since 1986 the seniors started criticizing 
her; raised questions regarding her ability to be the leader of such a huge party AL; tried to 
humiliate her by their propaganda tactics; sidetracking her tried to impose their will on the 
party. Hasina and her people took counter actions: (i) they engaged in curving Kamal and 
seniors' influence to isolate them inside AL. Before 1987 Council Session Hasina sent her 
loyal leaders in the lower party units to form new committees with loyal men. To defend their 
positions the old guards could do nothing; and (ii) drove out Kamal from decision-making 
process. In this conflict Hasina did not need to follow any image-building measures to 
strengthen her position against the seniors. Rather in the fight against A. Razzaq the old 
guards already did that for her. Since 1983 Hasina was the only popular leader in the party. 
Most of the district leaders already sided with Hasina. The former BAKSAL leaders, 
who returned to AL, also showed their loyalty only to Hasina not to Kamal-Tofael group. 
Hasina's relatives were also strong in AL. Besides this to tackle the seniors as a bargaining 
trick'^ since 1984 she pretended to bring back A. Kader Siddiqui, an AL leader who took 
asylum in India after the assasination of Mujib in 1975, in Bangladesh. The probable return of 
Among the key leaders of Kamai-Tofael group only Tofael showed his election success. On the other hand 
Hasina showed her best performance by winning all the three parliamentary seats she contested. 
Actually as a bargaining trick Hasina was using the name of Siddique but even Hasina did not wish the return 
and establishment of popular leader Siddiqui in AL as a political leader. 
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Siddiqui became headache to many of the old guards, as he was a strong critic of them'^. By 
playing this shrewd game before the Council Session she compelled this group to accept her 
conditions and reduce their enmity against her. On the other hand though Dr. Kamal was 
representing the senior group, but it was a conglomeration of different senior leaders and 
small groups led by the senior leaders. The old guards were arguing for an effective collective 
leadership in the party by reducing the authority of the party chief However their dream was 
shuttered in the Council Meeting held in January 1987. 
The council unanimously reelected Hasina as the party president for the next term. For 
the GS post A. Mannan, Zillur Rahman, Acting GS Sajeda Chowdhury, Amir Hossain Amu, 
Tofael etc were interested. Among all, Tofael was the most competent candidate. After the 
defection of A. Razzaq he was the only person except Hasina who had some followers. If the 
matter could be settled through election it was certain that councilors would elect Tofael their 
GS, not any other else. But he already sided with Kamal in the conflict. Hasina was not ready 
to jeopardize her leadership by making Tofael the party GS. She preferred loyal Sajeda for 
the GS post by disrespecting the councilors' wish. By using her influence Hasina formed the 
new WC comprising her own men, and also in the Presidium both group became equal. Thus 
through this Council Hasina's grip was consolidated; seniors were no more a threat to her 
leadership. 
The council was a big jolt for the old guards. Due to the lacking of a popular leader 
among them, they failed to counter Hasina's move. However all the old Presidium members 
were able to retain their membership. Their influence was curved evidently but still then they 
were propagating that the AL MPs should relinquish parliamentary seats in order to 
strengthen opposition movement to overthrow Ershad regime. But as they became minority 
group their activities failed to force to boycott the parliamentary sessions. After the council 
session ignoring the minorities, AL MPs joined in the sessions. Facing weak opposition in the 
parliament, the regime planned to pass a bill on the participation of the armed forces in the 
district coimcils. At this point AL led 8-party alliance walked out from the parliament and 
from June 1987 started continuous agitation targeting the end of autocratic rule and to stop 
passing the District Council bill'®. At the end of 1987 a series of strikes, called by opposition 
parties, paralyzed the administration throughout the countiy. To suppress the agitation in 
November the regime arrested Hasina and Khaleda. In order to further intensify the 
movement all the 10 JI MPs and three independent MPs resigned from the parliament. In an 
AL Presidium meeting, at the absence of Hasina and against her wish, majority old guards 
also accepted a resolution that AL MPs would resign from Parliament en-masse. To avoid 
further crisis before the resignation of the AL MPs the regime dissolved the parliament in 
December 1987 and by using its repressive forces finally crushed the agitation. 
The Presidium's decision to pull out AL MPs fVom Parliament resented Hasina. After 
the failure of the agitation Hasina declared that AL would form future agitation alliance only 
with the pro-liberation forces and the parties those believe in parliamentary form of 
government^''. In 1988, an extended meeting of the WC also approved her view. But Kamal 
led senior leaders favored a united opposition movement at all cost. This difference 
deteriorated the relation between the groups further. Since then Hasina and Kamal were 
Siddiqui accused many of the senior AL leaders as the murderer of Mujib because of their joining in President 
Mustaq's cabinet after the dawnfall of Mujib regime in 1975. 
The AL felt that with their minority position in the parliament they could do nothing to stop passing of the 
bill. If the bill passed, President Ershad's position would be solidified so intensely that no agitation would be 
possible since the army would have control at the lower tires of the administrative units. 
By this trickery move Hasina tried to comer the BNP, JI and other anti-liberation forces in politics. 
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staying in opposite poles. The deviation of AL from one-point movement was unfavorable for 
a greater unity of the opposition parties. From then till 1990 the AL and BNP could not join in 
any united anti-regime agitation. However finally at the last of 1990, the student leaders 
compelled AL leader Hasina and BNP leader Khaleda to settle their personal enmity to start a 
united one-point struggle to confirm the fall of the Ershad regime. In December 1990 an AL 
and BNP led uprising overthrew the Ershad regime. Afterwards a neutral interim caretaker 
government was formed to conduct the 1991 Parliamentary election. In the election BNP 
emerged as the largest party in the parliament by obtaining 140 seats out of 300, and with the 
support of Jammat took over the governing power. The main factors of AL's election debacle 
were: (i) Presence of squabble within the party. In about 40 constituencies AL candidates 
faced challenge from its own rebel candidates; (ii) Hasina's arrogant speeches during election 
campaign; and (iii) Overconfidence of the AL leaders of a confirm election victory and the 
party workers negligence in the organizational activities. 
The election result was a great shock to AL as it expected a confirm victory for its 
own. AL leader Hasina refiised to accept the election defeat alleging that some secret hand 
manipulated the election results. But disagreeing with her, Kamal admitted that the election 
was fare and the AL should accept the defeat. He added that the party chief was responsible 
for AL's election debacle. As a reaction of his statement Hasina resigned from AL leadership. 
However because of thousands of party workers appeal Hasina withdrew her resignation 
letter. The whole drama went against Kamal. The party workers abused him extremely and 
also physically insulted him. Now the conflict of Hasina with her uncles and aimty turned in a 
shape of personality clash. 
Day by day Kamal was loosing strength. Observing the grim future of this group some 
of the seniors including A.S. Azad left Kamal and joined with Hasina. Since 1987 Council 
Kamal and the old guards were not included in AL's policy-making. Even in some opportune 
moment Hasina expelled some of the pro-Kamal WC members including Amirul Islam, 
Sirajul Islam and Montu, from the party. By using her direct influence she also successfiilly 
curved Tofael Ahmed's influence from the student wing of AL. Those who came close to her 
by leaving Kamal were rewarded heavily. Following this carrot and stick policy Hasina 
successfiilly isolated Kamal. Especially after the expulsion of Montu the old guards including 
Kamal had to depend on the mercy of their archrival Hasina for their survival in AL. But she 
was not still out of anxiety as Kamal was an excellent architect of political game and at any 
time his presence in the party could jeopardize her leadership. As the seniors were very tactfiil 
in political game, by the advice of her Indian fiiends in 1991 Hasina welcomed her old enemy 
A. Razzaq in the party platform in a bid to crush the opposition of her one time guide and 
guardian Kamal, aunty Zohra and others. Here it is revealed that there is no a permanent 
fiiend or foe in politics. Friendship always changes on the demands of interest. 
Since 1988, the old guards were isolated inside the party. Kamal realized that if he 
proceeded against Hasina in a traditional way there was no possibility of his victory. He 
advanced in a very clever way. To overcome their isolation in national politics and to create a 
support-base for them Kamal led old guards floated a non-political Nagorik (Citizens) 
Committee in 1989 comprising the lawyers, intellectuals & politicians and in March 1992, it 
was renamed Democratic Forum (DF). Hasina was against of such activities of old guards and 
advised her men not to associate with this move. As defying the objection of party's policy-
makers when Kamal was advancing with his DF, before the 1992 council session the party 
leaders criticized him heavily. 
In the incoming Council Session Hasina intended to finish the remnant influence of 
Kamal in AL. She wanted to be the absolute leader of AL by curbing power of the party 
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Presidium. For an easy passage of the party constitution's cliange she needed majority support 
of the councilors who would be elected from the district leaders. Before the Council the new 
lower unit party committees were formed by the elements, loyal to her. Old guards lost their 
groimd to challenge her. Now it was a pain for them whether they would survive in the party 
hierarchy or had to get retirement from politics. Realizing deteriorated position prior to the 
Council majority of the seniors became silent from anti-Hasina criticism. Before the 1992 
Council Session Kamal severely criticized that any change to the AL constitution to 
strengthen party chiefs had would ultimately build an autocratic leadership in AL. He was 
advocating for a powerful collective leadership by increasing the authority of party Presidium. 
Zohra joined with Kamal in his demand, as she was the member of this highest body of AL. 
In the Council Session Hasina was reelected party President unopposed for a 
consecutive third term. The aspirants for the second post of AL were A. Razzq, Tofael, Amu, 
A. Kader Siddiqui, acting GS Sajeda, A. Jalil, Matia, Dr. Md. Selim, Md. Nasim etc. Similar 
to the past, in this session disrespecting councilors choice and depriving the party from a fit 
GS again Hasina used her discretion, choose 63 years old Zillur Rahman for the coveted post. 
Previously Zillur was elected GS in 1972 and 1974. Hasin favored her relative Zillur because 
he was loyal to her; being old, Zillur would be always dependent on her to run the party 
affairs and would never be a threat to her. With the approval of councilors Hasina installed 
her men in the party Presidium, Secretariat, CWC, National Committee etc. Tofael, A. 
Razzaq, Amu, Sajeda, Mohiuddin etc were included in the 13-member Presidium. From the 
old guards only Zohra and A. Mannan retained their positions but including Kamal all others 
were shifted to the newly formed Advisory Committee of the party chief A. Kader Siddiqui 
(who returned to Bangladesh in 1991), Sirajul Islam and M.I. Kamal (known as anti-Hasina 
elements) were also not given any important posts. The council made many amendments to 
the AL constitution to strengthen the power of party chief by curving the powers of party 
Presidium and made the Presidium inactive. Now the CWC and secretaries will be 
responsible/ accountable to the party chief instead of Presidium. She will be able to take any 
punitive action against any party member. She will nominate 21 members of the 65-member 
WC. She will nominate her Advisory Council members. If any change to the constitution is 
needed she will be allowed to amend which will be ratified in the next WC meeting. The party 
leaders, loyal to Hasina, ousted internal democracy from democratic AL by these 
amendments. Thus dictatorial leadership of Hasina replaced the joint leadership in AL. 
Now the difference between Hasina and Kamal grew so high that it was out of 
negotiation. Soon after their disgraceftil defeat in the Council, Kamal led anti-Hasina lobby 
engaged in a countrywide campaign to convene a grand summit of DF with an intension to 
turn it into a political party. In his campaign to assemble the political workers behind him, 
Kamal alleged that AL deserted the collective leadership formula and founded solo leadership 
in the party; there was no practice of democracy in AL etc. anti-AL newspapers gave big 
coverage to the activities of Kamal. Finally in the August 1993 GF convention Kamal 
declared the formation of a new political party 'Gono (People's) Forum'. The main 
components which merged in the GF were: a dissident faction of AL^', the Shajahan Siraj led 
JSD (Siraj), a faction of CPB led by Saiftiddin Ahmed Manik and a faction of NAP led by 
Pankaj Bhattacharia. Kamal became the President of the party and later on former communist 
leader Manik was made its GS. There was no fimdamental difference between the GF and AL 
programs. Actually the GF was formed due to the personality clash between Hasina and 
However Kamal could not create any mentionable dent in AL platform. From the AL those who joined the 
GF were: S. Abdul Aziz, Matiur Rahman, General (ret.) Khalilur Rahman, Amirul Islam, Advocate Zahirul 
Islam, M. Mohsin Montu, Mofizul Islam Kamal, Advocate Serajul Islam ect. 
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Kamal. Form the beginning of its formation, the GF faced infighting and splits. Different 
groups engaged in conflict to control the central committees of the party. Observing the grim 
future of GF, many of its leaders left it just after its formation and joined AL and BNP. 
Among the GF leaders, except Kamal, no one were having public image. In the June 1996 
polls the GF put up 104 candidates in different constituencies. But all of them forfeited their 
election deposits. The GF received only 0.12% of the total votes casted. Kamal's dream to 
make the GF the mainstream political party of Bangladesh was dashed by this election result. 
The reasons of his failure to make GF a mass based political party were that Kamal was not a 
good organizer and he did not give enough time to his party. However by leaving AL like all 
other defected AL leaders, Kamal also pushed his political career towards an unfortunate end. 
Since thel993 Council Hasina was enjoying unlimited power in AL. The defection of Kamal 
confirmed her total grip over AL, made her its supreme leaders. Since then like BNP and JP 
chiefs, Hasina cleared that the door of AL is closed for those who would criticized her, even 
on genuine ground. 
One of the main reasons of BNP's 1991 election victory was that JP and Jammat did 
not disturb BNP's vote bank. Rather to prevent an AL's victory, Jammat came close to BNP. 
But since 1992 the good relation between BNP and Jammat deteriorated. Due to the 
difference in the rightist camp the AL was growing strong organizationally and politically, 
winning victory in the by-elections one by one^^. Prior to the 1994 City-corporation polls 
Hasina minimized the difference inside the party. The AL's victory in Dhaka and Chittagong 
City Corporation elections boasted its image heavily vis-a-vis ruling BNP lost its credibility. 
The election rigging of BNP in Magura by-election, held in 1994, and the holding of one 
party election by BNP, in February 1996, in the opposition's boycott, damaged its image 
enormously. Since 1994 the opposition engaged in agitation, demanding for the appointment 
of a neutral caretaker government to supervise the parliamentary elections. After the February 
1996 polls the agitation got impetus, isolated the BNP from the masses. Facing the combined 
onslaught of AL, JP and Jammat finally the regime agreed to the demand and shifted power to 
a caretaker government to arrange a midterm election in June 1996. 
As AL was out of power for last two decades it lost the confidence of many of its 
workers and supporters. It was therefore imperative for the party to ensure its next election 
victory. During 1993-96 side by side the agitation politics, Hasina devoted on mainly three 
things to confirm a election win: (i) The defection of Kamal ended the conflict in the centre, 
but still conflict was present in its lower units, which was one of the reasons of 1991 election 
defeat. In that polls in about 40 seats AL had its dissident candidates. However, AL took long 
time to reduce the conflict in its lower units, (ii) During 1991 polls many outsiders joined the 
BNP but AL did not allow the newcomers. But due to the shortage of popularity or lacking of 
money power the AL candidates brought the election defeat. Now to confirm the upcoming 
election victory it decided to invite influential and moneyed local elites in those seats where 
the party candidates were weak. The different election wins of AL during BNP regime 
boosted its possibility of coming to power too much that outsiders became eager to join AL. A 
good number of different party leaders^^, businessmen, industrialists, retired civil and military 
bureaucrats etc joined the party to contest the election with AL ticket. Among its 300 
candidates contested the 1996 polls 158 were new. In 1996 maximimi political aspirants tried 
to join AL; BNP was their second choice then JP. Apprehensive of revolt by party's local unit 
leaders at the decision of nominating 'outsiders' the AL leaders declared that if voted to 
AL, in 1992, regained all the four parliamentary seats, which were vacated with the death of its MP's. 
Among the renowned politicians Shamsul Huda Chowdhuiy, Nurul Islam Nahid, Mohammad Yusuf MP, 
Dabirul Islam MP, Hazi Selim MP, Faijul Huq etc joined the party. 
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power the party would reintroduce the local government system and the aspirants failed to get 
nomination in the polls would be accommodated there. They would also be rewarded with 
various posts in the government funded autonomous and semi-autonomous offices within the 
purview of law. However, a few deprived AL leaders, including Arsaduzzaman and Dr. 
Alauddin Ahmed, defected to BNP. The defection of these leaders could not distress the AL 
badly, (iii) To regain its rightwing vote-bank in the March 1992 WC meeting a market 
economy was added in place of socialist economy of the party constitution and the word 
'socialism' was dropped from the four main principles of the party. In the poll campaign 
besides its traditional centrist and secular vote-bank by showing respect to religious feeling of 
the 90% Muslim masse AL was able to regain part of its old right wing vote-bank. After a 
long 21 years in opposition in the June 1996 election the AL emerged as the single largest 
party '^*. It had 3 seats less to have majority in the Parliament. So it took the support of JP and 
JSD (A. Rob) in the formation of its government. The surprise is that the AL led upheaval 
ousted Ershad's autocratic regime in 1990 and now it took JP's help to form government. 
After winning the election PM Hasina and her 20-member cabinet was swom-in on 23 
June 1996. Loyal Zillur Rahman was appointed the deputy leader of the ALPP though he was 
never a good parliamentarian. Many experienced and skilled senior AL MPs were available 
but Hasina's young cousin Abul Hasnat Abdullah was installed in the important Chief Whip 
post of ALPP^^. Many senior leaders were hurted because of dropping the names of former 
ministers such as A. Mannan, A. Momin, S.A. Aziz and Salahuddin Yusuf from the list of the 
ministers. Even some of the top leaders were absent from the oath taking ceremony of the 
ministers. To reduce the resentment of the AL rank within one week of the formation of AL 
regime the PM included 6 more members in her cabinet. In her cabinet Hasina included 5 
members from civil and military bureaucracy^^. She also inducted JP Secretary Anwar 
Hossain Monju and JSD leader A. Rob in the ministry and termed it as a 'government of 
national consensus'. Two top AL leaders, A. Razzaq and Tofael, were visibly unhappy when 
their names were placed under Finance Minister Kibria and Home Minister Raiql Islam in 
protocol list despite their seniority in the party. Moreover many AL leaders were found 
resentfiil due to inclusion of Monju and A. Rob in the AL cabinet^^. The appointment of 
Faijul Huq in the ministry also resented the party workers as Huq was ousted from AL in 
1972 due to his alleged involvement in anti-liberation activities during 1971. Hasina did not 
include the AL leaders (A. Mannan, A. Momen and Dewan Farid Gazi) in her cabinet who 
joined President Mustaq's cabinet just after the killing of Sheikh Mujib. For the same reason 
the name of Gen. (Ret.) Safiullah, the Chief of Army Staff in August 1975, was excluded 
from her cabinet. The, top AL leaders, who could not win the election, including Amu and A. 
Jalil, were also not included in the cabinet. AL made Justice (Ret.) Shahabuddin Ahmed, a 
unanimously accepted figure, the President of Bangladesh^^. Though even the bitterest critic 
of AL could not but nod in support of the nomination of Shahauddin for presidency but before 
taking the decision to make him the President of the country, like all other cases, AL chief did 
not discuss it with any one of the party. If party CWC would take the decisions in electing the 
In the polls AL won 147 seats out of 300 while BNP bagged 116, JP 32, JI3, other parties 2 seats. 
The other Whips of the ALPP were Principal RafiquI Islam, Md. Abdus Sahid, S.M. Mostafa Rashid Suja and 
Mohammad Mijanur Rahman Manu. 
The three included from civil bureaucracy were S.A.M.S Kibria, A.S.H.K. Sadek and Mohiuddin Khan 
Alamgir. The two included from military were General Nuruddin Khan and Major Rafiql Islam. 
After the killing of Mujib on August 1975 the 'Ittefaq' owned and edited by Manju expressed their delight in 
the next day. And A. Rob is known for his collaboration to Ershad's autocratic regime. 
Shahabuddin was made the caretaker government head of the country to conduct the 1991 parliamentary 
election. By discharging his responsibility efficiently he earned high esteem from the masses. 
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cabinet members, Deputy Leader of the Parliament, whips, President of the country etc, then 
it could be said that AL was practicing internal democracy in taking its decision, its decision-
making body is more important than any individual's wish and nation is above party. It could 
be recognized that sensible politics still got loudest applause in a third world country like 
Bangladesh. But all the nomination of AL made it clear that an authoritarian leader controls 
the party. 
Some difference was appeared in the AL regime during its rule. AL leader Md. Hanif, 
the Mayor of Dhaka, played a vital role in the AL led successful opposition movement in 
1996. In June 1996 election to confirm AL victory in the seats of Dhaka, Hanif s role was 
tremendous. After the election victory it was talk of the tovra that Hanif would be the LORD 
Minister of AL regime. But PM did not include him in her cabinet. Later on for the 
convenience to run the City Corporation mayor Hanif demanded to form a mini-government 
of Dhaka City Corporation and engaged in conflict with the LGRD Minister Zillur Rahman. 
He also asked for the interference of PM in the matter. PM did not accept his demand. Rather 
she formed a committee by including relevant service boards of LGRD ministry with the City 
Corporation and made Zillur its chairman. It frustrated the mayor and engaged him in conflict 
with the PM. Since then Hainf maintained his personal distant from party activities. 
The Indo-Bangla water sharing treaty signed in December 1996 was highly praised by 
the Bangladesh society. However after signing the treaty a cold war started between Foreign 
Minister A. Samad Azad and Water Resources Minister A. Razzaq as both of them demanded 
the credit of the task and none of them wanted to share the credit with other. Centering the 
issue relations between the two ministers deteriorated to such an extent that it affected their 
followers. However they could not reconcile their difference during the AL rule 1996-2001^^. 
A. Samad Azad, Suranjit Sengupta and Speaker Humayun Rashid Chowdhury were from 
greater Sylhet division. All of them were renowned leaders from that region. After Sengupta 
and Humayun's joining in AL Azad engaged in infighting with them in the establishment of 
their respective control in that area. Finance Minister Kibria and Step Minister for Plarming 
Mohiuddin Khan Alamgir, both were non-MP technocrat ministers and were of bureaucracy 
background. Even then because of their ego problem they were having unfriendly relation. 
Till 1993 Zohra Tajuddin maintained an anti-Haisna lobby. She did not leave the party 
with Kamal to save her political career from a pathetic end. To comer Zohra in AL politics in 
the 1996 election Hasina nominated her from Meherpur, an area with which Zohra had no 
previous organizational connection and was defeated. From Zohra's area her husband 
Tajuddin's younger brother Afsar Uddin was nominated and was elected MP. Subsequently, 
Hasina made him Step Minister for a convincible reason. But after eight months Afsar was 
removed from his ministerial job as he engaged in a personality conflict with Hasina's close 
cousin and Chief Whip of the ALPP, Abul Hasnat Abdullah. Afsar's removal from ministry 
was a warning for other cabinet members of the consequences if they do not follow the line of 
PM Hasina. 
Leading businessman Syed Abul Hossain joined AL in 1991 and was elected MP in 
1991 and 1996 elections. After AL's coming to the power he was made State Minister for 
Local Government and Rural Development (LGRD). This key ministry was directly 
connected to the rural development work. As Hossain was not an organizer, many of the top 
AL leaders were disappointed with his appointment in this particular ministry. They preferred 
this ministry for a professional organizer, who was well-connected to the local units of the 
party, (i) to utilize the post to provide benefits to the local AL workers through distributing 
It is known by informal tallying with both of their followers groups, hostile to each other. 
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work permits and contract jobs of local development works and (ii) to enhance the support 
base through providing the benefits of AL rule at the doors of the rural masses. Many middle 
ranking AL MPs became unhappy with Hossain's appointment because by exceeding them he 
was made minister. However after one year of his job Hossain was on tangled in a 
controversy due to his secret business trip to Singapore without prior permission of the PM 
and possession of two passports at a time. In this controversy Hossain's rivals worked to 
confirm his removal from the ministry. Finally PM advised him to resign from the cabinet. 
The civil and military bureaucracy background ministers of Hasina regime lost their 
popularity inside and outside the party soon after their appointment. Most of the AL and its 
front organization leaders and MPs became critical of Home Minister Rafiqul Islam, Finance 
Minister Kiria, Education Minister Sadeq, Step Minister for Planning Alamgir and Energy 
Minister Noor Uddin. They held the Home Minister responsible for the country's 
deteriorating law and order situation; Finance Minister for catastrophe in the country's share 
market, shortage of reserve fimd in the central bank; Energy Minister for a sudden rise of ftiel 
price and frequent power disruption; Education Minister for not cooperating the AL leaders to 
solve their local problems. They alleged that all these Ministers did not want to listen to party 
men, did not give due importance to them; they were accelerating the fall of AL regime. But 
till 1997 they were still in the ministry. Many of the party stalwarts resented by observing the 
audacity of a bureaucrat minister. Party depends on its workers for coming to power and if the 
workers are treated badly by their own ministers it is very sorrowfiil matter. However all the 
non-political ministers were either highly criticized for their failure or removed from their 
respective posts at the later stage of AL rule. 
A. Kader Siddiqui, the hero of 1971 liberation war, returned to Bangladesh in 
December 1990 ending his 16 years self-exile in India. He was first elected as the ALWC 
member in 1974. He was again made the WC member in 1987 in absentia. Since his return to 
Bangladesh he differed with Hasina on different issues. When Montu was expelled form the 
party in 1992, Siddiqui and the elders opposed the decision. He was not given any important 
post in the 1992 Council Session of AL. When Kamal's party GF was formed in 1993 except 
Siddiqui no AL leader was present in that convention. In 1994 he differed with the AL 
decision to go for an anti-regime agitation. After AL's taking over of power because of his 
difference wit PM, Siddiqui was not included in AL cabinet though he was an elected MP. He 
was insulted by it; engaged in a personality conflict with the PM. Siddiqui was also engaged 
in conflict with party's Joint Secretary Shamasur Rahman Khan and Presidium member A. 
Mannan in an endeavor to control the local politics of Tangail since long. During AL rule 
administration helped Khan to curve Siddiqui's influence definitely by the tacit approval of 
Hasina^®. So the relation of Siddiqui with the PM was deteriorating. 
Because of his brother Sheikh Moni, AJL leader Selim MP had a big friend circle 
inside AL organization. Montu and Siddiqui were among the many. When Montu and 
Siddiqui engaged in conflict with Hasina, her cousin Selim still maintained good relation with 
them. Selim's newspaper 'Banglar Bani' played a neutral role. During 1996-97 Selim and his 
AJL was helping Siddiqui against his political enemies in Tangail defying Hasina's wish. 
Selim's good relation with her enemies resented the PM. Including this term Selim was 
continuously elected MP for four times. His family had lot of dedication for the party. Even 
then he was not included in the AL regime. As a result cold relation developed between 
The police raided the house of Siddiqui on December 1996, anrested his younger brothers Azad Siddiqui, the 
local student wing leader of AL and 4 more of his followers. See Daily Star, 29 and 31 December 1996. 
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Hasina and Sclim. So, the AJL leaders became critical of some ministers of S. Hasina's 
cabinet. 
In spite of remaining outside the power for two decades AL was organizationally most 
strong party in the country because of its grassroots level leaders and workers sacrifice. But 
after the party's coming to the power, a difference was developed between the party workers 
and leaders. Reasons are many: (i) AL promised to rehabilitate the local leaders in the local 
government system, who were not nominated in the 1996 election. But due to the strong 
opposition of opposition parties on it AL could not re-introduce the system. So when the local 
leaders were not satisfied they became frustrated, (ii) In 1996, many of the new comers in AL 
platform were elected MPs by party ticket. After becoming the MPs they engaged in conflict 
with the local old leaders to get control over the local party politics by their money power and 
personal influence. The central party leaders were in dilemma to solve these recent crises. 
When the aggrieved local leaders were deprived from justice they formed personal groups in 
district and sub-district level. As a result many small local groups emerged in AL. They 
engaged in infightings to perish their opponents inside the party. This fight was of ministers 
against ministers; some AL leaders, who were not included in the ministry, was against the 
ministers; MPs are fighting against the top leaders; and the local deprived leaders are fighting 
against their MPs. Towards the end of 997 it was seen rift, conflict and jealousy were on the 
rise in the AL leadership. After the formation of the government the party organization 
became weak. 
Immediately after coming to power AL tried to hold the 8'*' Council Session but it had 
to shift its date in May 1997 due to the sharp infighting which was surfaced over the 
leadership issue in the lower level units of the party. Now there was no conflict for the highest 
post of the party. But the competition among the AL leaders for the second post and other 
central posts of the party continued on. Every one knew that the main eligibility to occupy a 
good position in the party is to win the support of Hasina. Since 1993 AL stalwarts are 
competing to prove their loyalty to Hasina. As, in power, the party leaders were engaged in 
ministerial and other activities, they could not give enough time to the party. So the party was 
loosing its traditional dynamism in its organizational activities. Factionalism was steadily 
increasing in all the units of the party. The sitting GS failed to show his efficiency in the party 
activities. In this situation AL needed an efficient and skilled GS. Among of the aspirants for 
the GS post were A. Razzaq, Tofael, Amu, Selim, A. Jalil and Nasim were prominent. In the 
triennial Council Session of BAL, held in May 1997, PM Hasina was reelected unopposed 
President of the ruling party for a fourth consecutive term since 1981. Like the past 
disrespecting the councilors feeling Hasina again imposed her loyal Zillur, the LGRD 
Minister, as the GS over the party. For another time party was deprived from a dynamic and 
skilled GS. Party chief also formed other central committees without bringing any 
mentionable change. At the death of two members of 15-member Presidium Hasina included 
A. Jalil and Suranjit Sengupta in it. This Council cleared the fact that AL was converted into a 
party to ftilfill Hasina's personal whim. For this reason not only Hasina was responsible rather 
all the party leaders, since Hasina's taking over of party leadership, who followed a 
persuasion policy to fulfill their own interest were responsible. Those who helped Hasnia in 
concentrating all the administering power of the party in her hand, among of them already 
many had to leave the party, many (like Amu, Selim, S.A. Aziz etc) could not achieve their 
targets. Rather many newcomers like Suranjit Sengupta and Saber Hossani Chowdhury etc 
after joining the party captured important positions in the central body of the party by their 
money power and social influence. 
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As AL took the support of JP to come to the power, it did not fail to express its 
gratitude. It included JP Secretary as a Cabinet Minister and sacriHced three reserved seats for 
women out of 30 for JP. And, airaiiged every thing that in long run lirshad could come out of 
the jail where he was detained for over six years. The AL believed that by getting Ershad in 
their side, they would be able to continue division in the rightist force of the country. But after 
being released from jail step-by-step Ershad went against the AL regime. Within September 
1997, JP by changing its pro-AL politics converted into a regular opposition party and 
engaged in anti-regime agitation. At the beginning of 1988 it joined a BNP led four party 
alliance to remove the AL from power. To neutralize him since 1988 AL put pressure on 
Ershad, they pointed at several corruption cases still hanging over his head. So since the 
middle of 1988 he seemed to be sitting on tlie fence that divided the government and the 
opposition^'. 
The victory of AL left a deep sense of resentment in the defeated BNP camp. Khaleda 
Zia never accepted her defeat at the polls. From the very beginning of AL's taking office the 
main opposition BNP initiated agitation politics. At the end of 1997 BNP, JP, Jammat and 
Islami Oikko Jote made anti-regime alliance to oust the AL fi"om power. However because of 
(i) the absence of a potent issue in their hand; (ii) the opposition parties (BNP and JP) 
engagement in intra-party and inter-party conflict; and (iii) AL regimes programs to give 
benefit of its rule to the people etc the BNP led agitation failed to build up any effective 
pressure on the regime till 997. 
Analysis: As a matter of fact, factionalism in Bangladesh politics is omnipresent and 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. In liberal democratic party system which are open and 
competitive in nature factional conflicts are inevitable. Intra-party groups and rivalries take 
many forms. It is due to this factionalism that the party politics in Bangladesh since the very 
beginning has passed through several interesting phases. During the period under study (1971 
to 1997) the AL witnessed many crisis and clash of interest, power and personalities. The 
players changed sides, the rules of game underwent alternations and strategies witnessed new 
dimensions. 
The hypothesis that factions are always led by individual party leaders not by a 
collective bodies i.e. factionalism is predominantly personal in nature is amply proved 
through the analysis of facts in the present case study. During the study period it has been 
seen the internal factions in AL were controlled and run by some individual leaders (such as 
Sheikh Moni, Mizan Chowdhury, A. Razzaq, Dr. Kamal, Sheikh Hasina etc.) instead of 
collective body and the factions were introduced by the faction leaders name. The interest of 
group leaders had, in all cases, been the major contributing factors in the formation and 
disintegration of factions in the party. For instance, during 1972 Sheikh Moni formed a 
faction with A. Razzaq and Tofael to confirm his future leadership position in the AL after 
Mujib. Here socialist Sirajul Alam Khan was Monis main enemy. Soon after the defection of 
radical youths from the AL platform, the Moni- A. Razzaq- Tofael faction disintegrated. A. 
Razzaq-Tofael formed separate group and engaged in intense factional strife with S. Moni. 
The conflict was ended at the death of Moni in 1975. A. Razzaq and Tofael worked together 
till 1979. On the allegation that A. Razzaq group was not giving proper share to Tofael group 
and A. Razzaq was trying to confirm his solo leader in the party, rift occurred between the 
two longtime partners. Since then their conflict to establish leadership supremacy within the 
party was initiated and at the end it established the dynastic leadership in AL. Similarly Dr. 
Kamal-Tofael group played key role in making Hasina the AL president in 1981. Hasina took 
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all help of the two to compelled her main enemy A. Razzaq to leave the party. Since A. 
Razzaq was ousted from the pai ty Hasina made her distance from Kamal-Tofaei group and 
soon engaged in conflict with Kamal. At one stage Dr. Kamal had to leave the party because 
of his strain relation with Hasina. 
Factional membership is highly unstable and fluctuating in nature. Members of both 
centre and periphery always change sides without any hesitation without any moral 
compulsion. In 1976-78 Ukil was the ally of Mizan. Ukil elected the party President in 1978 
council session by a compromise negotiation as the member of Mizan led old guard 
leadership. But when Mizan group defected the party including Ukil many of the former allies 
of Mizan did not follow him. Rather to consolidate his newly achieved leadership position 
Ukil remained in the main stream AL. In 1977-79 A.Razzaq and Zohra Tajuddin were in the 
same BAKSALite group. But when Ukil came close to A. Razzaq Zohra understood that then 
by remaining in A. Razzaq group, she would not able to be the party chief, her political 
aspiration would not be achieved. So she defected from A. Razzaq group and joined hand 
with Tofaei group. The joining of A. Samad Azad, Matia Chowdhury and M.A. Jalil in 
Hasina camp by breaking their very old tight ideological relation with A. Razzaq was totally 
an opportunistic tendency to secure their political career. In 1983 when Ukil realized the 
gloomy future of newly formed BAKSAL party he drifted away from A. Razzaq group and 
joined the Hasina group. Kamal-Tofael group was the instrument to make Hasina the party 
President and till 1986 Hasina was with them but later on Kamal-Tofael became the enemies 
of Hasina. Not only that Hasina took help of her former rival A. Razzaq against Kamal dtiring 
199land 1993. Tofaei was with Kamal till 1993 but when Kamal defected AL and formed 
Gono Forum he preferred to remain in AL. This also shows that factional leaders don't 
hesitate to leave their fellow partners if they foresee danger to their own interest or position 
by remaining with the incumbent factional partners. There is no permanent agreement in 
factional game. In the study it was always visible that the periphery leaders and the workers 
left their former leaders, whenever the former faction became weak or former faction leader 
became powerless and joined the stronger group in the party or joined the mainstream AL 
whenever any breakup took place in the party. Observing the infighting of AL it can be 
concluded that in politics of a mass based political party there is no last word, there is no 
permanent allegiance to any ideology or person, and there is no permanent friend or 
permanent foe. On the demand of time every thing is changeable. Here always the friendship 
is of individual interest. Factional leaders often sidetrack their factional partners if they 
foresee danger to their own interest or their political career. Thus it is apparent that 
factionalism is marked by a high degree of fluidity. 
In the present study the facts amply proved that in many cases personal ambitions and 
gains rather than principles and ideology have been determinants of factionalism. Principle 
and ideology got the back seat in the game of politics. Even faction-leader forgot their former 
ideology if he foresee danger to their own interest or position by maintaining his old ideology. 
Moni was opposing 'Socialist Revolutionary Government' in his fight against Sirajul Alam 
Khan in 1972. The same Moni persuaded Mujib in 1975 to form one party BAKSAL 
government. From the beginning Tofaei was a democrat. But till 1979 he was in the socialist 
camp for the reasonable cause. In many cases ideology is also changeable to suit the political 
situation. One ideology (for which leaders use to inspire the workers to sacrifice their lives) is 
worth enough till it fiilfills ones political ambition, otherwise, to many leaders, it becomes a 
secondary importance. To survive in politics and to confirm their ftiture ambitions, if needed, 
many leaders don't hesitate to join in such camp - that was previously treated by themselves 
as the enemy camp - rival to their ideology, rival to their personal choice and supporters wish. 
532 
They feel nothing wrong of their taking stand against their old friend - from whom they were 
previously benefited a lot and for whom previously they had lot of esteem; and old ideology. 
To achieve their selfish interest democrat Ukil and communist Zohra left their former 
ideology and joined the opposition camps. To survive in politics A. Razzaq, Matia 
Chowdhury, Mohiuddin Ahmed left their socialist ideology and joined the Hasina led 
mainstream AL. 
In Bangladesh politics till 1983 ideology played very important role in building and 
strengthening the relation of bondage between the faction leaders and their followers in the 
lower level of the organization. During 1971-72 Sirajul Alam Khan was enjoying majority 
support of the radical youth and student wings of AL due to his allegiance towards socialism. 
In his conflict with Mizan & old guards during 1977-78, with Kamal-Tofael group during 
1979-81 and with Hasina-Kamal-Tofael group during 1981-83 A. Razzaq was enjoying the 
confidence of a group of strong dedicated pro-left AL workers only due to his long pro-left 
ideological leaning. In this study it is observed that till 1983 ideology played decisive role in 
factional polarization in AL. 
Factional conflicts at one level of the organization some time tend to spread their 
tentacles to the other level too both vertically and horizontally. The central party leaders, in 
the present study, tried hard to gain the support of the lower level units of the organization as 
well as the ancillary organizations of the party. For example in all the infightings inside AL 
under the study period all the conflicting factions of AL tried to assemble support of the lower 
level units of the party vertically and ancillary organizations horizontally. As a result it was 
seen again and again before the breakup of the party every time the ancillary organizations of 
the party were divided and split also took place in the district level units of the party. Since 
1993 it was also visible that the competing party leaders for the GS and other important posts 
in the centre were engaged in competition vertically to convince the party high command i.e. 
S. Hasina in their favor. In fact, in the infighting all the factions needed to mobilize the 
support base both horizontally and vertically and since 1993 always the leaders considered 
essential to impress the High Command vertically to win the expected positions in the party. 
Thus it may be conclude that with the intensification of factionalism, both sides compete for 
winning over the support of power structures placed horizontally as well as vertically both 
down and above them. 
The strength of faction depends upon the bondage between its core leaders and others 
in periphery. The relation between them is two-way flow. The leader, in lieu of support from 
his followers, distributes benefits among them. The followers back him with the hope of 
receiving patronage from him. Thus patronage and support are intimately linked with each 
other. One will stop if the other does not come forth. In AL politics from the very beginning 
many to the extreme right in the AL were against Tajuddin. Mujib shielded him, build him 
and made him the GS of East Bengal AL despite opposition from Mustaq and some others. 
Mujib saw in Tajuddin a good and entirely dependable lieutenant who would faithfully cany 
any task entrusted to him. In the absence of Mujib Tajuddin was made the PM of Exiled 
Bangladesh Government as a lieutenant of Mujib and led the liberation war. In this long one-
year Tajuddin was handling enormous political power and became habituated with applaud of 
the media and press. In such situation when Mujib came back from Pakistan prison and took 
the responsibility of Bangladesh government, did not accept Tajuddin's views in rebuilding 
the country, did not give any special dignified position to him, moreover before 1971, 
Tajuddinn was the third person in AL hierarchy, and Mujib kept him in the same position. In 
this situaiton like others Tajuddin was not ready to loose his newly developed importance. 
Like earlier he was not ready to be satisfied by feeling himself as one of the prominent 
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lieutenant of Mujib. He started feeling ignored and became unhappy. Also involved in going 
against Mujib. In this development a power conflict between Mujib and 'iajuddin was started. 
In AL Mujib was supreme over every one. So Tajuddin Had to loose his position in the party 
and government. At the beginning of Hasina's leadership Hasina and Tofael were together in 
the same faction. When A. Razzaq defected from the party, Tofael expccted that Hasina 
would replace him in the GS post, in the place of A. Razzaq. When Hasina ignored it Tofael 
was shocked and separated himself from Hasina. Like this there are several similar instances 
in this study to present. In fact, the very strength and cohesiveness of a faction depend largely 
upon the ability of a leader to distribute material benefits and extended patronage to his 
followers. The relation between the leader and his followers is invariably that of give-and-
take a mutual interest adjustment. The leader, in return to get support from the sub-leaders, 
distributes benefits and political positions. The sub-leaders, in maximum case, support the 
leader in the hope of receiving patronage from him rather than following any principle or 
ideology. The relationship is superficial, short-lived and amoral. 
Before the death of Mujib there was proportional representation of every division/ 
region of Bangladesh in the top body of AL. Mujib was from Faridpur. Among the five iimer-
circle members of Mujib Syed Nazrul was from Rajshahi, Tajuddin from Dhaka (Gazipur), 
Mansur Ali from Pabna, Kamruzzaman from Mymensingh (Serpur) and Khondoker Mustaq 
was representing the Comillah district. But after the demise of Mujib majority of the top AL 
leaders has been representing greater Faridpur or greater Baruishal districts and these two 
areas have been known as the stronghold of AL. S. Hasina, A. Razzaq, Sajeda Chowdhury etc 
are from Faridpur. Tofael Amir Hossain Amu, Abul Hasinat Abdullah etc are from Barishal. 
Though Mijan Chowdhury was from Comillah district, Ukil was from Noakhali district, 
Zohra Tajuddin was from Gazipur district but in the factional game they had to depend on the 
leaders of these two regions. Moreover it is regular phenomenon that the top leaders of the 
ancillary organizations of AL (especially the student and youth front) are coming from these 
two regions. However, all major districts are representing the central body of AL, So, greater 
Faridpur and greater Barishal district leaders always played the decisive role in the factional 
game of AL. Regionalism has some significant role in AL politics. But as Hasina is the final 
deciders in making the other party leadership the regional conflict hardly influence the group 
conflict in AL. 
In terms of mobilization aspects, in the lower units of the party (i.e. at district and sub-
district levels): contrary to the usual contemplation, during 1977-79, alignment of the lower 
level AL workers and supporters with the left-wing A. Razzaq led faction was found near 
about total in the opposition of Mizan Chowdhury led group. This happened due to: (i) The 
cadre-group of A. Razzaq was more skilled, dedicated and energetic (because of their middle 
age background) in their organizational activities than that of Mizan group; (ii) Though the 
people were against socialist BAKSAL system (espoused by A. Razzaq group) and in favor of 
the parliamentary democracy (espoused by Mizan group) but Mizan group failed to convince 
the AL supporters that Mujib had been the believer of parliamentary democracy. To that time 
general AL workers BAKSAL was the last program of Bangabandhu Mujib to be executed 
and leaving BAKSAL program means burring the dream of Bangabandhu; (iii) and that time 
majority youthful AL leaders' and workers' emotional attachment for leftist ideology and 
socialist BAKSAL system, (iv) Personal background, direct relationship of the top leaders of 
A. Razzaq group with the lower level leaders and workers of AL helped them to gain majority 
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support in AL platform^^ where as the generation gap of Mizan group leaders with that time 
majority lower unit youth AL leaders and workers, and their absence of direct relation with 
the mass was the main obstacle in winning AL support base in their favor. After Hasina's 
taking over of the party leadership even the socialist workers of AL left A. Razzaq and joined 
Hasina camp; because: (i) Hasina was enjoying the image of Mujib as his successor; (ii) 
When majority AL workers sided with Hasina, many were not ready to jeopardize their 
political career by remaining with A. Razzaq; and (iii) After the fall of communist politics in 
Europe socialism lost its appeal in the youth of Bangladesh. Though Hasina led AL was not 
following the real programs of Mujib but the image of Hasina as the daughter of Mujib was 
sufficient to convince the people who were illiterate, half educated and having the mentality 
to follow feudalistic hereditary leadership. 
It is, to a large extent, true that factionalism tends to flourish in the absence of strong 
leader of the party. But there is little guarantee that the existence of a strong leader would 
result in the absence of factional conflict. In case of AL we find that Mujib was the leader 
with undisputed quality of leadership. He was the towering/ charismatic figure with immense 
following and had a lot of dynamism. But during his leadership infighting was going on in the 
party. However, because of his towering personality he contained the conflicting groups in the 
party. A. Razzaq was a strong leader having genuine organizing quality with mass following, 
though not comparable to Mujib. But he could not prevent the growth of new factions in the 
AL. Rather due to the factional game at one stage he had to leave the AL. In the tenure of S. 
Hasina factional game is still continuing. Since her taking over of power one after another 
factional conflict has been taking place in the party. Though in a dictatorial way, rather than 
in a rational way, she has been handling the infighting and already defeated faction leaders 
had to leave the party. But still there is presence of factional conflict in the party. It is true at 
present she is not facing any contest for the highest post but for another posts of the party and 
in its lower units jealousy and intense factionalism is still continuing on. However, Tajuddin, 
Nazrul Islam, Mustaq, Ukil, Mizan, A. Razzaq, Dr. Kamal, Tofael Ahmed in the post 
independent Bangladesh also are still known for their leadership quality and vast experience. 
Tajuddin was known for his calculative brain. A. Razzaq is known for his rare organizing 
capability. Mustaq and Dr. Kamal had shown their skills and unparallel shrewdness in their 
style of dealing the factional game. While Tofael, Mizan and Uldl etc are just brilliant leaders. 
However, the intense group fighting so much so that none of them could retain their previous 
dignified position in the party characterized the leadership of all these stalwarts, except Mujib. 
Many of them could not reach to their expected positions, though they were full of qualities. 
Though every one had the quality to lead the party but even together they failed to reduce the 
difference among them and could not give dynamism to the party. Rahter because of their 
own factional dealing, except Tofael, all had to leave the party one by one. However, many of 
them returned to their old platform. Due to the intense infighting hereditary leadership was 
emerged in the party and subsequently all had to bow to it. Hasina was given the 
responsibility of President of the party. There has been no change in the post of President 
since her taking over the party leadership. 
During the days of Mujib the young leaders affiliated to A. Razzaq group were having very close relation with 
Mujib. During the autonomous movement of AL (1966-69) and liberation war (1971) majority of these youth 
leaders were in with the general AL workers in the battlefield, they were the sharer of all the pains and sorrows 
of the masses. Where as in those days the senior Mizan group leaders and workers were enjoying the secured 
shelters in Kolkata, provided by the that time Indian government. Moreover during 1972-75 Mujib preferred the 
youth AL leaders to reorganize the AL and installed them in the very important positions of the AL and its 
ancillary organizations. 
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A dominant party, because of its unchallenged monopoly of political power, patronage 
and financial resources available to it, obviously attracts to itself a wide variety of socio-
economic interest and thus becomes a haven for most disparate elements, which grope, 
through it, for political recognition, articulation and control. During Pakistan era the AL was 
leading the Bengali sub-nationalist movement. At time it converted into the only popular 
party of the Bengalis. To fulfill the political aspiration all class of the people, fi:om extreme 
right to extreme left and moderates, from wealthy urban people to rich landholders of the 
village areas, all type of professional people etc joined in the AL platform. As a resuh after 
the independence it was converted into an umbrella organization of all strata of the people to 
fiilfill their socio-economic and political aspiration. Moreover the post-independent AL was 
the only dominant party in Bangladesh. To ftilfill their selfish economic and political 
aspiration all the economically and political ambitious people of various interest groups 
assembled in AL. It resulted the formation of several groups of interest and ideology under 
several factional leaders and intense factionalism among the different interests and ideologies. 
The similar views reappeared in the post 1993 AL politics. Since 1993 when the AL was 
getting momentum and day by day the possibility of its coming to power was becoming 
bright, m those days many of the aspirant political leaders of different parties, business 
people, retired civil-military bureaucrats started joining the party. The trend continued after 
the party came to the power in 1996. All these ambitious opportunistic leaders joined the 
party to fulfill their political and economic aspiration and after coming to the power in their 
respective areas involved in or encouraged infighting to confirm their position in the party. 
The view that party in power prone to intense factional cleavage proved correct in the 
study. In the post-independent Bangladesh in the absence of any effective and organized 
opposition the first AL regime was divided into multiple division. From the intense 
factionalism and splits JSD was formed in 1972. Again the party came to power in 1996. Like 
the previous term the ministers of AL also engaged in personality and prestige conflict. 
During both the term President of Bangladesh engaged in personality conflict with the PM. 
The observation showed that even if the party is strong and there is no threat to it from 
outside, the party is likely to be afflicted by group fighting. The national liberation war was 
leading by only AL, the single dominant party of this region in 1971. During 1972-75 the AL 
was the single dominant party in the country, virtually there was no real opposition during 
Mujib regime. In the post 1993 politics of AL, the party did not face mentionable external 
threat but in all these days AL faced factional infighting because of the presence of the highly 
ambitious and opportunist leaders in the party. Especially during the days of liberation war 
and during Mujib regime the youth leaders high ambition put the party in the verge of splits. 
Though it is assumed that in present of external threat intra-party tussle among the 
dedicated leaders of a party can be reduced but the study showed that all the dedicated and 
tested leaders of the post -1975 AL engaged in factional conflict one after another. In the days 
of crisis when to survive the party needed internal unity they forgot that and engaged in 
vilifying each other. As a result the party took maximum time to reorganize, faced several 
splits. The Zia and Ershad regime, in their formation of new government parties, successfully 
split the party again and again, made the party platform weak, by creating mistrust among the 
party leaders and distributing government patronage in the party leaders and workers. 
Professor Yusuf Ali, Korban Ali, Sheikh Shahid, Mizan Chowdhury, Shah Moazzem etc 
many of the top party leaders left the party and later joined the governing party to be the 
government ministers. Mizan, Korban Ali etc leaders were even directly accused for their 
involvement with the governing regime to engineer the division in the party. The study 
showed that the palace conspiracy of the governing party to create infightings and rift in the 
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opposition parties created enormous damage to the party's image and organizational ability. 
The study further showed that the governing regimes always engage their government 
machineries to make weak the opposition platform that they might not put real challenge to 
the government through anti-government movement and general election. 
In the study it is amply proved that the collective leadership formula instead of 
individual leadership of a party is unable to reduce factionalism if the party leaders are not 
honest enough in reducing their internal difference and are not ready to leave their selfish 
leadership aspirations. In 1981 council session to save the party from further division, by 
reducing the authoritarian power of the party president maximum power was transferred into 
the hand of newly formed party presidium. But as ideological difference was not reduced in 
the party during 1981 to 83 the collective leadership was proved ineffective in minimizing 
party factionalism. Rather Hasina group tried to use their majority dominance in Presidium to 
curve the influence of A. Razzaq and to punish the leaders of A. Razzaq group against the 
majority party workers wish. In 1987 when AL leader Hasina was in jail by using the majority 
domination of the Presidium the Kamal group tried to fulfill their selfish interest. Though the 
ALPP was not ready to resign in masse and the party constitution did not provide any such 
right to the party presidium that it can compel the ALPP to follow its decision but the 
Presidium tried to impose its minority will over the party MPs. As Presidium could not earn 
the party members respect when Hasina, in the subsequent days, increased her authoritarian 
power by reducing the influence of it, no one of the general party councilors show their 
unhappiness against the initiative of Hasina. Actually both collective leadership formula or 
individual leadership formula wall be successful specially, (i) when the party leaders will be 
honest to follow internal party discipline and internal party democracy; (ii) instead of 
indulging in detrimental infighting to fulfill their selfish interests and to increase their 
personal image or influence over the party workers and supporters when the party leaders will 
give importance on healthy leadership competition i.e. will give priority on organizing 
capability and skills, popularity, good image, mass cormection of the leaders etc leadership 
qualities in making the new leader or leaders of the party and (iii) when the party leaders will 
believe that only through the majority councilors vote in the council sessions through 
democratic way the leadership will be changed not through any undemocratic way or by 
imposmg any hereditary leadership. Instead of indulging in infighting to get party leadership 
when the party leaders will show their maximum leadership capability and will show their 
respect on party councilors voting right. 
In Ae study it is seen prior to the every splits of AL every time first its student wing 
Bangladesh Chatra League (BCL) was divided. The BCL leaders and workers are influenced 
by the personal politics of the big guns of AL. In Bangladesh students are the most dedicated 
and active force in politics. Every political party heavily depended on their student fronts to 
get success in their agitation politics. It is said that the party which is having the support of 
Dhaka University students, it will have the power to govern the country. To get recognition as 
the renowned politician, every leaders needs to be popular in the students. The AL had 
emerged as the major political party of the country during Pakistan period due to the success 
of the BCL in mobilizing the support of the large segment of the students of Dhaka University 
and all other educational institutions. Since 1972 whenever the AL party leadership engaged 
in infighting, this front organization also got affected heavily. It was always seen that student 
leaders of BCL were the followers of some top AL leaders who, since AL's power lost in 
1975, were divided into many factions. Because of strong mentor-disciple relations of the 
student leaders with the factionally divided top AL leaders, it was also seen that student 
leaders were always sided with their mentors in the factional conflict. So the BCL was also 
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affected and divided whenever the main organization, AL, was affected in infighting and 
broke down. As a resuh BCL, already lost its previous undisputed supremacy over other 
student organizations. 
Like all other politicians AL leaders did have their own disciples in different ancillary 
organizations and lower units of AL. The leaders and workers of these front and lower units 
of AL have a natural tendency to be the member of the central body of AL. There is 
leadership competition in these lower bodies of the party and the influential central party 
leaders personal influence always helped their disciples in these units to win the competition. 
Moreover till 1983 the same ideological affinity of the lower unit and ancillary organization 
leaders with different top party leaders made them close together. As a result in the study 
period it was always seen that the infighting of the main-body AL always influenced its 
associate and lower level organizations as those organizations were being run by the growing 
future leaders of the party - who were some how the followers of influential leaders of main-
body AL. Whenever AL was divided due to the infighting of the top party leaders, the 
associate organizations including the student, youth, labor and women wings and district/ 
subdistrict units of the party also faced vertical split. 
Another important observation is the strong possibility of inter-party collaboration 
when factionalism increases in a party. As the relationship between the fighting groups of a 
political party worsens, they tend to seek alliance from outside and in the process other 
political parties get dragged to the factional game. It is also observed that some ideology 
based party, those don't have enough voting strength to come to the power, try to establish 
their ideology in a country through utilizing another mass based popular party like that of AL. 
To strengthen the faction of similar ideology in the popular party that they get success in 
controlling over the party's highest decision making body and in its branch and front 
organizations, they use to involve in the inter-party collaboration during the infighting in the 
mass based party. During 1971 as infighting in the AL hierarchy was in the extreme, Tajuddin 
wanted to strengthen his position inside the party and within Exiled Bangladesh Government. 
He tried to include the CPB, NAP (B) and NAP (M) etc leftist parties in the Exiled 
Bangladesh Government and allowed the recruitment of the cadres of liberation force from 
the leftist parties. By this he sought communist support against his rivals. During 1972-73 
CPB, and NAP (M) extended their support in his favor to establish socialist principles in the 
state policies of Bangladesh. As in the post-independent Bangladesh Mujib withdrawn his 
blessings from Tajuddin, these two parties also left Tajuddin. Mujib used to depend on 
personal relation rather than depending on total organization to spread his support base. 
Realizing the fact CPB and NAP built close working relation wiA two of Mujib's nearest 
persons: Sheikh Moni, and M. Mansur Ali. Their sole intension was to establish socialism in 
Bangladesh through influencmg Mujib. In 1975 the communists got success in their planning. 
Mujib merged AL, CPB and NAP and formed new socialist national party BAKSAL to 
establish socialism and abrogated multiparty democracy. In another observation it was seen, 
since 1977 CPB was playing important role in the internal politics of AL. At the beginning 
CPB and NAP supported Zohra Tajuddin and A. Razzaq and later it supported A. Razzaq 
againist Mizan-Tofael-Kamal. The reason of their supporting Zohra and A. Razzaq was that 
AL might not leave its old socialist program and tilt towards democracy. The CPB and NAP 
was dreaming to establish socialism in Bangladesh through using the popular party AL. Due 
to the pro-socialist background A. Razzaq easily made connection with the CPB and NAP 
(Muzaffar) and time to time got their help in his fighting against the liberal democrats and 
pro-USA elements dominated Tofael-Kamal-Hasina group (time to time the name of this 
group was changed, but always these three leaders were the main protagonists of it). 
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In the light of fact it may be concluded that, when a leader of a faction fail repeatedly 
in his endeavor to capture organization or his hope to success in future is bleak, he either 
revolt openly against the party leadership or leaves the party altogether. For example time-to-
time when S.A. Khan in 1972, Mizan Chowdhury in 1979, A. Razzaq in 1983 and Kamal in 
1993 saw their respective positions were bleak in the party leadership, they left AL and 
formed new parties. 
The study also confirms that the infighting and chaos within the party delayed the 
party to reorganize itself. The party could never held national conventions in time. Because of 
its internal conflict it had to change its schedule to held National Council Session. As a result 
after the death of Mujib it took 21 years for coming to power for the second time in the 
independent Bangladesh. 
The study also showed that in the same cases timely intervention can prevent bitter 
infighting and split of the party. During 1971 the timely intervention of the Indian authority 
prevented direct factional clash between wartime government of Bangladesh and Mujib 
Bahini leaders. During 1976 when AL was reviving the timely intervention of third party 
prevented the Mujibites and the old guards from engaging in direct factional conflict till the 
party revives. Same thing happened in the conflicts between Zohra Vs Mizan and Kazi 
Zahirul Kayum, A. Razzaq Vs Tofael etc. In these cases timely and proper handling by the 
third party prevented the party from the splits. 
It was observed in the study that to prevent continuous factionalism and multiple splits 
and to save the party from a final destruction AL leadership installed Mujib daughter in 1981 
and started dynastic leadership in Bangladesh. When A, Razzaq and Tofael failed to reconcile 
their factional difference due to their personal leadership aspiration they made the field fertile 
for hereditary leadership. Moreover to win the factional game Tofael group proposed the 
name of Mujib's daughter Hasina as the party chief and due to the lacking of enough political 
education and awareness majority councilors of both group supported the proposal to save the 
party from ftirther factionalism and splits. So party infighting is responsible to install dynastic 
leadership in Bangladesh. 
The Indian subcontinent has seen the dominance of some influential families in 
political arena during the last several decades. These families enjoy the privileges of power 
generation- after- generation and are still fighting with their arch to keep intact their long 
tradition of being at the centre of political power. Similarly in Bangladesh politics the Sheiks 
are the largest family associated with the ups and downs of the country. It started with Sheikh 
Mujib and since 1971 relatives of Mujib, as a faction, are playing dominant role in AL 
politics. Sheikh Mujib, after independence, took overall responsibility of the country while 
some of his relatives came forward to have a share of power. Abdur Rab Semiabat, brother-
m-law of S. Muijb, was a minister in Mujib's cabinet. His son Abul Hasnat Abdullah was the 
secretary of Barisal district Youth League. Sheikh Moni, nephew of Mujib and Chief of AJL 
was the second most influential person in AL during Mujib's time. Sheikh Shahid, another 
nephew of Mujib, was elected the leader of Mujibs student wing BCL. He was also the 
ranking member of AL. Mujib's elder son, Sheikh Kamal, was a student in Dhaka University 
but was well connected with the central AL members even without a position. His 
introduction to AL politics seems to be simply a matter of time. After the 1975 killing the AL 
faced mtense infighting and splits. To save the party from ftirther splits, AL brought in Sheikh 
Hasina from India and was given the responsibility of the President of the party. There has 
been no change in the post of president since then. Sheikh family had five people in the 7''' 
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parliament", which was constituted in 1996. Besides, Sheikh Selim was working as the 
president of AJL, Sheikh Helal as a member of Bagerhat district AL, and Abul Hasnat 
Abdullah as chief whip in parliament and GS of Barisal district AL, Nur-e Alam Chowdhury 
was a member of Madaripur district AL. A distant relative of Hasina, S.A. Malek, GS of 
Bangabandhu Parishad, was the political adviser of PM S. Hasina, during the tenure of AL 
rule. Another distant relative Bahauddin Nasim was PM Hasina's assistant private secretary. 
AL Presidium member Sajeda Chowdhury, and former AL GS Zillur Rahman (the party GS 
till 2003) were the distant relatives of Sheikh family. Though not from the first row of AL 
leadership, Hasina's cousins Abul Hasnat Abdullah, Sheikh Helal and Sheikh Selim still play 
important role in various national and internal politics of AL. 
The present study suggests that the religious minority does not play any significant 
role in the factionalism of AL in a mono ethnic Muslim country like Bangladesh. Less than 
ten percent of the total population of the country is religious minority. The overwhelming 
numbers of the minorities are Hindus who constitute a solid vote bank for the party. In the 
newfound Bangladesh, secularism was made part of the constitution by AL but only few 
could understand what it really meant or implied and that the AL was hardly interested in 
pushing this issue. In fact the Tajuddin group, the left group within AL, who supported 
socialism and its attendant baggage were also not so keen about the issue. In AL there has 
been only little presence of Hindus in the top leadership. Sudhangshu Shekhar Haider was 
sole AL veteran Hindu leader while Suranjit Sengupta is a socialist hoper from another party 
who has joined recently. The few Hindu leaders in the middle rank of the party are unable to 
make any group; rather time-to-time they joined in the factional conflict as individuals. 
Factionalism in Bangladesh transcends important socio-political categories such as religion, 
tribes and cast etc. 
It is also seen that the parties, which were floated by the breakaway factions and 
faction leaders of AL could not survive in the political arena of Bangladesh, they never 
succeeded in their goal. The faction leaders, formed new parties by leaving AL, suffered a 
loss of their images, popularity and chances of acquiring political power. As a result their 
followers also deserted them in the quest of greener pastures. Since 1972 because of 
factionalism and splits in AL a number of political parties, such as JSD, JJP, GAL, DL, AL 
(Mizan), BAKSAL and GF etc, were emerged. But no one of these parties were having 
enough mass following, no one of them could build party base up to the grassroots level. 
From the begiiming except JSD and BAKSAL all were treated as leader based parties without 
mass following. Since the formation of these parties they were again divided and subdivided. 
In the following years some of these parties lost their existence, some of these faction leaders 
joined the military regimes of General Zia and General Ershad and strengthened the hands of 
autocratic regimes for the lust of powers and helped them to legalize their illegal power. 
Many of the faction leaders returned to the mainstream AL. Some of them are still exists but 
merely by name, without having significant political activities and mass following. In 
Bangladesh they are only increasing the number of the political parties and dividing the public 
opinion. This mushrooming growth of political parties by the defection of major parties only 
tlweatens the healthy political activities. It is also unhealthy for a democratic institution 
building process. 
TTie absence of internal democratic practice creates factional infighting inside a party. 
In the study it is observed that Tofael was one of the main instrument in making Hasina the 
They are S. Hasina, Sheikh Helal Uddin (son of Mujib's brother Sheikh Naser), S. Fazlul Karim Selim (son of 
Mujib's sister), Abul Hasnat Abdullah (son of Mujibs another sister), and Nur-e Alam Chowdhury (Mujib's 
grandson and son of Sheikh Selims sister). 
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party chief. It was an expectation that at the defection of A. Razzaq, Tofael would be replaced 
in his place and Tofael had enough popularity and organizing skill to be the party GS. In the 
1983 and 1987 council session maximum councilors were also supporting him. But Hasina's 
contemplation was different. She was afraid that the popular leader Tofael might create 
challenge to her leadership like that of A. Razzaq. So in the 1983 and 1987 council session 
instead of arranging election for the GS post she made loyal Sajeda and Zillur Rahman the 
party GS by using her authoritarian power. It made Tofael unhappy and encouraged him to go 
against Hasina. In the study AL leader Hasina's authoritarian tendency to form the lower level 
committees also seen and as a result many AL leaders became victim of it. Since the 
beginning the top leadership of AL do not practice democracy. Majority opinions do not 
reflect in the party decisions rather party chief impose his/ her own will over the party. Party 
leader impose her own men in the central posts of the party. Opposition faction members, 
even though they are having enough organizational skills, always deprives from their 
expected positions. As a result there was always fhistration in the party. Whenever split takes 
place in the party these deprived section join the defected leaders and later they join the 
governing party. The party lost many of its dedicated leaders because of the absence of 
internal democracy in the party. 
Factionalism impedes the growth of healthy politics in a country. The infighting in AL 
was largely responsible for the inefficiency of AL regime during 1972-75. The factionalism 
opened the path for the disgruntled army officers to oust Mujib regime through a military 
coup in 1975. Since then the country was under the dictatorial rule for 15 years. Due to the 
difference in AL, though it was the main opposition party and was having largest mass 
following, could not build up any movement to realize peoples democratic rights during 
General Zia regime. In 1982 when General Ershad abducted the governing power by another 
military coup, due to that time AL leadership's engagement in inter-party conflict with BNP 
and intra-party conflict in its own fold even could not criticize immediately General Ershad's 
illegal power abduction. Because of the inter-party and intra party conflict in the opposition 
including AL the people of the country had to tolerate Ershad's autocratic rule for another 
nine years. The intra-party and inter-party conflict of the opposition camp prevented them to 
form effective agitation against Ershad's autocratic regime till 1990. Only when the AL and 
BNP could reduce their internal difference the second military regime of the country was 
overthrovra by a popular uprising. Only when AL was freed from factional crisis after 21 
years in opposition in 1996 it returned to the power. The opposition agitation could not create 
any harm to the AL regime till 1997 but the infighting of AL confused the masses about the 
party. Every political party of Bangladesh has sustained damage due to the infighting and 
breakups. In the post liberation Bangladesh political scenario the intensity of the split in 
different political parties was so strong that as a result all the old political parties were divided 
and subdivided into pieces. Their political strength was totally exhausted. Only AL was saved 
from its total destruction. Due to the division of the political parties now Bangladesh is having 
about 200 political parties and as a result the public opinion is also multiply divided. It is 
against the healthy growth of political institutions. Factionalism impedes the development of 
healthy political environment. Intra-party and inter-party conflicts of the opposition help the 
military/ autocratic regimes remaining in power. 
One of the observations of the study is that the infighting of the governing parties is 
also responsible for the abduction of power by the military generals. During the first AL rule 
the internal factionalism of the party was the main problem behind the inefficiency of the AL 
regime. During that time there was no proper coordination among the ministers, among the 
party leaders. Instead of discussing the governing affairs in the party's or government's 
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internal forum, the party ministers, rival to each other, were seen accusing each other for the 
deteriorating economic and law and order situation of the country. Even side-by-side the 
opposition parties AL's three front wings (CL, JL and SL) also arranged processions and 
public meetings and vilified the AL leaders for their inefficiency in ruling the country. When 
unity among AL leaders and the public was much needed to build the war-ravaged country the 
infighting inside AL caused civil unrest. This internal conflict opened the way to the pro-US 
group and pro-capitalist traditional bureaucrats to reorganize against the Mujib's socialist 
BAKSAL system. Ultimately under the patronage of west one faction of Bangladesh army 
with the help of pro-US faction of AL killed Mujib and all the top ranking leaders of AL. 
Through this coup the pro-US minister of Mujib's cabinet Khandaker Mustaq assumed the 
President's office and also formed his cabinet with AL leaders. The coup ushered an era of 
military rule in the country, that deprived the people from their democratic rights for the next 
fifteen years. The participation of Mujib's own men in overthrowing the AL regime reveals 
that the infighting in the AL was responsible for the assassination of Mujib in 1975 and for 
subsequent long days undemocratic military rule in Bangladesh. 
AL leaders A. Razzaq, Tofael Ahmed, Matia Chowdhury, former AL leader Mostafa 
Mohsin Montu (currently in BNP) etc also agreed in their interviews that because of the two 
military regimes encouragement in factionalism and splits all the major political parties 
including AL were again and again divided and subdivided. There was strong allegation that 
Mizan Chowdhury, Korban Ali and many of the AL stalwarts were secretly engaged in 
creation of factionalism and rifts in AL as the instruments of the military regimes. Several of 
the AL leaders defected the party and joined the military regimes from the last of power and 
other government incentives. Military regimes encouraged factionalism and splits in the 
opposition parties to make weak the opposition parties' pro-democratic movement, to build up 
and strengthen their own new parties with the defected factions of the opposition camps with 
an intension to give civil color to their autocratic regimes. 
In the study it is observed that the sudden joining of the non-political personalities 
(such as retired civil and military bureaucrats, business people and other people from different 
occupation etc) create infighting in the parties. In the 1996 election for the first time many of 
the new comers in AL platform were elected MPs by party ticket. After becoming the MPs 
they engaged in conflict with the local old leaders to get control over the local party politics 
by their money power and personal influence. By the 1997 Council Sessions the party central 
committee and lower level committees were comprised with many of these moneyed and 
power-seeking people but the infighting did not reduced. The central party leaders were in 
dilemma to solve these recent crises. When the aggrieved local leaders were deprived from 
justice they formed personal groups in district and sub-district level. As a result many small 
local groups emerged in AL. They engaged in infightings to perish their opponents inside the 
party. This fight also spread in the centre when many of the old stalwarts did not include in 
the ministry but some of these new comers were accommodated there. Towards the end of 
997 it was seen rift, conflict and jealousy were on the rise in the AL leadership. After the 
formation of the government the party organization became weak. The inclusion of these 
people in AL reduced the confidence of the lower unit leaders on the central leadership. Is it 
also inflicting adverse reflection over the party popularity? 
Another noticeable fact, which emerges clearly from the study, is the decisive role 
played by the India in the infighting of AL. For example in 1971 to keep Indian control over 
the Bangladesh issues the Indian administration sustained the inner conflicts within the AL. It 
helped the youths of AL to form parallel force (Mujib Bahini), and side-by-side provided all 
type of assistance to the wartime Bangladesh government led liberation force for a successfiil 
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party. This fight also spread in the centre when many of the old stalwarts did not include in 
the ministry but some of these new comers were accommodated there. Towards the end of 
997 it was seen rift, conflict and jealousy were on the rise in the AL leadership. After the 
formation of the government the party organization became weak. The inclusion of these 
people in AL reduced the confidence of the lower unit leaders on the central leadership. Is it 
also inflicting adverse reflection over the party popularity? 
Another noticeable fact, which emerges clearly from the study, is the decisive role 
played by the India in the infighting of AL. For example in 1971 to keep Indian control over 
the Bangladesh issues the Indian administration sustained the inner conflicts within the AL. It 
helped the youths of AL to form parallel force (Mujib Bahini), and side-by-side provided all 
type of assistance to the wartime Bangladesh government led liberation force for a successfiil 
end of the war. By this they also tried to confirm that the post-independent Bangladesh 
government should be a pro-Indian one. They were successftjl in their effort. The first 
Bangladesh government was pro-Indian. Without the involvement of India in the infighting of 
AL in 1971, the liberation struggle of the Bengali's could be jeopardized. India's role is also 
cleared from the election of A. Razzaq as party GS in 1978. During 1976 to 1981 AL faced a 
number of factionalism and splits. In 1981 the party was in the verge of destruction. To save 
the party from further defections and disunity, AL's friends in India engaged the indo-westem 
lobby inside AL to make Mujib's daughter Hasina the party President. India needed powerfiil 
AL party to save its interest in Bangladesh. In removing A. Razzaq and Dr. Kamal from AL 
India also played important role. On the necessity to oust Kamal and strengthen AL in 1991 
India also mediate the negotiation between Hasina and A. Razzaq to find out a way for the 
return in AL platform of the later one. India played a good role in the 1978 and 1993 AL 
coimcii sessions etc. 
The role of press and electronic media in intensification of factionalism has been well 
observed during the present study. Press and politics go hand in hand in Bangladesh. Every 
stalwart in politics in Bangladesh either owns a newspaper or has direct or indirect control 
over newspapers. Mujib's nephew Sheikh Moni was the owner of two dailies. During Mujib 
regime Kamruzzaman, the cabinet member of Mujib was the owner of daily Janapad. That 
time AL MP Moinul Hossain was the owner of daily Ittefaq etc. Now still Sheikh Selim, the 
cousin of Hasina, is having the Banglar Bani. Hasina's younger sister S. Rehana has her own 
weekly named weekly Bichitra. Former AL MP Moqbul Hossain, S. Abul Hossain etc they 
won and edit different newspapers. Moreover some more newspapers support the AL stand 
and highlight some of the AL leaders activities. During Mujib regime to defame Tajuddin, 
Moni successfully used his two dailies in campaining against Tajuddin. In his fight against A. 
Razzaq-Tofael group Moni also propagated his own views against the stand of A. Razzaq and 
Tofael Ahmed. By Ae proper use of his newspapers Moni tried to sharpen his attack against 
that time AL leadership excluding Mujib. As a result Kamruzzaman defended the slander of 
Moni also tried to expose the unholy activities of JL through his daily Janapad. In 1978-79 
government won dailies and weeklies were supported Mizan against mainstream AL. During 
Zia and Ershad rule daily Sangbad, daily Banglar Bani, Mukti Bani, weekly Sachitra 
Sandhani, weekly Khabar etc wrote in favor of AL. Since Hasina's taking over of party 
leadership Banglar Bani was engaged in boosting the image of Hasina. It was also used to 
expose the misdeeds of A. Razzaq and other dissident leaders through the entire period when 
Hasina was facing challenge from A. Razzaq facton. Similarly when Hasina involved in 
infighting with Kamal some of the dailies such as Banglar Bani, Sangbad, Bhorer Kagoj, 
Ajker Kagoj, Janakantha etc not only praised and highlighted Hasina's bold leadership and 
substantial achievements, but also bitteriy attacked her opponents. The goveming parties 
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always used the radio, televisions and government own dailies and weeklies in humiliating the 
main opposition AL. Always these electronic and press medias used to provide the defaming 
news regarding AL, such as they highlighted all the factional skirmish of AL, whenever any 
AL leader left the party they highlighted him and his criticism towards AL with great 
importance. This shows that with the intensification of factionalism the press and medias got 
involved in it and try to intensify the infightings. 
The observation shows politics in Bangladesh is very much factional. In Bangladesh 
party leaders prestige, ego, personal aspiration, tendency to establish personality cult, 
ideological difference etc are mainly responsible for the factional conflict and splits in the 
parties and the mushrooming growth of the political parties. Some times regionalism play role 
in the infighting in the political parties and formation of region-based parties but that is not 
very common and also not a very powerful factor among the many. Cast, creed and religion 
don't have any role of infighting in parties in this mono-ethical country. In the post-
independent Bangladesh only from the infighting and division of AL as many as nine political 
parties were formed and from division of these newborn parties numerous parties were 
floated^'*. Now a days Bangladesh is having about 200 political parties and as a result country 
peoples' opinion are also multiply divided. Due to the absence of imity of opinion of the 
masses in the some basic issues of the coimtry the nation is imable to develop itself socially, 
economically and politically. 
Last but not the least is the observation that the process of the elimination of the 
dissidents some times help putting the party men on the right track. On different occasion 
Hasina ousted many of the old guard party leaders, demoted many of the top party leaders 
from their high position and replaced the new-generation leaders in their positions. All these 
generated hope among aspirant leaders and at the same time put the senior and top party 
leaders on track. This helped her in crushing the dissidents in the party. Probably by observing 
these Matia Chwodhury commented, if any one want to engage in factionalism in AL, he 
might try and face the consequences of his lust. 
Latest development: Factionalism in the political parties is a never-ending process. It 
is possible to reduce Ae factionalism but not possible to total elimination factionalism from a 
party. It can be said that the power conflict in the centre was over by the defection of Kamal, 
but still difference was prevailing in the district and sub-district level of the party. Still now 
the local leaders have allegiance to the central leaders for various reasons (such as regional 
grouping, mentor disciple relation, economic bondage, the friendly relation between the two 
leaders during the student life etc), but they always show unconditional loyalty first for 
Hasina. It is observed that in allover Bangladesh the local leaders are divided into two or 
many factions on the question of dominating the local politics (such as in the conflict of 
Tofael Vs Amu Vs Abul Hasnat Abdullah in Barishal or Mohiuddin Vs Aktaruzzaman in 
Chittagong or A. Samad Azad Vs Humayun Rashid Vs Surangit Sengupta or Sheikh Helal Vs 
Salahuddin Yusuf and others in Khulna or Matiur Rahman Talukdar Vs Mirza Azam group in 
JamaJpur and Farid Gazi in Sylhet), but if any regional leader challenge Hasina, he will be no 
more important even to the sub-district level AL leaders. The example of A. Kader Siddiqui 
can be cited here. The case of A. Kader Siddiqui was pathetic. Due to his personal conflict 
with Hasina when he left AL and formed new party, even his brother A. Latif Siddiqui did not 
join it. Only some of the youths of his local area joined him. It can be said that they will leave 
him soon if he does not return to AL or join the only alternative party BNP, in the two party 
The parties, which formed from the splits of AL, were JSD, JJP, BDL, GAL, AL (Mizan), A. Razzaq led 
BAKSAL and GF. Many AL leaders also individually left the party due to the intense factionalism. JSD was 
formed from the split of AL and only from the division of JSD a number of parties were emerged. 
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dominating political system of the country. Meanwhile, when Siddiqui tried to organize 
meetings in different districts excepting his home district Tangail, they faced hard resistance 
from AL workers; even in some cases the stages made for the meeting and the cars of 
Siddiqui was destroyed. In another incident after the 2001 parliamentary election defeat some 
of the central leaders of AL, such as Nurul Islam Nahid, Nurul Fazal Bulbul, Siddiqur 
Rahman Rouf etc, demanded internal practice of democracy in AL against the individual 
leadership of party leader, Hasina and finally had to leave the party. For the necessity of 
giving dynamism to the party in the 2003 council session of AL, Hasina appointed her another 
loyal M.A. Jalil as the party GS by replacing the octogenarian leader Zillur Rahman. In this 
council session including A. Razzaq, Amu, Tofael, M. Nasim, Matia Chowdhury, Obaidul 
Kader many of the AL leaders were engaged in lobbying to be the second leader of Ae AL. 
However in many district, city and sub-district level units of the party the AL leaders 
has been engaged in factional conflict since long. The reasons were: (i) personality clash; (ii) 
the tendency of spreading their personal support base; (iii) economic conflict or competition; 
(iv) the competition of the present leaders to get future nomination of the party for 
parliamentary, city corporation, municipal and other local level elections; (v) family clash; 
(vi) regional competition; (vii) competition among the central leaders to maintain their 
influence in local level to confirm their positions in centre; (viii) power and prestige conflict 
and (ix) leadership conflict etc. All the factional conflict in the lower level is on personality 
base. Though there was ideological difference among the leaders but after the defection of 
BAKSALites from AL in 1983 in the internal conflict of the party ideology dont play any 
role. 
Factionalism seems to have been a regular feature of all the parties of Bangladesh 
including AL. During the period under study (1971-1997) the AL witnessed several rounds of 
factional battles. The players changed sides; the rules of game changed and there was also a 
change in rival strategies. The clash of personal interest of leaders was the primary source of 
factional conflict in the party. Ideology was used as a cover to hide their selfish motives. At 
no stage of the factional war the organizational development or welfare of the masses was a 
serious issue. The leaders ran after power (organizational or governing power), which they 
used for personal gratification. Power is just like currency in economics. It is always 
convertible. In exchange of power one can purchase economic benefits and social prestige. 
Moreover, at times, power itself becomes an end. One plays the power to gain the power. 
Enjoying power is itself a great pastime/ hobby for some. Thus lust of power is one of the 
main factors responsible for the emergence of factional conflict. It is difficult to come across a 
single faction leader during the period under study that did not run after power and prestige. 
However, people can expect minimum ideology and principles from political parties' of the 
day. Masses expect that the parties vwll ftalfill their election pledges; the party leaders will 
execute their party programs. But when the party leaders lose their integrity and honesty, they 
don't hesitate to be dishonest and immoral only to dominate the party or to capture the 
governing power; then how they will do good for the masses. 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I 
Six- point Formula- O u r Right to live 
I have placed before the country a Six-point P ro-gramme as ba-
sic principles of a f irm solution of the countryis in ter-wing po-
litical and economical problems. I expected, and in fact, was ready 
to welcome criticism. But instead of citicising the p rog ramme 
and point ing out its defects, if there be any, a class of people has 
started hurl ing abuses at and ascribing disrupt ionis t mot ive to 
me. Normal ly I would have ignored these vilifications firstly 
because these abusive voices are too familiar, these grimacing 
faces are too well-known, and these sallying pat terns are too old 
to deserve anything but such ignoration; secondly because I have 
no manner to doubt that m y Six-point P rogramme has truly re-
flected the mind and correctly represented the d e m a n d s of sev-
enty-five million East Pakistanis of their right to live. Neither 
have I any doubt that all right-thinking patriotic elements of West 
Pakistan agree with me on these points. This has been amply 
demonstrated by the newspaper writings and reports, statements 
and speeches by all the sections of the intelligentsia, s tudents 
and workers. This t remendous countrywide suppor t to the six-
point programme is spontaneous. It is spontaneous because these 
d e m a n d s are no new points invented afresh by m e or any indi-
vidual , but are, in reality longstanding demands of the people 
and pledges of their leaders await ing fulf i lment for decades. 
This being the case, I am confident that the mischievous propa-
ganda and motivated campagn in carried on by the vested inter-
ests through their agents and protectors will fail to mislead our 
people. They will surely not forget that whenever in the past 
any demand was made by East Pakistanis, however small, simple 
and reasonable it might be, these beneficiaries and agents of 
vested interests kicked u p the self-same dus t by raising the well-
known cries of ilslam in dangeri disrupt ion of Pakistan and Sov-
ereign Bengal etc. It was the same set of people w h o discovered 
ehidden hand of Indiai in our simplest demand for inclusion of 
Bengali as a State Language along wi th Urdu. These are the 
people w h o brazenly dubbed our Sher-e-Bangla as a traitor and 
incarcerated our beloved leader Suharwardy on a fantastic charge 
of wrecking Pakistan with the help of foreign money. Noth ing is 
too m e a n for them to achieve their selfish objective which is per-
pe tua t ion of their exploitation of the people of East Pakistan. I 
k n o w our people are quite aware of these events of very distant 
past . But I also know that the mischief-making potentialities of 
these enemies of the people are inexhaustible that their resources 
are unl imited; that they are a multi-color variety of h u m a n spe-
cies wi th s u b h u m a n conscience. It is the variety w h o will be 
f o u n d in large number in the camp of the rul ing coterie in the 
n a m e of unity, faith and discipline; they will found a large n u m -
ber in the opposition camp for the sake of Mslam and democracy!. 
But wherever they may be, in whatever color, u n d e r whichever 
garb, they actually belong to one and the same camp, that is the 
camp of enemies of the people. They are thus solidly united in 
their at t i tude of denial towards East Pakistan. So natural ly they 
will leave no stone un turned to achieve their objective as they 
have done in the past. Whenever it suited their p u r p o s e to think 
that the people of East Pakistan were secretly inclined towards 
Communi sm, they turned the stone of American aid and assis-
tance by singing military pacts of fight communi sm and thereby 
save East Pakistan f rom secessionist design engineered by the 
Communis ts . If, on the other hand , it suited their convenience 
to imagine that East Pakistan was too much w e d d e d to Western 
democracy and too much attached to U.S.A., they hastened to 
turn the stone of aid and assistance of Communis t China to save 
East Pakistan f rom falling a prey to dollar imperialism. So on 
this occasion also they will come to the field to fight the Six-
poin t Programme just as they did to the 21-point P rogramme in 
the past . They have, in fact, already taken the field wi th varieties 
of weapons brandished by different heroes of numerous battle-
fields. The target is the same; it is the Six-point. Therefore it is 
quite in the fitness of things that President Ayub, C h o u d h u r y 
M o h a m m a d All a n d M a u l a n a M a u d o o d i , o u t w a r d l y th ree 
avowed mutual enemies, welding their respective weapons f rom 
three antipodal horizones, are aiming poisoned arrows on the 
same target of the Six-point. I, therefore, deem it m a y d u t y to 
i ssue this bookle t as an e x p l a n a t o r y no te to the Six-point 
P rogramme and fervently appeal to the democrat ic forces in 
general, and the Awami Leaguers in particular, to spread out in 
the country and carry the massage of the Six-Point to every hearth 
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and home. Now that the Six-point Programme has been formally 
adopted by the Awami League, it has undoubtedly become the 
national demand of the people, particularly the people of East 
Pakistan. I hope they will find this booklet useful in their con-
frontations with agents of the vested interests w h o are likely to 
be lying in ambush everywhere. Point 1 
In this point I have recommended as follows: 
The Constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in 
its true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and Parlia-
mentary form of Government with supremacy of Legislature 
directly elected on the basis of universal adul t franchise.lt will 
be seen that this point consists in the following seven ingredi-
ents viz: (a) Pakistan shall be a Federation, (b) it shall be based 
on the Lahore Resolution, (c) its Government shall be of Parlia-
mentary form, (d) it mus t be responsible to the Legislature,(e) 
the Legislature mus t be supreme,(f) it mus t be directly elected, 
and (g) election mus t be on the basis of universal adul t franchis. 
Let the opponents of the six-point Programme speak out. Which 
of these seven ingredients are they opposed to? Let the people 
know w h o are federalists and who are unitarists. Those w h o are 
unitarists are definitely against the Lahore Resolution . Con-
versely those w h o are opposed to the Lahore Resolution are defi-
nitely unitarists. So let it be decided once for all w h o o w n and 
w h o do not own the Lahore Resolution by which Pakistan was 
created and is rightly called the Pakistan Resolution. The people 
w h o disown the Lahore Resolution d isown Pakistan itself. It is 
evidently those people w h o did not rise their little f inger in the 
s t ruggle for Pakistan bu t subsequent ly j u m p e d on it to grab 
power after it was created with the blood and tears of the people. 
These opportunists and job-hunters cannot natural ly have any 
regard for or at tachment to the sanctity of such a historic Reso-
lution which brought about a Revolution in the sub-continent 
and created Pakistan. Even amongst those w h o swear by the 
Pakistan Resolution, there are some pseudofederalists . They pay 
lip-service to the Lahore Resolution but disregard it by speaking 
against the very fundamenta l principle of Federation and by in-
troducing extra-political controversies. This confusion has been 
fur ther confounded by the power that be by the forcible addi-
tion of political aberration like basically controlled democracy. 
566 
It was against such future personal likes and dislikes, w h i m s 
and caprices, hunger and thirst for power of individuals , that 
the Lahore Resolution was pledged as guarantee by the creators 
of Pakistan under the able guidance of Quaid-e-Azam. It will be 
sheer political dishonesty to deviate f rom the Lahore Resolution 
after Pakistan was created by peopleis votes obtained on the basis 
of that Resolution. If it is n o w found necessary to so deviate for 
the sake of stability and integrity of Pakistan itself, the people 
will certainly agree to such changes or even complete reversal. 
But in any event it is the people w h o will decide, and not any-
body else. As far as the people of East Pakistan are concerned, 
they in the 1954 general election, overwhelmingly voted for a 
constitution based on the Lahore Resolution. If, however , any-
body has any doub t about their present at t i tude d u e to lapse of 
long twelve years, we are prepared to face another r e f e rendum 
on the issue. Until that is done by a specific re fe rendum on uni-
versal adul t suffrage the Lahore Resolution and all its corollar-
ies remain the Magna Carta of the people of Pakistan, and the 
rulers and leaders are bound to give them a Consti tution based 
on the Resolution. 
Point 2 
This point recommends as follows: 
Federal Government shall deal with only two subjects, viz : De-
fence and Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subjects shall 
vest in the Federat ing States. Let us dispassionately discuss 
whether a two subject Centre will be sufficiently strong to be a 
respectable Federation. It should be borne in mind that wha t 
makes a Federation strong is not heaps of subjects u n d e r it. A 
Federation becomes strong by the loyalty and affection in which 
it is held by the people in peace and the allegiance they owe and 
obedience they show it in war. The h a p p y and s trong people 
represented through efficient and strong units that make the 
Federation, are the real source of its strength irrespective of the 
n u m b e r of subjects dealt wi th by it. Indeed, a State which serves 
the base rather than the apex is really the strongest. It is n o w a 
well established principle of political science that decentraliza-
tion, rather than centralization, makes the work of a State effi-
cient both in the administrative and in the development spheres. 
It is also a well recognized principle of Federation that only those 
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subjects be in the Federal list which can be jointly managed more 
efficiently and profi tably It is the same principle that is underly-
ing the system of Local self-government like District Councils 
and Municipalities. The very concept of Federation is based on 
the max im of unity in diversity and union wi thout over central-
ization. 
It was on this principle that in 1946 the Cabinet Mission pro-
posed an Indian Federation wi th only three subjects viz.: De-
fense, Foreign Affairs and Communicat ion. Both the congress 
and Musl im League accepted the Cabinet plan. The fact that ul-
timately it did not materialize due to a hitch elsewhere is a dif-
ferent matter and quite irrelevant to the issue n o w before us. 
Now, the British Government , by proposing the p lan and the 
Congress and the Musl im League accepting it, have all demon-
strated their agreement on the feasibility of a Federation with 
only three subjects. The only difference between the Cabinet Plan 
and m y proposal is that I have given two subjects instead of three 
given in the Cabinet Plan. Even that deference is only apparent 
and not real as will be seen in m y explanation to the Point 3 
given later on. That explanation will show that I, too have given 
three subjects to the Centre and not two. Only I have recom-
mended Currency in place of Communicat ion as had been ear-
lier done in the famous 21-Point Programme. I have omitted 
Communication for obvious reasons. The basic principle in which 
subjects are handed over to a Federation, as has been earlier, is 
the oneness and indivisibility of the inerest of the federating units 
in the subjects concerned. In the case of an und iv ided Indian 
Federation, communicat ion was really such a subject. In it, all 
the federat ing units would have been commonly interested and 
could have been more efficiently and profitabily r u n if jointly 
managed by the Federation. A n unbroken rai lway line and non-
s top th rough ra i lway train could have r u n f r o m Khybar to 
Chittagong. This would have been so because of the geographi-
cal contiguity. It is not so in Pakistan. Pakistan, being comprised 
of two geographical units separated by over a thousand miles of 
foreign territory, cannot possibly have any unbroken line of com-
municat ion between the two wings. The two wings being them-
selves two compact geographical areas, mus t have their own 
system of communicat ion separately organized and managed. 
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It can, therefore, never be a Federal subject. By transferr ing the 
rai lway to the Provinces though after prolonged procrastination 
the present regime has reluctantly admit ted the hard fact of ge-
ography. The same will have to be also in the case of Posts and 
Telegraphs and all other branches of communicat ion. In this con-
nection another point need to be clarified. Here I have recom-
mended designation of the federat ing units as state instead of 
provinces as is n o w done. This very ment ion of the word state is 
liable to be mischievously misinterpreted by the unitarists and 
pseudo-federalists. They will tell the unwary public: iLook, Mujib 
is want ing independent Statesi. This would be viciously wrong. 
Everywhere in different Federation of the world federat ing units 
are called estatei and not eprovincesi. U.S.A.,U.S.S.R, Federal 
Germany, Federation of Malaysia, and last of all our ne ighbour 
India , all h a v e des igna t ed their un i t s as es ta te ! i n s t ead of 
eprovincesi. Our next door ne ighbours like West Bengal and 
Assam are estatei of the Indian Union and no eprovincesi. That 
designation of Indian provinces has not rendered their Union 
loose or their Central Government weak. If Assam and West 
Bengal can have the dignity and honour of being called estates! 
wi thout impair ing the solidarity of Bharati Union, w h y canit w e 
have the same dignity and honour wi thout impair ing the soli-
dari ty of Pakistan Federation? Why are our rulers so allergic to 
our dignity? 
Point 3 
In this po in t I have recommended either of the fol lowing two 
measures wi th regard to our Currency, viz: 
Two separate but freely convertible currencies for two wings may 
be introduced, or 
One currency for the whole country m a y be maintained. In this 
case, effective constitutional provisions are to be m a d e to stop 
flight of capital f rom East to West Pakistan. Separate Banking 
Reserve is to be m a d e and separate fiscal and monetary policy 
to be adopted for East Pakistan. 
From the above it will be seen that I have not r ecommended the 
s t raightway taking of Currency out of the Federal list. If m y rec-
ommendat ion contained in B above is accepted. Currency re-
mains a Central subject. In this case, the only difference is that 
I have recommended the creation of separate Reserve Bank for 
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two wings in a Federal Reserve System as obtained in U.S.A. 
According to this arrangement, the State Bank of Pakistan will 
have two Reserve Bank for two wings. The currency for East 
Pakistan shall be issued through the East Pakistan Reserve Bank 
and shall be marked eEast Pakistani or simply eDhakai Simi-
larly, West Pakistan currency shall be issued through West Paki-
stan Reserve Bank and shall be marked eWest Pakistani or sim-
ply eLahorei. 
This is the only way by which we can save the East Pakistan 
f rom sure economic ruination by effectively s topping flight of 
capital f rom this wing to the other. The geographical separate-
ness has made the two wings ipso facto two economic units. An 
economic convulsion, either for the better or for the worse, in 
one wing has no corresponding convulsion in the other wing. 
So progress and development in the one does not, in the least, 
benefit the other. These economic incidents are quite indepen-
dent of each other in the two wings. Expenditure in one cannot 
create employment in the other. This economic independence 
and separateness of the two wings is correctly reflected in their 
respective price and wage structure including price of gold. This 
is wha t is known as the absence of mobility of labour and capi-
tal. This immobility of capital, however, does not prevent flight 
of capital. This is how it happens under the present dispensa-
tion. We are supposed to belong to one indivisible economy. We 
have one currency. There is no distinguishing mark to show the 
currency circulation wing wise. We are under only one Finance 
Ministry situated in and operating from West Pakistan presided 
over always by a West Paldstani Minister formulat ing financial, 
fiscal and monetary policies through one single Central Bank, 
that is the State Bank of Pakistan, also located in West Pakistan, 
issuing money minted, coined and printed in West Pakistan. This 
money after travelling and meander ing in circulation through-
out the country, journeys back to and rests in accumulat ion in 
West Pakistan. Along wi th the head office of the Government 
Central Bank, the head office of all the joint stock Banks, expect 
one or small ones of very recent origin, are also located in West 
Pakistan. 
The seat of the Government being located in the West Pakistan, 
head offices of the three armed forces, all Foreign Missions and 
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almost all foreign and national trade and industr ies organiza-
tions are situated in the wing. As a result, all money transactions 
done in East Pakistan are instantaneously t ransferred to West 
Pakistan. All share money of joint-stock companies, all deposi te 
of Banks^ their security money, all Government reserves, all earn-
ings, profits and savings of trade and industary operat ing in East 
Pakistan moves, in a matter of seconds to West Pakistan. Any 
one conversant with banking operat ion knows well that only 
barely ten percent of the entire deposits needs be kept ready for 
paymen t and the rest can be and generally is invested. Savings, 
when invested, become capital. This investment is natural ly done 
in West Pakistan as West Pakistanis capital. This is h o w capital 
format ion in West Pakistan has been so rapid. This again is h o w 
there has been total absense of capital formation in East Paki-
stan. As investment means employment , this incident has mean t 
employment in West Pakistan only As capital format ion is fol-
lowed by rapid industrialization, this has mean ii;idustralization 
of West Pakistan alone. This process will continue unless and 
unt i l the p reva i l ing one-day t ra f f i c of f inance is ef fec t ively 
checked by s topping this flight of capital. This can be done and 
capital investment can be generated in East Pakistan only by 
creating a Reserve Bank for East Pakistan as suggested by me. It 
is the only way to save East Pakistan f rom economic extinction. 
This reform in our currency system while saving East Pakistan 
f rom economic collapse will keep currency, a Central subject as 
a symbol of our unity and oneness. 
If, however, our West Pakistani brothers think otherwise, then 
my other alternative may be adopted. Under that a r rangment 
currency will, no doubt , be a provincial subject, but that will not 
weaken our centre. Nither will it affect the oneness of Pakistan. 
For even then we can have the same currency symbol by mutua l 
discussion and agreement. And for the other, a Federat ion can 
effectively work and be strong and stable wi thout Currency as 
its subjects. The Cabinet Mission recommended an Indian Fed-
eral Centre wi thout Currency in the Federal list. H a d it been 
thought unworkable the British Government w o u l d not have 
recommended it, nor would the Congress and the Muslim League 
have accepted it. 
Point 4 
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In this point I have recommended that the power of taxation 
and revenue collection shall vest in the federating units, and that 
the Federal Centre will have no such power. The Federat ion will 
have a share in the State taxes for meeting their required expen-
diture. The Consolidated Federal Fund shall come out of a levy 
of certain percentage of all State taxes. It is this proposal that 
seems to have annoyed the unitarists and pseudo-federalists . 
They are making a lot of noise and kicking up dus t of confusion 
such as disintrgration and disruption. These are old bogeys and 
shibboleths used by the vested interests against all reforms in all 
ages. They need not worry any Pakistani. The fact is that a strong 
Federation can successfully work and is work ing wi thou t the 
power of taxation. It makes the federation rather stronger. This 
is so because taxation is a du ty and necessity rather than a right 
and power. Levying taxes and collecting them is a responsibility 
and a botheration. It is just like manual ly earning oneis o w n live-
lihood. In our daily life we find people want ing to better em-
ploy themselves in finer and nobler work, lease out their prop-
erties to others at fixed rent leaving to them the a rduous task of 
collecting small amounts f rom individual tenants and earning 
pret ty sums f rom day-to-day transactions. The monarchs of the 
pas t used to, and land-lords of the present do, lease ou t their 
realms in ijara for tax collection. The Central authori tes in all 
ages have tried to be spared the botheration of tax collection for 
their own maintenance. It is only the banya mentail i ty of the 
present-day rulers that compels them to handle all money mat-
ters themselves. A little reflection will show that the right and 
power concerned do not rest in the act in the tax collection but in 
the money so collected. If a Central Government is constitution-
ally assured of the required a m o u n t , w h y should it bother about 
the actual collection? In the case of Federation it is only the fiscal 
taxation in which it is interested. The rest of the purposes of taxa-
tion, viz,: protective, social, commercial and moral , are the re-
sponsibility of the federat ing units. This is wha t is done in the 
U.S.A., and in some other Federations. In the U.S.S.R., even the 
fiscal taxation is not done by the Union. There is no Finance 
Minister and Finance Ministry in the Union Government of the 
Soviet Union. The Finance Ministries and Ministers are all with 
the Federating Republics. They meet the requirements and serve 
572 
the pu rpose of the Union Government . Have these a r rangments 
weakened the Central authorities of the U.S.A.,and the U.S.S.R.? 
It was with this knowledge and experience of the work ing of a 
Federation that the Cabinet Mission offered an Indian Federa-
tion wihtout the power of taxation, and it was for the same rea-
son that the Congress and Musl im League accepted the offer. It 
will, therefore, be seen that a Federation can be firmly p rov ided 
with its fiscal finances wi thout being burdened wi th the du ty of 
tax collection. My proposal is precisely to this effect. According 
to my recommendat ion, the Constitution will p rovide that a cer-
tain percentage of the Revenue collection on all heads shall au-
tomatically be credited to the Federal fund by the Reserve Banks, 
on which amount the unit Governments shall have no control. 
Constitutional provisions may also be made e m p o w e r i n g the 
Federation to raise f u n d s to meet the increased Defence expen-
diture at the time of war including expansion of Federat ion ju-
risdiction in such emergencies. It is therefore, sheer b u n k u m to 
call the autonomists the disruptors of Pakistan. O n the contrary, 
relieving the Federation of the burden of tax collection will have 
the following salutary effect, viz: 
The Federation will have more time to devote in mat ters of De-
fence and External Relations and to act as a uni fy ing force. 
Wastage due to overlapping, duplication and litigation etc. will 
be saved, and money thus saved and officials thus relieved will 
be available for better and nobler utilization. 
The tax and revenue collection will be cheaper and easier. 
Economy of having a single authority for tax collection will have 
been achieved. 
It will pave the way for introducing and adopt ing the most mod-
ern taxation method, viz single taxation. 
Point 5 
In this point, I have recommended tha t : 
There shall be two separate accounts for foreign exchange earn-
ings of the two wings. 
Earnings of East Pakistan shall be under the control of East Pa-
kistan Government and that of West Pakistan unde r the control 
of West Pakistan Government . 
Foreign exchange requirement of the Federal Government shall 
be met by the two wings either equally or in a ratio to be fixed. 
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Indigenous products shall move free of duty between two wings. 
The constitution shall empower the unit governments to estab-
lish trade and commercial relations with, set u p t rade missions 
in a n d e n t e r i n to a g r e e m e n t s w i t h f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . 
Now, a panoramic glance at the economic history of Pakistan 
since its creation will show the following consistent incidents: 
East Pakistan has earned bulk of the annual foreign exchange of 
Pakistan. 
East Pakistanis earnings have been spent in West Pakistan in 
industrializing that wing and earnings from those industries have 
been reinvested in West Pakistan as the earnings of that wing. 
East Pakistanis earnings are not being spent in East Pakistan on 
the plea of its inability to absorb them due to absence of capital 
formulation. 
Import to East Pakistan is less than her export, whereas import 
to West Pakistan is more than her export. 
Two-thirds of Pakistani's foreign exchange is earned by jute; but 
that earning is utilized neither for the benefit of the jute-growers 
nor for East Pakistan. 
Almost all foreign aids and loans are secured against foreign 
exchange earned by East Pakistan; but they are spent in West 
Pakistan on the same plea for non-absorbing capacity of East 
Pakistan. The irony is that interest on these loans and their 
instalments are being borne by East Pakistan. 
Now, the cumulative effects of these economic incidentss, all of 
which are artificial, are the following consequences, viz. 
East Pakistan has no t been industrialised sufficiently. 
The little industrialization, that has been done, has been done 
by West Pakistanis or by people other than East Pakistanis with 
all the characteristics of foreign investments both in the matter 
of employment and profi t earning. 
There is chronic inflation causing soaring high prices of com-
modities with all its concomitants like black-marketing and profi-
teering bringing untold miseries to the the life of the People. 
Jute-growers are not only not getting fair economic price for their 
p roduce but even the cost of product ion is denied to them re-
s u l t i n g in the i r p e r p e t u a l i n d e b t e d n e s s a n d p r o g r e s s i v e 
improverishment . 
There are man-made iniquities and are, therefore, remediable. 
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The obvious remedies are, firstly, to industrialize East Pakistan 
to p roduce weal th among and provide employmen t for East 
Pakistan; secondly, to check inflation by equalizing impor t and 
export and thereby supplying commodit ies to the people at rea-
sonable prices; thirdly, to nationalize jute t rade and thereby give 
fair price to the growers and ensure the statefs earnings in for-
eign exchange. It was with this last object in view that Awami 
League Government set u p the Jute Marketing Corporat ion in 
1957. It was sub-sequently reduced to nothing by the vested in-
terests with the help of the Central Government . 
Each and every one of these steps presupposes acceptance of 
the above proposals recommended by me. 
Point 6 
In this point, I have recommended setting up of a militia or a 
para militiary force for East Pakistan. This is neither unreason-
able nor new. We had pledged in the famous 21-point p rogramme 
in 1954 that we would give arms and uniforms to our Ansars. 
Neither is the proposal unpreceedented and impracticable. There 
are instances where such para-military territorial forces are main-
tained in outlying regions. We ourselves had one such regiment 
f rom before Independence. It was the Eastern Rifles. After Inde-
pendence, it became East Pakistan Rifles. The Present regime 
has taken this away f rom the hands of East Pakistan Govern-
ment. 
East Pakistan is the home of the majority of Pakistanis. To de-
fend it is the political obligation as well as moral d u t y of the 
Government of Pakistan. Why then should it be necessary for 
East Pakistan to demand it? Why do they not do it on their o w n 
initiative? H o w and with wha t conscience do they say that de-
fence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan? Does it no t tanta-
m o u n t to saying that the mouth , the belly and the s tomach of 
East Pakistan lie in West Pakistan ? H o w will the arms, a m m u -
nitions and weal th in West Pakistan help East Pakistan w h e n 
t ranspor t be tween the wings can be snapped in a mat te r of 
sceconds? Has not the recent 17-day war proved our utter help-
lessness ? H o w can one brag that some event in Warsaw saved 
East Pakistan? It is the defence policy of our Government that 
has reduced us to this position. Inspite of all this w e wan t a united 
Defence of the country and to retain it as a Central subject. But 
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at the same time we wan t that East Pakistan be m a d e self-suffi-
cient in the matter of Defence; that an Ordinance Factory, a Mili-
tary Academy and the Navy Headquar ter mus t be set u p in East 
Pakistan. These things were actually demanded in 1954. Noth-
ing, however, has been done in the course of long twelve years. 
We do not yet know w h e n these will be done. 
So in the meant ime w e wan t to make our o w n Defence arrange-
men t in a small w a y wi th unsophisticated weapons suited to 
our o w n field craft within easy reach of our limited resources. 
What is the objection? Where does it lie ? It is easy to compre-
hend. Neither is it easy to unders tand w h y a f u n d separately 
raised for East Pakistan war purposes is p rompt ly taken over by 
the Centre. 
An Appeal 
Now, before concluding, I wan t to submit a few words to m y 
West Pakistani brethren: 
Firstly, they should no t run away wi th the idea that whatsoever 
I have stated above, I have done in the interest of East Pakistan 
only. It is no t so. In each of m y Six-Point P rogramme is inherent 
a corresponding benefit to m y West Pakistani brethren. They are 
sure to derive equal benefit out of their implementat ion. 
Secondly, w h e n I speak of East Pakistanis weal th being f lown to 
and concentrated in West Pakistan, I only mean regional con-
centration. I do not, thereby, mean that this weal th has reached, 
the masses of West Pakistan. No , I do not, and cannot m e a n that. 
I k n o w there are millions like us in West Pakistan w h o also are 
unfor tuna te victims of this economic exploitation. I also know 
that the entire weal th of the country is concentrated in the hands 
of a f ew families. This will continue till the capitalistic pat tern of 
our society is not changed. But before that, this regional exploi-
tation mus t cease. I however, do not b lame West Pakistanis for 
this regional exploitation. 
Thirdly, it is the geographical situation and the unna tura l sys-
tem that is being pu r sued which are responsible for this injus-
tice. Take only one instance: 
H a d the capital of Pakistan been located in East Pakistan instead 
of West PaWstan this regional exploitation would have occurred 
in reverse, 62% of our Revenue that is being spent on our De-
fence forces, and 32% of our Revenue that is being spent on our 
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Central Administrat ion would have all been spent in East Paki-
stan instead of West Pakistan. The well-known Public Finance 
max im that ethe expenditure of the Government is the income 
of the people and the incoming of the Government is the expen-
di ture of the peoplei wou ld have worked in favour of East Paki-
stan instead of West Pakistan. This 94% of our total Revenue 
which has been annually spent in West Pakistan, and thus formed 
the income of West Pakistan, would have, in that case, been spent 
in and enriched East Pakistan. The seat of the Gove rnmen t be-
ing in West Pakistan, all the three Headquar te rs of the A r m e d 
Force and all central institutions and Foreign Missions have got 
their head offices in West Pakistan as a matter of course. Con-
stantly, all their spend ings are done in that w ing . All these 
spendings wou ld have been done in East Pakistan h a d the seat 
of the Government been here. East Pakistan w o u l d have been 
enriched and West Pakistan impoverished to that extent a n d in 
that proport ion. 
In that event, you , the West Pakistanis, wou ld have m a d e the 
same d e m a n d s for regional justice for which you are condemn-
ing us, the East Pakistanis, and ascribing all sorts of evil mo-
tives. In that case you would have realized that there was no 
other mot ive that the motive of self-preservation. In that context 
w h e n West Pakistanis wou ld have m a d e such d e m a n d s of re-
gional justice, d o you know wha t wou ld have been our att i tude? 
We, East Pakistanis, wou ld have s traightway accepted your de-
m a n d s instead of calling you bad name like provincial, narrow-
minded and disruptionist, w e would have at once conceded that 
it was your right to demand justice and equality and it w a s your 
d u t y to do so. Nay, w e would have gone further. We w o u l d not 
have wai ted for you to make these demands . Instead, w e would 
have met your requirements before you would have d e m a n d e d 
them. We really believe in justice, equality and fairplay amongs t 
brothers. A State is nothing if not a big family. Even in a family, 
eat ing by one member does not fill the stomach of another. So, 
h o w and with wha t conscience do you call us selfish for demand-
ing our share? What will others call you w h o are not only enjoy-
ing your own share bu t devour ing the share of your brothers 
also? We are, however, demanding our share only, no t yours, 
too. We wan t to live with you as equal partners, no t exploiters. 
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Fourthly, if we happen to have more than enough, w e can even 
sacrifice something for you f rom out of our share. We did so in 
the past . Do you not remember ? Please recall: 
In the first Consti tuent Assembly w e had 44 and you h a d 28 
representatives. If we wanted we could most democratically 
have brought the Capital and Headquar ters of the three A r m e d 
Forces to East Pakistan. We did not. 
Out of sheer brotherly feeling and sense of equality we elected 6 
West Pakistanis to constituent Assembly f rom East Pakistan by 
East Pakistan votes. 
By our majority we could have made Bengali our only State Lan-
guage. We, however, d e m a n d e d and got both Urdu and Bengali. 
By major i ty of votes w e could h a v e f r a m e d a Cons t i tu t ion 
favourable to East Pakistan. 
To remove any possible complex of dominat ion w e sacrificed 
our majori ty and accepted pari ty on your assurance that you 
would concede pari ty in all respects. 
Fifthly, the above should be enough to convince West Pakistani 
brothers that we. East Pakistanis, are really consumed wi th a 
sense of brotherly equality towards you by which w e w a n t to 
live in honour and dignity. That w e are capable of mak ing sacri-
fices for you, if you need it, has also been proved in the past . 
H a d the Capital been in East Pakistan w e would have, on our 
o w n initiative, set u p a real Second Capital in West Pakistan, not 
merely a hoax of a Capital. We would never have taken advan-
tage of that vantage posit ion and would not have grabbed all 
the impor tan t offices ourselves. We would not have captured all 
the h igh and lucrative posts of West Pakistan like chai rmanships 
of Cotton Board, PI.D.C., Railway Board, PC.S., Port Trust and 
WAPDA etc. We would no t have thought of captur ing the Gov-
ernorship of your wing . On the contrary, we wou ld have equita-
bly distr ibuted the high offices between the people of the two 
wings, w e would have m a d e effective ar rangements for spend-
ing Central revenues equitably between East and West Pakistan, 
we wou ld have extended regional and provincial au tonomy in-
stead of curtailing them. We w o u l d never have al lowed any dis-
par i ty to g row between two wings eithers political, adminis t ra-
tive or economic. 
We. w o u l d never have done anything to create any feeling that 
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because we. East Pakistanis, are in a majority, because the seat of 
the Government is here, w e are, therefore, the masters of Paki-
stan. We w o u l d rather have done everything to make you feel 
that this coimtry belongs to you as well as to us, both in thought 
and in action. We have shared State powers equally wi th you. 
We believe that this feeling of absolute equality, sense of inter-
wing justice and impartiality is the very basis of Pakistani pa-
triotism. Ordy he is fit to be a leader of Pakistan w h o is imbued 
wi th a n d consumed by such patriotism. A leader w h o sincerely 
believes that the two wings of Pakistan are really two eyes, two 
ears, two nostrils, two rows of teeth, two hands and two legs of 
the body-politic of Pakistan, a leader w h o feels that to m a k e Pa-
kistan heal thy and strong one mus t make each one of these pairs 
equally heal thy and stong; a leader w h o earnestly believes that 
to weaken any one of these limbs is to weaken Pakistan as a 
whole, a leader w h o zealously holds that any one w h o deliber-
ately or knowingly weakens any limb of Pakistan is an enemy of 
the country, and a leader w h o is ready to take strong measures 
against such enemies, is the only person entitled to claim the 
national leadership of Pakistan. Pakistan is a magnificent coun-
try wi th an uncommonly wide horizon. To be fit to become its 
leader one mus t posses a similarly magnificient hear t wi th an 
u n c o m m o n breadth of vision. 
Sixthly, let m e humbly remind m y West Pakistani brothers and 
sisters that w h e n w e demanded Bengali to be m a d e one of the 
two State Languages of Pakistan you condemned it as a n love to 
u n d o Pakistan. V\^en again w e demanded joint electorate par-
ticularly in the context of par i ty in representation d e m a n d e d by 
you, you condemned our demand to have been inspired f rom 
across the border. Both of these two d e m a n d s have n o w been 
accepted; bu t there has been no undo ing of Pakistan d u e to their 
acceptance. Does it not p u t you to shame that every bit of rea-
sonable d e m a n d of East Pakistan has got to be secured f rom you 
at t r emendous cost and after bitter struggle as if snatched f rom 
unwil l ing foreign rulers as a reluctant concession ? Does it do 
you any credit ? Please p u t a stop to such at t i tude once for a l l 
Please be brothers instead of rulers. 
In conclusion, I fervently appeal to m y count rymen to deeply 
ponder over the formula p u t forward by me. They will f ind that 
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none of the items in my Six-point Programme is either unjust, 
impractical or disruptive of the countryi's integrity. I hope I have 
succeeded, in the short space of this booklet, in showing that the 
acceptance of these points will not weaken Pakistan but will, on 
the countrary, make it stronger. 
But the vested interests, for obvious reasons, will not agree. They 
have got their own way of judging things. To them, only con-
tinuation and the perpetuat ion of their exploitation mean stabil-
ity of a Society and a State. To them, anybody w h o disturbs or 
threatens to disturb this process of exploitation is a traitor and a 
d i s rup to r . This is ne i t he r n e w nor s u r p r i s i n g . O u r grea t 
forebearers like Fazlul H u q and Suhrawardy had to fall victims 
to such vitriolics. In taking u p the cause of the exploited masses 
one must, therefore, be ready and prepared for such vilifications 
and incarcerations. To my lot have fallen many such trials and 
tribulations in the past. Through the blessings of m y superiors, 
comradeship of my colleagues and affectionate suppor t of my 
countrymen, God , in His infinite mercy, gave me courage and 
for t i tude enough to wi ths tand those oppressions. With this 
boundless affection of m y countrymen as m y asset, I a m fully 
prepared to make any sacrifice in their service." The life of any 
individual like myself is nothing compared to the salvation of 
the people of m y country. I know of no nobler battle than to 
fight for the rights of the exploited millions. This is the lesson I 
have learnt at the feet of m y political master Suhrawardy. H e is 
no longer in our mids t to guide us. But I am determined to live 
up to that lesson and keep his flag flying. The country is passing 
through the darkest hour of her life. At such a difficult time, 
Awami League Council has placed the heavy responsibility of 
its Presidentship on m y already overburdened shoulder. But 
through Allahis mercy I a m no shirker. I am not afraid of work. 
So, I have, with all humility, accepted the great reasonability. I 
have great faith in m y people. I also know that the darkest hour 
of night is just a harbinger of dawn. My beloved countrymen 
will only pray to Allah so that He may continue to give me men-
tal strength and physical fitness to devote the rest of m y life in 
fighting for restoration of their rights which have been forcibly 
snatched away. 
(Issued hy Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujihur Rahman as President of the 
Awami League on March 23,1966) 
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Appendix II 
Comparative Study of the Election Manifestoes of Major Political Parties for 12 June 
1996 Election 
Subject Bangladesh Bangladesh Jatia Party Jammat e Islami 
Awami League Nationalist Party Bangaldesh 
Government, Transparent and Democratization in Responsible and Declaration of the 
Constitution and accountable all level of accountable Islamic Republic 
Parliament government on the administration on government giving of Bangladesh, 
basis of the spirit the basis of four new structure of changing 
of liberation basic principles of interim constitution in the 
struggle and the constitution. government. light of the holy 
consensus. Quran and Sunnah. 
Administration, Corruption and Stepping for Reconstruction of Establishing 
Corruption, Law party influence formation of Upozila system. honest men's 
and order situation free corruption free formation of Zila governance, free 
administration. society. parisad with the from corruption 
ensuring people's accountable elected and nepotism. 
leadership, pay administration; pay representative. 
commission for commission for taking steps in the 
government government enhancement of 
service holders. service holders. law and order 
formation of establishing rule of situation. 
terror-free society. law with giving 
sovereignty of the 
people's will. 
Economy, Economic reform. Expansion of free- Expansion of Equilibration 
Agriculture, Trade expansion of free marker economy. national capital, between economic 
and Industry market economy, expansion of priority in development and 
cancellation of national and indusfrialization, distribution 
nationalization foreign establishment of system, conversion 
policy, granting investment, giving free market of agriculture into 
agricultural priority to economy and land profitable 
subsidy, expanding establishing reform, increase in occupation. 
national industry. industry and production through introduction of 
increasing reducing in modernization of corruption free 
employment production cost, agriculture system. modem land 
opportunity, ensuring low price policy, expansion 
increasing export of agricultural of industry, 
and reducing equipment and abolition of 
import through subsidy in interest system and 
incense in agriculture, reform infroduction of 
production. in land policy and 
labor laws. 
free-market 
economy on the 
basis of Islamic 
policy. 
Judiciary Ensuring freedom Taking steps to Taking initiative Judiciaiy will be 
in judiciary, protect the for the separation separated from the 
separation of independence of of judiciary from executive division. 
judiciary from the judiciary. the executive 
executive division. division. 
Defense Army, Air force Defense force will Modem defense Armed force will 
and Navy will be be built more force will be built be resuscitated 
built well skillfiilly, with and employed in with the spirit of 
equipped, well equipped and the national Jihad; military 
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professional skills advanced. reconstruct work. training will be 
will be developed given to ail iigcs 
and colonial laws between 10 to 40. 
will be altered. preference will be 
given to produce 
defense 
equipments. 
Mass media Giving autonomy Obedience to the Abolition of the Use of mass media 
to the radio. policy of free and government trust to the development 
television and uncontrolled flow system and of character and 
government of information. transfer of humanity, 
controlled press newspapers to enhancement of 
media. private ownership, professional 
denationalization withdrawal of standard and status 
of government government to the government. 
own newspapers restriction in 
advertisement 
rationing. 
Women, Children Ensuring equal Ensuring Initiative will be Women's right and 
and right to the participation of taken regarding dignity will be 
Unemployment women, accepting womenfolk in all women's elevated according 
special project for spheres of emancipation to the Islamic laws. 
establishing rights development socially and 
of the children in activities. economically. 
the light of UNO arrangement for ensuring 
declaration, taking alleviating loan to proportional 
comprehensive enhance women's representation of 
steps towards ability, children women in the 
removal will get preference. national assembly, 
unemployment. creating 
opportunity of 
work for the 
unemployed. 
Local government Restarting Upozila Formation of Zila Reconstruction of Democratization in 
and Infrastructure system, revival of Parisad and Thana Palli Parisad, local government 
Union Parisad, Parisad, revival of Transportation and giving priority 
decentralization of Union Parisad, development of development at 
administration introduction of through the village level. 
through self-reliance construction of 
empowering the Gram-Sarkar. bridges in place of 
elected ferry service. 
representative in arrangement of 
the Zila parisad. electricity at every 
Upozila level. 
Education, Human Reform in Introduction of Introduction of Reduction of 
resource and education system suitable and suitable and educational 
Health in the light of modem education modem education expenses. 
Kudrat-E-Khuda system. system, ensuring imparting religious 
Education encouraging health for all education with 
Commission, arrangement of within ten years on vocational traming, 
removing terrorism education at the the basis of inspire students to 
from the campus. mosque. national health develop career 
removing curse of expanding food for policy, unveiling keeping aloof from 
illiteracy within education project, means of eaming the present system 
ten years, increasing for the young of politics, making 
conversion of vast investment in people through the mosques the 
population into health and arranging centre point of 
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human resource, 
establishment of 
school in every 
village, attempt to 
ensure health 
system for all. 
arrangement of 
pension scheme 
for the aged 
people.. 
vocational training 
and arrangement of 
special loan for 
them. 
education and 
ensuring health 
facilities to all. 
Games and Culture Taking steps to 
uplift cultural life, 
abolition of 
dramatic 
performance act, 
infrastructural 
development for 
games. 
Renaissance of 
Islamic values, 
belief and control 
of cultural life in 
light of Islam. 
Expediting cultural 
light of liberation 
war, establishing 
sports organization 
in every union. 
Developing art and 
culture in the light 
of Islamic values, 
ensuring 
appropriate sports 
arrangement for all 
citizens. 
Source: 1996 Parliamentary Election Manifestoes of AL, BNP, JP and Jammat. 
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Appendix III 
Parliamentary Debates on the Factionalism and Splits in Bangladesh Nationalist Party 
Date. 08-03-1998 
Mr. Hafiz Uddin Ahmed, (Bir Bikram): We know they (the two BNP MPs) are not 
accommodated as technocrat ministers. They have crossed the floor and are ousted from the 
party (BNP). Have you sent the matter to the Election Commission, if you kindly inform us 
we will be thankful to you. 
Mr. K.M. Obaidur Rahman (Faridpur-1): Honorable Speaker thank you. 
Honorable Speaker, at present in the parliament of ours you as the speaker and honorable 
Prime Minister and the members of her cabinet have taken oath to guard/ protect the 
constitution and to sustain the constitution. But for some days we have been observing that 
the cabinet of our government has been violating the constitution. It is very sad happening 
that they are hindering the democratic process. 
On previous 10 February night suddenly, through television, we saw that Hasibur 
Rahman Shapan was being administered to take oath. After some days of it Dr. Mohammad 
Alauddin was also administered to take oath. I want to say, it is totally the violation of the 
constitution and it has been clearly stated in the 70"^  article of the constitution that if any 
person cross the floor or change the party then automatically his membership becomes 
invalid. 
Honorable Speaker, it is not only the matter of constitution, not only the matter of 
rules and regulations. It is the matter of ethics. At present it is the matter of morality. Now a 
day although their party has numerous members, our Prime Minister's eyes don't look at 
htem. But in which place, in which comer, which opposition party member is sitting - she 
find out them by switch on the torch and by kindling lantern (Harrican) and administered their 
oath taking as ministers. 
Date. 25-01-2000 
Dr. Mohammad Alauddin: Honorable Speaker.... I congratulate the Bangabandhu-daughter 
Sheikh Hasina, at present who is the Prime Minister, who called this country's people to 
form the government of national consensus. I joined the government of national consensus 
responding to her call. As I joined through this I availed the opportunity to development work 
for my local people. For that I congratulate her from my inner heart. I congratulate her 
because she accommodate me in the goveniment of national consensus and gave me the 
responsibility of water development ministry; after taking up the responsibility I tried to save 
the Rajshahi town throw engaging my self in building the dam to protect Rajshahi town. As I 
was given the responsibility I availed that opportunity. As I was included in the government 
of national consensus and was given the responsibility I have been able to include 17 schools, 
colleges and madrasas in the MPO list. It is a great success. If I would not join the 
government of national consensus, then I could not get these opportunities. In my 
constituencies for last 21 years roads and highways were not built, the roads were not good 
enough for the passers by. In this condition I got the opportunity to build up a 20-kiIometer 
concrete road as I joined in the government of national consensus. When I was advancing 
towards total development of my area including the development of roads, I was hindered in 
my way to social development. The BNP leadership sewed case against me in the High Court. 
To dismiss my membership they engaged doggedly. From high they went to Supreme Court. 
Supreme Court dispatched the matter to the Election Commission for a verdict of the case. By 
the verdict of the Election Commission my membership was dismissed. That constituency 
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became vacant. As the constituency became vacant, I got another chance to come here (by 
peoples vcrdict).... I have to give thanks to the people of my constituency, by electing me, 
they have given me opportunity to come to this Parliament. Honorable Prime Minister, the 
leader of the masses, the ideal of democracy, arranged an opportunity for me. She nominated 
me to contest the by-election by Awami League ticket and gave me the symbol (of Awami 
League) 'boat'. 
(Source: In the translated form from the Bengali original version of the Bangladesh 
National Parliamentary debates, dated 8 March 1998 and 25 January 2000) 
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Appendix IV 
Parliamentary Debates on the Factionalism and Splits in Jatia Party 
Date. 29-03-2001 
Begum Rawshan Ershad: By the name of Allah Almighty. 
Honorable Speaker thank you. I want to present something in front of you. 
In a critical stage of the nation I have appeared in front of you in the honorable 
parliament. In present the total politics and parliamentary democracy is in danger and is in 
confusion. At this historical moment I want to say something to overcome the crisis. 
You know it veiy well, politics is a recognized scientific process. Election is a part of 
it. One is complementary to other. One country cannot run without a political government. To 
elect a political government political parties and election symbols are essential. By the 
accommodation of all things it is a continuous process. The whole process is thwarted/ 
obstructed if there is a lacking of one of these things. There is political crisis in Bangladesh; 
the Jatia Party Parliamentary Party believes that at least the Jatia Party is the victim of this 
condition. The Jatia Party Chairman Hossain Mohammad Ershad, who is also the Chairman of 
Jatia Party's Parliamentary Party, is presently imprisoned. Even though the Supreme Court 
has freed him from the imprisonment still he is imprisoned by Special Power Act. Even an 
attempt has been taken to expel him from politics by canceling his parliamentary membership. 
On the other hand, by a decision taken by the Election Commission, it suspended to distribute 
the party symbol 'plough'. On this excuse that - in the parliament the leader of the majority 
faction of the Jatia Partyis not proved. Although after the 1996 parliamentary election with 
'plough' symbol, in the meeting of the Jatia Party Parliamentary Party, which was presided 
over by Jatia Party Chairman Alhaz Hussain Mohammad Ershad, unanimously elected him 
the leader of it, necessary documents of the meeting were given to the honorable Speaker and 
thus completed all the formalities. But recently during his meeting with the Jatia Party 
Parliamentary Party when the Speaker informed that there is no such kind of documents in the 
Parliament Secretary, it made all astonished. These are not any separate incidents. Jatia Party 
believes that all are planned happenings. So again on 27 March 2001 we were compelled to 
resubmit a written proposal, was taken on the 23-06-1996 meeting i.e. by showing majority 
Jatia Party parliamentary members support behind Mr. Hossain Mohammad Ershad. His 
leadership is still unbroken/ intact and unhindered and we are asking your kind ruling on the 
matter. We believe that your ruling will be helpful for Jatia Party to protect/ preserve its party 
symbol 'plough'. Honorable Speaker, it is notable that you personally was elected the 
parliamentary member of Jatia Party for two times by participating with this election symbol 
'plough'. 
Honorable Speaker, thank you for giving me scope to present this political speech and 
to overcome the crisis on the matter, we proposed, we are requesting your ruling. Jatia Party 
Chairman Hossain Mohammad Ershad has been the parliamentary member still now. For that 
thank you. 
Mr. Speaker: Honorable member, the question you have raised, you have said that you 
have sent a written application letter to me. Whatever decision you took in 1996; there is no 
documents about that matter; I did not get that. Before this time I also told you if you have 
any documents about the matter, submit that to me. Without that matter, just now you have 
said about your party decision, that one you have sent in black and white. I have not received 
this paper still now. If I get this paper, I shall evaluate that with great importance, investigate 
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it and 1 shall take decision according to the law and comparing the proceedings of the country 
and foreign countries. 
Advocate N.K. Alam Chowdhury (Nilfamari - 1): Honorable Speaker thank you. 
Honorable Speaker following the speeches of Rawshan Ershad on behalf of our Jatia Party, I 
want to tell you something and I feel it necessary to tell you. Honorable Speaker you have 
said that the matter we have discussed just before a while, the written papers of that is not 
reached to you yet or you don't have. In this moment our proposal is in my hand and by 
raising the issue in the parliament we want to submit it to you. Honorable Speaker, so with 
your permission in the light of the speech, that has been presented by our honorable 
parliamentarian member Begum Rawshan Ershad, I want to produce this proposal to you. 
Honorable Speaker, connecting to this matter you have said that there is no record with you. I 
humbly want to put up a request to you, previously in the of the formation of the government, 
i.e. on 23 June 1996, we did a meeting of our Parliamentary Party and in that meeting we 
made our leader Hossain Mohammad Ershad our Parliamentaiy Party Leader and that will be 
found if the records i.e. the tape of the meeting is searched. Even after that by giving 
reference of that one on 27-03-2001 we have accepted a resolution, we have shown our 
confidence behind him and we believe that his leadership is still intact and unhindered. 
Honorable Speaker, we believe you will give us a ruling very soon, within 4-5 days, on the 
proposal which we have put up in front of you. We ask this for the reason that this ruling will 
help us to get election symbol, so we are expecting your ruling very soon. 
Honorable Speaker, if you allow me I want to submit our written proposal which is 
already discussed in the parliament. 
Mr. Speaker: You are telling contradictory to each other - Begum Rawshan Ershad 
has said that the papers are already sent to my office. But again you are telling that you will 
give me papers. I have said that I shall take the decision on the matter by examining it with 
the precedents of the country and abroad, according to the prevailing law. In this position I 
don't have any thing more to say. 
Date. 08-04-2001 
Begum Rawshan Ershad (Mymensingh-4): Honorable Speaker thank you. The 
Parliamentary Party of Jatia Party is the part of Ershad led Jatia Party. We clearly demanded 
to you about this matter in this honorable Parliament. And we demanded your ruling on this 
matter. We mentioned in that demand that before the first session of 1996 the Jatia Party's 
Parliamentary Party unanimously elected Jatia Party Chairman and honorable parliamentary 
member Hossain Mohammad Ershad, the leader of Jatia Party's Parliamentary Party. It is 
mentionable that on 27 March 2001,20 out of 32 Jatia Party's Parliamentary Party members 
appeared in front of you physically and expressed their support for Ershad. 
If you acknowledge your decision about this matter today, we will be obliged to you. 
Because, the issue is too much important for our party's existence and for our politics. And 
one is interrelated with another. 
Honorable Speaker thank you very much. 
Mr. Speaker: Honorable member Begum Rawshan Ershad and honorable members. In 
the national parliamentary session held on 29 March, 2001, honorable member of Jatia Party 
Begum Rawshan Ershad gave some speeches on the parliamentary party leader of our party 
and mentioned that from the side of her party I have been informed in black and white on this 
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issue. O n this issue some other members of Jatia Party delivered their speeches. A l l of them 
wanted my decis ion on the matter. 
One proposal including the resolution taken by the Jatia Party's Parliamentajy Party 
was given me after a while of the speeches of honorable member Begum Rawshan Ershad 
during the proceedings of the Parliament. It is found in the proposal that 19 member of Jatia 
Party sat together in a meeting on last 27 March 2001 and took a resolution describing below: 
Quote "At the conclusion of the discussion majority Jatia Party Parliamentary Party members 
again supported the proposal which was accepted in the post-1996 election Parliamentary 
Party meeting, where party chairman Hussain Mohammad Ershad was unanimously elected 
the Jatia Party Parliamentaiy Party leader. As majority members' confidence on him exist, his 
leadership still remains intact and unhindered. Majority Jatia Party Parliamentary Party 
members proved that by showing their confidence again on him". Unquote 
This is your statement. Another honorable member of Jatia Party, Mr. Mujammel 
Hossain, could not present in that meeting as he was under treatment in hospital. However it 
is mentioned that he has agreed with this proposal and at one stage his presence was seen with 
other members of Jatia Party. 
Honorable member it should be mentioned here that by which resolution the Jatia 
Party Parliamentary Party meeting made Hossain Mohammad Ershad their leader till now any 
copy of that is not sent to me. However referring to the proposal accepted in 1996, in last 27 
March 2001 meeting of Jatia Party Parliamentary Party declared their confidence on Mr. 
Hossain Mohammad Ershad - it is mentioned. I am examining the matter thoroughly. 
Honorable member Begum Rawshan Ershad or any other honorable member did not give any 
speech or did not raise any question legally referring the rules and regulations of the 
constitution of the Peoples Democratic Bangladesh or of the proceeding regulation of the 
National Parliament. No such similar questions were also raised in the written proposal of 
Jatia Party Parliamentary Party and in the oral speeches of the members. 
An honorable member, in my eyes, in this moment the election of the leader of Jatia 
Party Parliamentary Party is internal matter of that Parliamentary Party. Toll now any 
question has not been raised according to the regulations cited in the constitution. For this 
reason any situation is not developed to give ruling about the matter according to the 
constitution of Bangladesh and the regulation of Bangladesh National Parliament. Thank you 
honorable members. 
Honorable member Dr. T.M. Fazle Rabbi Chowdhury (Gaibandha- 3); Honorable 
Speaker many thanks to you for giving me chance to say something. 
Honorable Speaker, by standing in this parliament with deep sorrowful heart I am 
bound to say that some of the quarters are creating conftision and misguiding the inhabitances 
of the country. They are telling that it is not the fact that Jatia Party is going to the parliament 
for their election symbol 'plough'; it is simply a cause and it is the outcome of their 
conspiracy with the government. They, moreover, are propagating that the Parliament can not 
provide the symbol 'plough'. The election commission use to distribute the symbols. Then 
why do we go to the Parliament? Honorable Speaker, this propaganda is detrimental for the 
Jatia Party. So I want to explain the real fact in front of you and the inhabitants of the country. 
Honorable Speaker, it is true that the Election Commission distribute the symbols. 
When any political parties contest elections, they do have a single election symbol. As for 
example the election symbol of AL is 'boat', honorable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the 
leader of AL as well as its Parliamentary Party, the election symbol of BNP is com of paddy 
and the opposition leader Khaleda Zia is the leader of the BNP. Is it necessary to propagate it 
to the people that the Jatia Party participated in four elections during 1986 to till now and Jatia 
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Party is the party of Bangladesh National Parliament and the election symbol of Jatia Party is 
'plough'. Wc have contested Ihc elections with having this 'plough' symbol. But why cannot 
we contest the election with the same symbol? I ajn trying to answer it. 
Honorable Speaker, it is sorrowful but true that during the distribution of election 
symbols the election commission mentioned that the Jatia Party Parliamentary Party has been 
divided into two groups in tlie Parliament. Which group has majority number of members? 
Which one is the real Jatia Party- the election commission does not know it. From this point 
of view it has given a judgment denying the lawful demand of Jatia Party for the sanction of 
election symbol'plough'. 
Honorable Speaker, according to the article 70' of the constitution each party can have 
only one Parliamentary Party. It is not known to the Election Commission. Even then due to 
the judicial vcrdict of the Election Commission, by showing rcspccl to the judiciary wc have 
come to prove that we the 33 Parliamentary Members unanimously elected Mr. Hossain . 
Mohammad Ershad, an elected Parliamentary Member from Rangpur, the Jatia Party 
Parliamentaiy Party leader. At present through the large majority members' support Ershad 
led Jatia Party in Parliament is proved only Parliamentary Party of Jatia Party and majority 
members proved that by their physical appearance on 29-03-2001. We have proved in this 
honorable Parliament that there is only one Jatia Party and the leader of the Jatia Party 
Parliamentary Party is Hossain Mohammad Ershad, elected parliamentary member from 
Rangpur - as during the distribution of the election symbols the election commission can not 
say which group has majority members, which one is realJatia Party? As the result of which 
we can realize our election symbol demand 'plough'. For why we have come to the 
Parliament. It is not an excuse (to come to the Parliament). It is not a conspiracy with any one. 
I want to tell it candidly in this Parliament. 
Honorable Speaker, our Jatia Party leader is in jail. Our demand for our election 
symbol has been ignoring imjustly. If one party don't have leader, don't have election symbol, 
that party cannot exists. As for example the flag of the independent country is the symbol of 
that country's existence. A country cannot exist without flag, a party cannot exists without 
symbol - it is the hard fact. The fundamental principle of every leaders and workers of Jatua 
Party is to build up exploitation free, corruption free, terrorism free happy and prosperous 
country. In order to upheld that principle we cannot allow to dissolve the existence of Jatia 
Party. Otherwise our politics will succumb to an unnatural death. For that reason it is veiy 
essential for us to save our election symbol, otir plough. It is our life and death struggle to 
survive with our political and ideological believes. 
(Source: In the translated form from the Bengali original version of the Bangladesh 
National Parliamentary debates, dated 29 March 2001 and 8 April 2001) 
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